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Semantics PDF

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Yogmuni Sinsinwar
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In this world, common people as well as critical thinkers utter sentences with the intention of conveying information that their listeners do not yet know but wish to know. In order to get what they want, intelligent people use language also to enquire about objects. Thus language generally known as 21 - makes human life possible. Hence the following remark by the poet 272t “Sarerda: Fea TTA Waa aPrecreas Saas a TS" ‘All the three worlds would be engulfed in blinding darkness, unless this light called Shabda had shone all around us’ Even Bhartrhari says : adv itracart seat wa Prareeay craraata: srearat artes saree a 2 It is words that form the bases of meaning, purposes, activities and truth. But intelligent insightful people do not wish to know or communicate to others over and over again things that they already know well. If they did so, their statement would not be worth heeding. They would not be respectable as ordinary or as reflective rational beings. Indeed, they would be dismissed as crazy. Thus everybody admits that it is only fresh information — information of things hitherto unknown (to the listeners) — that figures as sentence-meaning in order to convey which communicators utter words which make up intelligible sentences. The awareness generated by such 21% in the form of a sentence — is called “gITe erafrergOTeh, ace, THHST-28 keeping silence. The knowledge of the meaning of words (TaTdetftfa) : The operation is the recollection of the meaning of a word which (recollection) is the produced by the word. Otherwise, a person who has the knowledge of a word would have verbal knowledge, even when he has perceptual cognition etc. of the object denoted by the word. Even the recollection of meaning of words should be produced by words with the help of their significatory functions; otherwise, by means of words like ‘jar’ etc. one can have recollection of ether through the relationship of inherence and then there would come about verbal knowledge of ether. Significatory function is only a relation which is either denotative function or implication. It is here alone (i.e. for the recollection of the meaning of the word which is produced by the knowledge of the word) that the knowledge of the denotative function is useful. If one does not have the knowledge of the denotative function earlier, even though he has the knowledge of the words, there would not arise the recollection of the meaning as related with the word. This is because the knowledge of word brings about the recollection of its meaning in the capacity of being the knowledge of relatum. The opinion of the traditional school is as follows: Denotative function is the relation of the meaning of a word with that word, and that is in the form of the will of God, viz. from this word this meaning is to be understood. Recent names (given by parents and so on) have indeed denotative functions because with reference to them there is the will of God in the following way: On the eleventh day a father should give a name (to his child); but terms coined by moderns (alone) have no denotative functions. The modern (Naiyayikas) hold will and, therefore, they say that terms (coined by modern alone) have indeed denotative functions. Means of Knowing Denotative Function:- ofrecer areca ara ooferard ATR TATA ATAATANS STATE arrrer ature faqadafea arfrera: rareer Fart “arate, aexave:, TERETE 3441 The knowledge of denotative function is obtained from Grammar and so on, for learned men say: Knowledge of the denotative function is (obtained) from Grammar, from Comparison, from Dictionary, from the Testimony of apt person, from action brought about by usage, from the Rest of the sentence, from Explanation and from the Proximity of a well known word. The knowledge of the denotative function of root, uninflected words, suffixes etc. is obtained from Grammar. In some instances, where there is an opposing factor this is rejected, as for instances, the Grammarians say that denotative function of verbal suffix is in the agent. In sentence li ‘Chaitra cooks’ and so on Chaitra is related to the agent by the relation of non-difference. This is rejected because it is cumbersome. But denotative function is accepted in effort because of simplicity and effort is cognized as a qualifier in Chaitra and so on; nor can it be argued that since the agent is not expressed (by the verbal suffix) there should be the instrumental case to indicate the number of the agent is the absence of an expression to indicate the number of the agent is the cause of the use of the instrumental case. That thing which is to be known by the word ending in the nominative case and which is not connected with the state of being connected with the state of being the object (of action) and so on is capable of having its number expressed (by the verbal suffix). The expression ‘not-being-connected-with-state-of-being-the-object (of action)’ and so on (#fcaTataea) means that is not intended as a qualifier for another (meaning). Therefore, in a sentence such as ‘like Chaitra Maitra goes’ and so on there is no connection of the number (expressed by the verbal