DEFINITIONS

  a. Political Law

Political law is that branch of public law which deals with the organization, and operations of
the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of
its territory. Political law (or political activity law) is an established legal practice area
encompassing the intersection of politics and law. Political law comprises election law, voting
rights law, campaign finance law, laws governing lobbying and lobbyists, open government
laws, legislative and executive branch ethics codes, legislative procedure, administrative
procedure, constitutional law, and legislative and regulatory drafting. Political laws are applied
primarily to government officials, candidates, advocacy groups, lobbyists, businesses, nonprofit
organizations, and trade unions.

   b.   Constitutional Law

the body of rules, doctrines, and practices that govern the operation of political communities. In
modern times the most important political community has been the state.
Modern constitutional law is the offspring of nationalism as well as of the idea that the state must
protect certain fundamental rights of the individual. As the number of states has multiplied, so
have constitutions and with them the body of constitutional law, though sometimes such law
originates from sources outside the state. The protection of individual rights, meanwhile, has
become the concern of supranational institutions, particularly since the mid-20th century.

   c.   Constitution

: the basic principles and laws of a nation, state, or social group that determine the powers and
duties of the government and guarantee certain rights to the people in it

: a written instrument containing the fundamental rules of a political or social

organizationespecially, capitalized : the U.S. Constitution—
compare CHARTER, DECLARATION
NOTE: A constitution was originally simply a law, ordinance, or decree usually made by a
king, emperor, or other superior authority. A constitution now usually contains the
fundamental law and principles with which all other laws must conform. Unlike the U.S.
Constitution, the British Constitution is not set down in a comprehensive document, but is
found in a variety of statutes (as the Magna Carta) and in common law. Canada inherited
many of the rules and practices that are considered part of the British Constitution, but the
Constitution of Canada is also set down in comprehensive documents, such as the
Constitution Act, 1982 and the C

   d.   Administrative Law

administrative law, the legal framework within which public administration is carried out. It
derives from the need to create and develop a system of public administration under law, a
concept that may be compared with the much older notion of justice under law. Since
administration involves the exercise of power by the executive arm of government,
administrative law is of constitutional and political, as well as juridical, importance.

There is no universally accepted definition of administrative law, but rationally it may be held to
cover the organization, powers, duties, and functions of public authorities of all kinds engaged in
administration; their relations with one another and with citizens and nongovernmental bodies;
legal methods of controlling public administration; and the rights and liabilities of officials.
Administrative law is to a large extent complemented by constitutional law, and the line between
them is hard to draw. The organization of a national legislature, the structure of the courts, the
characteristics of a cabinet, and the role of the head of state are generally regarded as matters of
constitutional law, whereas the substantive and procedural provisions relating to central and local
governments and judicial review of administration are reckoned matters of administrative law.
But some matters, such as the responsibility of ministers, cannot be exclusively assigned to either
administrative or constitutional law. Some French and American jurists regard administrative
law as including parts of constitutional law.

The law relating to public health, education, housing, and other public services could logically be
regarded as part of the corpus of administrative law; but because of its sheer bulk it is usually
considered ancillary.
Defining principles

One of the principal objects of administrative law is to ensure efficient, economical, and just
administration. A system of administrative law that impedes or frustrates administration would
clearly be bad, and so, too, would be a system that results in injustice to the individual. But
to judge whether administrative law helps or hinders effective administration or works in such a
way as to deny justice to the individual involves an examination of the ends that public
administration is supposed to serve, as well as the means that it employs.

   e.   Law of Public Officers

THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 

Define Appointment.  Discuss its nature. 

Held:  An “appointment” to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by

one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and
functions of an office or trust.  The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of
the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order to render it effective.  Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the
part of the appointing authority.  In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,  reiterated in Flores v. Drilon, this Court has held: 
“The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary.  The appointing power has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.  It is a prerogative
of the appointing power x x x.”       

Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.  In the
exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral thereof.  (Bermudez v. Torres,
311 SCRA 733, Aug. 4, 1999, 3rd Div. [Vitug]) 

May the Civil Service Commission, or the Supreme Court, validly nullify an appointment on
the ground that somebody else is better qualified? 

Held:  The head of an agency who is the appointing power is the one most knowledgeable to
decide who can best perform the functions of the office.  Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer vested with such power according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law.  If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred.  Indeed, this is a prerogative of the
appointing authority which he alone can decide.  The choice of an appointee from among those
who possess the required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be
made by the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational
structure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function. 

As long as the appointee is qualified the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to
and respect the appointment even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials. 
The law limits the Commission’s authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the
legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else.  If they do then the
appointments are approved because the Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its
will for that of the appointing authority.  Neither can we.  (Rimonte v. CSC, 244 SCRA 504-505,
May 29, 1995, En Banc [Bellosillo, J.]) 

Does the “next-in-rank” rule import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the
person next-in-rank must be appointed to the vacancy? 

Held:  The “next-in-rank rule is not absolute; it only applies in cases of promotion, a process
which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position higher either in rank or salary.  
And even in promotions, it can be disregarded for sound reasons made known to the next-in-
rank, as the concept does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person
next-in-rank must be appointed to the vacancy.  The appointing authority, under the Civil Service
Law, is allowed to fill vacancies by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
reemployment, and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service eligibility, not
necessarily in that order.  There is no legal fiat that a vacancy must be filled only by promotion;
the appointing authority is given wide discretion to fill a vacancy from among the several
alternatives provided by law. 
What the Civil Service Law provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person
holding the position next in rank thereto “shall be considered for promotion.” 

In Taduran v. Civil Service Commission, the Court construed that phrase to mean that the person
next-in-rank “would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified.” 
In Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court elaborated the import of the rule in the
following manner: 

“One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher
vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed.  The rule
neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
authority to promote such person to the next higher position x x x” (Abila v. CSC, 198 SCRA
102, June 3, 1991, En Banc [Feliciano])               

Can a person who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position be appointed to it in
a permanent capacity?  Illustrative case. 

                Held:  At the outset, it must be stressed that the position of Ministry Legal Counsel-
CESO IV is embraced in the Career Executive Service.  X x x 

                In the case at bar, there is no question that private respondent does not have the
required CES eligibility.  As admitted by private respondent in his Comment, he is “not a CESO
or a member of the Career Executive Service.” 

                In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al., the Court held: 

It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he s being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed.”  Achacoso did not.  At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as
temporary.  And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and “at a
moment’s notice,” conformably to established jurisprudence. 

The Court, having considered these submissions and the additional arguments of the parties in
the petitioner’s Reply and of the Solicitor-General’s Rejoinder, must find for the respondents. 

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure in its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications.  Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it.  A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed
to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.  The appointment
extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. 

                Evidently, private respondent’s appointment did not attain permanency.  Not having
taken the necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain the requisite eligibility, he
did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed eligibility for a
position in the Career Executive Service.  Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal
Counsel-CESO IV/Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely temporary.  Such
being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed right to security of tenure.

                Private respondent capitalizes on his lack of CES eligibility by adamantly contending
that the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnels under the Career
Executive Service do not apply to him because he s not a Career Executive Service Officer. 
Obviously, the contention is without merit.  As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
non-eligibles holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain
immobile in their status.  Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium vesting them
with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not enjoy. 

