People v.

Borja
G.R. No. 199710, 2 August 2017
Leonen, J.
Topic: Crimes against personal security and liberty - Art. 267, RPC

Case Doctrine/s:

The apprehension of the kidnapping victim for violation of RA 9165 does not automatically
negate the criminal liability of the accused. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is “The
actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.” It
is not always necessary that the victim be imprisoned. The second element of the crime
of kidnapping (the individual kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner
deprives the latter of liberty) is met as long as there is a showing that the victim's
liberty of movement is restricted.

Facts:

Accused PO3 Julieto Borja was charged of kidnapping punished under Art. 267 of the RPC,
alleging that he kidnapped and illegally detained victim Ronalyn Manatad, and thereafter,
demanded and received the ransom money of P100,000 from Edwin Silvio, the victim’s
brother. During arraignment, PO3 Borja entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.

Per the prosecution witnesses:

At about 10AM, Ronalyn and her friend, Vicky Lusterio, were walking along Agham Road,
Diliman when a man, who was later identified as PO3 Borja, grabbed Ronalyn by her
right forearm and forcibly took her inside a gray van where 3 other men were waiting.
Both Ronalyn and Vicky shouted for help, but no one came to their rescue. Vicky
managed to escape, and immediately told Ronalyn’s mother, Adelina.

One of Ronalyn’s abductors, Major Clarito, asked for her relatives’ contact numbers, so
Ronalyn gave Edwin’s number. Adelina then received a phone call from one of the
kidnappers, who demanded P200,000, but Adelina told him that they could not afford to
pay the ransom. The caller suddenly hung up. One of the kidnappers called again and
this time, Edwin negotiated for a reduced random, so they lowered their demand to
P100,000. Ronalyn was now transferred from the van to a car.

As Edwin sought assistance from Sgt. Abet Cordova of the National Anti-Kidnapping
Task Force (NAKTAF), its group commander Major Santi Cababasay, immediately
mobilized his team for an entrapment operation.

At 12NN, Edwin was instructed by the abductors to place the money in an SM plastic
bag and to go to the Wildlife Park along Quezon Ave. at 3PM. The police operatives
likewise proceeded to the Wildlife Park and positioned themselves within the area.
 Shortly after 3PM, PO3 Borja approached Edwin and took the plastic bag containing the
random money. Upon seeing the exchange, the operatives arrested PO3 Borja and
recovered the following from him: (1) a 0.9mm pistol; (2) a cellphone; (3) a wallet; and
(4) the ransom amount.

The authorities, however, failed to rescue Ronalyn. While she was inside the van,
Ronalyn heard one of her abductors say that PO3 was entrapped. The others cursed her
and said, “Putang ina, yung kapatid mo. Tumawag ng taga-NAKTAF.” Her captors then
brought her to PDEA where she was charged with illegal sale of shabu.

Per PO3 Borja, on the day of the alleged incident, he was with PO2 Ding Tan at Br. 79,
RTC-QC to testify as a witness in a criminal case, but the hearing was postponed. Upon
securing a certificate of appearance, he went home at 12NN. Around 2PM, he received a
phone call from an unknown person seeking assistance to recover his sister who had been
arrested. On the second call, he was told to go to the Wildlife Park to meet a certain Edwin,
who would be wearing a white T-shirt and a bull cap. When he met Edwin, the latter told him
that Ronalyn and Vicky had been arrested earlier in a buy-bust operation. PO3 Borja advised
Edwin to go with him to the police station to report the incident, but Edwin said he had to
wait for his cousin. An hour later, Capt. Frederick Obar, SPO3 Eric Orellaneda, and three
unidentified persons approach PO3 Borja alluding that there was an extortion happening.
PO3 Borja was then arrested and was charged with kidnapping for ransom.

RTC: Found PO3 Borja beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom, and was
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua
CA: Affirmed with modification with regard to damages and indemnity

Hence, this petition, where Borja mainly argues that it is absurd to convict him of kidnapping
considering that the alleged victim was caught in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust
operation on the day of the alleged incident. Further, Ronalyn was found guilty of violation
of RA 9165 by both the CA and the SC and is now serving her sentence in the Women’s
Correctional in Mandaluyong.

Issue/s:

Whether or not PO3 Borja is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping?

