54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M.

& Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

Module 1
Overview of ASEAN Studies

W ELCOME STATEMENT

This is Module 1, I repeat, this is module 1-

Introduction to ASEAN studies ! Here you will
learn about ASEAN studies both as an academic
field and as an institution. You will also learn
about the development of ASEAN as a regional
institution as well as the concept of regionalism.
Enjoy your trip!

ASEAN AVE.

Module I Module II Module III

O UTCOMES
In this module, you are expected to determine the development of
ASEAN as a regional institution.

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 54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

Lesson 1: Introduction to ASEAN Studies

Lesson Outcomes:
At the end of the lesson, student will be able to…
1. Define the scope of ASEAN studies as a discipline.
2. Trace to history and development of ASEAN studies

I. Introduction

Association of Southeast Asian

studies (ASEAN) refers to research and
education on the Historical, Cultural, Social,
Economic, Geographical, and Political
characteristics of the
different states and ethnic groups of countries
in Southeast Asia who are members of ASEAN.
The discipline of ASEAN Studies fosters the
development, acquisition, and sharing of knowledge about the countries and
people of ASEAN and the ways they relate to each other and to the world.
ASEAN studies is a multidisciplinary academic field incorporating
anthropology, religious studies, linguistics, history, politics and governance,
and international relations.

ASEAN Studies undertaken in Southeast Asia itself is comparatively

young. There is a need
to qualify two
categories of ASEAN
Studies in the region.
First, there is ASEAN
Studies offered as a
discipline at the
various tertiary
institutions and
universities in the
region. The second
Figure 1. Group of Southeast Asia people with different race and culture in cute cartoon illustration design representing
ASEAN. Credits: [Link] category is the
and-culture-in-cute-car
numerous centers,
institutions and
departments specifically established with the particular objective of
promoting research of the region, whether as a whole or directed at the
different parts often along national-political lines.
In terms of ASEAN Studies as a tertiary course catering to undergraduate
and graduate studies its roots could be traced to the establishment of the
Institute of Asian Studies in 1955 at the University of the Philippines.
ASEAN Studies then, that primarily focused on the Philippines (Philippines

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
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IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences
Studies), was a part of the overall Asian studies program. Following
reorganization and a name-change to the Asian Center in 1968, degrees
were being offered where some students specialized in Philippine Studies. In
1961, although abortive, there were proposals for a School of Southeast
Asian Studies at the University of Malaya, then in Singapore. However, it
was only in 1976 that the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, initiated a
degree program in Southeast Asian Studies.
Relating to purpose-built institutions and centers, the 1960s
witnessed the establishment in 1968 of the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies (ISEAS) at Singapore with its main focus dedicated to the study of
Southeast Asia. Other centers and institutions in the region that have
Southeast Asia as their main or one of their research agenda include Institut
Alam dan Tamadun Melayu (ATMA, Institute of the Malay World and
Civilization), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia; Institute of East
Asian Studies (IEAS), Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, Malaysia; Center for
Khmer Studies (CKS), Cambodia; and SEAMEO-CHAT (Southeast Asian
Ministers of Education Organization Centre for
History and Tradition), Myanmar.

ASEAN CITIZENSHIP

According to the ASEAN

Foundation, across all
ASEAN nations, over 75%
of students agreed with the
statement, “I feel that I am
a citizen of ASEAN.”
These statements were
strongest in Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam,
and weakest in Singapore
and Myanmar. Nearly
90% of students felt that
membership in ASEAN is
beneficial to their
countries. Nearly 70% felt
that the ASEAN
membership was
beneficial to them
personally.

Source: ASEAN
Awareness of and
Attitudes toward ASEAN:
Summary findings from 10
nation surveyed of
university students.

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

Instruction: Fill in the circles with concepts you can

associate with ASEAN studies.

ASEAN
Studies

a. What is the relevance of ASEAN studies in your field/program?

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

II. Geographical Definition of ASEAN

The boundaries of Southeast

Asia are contested due to historical,
cultural, and linguistic similarities
between some groups in Southeast
Asia and neighboring regions like
India and China. Many scholars of
Southeast Asian studies rely on the
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) to create a concrete
list of nations that fit under the umbrella of Southeast Asia. As of 2016,
members of ASEAN include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao
DPR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Profile of Southeast Asian Nations

1. What is the difference between sovereign state and dependent

territories?
2. Which states are part of Mainland Southeast Asia (Indo-
China), and Maritime Southeast Asia (Malay Archipelago)?

SIGHT SEEING

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

Blank Map Test: Identify the ASEAN members

states in the map below.

1. _______________________ 6. ______________________
2. _______________________ 7. ______________________
3. _______________________ 8. ______________________
4. _______________________ 9. ______________________
5. _______________________ 10. _____________________

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

III. Brief History of the Southeast Asia

Before and During the Second World War

While the term "Southeast Asia" was first used

in connection with the present region by American
priest and educator Howard Malcom in 1837, the
region presently referred to as Southeast Asia was
split between India and the Far East by Anglophone
scholars prior to the Second World War and de-
emphasized as an area of study due to the presence
of national interests in the region. Initial inquiries
into the culture and traditions of Southeast Asia
were primarily conducted by German and Austrian scholars who had greater
access to the region because
their home countries had no colonies in the region. The strategic
importance of numerous locales in Southeast Asia such as the Dutch East
Indies and the Philippines during the Second World War attracted increased
attention from the West. This newfound attention led to the establishment of
Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command (SEAC) in 1
943, and the publication of the first map of Southeast Asia by the
National Geographic
society in 1944.

Postwar

Immediately
after the conclusion of
the Second World
War, the beginnings
of the Cold War drew
the attention of
United States think
tanks and intelligence
organizations away
from Southeast Asia.
Events such as the
1949 Revolution in
China and fear about
the spread of
communism re-
centered much of the
monetary focus on to
China and the Soviet
Union. This led to two
Colonial Rule in Southeast Asia results: while funding
and the commitment

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences
of corporations to the area decreased, oversight also decreased; researchers
in the West were free to pursue most avenues of interest without the
objection of their sponsors.

In East Asia

In Japan, Southeast Asian studies became a

more concrete field of study in the period after Southeast Asia: The Path to
Japanese colonization of the region during the Pacific Independence.
War. The Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto 1946 – Philippines (U.S.)
University was founded in 1963, and The Japan Society 1948 – Burma (Great Britain)
for Southeast Asian History was founded in 1966. In 1949 – Indonesia (Netherlands)
the United States, the rise of communism in Vietnam 1953 – Cambodia (France)
1954 – Laos (France)
and Laos brought Southeast Asian studies to the
1954 – Vietnam (France)
forefront of academia and politics. In Korea, academics
1963 – Malaysia (Great Britain)
began forming groups focusing on the region of
1964 – Singapore (Great Britain)
Southeast Asia in the 1990s. In 1991, the Korean
Association of Southeast Asian Studies (KASEAS).
Southeast Asian studies in South Korea focuses mainly on Southeast Asia's
relationship with other regions in Asia, trans-border migration within and
outside Southeast Asia, and the spread of Korean Wave in the region.

Southeast Asian Nations Gain Independence

British Colonies Gain Independence
Britain‘s timetable for granting independence to its Southeast
Asian colonies depended on local circumstances. Burma had been
pressing for independence from Britain for decades. It became a
sovereign republic in 1948. In 1989, Burma was officially named
Myanmar (myahn•MAH), its name in the Burmese language. After gaining freedom, Burma
suffered one political upheaval after another. Its people struggled between repressive military
governments and pro-democracy forces. Conflict among Communists and ethnic minorities
also disrupted the nation. In 1962, General Ne Win set up a military government, with the
goal of making Burma a socialist state. Although Ne Win stepped down in 1988, the military
continued to rule repressively. In 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi (owng sahn soo chee) returned to
Burma after many years abroad. She is the daughter of Aung San, a leader of the Burmese
nationalists‘ army killed years before by political rivals. Aung San Suu Kyi became active in
the newly formed National League for Democracy. For her pro-democracy activities, she was
placed under house arrest for six years by the government. In the 1990 election—the
country‘s first multiparty election in 30 years—the National League for Democracy won 80
percent of the seats. The military government refused to recognize the election, and it kept
Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. She was finally released in 1995, only to be placed
under house arrest again in 2000. Freed in 2002, she was detained again in 2003, leaving
many residents to doubt whether Burma will embrace democracy anytime soon.
Malaysia and Singapore
During World War II, the Japanese conquered the Malay Peninsula, formerly ruled by
the British. The British returned to the peninsula after the Japanese defeat in 1945. They
tried, unsuccessfully, to organize the different peoples of Malaya into one state. They also
struggled to put down a Communist uprising. Ethnic groups resisted British efforts to unite
their colonies on the peninsula and in the northern part of the island of Borneo. Malays were
a slight majority on the peninsula, while Chinese were the largest group on the southern tip,
the island of Singapore. In 1957, officials created the Federation of Malaya from Singapore,
Malaya, Sarawak, and Sabah. The two regions—on the Malay Peninsula and on northern
Borneo—were separated by 400 miles of ocean. In 1965, Singapore separated from the
federation and became an independent city-state. The federation, consisting of Malaya,
Sarawak, and Sabah, became known as Malaysia. A coalition of many ethnic groups
maintained steady economic progress in Malaysia. 8
54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

CRITICAL THINKING

Answer the following questions:

1. Using your notes, what are the greatest challenges

faced by the following ASEAN nations?