suffix) with Chaitra; where (ie. in such places as Ta TAA, rice cooks), (rice) is not intended as a qualifier for the-state-of-being-the-object-of action and so on (there), in order to avoid that (the connection of number denoted by the verbal suffix with rice, the expression to be to be known by word) ending in the nominative case (is used). Or else the meaning of the first part is not-being-the-qualifier-for-a-meaning-which-is-other-than-the- meaning-of-a-root. Therefore, in such expressions as ‘like Chaitra Maitra goes’ (there is) the prevention of connection of number with Chaitra and so on. In sentence such as ‘he cooks a little’, in order to avoid the (connection of number) with the meaning of the word ‘a little’ etc. the second part is used. Because it is known by the word ending in the chariot goes, and so on, (the verbal suffix has) well-established implication in the-state-of-being-the-substratum; in such expression as ‘it perishes’ and so on (the verbal suffix has) well-established implication in the state-of-being- the counterpositive. The manner in which the knowledge of the denotative function can be obtained from Comparison, Dictionary, the statement of a trustworthy person, from action brought about by usage, the remainder of the sentence, from Explanation and from the Proximity of a well known word. Abhidha : The Primary Meaning of a Word In India all the school of thought have assumed a direct relationship between Shabda (word) and Artha (meaning), which correspond to the significant and signifie of De Saussure. The essential meaning of a word lies in its significative power.” This significative power or Shakti is defined the relation that exist between word and its meaning, by which the meaning is cognized whenever the word is heard.° Speculations about the nature of this relation of meaning with words are found in India, as in ancient Greece; the two main schools, Mimamsa (HTT) and Nyaya (=17h), support respectively theories of a ‘natural’ and of a ‘conventional’ origin of this relation. According to the Mimamsaka-s (#T714%:) the significative power is inherent in the words themselves.’ They were not concerned with the ultimate origin of the relationship between words and meaning. To them it was impossible to conceive of a society without language. We learn our language from our parents and elders; they, in their turn, learned it from their forefathers; thus, it could be traced back to any conceivable period of human society. What the Mimamsaka-s (4T414:) meant by the eternality of words and their meaning was that it is not possible to trace the ° Tarkaseungraba, We THA, Npdyasera, 1.2.60: 4 PARATRAT: TH, Peni’ 1.4.14: aed 14, ° Setdhantamnkcaval, P. 265: TRA TAT Ae TTT AAT: Laghamanjiacda,P. 28: TETTEAT: separa aftr, arerarsrerarecrataT| 7 MimamsaSutra \1.5: ATTY TET TET, origin of the relationship to a person. The grammarians also agree with the Mimamsaka-s (4T474#:) that the permanent nature of the relation between word and meaning is to be understood from popular usage itself.” This natural connection between word and meaning has also been explained in term of innate capacity or Yogyata of words. Just as the Indriya-s or the organs of perception have a natural power to perceive what comes into their purview, so also words have natural capacity for conveying ideas."° Speech is the natural means of communication. Thus, any word has the natural capacity to express anything; this power is restricted by convention.” The permanent relation between a proper noun and its bearer is to be explained in this way. Yaska refers to Shabdanukriti or onomatopoeia as a factor in the naming of birds.’? He says that (311%) crow could be traced to the sound produced by the birds; but Aupamanyava denies the existence of onomatopoeia as a linguistic factor. The theory of natural relationship between words and meaning is rejected by Naiyayika-s and the Vaisheshika-s who advocate the conventional origin of relationship. Gautama says that it is by the conventional significance that the meaning of a word is understood.® The Vaisheshika-s also take the same view;’* they assert that there is no direct natural relationship between word (212) and meaning(24), between word the objects denoted. "Thisis called Provad-mityara (WATE FACAT).Cf. Allen, loc. Cit. This is different from the natural theory of Greek scholars who believed that ‘in giving names to the objects the primitive man was inspired by some innate quality or psychological effect of the thing itself.’ ° Katyayana’s Varttka begins: Fa sroarfarsrt " Vasyapadiya, 3.29: ream cafaray aarfeateray aa! aaTfacs: srearat Tea TAT ‘ail This verse is also explained to mean that each word has a natural capacity to express its meaning; itis this natural capacity of the word that is called its denotative power. ™ Shicsavarcita, Pratyaksha section, verse 228: Hatareaftrererned ATT HSAT AT aatercrdftarrant ara: FT ” Nrakea, W1B: FUR CAE MoT APA: FS TS THAT TET © ApBravacea, 1.55: ATH TAA ERATE, * VaicheshokasateaNW2.20; ATATH: THATS AATTT:| When the relation is only indirect, being based on the similarity or contiguity of the actual intended sense with the original primary sense, the relation is called LakShna and Gauni. It has no direct power to convey the sense intended; its power is derived from the primary sense. Contextual Factors: The importance of contextual factors in determining the exact meaning of an expression has been emphasized by various writers in India from very early times. In the Grtaddevace © it is said that the established rule regarding the meaning of a Vedic passage, as well as that of an ordinary sentence, is that the meaning is to be determined from consideration of the purpose to be served (artha), the subject matter under discussion (prakarana), an indication from another place (Linga), propriety (auchitya), the place (desh), and the time (kala). Bhartrhari agrees with this view and says that the meaning of an expression is determined not merely by its form, but by the contextual factors also." In the Vasygzadira he quotes the same list with a slight modification, substituting /sya or syntactic relation for Zzaga. Of these terms Vaya, Frakarana, Linga and Arcéa are known to the Afimansasa-s also. The process of subordinating the detail the detail of a sacrifice is done by the six means of proof: .Sérwe or direct statement, Zia or the implication from another word, Vakya or syntactic connection, A-aéarana or context of situation, Sté2n2 or position, and Samasaya or the etymological meaning. Of these each preceding one is stronger than each succeeding one. Aéareyaaré gives another list of such contextual factors that determine the exact meaning of a word in the case of ambiguous and equivocal expressions: deat fritrar arest facia ad: vaot fret secerera afer: arretattate Ger: areit afte: cacres: searhearraeae Pearreg hee? This list is taken up for detail discussion by latter grammarian like Nagesh and Alankarika-s like Mammata, Vishvanatha, Hemchandra, Appyadikshita and Jagannatha. It may be pointed out that the list is concerned with ambiguous 118: aatg veers aPrare erarera:| Hey alfa: care gaey fe a Peafas 6 yp ..316 : area THOTT ares Sera) rear: WTS a ATE a TATA Yvp, 11317 expressions. Whether we taken them as homophones or as homonyms there is a possibility of doubt as to the exact meaning intended. Here contextual factor help to determine the meaning. Classification of Words : Yaugika, Rudha, Yogarudha and Yaugikarudha Words are usually divided into four classes according to different ways in which their meaning is determined: yaugika or derivative, rudha or conventional, yogarudha or derivative-conventional, and yaugikrudha or that which could be taken either as derivative or as conventional. Corresponding to these, the expressive power of the words are called yoga, rudhi, yogarudhi and yogikarudhi. (a) Yaugika or derivational: When a word retain that signification which belongs to it according to its etymology, it is called yaugika or derivative. Its meaning is determined by those of its component parts, as it does not signify anything more or less than the meaning of its parts, e.g. pachaka (cook); here the meaning of the word is known from the verbal root pac (to cook) and the suffix aka signifiyin the agent of action. The meaning of such words can easily be understood from grammar and etymology. (6) Rudha or conventional. When a word has a meaning which is not directly connected with its derivation, it is called rudha. In this case the meaning of word independently of the part meanings, e.g. gauk (cow), ghatah (a pot). Underivable simple words (avyuipanna) belong to this class; though they can be derived with the help of unadi suffixes, their meaning is not based on the derived sense. The Naiyayika-s clearly state that there is no proof for holding that suffixes belonging to the unadi group have any denotative power. The grammarians too consider them as underivable words (avyutpanna). Even rudha words can be derived from verbal roots, but the meaning will not depend on the etymological sense. (c) — Yogarudha ot dcrivative-conventional. When the meaning determined by the whole word taken together (samudayshakti) agrees with that determined by the parts, it is called yogrudha. Here the derivative meaning and the conventional meaning coincide and refer to the same object. Thus, it is partly conventional; e.g. pankaj which popularly means ‘lotus’ by convention; the etymological sense ‘what grows in the mud’ is also applicable to it. The conventional usage restricts the application of the derivative sense. Otherwise the term pankaj might refer to any thing that grows in mud. Even though both the meanings are applicable to the word, it is the conventional meaning that comes to the mind immediately on hearing the word. The well-known rule accepted by all Indian writers is that the conventional meaning is more powerful than the etymological meaning, since the former occurs to the mind immediately whereas the latter has to be known through analysis. (a) Yaugikarudha is derivative or conventional. It is also referred to as rudhaugika. When the meaning of the word can be ascertained either etymologically from the meanings of its components parts, or conventionally from usage by the whole word taken together, it is called yaugikarudha. Both the meanings are determined independently of each other, and understood separately. The same woed gives one meaning when taken in its conventional sense and quite another if viewed as a derivative; e.g. the word udbhid means ‘tree’, when taken in its etymological sense, while conventionally it is also used as the name of sacrifice. Similarly the term ashvagandha can be used in its etymological sense of ‘having the smell of a horse’; it is also used popularly as the name of a particular plant, It is quite possible to consider that it is an instance of two words with two different meanings having the same form, one being yaugika and the other rudha. Some scholars do not consider yuagirudha as separate class. As in Laghumanjusha ‘saktis tridha rudhir yogo yogarudhis ca.'