Ruling/s:

Yes. Ronalyn’s apprehension for violation of RA 9165 does not automatically negate the
criminal liability of PO3 Borja. It also does not exclude the possibility of the commission of
the crime with which accused-appellant is charged. The buy-bust operation carried out
against Ronalyn and her kidnapping are events that can reasonably co-exist. Furthermore,
a violation of RA. 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation to the crime of kidnapping.
Ronalyn's innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor negate the commission of the crime of
kidnapping against her.

A conviction for the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) the
individual kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of
liberty; (3) the act of detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any
of the following circumstances is present: (a) The kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than 3 days. (b) It is committed by one who stimulates public authority. (c) Any
serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or any
threat to kill that person is made. (d) The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a
female, or a public officer.

A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting random cannot be said to
be acting in an official capacity. As held in People v. Santiano, public officials may be
prosecuted under Art. 267 if they act in their private capacity. The burden to prove that he
or she acted in furtherance of his or her official functions is on the accused.

Accused-appellant's membership in the PNP does not automatically preclude the filing of an
information for kidnapping or serious illegal detention against him. He may be prosecuted
under Art. 267 of the RPC if it is shown that he committed acts unrelated to the functions of
his office.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is “The actual deprivation of the victim's liberty
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.” It is not always necessary that the victim
be imprisoned. The second element of the crime of kidnapping is met as long as there
is a showing that the victim's liberty of movement is restricted.

In this case, Ronalyn was clearly deprived of her liberty. She was forcibly taken inside a
vehicle by the appellant and his cohorts and was driven around QC for at least 5 hours. The
first two and the last elements of the crime of kidnapping are present in this case, Ronalyn,
a woman, was forcibly taken by accused- appellant and loaded in a van where she was
detained for several hours. These acts are completely unrelated to appellant's functions as
a police officer, and as such, he may be prosecuted under Art. 267. The third element of the
crime of kidnapping is also present. The appellant and his companions deprived the victim
of her liberty to extort ransom from her family.

All the elements of kidnapping were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, which cannot be
overturned by accused-appellant's bare denial and alibi.

Further, for the defense of alibi to prosper, there must be a showing that it was physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. In this case, PO3 Borja failed to overcome this standard. It was not shown that
it was physically impossible for him to be at Agham Road after the hearing in QC Hall of
Justice when the victim was forcibly taken.

Further, it was highly irregular for a police officer to meet the victim's relative in a place other
than the police station to discuss the incident reported to him. That he had to wait for 30
minutes for another person to arrive is also suspect. Also, as pointed by the OSG, it is
unusual for accused-appellant to interfere with an ongoing operation to which he was not
assigned.

Although the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, since RA 9346 proscribes the
imposition of death penalty, the RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
 People v. Dionaldo
G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J
Topic: Article 267- Kidnapping and Serious illegal detention

Case Doctrine/s:

The Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime
the accused-appellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely
constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death,
which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the
trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the
Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that
in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for
review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in
the appealed judgment.

Facts:

Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health
Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from
another brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped. Three (3) men, later identified
as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of
the gym and pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car. Upon receiving the message,
Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. Morning of the same day, he
received a phone call from Edwin's kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should
report the matter to the police.
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the
payment of ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no
such money, as he only had P50,000.00. After negotiations over the telephone, the
kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of P110,000.00. Roderick
was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call.
Evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom
money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was
driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the designated place. After a while,
Roderick received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5
until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car pulled up in front of his vehicle where
four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering
the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove away.
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin. During the
course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed
that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off
Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio on the condition that he will be given a
share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts,
leading to their arrest. In the early morning of the following day, the Camp Crame Police
Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) team found the dead body of Edwin which
Roderick identified. Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time,
they were in their respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then
subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the
other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred that while walking on his way home, he noticed
that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle,
boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that
he was made to sign an extrajudicial confession.
RTC: convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
o Crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which is
punishable
by death.
o Conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants' individual
participation was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal design. While the RTC found
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim Edwin was abducted,
deprived of liberty, and eventually killed, a fact which is supported by the subject certificate
of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment.