                Then too, the cases on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent find no
application in the present case.  To reiterate, private respondent’s appointment is merely
temporary; hence, he could be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating his
right to security of tenure.  (De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 1, Jan. 22, 2001, En Banc
[Ynares-Santiago]) 

In the career executive service, is a career executive service (CES) eligibility all that an
employee needs to acquire security of tenure?  Is appointment to a CES rank necessary for
the acquisition of such security of tenure? 

                Held:  In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which
presupposes a permanent appointment is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by
the CES Board x x x. 

As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two requisites must concur in order that an
employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit: 

CES eligibility; and

Appointment to the appropriate CES rank. 

In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive
service (except first and second level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and
not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed.  Thus, a career executive
service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his
rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned.  In fact, a CESO suffers no
diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is
compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he
occupies. 

In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible,
does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is – CES rank level V, for the position of
Regional Director of the LTO (Region V).  Falling short of one of the qualifications that would
complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of
security of tenure.  Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other positions in the career
executive service.  x x x 
Moreover, under the mobility and flexibility principles of the Integrated Reorganization Plan,
CES personnel may be reassigned or transferred from one position to another x x x. 

One last point.  Respondent capitalizes on the fact that petitioner Luis Mario M. General is not a
CES eligible.  The absence, however, of such CES eligibility is of no moment.  As stated in Part
III, Chapter I, Article IV, paragraph 5(c), of the Integrated Reorganization Plan – 

“x x x the President may, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive
Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career
Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he
qualified in such examination.” 

Evidently, the law allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to the
obtention of said eligibility, in the same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not
possess the required CES rank (CES rank level V) for the position of Regional Director of the
LTO, is permitted in a temporary capacity.  (General v. Roco, 350 SCRA 528, Jan. 29, 2001,
1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago]) 

How are positions in the Civil Service classified?  Discuss the characteristics of each. 

                Ans.:  Positions in the Civil Service may be classified into: 1) Career Positions, and 2)
Non-Career Positions.  

Career Positions are characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as
far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2)
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure (Sec. 7, Chap.
2, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V, E.O. No. 292).  

The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than of the usual
tests of merit or fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made (Sec. 9, Chap. 2, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V, E.O. No. 292).

What is a primarily confidential position?  What is the test to determine whether a position is
primarily confidential or not? 

Held:  A primarily confidential position is one which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude
of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom
from intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal
trust or confidential matters of state. (De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 [1950]) 

Under the proximity rule, the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential
employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the
latter’s belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures
freedom of discussion without fear or embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.  Withal, where the position occupied is more
remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant.  (CSC v. Salas, 274 SCRA 414, June 19, 1997)

Does the Civil Service Law contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges? 

Held:  By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the
phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against
whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the
form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office” and
not included are “cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30)
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary” (Paredes v. Civil Service
Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 85) or “when respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no
occasion for appeal.” (Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965, 968)  In other words,
we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law  “does not contemplate a review
of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges” enunciated
in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission (192 SCRA 84); Mendez v. Civil Service Commission
(204 SCRA 965); Magpale v. Civil Service Commission (215 SCRA 398); Navarro v. Civil
Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority (226 SCRA 207) and more
recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission (237 SCRA 184). (CSC v. Pedro O. Dacoycoy,
G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, En Banc [Pardo])

What is preventive suspension?  Discuss its nature. 

Held:  Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is

not a penalty in itself.  It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged
may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same
is being investigated.  Thus preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of
removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 807.  While the former
may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is
the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final
disposition of the case.  (Beja, Sr. v. CA, 207 SCRA 689, March 31, 1992 [Romero])

Discuss the kinds of preventive suspension under the Civil Service Law.  When may a civil
service employee placed under preventive suspension be entitled to compensation? 

Held:  There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged
with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
investigation (Sec. 51, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292) and (2) preventive suspension pending
appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after
review, the respondent is exonerated (Section 47, par. 4, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292). 
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.  It is a measure intended to enable
the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from
intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him.  If the investigation is not finished
and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent
will automatically be reinstated.  If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the
charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.  However, no compensation was due for the
period of preventive suspension pending investigation.  The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No.
2260) providing for compensation in such a case once the respondent was exonerated was
revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was deleted. 

But although it is held that employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are
not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, they are entitled to
compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found
innocent. 

Preventive suspension pending investigation x x x is not a penalty but only a means of enabling

the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation.  On the other hand, preventive
suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered
illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. 
Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension.  (Gloria v. CA,
G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza])

Discuss the power of Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations, and to impose

preventive suspension. 

Held:  Worth stressing, to resolve the present controversy, we must recall that the authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.  x x x 

R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman the statutory
power to conduct administrative investigations.  x x x 

Section 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority x
x x. 

Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave misconduct and dishonesty.  That the
Office of the Ombudsman may conduct an administrative investigation into the acts complained
of, appears clear from the foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770. 

However, the question of whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over a
particular act or omission is different from the question of whether or not petitioner, after
investigation, may be held administratively liable.  This distinction ought here to be kept in mind
even as we must also take note that the power to investigate is distinct from the power to suspend
preventively an erring public officer. 
Likewise worthy of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an
official subject to its administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law.  x x x 

We have previously interpreted the phrase “under his authority” to mean that the Ombudsman
can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch
of government in which they are employed, excepting of course those removable by
impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary. 

The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the
Deputy Ombudsman.  This is the clear import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 abovecited. 

There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like the petitioner, to
prevent that official from using his office to intimidate or influence witnesses (Gloria v. CA, et
al., G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, p. 7, 306 SCRA 287) or to tamper with records that might
be vital to the prosecution of the case against him (Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto, et al., G.R. No.
134495, December 28, 1998, p. 9, 300 SCRA 494).  In our view, the present controversy simply
boils down to this pivotal question: Given the purpose of preventive suspension and the
circumstances of this case, did respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave abuse of
discretion when he set the period of preventive suspension at six months? 

Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770 x x x may be imposed when, among other
factors, the evidence of guilt is strong.  The period for which an official may be preventively
suspended must not exceed six months.  In this case, petitioner was preventively suspended and
ordered to cease and desist from holding office for the entire period of six months, which is the
maximum provided by law. 

The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong as to warrant preventive
suspension rests with the Ombudsman.  The discretion as regards the period of such suspension
also necessarily belongs to the Ombudsman, except that he cannot extend the period of
suspension beyond that provided by law.  But, in our view, both the strength of the evidence to
warrant said suspension and the propriety of the length or period of suspension imposed on
petitioner are properly raised in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.  X x x

Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently strong to justify
the imposition of preventive suspension against petitioner.  But considering its purpose and the
circumstances in the case brought before us, it does appear to us that the imposition of the
maximum period of six months is unwarranted. 

