GLOBALIZATION AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

What Is Terrorism?
What Is Terrorism?
What Is Terrorism?
What is Terrorism?
 Terrorists have sought to achieve their political agendas all over the world.

Here is an overview on terrorism: [Link]

Terrorism is a loaded term, one that stirs both fear and confusion. Charged public debate
in the wake of attacks can make it difficult to grasp the nature of threats and to assess responses.
But understanding terrorism is important, because policies enacted in the name of national
security affect a wide range of issues, such as encryption on mobile phone apps, admission
of refugees1, and distribution of foreign aid.

In the United States, current discussions focus mostly on Islamist terrorism emanating
from the Middle East. Throughout history, however, terrorists all over the world have advanced
diverse political agendas. Even now, most terrorism threats aren’t actually aimed at the United
States: the vast majority of terrorism-related deaths occur in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan,
and Syria. 

In this module, we will

 learn what motivates the four main types of terrorist groups;

 analyze where terrorist attacks occur (the majority happens in just five countries);
 explore how people become radicalized;
 understand who counts as a terrorist according to the U.S. government, and what makes
terrorism international versus domestic;
 recognize why terrorism is often described as requiring the “oxygen of publicity” and
how the media helps shape perceptions of terrorism;
 examine strategies to prevent terrorism available to national security experts;
 survey U.S. counterterrorism2 policies since 1945;
 zoom in on one piece of legislation with enduring influence on how the United States
fights terrorism in the post-9/11 world; and
1
Refugees as defined by the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, someone who has
fled conflict or persecution in their home country, has a reasonable fear that returning would be unsafe, and is
protected by international law. In many countries, the term refugee also refers to someone who has sought and
received asylum in a new country; individuals granted asylum are often legally recognized as refugees by host
countries, allowed to remain, and given certain rights.
2
Counterterrorism is the set of policies and actions—including intelligence collection and analysis, military action,
and homeland security measures—designed to combat terrorism.
  investigate the ways in which terrorists finance attacks, and what this means for the
evolution of terrorism over time.

What the World’s Terrorist Groups Have in Common

Strong ideology motivates those who commit terrorism, no matter their goals.

Terrorism isn’t limited to one group, geographic area, grievance, goal, method, or era.
For the last century, terrorists have committed violence for all kinds of reasons: to create a new
country, carry out a revolution, achieve racist goals, free animals from laboratory testing, end
abortion, and more.

It might, therefore, seem odd that groups with such diverse aims can all be classified as
terrorists. What unites them? One commonality is that strong ideological beliefs drive them to
commit violence.

In part because terrorism encompasses a range of acts and motivations, the term has a
long and contentious history. Yet it’s not impossible to define. Generally, terrorism is understood
to be violence, usually against civilians, committed by people or groups motivated by precise
political and ideological objectives. Terrorists seek to achieve their goals while also inspiring
fear and psychological terror in victims and bystanders. Terrorism isn’t crime—it’s political, and
generally not undertaken for financial gain. And it isn’t war—it’s committed against civilians or
other targets by non-state actors3 (any person or group unrelated to a government) with fewer
resources and less power than the state.

Analyzing terrorist groups—where they come from, why they form, and what they hope
to achieve—is the first step toward combating them. Scholars take various approaches to
categorizing and analyzing groups to recognize patterns of behavior, locate geographic hotspots
and potential targets, and understand the evolution of groups over time. One prominent way is by
ideology: the guiding principles, beliefs, and motivations that drive terrorist behavior. 

3
Non-state actors are individuals or groups that do not belong to or act on behalf of a state. This may refer to
nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International, media outlets such as the New York Times, or
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.
Terrorist groups fall into four broad ideological categories.

 Ethno-nationalist groups. Ethno-nationalist terrorists claim to represent a specific ethnic

or cultural group, often a minority. Distinct in that they seek to control independent
territory, sometimes a separate country, ethno-nationalist groups tend to commit violence
against their so-called rivals, often individuals belonging to a majority. Their grievances
stem from what they characterize as oppressive action (or inaction) on the part of the
government and/or the majority population. 
 Left-wing groups. Driven by anti-capitalist, Marxist ideas, left-wing terrorists typically
aim to overthrow capitalist governments they view as corrupt, elitist, and oppressive.
Unlike ethno-nationalist groups, left-wing ones do not advocate for a specific subset of
the population but argue that their struggle against capitalism and the state will result in
egalitarian benefits for the people at large.
 Right-wing groups. Right-wing groups define themselves in opposition to specific ideas
and people they seek to destroy. They tend to be some combination of nationalist, racist,
white supremacist, xenophobic, anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, anti-communist4, and anti-
government. Often, they have (Christian) religious leanings, favor the military, and fight
to preserve the status quo. On the surface, right-wing groups seem like ethno-nationalist
ones; the main difference is that instead of fighting for generally marginalized groups,
right-wing groups threaten them, up to and including with murder.
 Religious-oriented groups. Religious-oriented groups operate on an extreme
interpretation of faith. Fervent religious motivations distinguish these groups, whose
members tend to believe they are special, even chosen—and superior to those who don’t
share their faith, or simply their version of it. Because religiously motivated terrorists
often believe that they are obligated to commit violence by faith, and that this violence
will lead to salvation, it can be more challenging to curb their violence.

A few caveats: first, these four categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.
Groups operate outside these ideological boxes: animal rights groups for instance, or
environmentally minded ones. And terrorist groups often observe more than one ideology.
For example, ETA, described below, is a group that fought for autonomy and independence for
Basque people in Europe. As a group that also embraced Marxism, ETA can be described both as
an ethno-nationalist and a left-wing group.

Second, despite the fact that much of today’s terrorist activity occurs in specific regions of
the world, these categories know no geographical borders. For example, while many religious
threats have come from those acting on an extreme interpretation of Islam, often based in the
Middle East, Japanese doomsday group Aum Shinrikyo killed dozens in a 1995 sarin gas attack
at the behest of its religious leader.

4
Communist are governments or individuals that follow the philosophy of communism or their interpretation of it.
Directly opposed to capitalism, communism is a political philosophy asserting that private property should be
eliminated in favor or public, egalitarian ownership of factories, farms, natural resources, and more.
 Third, not every terror attack is conducted by a formal group or organization. Individuals
could be radicalized by ideologies promoted by terrorist groups through the internet and
other forms of media. 

With these categories—and caveats—in mind, let’s take a look at several groups from around
the world that meet these ideological criteria. Remember: this list contains just a few groups,
representing a range of backgrounds, objectives, and tactics common in terrorism over the past
fifty or so years.

Here are Terrorist Groups and their Categories

(1) Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Three members of Basque

separatist group ETA call a
definitive end to fifty years of
armed struggle, which has resulted
in at least 850 deaths, in this still
image taken from an undated video
published on the website of
Basque language newspaper
“Gara,” on October 20, 2011.
Source: Gara via Reuters

Who: Active between 1959 and 2018,

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
worked to achieve independence for
two to three million Basque people, a
culturally and linguistically distinct group whose homeland is in a mountainous region traversing
Spain and France. Shortly after its founding, ETA adopted Marxist ideas, so it also qualifies as a
left-wing group.

What: ETA’s members (numbering from fifty to five hundred at various times), supported by
hundreds or thousands of ordinary, non-combatant Basques, sought to achieve a sovereign
Basque state across northern Spain and south-western France. ETA also sought amnesty for all
its members, including prisoners, from the Spanish and French governments.

How: Most of ETA’s attacks occurred in Spain; it primarily used bombings and assassinations to
target Spanish government officials. Victims sometimes included civilians, although ETA often
phoned in warnings of its attacks before
carrying them out. In 2011, ETA officially
ceased armed combat and in 2018 dissolved
after apologizing to victims and their families.