Issue/s:

WON accuse-appellants are guilty of the crime Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

Ruling/s:

YES. Crime the accused-appellants have committed does not, as the records obviously
bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
This is in view of the victim's (i.e., Edwin's) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the
Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter
was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be
considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this
case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct
errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article
267 of the same Code now provides:
Art.267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.— Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:
xxx
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659. Thus, further taking into
account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom,
accused-appellants' conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which
carries the penalty of death.
 People v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 217978, 30 January 2019
Leonen, J.
Topic: (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security - R.A. No. 9208)

Case Doctrine/s:

“It did not matter that there was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or
abuse of power that was employed by De Dios when she involved AAA in her illicit sexual
trade. AAA was still a minor when she was exposed to prostitution by the prodding, promises
and acts of De Dios. Trafficking in persons may be committed also by means of taking
advantage of the persons' vulnerability as minors, a circumstance that applied to AAA, was
sufficiently alleged in the information and proved during the trial. This element was further
achieved through the offer of financial gain for the illicit services that were provided by AAA
to the customers of De Dios.” (People vs. De Dios)

Facts:

Around 9:45 p.m. on December 5, 2009, Police Officer 1 Nef Nemenzo (PO1 Nemenzo) and
13 other members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force conducted an
entrapment operation in xxxxxxxxxxx, Lapu-Lapu City. The operation was "based on their
surveillance of a widespread sexual service for sale by young girls" in the area.

The operation was divided into two (2) groups. PO1 Nemenzo's group targeted the area of
xxxxxxxxxxx KTV Bar in front of xxxxxxxxxxx Grill. He would be disguised as a customer
negotiating for the prices of the minors' services.

In the bar, PO1 Nemenzo and a team member, Police Officer 1 Llanes (PO1 Llanes),
ordered beers and waited for the pimps. Two (2) women approached them and introduced
themselves as AAA and BBB. Upon hearing that they would need two (2) more girls, another
woman approached them and introduced herself as Nancy, who was later identified as
Ramirez. She told the police officers that she could provide the girls. Then, BBB and
Ramirez left, and after a while, returned with two (2) more girls. They agreed that each girl
would cost P600.00 as payment for sexual services.

After Ramirez provided the four (4) girls, the group left and hailed a taxi heading for
xxxxxxxxxxx Motel. Ramirez had told the girls to accept the money that they would be given.
In the taxi, PO1 Llanes handed P2,400.00 to one (1) of the girls. As soon as the girl received
it, PO1 Nemenzo and PO1 Llanes introduced themselves as police officers, and turned the
girls over to their team leader in a civilian van parked near them. The police officers were
told to return to the area and await the other teams' return. Later, Ramirez was arrested
when BBB pointed to her as the pimp.
Accused-appellant was charged with having violated qualified trafficking in relation to
Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, which provides that it is unlawful for anyone "[t]o
maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography.

RTC and CA found Ramirez guilty of qualified trafficking.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified trafficking of persons.

Ruling/s:

YES.
In People v. Casio, this Court enumerated the elements that must be established to
successfully prosecute the crime:

The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3 (a)
of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs."

Republic Act No. 9208 has since been amended by Republic Act No. 10364 on February 6,
2013. In recognition of the amendments to the law, Casio clarifies that crimes prosecuted
under Republic Act No. 10364 must have the following elements:

Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded
to include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders;
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person;
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs.

Here, accused-appellant was charged with having violated qualified trafficking in relation to
Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, which provides that it is unlawful for anyone "[t]o
maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography."

The prosecution established that on the night of December 5, 2009, accused-appellant

approached PO1 Nemenzo and offered him the sexual services of four (4) girls, two (2) of
whom were minors, for P2,400.00. The police operation had been the result of previous
surveillance conducted within the area by the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force.
Both minor victims testified that this incident was not the first time that accused-appellant
pimped them out to customers, and that any payment to them would include the payment of
commission to accused-appellant

Accused-appellant hired children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their

vulnerability as minors. AAA's and BBB's acquiescence to the illicit transactions cannot be
considered as a valid defense.

Accused-appellant initially used the defense of denial, testifying that she was merely in the
area to listen to a live band when the police rushed to her and arrested her. Denial, however,
becomes a weak defense against the positive identification by the poseur-buyer and the
minor victims.

Moreover, accused-appellant, in her handwritten letter to this Court, seemingly abandoned

her earlier statement that she was just in the area to watch a live band when the police
rushed to and arrested her. This time, she alleged that it was BBB who approached and
dragged her to the police officers, and who also started negotiating prices. This contradicts
her earlier statement that she had no knowledge of the transaction. Worse, this appears to
corroborate the prosecution witnesses' testimonies that she was indeed at the transaction.