X x x [G]ranting that now the evidence against petitioner is already strong, even without
conceding that initially it was weak, it is clear to us that the maximum six-month period is
excessive and definitely longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case
against petitioner.  We must conclude that the period during which petitioner was already
preventively suspended, has been sufficient for the lawful purpose of preventing petitioner from
hiding and destroying needed documents, or harassing and preventing witnesses who wish to
appear against him. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207, Sept. 10, 1999, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing]) 
Distinguish preventive suspension under the Local Government Code from preventive
suspension under the Ombudsman Act.

Held:  We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to

petitioner’s claim that the Local Government Code, which he averred should apply to this case of
an elective local official, has been violated.  True, under said Code, preventive suspension may
only be imposed after the issues are joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days.  Here,
petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to refute first the charges against him,
and for the maximum period of six months provided by the Ombudsman Law.  But as
respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are
distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code.  Respondents point out that the
shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of
suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be motivated
by partisan political considerations.  In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer
period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a
constitutional body.  The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of whether there has
been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension. 

                Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter period of
preventive suspension imposable under the Local Government Code.  Political color could taint
the exercise of the power to suspend local officials by the mayor, governor, or President’s
office.  In contrast the Ombudsman, considering the constitutional origin of his Office, always
ought to be insulated from the vagaries of politics, as respondents would have us believe. 

                In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,  on the matter of whether or not the Ombudsman has been
stripped of his power to investigate local elective officials by virtue of the Local Government
Code, we said: 

“Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.  The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other.” 

                It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension under the
Ombudsman Law is “much too repugnant” to the 60-day period that may be imposed under the
Local Government Code.  But per J. Vitug, “the two provisions govern differently.”  

                However, petitioner now contends that Hagad did not settle the question of whether a
local elective official may be preventively suspended even before the issues could be joined. 
Indeed it did not, but we have held in other cases that there could be preventive suspension even
before the charges against the official are heard, or before the official is given an opportunity to
prove his innocence.  Preventive suspension is merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation and is not in any way the final determination of the guilt of the official concerned. 

                Petitioner also avers that the suspension order against him was issued in violation of
Section 26[2] of the Ombudsman Law x x x. 
                Petitioner argues that before an inquiry may be converted into a full-blown
administrative investigation, the official concerned must be given 72 hours to answer the charges
against him.  In his case, petitioner says the inquiry was converted into an administrative
investigation without him being given the required number of hours to answer. 

                Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner was given the requisite 72 hours to submit a
written answer to the complaint against him.  This, however, does not make invalid the
preventive suspension order issued against him.  As we have earlier stated, a preventive
suspension order may be issued even before the charges against the official concerned is heard. 

Moreover, respondents state that petitioner was given 10 days to submit his counter-affidavit to
the complaint filed by respondent Tagaan.  We find this 10-day period is in keeping with Section
5[a] of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman x x x. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314
SCRA 207, Sept. 10, 1999, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing]) 

Does Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and, therefore, the Sandiganbayan erred in decreeing the preventive suspension order against
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago?  Will the order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act
No. 3019 not encroach on the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution? 

                Held:  The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order. 

                The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an

incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has
both legal and jurisprudential support.  X x x 

                In the relatively recent case of Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated: 

“The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended – treating of the suspension pendente lite of
an accused public officer – may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this
Court.

“The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid

information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or
temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service.” (At pp. 336-337) 

                It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it.  Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order
of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.”  Explaining
the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan: 
“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.  In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension.” 

                In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered
to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court
has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public
officials and employees indicted before it. 

                Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which
he has been charged.  Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that
it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular
office under which he stands accused. (Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, supra; Segovia v.
Sandiganbayan, supra.) 

                     En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as

the validity of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard
and fast rule as to the conduct thereof.  It has been said that – 

“ ‘x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing.  Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF
THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of
due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal
Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or
he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117
of the Rules of Court x x x.’ 

                                “Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his

prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of
Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to
present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. 

“However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for
which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act No.
3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the
same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the
ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense.  In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity
of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts
alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense
punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code.” (Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187 [1971]; People v. Albano, 163 SCRA 511, 517-519
[1988])
                      The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-
suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds.  Neither does it contemplate a
proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the
gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the
court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. 
All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 

                The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension. 

                The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each –  

“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member.  A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” (Section 16[3],
Article VI, 1987 Constitution) 

                The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive

measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, upon an erring member.  Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes
by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of Congress.  The Court ruled: 

“x x x  Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals

with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly
behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to
the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – in
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.”

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
Members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.  The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government – the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. 
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit.  Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of “actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also in the determination of
“whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”  The provision
allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any
government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it
malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu.  In its normal concept, the
term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not
deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government.  It is
an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can
unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention.  If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to
be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in
the manner prescribed by the Charter itself. 

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order. 

Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner.  The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant
issue raised by petitioner.  (Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636, April 18, 2001, En
Banc [Vitug])

May an elective public official be validly appointed or designated to any public office or
position during his tenure? 

                Ans.:  No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any

capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.  (Sec. 7, 1st  par., Art. IX-B, 1987
Constitution)

May an appointive public official hold any other office or employment? 

                Ans.:  Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation. (Sec. 7, 2nd  par., Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution) 

May the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants hold
any other office or employment? 
                Ans.:  The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.  (Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) 

Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B? 

                Held:  The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section
7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: “Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries.” 

                We rule in the negative. 

                The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as
members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent
during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority.  There was a proliferation of newly-created
agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations created by
presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with the
corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office.  X x
x 

                This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-
enrichment.  X x x 

                Particularly odious and revolting to the people’s sense of propriety and morality in
government service were the data contained therein that Roberto v. Ongpin was a member of the
governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations;
Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco,
Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C.
Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Rono of twelve (12) each; Manuel P.
Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and
Teodoro Q. Pena of ten (10) each. 

                The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent
with the Marcos regime.  It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the
overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it
was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its
proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not
correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. 
X x x 

                But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already
contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the
government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically
prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in
the Constitution itself. 

                Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional
provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. 

                Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with
other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or
employees from holding other offices or employment.  Under Section 13, Article VI, “[N]o
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government x x x.”  Under section 5(4), Article XVI, “[N]o member of the armed forces in
the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries.”  Even Section 7(2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides “[U]nless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government.” 

                It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or
employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.  In striking contrast is the
wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that “[T]he President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.”  In the latter
provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase “in the
Government.”  The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-
embracing and covers both public and private office or employment. 

                Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: “They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”  These sweeping, all-
embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are
not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress,
members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. 
                Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.  In other words, Section 7,
Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.

                This being the case, the qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided
under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.  To construe said qualifying phrase as
respondents would have us to do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and
purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other
offices or employment in the government during their tenure.  Respondents’ interpretation that
Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B
would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the
high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to assistant Secretary, on the
one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant
Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government
during their tenure. 

                Moreover, respondents’ reading of the provisions in question would render certain
parts of the Constitution inoperative.  This observation applies particularly to the Vice-President
who, under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or employment when so
authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of
Article IX-B is absolutely ineligible “for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.”  Surely, to say that the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution” found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1)
of Article IX-B would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing
the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet (Sec. 3, Ibid.), and to act as President
without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not have been chosen or
fails to qualify (Sec. 7, Article VII).  Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by
interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-
B providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the
exception thereto.  In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be construed vis-
à-vis Section 13, Article VII. 

               Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their
tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity.  On its face, the
language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be
a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices and
employment.  Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation (Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky 596;
6 S.W. 457; Hunt v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, 3 S.W. 233).  The phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as
a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII.   

                It being clear x x x that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s
manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. 

                In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional.  Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order
No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from
doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. 

                The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result
from a strict application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the
operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their
offices held in an ex-officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of
legislation.  As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official
concerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of his office do not fall under the definition of “any other office” within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.  With respect to other offices or employment
held by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical
consequences are more apparent than real.  Being head of an executive department is no mean
job.  It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and
expertise.  If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head’s ability and expertise,
he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental offices or employment.  He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts,
attention and energy among too many positions and responsibility, which may result in
haphazardness and inefficiency.  Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of
attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and economic
development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head
spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle. 
                Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the Court hereby
orders respondents x x x to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as
herein defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.  (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, Feb. 22,
1991, En Banc [Fernan, CJ]) 

Does the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials’ office? 

                Held:  The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under
Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required (As opposed to the term “allowed” used in
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution, which is permissive.  “Required” suggests
an imposition, and therefore, obligatory in nature) by the primary functions of said officials’
office.  The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials.  To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd
consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National
Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115.  Neither can the Vice-President,
the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to
exist for lack of a chairperson and members.  The respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, would also be prohibited. 

                Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd
consequences.  A Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not
to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd
consequences, if possible, should be avoided. 

                To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as
covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official’s office.  The term ex-
officio means “from office; by virtue of office.”  It refers to an “authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position.”  Ex officio likewise denotes an “act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office.”  An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a
certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.  To illustrate, by express provision of
law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority (Sec. 7, E.O. 778), and the Light Rail Transit
Authority (Sec. 1, E.O. 210). 

                The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position in Rafael v.
Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, thus: “An examination of Section 2 of
the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and members of the Board to
qualify they need only be designated by the respective department heads.  With the exception of
the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio.  I order to be designated they must
already be holding positions in the offices mentioned in the law.  Thus, for instance, one who
does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be
designated a representative from that office.  The same is true with respect to the representatives
from the other offices.  No new appointments are necessary.  This is as it should be, because the
representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those already
performed under their original appointments.”   

                The term “primary” used to describe “functions” refers to the order of importance and
thus means chief or principal function.  The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to
the plural (33A Words and Phrases, p. 210).  The additional duties must not only be closely
related to, but must be required by the official’s primary functions.  Examples of designations to
positions by virtue of one’s primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting
as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and Communications
acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority and the Civil Aeronautics Board. 

                If the functions to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional
functions would fall under the purview of “any other office” prohibited by the Constitution.  An
example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation.  The same rule applies to such positions which confer on
the cabinet official management functions and/or monetary compensation, such as but not
limited to chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries. 

                Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet
Members, their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by
their offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their
respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions.  It is a practice
justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the
different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing
and implementing laws affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering basic
services to the people.  It is consistent with the power vested on the President and his alter egos,
the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices and
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.  Without these additional duties and functions
being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the governing bodies or boards of
governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by their primary functions, they would be deprived of the means for control and
supervision, thereby resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy. 

                It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such
additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official
concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without
receiving any additional compensation therefor. 
                The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for
his services in the said position.  The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.  It should be obvious that if, say,
the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member
thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his
principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come under the
jurisdiction of his department.  For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any
extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or
some other such euphemism.  By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation
is prohibited by the Constitution.  (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317,
Feb. 22, 1991, En Banc [Fernan, CJ]) 

Should members of the Cabinet appointed to other positions in the government pursuant to
Executive Order No. 284 which later was declared unconstitutional by the SC for being
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution be made to reimburse the government
for whatever pay and emoluments they received from holding such other positions? 

                Held:  During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be

considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.  It
has been held that “in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good
faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees
and other compensations attached to the office.  This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on
equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an
officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services.  Any per
diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.  (Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, Feb. 22, 1991, En Banc [Fernan, CJ])

May a Senator or Congressman hold any other office or employment? 

                Ans.:  No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat.  Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.  (Sec. 13,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution). 

What are the situations covered by the law on nepotism? 

Held:  Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in

favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following: 
a)       appointing authority;

b)       recommending authority;

c)       chief of the bureau or office; and

d)       person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. 

Clearly, there are four situations covered.  In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial
who the appointing or recommending authority is.  To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices
that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee. (CSC v. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999,
En Banc [Pardo])

What are the exemptions from the operation of the rules on nepotism? 

Ans.:  The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. 

                The rules on nepotism shall likewise not be applicable to the case of a member of any
family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts
marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention
therein of both husband and wife may be allowed. (Sec. 59, Chap. 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V,
E.O. No. 292)

What is the doctrine of forgiveness or condonation?  Does it apply to pending criminal cases? 

Held:  1.  A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.  The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner.  (Aguinaldo v. Santos,
212 SCRA 768, 773 [1992]) 

2.  A reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office.  The rationale for this holding is that when the
electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life
and character, including his past misconduct.  If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects
him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.  (Mayor Alvin B.
Garcia v. Hon. Arturo C. Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, Sept. 10, 1999 [Quisumbing])

 
What is the Doctrine of Condonation?  Illustrative case. 

Held:  Petitioner contends that, per our ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos,  his reelection has rendered
the administrative case filed against him moot and academic.  This is because his reelection
operates as a condonation by the electorate of the misconduct committed by an elective official
during his previous term.  Petitioner further cites the ruling of this Court in Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, citing Conant v. Brogan, that 

“x x x  When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.  It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.” 

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that while the contract in question was signed during
the previous term of petitioner, it was to commence or be effective only on September 1998 or
during his current term.  It is the respondents’ submission that petitioner “went beyond the
protective confines” of jurisprudence when he “agreed to extend his act to his current term of
office.”  Aguinaldo cannot apply, according to respondents, because what is involved in this case
is a misconduct committed during a previous term but to be effective during the current term. 

Respondents maintain that, 

“x x x petitioner performed two acts with respect to the contract: he provided for a suspensive
period making the supply contract commence or be effective during his succeeding or current
term and during his current term of office he acceded to the suspensive period making the
contract effective during his current term by causing the implementation of the contract.” 

                Hence, petitioner cannot take refuge in the fact of his reelection, according to
respondents. 

                Further, respondents point out that the contract in question was signed just four days
before the date of the 1998 election and so it could not be presumed that when the people of
Cebu City voted petitioner to office, they did so with full knowledge of petitioner’s character. 

                On this point, petitioner responds that knowledge of an official’s previous acts is
presumed and the court need not inquire whether, in reelecting him, the electorate was actually
aware of his prior misdeeds. 

