DESCARTE

René Descartes is often credited with being the “Father of Modern Philosophy.” This
title is justified due both to his break with the traditional Scholastic-Aristotelian
philosophy prevalent at his time and to his development and promotion of the new,
mechanistic sciences. His basic strategy was to consider false any belief that falls prey
to even the slightest doubt. This “hyperbolic doubt” then serves to clear the way for
what Descartes considers to be an unprejudiced search for the truth. This clearing of
his previously held beliefs then puts him at an epistemological ground-zero. From
here Descartes sets out to find something that lies beyond all doubt. He eventually
discovers that “I exist” is impossible to doubt and is, therefore, absolutely certain. It
is from this point that Descartes proceeds to demonstrate God’s existence and that
God cannot be a deceiver. This, in turn, serves to fix the certainty of everything that is
clearly and distinctly understood and provides the epistemological foundation
Descartes set out to find. Descartes sought to avoid these difficulties through the
clarity and absolute certainty of geometrical-style demonstration. In geometry,
theorems are deduced from a set of self-evident axioms and universally agreed upon
definitions. Accordingly, direct apprehension of clear, simple and indubitable truths
(or axioms) by intuition and deductions from those truths can lead to new and
indubitable knowledge. Descartes found this promising for several reasons. First, the
ideas of geometry are clear and distinct, and therefore they are easily understood
unlike the confused and obscure ideas of sensation. Second, the propositions
constituting geometrical demonstrations are not probabilistic conjectures but are
absolutely certain so as to be immune from doubt. This has the additional advantage
that any proposition derived from some one or combination of these absolutely
certain truths will itself be absolutely certain. Hence, geometry’s rules of inference
preserve absolutely certain truth from simple, indubitable and intuitively grasped
axioms to their deductive consequences unlike the probable syllogisms of the
Scholastics. In the First Meditation, Descartes lays out several arguments for
doubting all of his previously held beliefs. He first observes that the senses
sometimes deceive, for example, objects at a distance appear to be quite small, and
surely it is not prudent to trust someone (or something) that has deceived us even
once. However, although this may apply to sensations derived under certain
circumstances, doesn’t it seem certain that “I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a
winter dressing gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on”? (AT VII
18: CSM II 13). Descartes’ point is that even though the senses deceive us some of the
time, what basis for doubt exists for the immediate belief that, for example, you are
reading this article? But maybe the belief of reading this article or of sitting by the
fireplace is not based on true sensations at all but on the false sensations found in
dreams. If such sensations are just dreams, then it is not really the case that you are
reading this article but in fact you are in bed asleep. Since there is no principled way
of distinguishing waking life from dreams, any belief based on sensation has been
shown to be doubtful. This includes not only the mundane beliefs about reading
articles or sitting by the fire but even the beliefs of experimental science are doubtful,
because the observations upon which they are based may not be true but mere dream
images. Therefore, all beliefs based on sensation have been called into doubt, because
it might all be a dream. This, however, does not pertain to mathematical beliefs, since
they are not based on sensation but on reason. For even though one is dreaming, for
example, that, 2 + 3 = 5, the certainty of this proposition is not called into doubt,
because 2 + 3 = 5 whether the one believing it is awake or dreaming. Descartes
continues to wonder about whether or not God could make him believe there is an
earth, sky and other extended things when, in fact, these things do not exist at all. In
fact, people sometimes make mistakes about things they think are most certain such
as mathematical calculations. But maybe people are not mistaken just some of the
time but all of the time such that believing that 2 + 3 = 5 is some kind of persistent
and collective mistake, and so the sum of 2 + 3 is really something other than 5.
However, such universal deception seems inconsistent with God’s supreme
goodness. Indeed, even the occasional deception of mathematical miscalculation also
seems inconsistent with God’s goodness, yet people do sometimes make mistakes.
Then, in line with the skeptics, Descartes supposes, for the sake of his method, that
God does not exist, but instead there is an evil demon with supreme power and
cunning that puts all his efforts into deceiving him so that he is always mistaken
about everything, including mathematics.

In this way, Descartes called all of his previous beliefs into doubt through some of the
best skeptical arguments of his day But he was still not satisfied and decided to go a
step further by considering false any belief that falls prey to even the slightest doubt.
So, by the end of the First Meditation, Descartes finds himself in a whirlpool of false
beliefs. However, it is important to realize that these doubts and the supposed
falsehood of all his beliefs are for the sake of his method: he does not really believe
that he is dreaming or is being deceived by an evil demon; he recognizes that his
doubt is merely hyperbolic. But the point of this “methodological” or ‘hyperbolic”
doubt is to clear the mind of preconceived opinions that might obscure the truth. The
goal then is to find something that cannot be doubted even though an evil demon is
deceiving him and even though he is dreaming. This first indubitable truth will then
serve as an intuitively grasped metaphysical “axiom” from which absolutely certain
knowledge can be deduced. For more, see Cartesian skepticism

In the Second Meditation, Descartes tries to establish absolute certainty in his famous

reasoning: Cogito, ergo sum or “I think, therefore I am.” These Meditations are conducted
from the first person perspective, from Descartes.’ However, he expects his reader to
meditate along with him to see how his conclusions were reached. This is especially
important in the Second Meditation where the intuitively grasped truth of “I exist” occurs.
So the discussion here of this truth will take place from the first person or “I” perspective. All
sensory beliefs had been found doubtful in the previous meditation, and therefore all such
beliefs are now considered false. This includes the belief that I have a body endowed with
sense organs. But does the supposed falsehood of this belief mean that I do not exist? No, for
if I convinced myself that my beliefs are false, then surely there must be an “I” that was
convinced. Moreover, even if I am being deceived by an evil demon, I must exist in order to
be deceived at all. So “I must finally conclude that the proposition, ‘I am,’ ‘I exist,’ is
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind” (AT VII 25: CSM
II 16-17). This just means that the mere fact that I am thinking, regardless of whether or not
what I am thinking is true or false, implies that there must be something engaged in that
activity, namely an “I.” Hence, “I exist” is an indubitable and, therefore, absolutely certain
belief that serves as an axiom from which other, absolutely certain truths can be deduced

