Ideas & Issues (Wargaming)
Command and
Control
Considerations
for EABO
Marine Corps integration into the fleet
via the Composite Warfare Commander concept
by Marc Riccio & Maj William Grimball
years, the Marine Corps has focused
No single activity in war is more important than com- almost exclusively on the force projec‑
tion ashore part of the naval mission
mand and control. Done well command and control of amphibious or expeditionary opera‑
tions; the one exception being the in‑
adds to our strength. Done poorly, it invites disaster, troduction of defense battalions in the
even against a weaker enemy. waning days before Pearl Harbor. How
we got there was up to the Navy. Once
—MCDP 6, Command and Control we hit the high-water mark, we took it
from there.
A
s we continue to experiment our ability to conduct sea control and What has changed to precipitate
with and advance the war‑ sea denial operations both from sea this monumental shift? The obvious
fighting concepts outlined and from key maritime terrain is an answer is that the threat has changed.
in the 38th Commandant’s essential naval capability in modern The maritime terrain is once again rel‑
Planning Guidance, it is not too early to armed conflict … it is not a nice to evant, particularly concerning potential
begin the discussion of what the com‑ have, it is essential.”2 adversaries and global peer competitors
mand and control (C2) structure for He further elaborated that like China and Russia, and to a lesser
that envisioned force and associated those mobile, bad attitude, tool-kit extent Iran and North Korea. According
missions might look like. Why is this packing Marines are focused on a to Gen Berger,
even a concern? What is new? What is small set of tasks to achieve sea control China’s pivot to the sea as the primary
different about this new orientation that and sea denial; sinking ships, shoot‑ front in a renewed great power compe‑
would warrant a legitimate look at C2 ing down planes, killing enemy forces tition has fundamentally transformed
structures? The Commandant’s words inside the area, and stopping all force the operational environment in which
in his CPG may shed some light: from coming in.”3 the Naval and Joint Force must oper‑
Marines will focus on exploiting po‑ These roles are hugely different than ate.4
sitional advantage and defending key the ones Marines have played in past The U.S. Navy no longer possesses
maritime terrain that enables persis‑ operations involving the Navy-Marine unchallenged global maritime domi‑
tent sea control and denial operations Corps Team. For roughly the past 80 nance. Presumptive sea control is a
forward.1
Gen Berger went even further in a
recent speech at the Marine Corps As‑ >Mr. Riccio is the regional director, MCU/CDET, Camp Lejeune, NC.
sociation Foundation Ground Dinner
on 21 November 2019 in describing >>Maj Grimball currently serves as the Regional Chief Instructor of the Expedition-
what this force would be capable of ary Warfare School Blended Seminar Program (EWSBSP) for Camp Lejeune, NC.
executing:
Marine Corps Gazette • February 2020 [Link]/gazette WE75
Ideas & Issues (Wargaming)
They may also control—or at least
Specifically, the Navy and Marine Corps must confront outpost—key maritime terrain to im‑
prove the security of sea lines of com‑
the new reality that presumptive sea control is no lon- munications and chokepoints, or deny
ger assured for the United States—we will compete their use to the enemy, and exploit and
enhance the natural barriers formed by
for it. island chains.5 As such, these capabili‑
—Gen David H. Berger ties serve to increase friendly capacity
and survivability while complicating
adversary targeting inside the weapons
thing of the past. Our days of unchal‑ Addressing the first question, as engagement zone.
lenged sea control and sea denial have described in the concepts of Littoral The terms stand-in forces and inside-
evaporated. Global competitors are Operations in a Contested Environment forces are prominent in any discussion
actively and aggressively challenging and EABO, the Marine Corps seeks to or recent literature on EABO. Mr. Art
that dominance. The range, volume, further distribute lethality by providing Corbett describes in his February 2019
and sophistication of adversary anti- land-based options for increasing the Marine Corps Gazette article, “Stand-In
access and area-denial weapons make number of sensors and shooters beyond Forces: Disrupting the current struggle
large maritime formations and fixed the upper limit imposed by the number for dominance,” that stand-in forces are
installations highly vulnerable and of seagoing platforms available. Some forces with disruptive new tactical ca‑
susceptible targets. Consequently, the pabilities (several listed above) that will
U.S. Navy now embraces concepts such persist and operate forward within an
as distributed maritime operations and
distributed lethality thru an integrated
The terms stand-in forc- adversary’s weapons engagement zone.
