CSS Analyses in Security Policy
No. 300, March 2022
AUKUS: Below the Surface
The newly formed AUKUS partnership, a trilateral defense technology
arrangement bringing together the US, the UK, and Australia, signals
a shift in Washington’s regional posture. It seeks to close ranks with
important allies, particularly vis-à-vis China, and illustrates the subor-
dination of non-proliferation and diplomatic concerns to strategic
utility.
By Niklas Masuhr and
Névine Schepers
In September 2021, Australia, the UK, and
the US announced the creation of a trilat-
eral security partnership named AUKUS.
The new format is intended to strengthen
defense cooperation between the three na-
tions in four areas – artificial intelligence
(AI) as well as cyber, quantum, and under-
sea technologies – and will include the de-
velopment of an Australian fleet of nucle-
ar-powered submarines (SSN) through the
transfer of US or British technology. The
implications of this new partnership are
significant in a number of ways, if uncer-
tain.
First, AUKUS signals a clear recognition In May 2020, the Royal Australian Navy teamed up with the US Navy to conduct combined exercises in
by all three states that Chinese actions pose the South China Sea. Reuters
a systemic and military challenge to their
interests and the existing regional and
global security order; a challenge the agree-
ment seeks to counter. It also cements the increasingly dividing the region between a some of the broader strategic trends at play
US’ strategic repositioning toward the US-led and a Chinese-led order. It creates in the region, the risks they heighten, and
Asia-Pacific. Second, the sharing of nucle- additional pressure for states from the the opportunities they create.
ar naval propulsion technology is a depar- Asia-Pacific and for those with an interest
ture from practices in the defense and civil in the region, notably Europeans, to take Framing AUKUS
nuclear industry based on non-prolifera- sides when many do not want to define At its core, AUKUS is a partnership fo-
tion norms and the preservation of strate- China as a threat and prefer to leave the cused on defense cooperation, technology
gic capabilities. The only other prior case door open for cooperation with Beijing. sharing, and increasing military interoper-
was the US’ transfer to the UK in 1958, al- ability. It is not an alliance, as the US al-
though this was much broader in scope to An initial analysis of the military and pro- ready has alliance relationships with Aus-
include cooperation on Britain’s nuclear liferation implications of the partnership as tralia through the ANZUS treaty and with
weapons program. Third, AUKUS furthers well as its impact in both the Asia-Pacific the UK through the US-UK Mutual De-
a deeper trend of shifting power dynamics, and Europe provides an understanding of fense Agreement and NATO. The UK and
© 2022 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 1
CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 300, March 2022
Australia have an established bilateral part- of the US’ European defense efforts submarines, by contrast, would be much
nership and all three countries are part of through NATO, but in the Asia-Pacific, more tactically suited to operate closer to
the Five Eyes intelligence framework. In necessary competencies have a more mari- Australia itself and thus provide less utility
addition, the partnership does not revolve time and aerial bend. to the Pentagon’s force posture.
around a single document but rather a col-
lection of agreements and announcements. As such, the three AUKUS partners’ plat- However, as of now, it is unclear what sub-
AUKUS therefore sits between a formal al- forms necessary for fighting over the Pa- marine class the RAN can expect to com-
liance and a multidimensional arms agree- cific Ocean’s vast distances are already alike. mission into service, as there is no obvious
ment. Whether it becomes a more institu- This is especially pronounced in respective option. While the British Astute class may
tionalized mechanism, a flexible but low aerial forces, where, for example, similar or make sense thanks to lower cost and crew-
profile “minilateral”, or an agreement en- identical platforms serve as airborne early ing requirements, the US Navy’s Virginia
tirely focused on technology will depend warning systems, maritime patrol aircraft, class allows more payload and is impelled
on how Canberra, London, and Washing- and multipurpose fighters. This commonal- by a more modern reactor. As a result, Can-
ton deal with two major challenges over ity allows the US to fuse their networks of berra faces a difficult trade-off: While it is
time. sensors and weapons systems with their already straining to crew its Collins-class
close military allies across the region. legacy fleet, Virginia platforms could be
First, AUKUS will need to engage with advantageous in terms of longevity, espe-
other alliances and partnerships in the re- AUKUS’ pronouncements have revolved cially as they are able to link up with UUVs.