(2) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE)
 LTTE rebels raise their flag at a Black Tigers Day ceremony in the rebel-held northern Sri
Lankan town of Kilinochchi, on July 5, 2004.
Source: Anuruddha Lokuhapuarchchi/Reuters

Who: More commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, this group from Sri Lanka was founded in
1976 on behalf of the Tamils, an ethnic group found mostly in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, as
well as southern India. The group, active in Sri Lanka and India until 2009, is believed to have
had between seven thousand and fifteen thousand fighters.
What: Citing anti-Tamil discrimination and violence by Sri Lanka’s majority, the Sinhalese, the
LTTE aimed to create a separate, independent state for the Tamils, who make up 11 percent of
the population.

How: The LTTE waged guerrilla warfare; it was also known for pioneering the suicide bomb
jacket, as well as the use of women in its attacks, notably in 1991, when an LTTE suicide
bomber killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in India, and in 1993, when it
assassinated the Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa. By 2009, however, the LTTE no
longer had the military might it once commanded, and the Sri Lankan army overcame it, killing
its top leadership in the process.

(3) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

FARC rebel leader Rodrigo Londono,

better known as Timochenko, is seen
on a screen during the opening
ceremony of the group’s congress at
the camp where they prepare for
ratifying a peace deal with the
government, in Yari Plains, Colombia,
on September 17, 2016.
Source: John Vizcaino/Reuters
Who: FARC was active in Colombia between
1964 and 2016. Composed of communist
militants and peasant self-defense groups,
FARC’s membership numbered at eighteen
thousand at its 1999 peak and six or seven thousand by 2016, when peace talks were ongoing.
FARC was formed after a decade of bloody civil conflict and political violence in Colombia
whose resolution was inclusive of the two major political parties but not of any left-wing
organization.

What: During its fifty-year struggle against the Colombian government, FARC sought to
overthrow that government and establish a leftist regime in its place. It claimed to fight for
Colombia’s impoverished rural population; for example, it wanted to keep natural resources
publicly, rather than privately, owned.
How: FARC waged a guerrilla war against Colombian security forces, and fought right-wing
paramilitaries aligned with the government. FARC also carried out acts of terrorism. It
conducted bombings, assassinations, and hijacked a plane; it used taxation, kidnappings, and
drug trafficking to fund its activities. Its victims included many civilians; the conflict resulted in
about seven million people being internally displaced. In 2016, FARC reached a peace
agreement with the Colombian government.

(4) Ku Klux Klan (KKK)

A Klansman with a tattoo on his fingers

that reads “Love” participates with
members of the Nordic Order Knights
and the Rebel Brigade Knights, groups
that both claim affiliation with the Ku
Klux Klan, in a cross-lighting ceremony
on a fellow member’s property in Henry
County, Virginia, on August 9, 2014.
Source: Johnny Milano/Reuters

Who: The KKK is a group of American white

supremacist organizations active since 1866.
Founded during Reconstruction—the post–Civil War period during which the federal
government tried to rebuild the South and enact major reforms, such as the expansion of civil
rights to formerly enslaved people—the Klan is an umbrella term used to describe dozens of
groups that use the Klan name, including the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the Imperial
Klans of America.

What: Since the nineteenth century, the Klan’s motive has been to spread and act upon its
members’ beliefs in white supremacy. Its prominence has fluctuated over the years; although the
group had millions of members a century ago, today, their membership has dwindled. Over its
long history, the KKK has defended the legacy of the Confederacy—slave-holding states that
seceded from and later fought a civil war with the United States—and targeted various minority
groups in the United States, mostly Black people but also immigrants, Jews, and LGBTQ+
people, and at one point, Catholics. Today, KKK members could overlap or ally with neo-Nazis,
white nationalists, and the so-called alt-right.

How: Members of the Klan have resorted to a variety of

tactics to pursue their agenda, including arson, lynching,
rape, and kidnapping; it also bombed a Baptist church in
Birmingham in 1963, killing four Black girls.

(5) Al-Qaeda
 Police officers in New York stand near a full-page wanted poster for Osama bin Laden printed
on a newspaper, in this file photo from September 18, 2001.
Source: Russell Boyce/Reuters

Who: Al-Qaeda was founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden and operates as an international
terrorist network with a number of affiliates around the world that are linked to the central
structure. Al-Qaeda’s large network makes it hard to pinpoint the group’s exact size, but forces
loyal to al-Qaeda and its affiliates likely number in the tens of thousands.

What: Al-Qaeda has several aims: it seeks to unite Muslims to fight the United States and other
Western powers deemed “non-Islamic,” expel Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim
countries, and replace the governments in Muslim countries with fundamentalist Islamic
regimes.

How: Al-Qaeda’s attacks are usually carefully planned over the course of months, sometimes
even years. They are known for their employment of suicide bombings, including multiple
suicide bombings whereby coordinated attacks take place at roughly the same time. The group is
best known for the attacks of September 11, 2001, one of the deadliest terrorism incidents on
record, when it hijacked four U.S. airplanes and crashed two into the World Trade Center, one
into the Pentagon, and one in Pennsylvania, killing 2,996 and injuring over 6,000.

(6) Boko Haram

A signpost painted by Boko Haram is seen

in the recently retaken town of Damasak,
Nigeria, on March 18, 2015.
Source: Emmanuel Braun/Reuters

Who: Founded in 2002 by Islamist cleric

Mohammed Yusuf, the group declared loyalty to
the self-declared Islamic State in 2015. Boko
Haram is based in Nigeria, but the group’s violence
has spread to neighboring countries including
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. It’s fairly
decentralized and currently split into two factions; the group’s membership ranges between four
thousand and eighteen thousand5 militants, including many poor and uneducated young men.

What: Boko Haram’s primary objective is to overthrow the Nigerian government and institute
an Islamic state governed by sharia, Islamic law derived from religious texts. As part of this
campaign, Boko Haram rejects science and Western-style education.

How: Boko Haram’s insurgent tactics have shifted from targeting army and security forces to
targeting civilians via attacks on schools, religious institutions, markets, and towns. In April
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2014, for example, the group kidnapped 276 female students from a government-run school in
Nigeria, garnering a large international response. Since 2011, it has increasingly relied on suicide
bombings.

(7) Islamic State

Math and English textbooks, which include military

imagery, found in an Islamic State facility for child
fighters are pictured in Mosul, Iraq, on February 16,
2017.
Source: Khalid al Mousily/Reuters

Who: The self-proclaimed Islamic State arose from the

aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq that began in
2003. Considered an al-Qaeda affiliate by 2004, it broke
with the organization and became its rival. It is active in Iraq and Syria, and estimates of its
fighters vary, but at its peak, it likely counted between twenty thousand and thirty-one thousand
fighters in its ranks. The Islamic State used propaganda to attract tens of thousands of people
from dozens of countries, many of whom traveled to Syria to fight.

What: The Islamic State’s one clear objective: to establish a single, transnational Islamic
caliphate, or country governed by sharia. It capitalized on civil unrest in Iraq and Syria to
advance its goals and inspired terrorist acts in its name around the world.

How: The Islamic State conquered territory using paramilitary forces and at one point controlled
land in Iraq and Syria almost the size of New Zealand. It intimidated populations under its
control using gruesome tactics such as mass execution, beheading, and rape. In addition, the
Islamic State or individuals allied with it (with the group’s prior knowledge or not) carried out
isolated terrorist attacks. The Islamic State funded its activities from the oil it controlled in Syria,
as well as extortion schemes, taxes, and foreign donations from sympathetic individuals and
groups. Today, territories under Islamic State control have been retaken, but the group hasn’t
dissolved and continues to advocate for its goals and motivate supporters to plan attacks.

Who Counts As a Terrorist?

Who Counts As a Terrorist?
From foreign groups to domestic threats, how does the U.S.
government define terrorism?
 A U.S. flag flies above a razor wire-topped
fence at the Camp Six detention facility at the
Guantanamo Bay naval station, on December
10, 2008.
Source: Mandel Ngan/Pool via Reuters

Terrorist. Terrorist attack.