* Laksana or METAPHOR :- Sometimes a word is used to denote a referent other than its normal one. Such metaphoric usage is common in all languages. If we take the word as denoting its in the context, This produces a “psychic resistance ' in the listener, and there is a sort of break in the flow. It excites attention and requires inter-pretation for understanding the purport. The actual referent of the word has to be taken as different from its normal one, but in some way connected with it, either through similarity or through some other relation. This function of the word, denoting a referent different from its normal and primary normal primary meaning, the sentence may become nonsensi one, but somehow related to it, is called Laksana or upacara; other terms like gauni vrtti and bhakti are also used to refer to this secondary significative function of words. The three essential conditions generally accepted by the later Alankarika-s as necessary in a Laksana or transfer are (a) the inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the context, (b) some relation between the primary and the actual referent of the word and (c) sanction for the transferred sense by popular usage, or a definite motive justifying the transfer'’, Of these three conditions the first two are * Laghumanjusha p.105, erfeaferer etzatat atareteeTy ® Kavyaprakash|l. 9 qoaTdarat gett wisn wrorare | aaitsat ae aaa arora Ara accepted by all writers; but the motive element justifying the use of a metaphor which has not received the sanction of established usage is not stressed by the earlier writers; even later writers belonging to the other schools of thought are not interested in the motive element in akshana; it is only the literary critics who give great prominence to it, The well-known example of /akshana in Sanskrit is the sentence gangayam ghosah) (The village is on the Ganges). Here the primary meaning of the word gangayam is ‘on the river Ganges’; this is not suitable to the context, since the village cannot actually be on the stream itself, hence the actual meaning of the word ganga is taken to be gangatata' the bank of the river Ganges’; the relation between the normal meaning of the word and its actual meaning here is one of proximity (samipya)”’. This secondary meaning of the word is not understood directly from the word, but only indirectly through its primary and normal meaning. It is the normal meaning that occurs to, our mind immediately on hearing a word; when this is found to be incompatible with the context, we resort to lakshana and get the actual sense which is related to the normal one and which removes the incompatibility. The special motive underlying the metaphorical usage is rather vague and depends mainly on contextual factors; in the present case it may be to indicate that -the village has the qualities of sanctity and coolness associated with the sacred river. The Normal and the Actual Meanings in a Transfer :- Gautama in his Nydyasutra-s applies the term upacarya to this secondary function of words. He says that such transfer of meaning is quite common, when the actual referent is closely related to the normal and primary referent, and he enumerates with examples ten such relations”! (a) ASSOCIATION. e.g. yastikam bhojaya (Af ATSPT, Feed the stick). In this sentence the Brahmin is referred to as stick’, as he is always associated with the stick which he -carries. Another example of the same relation is the use of the term kuntah *In English the expression a village on the river’ does not seem to be a transfer, since it is sanctioned by everyday. usage. One ofthe normal meanings- of the preposition on's aecepted to be nearness, so that the expression a village nthe river ea directly mean a village onthe bank ofthe river, 2% yyayasunra 2. 62, AES Corea erence eT ATO ES THT TIALS ABTA (lances) for ‘the lance-bearers’ in the sentence kuntah pravishanti (GT: Wasa, The lances enter). (b) LOCATION. e.g. manchah kroshanti (AAT: FFA, The cots cry). Here the term manchah (A@:cot) is used to refer to. ‘the children on the cot’. (©) PURPOSE. e.g. katam karoti (Fé #21f%, He makes a mat). The sentence means: ‘He collects reeds for the purpose of making a mat’ Here the reeds intended for making a mat are referred to as a mat. (d) BEHAVIOUR. e.g. yamo raja (Ut TT, The king is the God of Death). Here the term yams (God of Death) is used in the sense of ' one who acts like Yama (c) MEASURE. e.g, adhakasaktavah (#T@8F:, One adhak of flour). Here the term iighaka denoting the measure is used to mean ' that which is measured ' (are fra: ae¥a:, adhakena mitah saktavah). (f) WEIGHING. eg. tulachandanam ({aT4=7H, One tula of sandal). Here tula is used in the sense of 'that which is weighed in the balance! ((aTat Yt AFS7H, tulayam dhritam chandanam), (g) PROXIMITY. e.g. gangayam gavas-charanti (TETat TAA, The cows are grazing on the Ganges). Here ganga is used in the sense of 'the bank of the Ganges’ (h) INHERENT CONNECTION. e.g. Krishnah shatakah (FO: @Te¥:, the black cloth). The word ' black’ primarily means ‘blackness’ but here it means the thing having blackness’. The use of the term denoting quality for the thing qualified (e.g. 