Case #1

Pacific Banking Corporation vs CA

GR No. 109373

FACTS:

Pacific Banking Corporation was placed under receivership and later was
placed under liquidation. A Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific
Banking Corporation was filed by Central bank and was approved. Pacific Banking
Corporation Employees Organization, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking
payment due its members as employees of the Bank. In its order, the court ordered
payment of the principal claims of the Union.

The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On

October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the
order but in effect was denied by the Court. This order was received by the
Liquidator on December 9, [Link] following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a
Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's
Notice of Appeal on the ground that it lapsed for more than 15 days after the
decision.

The RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents and such order
was received by the Liquidator on September 16, [Link] September 30, 1992 he
moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2,
1992.

Issue:

WON a liquidation proceeding is a special proceeding.

Held:

Yes. The Court distinguishes an action and a special proceeding. An action

is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special
proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party,
or a particular fact.
 Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent
corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action.
Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the
prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative
relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of
action that can be enforced against any person. What it seeks is merely a
declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors
may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and
obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation’s state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the
order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Case #2

Natcher vs CA
GR. No. 133000

Facts:

Sps. Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of
a parcel of land located in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano,
together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana
and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate.

On 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an “Agreement of

Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights”. Graciano then
donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered
under Graciano’s name.

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.

During their marriage, Graciano sold his land to his wife Patricia. On 07 October
1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his
first marriage, as heirs.

Private respondents filed a complaint alleged that upon Graciano’s death,

petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and
forgery, making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June
19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation and the issuance of
title in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged
in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes
have been impaired.

RTC ruled that the sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity.
Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased.”

CA reversed and set aside the lower court.

Issue:

WON an RTC may adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made
by the decedent to any of the heirs.

Held:

No. The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue
of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch
as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is
not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil

action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person
such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a
special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules
as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Case #3
Hernaez vs IAC
GR No. 73864

Facts:

On September 2, 1980, petitioner represented by his mother and natural

guardian, Evelyn Palmes, filed a complaint with the then Juvenile and Domestic
Court against Teodoro Hernaez for acknowledgment and support with support
pendente lite. Teodoro Hernaez filed a notice of appeal of said decision. As the
appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days as mandated by
Section39 of Batas Pambansa 129, petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal as the
decision of the trial court has become final and [Link] the defect in
his notice of appeal, Teodoro Hernaez filed a Motion to Give Due Course to
Appeal or Petition for Relief which was denied on the ground that the motion was
filed out of time and the petition did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 38 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Teodoro Hernaez thru his new counsel, filed another Petition for Relief from
Judgment alleging that he was not aware of the decision of the lower court. On the
same date, private respondent's wife, Estrella Hernaez, together with their six
children likewise filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Motion to
Intervene because they were not included as parties in the instant case, which
petitions and motion were denied for lack of merit and on the ground that the
decision had already become final and executory. Private respondents then filed a
motion for clarification inquiring as to whether their appeal which was granted on
January 25, 1986 was subsequently denied.

The trial court issued an order declaring that there is no need for a
clarification. On March 20, 1985, petitioner filed a motion to require private
respondent Teodoro Hernaez to deposit support in arrears or to be cited for
contempt. During the hearing of the motion for contempt, private respondents'
counsel requested for 10 days within which to comply with the questioned
decision. However, on April 10, 1986, private respondents, instead of complying
with said decision, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or
alternatively, an action for the annulment of judgment with preliminary injunction
with the Intermediate Appellate Court, 5 which declared the decision of the trial
court null and void for lack of summons by publication being an action in rem.

Issue:
 WON an action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not
among cases of special proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules
of Court.

Held:

Yes. An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not

among cases of special proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules
of Court. Consequently, such an action should be governed by the rules on
ordinary civil actions. The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of
Court since the same applies only to cases falling under Article 281 of the Civil
Code where there has been a voluntary recognition of the minor natural child, i.e.,
prior recognition of the minor natural child in a document other than a record of
birth or a will, which is absent in the case.