                Petitioner cites our ruling in Salalima v. Guingona, wherein we absolved Albay

governor Ramon R. Salalima of his administrative liability as regards a retainer agreement he
signed in favor of a law firm during his previous term, although disbursements of public funds to
cover payments under the agreement were still being done during his subsequent term. 
Petitioner argues that, following Salalima, the doctrine of Aguinaldo  applies even where the
effects of the acts complained of are still evident during the subsequent term of the reelected
official.  The implementation of the contract is a mere incident of its execution.  Besides,
according to petitioner, the “sole act” for which he has been administratively charged is the
signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig.  The charge, in his view, excludes the contract’s
execution or implementation, or any act subsequent to the perfection of the contract. 
                In Salalima,  we recall that the Solicitor General maintained that Aguinaldo  did not
apply to that case because the administrative case against Governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo of
Cagayan was already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection bid. 
Nevertheless, in Salalima, the Court applied the Aguinaldo doctrine, even if the administrative
case against Governor Salalima was filed after his reelection. 

                We now come to the concluding inquiry.  Granting that the Office of the Ombudsman
may investigate, for purposes provided for by law, the acts of petitioner committed prior to his
present term of office; and that it may preventively suspend him for a reasonable period, can that
office hold him administratively  liable for said acts? 

                In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be
held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of
office.   The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is
resumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct.  If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.     

                However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by
petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections.  It was not
made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for
petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. 

                For his part, petitioner contends that “the only conclusive determining factor” as
regards the people’s thinking on the matter is an election.  On this point we agree with
petitioner.  That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed,
precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge.  Such
an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the
precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the
official’s reelection, except that it must be prior to said date. 

                As held in Salalima, 

“The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases are concerned, is

still a good law.  Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an official’s reelection
expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission
constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous
term.  We may add that sound policy dictates it.  To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to
exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official and his political enemies,
who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts
alleged to have been committed during his previous term.  His second term may thus be devoted
to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service x x x.”          

The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case.  Petitioner cannot anymore be

held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the
contract with F.E. Zuellig. 
                The assailed retainer agreement in Salalima was executed sometime in 1990. 
Governor Salalima was reelected in 1992 and payments for the retainer continued to be made
during his succeeding term.  This situation is no different from the one in the present case,
wherein deliveries of the asphalt under the contract with F.E. Zuellig and the payments therefor
were supposed to have commenced on September 1998, during petitioner’s second term. 

                However, respondents argue that the contract, although signed on May 7, 1998, during
petitioner’s prior term, is to be made effective only during his present term. 

                We fail to see any difference to justify a valid distinction in the result.  The agreement
between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the
contract was signed, during petitioner’s prior term.  At that moment, petitioner already acceded
to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city
government.  Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became
extant on the day the contract was signed.  It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract
are supposed to have been made months later. 

                While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract
with F.E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than
administrative against petitioner.  Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total
exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing
the subject contract.  The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be
held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.  (Garcia v.
Mojica, 314 SCRA 207, Sept. 10, 1999, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing])

Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove her as Director IV of the EID and
reassign her to the Law Department.  Petitioner further argues that only the COMELEC,
acting as a collegial body, can authorize such reappointment.  Moreover, petitioner maintains
that a reassignment without her consent amounts to removal from office without due process
and therefore illegal. 

                Held:  Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any color of
title to the office of Chairman of the COMELEC.  We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is
the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the
powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective.  X x x.  The
Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.  In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of
the COMELEC en banc. 

                Petitioner’s appointment papers x x x indisputably show that she held her Director IV
position in the EID only in an acting or temporary capacity.  Petitioner is not a Career Executive
Service (CES), and neither does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility, which are
necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the
Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission.  Obviously,
petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.  X x x 

                Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not possessed of
the necessary qualifications to hold the position of Director IV, petitioner has no legal basis in
claiming that her reassignment was contrary to the Civil Service Law.  X x x 

Still, petitioner assails her reassignment, carried out during the election period, as a prohibited
act under Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code x x x.  

Petitioner claims that Benipayo failed to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc to effect
transfers or reassignments of COMELEC personnel during the election period.  Moreover,
petitioner insists that the COMELEC en banc must concur to every transfer or reassignment of
COMELEC personnel during the election period.  

Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the COMELEC did in fact issue COMELEC Resolution No.
3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting the COMELEC from Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus
Election Code.  X x x 

The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any
transfer or reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to
COMELEC field personnel and not to head office personnel like the petitioner.  Under the
Revised Administrative Code, the COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested
with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel.  The COMELEC Chairman will
logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300.  The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this
power because that will mean amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the
COMELEC en banc cannot legally do. 

COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of
COMELEC personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. 
Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution
meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or
reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless.  Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted
for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of
securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or
reassignment. 

The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel.  The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo.  The
COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment
of COMELEC personnel during the election period.  Thus, Benipayo’s order reassigning
petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus
Election Code.  For the same reason, Benipayo’s order designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of
the EID is legally unassailable. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc
[Carpio])

 
May the appointment of a person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment be validly recalled or revoked? 

Held:  It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption
of the position in the civil service, “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either
by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and
hearing.”  Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service
under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position.  This
right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken
away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so,
provided that there is previous notice and hearing. 

Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town mayor was to
issue Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of the private respondents.  There
was no previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to the latter.  Clearly, it was petitioner who
acted in undue haste to remove the private respondents without regard for the simple
requirements of due process of law.  While he argues that the appointing power has the sole
authority to revoke said appointments, there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority
to do so.  Neither can he question the CSC’s jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall. 

Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative

Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn
or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved
by the Commission.”  Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially
approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of
applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. 

Moreover, Section 10 of the same rule provides: 

Sec. 10.  An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the
duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the
approval of his appointment by the Commission.  The appointment shall remain effective until
disapproved by the Commission.  In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date
of its issuance. 

Section 20 of Rule VI also provides: 

Sec. 20.  Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on
any of the following grounds: 

Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan;

Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board;

Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to
promotion; or
Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations. 

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-
cited grounds.  And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that
these were “midnight appointments.”  The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional
prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within two (2) months
immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting
President. (De Rama v. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 94, Feb. 28, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-
Santiago])

Is a government employee who has been ordered arrested and detained for a non-bailable
offense and for which he was suspended for his inability to report for work until the
termination of his case, still required to file a formal application for leave of absence to
ensure his reinstatement upon his acquittal and thus protect his security of tenure? 
Concomitantly, will his prolonged absence from office for more than one (1) year
automatically justify his being dropped from the rolls without prior notice despite his being
allegedly placed under suspension by his employer until the termination of his case, which
finally resulted in his acquittal for lack of evidence? 

Held:  EUSEBIA R. GALZOTE was employed as a lowly clerk in the service of the City
Government of Makati City.  With her meager income she was the lone provider for her
children.  But her simple life was disrupted abruptly when she was arrested without warrant and
detained for more than three (3) years for a crime she did not commit.  Throughout her ordeal
she trusted the city government that the suspension imposed on her was only until the final
disposition of her case.  As she drew near her vindication she never did expect the worst to come
to her.  On the third year of her detention the city government lifted her suspension, dropped her
from the rolls without prior notice and without her knowledge, much less gave her an
opportunity to forthwith correct the omission of an application for leave of absence belatedly laid
on her. 

                Upon her acquittal for lack of evidence and her release from detention she was denied
reinstatement to her position.  She was forced to seek recourse in the Civil Service Commission
which ordered her immediate reinstatement with back wages from 19 October 1994, the date
when she presented herself for reassumption of duties but was turned back by the city
government, up to the time of her actual reinstatement.  