In any case, PO1 Nemenzo had categorically testified that he and PO1 Llanes were
approached by accused-appellant, who had negotiated prices on AAA and BBB's behalf.
Accused-appellant has not alleged any ill motive on PO1 Nemenzo's part to testify against
her.
 People v. XXX and YYY,
G.R. No. 235652, 9 July 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J
Topic: RA 9208 - Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003

Case Doctrine/s:

"Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or

receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." The same
provision further provides that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in
persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph."

The crime of "Trafficking in Persons" becomes qualified under, among others, the
following circumstances:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises
authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or
employee;

Facts:

The prosecution claimed that AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses XXX
and YYY. AAA claimed that sometime in April 2010, when she was just 13 years old, her
mother XXX brought her to a hotel in Makati to meet with a certain John Hubbard who
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA further alleged that from 2008 to 2011,
XXX ordered her to engage in cybersex for three (3) to four (4) times a week in pornographic
websites where AAA was shown in her underwear and made to do sexual activities in front
of the computer. For their part, BBB and CCC corroborated AAA's statements, both averring
that from 2010-2011, XXX ordered them to dance naked in front of the computer with internet
connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with a certain "Sam," their
usual client. BBB and CCC alleged that during those sessions, their father YYY would be
outside the room or fixing the computer. The children all claimed that they were made to do
sexual activities to earn money for their household expenses which were collected by YYY
in remittance centers.
Sometime in February 2011, AAA sought the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) as she wanted her and her siblings to be rescued. AAA was then
taken by the DSWD Social Worker, who then coordinated with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). After making an investigation and a technical verification of the
pornographic websites which revealed photos and transactions of AAA, the NBI applied for
and was granted a search warrant. Subsequently, the law enforcement authorities
implemented the search warrant, resulting in the rescue of AAA, BBB, and CCC, the
confiscation of the computer units and paraphernalia connected with the alleged crimes,
and the arrest of both XXX and YYY.

For their defense, accused-appellants denied the accusations and claimed not knowing any
motive for their children's accusations as XXX is a housewife, while YYY works at a printing
press. They alleged that AAA ran away when she was impregnated by her boyfriend and
denied that computer gadgets were confiscated from them.

RTC found accused- appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons as defined and penalized under RA 9208.

CA affirmed accused- appellants' conviction, with the following modifications: (a) YYY's
conviction is reduced to three (3) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons; and (b) the
awards of damages for the victims were increased to P500,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In affirming accused-appellants' respective convictions, the CA gave credence to the

testimonies of the three (3) children-victims who not only positively identified accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, but also straightforwardly explained the acts of
sexual exploitation perpetuated against them by their own parents. This notwithstanding,
the CA found it appropriate to find the children's father, YYY, guilty for only three (3) counts
of Qualified Trafficking, as he was only named as an accused in three (3) of the four (4) total
Informations 21 for such crime filed before the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

Issue/s:

Whether or not XXX and YYY are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) and three (3)
counts, respectively, of Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – YES!

Ruling/s:

Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the
purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs." The same provision further provides that "[t]he recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set
forth in the preceding paragraph."

The crime of "Trafficking in Persons" becomes qualified under, among others, the
following circumstances:
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons . — The following are considered as
qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a
public officer or employee;

In this case, accused-appellants were charged of three (3) counts each of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208.
XXX was further charged with another count of the same crime under Section 4 (a) also in
relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of the same law. Section 4 (a) and (e) of RA 9208 reads:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person,
natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or
training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
xxx xxx xxx

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in relation
to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208 as the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt that:
(a) they admittedly are the biological parents of AAA, BBB, and CCC, who were all minors
when the crimes against them were committed;
(b) they made their children perform acts of cybersex for different foreigner customers, and
thus, engaged them in prostitution and pornography;
(c) they received various amounts of money in exchange for the sexual exploitation of their
children; and
(d) they achieved their criminal design by taking advantage of their children's vulnerability
as minors and deceiving them that the money they make from their lewd shows are needed
for the family's daily sustenance.

In the same manner, the courts a quo likewise correctly convicted XXX of one (1) count of
the same crime, this time under Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208,
as it was shown that XXX transported and provided her own minor biological child, AAA, to
a foreigner in Makati City for the purpose of prostitution, again under the pretext that the
money acquired from such illicit transaction is needed for their family's daily sustenance.