During day-to-day competition, stand-
maritime defense. The Marine Corps’ es and inside-forces in forces enable the United States and
new role in supporting the maritime our partners to confront fait accompli
commander in this evolving and dan‑
are prominent in any gambits and malign behavior with
gerous threat environment is captured discussion or recent lit- proportionate, responsive, and credible
in the Expeditionary Advance Base Op- military options to match adversary ag‑
erations (EABO) concept and the deter- erature on EABO. gression with commensurate force and
rence by denial strategy of the contact risk. We are in affect deterring by denial
layer and the stand-in-forces. through posturing forces and resources
The key change is undeniable. The examples of capabilities that might be to detect aggression quickly enough to
Marine Corps is no longer “along for provided by EABO forces includes in‑ do something about it.6 During con‑
the ride” and we recognize that we telligence, surveillance, and reconnais‑ flict, stand-in forces may be employed as
must play a more significant role in sance, coastal defense cruise missiles, one of several simultaneous operational
supporting the maritime commander’s anti-air missiles, forward arming and efforts within a larger joint campaign to
sea control and sea denial missions. If refueling of aircraft, and munitions defeat the counter-intervention strategy
we are going to play an active role in reloading for ships and submarines. of peer adversaries.7 In essence, EAB
maritime missions, we need to under‑
stand how these naval forces (specifi‑
cally expeditionary advanced bases)
integrate into and are part of the overall
maritime C2 structure. To achieve this
understanding, the naval force must
address several fundamental questions.
First, what is the envisioned role of EAB
forces in the sea denial and sea control
missions as well as their role in the greater
deterrence by denial strategy? Secondly,
how are they integrated into the tacti-
cal naval architecture represented by the
composite warfare commander (CWC)
construct? Thirdly, who does the EAB
force work for and what is the best orga-
nization and C2 structure to optimize
the EAB forces contribution to the mari- Deputy JFMCC, BGen Chris Owens’ flag flies over the JFMCC flag ship, USS Mount Whitney
time fight? (LCC 20) during COMEUCOM Exercise Austere Challenge 2009. (Photo courtesy of M.F. Riccio).
WE76 [Link]/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • February 2020
Figure 1. NWP 3-56, pgs. 19 and 21)
forces are by definition stand-in forces. implement a composite warfare organi‑ force commanders, the command will
To clarify even further the often in‑ zation whenever and to whatever extent simultaneously be an operational- and
terchangeable terminology, stand-in required, depending upon the composi‑ tactical-level command.12
forces describes a force positioned and tion and mission of the force and the ca‑ So the question remains: How does
designed to deter an adversary fait ac- pabilities of the adversary.10 The OTC the Marine Corps integrate into the fleet
compli, while inside forces describes a uses task organization to enable a more composite warfare construct as directed
force that is actively operating within reasonable span of control and to pro‑ by the CPG?
range of adversary long-range fires if vide a framework for future delegation To determine this, we must address
and when deterrence fails. of authority. Tactical-level commanders our third and final question: Who does
With a basic understanding of the task-organize to achieve military objec‑ the EAB force work for and what is the
Marine Corps’ role, via EABO in mari‑ tives by organizing assigned forces into best organization and C2 structure to
time sea control and sea denial missions, task forces, task groups, task units, or optimize the EAB forces contribution to
let us now shift our attention to the task elements. Task organization allows the maritime fight? As described by the
second question: How will these EAB an operational commander to divide Marine Corps Warfighting Lab-Futures
forces and stand-in forces be integrated and organize subordinate forces and Directorate, EABO espouses employing
into the naval architecture represented assign authority and responsivity to plan mobile, relatively low-cost capabilities
by the CWC construct? The Comman‑ and execute based on mission, platform in austere, temporary locations forward
dant states, capability, geography, or a hybrid of the as integral elements of Fleet/JFMCC
As an organization statutorily desig‑ three to address other issues and chal‑ operations.13
nated for service with the Fleet during lenges.11 (See Figure 1.) By definition and purpose, these
the prosecution of a naval campaign, EAB’s are inherently maritime in na‑
the Marine Corps must be able to ture. Think of them as a land-based
quickly and effectively integrate into naval platform. As such, it makes
the naval forces.8 The basis for all com- sense that the EAB force would need
The Commandant further directs the
Marine Corps to prepare to operate
mand and control is the to be tightly integrated into the na‑
val force commander or JFMCC C2
within the CWC construct. So what authority vested in a structure just as any other at-sea or
is the Navy’s composite warfare con‑ airborne platform would be. It also
struct? According to the NWP 3-56, commander over subor- allows the EAB force to take advan‑
the composite warfare organization en‑ dinates. tage of the resources represented by
ables offensive and defensive combat the other warfare commanders in the
operations against multiple targets and —MCDP 6 naval force writ large with access to
threats simultaneously.9 all other CWC capabilities.