Nation Challenges

1. Philippines

2. Myanmar

3. Malaysia

[Link]

1. CLARIFYING. How did World War II play a role in the eventual decolonization
of Southeast Asia?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
2. For each of the name, wright a sentence explaining its significance.
Aung San Suu Kyu
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Corazon Aquino -
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Sukarno -
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

References:

Acharya, A. (2000), Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:

ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, London: Routledge.

Katzenstein, P.J. (2005) A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium,
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y.

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences

Lesson 2: Theoretical Perspectives of Regionalism

___________________________________________________________________________

Lesson Outcomes:
At the end of the lesson, student will be able to…
1. Define Regionalism
2. Determine the characteristics of regionalism
3. Analyze the advantages and disadvantages of regionalism

Introduction

During the past few decades, there has been a

tremendous surge in regionalism throughout the
international system. This growth has been
stimulated in large measure by the proliferation of
regional institutions, giving rise to substantial
scholarly interest in both their sources and
consequences. Some of this work has been
conducted by economists interested in regionalism‘s
welfare effects and its impact on the stability of the global economic system.
However, there is also a long tradition of work on regionalism in political
science. Scholars of international relations and comparative politics have
generated a sizable literature on the political economy of regionalism.
Researchers have also expressed a lively interest in analyzing international
security from a regional perspective. In this article, we review and analyze
some recent research on regionalism, sometimes referred to as ―the new
regionalism‖ (Hettne 2005). We begin by explaining that regionalism is
usually understood to involve policy coordination through formal
institutions. Often—although by no means always—this coordination occurs
among states located in close geographic proximity. Because much of the
research on regionalism focuses on its economic consequences, we briefly
review that body of work. Then we discuss the political economy of
regionalism and regionalism in security relations. We conclude by outlining
some avenues for future research, placing particular emphasis on the need
for work that links these two topics, improving our understanding of the
political economy of national security in regional contexts (Mansfield &
Solingen, 2010).

ASEAN envisioned the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an

ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural
heritage and bound by a common regional identity.
We see vibrant and open
ASEAN societies consistent with their respective national identities, where
all people enjoy equitable access and opportunities for total human
development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and
cultural background (ASEAN vision 2020).

The ASEAN leaders have a vision to create a common identity in

Southeast Asia by 2020. Considering the recent history of the region, this is
quite significant. A little more than a decade ago, Southeast Asia was

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences
divided into two blocs, one with the old ASEAN members Thailand,
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Brunei, and the other with
the newest members Vietnam, Laos, Burma/ Myanmar and Cambodia.
Despite integration efforts since the announcement, the region still suffers
from unsolved conflicts and substantial socio- economic inequalities
between, as well as within, the countries. In order to create stability and to
remain in power, the regimes engage in different projects of strengthening
their national identities, which creates contradictory processes within the
countries, as well as between them. The aim of the lesson is to discuss the
issue of regional integration and regional identity-building in Southeast Asia
and to problematize the quest for a regional identity, as stated in the ASEAN
Vision 2020 cited above, by relating the efforts of integration to regional
diversity and to the issue of national identity-building. The quest for a
regional identity is a political (elite) project and that without an
accommodating, inclusive and pluralistic society, a common regional
identity will be hard – if not impossible – to create.

The literature on regionalism and regional integration has so far

primarily focused on regional security and the economics matters of nation-
states, and the interaction and collaboration between the states together
with the development and functioning of regional organizations. The region‘s
violent past, strategic importance, and the last decades‘ exceptional
economic developments can partly explain this. Attempts to measure
regionalism have often focused on quantifiable indicators such as level of
interaction. According to Acharya (2000), regional perspectives on Southeast
Asian politics and international relations are scarce. Also, there is relatively
little written about regionalism from the perspectives of the
conceptualization of regions and regional identity-building in relation to
local and national identity formation processes, and what it takes to
integrate individuals of diverse cultural and ethnic groups into a regional
identity (Jones 2004). This despite the fact that Southeast Asia is a mosaic
of different cultural and ethnic groups, and that it is often pointed out that
globalisation processes increase the risk of ethnic fragmentation.
Accordingly, different bodies of literature will be combined in order to better
understand the complexity of regionalism.

DEFINING REGIONS, REGIONALISM, AND REGIONALIZATION

Despite widespread interest in regionalism, we lack consensus on its

definition. In part, this is because observers do not agree on what
constitutes a region. Regions are frequently defined as groups of countries
located in

the same geographic space; but where one region ends and the next begins
is sometimes unclear. Furthermore, most researchers agree that a region
implies more than just physical proximity, although the additional criteria
that should be used have proven controversial. Among some of the best-
known studies, for example, Russett (1967) defines a region based on
geographic proximity, social and cultural homogeneity, shared political

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
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IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences
attitudes and political institutions, and economic interde- pendence.
Deutsch et al. (1957) view high levels of interdependence across multiple
dimensions—including economic transactions, communications, and
political values—as determining whether a group of countries composes a
region. Thompson (1973) argues that regions include states that are
geograph- ically proximate, interact extensively, and have shared
perceptions of various phenomena.

Although geography lies at the heart of most of these definitions, some

scholars define re- gions in nongeographic terms. Behavioral def- initions
emphasize that political practice and interaction can alter a region‘s
composition. As Katzenstein (2005, p. 9) puts it, ―regions are po- litically
made.‖ Solingen (1998) subsumes a re- gion‘s boundaries to the respective
grand strate- gies of different domestic political coalitions. The scope of a
region is thus in the eyes of mem- bers of the dominant coalition.
Consequently, it is subject to continuous redefinition through expansion
into other regions or through domes- tic coalitional shifts in grand strategy.
Other nongeographic definitions that are ideational or social-constructivist
stress shared com- munal identities of states within a region (Risse-Kappen
1995; Katzenstein 1997, 2005).

In light of the ontological disagreement over what constitutes a region, it is

no surprise that regionalism is also a contested concept. One source of
confusion has been the distinction be- tween regionalism and
regionalization. Various political scientists have argued that regionalism is a
political process marked by cooperation and policy coordination, whereas
regionalization is an economic process in which trade and in- vestment
within the region grow more rapidly than the region‘s trade and investment
with the rest of the world (Haggard 1993, pp. 48– 49; see also Gamble &
Payne 1996, Breslin & Higgott 2001, Ravenhill 2009). Pempel (2005, pp. 19–
20) makes a different but related distinc- tion; he defines regionalization as
a bottom-up, societally driven process, whereas regionalism ―involves
primarily the process of institution creation‖ and is the intentional product
of in- terstate cooperation.

Katzenstein (2006, p. 1) defines regionalism as institutionalized practices

and regionaliza- tion as ―a process that engages actors.‖ For Hur- rell (1995,
pp. 39–40), however, regionalization is a feature of regionalism.
Regionalization is ―the growth of societal integration within a re- gion and. .
.the often undirected processes of so- cial and economic interaction.‖ This is
akin, he argues, to informal integration or ―soft region- alism,‖ which
involves increasing population flows, multiple channels, and complex social
networks spreading ideas and attitudes. Fawcett (2004, p. 433) defines
regionalism as a policy or a project, while defining regionalization as both a
project and a process, preceding and flow- ing from regionalism.
Alternatively, Marchand et al. (1999) emphasize the globalizing, restruc-
turing context of regionalization. Regionaliza- tion reflects state and
nonstate forces reacting in opposition to globalization, whereas region- alism
concerns ideas, identities, and ideologies related to a regional project.