                Plainly, the case of petitioner City Government of Makati City revolves around
a rotunda of doubt, a dilemma concerning the legal status and implications of its suspension of
private respondent Eusebia R. Galzote and the automatic leave of absence espoused by the Civil
Service Commission.  Against this concern is the punctilious adherence to technicality, the
requirement that private respondent should have filed an application for leave of absence in
proper form.  The instant case is therefore a dispute between, at its worst, private respondent’s
substantial compliance with the standing rules, and the City Government’s insistence that the
lowly clerk should have still gone through the formalities of applying for leave despite her
detention, of which petitioner had actual notice, and the suspension order couched in simple
language that she was being suspended until the final disposition of her criminal case. 

                The meaning of suspension until the final disposition of her case is that should her
case be dismissed she should be reinstated to her position with payment of back wages.  She did
not have to apply for leave of absence since she was already suspended by her employer until her
case would be terminated.  We have done justice to the workingman in the past; today we will do
no less by resolving all doubts in favor of the humble employee in faithful obeisance to the
constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor (Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 1; Art. II,
Sec. 18) 

                As may be gleaned from the pleadings of the parties, the issues are: (1) whether private
respondent Eusebia R. Galzote may be considered absent without leave; (b) whether due process
had been observed before she was dropped from the rolls; and, (3) whether she may be deemed
to have abandoned her position, hence, not entitled to reinstatement with back salaries for not
having filed a formal application for leave.  Encapsulated, the issues may be reduced to whether
private respondent may be considered absent without leave or whether she abandoned her job as
to justify being dropped from the service for not filing a formal application for leave. 

                Petitioner would have private respondent declared on AWOL and faults her for failing
to file an application for leave of absence under Secs. 20 (Now Sec. 52 of Rule XVI, Leave of
Absence, of Res. No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991, as amended by CSC MC No. 41, s.
1998) and 35 (Now Sec. 63 of Rule XVI, Leave of Absence, of Res. No. 91-1631 dated 27
December 1991, as amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s. 1998 and 14, s. 1999) of the CSC Rules
and rejects the CSC’s ruling of an “automatic leave of absence for the period of her detention”
since the “current Civil Service Law and Rules do not contain any specific provision
on automatic  leave of absence.” 

                The Court believes that private respondent cannot be faulted for failing to file prior to
her detention an application for leave and obtain approval thereof.  The records clearly show that
she had been advised three (3) days after her arrest, or on 9 September 1991, that petitioner City
government of Makati City had placed her under suspension until the final disposition of her
criminal case.  This act of petitioner indubitably recognized private respondent’s predicament
and thus allowed her to forego reporting for work during the pendency of her criminal case
without the needless exercise of strict formalities.  At the very least, this official communication
should be taken as an equivalent of a prior approved leave of absence since it was her employer
itself which placed her under suspension and thus excused her from further formalities in
applying for such leave.  Moreover, the arrangement bound the City Government to allow
private respondent to return to her work after the termination of her case, i.e.,  if acquitted of the
criminal charge.  This pledge sufficiently served as legitimate reason for her to altogether
dispense with the formal application for leave; there was no reason to, as in fact it was not
required, since she was for all practical purposes incapacitated or disabled to do so. 

Indeed, private respondent did not have the least intention to go on AWOL from her post as
Clerk III of petitioner, for AWOL means the employee leaving or abandoning his post without
justifiable reason and without notifying his employer.  In the instant case, private respondent had
a valid reason for failing to report for work as she was detained without bail.  Hence, right after
her release from detention, and when finally able to do so, she presented herself to the Municipal
Personnel Officer of petitioner City Government to report for work.  Certainly, had she been told
that it was still necessary for her to file an application for leave despite the 9 September 1991
assurance from petitioner, private respondent would have lost no time in filing such piece of
document.  But the situation momentarily suspending her from work persisted: petitioner City
Government did not alter the modus vivendi  with private respondent and lulled her into believing
that its commitment that her suspension was only until the termination of her case was true and
reliable.  Under the circumstances private respondent was in, prudence would have dictated
petitioner, more particularly the incumbent city executive, in patria potestas, to advise her that it
was still necessary – although indeed unnecessary and a useless ceremony – to file such
application despite the suspension order, before depriving her of her legitimate right to return to
her position.  Patria potestas in piatate debet, non in atrocitate, consistere.  Paternal power
should consist or be exercised in affection, not in atrocity. 

It is clear from the records that private respondent Galzote was arrested and detained without a
warrant on 6 September 1991 for which reason she and her co-accused were subjected
immediately to inquest proceedings.  This fact is evident from the instant petition itself and its
attachments x x x.  Hence, her ordeal in jail began on 6 September 1991 and ended only after her
acquittal, thus leaving her no time to attend to the formality of filing a leave of absence. 

                But petitioner City Government would unceremoniously set aside its 9 September
1991 suspension order claiming that it was superseded three (3) years later by a memorandum
dropping her from the rolls effective 21 January 1993 for absence “for more than one (1) year
without official leave.”  Hence, the suspension order was void since there was no pending
administrative charge against private respondent so that she was not excused from filing an
application for leave. 

                We do not agree.  In placing private respondent under suspension until the final
disposition of her criminal case, the Municipal Personnel Officer acted with competence, so he
presumably knew that his order of suspension was not akin to either suspension as penalty or
preventive suspension since there was no administrative case against private respondent.  As
competence on the part of the MPO is presumed, any error on his part should not prejudice
private respondent, and that what he had in mind was to consider her as being on leave of
absence without pay and their employer-employee relationship being merely suspended, not
severed, in the meantime.  This construction of the order of suspension is actually more
consistent with logic as well as fairness and kindness to its author, the MPO.  Significantly, the
idea of a suspended employer-employee relationship  is widely accepted in labor law to account
for situations wherein laborers would have no work to perform for causes not attributable to
them.  We find no basis for denying the application of this principle to the instant case which
also involves a lowly worker in the public service. 

                Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government’s order of suspension, as
we have no reason to do so, much less retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private
respondent of a compelling and valid reason for not filing the leave application.  For as we have
held, a void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past
acts or omissions done in reliance thereof.  Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive
order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are
attached.  It would indeed be ghastly unfair to prevent private respondent from relying upon the
order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave application. 

                At any rate, statements are, or should be, construed against the one responsible for the
confusion; otherwise stated, petitioner must assume full responsibility for the consequences of its
own act, hence, he should be made to answer for the mix-up of private respondent as regards the
leave application.  At the very least, it should be considered estopped from claiming that its order
of suspension is void or that it did not excuse private respondent from filing an application for
leave on account of her incarceration.  It is a fact that she relied upon this order, issued barely
three (3) days from the date of her arrest, and assumed that when the criminal case would be
settled she could return to work without need of any prior act.  x x x 

The holding of the Civil Service Commission that private respondent was on automatic leave of
absence during the period of her detention must be sustained.  The CSC is the constitutionally
mandated central personnel agency of the Government tasked to “establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and
courtesy in the civil service” (Const., Art. IX-B, Sec. 3) and “strengthen the merit and rewards
system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.” Besides,
the Administrative Code of 1987 further empowers the CSC to “prescribe, amend, and enforce
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other
pertinent laws,” and for matters concerning leaves of absence, the Code specifically vests the
CSC to ordain – 

Sec. 60.  Leave of absence. – Officers and employees in the Civil Service shall be entitled to
leave of absence, with or without pay, as may be provided by law and the rules and regulations
of the Civil Service Commission in the interest of the service. 

