Incident Summary #II-1288074-2021 (#25071) (FINAL)
Incident Date
November 18, 2021
Location
Comox
Regulated industry sector
Gas - Natural gas system
Qty injuries
28
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Injury
One moderate injury requiring hospitalization and up to 27 additional injuries all
Injury
description
ranging from minor to moderate resulting from a natural gas explosion.
Impact
Injury rating
Moderate
Damage
Explosion damage to a military barracks building, including blown out walls, roof,
description
Damage
windows and a partially collapsed second story floor.
Damage rating
Severe
Incident rating
Severe
An exposed underground gas line was struck by an excavator while installing new
perimeter drain around an occupied military barracks building under exterior
Incident overview renovation. The escaping gas from the damaged gas line migrated into the building
through building openings and contacted a source of ignition resulting in a large
explosion.
The building is a two-level multi-unit residence used for housing personnel. The
building is structured in the shape of an “H” with individual rooms along the ends and
common areas in the connecting middle section (Diagram 1). The design creates
areas on the East and West sides surrounded by three two story walls and open on
one end. The structure is built on a 4-foot-deep crawl space with passive ventilation
INVESTIGATION CONCLUSIONS
openings into the crawl space located around the entire structure. The East side of
the building has an attached mechanical room with a double access door facing the
outside. The mechanical room houses equipment including a gas fired water heater,
hallway pressurization and ventilation air handling unit and air compressors along
with electrically operated components such as pumps, switches, and controls.
Site, system and
Contractors working at the site are required to review and sign a construction
components contract that stipulates they and their subcontractors must comply to all provincial
and municipal regulations.
The building had a natural gas supply from the gas utility. A ¾ inch diameter
polyethylene gas line was run underground approximately 40 feet away from a main
distribution line to a gas meter located on the East side of the building outside the
mechanical room. The supply pressure in the line up to the meter was 80 pounds per
square inch (PSI).
Medium density polyethylene underground gas line is manufactured yellow which
provides increased visibility while exposed and identifies it as containing combustible
gas.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Incident Summary #II-1288074-2021 (#25071) (FINAL)
Excavation work in the vicinity of a gas installation is subject to section 39 of the Gas
Safety Regulation, requiring persons performing excavating work to:
- Request gas service locations from the gas company prior to beginning
excavation work.
- Consider a gas installation to lie within a one-meter zone on either side of
the location indicated by the gas company.
- Confirm gas line locations by hand digging to expose their exact locations.
- Not excavate in a manner that is damaging or dangerous to a gas
installation.
Manners of excavation that are considered dangerous are not defined in the
Regulation.
The CSA Z662 Canadian Standard for Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems states that
operating companies (Gas utility) shall communicate company-specific safe work
practices and conditions to those who purpose ground disturbance.
The BC Common Ground Alliance best practices, identify a “Tolerance zone”, based
on the Gas Safety Regulation, within one meter on either side of an underground
facility, such as a gas line. The guidance from the best practice document is for the
ground disturber to “exercise the necessary care” within this zone. There is discretion
given to the ground disturber who “may wish to consider using” lower risk methods
such as hand digging, hydro-excavation or pneumatic hand tools in the tolerance
zone.
WorkSafeBC produced a guideline document titled “Prevention of Damage to Buried
Facilities in BC”, this document recommends “The hand exposure zone is a distance
1m either side of the located marks within which an excavation with mechanical
equipment must not take place, until the buried facility has been hand exposed and is
clearly visible.” This recommendation is included in the standard for training
programs produced by the BC Common Ground Alliance for ground disturbance.
The gas utilities’ guideline for excavation safety around natural gas states that when
exposing gas lines, no mechanical equipment can be used within 1 meter of an
identified buried gas line, until such time that the gas line has been exposed by hand.
Once the line has been exposed there are no rules or guidelines addressing the
protection of an exposed gas line or limits for distances away for mechanical
excavation.
The emphasis of the regulation and guidelines are focused on prevention of damage
through identification and exposure of gas lines and has not been found to directly
consider explosion risks prior to an accidental gas release.
