MUYUELA, Aldwin Leslie M.

[G.R. No. 205728. January 21, 2015.]

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, petitioners, vs. COMELEC & MAJARUCON, respondents.

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law
were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it
form “Team Buhay.”

Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod

City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials ordering the tarpaulin’s removal within
three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that
petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the
tarpaulin; and pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed
to remain. COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners
initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is an election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech.
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.
 MUYUELA, Aldwin Leslie M.
[G.R. No. 169838. April 25, 2006.]
BAYAN, et al., petitioner, vs. ERMITA, et al., respondent.

FACTS:

The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in
support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing”
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
“maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because
they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This
petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During
the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the
petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising
the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20,
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.

RULING:
No. Under the Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution, the right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For these rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. However, it must be
remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of
the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it
refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful
cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,”
“protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so
its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
 Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
MUYUELA, Aldwin Leslie M.
[G.R. No. 175241. February 24, 2010.]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ATIENZA, respondent.

FACTS:

On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz
(Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to
rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be
participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on
given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949. The petition having been unresolved within 24
hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate court's inaction or refusal to resolve
the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed
with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier
barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily
dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not it is within Mayor Atienza’s power to modify the rally permit without
consulting first the IBP.

RULING:
No. In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the
venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may
directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof.
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his
action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an
assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate
court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory provision,
not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the applicant."
 MUYUELA, Aldwin Leslie M.
[A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006.]
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.

FACTS:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty-five years and had a
son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary
while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it
will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights
in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus, the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus, the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
 MUYUELA, Aldwin Leslie M.
[G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009.]
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, respondent.

FACTS:

The petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, the host of the television program, Ang Dating Daan,
made remarks that were found malicious. Two days, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the petitioner’s
remarks. After the preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB,
preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan for 20 days, in accordance with Section
3(d) of Presidential Decree No. 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of
the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of P.D. No. 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of
the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.
The petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances in his television show, Ang
Dating Daan.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the utterance of the petitioner may be considered as a protected form of
speech.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the petitioner, in his utterance, cannot avail the constitutional
protection of free speech. The language of the petitioner was categorized as indecent. The
statements said by the petitioner were made in a medium accessible to the children.
Under the clear and present danger doctrine, freedom of speech and of press susceptible
of restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the government may lawfully protect.
Petitioner’s flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without
adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, is not acceptable. This only recognizes the
importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully
scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.
 MUYUELA, Aldwin Leslie M.
[G.R. No. 124382. August 16, 1999.]
PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. NLRC, et al., respondent.

FACTS:

Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day
Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law and is represented by the other
private respondents. Petitioner had worked with the private respondent Seventh Day Adventists
(SDA) for 28 years before he was terminated. Prior to said termination, petitioner was asked to
admit accountability for the church offerings collected by his wife in the amount of
Php15,078.10. Petitioner refused since it was private respondent’s Pastor Buhat and Eufronio
Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect. Thereafter, the petitioner requested Pastor Buhat to
convene the Executive Committee to settle the dispute between him and Pastor Rodrigo, but the
latter denied the same because there was no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until
petitioner left the office. Later, an Executive Committee meeting was held where the non-
remittance of church collections and the events that transpired were discussed. Subsequently,
petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing therein grounds for the termination of his services.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and a decision was rendered in his favor.
The SDA appealed the same to the NLRC and after much argument, the case was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the case involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the State
cannot interfere.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and
as such, involves the separation of church and state.

RULING:
The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The
rationale of principle of separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying,
“strong fences make good neighbors.” The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the
boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other
because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. While the
state is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the church is likewise barred
from meddling in purely secular matters.
The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair so as to bar
the state from cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine,
creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious
association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the
power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Examples of
this so-called ecclesiastical affair are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance.
The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the given examples. What is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely
secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the
church. The matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different
from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.