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Understanding Constitutivity Arguments

Constitutivity arguments assert that intuitions reveal truths due to a constitutive link between intuition and concepts, suggesting that while errors can occur, they are performance-related rather than competence-related. Bealer argues for a strong modal tie between intuition and truth, asserting that philosophy is autonomous and authoritative over the sciences. His 'multigon' example illustrates that a person's intuitions about new terms can reliably indicate the truth of their meanings under suitable cognitive conditions.

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3 views1 page

Understanding Constitutivity Arguments

Constitutivity arguments assert that intuitions reveal truths due to a constitutive link between intuition and concepts, suggesting that while errors can occur, they are performance-related rather than competence-related. Bealer argues for a strong modal tie between intuition and truth, asserting that philosophy is autonomous and authoritative over the sciences. His 'multigon' example illustrates that a person's intuitions about new terms can reliably indicate the truth of their meanings under suitable cognitive conditions.

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Wonder Mally
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© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Constitutivity arguments are characterized by their claim that intuitions must

necessarily reveal truths (at least, in suitably good cognitive conditions),


due to the existence of some sort of constitutive tie between intuition and
meanings or concepts. That intuition is generally reliable simply follows from
the existence of this constitutive relation. This is not to suggest infallibility;
it is agreed on all sides that we may still err, if we are inattentive or if we do
not reflect appropriately. But these errors must lie at the level of performance,
rather than the level of competence.
Bealer’s version of this form of argument involves the assertion that intuition
has a “strong modal tie” to the truth; and further, that the existence of this
modal tie implies that philosophy is both autonomous from and authoritative
over the sciences. The most compelling argument Bealer offers for the existence
of a strong modal tie between rational intuition and the truth is his “multigon”
example, which proceeds as follows. Suppose a woman introduces through
use (as opposed to via stipulation) a new term, “multigon.” She applies this
term to pentagons, hexagons, and so forth, but she has not yet applied it to,
nor withheld it from, triangles or rectangles. Suppose she now considers
whether triangles and rectangles are in fact multigons. Supposing that she
is suitably intelligent, attentive, and so forth, and that her term “multigon”. expresses a definite
concept that she determinately possesses, Bealer claims
that it’s plausible that the woman will judge that triangles and rectangles are
multigons if and only if the property of being a multigon is identical to the
property of being a polygon, and she will judge that triangles and rectangles
are not multigons if and only if the property of being a multigon is identical
to the property of being a polygon with five or more sides. Thus, the woman’s
intuitions have a strong modal tie to the truth.

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