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
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IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences
Munakata (2006) agrees that regionalism involves institutions es- tablished
by governments to promote regional economic integration but emphasizes
the vary- ing degrees of commitment by members. Free trade areas (FTAs)
are considered a solid form of regionalism, whereas regional consultative
bodies that lack legally binding agreements— even if they promote economic
integration— are a looser form.

A wide variety of researchers consider re- gionalization to be a process

driven by eco- nomic or social forces and regionalism to be a political
process. Yet a multiplicity of meanings for each of these two terms re-
mains. The boundaries between regionalism and regionalization remain
porous. On the one

hand, regionalization driven by private actors— economic and otherwise—is

often reinforced by states. On the other hand, bottom-up efforts (domestic
and transnational) may lead to re- gionalism as the intended or unintended
prod- uct of pressures on states. Identifying different sequences of
regionalism and regionalization— and their mutual effects—may be a more
pro- ductive endeavor but it can only be advanced through improvements in
the conceptualiza- tion and measurement of ―region,‖ ―regional- ism,‖ and
―regionalization.‖

A great deal of research on regionalism has focused on preferential trading

arrangements (PTAs), institutions that provide each member- state with
preferential access to the other par- ticipants‘ markets. Many such
arrangements in- volve states in close geographic proximity (e.g., the
European Union or Mercosur), but some are not (e.g., the FTAs between the
United States and Israel, Chile and South Korea, or Mexico and Japan). In
this article, we pay partic- ular attention to PTAs, which involve economic
policy coordination and cooperation among member-states. Among the
various types of PTAs are arrangements that partially liberal- ize trade
between members; FTAs, which elim- inate trade barriers among members;
customs unions, which eliminate internal trade barriers and impose a
common external tariff on third parties‘ products; common markets, which
al- low free movement of factors of production and finished products across
national borders; and economic unions, which are common mar- kets
coupled with a currency union. Because all PTAs attempt to coordinate
trade policy among members, they are usually analyzed as a group.

At the outset, it is important to recognize that, despite contemporary

observers‘ partic- ular interest in PTAs formed during the past half century,
regionalism is not a recent phe- nomenon. In fact, four waves of regionalism
have taken place over the past two centuries (Mansfield & Milner 1999). The
first occurred during the second half of the nineteenth cen- tury and was
largely a European phenomenon (Pollard 1974, Lazer 1999, Pahre 2008).
This wave was associated with the emergence of a liberal international
trading system, since PTAs were networked via most-favored-nation clauses.
A second wave began in the aftermath of World War I. These arrangements
were more economically discriminatory than those formed during the earlier

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
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IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences
wave. Many observers argue that the PTAs established during the interwar
era gave rise to ―beggar-thy-neighbor‖ trade policies, a sharp decline in
world trade, and heightened political conflict (Irwin 1993). Since World War
II, two additional waves of PTAs have occurred. They have proven more
difficult to characterize as either liberalizing or discrim- inatory than the
first two. One took place in the 1960s and the early 1970s. The second
began [Link], PTAs have become so
pervasive that more than half of all international commerce has come to be
conducted within these arrangements, and almost every country belongs to
at least one. These developments have spurred substantial scholarly interest
in both the causes and effects of economic regionalism.

Origins and Development of Regionalism

The growth and study of formal regional organizations dates

principally from the Second World War and is part of a general pattern of
growth in international institu- tions. This is important since a study of
regionalism necessitates a parallel study of multilateralism or at least an
understanding of the interdependent relationship be- tween the two.

From a longer perspective, however, regionalism has always been with

us. Re- gions as empires, spheres of influence, or unions of states have been
apparent in dif- ferent international systems. In the nineteenth century in
particular one can point to the widespread existence of different unions,
leagues and associations, showing how the idea of regional integration is no
new phenomena.13 While such unions flour- ished among European states,
in the Americas the Inter-American System, with its roots in the late
nineteenth century, provides evidence of a set of semi-formal non- European
institutions. Embedded in this American system was the idea of a regional
security regime as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine, which singled out the
Ameri- cas as part of a US sphere of influence. And in Europe, alongside the
economic uni- ons and political projects, security regimes were also evident
as demonstrated by the existence of a ‗concert‘ or balance of powers which
informed understanding of regional order.

Indeed it was the breakdown of this loose regime - the European

concert – in the events culminating in the First World War, that encouraged
world leaders, led by US President Woodrow Wilson, to make the first
sustained attempt at constructing a formal international security
institution: the League of Nations, with important implications for
subsequent institutional development both global or regional.

The League experiment, though intended to be universal, betrayed a

number of regional features, not least that its dominant members were all
European. A referen- ce in the Covenant, in Article 21, to ‗regional
understandings‘, was included to re- flect the interests of the United States
in the Americas, though the latter never beca- me a member.14 More
broadly, the League period set the tone for a much wider de- bate about how
to deal with what Inis Claude would later call the ‗problem of re- gionalism‘
or how to integrate regional arrangements into the framework of a gen- eral

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54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
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IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences
security organization.15 This debate was overtaken - though not forgotten -
by the events of the 1930s when Europe, and much of the rest of the world,
became embroiled in a new war. At this time it appeared that the League
had failed as a glo- bal security institution, and regionalism, whether as an
economic or political process had also been associated with failure or with
expansionist and hegemonic projects like Japan‘s pan-Asian project, or Nazi
Germany‘s pan-European one.

1. Regional Institutions: The First Wave 1945-1965

Despite such negative impressions, the spirit of regionalism was

quickly revived and strengthened against the backdrop of the ending of the
Second World War and the creation of a new set of international
institutions, notably the United Nations and the Bretton Woods/GATT
system. The League‘s example, both positive and negative, closely informed
these developments. Such institutions were constructed precisely to prevent
the social, political and economic upheavals that had taken the world to war
after 1939 and hence to make states more secure. Though few states
questioned the need for more ambitious multilateral institutions, many also
sought to protect their own interests through regional or cross regional
groupings, and it is in this period that the first sustained wave of regional
institution building took place.

Three main types of regional institution can be identified in this

period. First, what are often called ‗multipurpose‘ institutions like the
League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of American States (OAS),
successor to the Inter-American system and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU); second, security alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and
third, institutions with a principally economic fo- cus, notably the early
European institutions and later attempts to replicate them elsewhere.

Already by 1945, multipurpose institutions of the first type,

representing the Americas, Commonwealth, and Arab states had come into
being. And the final de- sign of the UN Charter, like the League Covenant
before it, was directly influenced by states with actual or potential
investments in such institutions. Hence the early reservations of UN
founding fathers about how to deal with regionalism and the possible
dilution of universal aspirations and competence were overcome.16 The UN
Charter, in its final form, endorsed the principle of regional partnership and
ac- tion within the framework of the global security organization.17

Institutions of the second type, regional security alliances, notably

NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Rio Pact, SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS, were
established in the 1950s. Rather than the UN-friendly institutions envisaged
by the Charter, these alli- ances owed their rationale more to the evolving
Cold War system and corresponding attempts by the superpowers to
consolidate their respective spheres of influence, and as such constituted a
blow to multilateralism

Though the five Regional Economic Commissions were an early and

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integral part of the UN, the Charter had little to say about economic
regionalism outside the UN system, or institutions of the third type, those
principal aim was initially to promote regional economic integration.
Multilateral regulation of such institutions was pro- vided through the
GATT, which like the UN, envisaged coexistence with charter friendly or
non-discriminatory regional arrangements.18 Such institutions, with the
Europe leading the way with the creation of the European Community (EC)
in 1958, proliferated in the 1960s such that the world was ‗filled with
proposals for NAFTA, PAFTA, LAFTA... and ever more‘.19

What is striking about this first wave of regionalism, whether in the

area of eco- nomics or security, was the fact that it was characterised less
by any new norma- tively informed understanding of regional-multilateral
relationships, more by strictly material calculations of power, security and
interest. Above all it was the post-war balance of power, which quickly
became that of the Cold War, that represented the overriding factor in
determining regionalism‘s early trajectory. If this was self evi- dently true of
the new security institutions, it was also true both of the multipurpose and
early economic institutions, all of which were mechanisms not only for
promot- ing the welfare and security of members but also for enhancing the
power and influ- ence of states onto the new global stage. Multilateral
institutions had both empow- ered and facilitated regionalism in certain
ways providing them with a façade of le- gitimacy, yet their rationale
ultimately lay in the post-Cold War order and interna- tional balance of
power.