Terrorism. People hear these words all the time on the news, from law enforcement and from
elected officials, especially in the wake of a violent attack. These terms are used widely, but
sometimes it’s difficult to tell who qualifies as a terrorist, what separates a terrorist attack from
other types of violence, and what actually is terrorism. 

The response to these questions depends on who answers them. Because terrorist threats
can come from anywhere—formal groups, individuals, even countries—and terrorists can pursue
any number of goals, no single definition works in all contexts.

That challenge, however, doesn’t stop governments from trying. Different U.S.
government departments and agencies place terrorism and related threats into several distinct
categories: foreign terrorist organizations, state sponsors of terrorism (countries that finance and
support international terrorism), and domestic threats. Understanding these distinctions is
important, because they reflect a variety of factors, including political considerations, and have
different legal consequences.
Foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) are identified by the U.S.
Department of State.

The U.S. Department of State maintains a list of foreign terrorist organizations6, more than
sixty groups from all over the world with diverse aims. They include al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, two
splinter groups of the Irish Republican Army, and others. Organizations are added—or removed
—based on whether they meet three criteria:

 the group must be from another country;

 it must engage in terrorist acts as defined by the U.S. government, or have the ability and
intent to engage in terrorism; and
 it must threaten the safety of U.S. nationals or U.S. national security—including national
defense, relations with other countries, and economic concerns.

The FTO designation carries certain legal consequences:

 It is illegal for any U.S. citizen, or anyone in the United States, to provide terrorist groups
with material support such as money, housing, false identification, and equipment or
weapons.
 U.S. financial institutions can’t house or process funds from FTOs and must report any
money from terrorist groups to the Department of the Treasury.
 Members of an FTO are not allowed to enter the United States. If one is already living in
the United States, the U.S. government may be able to deport them.

Adding an organization to the list of FTOs is not a decision taken lightly and often includes
political considerations, including relationships with U.S. allies and the allocation of foreign aid.
For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan arguably meets the criteria for designation, yet the U.S.

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government declines to label it a foreign terrorist group because doing so would
complicate peace negotiations7 with the group.

The State Department also keeps a list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The list of state sponsors of terrorism8 identifies countries determined by the U.S.

government to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terror. To determine
which countries qualify, the U.S. government uses a specific definition of international terrorism
found in U.S. law:

 International means that the act of terror involves the citizens or the territory of multiple
countries.
 Terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence” that attacks
civilians and is carried out by groups or people acting in secret. 

Four countries are currently on the list: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria. These countries
face similar legal restrictions to foreign terrorist organizations, including

 sanctions to prevent these countries from receiving most forms of U.S. foreign assistance
(assistance could be anything from deploying Peace Corps volunteers to financing health
projects in the country); and
 bans on selling or exporting defense technology—including weaponry, military vehicles,
and aircraft—to the countries.

Even if a country is deemed to sponsor terrorism internationally, political considerations still

influence its inclusion on the list. After twenty years on the list, North Korea was removed in
2008 as part of a deal to encourage the country to get rid of its nuclear weapons program. In
2017, however, President Donald J. Trump redesignated North Korea a state sponsor of

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terrorism, a decision also intended to encourage denuclearization but, this time, using the
opposite approach—applying sanctions that, for example, prevent U.S. aid from going to any
foreign governments that help North Korea and forbid any government or person who trades
with North Korea from also doing business with the United States.

Domestic terrorism is treated differently than international terrorism.

In the two decades since September 11, hundreds of people have died in domestic terror
attacks. This means domestic terrorism is also a law enforcement priority. However, its treatment
by the U.S. government differs greatly from that of international terrorism: there is no
centralized, public, official list of domestic terrorist organizations or sponsors. Tracking
domestic terrorism falls primarily to the FBI, which defines it as “perpetrated by individuals
and/or groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse
extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.”  

The FBI does maintain a list of most wanted terrorists9, people charged with federal
crimes, and people it deems responsible for domestic terrorism10. None of the individuals in the
latter group, however, are actually charged with domestic terrorism, because no crime called
domestic terrorism exists in U.S. law. Instead, someone is charged with murder, assault, or other
violent crimes. 

Notably, the FBI also periodically identifies what it calls threats (such as militia
extremists plotting to overthrow the U.S. government) or homegrown violent extremists (people
in the United States who have been radicalized but aren’t working with an FTO).  The FBI
coordinates a separate terrorist watch list, comprised of people suspected of involvement in
terrorist activities or of providing aid to terrorists also exists, to which multiple government
agencies contribute. The famous “no fly list” is derived from this watch list. 

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Terrorist designations determine the consequences of committing terrorist acts.

The difficulty in defining domestic terrorism does not only limit who gets designated as a
threat, it also affects the legal consequences for committing acts of terror in the United States.
Under U.S. law, a perpetrator can be explicitly charged with a crime relating to international
terrorism but not domestic acts. Even though U.S. government agencies, and laws like the Patriot
Act, offer definitions of terrorism, those definitions haven’t been translated into specific crimes
with which a prosecutor can charge someone.

What this means is that if an investigation into a violent act reveals a political motive and
links to an FTO, the perpetrator can be labeled a terrorist and prosecuted under those specific
laws, which allow, in part, for much longer terms in prison. This was the case with the 2017 van
attack in New York City that killed eight people, because the perpetrator declared allegiance to
the self-proclaimed Islamic State.

But for domestic perpetrators with no links to FTOs and whose ideology is sometimes
harder to prove, the consequences are different. The federal government has no laws specifically
for prosecuting domestic terrorism. For example, someone like the perpetrator of the 2017 Las
Vegas shooting, which killed fifty-eight and injured over five hundred, who had no political
motive that the FBI could find, would have been charged with murder and other crimes—not
domestic terrorism—if he had not died by suicide during the shooting.

Lone Wolf attackers: are they terrorists?

Another common term in debates over terrorism is lone wolf. The term is used to
describe attackers who seem not to be officially connected to a terrorist organization (even if
they were possibly inspired by one), and who seem to independently commit acts of violence—
for example, the police used the term to describe the perpetrator of the 2017 Las Vegas shooting.
It’s used to distinguish people and events like the Las Vegas shooting from those like the 9/11
attacks, several sophisticated, well-funded, organized terrorist attacks carried out simultaneously
by multiple people.

Lone wolf is a controversial term among experts for several reasons. Some find it
misleading, arguing that people have to be radicalized somewhere, by something or someone,
and therefore can never be said to be acting entirely alone. If an attacker is inspired by
propaganda, such as explicit calls to violence, can they really be considered lone wolves? Some
experts also assert that the term lone wolf is glamorizing and should thus be avoided.

The term is still frequently used, including by law enforcement and elected officials, and
is important to know. The FBI investigates potential lone wolf attackers, whom it considers a top
U.S. national security threat. According to a 2015 research brief11, in the United States, lone
wolves make up 6 percent of terrorists but are responsible for 25 percent of attacks, and their
attacks tend to be harder to predict and prevent given their more isolated nature. 

Who counts as a terrorist and what counts as terrorism is a debate that remains unresolved.

As questions over what counts as terrorism and who counts as a terrorist persist, it’s
important to remember that describing something as terrorism doesn’t necessarily make it so
legally. Eagerness to precisely define or categorize an attack or attacker in the wake of an event
leads to confusion and debate over what qualifies as terrorism, especially since 9/11, which
spawned a sprawling U.S. counterterrorism infrastructure that has focused its attention and
resources on international terrorism, despite other genuine, deadly threats.

Terrorism by the Numbers

Terrorism by the Numbers
What the numbers behind terrorism—and the process of getting to them—reveal.

Pakistani Taliban fighters gesture toward the

camera before leaving Buner, about 60 miles
northwest of Islamabad, on April 24, 2009.
Source: Reuters

On June 15, 2021, President Joe Biden

announced the United States’ first-ever
National Strategy for Countering Domestic
Terrorism. This new approach, directed at
addressing the dangers of domestic terrorism,
marked a shift away from previous U.S. counterterrorism strategy, which since the attacks of
September 11, 2001, has focused on the risk of terrorist attacks from abroad. 