gion and beyond, as well as with its adver- around four further technology clusters it However, at present, neither the US nor
saries. Given how its announcement pro- seeks to develop jointly for strategic and the UK possess the industrial capacity to
pelled a diplomatic crisis with France – an military applications. AI, in this case, rang- simply manufacture additional submarines
ally of both the US and the UK whose 66 es from improved planning and battle for the RAN to fill the 20-year gap until
billion USD contract for diesel-electric management systems to improved or even the next generation of boats becomes op-
automatized intelligence col- erational. This is also due to the fact that
AUKUS will need to engage with lection and analysis. Autono- renewing either navy’s fleet of strategic
mous unmanned military plat- submarines (i.e. those carrying nuclear-
other alliances and partnerships forms that may be deployed in armed missiles) will take priority.
in the region and beyond. the near-term future also de-
pend on advances in this field. The challenges do not stop there, though.
submarines sunk as a result – AUKUS is The plan includes leveraging emerging Training officers and crews will be a con-
not particularly off to an auspicious start. quantum technologies for similar purposes, siderable task and require significant sup-
The three states also need to address re- as well. Furthermore, networked warfare port from Australia’s partners. The nuclear
gional fears that AUKUS will exacerbate over vast distances requires secure commu- reactors and related competencies and in-
arms race dynamics in the region and cre- nications. Accordingly, cyber capabilities frastructures further complicate Canberra’s
ate further instability, beyond pointing fin- are also on AUKUS’ list. This likely in- plans. In addition, the nuclear submarine
gers at China. cludes, in an offensive sense, the ability to deal risks puncturing nuclear non-prolifer-
disrupt the enemy’s command and control ation norms by openly exploiting a loop-
Second, Australia’s SSN program, its larg- arrangements as well as, defensively, the hole in the safeguards regime of the Non-
est and most complex defense undertaking need to protect civilian infrastructures and Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
to date, has neither straightforward nor economic actors. Lastly, the signatories in-
timely solutions. It will need to withstand tend to invest in the development of un- Proliferation Concerns
parliamentary scrutiny and numerous elec- manned underwater vehicles (UUVs), While the development of naval nuclear
tion cycles. The partner governments are which will constitute important elements propulsion and nuclear weapons are two
currently exploring the SSN program’s of future undersea warfare by allowing to very distinct endeavors, they both require
many parameters during an initial consul- distribute sensors and weapons systems fissile material. For that reason, only nucle-
tation period expected to last until at least across more numerous platforms. ar weapon-possessing states operate nucle-
March 2023. ar naval reactors so far. Non-nuclear weap-
Due to the SSNs’ extended timeline, these on states are legally able to develop
Military-Strategic Promise technology clusters may provide more util- nuclear-powered ships. Therefore, nuclear
While the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ity in military-strategic terms in the nearer safeguards agreements concluded with the
will likely only receive operational SSNs by future than the submarines. Both military International Atomic Energy Agency
the 2040s, they constitute but one element and political rationales led to a cancellation (IAEA) allow for nuclear material to be
of the AUKUS announcements. As a re- of the contract with France on diesel-elec- taken out of safeguards for a “non-pro-
sult, it is worth zooming out onto the re- tric submarines in favor of a nuclear-pow- scribed military activity” such as naval reac-
gional-strategic level. For the United ered platform. The great advantage of nu- tors. This loophole stems from the difficul-
States, military compatibility and interop- clear propulsion lies in its endurance and ty for the IAEA to monitor nuclear
erability are key priorities for their Pacific speed, and, thus, operational range. Here material used in submarines and the desire
alliance structure, which requires allied the US’ scenarios for a conflict with China of non-nuclear weapon states to ensure the
troops to integrate seamlessly with US for- come to the fore. Nuclear submarines widest access to nuclear activities bar weap-
mations. This starts with similar equipment would permit the Australian subsurface ons. This exemption remains yet unused
and logistical needs but extends to the abil- fleet to push up further north and to com- but has long been debated within the
ity to operate jointly regarding tactics and bat the People’s Liberation Army Navy NPT given the obvious proliferation risks
procedures. Comparable priorities are part closer to Chinese shores. Diesel-electric it creates.