Also striking were the limited and uneven results of this first wave. Of
the early economic arrangements those outside Europe had mostly failed by
the late 1960s, though a number were later revived in different forms during
regionalism‘s third wave. The multipurpose organizations were similarly
regarded as failures - perhaps somewhat unfairly given the considerable
constraints they faced.20 Developing countries, for example, were able to
use such institutions as platforms for promoting common positions on
matters of importance to their members, such as decoloniza- tion and
apartheid (in the OAU) or support for Palestine (in the LAS). The same was
true of a ‗pan‘ Third World institution like the Non-Aligned Movement which
(like the later Group of 77) represented a vehicle for projecting broad
developing country interests onto the international stage. Given the global
context in which such region- alisms developed however, it is unsurprising
that many early institutions lacked ca- pacity and resources. Indeed, only
the two major superpower sponsored alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
enjoyed almost unqualified success in securing their respective regions from
external threats and sustaining the ‗long peace‘ that pre- vailed during the
Cold War.21

2. Regionalism: The Second Wave, 1965-85

Against this backdrop and with the Cold War entering its third
decade, a further and somewhat distinctive round of regional activity took

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place. This was, in part, a reaction to the superpower dominance of the
regional security arena, the disappoin- ting early results of both the
multipurpose institutions and non-European economic institutions and the
changing regional security environment itself. The second wave of institution
building which occurred mainly among developing countries, had an
underlying security focus, and hence was clearly distinguishable from the
earlier wave of economic regionalism that had been inspired by the creation
and successful early years of the EC. It was similar in that it was mostly
sub-regional in scope (with sub-regional here meaning sub-continental, or at
least encompassing a smaller geographical space and fewer states than the
earlier pan-regional groups) though it also included both a pan-European
security institution, the CSCE, and a pan-Islamic one, the ICO. The more
familiar examples of this second regional wave are the As- sociation of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community (SADC), the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC).22

Overall, this second wave was characterized by small steps to improve

regional self-sufficiency and cooperation in a changed regional and global
environment which afforded a little more flexibility to regional actors.
Bipolarity had somewhat loosened in the détente era of the late-1960s to
mid-1970s, while many developing countries had consolidated their
statehood and autonomy. Not all these new institu- tions immediately
assumed security roles; a number had ostensibly more economic functions
and purposes: the GCC is an interesting case of an institution designed to
meet a new security threat - following the Iranian revolution - whose charter
is cou- ched in mainly economic and cultural terms.23 Still there was a
clear security dimen- sion to this second wave of institution building,
demonstrated by the fact many of these new security groupings were
constructed with a particular local threat in mind: for ASEAN it was
Vietnam, for the GCC, Iran; for SADCC apartheid South Africa.

The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was similarly conceived as a

vehicle for the containment of Iraq, though its life span was limited following
the latter‘s invasion of a fellow member, Kuwait, in 1990.

These new initiatives, however, were still conditioned by the ever

present con- straints of the Cold War. This was of course also true for the
CSCE, a quite different pan-European security enterprise, which by
encouraging East-West convergence in several areas played a facilitating role
in the end of the Cold War.

The results of this second wave, like the first, were mixed, but a
couple of points should be noted. As in the first wave, institutional survival
rates were high: indeed the tally of institutional deaths in the first two waves
is surprisingly small. It inclu- des the non-European US-sponsored
alliances, CENTO and SEATO, the short lived ACC and a number of non-

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European economic institutions, though many of these were later revived in
some related form. Their survival demonstrates not only how they were
valued by their members, but also resilience and flexibility. Many went on to
further develop and expand their economic and security roles as their raison
d‘être was shifted, and indeed enhanced by the new global balance of power
at end of the Cold War.

Regionalism: The Third Wave 1985-Present

Just as the international system had closely defined the parameters

and possibilities of regionalism during the Cold War, it was system change
and its consequences that also helps explain the post-Cold War changes and
developments. Though argu- ably more complex and diverse than previous
regional waves, the new regionalism was no less a response to the shifting
political, economic and security imperatives of the post-Cold War
environment in which states now found themselves. On the one hand, the
example of Europe, the effects of globalization and uncertainty about the
capacity of multilateral institutions all provided incentives to other countries
to fos- ter projects of economic integration, notably the creation of free trade
areas (FTAs). On the other, the removal of Cold War overlay also changed
the parameters of the security domain making regional security more
vulnerable and accessible to local actors.24 Like the earlier waves of
regionalism, the post-Cold War phenomena, widely dubbed the ‗new
regionalism‘ - despite its continuities with the old - has been the subject of
sustained debate and a growing literature.25

At first, there was a distinctly universalistic flavour to the post-Cold

War order which did not immediately suggest an important role for regional
institutions. Just as the two world wars had seen the birth of new
paradigms of global order, reflected in the founding documents of League of
Nations and the UN, the end of the Cold War era was similarly informed by a
renaissance of ideas about the possibilities of uni- versal institutions and
projects and the fostering of global peace. Such notions were picked up in
the rhetoric of the ‗New World Order‘ articulated by US President George
Bush Sr., after the 1991 Gulf War, and in popular works by Francis Fukuy-
ama and others on the end of history, ideology, geography and so on. These
big i- deas were also captured in different understandings of the term
globalization. As in the past, regionalism was viewed positively by some as a
mere stepping stone to- wards a more integrated world, and suspiciously by
others as potentially obstructive and damaging to broader global
processes.26

Both views contained truths but also tended both to oversimplify and
underesti- mate the diversity of regionalism. Above all the global processes
of regionalism did not form a united project except in that they all
represented responses to changes at the level of the international system.
Three factors however highlighted their impor- tance. First, was the
experience of Western Europe. Though the evidence from Eu- rope on the
eve of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was decidedly mixed, the European

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process could not easily be disregarded. Even if the example of the
European Union was not readily or immediately exportable, it still
represented an important model of how cooperation might be conducted at
the regional level and opened up new per- spectives on globalization. And for
the second time in less than thirty years, non- European institutions started
to grow quickly after the Cold War ended, a number building on earlier ‗first
wave‘ experiments in economic integration. And, no less significantly, the
EU, like a number of other institutions, was also poised to move from a
predominantly economic focus to one which further emphasized political
and security cooperation.

Second, and from a more practical perspective, it quickly became clear

that the post-Cold War multilateral structures, given the huge demands
placed upon them, were both inadequate for the task and were highly
susceptible to the interests of core members. Both economic and security
structures would need buttressing. This was revealed at the level of the
international economy when serious financial crises in Asia and the
Americas exposed the shortfalls of international financial institutions and
demanded regional responses. It was also revealed at the level or
international security, most notably in the area of conflict resolution and
peace operations gener- ally. In calling for the revival of Chapter VIII
provision – and hence a more effective partnership between the UN and
regional institutions - UN Secretary-Generals like were not advocating
regionalism per se, but burden sharing.27 The UN, despite the palpable
euphoria that accompanied its early post-Cold War years, lacked the re-

sources and the commitment of major states to act as a global

security provider, lea- ving vacuums that regional powers and institutions
sought to fill.28

Hence the new wave of security regionalism must be understood in

terms of UN capacity, the relative disinterest of great powers in costly
external interventions and declining salience of the former alliance systems.
Like the new wave of economic regionalism, it represented the further
development of a self help system for weaker states to cope with the changed
international environment, demonstrated perhaps most strikingly in the
security reforms of African institutions. It also permitted stronger emerging
regional powers the scope to set local agendas within a institu- tional
framework that bestowed greater legitimacy on their actions.

Third, and less tangibly, was the way in which regionalism has
become caught up in the idea of a ‗clash of civilizations‘ as outlined by
Samuel Huntington.29 This at times clumsy, but nonetheless helpful
characterization made the point that ‗civiliza- tions‘, often loose regions,
could not be easily homogenized and had creative and fragmentary power. In
this sense regionalism, construed as a response to the univer- sal other,
merely extended the project that had commenced with the multipurpose
institutions the early Third World regionalisms and the second wave of more
securi- ty-focused regionalism in the latter decades of the Cold War.

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Regionalism thus pro- vided states the opportunity to place their distinctive
mark on their own local institu- tional arrangements. Regionalisms now
bore different labels; not only ‗made in Eu- rope‘, but made in Africa, Asia
and the Americas.