It is also important to notice that the mind is a substance and the modes of a
thinking substance are its ideas. For Descartes a substance is a thing requiring
nothing else in order to exist. Strictly
speaking, this applies only to God whose existence is his essence, but the term
“substance” can be applied to creatures in a qualified sense. Minds are substances in
that they require nothing except God’s concurrence, in order to exist. But ideas are
“modes” or “ways” of thinking, and, therefore, modes are not substances, since they
must be the ideas of some mind or other. So, ideas require, in addition to God’s
concurrence, some created thinking substance in order to exist (see Principles of
Philosophy, part I, sections 51 & 52). Hence the mind is an immaterial thinking
substance, while its ideas are its modes or ways of thinking.
Descartes continues on to distinguish three kinds of ideas at the beginning of
the Third Meditation, namely those that are fabricated, adventitious, or innate.
Fabricated ideas are mere inventions of the mind. Accordingly, the mind can control
them so that they can be examined and set aside at will and their internal content can
be changed. Adventitious ideas are sensations produced by some material thing
existing externally to the mind. But, unlike fabrications, adventitious ideas cannot be
examined and set aside at will nor can their internal content be manipulated by the
mind. For example, no matter how hard one tries, if someone is standing next to a
fire, she cannot help but feel the heat as heat. She cannot set aside the sensory idea of
heat by merely willing it as we can do with our idea of Santa Claus, for example. She
also cannot change its internal content so as to feel something other than heat–say,
cold. Finally, innate ideas are placed in the mind by God at creation. These ideas can
be examined and set aside at will but their internal content cannot be manipulated.
Geometrical ideas are paradigm examples of innate ideas. For example, the idea of a
triangle can be examined and set aside at will, but its internal content cannot be
manipulated so as to cease being the idea of a three-sided figure. Other examples of
innate ideas would be metaphysical principles like “what is done cannot be undone,”
the idea of the mind, and the idea of God.
Descartes’ idea of God will be discussed momentarily, but let’s consider his claim
that the mind is better known than the body. This is the main point of the wax
example found in the Second Meditation. Here, Descartes pauses from his
methodological doubt to examine a particular piece of wax fresh from the
honeycomb:
It has not yet quite lost the taste of the honey; it retains some of the scent of flowers
from which it was gathered; its color shape and size are plain to see; it is hard, cold
and can be handled without difficulty; if you rap it with your knuckle it makes a
sound. (AT VII 30: CSM II 20)

The point is that the senses perceive certain qualities of the wax like its hardness,
smell, and so forth. But, as it is moved closer to the fire, all of these sensible qualities
change. “Look: the residual taste is eliminated, the smell goes away, the color
changes, the shape is lost, the size increases, it becomes liquid and hot” (AT VII 30:
CSM II 20). However, despite these changes in what the senses perceive of the wax, it
is still judged to be the same wax now as before. To warrant this judgment,
something that does not change must have been perceived in the wax.

One of Descartes’ main conclusions is that the mind is really distinct from the body.
But what is a “real distinction”? Descartes explains it best at Principles, part 1, section
60. Here he first states that it is a distinction between two or more substances.
Second, a real distinction is perceived when one substance can be clearly and
distinctly understood without the other and vice versa. Third, this clear and distinct
understanding shows that God can bring about anything understood in this way.
Hence, in arguing for the real distinction between mind and body, Descartes is
arguing that 1) the mind is a substance, 2) it can be clearly and distinctly understood
without any other substance, including bodies, and 3) that God could create a mental
substance all by itself without any other created substance. So Descartes is ultimately
arguing for the possibility of minds or souls existing without bodies.
Descartes argues that mind and body are really distinct in two places in the Sixth
Meditation. The first argument is that he has a clear and distinct understanding of the
mind as a thinking, non-extended thing and of the body as an extended, non-
thinking thing. So these respective ideas are clearly and distinctly understood to be
opposite from one another and, therefore, each can be understood all by itself
without the other. Two points should be mentioned here. First, Descartes’ claim that
these perceptions are clear and distinct indicates that the mind cannot help but
believe them true, and so they must be true for otherwise God would be a deceiver,
which is impossible. So the premises of this argument are firmly rooted in his
foundation for absolutely certain knowledge. Second, this indicates further that he
knows that God can create mind and body in the way that they are being clearly and
distinctly understood. Therefore, the mind can exist without the body and vice versa.
The second version is found later in the Sixth Meditation where Descartes claims to
understand the nature of body or extension to be divisible into parts, while the
nature of the mind is understood to be “something quite simple and complete” so as
not to be composed of parts and is, therefore, indivisible. From this it follows that
mind and body cannot have the same nature, for if this were true, then the same
thing would be both divisible and not divisible, which is impossible. Hence, mind and
body must have two completely different natures in order for each to be able to be
understood all by itself without the other. Although Descartes does not make the
further inference here to the conclusion that mind and body are two really distinct
substances, it nevertheless follows from their respective abilities to be clearly and
distinctly understood without each other that God could create one without the other