                Pursuant thereto the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 91-1631 dated 27 December

1991 entitled Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws which it has several times amended through memorandum circulars.  It devotes
Rule XVI to leaves of absence.  Petitioner City Government relies upon Secs. 20 and 35 to
debunk the CSC ruling of an automatic leave of absence.  Significantly, these provisions have
been amended so that Sec. 20 of the Civil Service Rules is now Sec. 52 of Rule XVI, on Leave of
Absence, of Resolution No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991 as amended by CSC MC No. 41, s.
1998, and Sec. 35 is now Sec. 63 as amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s. 1998 and 14, s. 1999. 

                As a general rule, Secs. 20 and 52, as well as Secs. 35 and 63, require an approved
leave of absence to avoid being an AWOL.  However, these provisions cannot be interpreted as
exclusive and referring only to one mode of securing the approval of a leave of absence which
would require an employee to apply for it, formalities and all, before exceeding thirty (30) days
of absence in order to avoid from being dropped from the rolls.  There are, after all, other means
of seeking and granting an approved leave of absence, one of which is the CSC recognized rule
of automatic leave of absence under specified circumstances.  x x x 

                As properly noted, the CSC was only interpreting its own rules on leave of absence and
not a statutory provision (As a matter of fact, Sec. 60 of the Administrative Code does not
provide for any rule on leave of absence other than that civil servants are entitled to leave of
absence) in coming up with this uniform rule.  Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other agency has
the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them with its interpretation
significantly becoming part of the rules themselves.  x x x 

                Under RA 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization) and RA 7160 (The Local
Government Code of 1991), civil servants who are found illegally dismissed or retrenched are
entitled to full pay for the period of their separation. 

                Our final point.  An efficient and honest bureaucracy is never inconsistent with the
emphasis on and the recognition of the basic rights and privileges of our civil servants or, for that
matter, the constitutional mandates of the Civil Service Commission.  In fact only from an
enlightened corps of government workers and an effective CSC grows the professionalization of
the bureaucracy.  Indeed the government cannot be left in the lurch; but neither could we decree
that government personnel be separated from their jobs indiscriminately regardless of fault.  The
fine line between these concerns may be difficult to clearly draw but if we only exerted extra
effort to rebel against the allure of legal over-simplification, justice would have been done where
it is truly due.  (City Government of Makati City v. Civil Service Commission, 376 SCRA 248,
Feb. 6, 2002, En Banc [Bellosillo])

What is abandonment of office?  What are its essential elements? 

Held:  Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with
the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.  In order to constitute
abandonment of an office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an
absolute relinquishment.  There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance
that the law will infer a relinquishment.  Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs
from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice.  There are, therefore, two
essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an overt or
“external” act by which the intention is carried into effect. 

Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by non-user or
acquiescence.  Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. 
However, non-performance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonment where
such non-performance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform. 
Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or
discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by an officer illegally
removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of the office. 
Where, while desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or intention to
abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute which is
afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and
the officer may recover the effect.  (Canonizado v. Aguirre, 351 SCRA 659, 665-668, Feb. 15,
2001, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
 

By accepting another position in the government during the pendency of a case – brought
precisely to assail the constitutionality of his removal – may a person be deemed to have
abandoned his claim for reinstatement? 

Held:  Although petitioners do not deny the appointment of Canonizado as Inspector General,
they maintain that Canonizado’s initiation and tenacious pursuance of the present case would
belie any intention to abandon his former office.  Petitioners assert that Canonizado should not
be faulted for seeking gainful employment during the pendency of this case.  Furthermore,
petitioners point out that from the time Canonizado assumed office as Inspector General he never
received the salary pertaining to such position x x x. 

                By accepting the position of Inspector General during the pendency of the present case
– brought precisely to assail the constitutionality of his removal from the NAPOLCOM –
Canonizado cannot be deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement to the latter
position.  First of all, Canonizado did not voluntarily leave his post as Commissioner, but was
compelled to do so on the strength of Section 8 of RA 8551 . 

                In our decision of 25 January 2000, we struck down the abovequoted provision for
being violative of petitioner’s constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.  Thus,
Canonizado harbored no willful desire or intention to abandon his official duties.  In fact,
Canonizado, together with petitioners x x x lost no time disputing what they perceived to be an
illegal removal; a few weeks after RA 8551 took effect x x x petitioners instituted the current
action x x x assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of said law.  The removal of
petitioners from their positions by virtue of a constitutionally infirm act necessarily negates a
finding of voluntary relinquishment.  (Canonizado v. Aguirre, 351 SCRA 659, 665-668, Feb.
15, 2001, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])

Distinguish “term” of office from “tenure” of the incumbent. 

Held:  In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between “term” and “tenure.” 
“[T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent.  The term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.  The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds the office.  The term of office is not affected by
the hold-over.  The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power
of the incumbent.”  (Thelma P. Gaminde v. COA, G.R. No. 140335, Dec. 13, 2000, En Banc
[Pardo]) 

Discuss the operation of the rotational plan insofar as the term of office of the Chairman and
Members of the Constitutional Commissions is concerned. 
Held:  In Republic v. Imperial, we said that “the operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3)
Commissioners should start on a common date, and (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term.”   

Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the
variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the
expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence
of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. 

Applying the foregoing conditions x x x, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms
of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution
must be on February 2, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.  In case of a
belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual
qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.  (Thelma P. Gaminde v. COA,
G.R. No. 140335, Dec. 13, 2000, En Banc [Pardo])

What is the hold-over doctrine?  What is its purpose? 

Held:  1.  The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a
fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term.  It is usually provided by law
that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but
until their successors have been elected and qualified.  Where this provision is found, the office
does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and
qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and
qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.  

Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is

entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.  The
legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the
same.

Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an
executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or
unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions.  This is founded on obvious
considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent
public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance
of government functions.  (Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 397, March 25, 1999,
2nd Div. [Bellosillo]) 

2.  The rule is settled that unless “holding over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the
incumbent may continue to hold over until someone else is elected and qualified to assume the
office.”  This rule is demanded by the “most obvious requirements of public policy, for without it
there must frequently be cases where, from a failure to elect or a refusal or neglect to qualify, the
office would be vacant and the public service entirely suspended.”  Otherwise stated, the purpose
is to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when the successor may be chosen and
inducted into office.  (Galarosa v. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728, Nov. 11, 1993, En Banc [Davide,
Jr.])

What is resignation?  What are the requisites of a valid resignation? 

Held:  1.  It is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to use it.  It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express
or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance
by competent and lawful authority.  To constitute a complete and operative resignation from
public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of
relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.  The last one is required by reason
of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.  (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes
v. CA, 284 SCRA 276, Jan. 16, 1998) 

2.  Resignation x x x is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an

intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.  The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form.  It can be oral.  It can be
written.  It can be express.  It can be implied.  As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given
legal effect.  (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, en Banc [Puno])

What is abandonment of an office?  What are its requisites?  How is it distinguished from
resignation? 