The third wave of regionalism was characterized by diversity of forms

and orga- nizations, a selection of which are presented in Table 1 below.
Like the third wave of democratization, there were few regions which did not
participate in this new wa- ve. New institutions were formed in the Asia-
Pacific region, like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), in
the Americas, the Southern Cone Com- mon Market (MERCOSUR) and in
the former Soviet space, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
China, with the creation Shanghai Cooperation Organiza- tion (SCO), also
entered into regional security arrangements for the first time. Major reforms
were introduced in a number of existing institutions, notably in Europe, the
Americas and Africa, where additional protocols, treaties and conventions
were signed relating to conflict prevention and management, human rights
and democ- racy. Changes in name - leading to a reshuffling of acronyms -
were introduced to reflect these reforms. A great deal has been written about
the nature and content of this new regionalist moment, its varied and novel
dimensions and its relationship with global governance. However one
regards it the quantitative (and indeed qualita- tive) evidence cannot be
ignored. 30 If one considers one criteria alone: the invol- vement of regional
organizations in peacekeeping operations the growth in activity is striking.
From a mere handful of such operations in 1990, there were over 20 by
2000, and following a small dip, a further rise after 2006.31

IV. Conclusions: The Contemporary Scene

This short chapter has highlighted the constraints and opportunities

that the interna- tional system provides in explaining start up and change in
regional institutions. While new and old scholarship has approached
regionalism from a variety of per- spectives, all of which have had their uses
according to time and place, it has been argued here that
rational/institutionalist arguments dominate in explanations of re-
gionalism both past and present. Illustrating this, the chapter has argued
that a use- ful distinction can be made between regionalism under bipolarity
in the Cold War and regionalism under unipolarity in the post-Cold War era.
In both cases regional- ism, whether in economic or security affairs must be
understood as a response to the dominant order, providing states with a
means of balancing against large powers or bandwagoning with them. In
both cases regionalism has also had an interdependent relationship – at
times competitive, at times complementary - with multilateral insti- tutions
and broader global processes. The way in which the numbers, functions and
memberships of regional organizations have shifted in line with global
trends sup- ports this conclusion.

Regional institutions evidently condition the behaviour of their

members and pro- vide parameters for action, but the propensity of

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institutions to switch roles in res- ponse to systemic changes suggests also
the close correlation between material inte- rests and collective behaviour.
On the other hand, their survival and maintenance indicate that states do
value institutions and are willing to bear their costs even du- ring periods of
uncertainty and failure.

Under unipolarity the trend towards further regional consolidation is

set to conti- nue. It is both product of and reaction to what Peter
Katzenstein has called the American imperium.39 Given the constraints it
currently faces, a multilateral institu- tion like the United Nations, as
highlighted in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document, is likely to
encourage rather than supplant the roles of regional organiza- tions in the
near future.40 The consequences of the overextension of US power can be
seen in Iraq and elsewhere, demonstrating a growing demand for alternative
sources of action. Strong states will continue to find useful legitimizing roles
for re- gional institutions, and weak states will also benefit from their
welfare provision and security umbrella. To some extent then, contemporary
regionalism, like regionalism during the Cold War, is on a path dependent
trajectory unlikely to change until some new critical turning point is
reached.

Reference:

Acharya, A. (2000), Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:

ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, London: Routledge.

Fawcett, L. [Link] (n.d). Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present. Oxford University
Press.

Mansfield, E, [Link]. (2010). Regionalism. Annual Review of Political Science. 2010. 13:145-
63.

Katzenstein, P.J. (2005) A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium,
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y.

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Lesson 3: The Development of ASEAN as a Regional

Organization
Lesson Outcomes:
At the end of the lesson, student will be able to…
1. Discuss the development of ASEAN.
2. Determine the factors that lead to the conceptualization of
ASEAN.

The Founding of ASEAN

On 8 August 1967, five leaders – the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – sat down together in
the main hall of the Department of Foreign Affairs building in Bangkok,
Thailand and signed a document. By virtue of that document, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born. The five Foreign
Ministers who signed it – Adam Malik of Indonesia, Narciso R. Ramos of the
Philippines, Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia, S. Rajaratnam of Singapore, and
Thanat Khoman of Thailand – would subsequently be hailed as the
Founding Fathers of probably the most successful inter-governmental
organization in the developing world today. And the document that they
signed would be known as the ASEAN Declaration.

It was a short, simply-worded document containing just five articles. It

declared the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation
among the Countries of Southeast Asia to be known as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and spelled out the aims and purposes of
that Association. These aims and purposes were about cooperation in the
economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields, and in the
promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice
and the rule of law and adherence to the principles of the United Nations
Charter. It stipulated that the Association would be open for participation by
all States in the Southeast Asian region subscribing to its aims, principles
and purposes. It proclaimed ASEAN as representing ―the collective will of the
nations of Southeast Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and
cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples
and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.‖

It was while Thailand was brokering reconciliation among Indonesia,

the Philippines and Malaysia over certain disputes that it dawned on the
four countries that the moment for regional cooperation had come or the
future of the region would remain uncertain. Recalls one of the two surviving
protagonists of that historic process, Thanat Khoman of Thailand: ―At the
banquet marking the reconciliation between the three disputants, I
broached the idea of forming another organization for regional cooperation
with Adam Malik. Malik agreed without hesitation but asked for time to talk
with his government and also to normalize relations with Malaysia now that
the confrontation was over. Meanwhile, the Thai Foreign Office prepared a

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draft charter of the new institution. Within a few months, everything was
ready. I therefore invited the two former members of the Association for
Southeast Asia (ASA), Malaysia and the Philippines, and Indonesia, a key
member, to a meeting in Bangkok. In addition, Singapore sent S.
Rajaratnam, then Foreign Minister, to see me about joining the new set-up.
Although the new organization was planned to comprise only the ASA
members plus Indonesia, Singapore‘s request was favorably considered.‖

And so in early August 1967, the five Foreign Ministers spent four
days in the relative isolation of a beach resort in Bang Saen, a coastal town
less than a hundred kilometers southeast of Bangkok. There they negotiated
over that document in a decidedly informal manner which they would later
delight in describing as ―sports-shirt diplomacy.‖ Yet it was by no means an
easy process: each man brought into the deliberations a historical and
political perspective that had no resemblance to that of any of the others.
But with goodwill and good humor, as often as they huddled at the
negotiating table, they finessed their way through their differences as they
lined up their shots on the golf course and traded wisecracks on one
another‘s game, a style of deliberation which would eventually become the
ASEAN ministerial tradition.

Now, with the rigors of negotiations and the informalities of Bang Saen
behind them, with their signatures neatly attached to the ASEAN
Declaration, also known as the Bangkok Declaration, it was time for some
formalities. The first to speak was the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Narciso Ramos, a one-time journalist and long-time legislator who had given
up a chance to be Speaker of the Philippine Congress to serve as one of his
country‘s first diplomats. He was then 66 years old and his only son, the
future President Fidel V. Ramos, was serving with the Philippine Civic Action
Group in embattled Vietnam. He recalled the tediousness of the negotiations
that preceded the signing of the Declaration that ―truly taxed the goodwill,
the imagination, the patience and understanding of the five participating
Ministers.‖ That ASEAN was established at all in spite of these difficulties,
he said, meant that its foundations had been solidly laid. And he impressed
it on the audience of diplomats, officials and media people who had
witnessed the signing ceremony that a great sense of urgency had prompted
the Ministers to go through all that trouble. He spoke darkly of the forces
that were arrayed against the survival of the countries of Southeast Asia in
those uncertain and critical times.

―The fragmented economies of Southeast Asia,‖ he said, ―(with) each

country pursuing its own limited objectives and dissipating its meager
resources in the overlapping or even conflicting endeavors of sister states
carry the seeds of weakness in their incapacity for growth and their self-
perpetuating dependence on the advanced, industrial nations. ASEAN,
therefore, could marshal the still untapped potentials of this rich region
through more substantial united action.‖
When it was his turn to speak, Adam Malik, Presidium Minister for Political
Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, recalled that about a

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year before, in Bangkok, at the conclusion of the peace talks between
Indonesia and Malaysia, he had explored the idea of an organization such as
ASEAN with his Malaysian and Thai counterparts. One of the ―angry young
men‖ in his country‘s struggle for independence two decades earlier, Adam
Malik was then 50 years old and one of a Presidium of five led by then
General Soeharto that was steering Indonesia from the verge of economic
and political chaos. He was the Presidium‘s point man in Indonesia‘s efforts
to mend fences with its neighbors in the wake of an unfortunate policy of
confrontation. During the past year, he said, the Ministers had all worked
together toward the realization of the ASEAN idea, ―making haste slowly, in
order to build a new association for regional cooperation.‖

Adam Malik went on to describe Indonesia‘s vision of a Southeast Asia

developing into ―a region which can stand on its own feet, strong enough to
defend itself against any negative influence from outside the region.‖ Such a
vision, he stressed, was not wishful thinking, if the countries of the region
effectively cooperated with each other, considering their combined natural
resources and manpower. He referred to differences of outlook among the
member countries, but those differences, he said, would be overcome
through a maximum of goodwill and understanding, faith and realism. Hard
work, patience and perseverance, he added, would also be necessary.