'T love beauty’) come under this. (i) CAUSE. e.g. annam pranah (4 IT, Food is life). Here food which is the cause of life is referred to as life itself. (j) PROMINENCE. e.g. ayam kulam (3% in the sense of the prominent person in the kula (family). . He is the family). Here kula is used In all these examples Gautama gives popular examples of figurative usage from everyday life; the list is intended only to be illustrative, and not to be exhaustive. He also refers to the Mimamsaka view that the primary meaning of every word is the universal and that the particular to which it refers in a sentence is known through the secondary function upacara; but he does not accept that view, since according to him a word means the universal, the form and the particular. Vyafijana or Suggestion: - The theory of literal and metaphorical meaning, developed by the Mimamsaka- s and the Naiyayika-s in ancient India, was further extended by Anandavardhana in the latter half of the ninth century in order to include emotive and other associative meanings also under linguistic meaning. Centuries earlier, Bhartrhari had exposed the unsatisfactory nature of a linguistic theory which depends entirely on individual words and their lexical meanings; the sphota doctrine which he brought forward emphasized the importance of taking the whole utterance as a significant unitary linguistic symbol. Bhartrhari had also shown that the meaning of an utterance depends on contextual factors, and that the logical interpretation of the sentence-meaning on the basis of the individual word-meanings is defective in many cases. At times the meaning of the whole utterance is different from what the individual words indicate. Anandavardhana took the cue from Bhartzhari and developed the theory of language on the lines suggested by him; but since he was concerned only with the question of literary appreciation, he did not proceed with the full discussion of all the intricate problems connected with speech activity. He confined his attention to his own field of poetic meaning. In the Dhvanyaloka, he openly declares his indebtedness to the sphota doctrine. Even the Vedic sages understood the fact that the literal meaning of an utterance is only a part of its total meaning and that those who try to analyse the literal meaning may completely lose sight of the real significance of speech. One of the wellknown hymns. of the Rigveda” distinguishes between the man who understands only the literal meaning of a poem and the man who looks more into the inner significance of the passage than to the meanings of the words therein; the former ' sees, but does not see; he hears, but does not hear’; it is only to the latter that Speech ‘reveals herself completely, like a loving wife to her husband’ 2 agrdq te/Uti¥ this is quoted in Nirukta and Mahabhashya also “gaea: tears cash ard Tae: GUTH SOTA Saearet wed eet orate geet are” In another passage in the Rigveda® it is said that great poets select their words, " winnowing away the chaff from the grain ', and only men of equal scholarship and literary taste can fully appreciate their poems.”* Anandavardhana does not attack the usual division of speech utterances into sentences and words, into stems and suffixes, and the distinction between the primary and the transferred or metaphorical sense of words (abhidha and lakshana). He accepts all these, but in addition, he postulates a third potency of language which he calls ' the capacity to suggest a meaning other than its literal meaning .”* This suggestive power of language is called Vyanjana. It is a matter of common experience that an utterance may mean much more than its literal sense. The Naiyayika-s and the Mimamsaka-s, interested more in accuracy and precision in the use of words which they want to analyse objectively than in the fullness of expression and in the possibilities of extending the range of meanings to the domain of the inexpressible, are satisfied with the normal literal sense; but the poets and the critics who deal with the totality of human experience cannot neglect vast portions of language behavior. Most philosophic discussions of meaning confine themselves to a relatively small portion of language behavior, namely, statements which describe or report a state of affairs—the propositions of the natural sciences, or, more generally, such statements as are traditionally handled by logic.' Thus Wittgenstein dismisses the subject of colloquial languages by saying: The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously complicated. In Philosophical Investigations, he says, again, 'It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed’ Abnormal cases are only exceptions. Otherwise our language games will lose their points. This view is on the basis that every word has a * Rigveda X.71.2: wage agar Gara. % AH. Gardiner, The Theory of Speech and Language, p. 61: 'A curious position sometimes confronts the