Flexibility of implementation, rein‑ If the above argument is accepted,
forced by clear guidance to subordinates Furthermore, NWP 3-56 states in a then logically the answer to our ques‑
and use of command by negation, are maritime operation area that has mul‑ tion is the EAB force would work for
keys to decentralized control of the tac‑ tiple task forces operating within it, the the naval force commander (this could
tical force. The officer in tactical com‑ common superior (OTC) will be the be a Navy officer or a Marine officer).
mand (OTC), normally the naval force numbered fleet commander /JFMCC. What might that organization look like?
commander or joint force maritime Unless this commander assigns OTC One potential option, and the one we
component commander (JFMCC), may command functions to one of the task propose for further study, would be to
Marine Corps Gazette • February 2020 [Link]/gazette WE77
Ideas & Issues (Wargaming)
force commander, a virtual ship on solid
ground, and that these forces must be
fully integrated into the CWC in sup‑
port of the maritime missions of sea con‑
trol and sea denial, then the next logical
step is that these forces—regardless of
whether they are operating as contact
layer forces or blunt layer forces—work
for the naval force commander (i.e., the
littoral group commander in this pro‑
posed C2 structure).
Are we proposing to alter or change
the time-tested commander amphibious
task force/commander landing force
command relationships? The short
answer is no. If and when executing
any of the five doctrinal amphibious
Figure 2. operation missions, the commander am‑
phibious task force/commander landing
force, supporting/supported command
develop under the numbered fleet com‑ as an EAB force contributing to the sea relationship model is still sound. The
mander/JFMCC, a littoral task force control and sea denial missions should proposed C2 structure and command
commander who would also be dual be discussed and discerned now in order relationships proposed in this article
hatted as the littoral warfare command‑ to help decide these future technical specifically address the Marine Corps’
er for the Naval Force Commander/ requirements. new role as an active participant in the
JFMCC. This commander would man‑ If we agree to the supposition that an maritime commander’s sea control and
age and control all littoral operations EAB force is an extension of the naval sea denial efforts.
within a designated maritime area and
inside the arc of enemy long-range fires.
(See Figure 2.)
This designated littoral task force ... the C2 structure that will best optimize our abili-
could be task organized with subor‑ ties and capabilities as an EAB force contributing to
dinate littoral combat groups (one or
more) which would consist of afloat the sea control and sea denial missions should be
platforms and EAB forces. (See Figure discussed and discerned now in order to help decide
3.) Each of the LCGs would be assigned
a specific area of operations that would these future technical requirments.
or could include one or more EAB’s.
(See Figure 4 on next page.)
These “tool-kit packing” EABs, of
different sizes and capabilities, would
fall under the command authority (op‑
erational control) of the littoral combat
group commander. In this way, the EAB
would be tied directly into the CWC C2
structure overseeing all naval operations
in the amphibious operations area. All
collection, sensing, queuing, and shoot‑
ing, both lethal and non-lethal, would
be connected and coordinated by and
through the littoral combat group. The
EAB would indeed be an extension of
the naval force commander. Although
the systems that would allow this to
happen have not yet been fully devel‑
oped, the C2 structure that will best
optimize our abilities and capabilities Figure 3.
WE78 [Link]/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • February 2020
Notes
1. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s
Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: July 2019).
2. Todd South and Philip Athey, “We are the
Front Line: How the Top Marine Wants the
Corps Sinking Ships, Shooting Down Planes,
and Killing Enemy Forces,” Marine Corps Times,
(Springfield, VA: November 2019).
3. Ibid.
4. Gen David H. Berger, “Remarks at the
MCAF Ground Dinner,” (remarks, MCAF
Ground Dinner, Arlington, VA, November
2019).
5. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Con-
cepts and Programs, (Quantico, VA).
Figure 4. 6. Mike Gallaher, “State of (Deterrence) De‑
nial,” The Washington Quarterly, (Washington,
DC: Elliot School of International Affairs, Sum‑
mer 2019).
7. Col Art Corbett, USMC(Ret), “Stand-in
Forces,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA:
February 2019).
8. Commandant’s Planning Guidance.
9. Department of the Navy, NMWP 3-56,
Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at
the Tactical Level of War, (Washington, DC:
December 2015).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Concepts and Programs.
14. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 6,
Command and Control, (Washington, DC:
Done well, command and control adds to our strength. (Photo by Cpl Xavier McNeal.) 1997).
We concur that Marine commanders In either case, it will do us well to
are flexible and agile enough to adopt remember, as stated in MCDP 6, “Done
and operate within different C2 struc‑ well, command and control adds to our
tures based on task organization and strength. Done poorly, it invites disas‑
mission. If executing maritime mis‑ ter.”14 Let’s not invite disaster. We en‑
sions in the littorals as an EAB force, courage rigorous debate on this crucial
the littoral task force/LCG command topic, and we look forward to advancing
and control structure proposed in this the discussion.
article would be applied. If executing
one of the five amphibious operations
the commander amphibious task force/
commander landing force model would
be more appropriate.
Marine Corps Gazette • February 2020 [Link]/gazette WE79