The countries of Southeast Asia should also be willing to take

responsibility for whatever happens to them, according to Tun Abdul Razak,
the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, who spoke next. In his speech, he
conjured a vision of an ASEAN that would include all the countries of
Southeast Asia. Tun Abdul Razak was then concurrently his country‘s
Minister of Defence and Minister of National Development. It was a time
when national survival was the overriding thrust of Malaysia‘s relations with
other nations and so as Minister of Defence, he was in charge of his
country‘s foreign affairs. He stressed that the countries of the region should
recognize that unless they assumed their common responsibility to shape
their own destiny and to prevent external intervention and interference,
Southeast Asia would remain fraught with danger and tension. And unless
they took decisive and collective action to prevent the eruption of intra-
regional conflicts, the nations of Southeast Asia would remain susceptible to
manipulation, one against another.

―We the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia,‖ Tun Abdul Razak
said, ―must get together and form by ourselves a new perspective and a new
framework for our region. It is important that individually and jointly we
should create a deep awareness that we cannot survive for long as
independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together and
unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family of Southeast Asian
nations bound together by ties of friendship and goodwill and imbued with
our own ideals and aspirations and determined to shape our own destiny‖.
He added that, ―with the establishment of ASEAN, we have taken a firm and
a bold step on that road‖.

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For his part, S. Rajaratnam, a former Minister of Culture of multi-cultural
Singapore who, at that time, served as its first Foreign Minister, noted that
two decades of nationalist fervor had not fulfilled the expectations of the
people of Southeast Asia for better living standards. If ASEAN would
succeed, he said, then its members would have to marry national thinking
with regional thinking.

―We must now think at two levels,‖ Rajaratnam said. ―We must think
not only of our national interests but posit them against regional interests:
that is a new way of thinking about our problems. And these are two
different things and sometimes they can conflict. Secondly, we must also
accept the fact, if we are really serious about it, that regional existence
means painful adjustments to those practices and thinking in our respective
countries. We must make these painful and difficult adjustments. If we are
not going to do that, then regionalism remains a utopia.‖

S. Rajaratnam expressed the fear, however, that ASEAN would be

misunderstood. ―We are not against anything‖, he said, ―not against
anybody‖. And here he used a term that would have an ominous ring even
today: balkanization. In Southeast Asia, as in Europe and any part of the
world, he said, outside powers had a vested interest in the balkanization of
the region. ―We want to ensure,‖ he said, ―a stable Southeast Asia, not a
balkanized Southeast Asia. And those countries who are interested,
genuinely interested, in the stability of Southeast Asia, the prosperity of
Southeast Asia, and better economic and social conditions, will welcome
small countries getting together to pool their collective resources and their
collective wisdom to contribute to the peace of the world.‖

The goal of ASEAN, then, is to create, not to destroy. This, the Foreign
Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, stressed when it was his turn to
speak. At a time when the Vietnam conflict was raging and American forces
seemed forever entrenched in Indochina, he had foreseen their eventual
withdrawal from the area and had accordingly applied himself to adjusting
Thailand‘s foreign policy to a reality that would only become apparent more
than half a decade later. He must have had that in mind when, on that
occasion, he said that the countries of Southeast Asia had no choice but to
adjust to the exigencies of the time, to move toward closer cooperation and
even integration. Elaborating on ASEAN objectives, he spoke of ―building a
new society that will be responsive to the needs of our time and efficiently
equipped to bring about, for the enjoyment and the material as well as
spiritual advancement of our peoples, conditions of stability and progress.
Particularly what millions of men and women in our part of the world want
is to erase the old and obsolete concept of domination and subjection of the
past and replace it with the new spirit of give and take, of equality and
partnership. More than anything else, they want to be master of their own
house and to enjoy the inherent right to decide their own destiny …‖

While the nations of Southeast Asia prevent attempts to deprive them

of their freedom and sovereignty, he said, they must first free themselves

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from the material impediments of ignorance, disease and hunger. Each of
these nations cannot accomplish that alone, but by joining together and
cooperating with those who have the same aspirations, these objectives
become easier to attain. Then Thanat Khoman concluded: ―What we have
decided today is only a small beginning of what we hope will be a long and
continuous sequence of accomplishments of which we ourselves, those who
will join us later and the generations to come, can be proud. Let it be for
Southeast Asia, a potentially rich region, rich in history, in spiritual as well
as material resources and indeed for the whole ancient continent of Asia, the
light of happiness and well-being that will shine over the uncounted millions
of our struggling peoples.‖

The Foreign Minister of Thailand closed the inaugural session of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations by presenting each of his colleagues
with a memento. Inscribed on the memento presented to the Foreign
Minister of Indonesia, was the citation, ―In recognition of services rendered
by His Excellency Adam Malik to the ASEAN organization, the name of
which was suggested by him.‖
And that was how ASEAN was conceived, given a name, and born. It had
been barely 14 months since Thanat Khoman brought up the ASEAN idea in
his conversations with his Malaysian and Indonesian colleagues. In about
three more weeks, Indonesia would fully restore diplomatic relations with
Malaysia, and soon after that with Singapore. That was by no means the end
to intra-ASEAN disputes, for soon the Philippines and Malaysia would have
a falling out on the issue of sovereignty over Sabah. Many disputes between
ASEAN countries persist to this day. But all Member Countries are deeply
committed to resolving their differences through peaceful means and in the
spirit of mutual accommodation. Every dispute would have its proper season
but it would not be allowed to get in the way of the task at hand. And at that
time, the essential task was to lay the framework of regional dialogue and
cooperation.

The two-page Bangkok Declaration not only contains the rationale for
the establishment of ASEAN and its specific objectives. It represents the
organization‘s modus operandi of building on small steps, voluntary, and
informal arrangements towards more binding and institutionalized
agreements. All the founding member states and the newer members have
stood fast to the spirit of the Bangkok Declaration. Over the years, ASEAN
has progressively entered into several formal and legally-binding
instruments, such as the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia and the 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone.

Against the backdrop of conflict in the then Indochina, the Founding

Fathers had the foresight of building a community of and for all Southeast
Asian states. Thus the Bangkok Declaration promulgated that ―the
Association is open for participation to all States in the Southeast Asian
region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.‖
ASEAN‘s inclusive outlook has paved the way for community-building not

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only in Southeast Asia, but also in the broader Asia Pacific region where
several other inter-governmental organizations now co-exist.

The original ASEAN logo presented five brown sheaves of rice stalks,
one for each founding member. Beneath the sheaves is the legend ―ASEAN‖
in blue. These are set on a field of yellow encircled by a blue border. Brown
stands for strength and stability, yellow for prosperity and blue for the spirit
of cordiality in which ASEAN affairs are conducted. When ASEAN celebrated
its 30th Anniversary in 1997, the sheaves on the logo had increased to ten –
representing all ten countries of Southeast Asia and reflecting the colors of
the flags of all of them. In a very real sense, ASEAN and Southeast Asia
would then be one and the same, just as the Founding Fathers had
envisioned.

This article is based on the first chapter of ASEAN at 30, a publication

of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in commemoration of its 30th
Anniversary on 8 August 1997, written by Jamil Maidan Flores and Jun
Abad.

Further readings in ASEAN History:

ASEAN Conception and Evolution

ASEAN Conception and Evolution

By: THANAT KHOMAN
1 September 1992
The author was the Foreign Minister of Thailand when ASEAN was founded in Bangkok in
1967. This article was reprinted from The ASEAN Reader, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Singapore, 1992.

On 8 August 1967 the ―Bangkok Declaration‖ gave birth to ASEAN,

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, an organization that would
unite five countries in a joint effort to promote economic co-operation and
the welfare of their peoples. After repeated unsuccessful attempts in the
past, this event was a unique achievement, ending the separation and
aloofness of the countries of this region that had resulted from colonial
times when they were forced by the colonial masters to live in cloisons
etanches, shunning contact with the neighboring countries.