With so much changing, data can help explain where terrorist threats to the United States
come from and whether the country is at higher risk of terrorism than other places around the
world.

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 Since 9/11, terrorism has loomed large as a pervasive security issue. Has terrorism really
reached an unprecedented level, or has sensational news coverage inflated the threat? Is terrorism
a danger in some places more than others?

To start answering those questions, the first step is to determine what actually
counts as a terrorist attack.

Defining terrorism is a challenge, requiring researchers to make a number of decisions

when classifying incidents as terrorist attacks. 

The Global Terrorism Database, operated by START at the University of Maryland, is

the largest public database on terrorist violence. It is a compilation of every terrorism incident on
record since 1970 and includes information detailing the location of each attack, the group
responsible, the type of weapon used, the number of casualties, and more.

START’s definition of a terrorist incident is based on three criteria; an attack must meet at
least two of those to be listed in the START database:

 The violent incident is designed to meet a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
 It’s meant to coerce, intimidate, or convey another message to a broader audience.
 It targets civilians and is not an act of war.

Terrorism is, by definition, frightening. When fear drives decision-making, the resulting
policies can easily respond to the wrong threats. Collecting global data on terrorist attacks and
deaths allows researchers to confirm or challenge claims about the threat of terrorism, which can
be inflated by politicians or media coverage. The data collected by START reveals, among other
things, that the vast majority of terrorist attacks don’t make international headlines, and half of
terrorist attacks claim no lives. A comprehensive look at terrorism allows policymakers to
develop strategies that take into account the real nature of terrorist attacks: the groups
responsible, the methods they use, the grievances that drive them, and the places they act.

What trends emerge from the data in our post-9/11 world? 

Zeroing in on the United States reveals that terrorism-related deaths have increased since
2013 after a decade of remaining relatively low. The uptick in fatal terrorist incidents and
particularly lethal events—like mass shootings—have caused this spike.

Because the overall volume of terrorist attacks in the United States is low relative to other
parts of the world, one attack with a significant number of casualties can have an outsize effect
on the data. Although upward trends are worrying, the United States faces a relatively low threat
from terrorism compared to other parts of the world.

Globally, terrorist violence went up significantly between 2002 and 2014.

This trend began to reverse itself in 2014, which was the deadliest year on record in terms
of terrorism-related deaths. Since 2014, both the number of terrorist incidents and resulting
deaths have actually declined—a trend not always clear from media coverage—but both remain
at historically high levels. For example, terrorist attacks in 2017 were more than three times as
common as they were in 2007.
Both the 2014 peak in terrorist violence and the subsequent decline are the result
of a stark reality: a few particularly lethal groups operating in areas of conflict
across the Middle East, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa have driven a majority of
the world’s deaths due to terrorism. 

Up to 99 percent of all terrorism-related deaths have occurred in countries embroiled in

conflict or that have high levels of political terror (meaning extrajudicial killings, torture, and
imprisonment without trial), such as Iraq, Somalia, and Syria. In 2018, over half of all deaths
from terrorism took place in Afghanistan and Nigeria.

The Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and al-Shabab (an al-Qaeda affiliate) were
responsible for more than half—53 percent—of all terrorism-related deaths caused by known
groups between 2002 and 2018.
 Logically, then, the decrease in terrorist violence since 2014 is the result of the
containment of the deadliest terrorist groups in the places where they are most active. The
Islamic State has lost all of its territory in Iraq and Syria, and starting in 2015 Nigeria launched a
military campaign against Boko Haram.

The data illustrates the correlation between conflict and terrorism, which START does
not consider an act of war, but mostly happens within the context of conflict. As conflict has died
down, so has terrorism: deaths from terrorism and battlefield deaths have climbed and fallen
together in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen. Analyzing these two trends,
it’s clear that the vast majority of terrorism is used as a tactic within an armed conflict or against
repressive political regimes.

However, several Western countries—many without a recent history of conflict within

their borders—have experienced an alarming trend: a surge in far-right terror attacks.

The 2020 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), using data from START’s Global Terrorism
Database as well as other sources, reported that since 2014 far-right attacks have increased 250
percent to reach forty-nine incidents across North America, Oceania (Australia and New
Zealand), and Western Europe, and related deaths have spiked by more than 700 percent, from
eleven deaths in 2014 to eighty-nine in 2019. And although these attacks and deaths represent a
small minority of terrorist incidents and casualties worldwide, they illustrate a growing threat.

Why are these attacks increasing? And what are far-right terrorists trying to accomplish? 

According to the GTI, the far right refers to a political ideology focused on one or more
of the following elements: strident nationalism that is usually somehow racial or exclusivist,
fascism, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-immigration sentiment, chauvinism, nativism, and
xenophobia.
 A multitude of factors drives the far right, including disillusionment with government and
a sense of perceived victimhood. In the West, far-right terrorism has also escalated amid growing
political unrest and polarization. 

According to the GTI, this ideology poses a particular threat to the United States. Half of
all far-right terror incidents between 2002 and 2019 occurred in the country, as did 40 percent of
all deaths, of which there were 113. 

Back in 2009, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report [PDF] warned that

the election of the country’s first Black president, as well as the economic recession, would
“present unique drivers for right-wing radicalization and recruitment.” More than a decade later,
in October 2020, the DHS labeled white supremacist extremists the “most persistent and lethal
threat” facing the United States.

White supremacist extremists believe in the global superiority of white people and

oppose what they see as the deliberate erosion of white societies by changing demographics and
immigration. And although the violent activities of white supremacists—some of whom were
part of the mob at the U.S. Capitol insurrection on January 6, 2021—have recently dominated
headlines, this ideology is nothing new. 

Experts trace the roots of white supremacist ideology back to the age of imperialism and
the transatlantic slave trade and see its influence throughout history on laws, institutions, and
events such as the development of the Jim Crow segregation system in the United States after the
American Civil War and the rise of South Africa’s apartheid government in the mid-twentieth
century. Societies around the world continue to grapple with the effects of white supremacist
ideology. 

Today, the internet has created new potential for the global ideology to spread and
provided a streamlined pathway to radicalization. Online, like-minded extremists have forged
connections with few barriers and shared their views near instantaneously with devastating
results. As far-right attacks have increased, white extremist killers around the globe have
referenced or been inspired by previous attackers, revealing a transnational web of connections
between perpetrators and the enabling role of the internet and social media.

Below, let’s explore the consequences far-right and white supremacist ideologies have
not just on the United States but on societies around the globe.

Far-Right Terrorist Incidents: Case Studies

Here are examples of far-right terrorist incidents around the world.

United States

A man places a wreath at the Grand

Candela memorial for the victims of the
Walmart mass shooting on the evening of
the one year anniversary of the massacre at
a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, on August 2,
2020.

Source: Paul Ratje/ Routers

Federal Prosecutors allege that on August 3,

2019, Patrick Crusius drove several hours
through Texas to reach El Paso, a city on the border between the United States and Mexico, to
target and attack the Hispanic/Latinx community. Shortly before opening fire at the city’s
Walmart, which was busy with back-to-school shoppers, Crusius is accused of having posted an
anti-immigrant manifesto online, which also referenced his support for the Christchurch attacks
in New Zealand.

Crusius is alleged to have killed twenty-two people and injured dozens of others. Crusius’ trial is
on-going; he faces ninety federal charges under hate crime and weapons laws – and, potentially,
the death penalty.

The Anti-Defamation League has called the El Paso shooting the deadliest white supremacist
attack in the United States in more than half a century.