commentator of letters or ancient texts. The sentences hang together and yield a sense which is satisfactory and certain up toa point, but no further. To the audience addressed by the author the back-ground of fact was known, so that he could” see what was meant ", But the interpreter is left perplexed and baffied, because for him that background is unascertainable. cf J, Brough, ' Some Indian Theories of Meaning’, P. 173. definite and fixed meaning and that this is all that need be considered. But, as Angus Sinclair says, in a passage of poetry or of impressive prose . . . . a word has in itself no fixed and definite meaning and has a slightly different meaning in every context, The Indian literary critics do not deny the -existence of fixed literal meanings for words and sentences. But they believe that over and above alll these, -there is the suggested meaning or the social-cultural meaning ', as a modern linguist puts it, which varies from context to context, 'In addition to the regularly recurring responses to the lexical items and structural arrangements there are also throughout a linguistic com-munity recurring responses to unique whole utterances or sequences of utterances. "These social-cultural meanings’ fall within the domain of the power of vyanjana. Anandavardhana's basic postulate is that utterances possess a literal meaning, and can also convey a further meaning—the social-cultural meaning’. This includes - everything other than the literal meaning (the primary and the metaphorical senses). ‘And under the term “meaning' is included not only the information conveyed, but also the emotion induced; this naturally necessitates the assumption of suggestive power for language. For seven the Naiyayika-s and the Mimamsaka-s cannot argue that the emotions induced by language are brought about by the literal power of the words. Again, Anandavardhana did not confine himself to the words and sentences as indicators of meaning; he included all the contextual factors, the intonation. Stress, gestures and even the pure sounds used in the utterance, as well as the literal sense, as indicators of the full meaning of an utterance. Not only the expressive symbols (Vacaka-s), but the indicative signs (bodhaka-s) like gestures also form part of language. As Russell says, even 'music may be considered as a form of language in which emotion is divorced from information" Using Bhartrhari's terminology we may say that not only the prakrita-dhvani-s or the normal sound-patterns which reveal the linguistic sign (sphota), but even the vaikrita-dhvani-s or the individual modifications of the sound may have an important role in speech-activity. Thus, we have to include in language, even the set of deviations from the norm of the sound segments that signal the meaning that a speaker is drunk, the whispering of an utterance that signals the meaning that the content of it is secret, and the unusual. distribution that is the cue to a metaphor. The voice of the speaker can indicate whether it is a man or a woman, a child or a grown-up person and can give even the identity of the speaker to those who know his voice. Anandavardhana is concerned only with poetic language, and therefore, omits many of these elements of speech from his field of observation. He is concemed only with the suggestion of elements that are of aesthetic value. Though vyanjana, in the broadest sense of the term, embraces all such elements, it is only in its-restricted sense as applied to poetry that Anandavardhana studies the problem. His aim is to establish the doctrine of dhvani, which is vyanjana applied to poetry. The Buddhist Theory of Apoha Whereas the Realistic schools of the Mimarnsaka-s and the Naiyayika-s believe that words have direct reference to objective realities, the Buddhist logicians maintain that the essence of meaning is negative in character and that words have no direct reference to objective realities. According to the Buddhists” words deal directly with conceptual images which are purely subjective constructions of the mind (vikalpa-s), and therefore, there can be no real connection between words and the external objects. The meaning of a word is a conceptual image (vikalpa) whose essence is the negation of all its counter-correlates (anyapoha); the word ‘cow’ does not actually mean the animal with dewlap, hors etc.; it means only the exclusion of all objects that are not the cow. The Buddhists do not accept the view of the Mimarnsaka-s and the Naiyayika-s about the existence of a positive entity called the universal (samanya or jati). To them, only the particular at a time-point (svalaksahna) is ultimately real. The so-called objective world is made up of a succession of such momentary particulars, like the still pictures of a cinema’. Strictly speaking, these momentary particulars produce mutually different results, but since they produce the same sensation, they all appear as identical, Dharmakirti says that the sensation of sameness is produced by a repeated series of the same perception, and that the sameness of the particulars is the consequence of the fact that they produce the same sensation.”