Combustible gases have a specific range of fuel-to-air ratios in which ignition can
occur called the flammable range. For natural gas the flammable range is commonly
identified as between 5-15% of a gas-air mixture. The 5% is the lower flammable limit
(LFL) and the 15% is the upper flammable limit (UFL). These terms are also referred
to as the lower explosive limit (LEL) and upper explosive limit (UEL) when detecting
gas concentrations in an enclosed space. Natural gas concentrations outside of this
range are not ignitable. For a natural gas explosion of a structure to take place, the
released gas needs to mix with a volume of air to between its LFL and UFL then
contact an ignition source. The expansion of gases during combustion will be
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Incident Summary #II-1288074-2021 (#25071) (FINAL)
contained by the structure causing a rapid increase in pressure inside that will force
the structure outward.
A contracting company was hired to install new perimeter drain around the exterior of
a military barracks buildings. Prior to the work beginning, the gas utility was
contacted, and the underground gas line locations were identified and marked. When
the required excavation for the drainpipe approached the area of the underground
gas line, the contractor entirely exposed a 15-foot length of the gas line by hand
digging backwards from the location of the gas meter. The exposed gas line ran
parallel to the location of the required trench before turning and crossing over to the
other side and ending away from the location of the trench (Diagram 1). The entire
section of the gas line from the gas meter to past the location of the trench was
exposed and visible so mechanical digging was not necessary in the vicinity of the
line. Once the gas line was exposed it became vulnerable to external damage and
had no means of physical protection from accidental contact.
The exterior of the building was under renovation with new siding being installed.
Due to that renovation work, the double door to the building’s mechanical room had
been removed and replaced with plywood sheets to secure it during off-work hours.
The morning of the incident the plywood had been removed to allow worker access
Failure scenario(s)
into the mechanical room.
No actions were taken prior to the excavation work commencing to anticipate for an
accidental gas release or to identify risk factors such as possible gas migration into
the building, building occupancy at the time of the work or potential ignition sources
in the area.
Immediately prior to the gas line strike the excavator was working in the vicinity close
to the end of the exposed gas line. There was no spotter directly observing the
excavator work at the time. The excavator bucket contacted the gas line where it re-
entered the ground severing it completely. The severed gas line was seven feet
away from and pointed directly at the center of the mechanical room door opening.
Gas began escaping at 80psi pressure in the direction of the mechanical room door
opening and in the vicinity of other building openings on an inside corner. For
approximately 10-15 minutes gas migrated inside the building, accumulating to an
explosive concentration, and contacting a source of ignition creating an explosion.
The explosion occurred before the building could be completely evacuated.
Interviews were conducted with the excavator operator and the site supervisor
employed by the contracting company responsible for the perimeter drain excavation.
Excavator operator statements
• They had completed the same task excavating for perimeter drain on the
neighbouring building in the weeks prior and excavated around the
Facts and evidence underground gas line without incident.
• The job was ahead of schedule, and everything had been going well.
• Visibility was good and there were no distractions or anything out of the
ordinary or out of routine.
• The company has discussed the gas line at the site and planned of hand
exposing it and staying 1 meter away with the excavator.
• They had entirely exposed the gas line 15 feet out from the gas meter by
hand and it was entirely visible to them while in the cab of the excavator.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Incident Summary #II-1288074-2021 (#25071) (FINAL)
• They had little perceived risk in working around the exposed gas line. They
stated it was only a small ¾” line at low pressure and not a 4-6” high
pressure line. Other contractors had mentioned to them that when they had
hit gas lines that it was a one in a million chance it would cause a problem.
• They believed they had done everything right. They had discussed the line
prior to work, located and hand exposed it and planned to stay one meter
away with the excavator.
• They do not know how or why the line was hit.
• The door to the mechanical room had been removed and the mechanical
room was wide open and that is where the gas line was hit.
• The first indication the line was hit was the sound. There was a “pop” sound
then the sound of air releasing like when you are filling a tire.
• The gas was leaking for between 10-15 minutes before the explosion
occurred.
Site Supervisor statements
• They had covered in work preparation meetings that they would not be
digging with the machine closer than 1 meter to either side of the gas line.
• The schedule was good and there was plenty of time to complete the work
and there wasn’t a need to rush.
• The gas line was completely exposed by hand from the gas meter to a meter
past the other side of the location of the drain trench.
• The excavator operator was a qualified and talented operator with lots of
experience on the machine they were using.
• They were the designated spotter for the excavator operator when working
around underground services. After the gas line was exposed the job of the
spotter was complete and they were not in the trench spotting for the
operator when the line was struck.