Two women hug paying their respects

outside the Emanuel African Methodist
Episcopal Church in Charleston, South
Carolina, on June 20, 2015, three days
after a mass shooting which left nine dead
during a bible study at the church.
Source: Bryan Snyder/Reuters

United States
On June 17, 2015, Dylann Roof entered
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal
Church (also known as Mother Emanuel) in Charleston, South Carolina, during the
congregation’s Bible study. After forty minutes, Roof opened fire on the Black parishioners at
the church and murdered nine people.
Under police questioning after the attack, Roof told law enforcement he sought to kill Black
people and claimed he was motivated by revenge and a desire to start a “race war.” He also told
the FBI he believed white people had become second-class citizens in the United States.

In December 2016, Roof was convicted on thirty-three charges including murder and federal hate
crimes. One year later, he was sentenced to the death penalty. (Roof has appealed this sentence.)

United Kingdom
People hold hands as they attend a special
service for murdered Labour Party MP Jo
Cox, at Trafalgar Square in London on
June 22, 2016.
Source: Toby Melville/Reuters

United Kingdom
On June 16, 2016, Thomas Mari shot and
stabbed British member of parliament Jo Cox
to death. As a member of the United
Kingdom’s Labour Party Brexit, the push for
the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. Just one week before the public voted on
Brexit, Cox’ attacker charged at her while she was visiting a library in her constituency.
According to reports, he said: “Britain first” and “keep Britain independent.”
After Mair was taken into custody, police searched his home and found Nazi-related and far-
right reading materials as well as a newspaper clippings on Anders Breivik.

Mair was sentenced to life in prison in November 2016, with trial’s judge designating Mair’s
motive the advancement of white supremacy and exclusive nationalism.

Norway
People mourn for the victims of the
shooting spree and bomb blast during
a memorial arch outside Oslo City
Hall on July 25, 2011.
Source: Erlend Aas/Scanpix via Reuters

Norway
On July 22, 2011, Norwegian neo-Nazi
Anders Breivik planted a bomb outside a
government building in Oslo, killing
eight people and injuring many others. Soon after leaving the bomb, Breivik drove to a summer
camp for young people associated with Norway’s left-leaning Labour Party. Dressed as a police
officer, Breivik opened fire at the camp, killing sixty-nine people.

At the ensuing criminal trial, one witness, a police superintendent, described Breivik telling him:
“I must save Norway from Islamization.” He viewed his violent attacks as a way to combat
multiculturalism and immigration. Breivik was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison, the
maximum sentence in Norway.

The twin attacks remain the deadliest in Norwegian history since the Second World War.

Germany
A memorial plaque and propped up
wreaths are seen outside the
synagogue during the
commemoration ceremony for
victims of a shooting at a synagogue
and a kebab shop one year ago in
Halle, Germany, on October 9,
2020.
Source: Fabrizio Bensch/Reuters

Germany
On the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur in October 2019, Stephan Balliet attempted to break into a
synagogue in Halle, Germany. Hindered by the lock on the door, the shooter targeted people
outside and beyond the synagogue, killing two people and injuring two others.

The gunman livestreamed his attack, labeled a far-right terror attack by Germany’s justice
minister, and included anti-Semitic anti-immigrant, and anti-feminist commentary. During his
trial, Balliet denied the existence of the Holocoust, the state-sponsored killing of over six million
Jews in Nazi Germany, and revealed that he was inspired to attack the Halle synagogue after the
Christchurch, New Zealand, terror attacks.

Balliet was sentenced to life in prison. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Germany has
experienced forty-eight far-right terror attacks since 2002, the second-highest number for
Western countries.

New Zealand
 A student and a woman attend the
burial ceremony of a victim of the
mosque attacks, at the Memorial Park
Cemetery in Christchurch, New
Zealand, on March 21, 2019.
Source: Edgar Su/Reuters

New Zealand
On March 15, 2019, Australian Breton
Tarrant attacked the Al Noor mosque in
Christchurch. In an online manifesto containing anti-immigrant, anti-muslim, and white
supremacist references posted before the attack, Tarrant claimed to have been inspired by terror
attacks in the United States, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Upon entering the
mosque, the shooter opened fire while livestreaming the attack, which killed more than forty
people.

After targeting the Al Noor mosque, Tarrant proceeded to the Linwood Islamic Centre just a few
miles away and murdered an additional eight people. Dozens more were injured in both attacks.

He was designated a right-wing extremist terrorist by officials and sentenced to life in prison
without parole.

What’s Next?

Although the risk of terrorism in the Philippines is relatively small compared to other places, the
recent increase in domestic terrorism has made clear that no country is entirely safe from these
threats. Understanding how terrorism data is collected—and the trends it reveals—can help put
threats in perspective both domestically and internationally, and help policymakers decide how
to address them.

Radicalization and Right-Wing Extremism

Learn how the domestic terror threat has evolved since 9/11.
 The U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, DC, is breached by thousands of protesters
during a "Stop The Steal" rally in support of President Donald Trump during the
worldwide coronavirus pandemic on January 6, 2021.
Source: Mihoko Owada/Star Max via AP

Following the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
launched its war on terror—a sprawling, decades-long campaign to combat violent extremism
around the world.

In the past twenty years, the U.S. government has spent trillions of dollars waging two
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, fighting the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and
hunting down foreign terrorist organizations in Somalia, Yemen, and several other countries,
predominantly in the Muslim world.

However, amid a recent surge in domestic terrorist attacks from groups such as white
supremacists and neo-Nazis, U.S. counterterrorism operations have begun to turn inward,
focusing on the rising threat of home-grown, right-wing extremism.

“There’s never been a more dangerous time in the twenty years since 9/11,” says Farah
Pandith, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former diplomat, and
pioneer in the field of countering violent extremism. She sat down with Caroline Netchvolodoff,
CFR’s vice president of education, for a conversation about the most pressing security threats
facing the United States, the rise of right-wing violence, and the ways the U.S. government and
Silicon Valley can better combat extremism.

This interview was conducted in June 2021 and has been condensed and edited.

Caroline Netchvolodoff: How does the threat of terrorism facing the United States today
compare to other points in recent history?

Farah Pandith: There’s never been a more dangerous time in the twenty years since 9/11. Far
more people today are at risk of radicalization.
CN: How so?

FP: With al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State, you primarily had young people who
were being recruited. Mind you, these groups have not gone away; they’re still out there.

But now we’ve had an explosion of white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and other extremist groups,
which began to blossom during the Trump administration. We saw what happened with the
attack on the Capitol on January 6. These groups don’t just sweep up young people. They attract
retirees and veterans to their ideologies in addition to millennials, Gen Z, and Gen Alpha.

Neo-Nazis, alt-rightists, and white supremacists encircle and chant at

counter-protestors at the base of a statue of Thomas Jefferson after
marching through the University of Virginia campus with torches in
Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 11, 2017.
Source: Samuel Corum/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

CN: Why do you think we’re seeing a surge in threats from white supremacists and similar
groups now?

FP: It’s a combination of things. Identity and belonging are at the core of these ideologies.
There’s also the politicization of what a true American is and how to properly understand
American history.

We have hundreds of militia groups in the United States, but it was never the kind of threat that
we’re seeing today. Before, they didn’t necessarily feel they had the capacity to do what they
wanted to. Now, they have the money, they are much more organized, and they feel like they
have supporters out there.

We’re set up for a dangerous decade ahead. I agree with the Department of Homeland Security
that violent white supremacy is the greatest domestic terror threat facing the United States.

CN: Do you think the United States was prepared to handle this threat?

FP: No. As the 9/11 commission stated, our biggest failure twenty years ago was the failure of
imagination.
Now look at QAnon. The Department of Homeland Security has had intelligence for a really
long time on this conspiracy theory. And what did the Trump administration do? They said it
was so far-fetched that it could never be a threat. That should not be the response.

QAnon talks about a satanic cult of blood-drinking madness, and we think that no one is going to
buy it. But guess what? Now, one in five people believes in QAnon. And just like after 9/11,
we’re wringing our hands and saying, “How can it be?”

Source: PRRI (2021)

CN: Now that this threat is more visible and better understood, does the United States have the
necessary laws in place to crack down on this form of domestic extremism?