* The relative differences of these particulars is not grasped, and hence man imputes sameness them, by the common exclusion of all the others. The efficiency of the particulars is the basis of differentiation; all things which produce certain results are different from those that do not produce them. to * Dignaga : Preerirra: erexfaorew: aexcrra: (quoted in Stcherbasisky, Buddhist Logic, ll, p.405n *” Bergson (Creative Evolution, London, 1928, p. 322) compares our cognitive apparatus with a cinematograph which reconstitutes a movement out of momentary stabilized snapshots. * Dharmakint, quoted by Vachaspatimishra in NVIT, p-486 : ENereamsten Sararg sree come arses arse To the Buddhist logicians, pratyaksa or real perception is the unerring knowledge of the unique particular that is given directly by the senses; the name and the concept through which we generally interpret the particular are not to be included in perception, since-it is the mind that supplies them. Indeterminate perception is the only pratyaksa according to them. The-Vaiyakarana-s, on the other hand, consider that there is no knowledge without language and concepts; knowledge must always be determinate. The Naiyayika-s distinguish between indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa pratyaksa) and determinate perception (savikalpa pratyaksa); but they say that the indeterminate stage is not actually experienced, but is to be inferred, The Mimamsaka-s, however, accept both the stages of perception as valid means of knowledge; but to them indeterminate perception is only that unattended by verbal images, as in the case of children or the dumb, The Vedantin-s also believes that it is possible to have different stages of perception before the fully developed perceptual judgment.’ According to the Buddhists the conceptual image of a thing has no direct correspondence with the real extemal things which are mutually different; the apparent identity of the image is produced by the identical efficiency of the things. Just as different medicinal plants have the same febrifugal influence, even though they do not have the same form, so also the different things, like a black and a white cow, become the cause of the same repeated uniform image, without the presence in them of any real universal. These conceptual images which are actually unreal can, however, bring about purposeful action in daily life. Everyone experiences his own images, but the imaginative operations of different individuals agree with one another. It is like the visual experience of two persons suffering from the same eye disease, both seeing the moon double. Like the Vedantin-s,”’ the Buddhists also believed” that there are two kinds of truths, the practical or empirical truth and the supreme truth. A word cannot signify a , since the ' particulars momentary entities and do not continue up to the time that conventional relation is apprehended. Even if verbal relation is supposed to exist in one particular at one instant, it cannot .serve any other particulars, and the word ' cow’ would mean only unique particular are one cow at a particular time, and not others. Moreover, it is impossible for one to know the conventional relation of the word with all the particulars, past, present and ®° para and apara vidya in Mundakopanishad, |. 1. 4, > wigfttrer, Tact, See Nagarjuna-s Madhyamikakarika XXIV.8: wat apaft gana enfRer arrighteeag wong roms future, Thus, there can be no comprehension of a verbal connection with regard to particulars either individually or collectively.*" As for the universal, it is only an intellectual fiction without any reality. A word cannot denote a real positive thing, because only the momentary particular, the thing-in-itself (svaLaksana), is ultimately real. The meaning of a word is primarily and naturally a conceptual construction (vikalpa) and not an objective fact. The relation between the two is one of cause and effect; i the word produces the purely subjective concept, which is negative in nature, consisting as it does in the exclusion of other concepts to make it distinct. Hence, the meaning of a word has to be considered as the negation of the concept’s counter-correlate, as the exclusion of every-thing other than the concept (anyapoha). When Dignaga first promulgated this theory of Apoha establishing the negative essence of meaning in the fifth chapter of his Pramanasamucchaya, he seems to have explained it in terms of pure negation without any positive reference. Many works on the subject are available in Tibetan translation; but it is mainly from its representation by the opponents of Buddhism like Kumarilabhatta, Uddyotakara and Bhamaha that we get some clear ideas about the original form of the theory of Apoha. They all criticize the theory on the assumption that it is a purely negative approach. In the Tattvasangraha, Santaraksita suggests” that when Dignaga denied the positive import of words, it was on the ground that from the logical point of view, words did not have any reference to a positive reality. Some of the main arguments adduced by the Buddhists for assuming that the meaning of a word is essentially negative in nature are the following: (a) Similarity between things absolutely dis-similar can be established only by the common exclusion of their counter-correlates. Different animals such as the cow, the horse, the buffalo and the elephant can be classed together as similar, only by taking them all .as excluding