Case #4

Portugal vs Portugal-Beltran
GR No. 155555

Facts:

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner

Isabel de la Puerta and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-
petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli
Portugal.

Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and

Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died
intestate. In the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a parcel of land in his favor.

Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-
Beltran executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased
Person” adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then
issued the title in her name.
 Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City a complaint against Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit
of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed
by the RTC for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court,
and lack of jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

WON Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to

determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name.

HELD:

No. The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the
case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship
should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.

However, in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case,
to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil
case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
Case #5

Rebong vs Ibaňez
GR No. L-1578

Facts:

Petitioner Rebong applied for a petition to cancel the annotation on the

certificate of title of a land which he inherited from his parents. In which the
annotation was pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, on
settlement of estate, to the effect that the property is still subject to any claim by
creditors and other heirs of his deceased parents within 2 years from settlement of
estate.

Petitioner based her petition for cancellation on section 112 of Act no. 496.
Which provides, “SEC. 112. ... Any registered owner or other person in interest
may at any time apply petition to the court, upon the ground that the registered
interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate,
have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been created
which do not appear upon the certificate; ... and the court shall have jurisdiction to
hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order
the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a
certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring
security if necessary, as it may deem proper; . . . .

Since the respondent Judge denied her petition, petitioner claims that the
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

WON petition to cancel annotation should be allowed?

Held:

No. The annotation could not be cancelled because the registered interests
have not yet terminated and ceased. The two-year period required by Rule 74 has
not yet lapsed when the petition for cancellation was filed. Neither section 4, Rule
74 nor Act 496 authorizes the substitution of a bond for a lien or registered interest,
whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated
or ceased.
Case #6

Torres vs Torres
GR No. L-19064

Facts:

Petitioner claims to be one of the four legitimate children of Paz E. Siguion

Torres who died intestate on December 18, 1959, prayed for the issuance in his
favor of letters of administration in connection with the properties left by the
decedent, with an aggregate value of about P300,000.00. It was also alleged therein
that petitioner was unaware of any existing debt or obligation contracted by the
deceased or by her estate, from any of the heirs or from third persons.

This petition was opposed by Conchita Torres, one of the heirs, on the
ground that the appointment of an administrator is unnecessary in view of the fact
that on January 27, 1960, the heirs of the deceased (including petitioner) had
already entered into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate, pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner who, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition was signed
by the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual designation of their respective
shares had failed thus needing the court’s intervention. It was also claimed that
some properties of considerable value were not included in said extrajudicial
partition.

On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial settlement had
already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed the petition. Hence, the institution
of the present appeal.

Issue:

WON a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is necessary.

Held:

No.  Where the decedent left no debts and the heirs or legatees are all of age,
there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment
of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same can be
effected either extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition.

Case #7

Ermac vs Medelo
Gr No. L-32281

Facts:

Spouses Mariquit both died leaving as the only property to be inherited by

their heirs a parcel of land with an assessed value of P590.00. Accordingly, herein
respondent Cenon Medelo, one of the grandchildren of the said spouses, filed a
petition for summary settlement of said estate. All requirements having been
complied with, and there being no opposition thereto, respondent court issued an
order granting the same, enumerating all the heirs entitled to participate in the
inheritance and ordering petitioner to present the proper project of partition of the
lot aforementioned.

On February 2, 1970, however, petitioner, one of the children of the

deceased spouses, moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement, praying for
the elimination of Lot 1327 from the estate on the ground that it belongs to him
and his wife. This motion was denied, the court ruling that the proper remedy is a
separate suit. Accordingly, petitioner, together with his children, filed a
corresponding action. And when upon submission of the project of partition, the
respondent court approved the same over his objection predicated on the pendency
of Civil Case No. 1564, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

WON the settlement proceeding should go on.

Held:

Yes. The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons with the least loss of time.