Held:  Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office

by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.  Indeed,
abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal
relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. 

Abandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice.  Its
concomitant effect is that the former holder of an office can no longer legally repossess it even
by forcible reoccupancy. 

Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned.  Such intention may
be express or inferred from his own conduct.  Thus, the failure to perform the duties pertaining to
the office must be with the officer’s actual or imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the
office.  Abandonment of an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it results from a complete
abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment.  Therefore,
there are two essential elements of abandonment; first, an intention to abandon and, second, an
overt or “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect.  (Sangguniang Bayan of
San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA, 284 SCRA 276, Jan. 16, 1998)
 

What is the effect of acceptance of an incompatible office to a claim for reinstatement? 

Held:  The next issue is whether Canonizado’s appointment to and acceptance of the position of
Inspector General should result in an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to the
NAPOLCOM.  It is a well-settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another
incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated
without any other act or proceeding.  Public policy considerations dictate against allowing the
same individual to perform inconsistent and incompatible duties.  The incompatibility
contemplated is not the mere physical impossibility of one person’s performing the duties of the
two offices due to a lack of time or the inability to be in two places at the same moment, but that
which proceeds from the nature and relations of the two positions to each other as to give rise to
contrariety and antagonism should one person attempt to faithfully and impartially discharge the
duties of one toward the incumbent of the other.  

                There is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector
General of the IAS are incompatible with each other.  As pointed out by respondents, RA 8551
prohibits any personnel of the IAS from sitting in a committee charged with the task of
deliberating on the appointment, promotion, or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas the
NAPOLCOM has the power of control and supervision over the PNP.   However, the rule on
incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case at bar because at no point did Canonizado
discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously.  Canonizado was forced out of his first
office by the enactment of Section 8 of RA 8551.  Thus, when Canonizado was appointed as
Inspector General x x x he had ceased to discharge his official functions as NAPOLCOM
Commissioner.  x x x  Thus, to reiterate, the incompatibility of duties rule never had a chance to
come into play for petitioner never occupied the two positions, of Commissioner and Inspector
General, nor discharged their respective functions, concurrently. 

As in the Tan v. Gimenez and Gonzales v. Hernandez cases, Canonizado was compelled to leave

his position as Commissioner, not by an erroneous decision, but by an unconstitutional provision
of law.  Canonizado, like the petitioners in the above mentioned cases, held a second office
during the period that his appeal was pending.  As stated in the Comment filed by petitioners,
Canonizado was impelled to accept this subsequent position by a desire to continue serving the
country, in whatever capacity.  Surely, this selfless and noble aspiration deserves to be placed on
at least equal footing with the worthy goal of providing for oneself and one’s family, either of
which are sufficient to justify Canonizado’s acceptance of the position of Inspector General.  A
Contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his right to live, which contemplates not only a right
to earn a living, as held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and productive life. 
Furthermore, prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position during the pendency of
his petition would be to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act
which under no circumstance can be attributed to him.  However, before Canonizado can re-
assume his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-
PNP.  (Canonizado v. Aguirre, 351 SCRA 659, Feb. 15, 2001, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])

 
When may unconsented transfers be considered anathema to security of tenure? 

Held:  As held in Sta. Maria v. Lopez: 

“x x x  the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only
to an officer who is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station.  Such a rule does
not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency
to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency.  x x x” 

The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual
employment.  It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the
employee.  What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss.  But where it
is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of
employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a
perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.  (Agripino A. De Guzman, Jr., et al. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])              

Discuss Abolition of Office. 

Held:  The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.  It is

acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer’s
right to continue in the position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons,
such as the lack of funds or in the interest of economy.  However, in order for the abolition to be
valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. 

An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and
permanently, as the word “abolished” denotes.  Where one office is abolished and replaced with
another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.  Thus, in U.P. Board
of Regents v. Rasul we said: 

It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the right to
security of tenure (De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982]).  However, in this case, the
renaming and restructuring of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid
and bona fide abolition of the position of PGH Director.  This is because where the abolished
office and the offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good
faith (Jose L. Guerrero v. Hon. Antonio V. Arizabal, G.R. No. 81928, June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA
108 [1990]).   We hereby apply the principle enunciated in Cezar Z. Dario v. Hon. Salvador M.
Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]) that abolition which merely changes the nomenclature of positions
is invalid and does not result in the removal of the incumbent. 

The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the PGH Director
and the creation of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are valid, the removal of the incumbent is
still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions of the two positions are basically the
same. 

This was also our ruling in Guerrero v. Arizabal, wherein we declared that the substantial
identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia  of bad faith in the removal of
petitioner pursuant to a reorganization. (Alexis C. Canonizado, et al. v. Hon. Alexander P.
Aguirre, et al., G.R. No. 133132, Jan. 25, 2000, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])

What is reorganization?  When is it valid?  When is it invalid? 

Held:  1.  Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of

government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them.  It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.  Naturally, it may result in the loss of one’s
position through removal or abolition of an office.  However, for a reorganization to be valid, it
must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison: 

x x x As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in “good faith” if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.  In that event, no dismissal (in case of
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.  And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.  Be that as it may, if the “abolition” which
is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid “abolition” takes place and whatever
“abolition” is done, is void ab initio.  There is an invalid “abolition” as where there is merely a
change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of
ample funds. (Alexis C. Canonizado, et al. v. Hon. Alexander P. Aguirre, et al., G.R. No.
133132, Jan. 25, 2000, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes]) 

                2.  While the President’s power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean
however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law.  Well-settled is
the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.  Thus,
in Dario v. Mison, this Court has had the occasion to clarify that: 

“As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient.  In that event no dismissal or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.  And in that case the security of tenure
would not be a Chinese wall.  Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition done is void ab
initio.  There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.”  (Larin v.
Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713, Oct. 16, 1997)

   f.   Law on Public Corporations

Public corporation law is created to govern the actions and activities of public corporations
created by a state to execute public missions and services.3 min read
1. Public Corporation
2. Corporations
3. Types of Corporations
4. Private vs. Public Corporation

Public corporation law is created with the sole intention of governing the actions and activities of
public corporations created by a state to execute public missions and services.

Public Corporation
In order to carry out these services and missions, public corporations provide services or
participate in activities similar to that of private enterprises.
To ensure success, public corporations are granted operational flexibility while retaining the
principles of fundamental public policy and public accountability. A public corporation's board
of directors is appointed by the sitting Governor while the Senate confirms said appointment.
However, the board of directors has the authority to manage the public corporation's operations
and set policy as they see fit.
Any district, county, or city that is organized for public purposes can be designated as a public
corporation.

Corporations

   g.   Election Law

What do you mean by election law?

Election law is a discipline falling at the juncture of constitutional law and political science. It
researches "the politics of law and the law of politics". The conceptual knowledge behind
election law focuses on who votes, when that person can vote, and the construction behind the
tabulated totals.

    h.   Distinction between Political Law and Constitutional Law