In effect this historical event represented the culmination of the

decolonization process that had started after World War II. Following their
victory in the war, the colonial powers tried their best to maintain the status
quo. However, since they had not even been able to ensure the protection of
their territories against the Japanese invasion, how could they justify their
claim to control them again. In their defeat, the Japanese had effectively
undermined colonial rule by granting some form of autonomy or even
independence to the territories they had earlier invaded, thus sowing the
seeds of freedom from the colonial masters. The process of decolonization,

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inside and outside the United Nations, then advanced at a fast pace and led
to the emergence of a number of independent and sovereign nations.

This created an entirely novel situation which necessitated new

measures and structures. Thailand, as the only nation which had been
spared the plight of colonial subjection thanks to the wisdom and political
skill of its Monarchs, felt it a duty to deal with the new contingencies. Pridi
Panomyong, a former Prime Minister and statesman, tried to promote new
relationships and co-operation within the region. I, myself, posted as the
first Thai diplomat in the newly independent India, wrote a few articles
advocating some form of regional co-operation in Southeast Asia. But the
time was not yet propitious. The world was then divided by the Cold War
into two rival camps vying for domination over the other, leading the newly
emerging states to adopt a non-aligned stance.

When, as Foreign Minister, I was entrusted with the responsibility of

Thailand‘s foreign relations, I paid visits to neighboring countries to forge
co-operative relationships in Southeast Asia. The results were, however,
depressingly negative. Only an embryonic organization, ASA or the
Association of Southeast Asia, grouping Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand could be set up. This took place in 1961. It was, nevertheless, the
first organization for regional co-operation in Southeast Asia.
But why did this region need an organization for co-operation?
The reasons were numerous. The most important of them was the fact that,
with the withdrawal of the colonial powers, there would have been a power
vacuum which could have attracted outsiders to step in for political gains.
As the colonial masters had discouraged any form of intra-regional contact,
the idea of neighbors working together in a joint effort was thus to be
encouraged.

Secondly, as many of us knew from experience, especially with the

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO, co-operation among
disparate members located in distant lands could be ineffective. We had
therefore to strive to build co-operation among those who lived close to one
another and shared common interests.
Thirdly, the need to join forces became imperative for the Southeast Asian
countries in order to be heard and to be effective. This was the truth that we
sadly had to learn. The motivation for our efforts to band together was thus
to strengthen our position and protect ourselves against Big Power rivalry.

Finally, it is common knowledge that co- operation and ultimately

integration [Link] the interests of all- something that individual efforts can
never achieve. However, co-operation is easier said than done.
Soon after its establishment in 1961, ASA or the Association of Southeast
Asia, the mini organization comprising only three members, ran into a snag.
A territorial dispute, relating to a colonial legacy, erupted between the
Philippines and Indonesia on the one hand and Malaysia on the other. The
dispute centred on the fact that the British Administration, upon withdrawal
from North Borneo (Sabah), had attributed jurisdiction of the territory to

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Malaysia. The konfrontasi, as the Indonesians called it, threatened to boil
over into an international conflict as Malaysia asked its ally, Great Britain,
to come to its support and British warships began to cruise along the coast
of Sumatra. That unexpected turn of events caused the collapse of the
fledgling ASA.

While ASA was paralysed by the dispute on Sabah, efforts continued to be

made in Bangkok for the creation of another organization. Thus in 1966 a
larger grouping, with East Asian nations like Japan and South Korea as well
as Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, Taiwan, New Zealand, South
Vietnam and Thailand, was established and known as ASPAC or the Asian
and Pacific Council. However, once again, calamity struck. ASPAC was
afflicted by the vagaries of international politics. The admission of the
People‘s Republic of China and the eviction of the Republic of China or
Taiwan made it impossible for some of the Council‘s members to sit at the
same conference table. ASPAC consequently folded up in 1975, marking
another failure in regional co-operation.

With this new misfortune, Thailand, which had remained neutral in

the Sabah dispute, turned its attention to the problem brewing to its south
and took on a conciliatory role in the dispute. At the time, I had to ply
between Jakarta, Manila, and Kuala Lumpur. After many attempts, our
efforts paid off. Preferring Bangkok to Tokyo, the antagonists came to our
capital city to effect their reconciliation. At the banquet marking the
reconciliation between the three disputants, I broached the idea of forming
another organization for regional co-operation with Adam Malik, then
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Indonesia, the largest
country of Southeast Asia. Malik agreed without hesitation but asked for
time to talk with the powerful military circle of his government and also to
normalize relations with Malaysia now that the confrontation was over.
Meanwhile, the Thai Foreign Office prepared a draft charter of the new
institution. Within a few months, everything was ready. I therefore invited
the two former ASA members, Malaysia and the Philippines, and Indonesia,
a key member, to a meeting in Bangkok. In addition, Singapore sent S.
Rajaratnam, then Foreign Minister, to see me about joining the new set-up.
Although the new organization was planned to comprise only the former ASA
members plus Indonesia, Singapore‘s request was favourably considered.

The first formal meeting of representatives from the five countries -

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand -was held in
the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The group then retired to the seaside
resort of Bangsaen (Pattaya did not exist at that time) where, combining
work with leisure -golf to be more exact -the ASEAN charter was worked out.
After a couple of days, using the Foreign Office draft as the basis, the
Charter was ready. The participants returned to Bangkok for final approval
of the draft, and on 8 August 1967, the Bangkok Declaration gave birth to
ASEAN – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (ASEAN owes its name
to Adam Malik, master in coining acronyms.)

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The formation of ASEAN, the first successful attempt at forging regional co-
operation, was actually inspired and guided by past events in many areas of
the world including Southeast Asia itself. The fact that the Western powers,
France and Britain, reneged on their pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia
promising protection against external aggression, was instrumental in
drawing the attention of many countries to the credibility of assurances
advanced by larger powers to smaller partners. The lesson drawn from such
events encouraged weak nations to rely more on neighborly mutual support
than on stronger states that serve their own national interests rather than
those of smaller partners. For Thailand, in particular, its disappointing
experience with SEATO taught it the lesson that it was useless and even
dangerous to hitch its destiny to distant powers who may cut loose at any
moment their ties and obligations with lesser and distant allies.

Another principle to which we anchored our faith was that our co-operation
should deal with non-military matters. Attempts were made by some to
launch us on the path of forming a military alliance. We resisted; wisely and
correctly we stuck to our resolve to exclude military entanglement and
remain safely on economic ground.
It should be put on record that, for many of us and for me in particular, our
model has been and still is, the European Community, not because I was
trained there, but because it is the most suitable form for us living in this
part of the world -in spite of our parallel economies which are quite different
from the European ones.

However, although we had clearly defined our aims and aspirations,

international realities forced ASEAN to deviate from its original path. Several
developments began to preoccupy ASEAN: the defeat and withdrawal of the
United States from Vietnam and even from the mainland of Asia; the
growing Vietnamese ambitions nurtured by the heady wine of victory; and
the threat of Ho Chi Minh‘s testament enjoining generations of Vietnamese
to take over the rest of French Indochina in addition to the northeastern
provinces of Thailand. Such developments forced ASEAN to turn its
attention to more critical issues, like Cambodia, with the result that
economic matters were almost entirely neglected and set aside.
Although not the original plan or intention of the founders of ASEAN, the
effective and successful opposition to the implementation of Vietnam‘s
Grand Design, using only diplomatic and political means, won a great deal
of plaudits and international credit, lifting it from an insignificant grouping
of small countries to a much courted organization with which more
important states now seek to have contact and dialogue. This has not been a
negligible result. Indeed, ASEAN has greatly benefited from its deviated
performance. ASEAN has now become a well established international
fixture.
While applauding the successes of the Association, it is not my
intention to pass over its weaknesses and shortcomings.
In the first place, the partnership spirit is not fully developed. Some parties
seek to take more than to give even if in choosing the latter course, they may
be able to take much more later on. Indeed, some of them do not hesitate to

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reduce their allotted share in projects, which, in their opinion, would not
immediately bring the highest return, and thus they leave the burden to
other members. In fact, it is common practice at many meetings, to jockey
for selfish gains and advantages, not bearing in mind the general interest.
Nevertheless, the most serious shortcoming of the present system resides in
the lack of political will as well as the lack of trust and sincerity towards one
another. Yet each and everyone in their heart realizes that the advantages of
ASEAN accrue to them all, and no one is thinking of leaving it.