The settlement proceeding must go on, and not be delayed. The probate
court is NOT the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims of ownership of
any property ostensibly belonging to the decedent’s estate. While there are settled
exceptions to this rule, it is not proper to delay the summary settlement of deceased
person’s estate just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties
do not belong to the estate but to him. Adverse claims of ownership must be
ventilated in an INDEPENDENT ACTION. For the protection of the claimant, the
appropriate step is to have the proper annotation of lis pendens.

Case #8

Buot vs Dujali
GR No. 199885

Facts:

Buot filed before the RTC a petition for letters of administration of the estate
of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). Buot alleged that she was a surviving heir
of Gregorio who died intestate. She also claimed that since Gregorio’s death, there
had been no effort to settle his estate. And that Dujali purportedly continued to
manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot
further alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to settle the
estate. Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve
Gregorio’s estate; (2) a final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be
established; and (4) the net estate be ordered distributed in accordance with law
among the legal heirs.

Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss. According to Dujali, when

an estate has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed only
when there are good and compelling reasons. Where an action for partition
(whether in or out of court) is possible, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding.

Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for
administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary action
for partition. In her case, she claims that there are good reasons justifying her
recourse to administration proceedings: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement
did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property;
(3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot’ s status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been
deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia
Dujali and Marilou Dujali, have already manifested that they are amenable to the
appointment of an administrator.

ISSUE:

WON Petition for letters of administration filed by Buot be granted.

HELD:

No. The Court held that the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant
of her petition for letters of administration do not suffice to warrant the submission
of Gregorio’s estate to administration proceedings.

Buot’s allegation that the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover
Gregorio’s entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the
administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover
the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the
entire estate may be considered valid do not automatically create a compelling
reason to order the administration of the estate

An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot’s

entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an heir. Not only would it allow for
the full ventilation of the issues as to the properties that ought to be included in the
partition and the true heirs entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also
the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to
ascertain if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.

When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to
judicial administration [Link] are, however, several exceptions.

If the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs
may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs
may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the
Register of Deeds. In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an
action for partition.
Case #9

Pereira vs CA
GR No. L-81147

Facts:

Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3,

1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of
ten months, and his sister. Rita instituted for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira and alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira
are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that
there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties,

Victoria filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters
of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving
spouse.

Issue:

WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no

debts left by the decedent

Held:

No. What constitutes good reason to warrant a judicial administration of the

estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors
will depend on the circumstances of each case. The general rule is that when a
person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established
in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one,
should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to this rule is established
in Section 1 of Rule 74.
 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property
without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate
has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action for partition.

The Court ruled that to subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira,
which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left
has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful
purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or
squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, the claims of both parties as to
the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition
proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.

Case #10

Sheker vs Estate of Sheker

GR No. 157912

Facts:

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against
the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on a contingent claim for
agent’s commission due him in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be
incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice Sheker (MEDINA) moved for the
dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money
claim was not filed and served personally.
 The RTC-Iligan City issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice
the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner’s MR
was denied. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate

proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written
explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of
the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the ROC provides that rules in
ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

Issues:

WON rules in ordinary civil actions are only suppletory to rules in special
proceedings.

Held:

No. Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same ROC provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. – In the absence of special

provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the ROC govern

special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special
proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform;

capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the
absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special
proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to
said proceedings. Nowhere in the ROC does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the ROC requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service
and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would
not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the
present case.
Case #11

Ventura vs Ventura
GR No. L-11609

Facts:

Petitioner is the widow of Agustine del Valle, who died in Paniqui, Tarlac,
on May 19, 1955. Soon thereafter, she instituted Special Proceedings with a
petition for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of the deceased. After
the issuance of the corresponding notice of hearing, the publication of said notice
and the service of copies thereof upon all parties concerned, petitioner filed a
motion stating that the heirs instituted in the will had agreed to partition, among
themselves, the estate of the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of said
instrument, and praying that an order be issued "terminating and closing" the
aforementioned proceedings.

However, Antonia Ventura filed another partition for the probate of the
probate of the aforementioned last will and testament of her deceased husband
which petition was docketed on the same court. Appellees Maura, Milagros,
Deogracias and Jacinta, all surnamed Ventura, moved for the dismissal of the case.