something else; e.g., as 'non-lions'. If the word ‘cow’ is to be used to mean different kinds of cows, the red, the black and the brown, it can be only by the negation of the non-cow. There can be no positive similarity between such grap p.278 : 3 fe agby attaching a: aearTARTTETTT © spear Pik so: araTeTReTEaT area Pecan ae PTT © NYTT, p48: areara rer reer arene wal aa meresFEMeT sare aA goa aera different objects as the red and the black. The word ' cow ', therefore, does not denote a positive object cow, but means only the negation of the non-cow. (b) Anything that can be alternately affirmed and denied is necessarily of the nature of exclusion of its counter-correlate. In the case of every word we find an element common to both existence and non-existence; for a word like cow’ can be connected either with 'is' or with ‘is not’. If the meaning of the word were exclusively positive, it could not be connected with ‘is not’, as that would be a contra-diction. Neither could it be connected with ‘is, since that would be superfluous. Hence, the cognition of the common element must be attributed to some cause which is negative in nature; it must lie in the exclusion of all other things. (c) The meaning of a word is directly experienced as something distinct, something whose essence consists in the negation of its counter-correlate. If the objects of determinate perception were not cognized directly as an exclusion of their counter~ correlates, a man ordered to tie up a cow might proceed to tie up a horse, as he would not recognize the difference. Dignaga seems to have carried out this negative approach to meaning even in the case of expressions like blue lotus; here the term blue is used to exclude all lotuses that are not blue, and the term ‘Totus’ to exclude all blue things that are not lotuses. Thus the expression signifies the exclusion of the non-blue and the non-lotus. This view is quite similar to the theory of Vyadi, that the meaning of a sentence is not samsarga or the mutual association of the word meanings, but the mutual exclusion (bheda) of these.’ Ratnakirti says that in a sentence every word denotes a negation. Thus, in the sentence "This road leads to Srughna’, the word 'this' excludes all roads other than the one indicated, ‘road’ excludes footpaths, etc.,' leads to ' shows that it is not a blind path, and Srughna ' excludes all the other places.“ The similarity between the Apoha theory and the theory of Vyadi is only in regard to the sentence meaning; as far as an isolated word is concerned, Vyadi holds that its meaning is ‘any particular’ (dravya), whereas to the Buddhist logicians, it is only a conceptual image without any positive reality in it. In recent times de Saussure has advanced a similar linguistic theory in his Cours de Linguistique Generale. He says that in language there are only differences, with-out positive terms (Dans la langue it n'y a que des differences .... sans termes positifs). Though we say that meanings correspond to concepts, we have to understand that these concepts are not positive in their content, but only * Apohasiddhi, o.5 differential. The function of a word is contextual elimination. Thus, the meaning of a word in a sentence will be modified, if a neighbouring term undergoes. modification. After establishing the negative essence of meaning in the case of words, de Saussure says that the sign and the thing signified are negative only when taken separately, but their combination is a positive fact. This idea is also similar to the Buddhistic theory according to which the import of a sentence is positive,’ even though the meanings of the individual words, taken separately, are negative. BIBLIOGRAPHY Vishwanath Panchanan, Nydyasiddhantamuktavali with Kirnavali by Pt. Sri Krishanvallabhacarya. Ed. By Swetavaikuntha Shastri, Varanasi, 1983. John Vattanky, SJ. Nydya Philosophy of Language. Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1995: Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 187 Bhimacarya Jhalakikar, Nyéyakosa. Ed. V.S. Abhyankar, The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1978. Jagdisha Tarkalankar, Shabdashaktiprakashika with Prabodhini. Ed. Dhundhiraj Shastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1973. Salikanatha Mishra, Prakaranapanchika with the commentary Nydyasiddhi. Ed. By A. Subrahmanya Shastri, Benares, 1961. BHU Darshan Series, 4. Jha, V.N., Shabdakhanda of the [Link], Vol 13, 1992. Vattanky, J, The Referent of words: Univershal or Indivisual-The Controversies between Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 21, 51-78, 1993 Subrahmanya Shastri V., Shabdatarangini. The Sanskrit Education Society, Mylapore, Madras, 1969. Goswami, Ashok Kumar, A Critque on Shabda (based on Vishvanatha-s Bhashapariccheda) Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1991: Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 112. Bhattoji Dikshita, Siddhantakaumudi with the commentary Balamanorama of VasudevaDikshita. Ed. By Gopal Shastri Nene, Varanasi, 1982-87: Kashi Sanskrit Series 136. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning. (Adyar Library series) Hardcover ~ December, 1963. = Laghumanjusha, by NAGESHABHATTA, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1973.

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