FP: I don’t think so. We never imagined we would need the type of federal laws that are used
against foreign terrorist organizations or have to use similar counterterrorism strategies, like
tracking and disrupting funding. But I think the Biden administration understands this and is
trying to figure out what to do.

Also, the U.S. government has not held Silicon Valley accountable—mostly because it did not
imagine two things. One, the government failed to realize that Silicon Valley would not do
things for the common good. We were behind the eight ball there, and so we lack adequate laws
around things like hate speech. Two, when the government realized algorithms were doing harm,
it did not slap them down with rules and regulations.

The government and society have to align in terms of what we find acceptable, just as we do
around pornography and child trafficking.
 A man holds up a large "Q" sign while waiting in line to see then-
President Donald J. Trump at his rally on August 2, 2018, in Wilkes
Barre, Pennsylvania. "Q" represents QAnon, a conspiracy theory group.
Source: Rick Loomis/Getty Images

CN: What else should the U.S. government be doing to combat such radicalization?

FP: With ISIS, we saw how millennial recruiters drew in other millennials. What we ought to be
doing with white supremacists is similarly understanding all the signals we see online and
offline, which can come from old-school stuff like radio and new-school stuff like TikTok. We
have to look at what people eat, what they wear, what they listen to, and who they’re hanging out
with. This type of cultural intelligence can serve as a predictor.

During our last conversation, I noted that the answers to stop recruiting are both available and
affordable. We know we need to scale up authentic, credible voices at the local level. And so,
whether it’s a graffiti artist, a hip-hop artist, or an athlete, these young people can connect with
them. This isn’t just a problem that governments have to solve. This is a problem that every
citizen in the world needs to get engaged in: It’s politicians. It’s journalists. It’s businesspeople.
It’s philanthropists. It’s regular citizens. It’s teachers. It’s peer groups.

CN: We've heard the term “lone wolf” used to describe terror attacks in the United States. Do
you feel like that is a fair characterization?

FP: I’ve never liked the term lone wolf. Nobody wakes up and just has the idea to shoot up a
synagogue. They learned it. They sucked in the air of hate, and they saw it done elsewhere—like
in Christchurch, New Zealand. 

So an extremist may not have allegiance to a nonstate actor, but it’s connected. It’s inspired by
and is part of a larger movement.

CN: Do you think far-right extremists in the United States influence foreign terrorist groups, and
vice versa?
FP: Yes. We already know that groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda espouse a narrative
around the United States hating Islam. So if white supremacist violence results in bad things
happening to Muslims at a higher pace in our country or in Europe, those groups will say they
were right.

There is also a danger to these groups learning from each other. The white supremacists have
already used the Islamic State as a playbook—even though their ideologies are totally different.
The Islamic State was super successful. They knew how to do this. So why wouldn’t white
supremacists replicate their tactics?

Terrorism and the Media

How terrorists use the media—and how coverage can shape terrorism. 
In 1985, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher urged officials to “to find ways to
starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.” Three
years later, she took her own advice and banned television and radio stations in the United
Kingdom from broadcasting the voices of members of Irish paramilitary groups. The so-called
British broadcast ban was just one chapter in the long history of the symbiotic relationship
between the media and terrorists. From Russian radicals landing front-page coverage in the
nineteenth century to present-day attacks captured on smartphones or streamed online, this
uneasy dynamic has existed for more than a century

Watch this video online: [Link]

Tools of Counterterrorism
National security experts have a range of options available as they work to
prevent terrorism.
Counterterrorism works to both defeat current terrorist threats and reduce the likelihood of future
ones. That two-part mission requires a range of policy tools, some tactical and some strategic.

The video presentation through this link discusses how government try to prevent
terrorist attacks: [Link]

How a Single Phrase Defined the War on

Terror
The open-ended scope of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force has
justified counterterrorism policy for two decades—and counting.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, two hijacked planes crashed into the twin towers
of the World Trade Center, a third struck the Pentagon, and a fourth was headed for Washington,
DC, when passengers overtook the hijackers and brought the plane down in Pennsylvania.

The 9/11 attacks targeted the symbolic centers of U.S. business and security, killing
nearly three thousand people and fundamentally changing Americans’ perceptions of security,
privacy, religious extremism, and geopolitics. Post-9/11 policies affect the most mundane and
most profound aspects of American lives—from boarding an airplane to grappling with the
ramifications of drone warfare.

The second tower of the World Trade Center explodes after being hit by
a hijacked airplane in New York, on September 11, 2001.
Source: Sara K. Schwittek/Reuters

In the chaotic aftermath of the deadliest terrorist incident on record, Congress passed a
series of laws reorganizing and empowering U.S. intelligence agencies and the military to
combat the threat from terrorism. It is not surprising that the U.S. government enacted these
changes in the wake of the attacks. What is striking, however, is how many of those measures are
still in place today, and have served as the foundation of U.S. foreign and domestic policy for
nearly twenty years. 

In particular, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) has been
interpreted, many experts say, far beyond its original scope, serving as the justification
for counterterrorism policies through almost two decades.

What is an AUMF?

The president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but the White House needs
Congress’s permission to use military force abroad for any operation lasting longer than sixty
days. Lawmakers can declare war, giving the president broad powers, but that practice is
effectively obsolete; Congress issued its last official declaration of war during World War II.
Alternatively, Congress can pass a law authorizing a narrower scope of military operations.
AUMF laws serve as that authorization, and they typically restrict military action to specific
locations and, often, time frames. The 2001 AUMF, however, is so broad that it has been
compared to declarations of war and is arguably, in one respect, even broader: the enemy is
described, rather than named.

Its open-ended nature means that the 2001 law is still operational and that it has been
used to justify some of the most significant national security policy and military operations since
9/11.

Source: AUMF = The Authorization for Use of Military Force

Drafted in the hours after the 9/11 attacks and passed three days later, the sixty-word
resolution authorized the president to take action against those responsible for the attacks on
September 11:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons.

The 2001 AUMF was passed in the midst of a national emergency, and it unambiguously
allowed for a military response against those responsible for the attacks. What has become a
subject of great debate, however, is whether it can actually authorize the actions that subsequent
administrations have taken under the law’s auspices. 
A GROWING LIST OF AUTHORIZATIONS
THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: 2001

U.S. marines supporting Operation Enduring Freedom disembark from an amphibious assault ship, on
October 29, 2001.
Source: Earnie Grafton/Reuters

The first major policy step, clearly based on the 2001 AUMF, was the invasion of
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, less than a month after the 9/11 attacks. Launched with support
from the United Kingdom, Operation Enduring Freedom targeted al-Qaeda (which “planned”
and “committed” the attacks) and the Taliban (which “harbored” al-Qaeda). Osama bin Laden,
the founder of al-Qaeda who claimed responsibility for directing the attacks, was ultimately
killed by U.S. forces in 2011.
DETAINING ENEMY COMBATANTS AT GUANTANAMO
BAY: 2001–PRESENT

Military Police at Guantanamo Bay bring a detainee, who arrived at the camp injured, to an
interrogation room for questioning, on February 2, 2002. At the time, there were one hundred and fifty
eight detainees in Guantanamo Bay.
Source: Marc Serota/Reuters

One month later, Bush, citing his authority under the AUMF, issued a military order outlining his
administration’s plans for the detention, treatment, and trial of enemy combatants in the war on
terror. His order led to hundreds of alleged al-Qaeda members being detained at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The detentions faced legal challenges, but in 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the
president’s authority to detain enemy combatants, calling it a “fundamental incident” of the use
of military force. In other words, in a war, preventing a fighter on the other side from returning
to the battlefield is part of the deal: by authorizing the war itself, the Supreme Court held,
Congress had authorized the natural next step, detention. The AUMF became the main source of
presidential authority to detain enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.
THE GROUNDWORK FOR IRAQ WAR: 2002