The lower court granted this motion upon the theory that it " no longer" had
"jurisdiction to entertain" the case, "because to do so would be for the court to
reopen Special Proceedings No. 912", notwithstanding the fact that it had been
"definitely declared terminated, closed and archived" by an order which has
already "become final and executory", no appeal having been taken therefrom.
Hence, the present appeal taken by petitioner Antonia Ventura.

Issue:

WON the dismissal of the Special Proceedings bars the consideration of the
petition.
Held:

No. Although final and executory; said order of dismissal of Special

Proceedings No. 912 does not bar the consideration of the petition herein.
Pursuant to rule 30, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.

"An action may be dismissed by the by the plaintiff without order of

court by filling a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the
answer. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an
action based on or including the same action."

Although found in Part I of the Rules of Court, which refers to civil actions, this
rule is applicable to Special Proceedings, for Rule 73, section 2, of said Rules
provides:

"In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."

The order issue in Special Proceedings No. 912, directing that the same be closed,
terminated and archived, had filed a pleading or raised an issue, is deemed,
therefore, to be "without prejudice", the contrary not being stated either in said
order or in the motion that prompted its issuance. Needless to say, the
aforementioned order may not be regarded as a judgment, barring a subsequent
action upon the ground of "res adjudicate”.

Case #12

Bunyi vs Factor
GR No. 172547

Facts:

Respondent is one of the co-owners of a piece of land in Las Pinas City

owned by her grandparents. Her father E caused the construction of several houses
in the compound including the subject property, a rest house, where members of
the Factor family stayed during get-togethers and visits. Petitioners, were tenants in
one of the houses inside the compound City 1999. When Enrique Factor died, the
administration of the Factor compound was transferred and entrusted to Enrique’s
eldest child, who lives with her husband.
Gloria died in 2001 and the administration of the Factor compound passed
on to respondent Fe as co-owner of the property. As an act of goodwill,
considering that Ruben Labao was sickly and had no means of income, respondent
allowed him to stay at the rest house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a
guest of the Factor family. Ruben Labao later on married herein petitioner.
On November 10, 2002, Ruben Labao died. Respondent discovered that
petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the rest house and stole all the personal
properties owned by the Factor family and then audaciously occupied the premises.
Respondent alleged that petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family
of the subject property’s lawful use and possession. Respondent also added that
when she tried to enter the rest house on December 1, 2002, an unidentified person
who claimed to have been authorized by petitioners to occupy the premises, barred,
threatened, and chased her with a jungle bolo.

Respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against herein petitioners

Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi. Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fe’s claim of
ownership of the subject property and the alleged prior ownership of her father
Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject property was owned by Ruben
Labao, and that petitioner Precy with her husband moved into the subject property.

Issue:

WON petitioner has better right of physical and material possession of the
subject property.

Held:

No. The private respondent Fe S. Factor has a better right of physical and
material possession of the subject property. In ejectment cases, the only issue for
resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-
litigants.

The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself. Possession de facto is the physical
possession of real property. Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the
only issue in a forcible entry case.
 In this case, while petitioners claim that respondent never physically
occupied the subject property, they failed to prove that they had prior possession of
the subject property. On record, petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted that Gloria
Factor-Labao and Ruben Labao, as spouses, resided in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro
Manila and used the subject property whenever they visit the same. The right of
respondent’s predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient to
uphold respondents right to possession over the same. Also, the right over the
property was vested to the heirs, Fe being a co-heir of Gloria, from the moment of
death of their father Enrique and there being no showing of evidence that would
contradict such, Fe has a better right over the subject property.