As such, accused-appellants' conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons must be upheld.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on accused-appellants, Section 10 (c) of RA 9208

states that persons found guilty of Qualified Trafficking shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2,000,000.00 but not more than P5,000,000.00.
Thus, the courts a quo correctly sentenced them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00 for each count of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

Finally, the courts a quo correctly ordered accused-appellants to pay the victims the
amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count of Qualified Trafficking in Persons as such amounts are at par with prevailing
jurisprudence. Further, the Court deems it proper to impose on all monetary awards due to
the victims legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until full
payment.
 People v. Mora
G.R. No. 242682, July 1, 2019
Perlas-Bernabe J.
Topic: R.A. 9208

Case Doctrine/s:

In this case, Mora and Polvoriza were charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons under
Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) of RA 9208.

The prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements, to wit: (a) Mora,
through deception and by taking advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor, was able to
"convince" the latter to go to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur; (b) upon arrival thereat, Mora
took AAA to Polvoriza's videoke bar, i.e., Otoy's, and left her there; and (c) since then and
for the next 8 months, Polvoriza forced AAA to work as a prostitute in Otoy's, coercing her
to perform lewd acts on a nightly basis, such as dancing naked in front of male customers
and even having sex with them.

Facts:
An information was filed charging Mora and Polvoriza of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons, the accusing them that on November 26, 2011 until July 5, 2012 in the Municipality
of Polangui, Albay, the accused conspired with one another, for purpose of exploitation,
prostitution and sexual exploitation, hired AAA at Otoy's Videoke Bar (Otoy’s) at Barangay
Sagrada, Buhi, Camarines Sur. That the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance
of minority as AAA was only 16.

On November 26, 2011, Mora left AAA at Otoy's owned by Polvoriza. Thereafter, Polvoriza
locked AAA inside a room, prohibited her from going out, took her mobile phone and
destroyed its SIM card. Polvoriza then made AAA work as an entertainer at Otoy's under
the stage name "Rizza M. Rañada," forcing her to take shabu, dance naked, and even have
sex with the customers. 8 months later, AAA was able to escape from Polvoriza's custody
and return to her father, to whom she narrated her ordeal. Her father then took AAA to the
police station to report the matter and also to a medico-legal who confirmed that AAA
sustained multiple hymenal lacerations which could have resulted from consensual and
forcible sexual contact.

In her defense, while Mora admitted knowing Polvoriza, she denied being close friends with
her. She then narrated that AAA insisted that she accompany her to Buraburan, Buhi, to
which Mora reluctantly agreed. Upon arrival thereat, AAA proceeded inside Otoy's and a
few moments later returned outside to give her P200. Finally, she claimed that when she
first met AAA, she thought that the latter was already of age based on her physical
appearance.
Polvoriza maintained that she first saw AAA in the evening of November 26 when the latter
went inside Otoy's, introduced herself as "Rizza M. Rañada," and expressed her desire to
work therein. According to Polvoriza, she initially declined as she did not hire entertainers

for her bar, but nonetheless, she let AAA stay because she was "nice." A few days later,
AAA returned to Otoy's and handed her a pink card, which Polvoriza knew to be a health
card secured by entertainers from health centers. Finally, Polvoriza claimed that she only
learned of AAA's true identity when she was arrested in connection with the instant criminal
case.

RTC found Mora and Polvoriza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
accordingly, sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine in the amount of P2,000,000.00. It also ordered them to jointly and severally pay AAA
the amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

RTC found immaterial AAA's purported voluntariness to work at Otoy's as claimed by both
accused, pointing out that knowledge or consent on the part of minor victims is immaterial
in cases of Human Trafficking. CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification as to the
monetary awards. It held that the prosecution, through AAA's unimpeached testimony, had
successfully established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of the
crime charged.

Notably, records do not show that Polvoriza made a similar appeal before the Court.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Mora's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons should be upheld.

Ruling/s:
YES. Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the
"recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use
of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs." Trafficking in Persons" becomes qualified when
the trafficked person is a child.

In this case, Mora and Polvoriza were charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons under
Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) of RA 9208. Section 4 (e) of RA 9208 reads:

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
juridical, to commit any of the following acts:cralawred x x x x

(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[.]

The prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements, to wit: (a) Mora,
through deception and by taking advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor, was able to

"convince" the latter to go to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur; (b) upon arrival thereat, Mora
took AAA to Polvoriza's videoke bar, i.e., Otoy's, and left her there; and (c) since then and
for the next 8 months, Polvoriza forced AAA to work as a prostitute in Otoy's, coercing her
to perform lewd acts on a nightly basis, such as dancing naked in front of male customers
and even having sex with them.

Even when it was AAA who voluntarily presented herself to work as an entertainer/sex
worker in Otoy's, trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent
- most especially in cases where the victim is a minor. In this regard, case law instructs that
"the victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will."
 FERNANDO B. ARAMBULLO,* PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 241834, July 24, 2019
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Topic:

Case Doctrine/s:

Convictions for "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" shall rest on: (a) the commision of any of
the acts provided under Section 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C or % of RA 9208; and (b) the existence of
any of the circumstances listed under Section 6. Otherwise stated, one cannot be convicted
of "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" if he is not found to have committed any of the
punishable acts under the law.

Facts:

The RTC and CA convicted Fernando B. Arambulo for the crime of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons. petitioner and his minor son, Dominique Dimple Arambulo9 (Dominique), invited
the latter's three (3) schoolmates who were also minors, namely AAA, BBB, and CCC, 10
to their house sometime in 2011. It was then revealed that the purpose of the meeting was
to discuss petitioner's plans to commit robberies with the help of AAA, BBB, and CCC. Upon
learning about this, CCC expressed his desire to leave but petitioner got angry and punched
him; thus, he was forced to join the group. AAA, BBB, and CCC then similarly testified that
not only was petitioner the mastermind of the series of robberies they subsequently
committed against various people, but he was also the driver of their getaway tricycle.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in
Persons.

Held:

Yes. Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the
purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs." The same provision further provides that "the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set
forth in the preceding paragraph."The crime becomes qualified when any of the
circumstances found under Section 6 of the law is present.
 Caluag v. People
G.R. No. 171511, March 4, 2009
Quisimbing, J.
Topic: Threats

Case Doctrine/s:

The threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing
factor between grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.

Facts:

In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Nestor Denido learned
that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Ronnie
Caluag and Jesus Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son of Sentillas. When
Nestor inquired from several people including his own son Raymond what happened,
Caluag butted in and replied, "Bakit kasama ka ba roon?", and immediately boxed him
without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia
Denido saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they
did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At
around 6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay
authorities. Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on
their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley
near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said "Saan
ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?" Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to
the barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.

Issue/s:

Whether Caluag is guilty of grave threats

Ruling/s:

Yes, Caluag is guilty of grave threats.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats (Article 282),
light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285).
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be
accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a
crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened
does not amount to a crime and there is no condition.
The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to
the barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier at around
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. On her way there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun
to her forehead, while at the same time saying "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"
Considering what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia's husband, petitioner's act
of pointing a gun at Julia's forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious
physical injury on her person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the
surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict
serious injury evinced by petitioner's accompanying act.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2
(grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat
to kill was not subject to a condition.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, "shall
threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel", since it presupposes
that the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a
wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave
threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.
 Santiago Paera v. People
G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011
Carpio, J.
Topic: Threats

Case Doctrine/s:

Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid
succession, petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.

Facts:

As the punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, Paera allocated his
constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution
to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring
barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong (Vicente), father
of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioner’s scheme, Indalecio
continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded Indalecio of the
water distribution scheme and cut Indalecio’s access.

Petitioner inspected the tank the next day because the constituents complained of water
supply interruption. He discovered that the main line had a tap, which he promptly
disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed
bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived.

According to the prosecution, the petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and
charged towards Indalecio, shouting "Patyon tikaw!" (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety,
passing along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the
water tank. Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of
replying, petitioner shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I don’t spare
anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought
refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his
attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and,
recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting "Bisag gulang ka,
buk-on nako imo ulo!" ("Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!").

According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily
inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice
but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper.

MCTC Ruling: petitioner guilty of three counts of grave threats. Held petitioner’s denial as
self-serving and uncorroborated.
RTC Ruling: affirmed MCTC.
 Issue/s:

Whether the petitioner is guilty of three counts of grave threats.