A U.S. marine watches as a statue of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is brought down in central
Baghdad, on April 9, 2003. The 2001 AUMF remained part of the legal foundation for the Iraq War.
Source: Goran Tomasevic/Reuters

In October 2002, Bush convinced Congress to pass another AUMF by arguing that Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein was an al-Qaeda ally and that “confronting the threat posed by Iraq is
crucial to winning the war on terror.” This additional AUMF, known as the Iraq Resolution,
authorized military force in Iraq, but the 2001 AUMF remained part of the legal foundation for
the Iraq War. In a March 2003 letter to Congress announcing the start of the U.S. invasion, Bush
quoted the 2001 AUMF: “The use of armed force against Iraq is consistent,” he wrote, with
necessary action against “those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”

THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: 2002–

2007

The U.S. national intelligence director walks past a video screen during a visit by U.S. President
George W. Bush at the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Maryland, on January 25, 2006.
Source: Jason Reed/Reuters
 According to the Bush administration, the 2001 AUMF not only authorized military
action abroad but also permitted intelligence operations within the United States. In 2005, a New
York Times story revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) had been wiretapping U.S.
citizens without warrants since 2002. The monitoring captured international calls and emails that
authorities thought were potentially linked to terrorist activity.

The Bush administration pointed to the AUMF as legal justification for the so-called
Terrorist Surveillance Program. Using the Supreme Court’s 2004 ruling on the AUMF, Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales equated the necessity of gathering intelligence to the need for
detaining enemy combatants, both “fundamental incidents” of using military force.

In response to the ensuing public outcry over privacy concerns, Congress set broad legal
constraints on the NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program. The program was later significantly
rolled back under the Obama administration.

TARGETING AL-QAEDA’S ASSOCIATED

FORCES: 2006–PRESENT

Residents inspect damaged buildings in what activists say was a U.S. strike, in Kfredrian, Idlib
Province, Syria, on September 23, 2014.
Source: Abdalghne Karoof/Reuters

In addition to al-Qaeda and the Taliban (clear targets of the 2001 AUMF), the United
States has also taken military action against the “associated forces” of those organizations. The
phrase associated forces is not included in the 2001 AUMF; instead, the Bush administration
began using it as a reference to groups fighting alongside al-Qaeda or the Taliban against the
United States or U.S. coalition partners.

White House officials have argued that the 2001 AUMF authorizes attacks on these
associated forces and have used that argument to support air strikes, targeted killings, and ground
operations against groups such as al-Shabab in Somalia, the Islamic State in Khorasan, and al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.

After Bush, the Obama administration continued to target associated forces. The self-
proclaimed Islamic State did not exist when the AUMF was passed—in fact, it has been in open
conflict with al-Qaeda since 2014. Regardless, the Obama administration considered the Islamic
State an associated force and took military action against the terrorist group. 

AIR STRIKES AGAINST SYRIAN GOVERNMENT: 2017

U.S. President Donald J. Trump announces military strikes on Syria while delivering a statement from
the White House in Washington, DC, on April 13, 2018.
Source: Yuri Gripas/Reuters

The Trump administration has also used the 2001 AUMF to defend military actions
with increasingly nebulous justification. After the Syrian government used chemical
weapons against civilians in 2017, Trump ordered air strikes against the government forces.
Though Syria was not technically part of the original scope of the 2001 AUMF, Paul D.
Ryan, then the speaker of the House of Representatives, said the president “has the
authority to attack under the existing AUMF.” However, the administration itself did not
elaborate why, precisely. This was seen as the latest in a string of isolated actions
undertaken by presidents, with no backing from Congress or the United Nations, covered—
however tenuously—by the AUMF.

IS THE 2001 AUMF HERE TO STAY?

In 2015, Obama pressured Congress to pass a new AUMF that would more specifically
cover action against the Islamic State, but lawmakers failed to agree on the scope of any new
authorization law. In 2018, a group of senators did introduce draft language for a new AUMF,
but it did not impose a time limit or create other significant restrictions . It stalled in the Senate,
regardless.

For now, the 2001 AUMF remains operational. In part, the lawmakers who drew up the
original text are responsible for its longevity: they did not include any details on how to review
the law to make changes or how to terminate it when the mission is complete. 

But it’s not just the text of the law that’s broad—it’s also the concept the 2001 AUMF is
trying to counteract. While past force authorizations did not always include timing restrictions,
they would implicitly end when the specified enemy was defeated. But terrorism is not a specific
enemy. So how can the U.S. government know when terrorism has been defeated? 

The 2001 AUMF is unique in that it authorizes the use of force against not only other
countries but also unspecified organizations and individuals connected to international terrorism.
It is therefore difficult to determine whether the United States has finally achieved the goal for
which military force was originally authorized—or whether the U.S. government has
overreached in its effort to prevent future attacks.

The Terrorist Money Trail

What the challenges of targeting terrorists’ finances tell us about the evolving
terrorist threat.

Evidence is displayed during a hearing for suspected members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb at a
military court in Tunis, Tunisia, June 9, 2012.
Source: Zoubeir Souissi/Reuters

On September 10, 2001, a man named Mohamed Atta visited an ATM in South Portland,
Maine.  From security footage, it looked like a routine transaction.  But it was hardly ordinary:
the money he withdrew had been transferred from accounts run by a senior al-Qaeda operative in
the United Arab Emirates.  The next morning, Atta steered American Airlines flight 11 into the
north tower of the World Trade Center.
 Targeting terrorist finance became a priority after the 9/11 attacks, when the U.S.
government tried to identify moments when it could have stopped al-Qaeda’s plot. Wire
transfers, newly opened bank accounts, ATM transactions, car rentals, and ticket purchases could
have been flagged, potentially, had someone been closely monitoring the operatives’ financial
activity.

Today, “following the money” remains a major part of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

Terrorists need funds to carry out attacks and maintain their organizations. U.S. officials can
both frustrate potential attacks by restricting terrorists’ access to cash and learn more about how
and where terrorist groups are operating by keeping an eye on their finances.

To do this, the U.S. government first expanded its own operations. Days after 9/11,
President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13224,  which froze all assets in the United
States of designated Islamist terrorist groups and associated individuals. As of January 2021, the
list of people and groups designated under this executive order has grown to more than 1,500
pages long.

Bush’s executive order also expanded the powers of the treasury secretary to
impose sanctions on banks around the world. Reinforced by the Patriot Act, it effectively cut off
foreign banks that did not cooperate with American investigators from doing business in the
United States or in U.S. dollars. The government also called on the private sector, namely, the
big banks that have a global presence, to flag suspicious transactions and freeze suspected
terrorist accounts.

These strategies have achieved some success, both in disrupting financial flows and in
using financial intelligence to disrupt attacks. In 2007, for example, a propaganda video showed
al-Qaeda’s finance chief asking for money, reminding supporters that “funding is the mainstay
of jihad.”  Investigators, alerted in part by large transactions disguised as earthquake relief, foiled
a 2006 plot to blow up British planes traveling to the United States with liquid explosives.
Nonetheless, the fight to bankrupt terrorism faces a number of challenges.

First, ideology—not profit—drives terrorism, and terrorists are flexible when it comes
to where they get their money. They usually have multiple funding sources, such as profits from
illegal activities, money funneled from charities, and direct donations.  The wide range of
examples illustrates the extent of the challenge for counterterrorism officials. In the 1980s, a
charity called the Irish Northern Aid Committee, or NORAID, had a large presence in New York
and Boston, and was a major source of overseas funding for the Provisional Irish Republican
Army.   In addition to receiving donations from people and charities based in Saudi Arabia
(including the questionably named organization, Help Africa People ), al-Qaeda operated a string
of legitimate businesses, including honey shops in Yemen and Pakistan, to earn revenue and
move money covertly.