Case #13
Lim vs CA
GR No. 124715

Facts:

On June 11, 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as

surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew, George Luy filed on March
17, 1995, a joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent corporations
whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim,
then filed a Motion for the Lifting of Lis Pendens and Motion for Exclusion of
Certain Properties from the Estate of the decedent, Pastor Y. Lim.
RTC, as probate court, granted these 2 motions. Petitioner filed a verified
Amended Petition. RTC acting on petitioner's motion issued an order directing the
Registry of Deeds to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens. Probate court also
issued an order denying private respondents' Motion for Exclusion.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for Certiorari before the CA
questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court. The
CA ruled in favor of herein private respondents and reversed the RTC constituted
as a probate court. Petitioner files this instant petition praying that SC affirm the
orders issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court
of Appeals. Petitioner on her appeal via Rule 45 assigned the lone error committed
by the CA in that she alleged that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the orders of the lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or
provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate of the late
deceased, Pastor Y. Lim, with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto
itself the power to repeal, to disobey, or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions
of Rules 81, 83, 84, and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the
petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate as
expressly provided in the said Rules.

Issue:
WON the Petitioner’s contention is meritorious to warrant a reversal of the
CA’s ruling.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court stated that settled is the rule that a Court of First
Instance, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has
no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed
by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of
third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the
question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court, is
in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of
practice which may be waived.

Case #14

Roberts vs Leonidas
GR No. L-55509

Facts:

Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived

by his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his
two children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.

Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23,

1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property
of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside
the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah
by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the
intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court
admitted the two wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued
upon consideration of the stipulation between the attorneys for Maxine and
Ethel.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills
(already probated in Utah), praying inter alia that the partition approved by the
intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, and that
she be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and return the same to her. Maxine alleged that they were
defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was
illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so
partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills.
Issue:

WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.

Held:

No. A testate proceeding is proper in case the decedent died testate and
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed. As a consequence, the probate of the will is mandatory. It is
anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding.

In this case, there was sufficient proof that the decedent died leaving a
will and to allow intestate proceedings where a will was proven to be executed
by the decedent will be contrary to both logic and law. In such scenario where
an intestate and testate proceeding were commenced, the latter shall govern.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.

Case #15

Uriarte vs CFI of Negros Occidental

GR Nos. L-21938-39

Facts:
 Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the
Philippines. Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of the
deceased, filed a petition for the intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Said petition was opposed by the
nephews of Juan stating that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a
copy of which is being requested.

The nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila, on the
basis of the alleged will of the deceased. Vicente filed an opposition to the
settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating that the court of Negros
Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The opposition
of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement in the CFI of
Negros.

Issue:

WON the intestate settlement filed in the CFI of Negros Occidental prior to
the institution of the testate settlement in Manila should be dismissed.

Held:

Yes. Under the Rules on the settlement of estate of the deceased person,
testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

In cases where an intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding of the
will of the deceased, and because of such find, a probate proceeding regarding such
will is filed thereafter, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give
priority to the testate proceeding.

Case #16

Cuenco vs CA
GR No. L-24742

Facts:

Senator Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in
Cebu. One of the children from the first marriage filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the
senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu at the time of his death and
that he left real and personal properties with in Cebu and Quezon City.

On Mach 12, 1964, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on
the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on

the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI
Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and
motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a Writ of Prohibition against the CFI Quezon City court from proceeding
with the testate proceedings in view of the prior acquisition of jurisdiction of the
CFI of Cebu.

Issue:

WON the ruling of the Court of Appeals is proper.

HELD:

No. Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The Rule on venue though does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The court with whom
the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

In this case, the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference
of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of
venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon
City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as
the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate
the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in
accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.

Case #17

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs Dumlao

GR No. 44888

Facts:

Ricardo M. Gonzales, filed a Petition with the Court of First Instance of

Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying that he be appointed judicial
administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy.
Private respondents, opposed the prayer asserting that the petition did not
allege that the petitioner is an interested person and for that reason the case must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It contended that when you file a petition for
intestacy, you must state that you are an interested person because the opening
sentence of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court dictates that, a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person.

Issue:

WON an allegation that the petitioner is an interested person is a

jurisdictional fact which must be stated in the petition.