Ruling/s:

Yes. Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime[.]" This felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the
knowledge of the person threatened.

Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner’s threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea
and crack open Vicente’s skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least)
homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats were
consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his
threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three
individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.

To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the case
to the concept of "continued crime" (delito continuado) which envisages a single crime
committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution. Petitioner’s
theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had "a single mental
resolution, a single impulse, and single intent" to threaten the Darongs assumes a vital fact:
that he had foreknowledge of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente’s presence near the water
tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. The records, however, belie this assumption. Thus, in
the case of Indalecio, petitioner was as much surprised to see Indalecio as the latter was in
seeing petitioner when they chanced upon each other near the water tank. Similarly,
petitioner came across Diosetea as he was chasing Indalecio who had scampered for
safety. Lastly, petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed,
petitioner went to the water tank not to execute his "single intent" to threaten Indalecio,
Diosetea, and Vicente but to investigate a suspected water tap. Not having known in
advance of the Darongs’ presence near the water tank at the time in question, petitioner
could not have formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently
came across each of them.

Indeed, petitioner’s theory holds water only if the facts are altered – that is, he threatened
Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time. Had this been
true, then petitioner’s liability for one count of Grave Threats would have rested on the same
basis grounding our rulings that the taking of six roosters or 13 cows found at the same
place and taken at the same time results in the commission of only one count of theft
because – [t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different
purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of
only one crime.
 Escolano v. People
G.R. No. 226991, December 10, 2018
Gesmundo, J;
Topic: Threats

Case Doctrine/s:

In grave threats, the wrong threatened to be committed amounts to a crime which may or
may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not
amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the
wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition.

Facts:

AAA testified that he was 11 years old at the time of the incident; that on May 29, 2009, at
around eleven o'clock in the morning, he and his two brothers: BBB, 9 years old, and CCC,
8 years old, were flying paper planes from the third floor of their house when the planes
landed in front of the house of Perlin Escolano (Perlin), the daughter of petitioner. Perlin
uttered "putang ina" directed at CCC. The following day, the siblings saw Perlin in front of
their house. Private complainants got three ketchup sachets from their refrigerator and threw
these at her. However, Perlin went inside their house so it was petitioner who was twice hit
instead by the sachets. Petitioner exclaimed, "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong
pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso
ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko." Private complainants reported the incident to their mother
DDD when she arrived from the market.

When DDD confronted petitioner, the latter uttered "nagpuputa ka, puta-puta ka. " Petitioner
then went inside her house, came out with a bolo, and threatened DDD, "walang demanda
demanda sa akin, basta bumaba kayo dito lahat, papatayin ko kayong lahat. Tatagain ko
kayo, papatayin ko kayo." The incident left private complainants terrified. They only went
downstairs when they had a companion; and they no longer played as they usually did. BBB
and CCC corroborated AAA's testimony that they threw ketchup sachets at Perlin because
she uttered bad words against CCC.

On the other hand, DDD testified that on May 30, 2009, private complainants told her about
the incident, thus, she confronted petitioner. The latter pointed her finger at her and uttered,
"Hoy, putang ina mo," got a bolo, and yelled "Kaya ninyo ito? Pagtatatagain ko kayo."[11]
Thereafter, DDD noticed a change in the behavior of private complainants as they no longer
played downstairs and they even transferred residence because of the incident. DDD
averred that her children were traumatized, and they were in constant fear because of
petitioner's threat.

Issue/s:

Whether the petitioner Erlinda Escolano committed the crime of Other light threats against
the private respondent.
 Ruling/s:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, in relation thereto, Sec. 3(b)
of the same law, highlights that in child abuse, the act by deeds or words must debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Debasement
is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something; degradation, on
the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality; while demean
means to lower in status, condition, reputation or character.[25] In this case, the Court finds
that the act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private complainants does not
constitute child abuse. Petitioner had no intention to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity
of the child. It was rather an act carelessly done out of anger.

The present case is only concerned with the acts committed by petitioner against private
complainants; and not those committed against DDD which purportedly constituted grave
threats. DDD conceded that the profanity hurled by petitioner was directed at her. The
expression "putang ina mo" is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more
often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity.[35] Thus, it cannot
be held with moral certainty that the purported hacking gestures and profanities
subsequently hurled by petitioner were intended for private complainants.