© 2022 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2
CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 300, March 2022
The US has made it clear that sharing this strict model including conditions non-nu-
Further Reading
technology with Australia is an exception clear weapon states should fulfill when ac-
and contingent on Australia’s excellent quiring nuclear propulsion technology. James M. Acton, “Why the AUKUS Subma-
non-proliferation record and commit- Several experts have suggested the conclu- rine Deal is Bad for Nonproliferation—And
ments. Canberra is an active participant in sion of an additional protocol to a safe- what to Do about it,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 21.09.2021.
the NPT regime, taking part in several ad- guards agreement, being in full compliance
ditional multilateral initiatives promoting with safeguards for a minimum number of Tanya Ogilvie-White / John Gower, “A Deeper
transparency, as well as a party to all the years, and the external provision of nuclear Dive Into AUKUS. Risks and Benefits for
major export control mechanisms, nuclear fuel, among others. Since Australia already the Asia-Pacific,” Asia-Pacific Leadership
Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
safety and security agreements, and non- ticks most boxes, this could be perceived as Disarmament, 05.10.2021.
proliferation treaties. This includes the a case of re-writing the rules for one’s own
Treaty of Rarotonga that establishes a nu- benefit. Therefore, AUKUS could go a step Andrew Nicholls / Jackson Dowie / Marcus
clear weapon-free zone in the South Pa- further and explore non-intrusive safe- Hellyer, “Implementing Australia’s Nuclear
cific. Since Australia is not planning to de- guards with the IAEA, proposals for which Submarine Program,” Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, 14.12.2021.
velop uranium enrichment capabilities and already exist and could be developed in an
would most likely receive loaded and sealed inclusive manner.
reactors – making the diversion of nuclear
material impossible – the proliferation risk Alliances vs Partnerships
would be near-zero. The main problem is Proliferation concerns are one of two main
the precedent this sets within the NPT re- rationales that Beijing has used to con- US and China and resent Washington’s
gime, one which other states could take ad- demn AUKUS; the other being the part- pressure to choose a side. Japan and South
vantage of in the future either in terms of nership’s threat to regional stability and re- Korea’s more muted welcoming of the an-
supply or to justify domestic enrichment turn to a “Cold War mentality”. Both nouncement also reflects uncertainty about
programs. Ensuring states’ compliance narratives build on existing apprehensions opportunities for cooperation with the
with their safeguards agreements relies on expressed by the Association of Southeast AUKUS format. The “one-off ” framing re-
a political rather than legal process within Asian Nations (ASEAN) states regarding garding the sharing of naval propulsion
the IAEA. Accordingly, such a precedent AUKUS. China’s recent announcement technology with Australia is vexing Seoul.
would make it more difficult to enforce that it is willing to sign the protocol of the In the past, the US has refused to support
compliance through sanctions in suspected Bangkok Treaty (the agreement establish- its ambitions to develop an SSN program,
proliferation cases. It could also lead to ing a Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon- due to South Korea’s more problematic
double standards, which states such as Free-Zone) independently of other nuclear proliferation record.
Russia and China already believe the US weapon states is one way of courting ASE-
and its allies practice. AN states, for which disarmament remains Finally, Australia bears a disproportionate
a key foreign policy goal. It also helps to amount of the risks the partnership entails
While France and China power their nu- gather support from states that are wary of for the region’s future. Entrenching its
clear submarines with low-enriched urani- the precedent created by the US transfer of partnership with the US with explicit mili-
um (LEU), India, Russia, the tary connotations is a gamble. Washing-
UK, and the US use highly en- The nuclear submarine deal ton’s stance on the Asia-Pacific and Aus-
riched uranium (HEU). The tralia’s role in it may not remain static, and
continued use of HEU globally risks puncturing nuclear non- neither is the notion that the US would
is a proliferation concern that proliferation norms by openly end up winning a potential military con-
the US has tried to mitigate in flict with China. However, this gamble may
the context of research reactors. exploiting a loophole. be worth it as Australia’s positioning in the
However, Washington has re- region, by its geographic location, will al-
fused to endorse such a change in the case nuclear propulsion technology to Australia, ways be more threatened than the US or
of submarines on the basis that converting while conveniently diverting attention UK, with or without AUKUS.
its naval reactors to LEU would be too from China’s own nuclear buildup.
costly, reinforcing yet another double Transatlantic Fission?