• The excavator operator was very aware of the location of the gas line, they
had gone over the line after it was exposed. They did not witness the gas
line strike but assumed the operator had moved something or put the bucket
down and struck the gas line.
• They were following every step of the process correctly then the operator hit
the gas line.
• They didn’t believe there was any equipment error with the excavator.
• From multiple recent discussions, they were told the risk of ignition of a gas
leak is one in a million and it can’t ignite. “It does not light, and it doesn’t blow
up.” “Buildings don’t blow up, it doesn’t happen, ever. Gas lines get hit all
over Vancouver Island all the time, multiple times a week ... and nothing ever
blows up, ever.”
• They do not understand how the building blew up.
The excavator operator and site supervisors’ statements indicate they believed that
they were working in a manner that was not dangerous. They did not state an
awareness of explosion risks or hazards when asked. And they indicated a limited
understanding of gas flammability and explosion mechanics.
Report from the gas utility
• The gas service to the building was a ¾ inch diameter polyethylene line
operating at 80psi.
• A request for gas location was made through BC One Call by the contractor
in April 2021.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Incident Summary #II-1288074-2021 (#25071) (FINAL)
• The gas location package delivered to the contractor from the gas utility
included a map showing the gas line location, instruction for safe excavation
and some clauses from the Provincial Gas Safety Regulation.
• The instruction for safe excavation says to hand dig to expose the gas line
before using mechanical equipment then to follow provincial laws and
regulation when excavating.
• The gas utility received a call at 8:53am reporting the gas leak, at 10:43am
the gas leak was stopped by the utility technicians.
An independent fire and explosion investigator was hired by Technical Safety BC to
examine the scene. A report was produced by the investigator (Appendix A) which
stated the following:
• Debris from the explosion was found up to 106 meters away from the
location of the buildings mechanical room.
• Natural gas was the only fuel identified capable of producing the damage
observed.
• The proximity of the gas line break would allow the gas vapors to flow
through the passive air openings into the building.
• When the air/fuel mixture contacted a competent ignition source, the ignition
of the mixture would result in an overpressure inside the structure causing
the damage observed.
• There were multiple competent ignition sources within the building.
The explosion was caused by the excavator hitting the exposed gas line.
The gas line in the vicinity of the excavation work had been located, identified, and
exposed by hand. The hazard of hitting the line with the excavator had been
identified by the contractor who developed a plan and communicated to employees
to keep mechanical excavation over one meter away from the line.
Causes and Contributing factors that could be considered dangerous manners of excavation work
contributing factors include:
• Working in close proximity to an exposed and unprotected gas line with a
mechanical excavator.
• Working in close proximity to an unprotected gas line without a spotter.
• Misunderstanding of explosion risks when working near live gas lines.
• Not moderating excavation practices when increased risk of explosion
hazards are present such as occupied buildings, building openings and
ignition sources.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Diagram 1 - Location of gas pipe hit in relation to the building and building openings.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 1 – East side of building prior to incident. Red arrow indicates location of gas meter. Blue arrow
indicates the mechanical room door opening with door removed. Red oval indicates location of gas pipe strike.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 2 – Mechanical room entrance prior to excavation and explosion. Redbox shows location of gas meter,
blue boxes show the mechanical room doorway with door removed and an opening for the combustion air duct
for the water heater, green box shows passive ventilation into the building crawlspace.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 3 – Still shot taken from airport surveillance video showing blast and debris.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 4 – East side of building after the incident.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 5 – West side of building after the incident.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 6 – Mechanical room piping and equipment after the incident.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 7 – Excavator damage from the blast and flying debris from the explosion.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 8 -Opening to mechanical room with orange paint marking the edges of the doorway that was not
installed at the time of the explosion.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 9 – The gas pipe laid back in the hand dug trench after the incident. The red arrows indicate the pipe
break 7 feet away and centered to the mechanical room doorway opening. The green lines indicate the
location of the mechanically dug trench. The yellow arrow indicates the direction of gas flow from the broken
pipe towards the mechanical room door opening. The red symbol indicates the location of the gas pipe strike.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 10 – Close image of the severed end of gas pipe.
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 11 – Macro image of gas pipe break from an independent testing laboratory
Technical Safety BC [Link]
Image 12 – Macro image of gas pipe break from an independent testing laboratory
Technical Safety BC [Link]