Nevertheless, though the prosecution failed to prove the intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth of private complainants, petitioner still uttered insults and
invectives at them. Specifically, petitioner's statement "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala
kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko
ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko," were directed against private complainants.
However, it must also be emphasized that, as discussed, petitioner's utterances were made
in the heat of her anger because private complainants had thrown ketchup sachets at her.
Petitioner merely intended that private complainants stop their rude behavior. Thus,
petitioner committed the crime of Other Light Threats under Article 285(2) of the RPC.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened to be committed amounts to a crime which may or
may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not
amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the
wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition.

In the case at bar, the threat made by petitioner of releasing her dogs to chase private
complainants was expressed in the heat of anger. Petitioner was merely trying to make
private complainants stop throwing ketchup sachets at her. However, instead of doing so,
private complainants still continued to throw ketchup sachets against petitioner, which
infuriated the latter causing her to utter invectives against private complainants. Given the
surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 285, par. 2 (other light
threats) since: (1) threat does not amount to a crime, and (2) the prosecution did not
establish that petitioner persisted in the idea involved in her threat.

Assuming arguendo that private complainants were also affected and distressed by the
threat made by petitioner against DDD in brandishing a bolo, such act is still within the ambit
of Other Light Threats under Article 285 (1). Insofar as private complainants are concerned,
petitioner committed an act of threatening their mother with a weapon in a quarrel. As
discussed earlier, the present case is only concerned with the threats that affected private
complainants; it should not refer to the threats specifically aimed towards DDD. The criminal
complaint for grave threats against petitioner filed by DDD should be resolved in a separate
action.

For threatening private complainants, petitioner is criminally liable for Other Light Threats
under Article 285 of the Revised Penal Code. She must suffer the straight penalty of
imprisonment of 10 days of arresto menor and to pay the costs of suit.
 Consulta v. People
G.R. No. 179462 , February 12, 2009
Carpio-Morales, J.
Topic: Coercion

Case Doctrine/s:

The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other
to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to
gain to take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for
robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or
the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then,
conviction for coercion. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion.

Facts:

At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, private complainant Nelia R. Silvestre (Nelia),
together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and Veronica Amar (Veronica), boarded a tricycle on
their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street, appellant and his brother
Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and
left. Appellant and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying "Putang ina mong
matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin." Appellant added
"Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala, sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita
matiempuhan, papatayin kita."

Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia's 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which,
according to an "alajera" in the province, was of 18k gold, and which was worth P3,500,
kicked the tricycle and left saying "Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang,
anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo. Kami, marami kaming mga abogado.
Hindi niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!"

Accused-appellant was then charged with Robbery with Intimidation of Persons.

Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his family, and that
it was Nelia who started the scandalous acts. Appellant's witness testified that on the date
of the alleged robbery, Nelia approached the witness while he was at Ambel and asked him
if he knew a bald man who is big/stout with a big tummy. As the witness replied in the
affirmative, Nelia at once asked him to accompany them to appellant's house, to which he
acceded. As soon as Nelia reached appellant's house, appellant emerged and on seeing
Nelia, told them to go away so as not to cause trouble. Retorting, Nelia uttered "Mga hayop
kayo, hindi ko kayo titigilan".
The trial court, holding that intent to gain on appellant's part "is presumed from the unlawful
taking" of the necklace, convicted appellant of Robbery. The appellate court affirmed
appellant's conviction.

Issue/s:

Was the trial court correct in convicting Consulta of robbery?

Ruling/s:

NO.

The elements of robbery are thus: 1) there is a taking of personal property; 2) the
personal property belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and 4) the taking
is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things.

Under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental encounter of

the parties, the taking of Nelia's necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on
appellant's part. That intent to gain on appellant's part is difficult to appreciate gains light
given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested
by, among other things, the filing of complaints against him by Nelia and her family which
were subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal. Absent intent to gain on the part of
appellant, robbery does not lie against him.

He is not necessarily scot-free, however. For "[w]hen there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved."

The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission
of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion:

"The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding
to robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the
accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another
by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the
purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the
creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to seize
property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal
Code. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there was
no common robber in the present case, but a man who had fought bitterly
 for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands and
attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was
lacking."

The Court finds that by appellant's employment of threats, intimidation and

violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle
driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her
destination.

Appellant is thus guilty of grave coercion.