standard. HEU will likely be the fuel of AUKUS’ announcement feeds into South- For Europe, the key question becomes
choice for Australia’s submarines and east Asian states’ fears that the partnership whether AUKUS is a symptom or a driver
would probably be provided by the US, contradicts inclusive regional approaches of the US’ prioritizing the Asia-Pacific. At
which still has a stockpile. Providing a ra- and creates a tiered alliance system. US- present, it appears to be both: Washington’s
tionale for HEU use in non-nuclear aligned local players, such as Singapore, desire to focus on its western approaches
weapon states is contentious, especially may be disaffected by AUKUS codifying a dates back to the early days of the George
considering a lack of progress on negotiat- hierarchy of Washington’s allies and part- W. Bush presidency, with China moving
ing a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. ners through AUKUS, implying that the from being considered a rival to an adver-
US would always choose Australia’s side sary in the meantime. A secondary ques-
AUKUS also offers opportunities to ad- during potential disagreements. Even US- tion in European capitals is whether the
dress these non-proliferation concerns by leaning governments may be uncomfort- way AUKUS was announced at the ex-
bringing the dormant IAEA safeguards able with AUKUS’ implied binary choice pense of France’s submarine deal was down
loophole issues back to the forefront. Giv- where relations become increasingly secu- to diplomatic impropriety or a callous dis-
en Australia’s excellent non-proliferation ritized and militarized. Some may prefer regard for continental interests more
credentials, it could push for establishing a more ambiguity in their relations with the broadly. Additionally, the AUKUS launch
© 2022 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 3
CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 300, March 2022
completely overshadowed the unveiling of Africa. While diplomatic relations did ship, give way to a more selective applica-
the EU’s own Indo-Pacific strategy, further freeze in the wake of the AUKUS an- tion in a period of declared great power
sidelining Europeans even when they seek nouncement, neither side seems willing to competition. As the only nuclear supplier
involvement in the region. Similar to ASE- endanger ties in the long-term. to take advantage of the NPT loophole, the
AN concerns, AUKUS’ focus on hard pow- US’ transfer of such a sensitive technology
er also sits uncomfortably with some Euro- Outlook is illustrative of the difficulty to reconcile
pean states that would prefer to maintain a The partnership’s broader regional impact new requirements for deterrence, crisis sta-
level of ambiguity in the relations with is, as of now, rather uncertain. Assessing bility, and non-proliferation, with the latter
China. these concrete implications of AUKUS will being deprioritized in the short term to en-
likely only be possible once various ques- able the other two. The impact on Beijing
Moreover, the announcement occurring tions pertaining to the scope and intensity presents a final variable that, as of now, is
four weeks after the fall of Kabul provided of future cooperation have been answered hard to quantify in relation to AUKUS and
ammunition to advocates of increased Eu- – and by the future success or failure of the the wider US shift to a more securitized
ropean autonomy in the face of US aban- trilateral submarine program. Some indica- and militarized regional posture. Whether
tions on how this path may look this sea change will hinder Chinese influ-
AUKUS’ focus on hard power like can be expected in early ence or enable it by opening political space
2023 after the initial consulta- that can be exploited remains to be seen.
sits uncomfortably with some tive process. The lion’s share of
European states. the risk falls on Australia, which
has chosen to potentially sacri-
donment. However, events in 2022 have fice its individual defense capacity in favor For more on military doctrine and arms
proven that this interpretation is somewhat of collective capability. Even without the procurement, see CSS core theme page.
simplified, at least for the moment. In the benefits of AUKUS accruing, Canberra
run-up to and during Russia’s full-scale in- may face more difficult circumstances on
vasion of Ukraine, the the US is clearly the political level, particularly in its rela- Niklas Masuhr is a Researcher of the Global
taking Eastern NATO members’ fears seri- tions with ASEAN countries. Security Team at the Center for Security Studies
ously, despite its obvious preference of the (CSS) at ETH Zürich. His areas of research are
Asia-Pacific. France has no continental On the non-proliferation front, AUKUS defense policies and military strategies.
partner with which it can substitute US appears to be a symptom of a shift in US
(and even British) logistical and operation- attitude. Given the perceived military Névine Schepers is Senior Researcher in the Swiss
al support to project power and substan- threats posed by both China and Russia, and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the
tially engage in stabilization operations up- established norms that may have driven CSS, where she focuses on nuclear arms control
wards of a certain scale in Sub-Saharan previous efforts, notably under US leader- and non-proliferation issues.
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