HELD:

No. Under the law, a jurisdictional fact in intestacy proceedings or a petition

seeking Letters of Administration means that the applicant must allege, among
others: (1) the death of the testator, (2) the place of residence of the deceased at the
time of his death, (3) the place, area, or territory where the probate court is sitting,
(4) if he is inhabitant of the foreign country, and (5) his having left his estate in
such country.

The allegation that the petitioner seeking Letters of Administration is an

interested person is not within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts to be
established in such proceedings. Thus the contention that establishing locus standi
in such proceeding is not a jurisdictional fact. However, the Court in this case
emphasized that it is undeniable that an allegation that a person is an interested
person in such proceeding is also required and Motion to Dismiss will lie not on
ground of lack of jurisdiction but on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute
the proceeding.

Case #18

San Luis vs San Luis

GR No. 1337434

Facts:

Felicisimo San Luis, the former Governor of the Province of Laguna, during
his lifetime, contracted three marriages.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and

the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati City.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and

failure to state a cause of action, claiming that the Petition for Letters of
Administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.

A similar motion to dismiss was filed by Linda, sister of petitioner. The trial
court denied the Motions to Dismiss. In her opposition thereto, respondent
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
Alabang which they bought sometime in 1982.

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed Motions for Reconsideration from the Order denying their Motions to
Dismiss. The court a quo issued an Order denying the Motions for
Reconsideration. The trial court dismissed the Petition for Letters of
Administration on grounds of improper venue and lack of legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.

Issue:

WON the CA’s decision as to venue of action is proper.

RULING:

Yes. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court states that the Petition for
Letters of Administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the RTC of
the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” For purposes of fixing
venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.

In this case, it is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for

purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with “domicile.” Needless to say, there is a distinction between
“residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing
the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. While petitioners established that Felicisimo
was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.

From the foregoing, it is thus clear that Felicisimo was a resident of

Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa.

Case #19

Utulo vs Pasion
GR No. 45904
Facts:

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the
CFI of Tarlac for the administration of his property Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia,
the surviving spouse and the herein Oppositor, was appointed judicial
administratrix.

The said deceased left legitimate children, who, with the widow, are the
presumptive compulsory heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo
and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased,
she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only heirs
being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court
the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (Special
Proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself
and his mother-in-law, the Oppositor, and that the only property left by the
deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan
Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property
of said deceased.

The Oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration

of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant as
administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness,
there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that
should the court grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed
the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant. The
trial proceeded and the court finally issued the appealed order to which the
Oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified
and approved.

ISSUE:

WON the judicial administration of the property left by the deceased lies
with the consequent appointment of an administrator.

HELD:

No. In this case, the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of legal age,
thus there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and
expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the
absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to
intervene in anyway whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They
are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the
division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to
show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they
intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are any heirs of the
estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition
for partition of the said estate.

Case #20
Hernandez vs Andal

Facts:

Cresencia, Maria, Aquilina, Pedro and Basilia Hernandez are siblings, who
acquired in common, a parcel of land from their deceased father. Maria and
Aquilina sold to the spouses Andal a portion thereof, which they purport to be their
combined shares. After the sale, Cresencia attempted to repurchase the land but
Andal refused to sell the same.

Andal resold the same to Maria and Aquilina. Maria and Aquilina alleged
that there had been an oral partition among them and their brother and sisters, and
that there are witnesses ready to prove such partition. However, Cresencia asserted
that under the Rules of Court, oral evidence of partition is inadmissible.

Issue:

WON oral evidence is admissible in proving a contract of partition among

heirs.

Held:
 Yes. As a general rule, transactions are required to be reduced to writing
either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove
the existence of such transactions. However, written form in a contract of partition
among heirs are not governed by the statute of frauds, as the same is not a
conveyance of property but simply a separation and designation of that part of the
land which belongs to each tenant in common.

The Civil Code, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public

instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy
so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party
bound may be compelled to execute the document. It must be noted that where the
law intends a writing or other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity
of the transactions it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Section 1 of Rule 74
of the Rules of Court contains no such express or clear declaration that the required
public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent
element of its effectiveness as between the parties.