Be that as it may, there is no readiness to admit to these shortcomings. That

is why they put the blame for these deficiencies on the Secretariat which
was set up by the governments themselves. Indeed, they distrust their
subordinate officials to the point that they have not been willing, until
recently, to appoint a Secretary-General of ASEAN, but only a Secretary-
General in charge of the Secretariat.
Whatever problems exist at present, it is not my intention to dwell on them.
They should, however, be resolved as expeditiously and effectively as
possible. Personally, I prefer to look ahead and chart out a course that will
lead to the objectives originally set out, so as to meet the expectations of our
peoples.

The question we should ask is: ASEAN, quo vadis? Where do we go from
here? To this, I would reply that, first of all, we must set ourselves on the
economic track we designed for the Association. This is necessary, even
imperative, now more than ever as the world is being carved into powerful
trade zones that deal with one another instead of with individual nations. At
present, many countries outside our region are prodding us to integrate so
that a single or more unified market will simplify and facilitate trade. That
stands to reason and yet it was only in 1992 when all partners were
convinced of the veracity of the proposition, when the then Thai Prime
Minister, Anand Panyarachun, officially put the idea of an ASEAN Free
Trade Area for discussion at the ASEAN Summit at Singapore. This
meaningful move was logical since ASEAN was born in Thailand. However, it
may take some fifteen years -as requested by some members -before a
rudimentary single, integrated market comes into being.

For the months and years to come, gradual economic integration

should be the credo for ASEAN if we want our enterprise to remain viable
and continue to progress. Otherwise, it may become stagnant, unable to
keep up with the pace of global activity. In spite of the Maastricht setback
where the Danes voted against ratifying the Treaty on European Union, the
European Community will most probably witness sustained expansion with
the addition of former EFTA members as well as a number of Central and
East European countries waiting to join. Meanwhile, NAFTA -the North
American Free Trade Area -is coming into being, parallel to another one
further south of the American continent. Likewise, on the southeast wing of
Europe, Turkey is busy organizing some form of co-operation with the
Islamic states of the Black Sea region of the defunct Soviet Union. All these
activities should be sufficient indication that there is an urgent need for

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ASEAN to scrutinize itself, to update its role, and to implement wider and
more serious organizational reforms -measures that are more meaningful
than simply revamping the Secretariat.

On the non-technical side, political will and the spirit of partnership

greatly need to be strengthened. In the future, competition will be severe.
Political and economic pressure through the use of unilateral measures and
threats will be resorted to without mercy by those who believe in brute force
rather than civilized negotiations, a method which I call ―crowbar‖ diplomacy
proudly proposed by the ―Amazon Warrior‖ before the legislative authorities
of her country. Without appropriate adjustments and improvements, ASEAN
may lose in the race for survival. And time is of the essence. ASEAN, in my
opinion, does not have much leeway to idle or doodle. We should realize that
two or three years are all we really have to implement urgent reforms.

While the pursuit of economic aims, as originally assigned, is

essential, it does not mean the Association should abandon the considerable
political gains it has made. On the contrary, ASEAN should continue to
build upon the prestige and recognition that the outside world has accorded
it. The results of ASEAN‘s past performance especially in the resistance
against Vietnamese military conquests and territorial expansionism, as well
as the unqualified success in preserving peace and stability against all odds,
are evident. Without doubt, ASEAN must strive to consolidate these assets
which will complement its efforts on the economic side. In other words, the
arduous task ahead for the Association will be a double- or triple- track
endeavour which can be crowned with success provided that the
weaknesses mentioned earlier are remedied and all the members, for their
own good and that of their people, decide to carry out their duties and
obligations with determination and a sense of purpose.

On the other hand, we should foresee that, in time to come, not only
will ASEAN have to face the difficult task of creating and maintaining
harmony among its members who have different views, different interests,
and are of different stages of development -factors that in the past have
made the adoption of needed reforms so uneasy -but ASEAN will also have
to cope with the extremely complicated problems of dealing with hard-nosed
opponents and interlocutors among the developed countries.

Finally, as with all organizations and entities, ASEAN will have to realize
that it will not be nor can it be the ultimate creation. In truth, it should be
only a stepping stone, a preliminary or intermediate stage in the process of
international development. As the world progresses, so will ASEAN. At this
juncture, everyone within the Association is aware of this reality. It should
be prepared to move on to the next stage and raise its sights towards wider
horizons. Some nascent possibilities like PECC (the Pacific Economic Co-
operation Council) and APEC (the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation
forum) are already in existence and more or less ready to bloom into
something more stable and viable. So far, ASEAN members have not been
willing to merge with the new entities, for various reasons, the most

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important of which may be a lack of conviction in the latters‘ viability.
Perhaps correctly, ASEAN members prefer to wait for more convincing
indications assuring them of their capacity to survive. They continue to
insist that ASEAN remains the nucleus from which peripheral relationships
might radiate. This is not an unwise approach, apparently dictated by
realism and caution in view of the audacity and increasing arrogance of
certain major powers. A precipitous decision may result in undesirable
entanglement or worse strangulation. Nevertheless, it may be wise for
ASEAN not to lose sight of two important countries further to the south of
Asia -Australia and New Zealand. If and when, they should express a clear
willingness and desire to playa genuine partnership role, they should be
welcome to join in any common endeavour. Their contribution will
undoubtedly increase the strength and capacity of our existing and future
co-operative undertakings, thus enabling us to meet with every chance of
success in future encounters and negotiations with similar entities of other
continents.

Lately, ASEAN has taken up a new assignment by engaging in

discussions on security matters, more precisely on the Spratly Islands
which are claimed by a number of nations, including Vietnam and the
People‘s Republic of China. The dispute threatened to erupt into an armed
conflict after concessions for oil exploration were granted by the People‘s
Republic of China to some American oil companies. If one or more
contestants resort to violence the dispute may degenerate into an ugly
conflict thereby disrupting the peace and stability of the region. For that
reason, Indonesia has already been moved to organize ―workshop‖
discussions to explore the possibility of an acceptable solution.
In the light of the Spratly problem, the ASEAN members prepared a draft
―Code of International Behaviour‖ which rules out any resort to violence.
This draft was tabled at the Manila Ministerial Meeting in 1992 which
approved it, as did the PRC and Vietnam, a dialogue partner and a signatory
of the ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Co-operation respectively. This was what
ASEAN could do, although it was only a moral gesture. Obviously, it could
not obtain from the main parties to the dispute, a categorical pledge not to
resort to violence. It may not be much. It was nevertheless better than
nothing and certainly better than to bury one‘s head in the sand. It is hoped
that in this, as in any other case, wisdom and restraint will prevail.

What will ultimately be the fate of ASEAN?

To this question, I am ready to offer a candid reply, forgetting my role as a
co-founder of the Association. My faith in the usefulness and ―serviceability‖
of ASEAN cannot and will not diminish. If anything, members will find it
beneficial to strengthen it. This is the rationale. In the post Cold War world,
the Western countries find it fit to assert with little restraint or moderation
their ascendancy and dominance, and some even seek to establish their
hegemony over the entire world by claiming undisputed leadership in a so-
called New World Order framework because of the absence of Soviet
challenge and rivalry. The ultimate result would be that other nations will,
ipso facto, become nothing but mere pawns of different size. The smaller

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ones will shrink still further and become even smaller and less significant.
In fact, they will count less on the world scene than before the advent of the
New World Order. Therefore, if they do not combine their minuscule
strength, they will lose all meaning. Now the only place where they can do
something with a measure of success is none other than the ASEAN forum.
Therefore, for our own interests, we cannot afford to be oblivious of this
plain truth and fail to act accordingly.

ASEAN Motto
The motto of ASEAN is “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”.

AIMS AND PURPOSES

As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, the aims and purposes of ASEAN are:
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a
prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the
region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific
and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and
research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and
administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the
study of the problems of international commodity trade, the
improvement of their transportation and communications facilities
and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
6. To promote Southeast Asian studies; and
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing
international and regional organisations with similar aims and
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among
themselves.

Reference:

ASEAN. Org.

Thanat Khoman, ―ASEAN Conception and Evolution‖, in the ASEAN Reader,

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1992.

S. Rajaratnam, ―ASEAN: The Way Ahead‖, in The ASEAN Reader, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1992.

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Sciences

LOSING STATEMENT

You have learned about ASEAN and have traced its

development. By now you should understand the reasons and
the circumstances behind the effort of the Southeast Asian
countries in establishing a regional institution such as ASEAN.
Despite the overwhelming diversity in terms of culture, religion
and political landscape, the countries in Southeast Asia opted to
emphasize unity to promote sustainable peace and development
in the region. Next Stop-ASEAN organization.

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