Terrorists often tap into local criminal enterprises, using existing networks instead of
putting time and resources into creating their own. FARC, for example, profited from
Colombia’s cocaine trade because it controlled land used to grow the coca plant.  Unlike
Colombia’s drug cartels, however, FARC depended on the illegal drug business for just a portion
of its revenue stream that also included kidnapping for ransom, mining minerals, extorting
energy companies, and taxing gold mines. Terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and Boko
Haram also raise funds through human trafficking—one of the world’s most profitable crimes,
which generates $150 billion annually. For terrorist groups, money is simply a means to an end,
rather than an end in itself.

Financial tools also have limits. At the so-called Islamic State’s height in late 2014, it
was reportedly worth $2 billion and often referred to as the world’s wealthiest terrorist
organization. A pseudo-state controlling a territory the size of Britain, it exploited what it had:
land, resources, and a population of, at one point, 11 million.  The group taxed people and
businesses at extortionary rates, sold oil below market rate, looted villages as they were
conquered, and imposed fines for minor infractions.  The Islamic State did not depend heavily on
the international financial system; therefore, freezing bank accounts and imposing
targeted sanctions could have limited effect on the group. Seizing the Islamic State’s territory, its
real source of its wealth, required military, not financial, operations. But military and financial
strategies can work in tandem: some coalition military operations targeted the Islamic State’s
economic infrastructure, aiming to limit the group’s ability to pay fighters and keep
its governance running.
 Finally, terrorism can be done on the cheap. Attacks themselves are often inexpensive, a
reflection of an evolution in tactics. The elaborate and devastating 9/11 attacks cost close to half
a million dollars, and much of the counter-finance infrastructure put in place was designed to
look for large transfers of money. But no attacks since then have come close, cost-wise. Even al-
Qaeda’s coordinated 2004 Madrid transit bombings—ten bombs exploded simultaneously on
four trains, killing nearly two hundred people—cost less than $50,000. Recent examples, like
the 2016 truck attack in Nice, France, suggest that attacks are only getting cheaper. A 2015 study
found that the majority of European-based terrorist cells between 1994 and 2013 have been self-
funded, and three-quarters of attacks in Europe have cost less than $10,000 each.
 Financial measures alone cannot stop terrorism completely, nor can every suspicious
transaction be flagged. But most policymakers argue that that is not the point: the goal of
interrupting terrorist finance is not to eliminate the threat but to make it harder for groups to
operate. Counterterrorism officials need a variety of tools to both undermine the ideological pull
of terrorism and prevent terrorists from easily acting on their beliefs. Financial tools represent
just one part of a broader strategy to manage an evolving threat.

Terrorism Module Assessment

Questions to check your understanding.

Assessment will be posted in your Google Classroom.

Terrorism Reading List

Supplemental readings and other resources to help you explore a full range
of issues and debates related to the module materials.

CFR Resources

Peter Bergen and David Sterman, “The Real Terrorist Threat in America,” October 30, 2018.

A short essay that argues that the United States needs to widen its counterterrorism focus
beyond just foreign jihadi threats. (1,300 words)

Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, “Colombia’s Civil Conflict,” last updated January 11, 2017.

A brief survey of the history and current status of the Colombian government’s conflict with
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgents. (1,900 words)

Claire Felter, “Nigeria’s Battle With Boko Haram,” last updated August 8, 2018.

A brief introduction to a major African terrorist group. (1,700 words)

Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, “Hezbollah,” last updated January 3, 2014.

An introductory backgrounder on Hezbollah, the militant group and Lebanese political party.

(1,800 words)

Articles

Jon Lee Anderson, “Death of the Tiger,” New Yorker, January 17, 2011.

A story of the end of the Sri Lankan civil war and the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam, commonly known as the Tamil Tigers. (11,400 words)
Mark Bieter, “The Rise and Fall of ETA,” Blue Review, November 12, 2013.

A comprehensive look at the Basque terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA).
(11,500 words)

Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” New York Times, July
29, 2014.

An article that shows a catalog of ransom payments made to terrorists and explores the
consequences of these payments. (4,500 words)

David Hambling, “IRA Historian: Today’s Terrorists Are ‘Amateurs’—and Still Deadly,”
Wired, December 11, 2008.

A look at the Irish Republican Army and how its tactics presaged modern terrorist tactics.
(1,700 words)

David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, “Aum’s Shoko Asahara and the Cult at the End of the
World,” Wired, July 1, 1996.

A profile of the Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo. (7,000 words)

Brendan I. Koerner, “Why ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War,” Wired, April 2016.

A look at the Islamic State group’s media strategy. (7,000 words)

Nick Miroff, “‘Do You Know What It’s Like to Spend Twenty Years at War?’,” Washington
Post, September 30, 2016.

A collection of photos and interviews with fighters from FARC, cataloging their daily life.
(1,700 words) 

Evan Osnos, “The Imam’s Curse,” New Yorker, September 14, 2015. 

A long-form article that examines the U.S. government’s fight against terrorist financing
through the lens of one Pakistani-American family accused of material support of terrorism.
(6,700 words)

Janet Reitman, “Jahar’s World,” Rolling Stone, August 1, 2013.

A profile of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of the perpetrators of the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombing. (11,300 words)

Janet Reitman, “U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. Now
They Don’t Know How to Stop It.,” New York Times Magazine, November 3, 2018. 

An examination of how and why the U.S. government has overlooked domestic terror threats.
(11,500 words)

Andrew Walker, “Join Us or Die: The Birth of Boko Haram,” Guardian, February 4, 2016.
 An excerpt from Walker’s book that tells the story of the founding of Boko Haram. (4,600
words)

Katie Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common—and More Deadly,” Frontline,
July 14, 2016. 

An article that uses two 2016 attacks to discuss the growing trend of “lone wolf” attacks,
exploring how they differ from other forms of terrorism. (2,500 words)

Books

Nitsana Darshan-Leitner and Samuel M. Katz, Harpoon: Inside the Covert War Against
Terrorism’s Money Masters, 2017.

An account of an Israeli program to disrupt terrorist finances, tactics of which were later
adopted by the United States. (312 pages)

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2006.

A scholarly introduction to terrorism. (456 pages)

Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: the Secret History of American Counterterrorism, 2006.

An account of U.S. counterterrorism efforts from World War II to 9/11. (428 pages)

Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS, 2015. 

A Pulitzer Prize–winning account of the history of the Islamic State. (351 pages)

Graeme Wood, The Way of the Strangers: Encounters With the Islamic State, 2016.

A book based on extensive interviews with Islamic State supporters that explores what leads
people to assist or join the group. (352 pages)

Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, 2006.

A Pulitzer Prize–winning account of the rise of Islamist terror, al-Qaeda, and 9/11. (480
pages)

Multimedia

Michael Barbaro, “The American Women Who Joined ISIS,” The Daily, New York Times,
February 22, 2019. 

A discussion of how Western countries are responding to women fleeing the Islamic State.
(30 minutes)

Nicole L. Cvetnic and Maureen Chowdhury, “How Does a Crime Get Classified As ‘Domestic
Terrorism’?,” McClatchy, February 9, 2018.

A brief explanation of the term domestic terrorism. (2 minutes)

Barak Goodman, “Oklahoma City,” American Experience, August 24, 2017.  

An award-winning documentary on the 1995 bombing of a federal government complex in

Oklahoma City. (113 minutes)

Carlos Maza, “This Is Your Brain on Counterterrorism,” Vox, March 20, 2017. 

A brief explanation of how media coverage of terrorism can lead viewers to overestimate the
risk terrorism poses. (7 minutes)

“Oops,” in Radiolab, June 28, 2010.

A podcast episode that includes the chilling story of what drove the terrorist known as the
Unabomber to violence. (60 minutes)

Kelsey Padgett and Matthew Kielty, “60 Words,” Radiolab, April 18, 2014. 

An exploration of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. (58 minutes)

Stephanie Savell and 5W Infographics, “This Map Shows Where in the World the U.S. Military
Is Combatting Terrorism,” Smithsonian, January 2019. 

A visualization of where and how U.S. counterterrorism efforts are taking place.