POSSESSION

Ramos vs. Director, 39 Phil 175

Facts: Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva
Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the
land and was registered as such. Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner. Ramos instituted
appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Director of Lands opposed on the ground
that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government. Director of Forestry
also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land. It has been seen however
that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of
title.
Issue: Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument
giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

Held: The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under
the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another. The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has
open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the
community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. Possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by
law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of
property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest,
the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. In this case, the mere formal opposition on
the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory
evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. Petitioner and appellant has
proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration. Registration in the
name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
 Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil 161

Facts: Applicant, JESUS VAño, wanted to obtain a title to a tract of land containing a little
over 3,793 hectares, including within its boundaries four municipalities and constituting a not
inconsiderable part of the entire Province of Bohol, which was opposed by the Director of
Lands and the Director of Forestry. CFI Bohol, In its decision, denied the said registration.

Issue: WON open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land is enough to
relied upon in obtaining title?

Held: To prove title, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land by the
applicant and his predecessors in interest since 1882, interrupted by the revolution, is relied
upon. Included within the perimeter of the tract are approximately 685 hectares of forest land
and four logging trails in the nature of highways. These portions should, without question, be
eliminated from the claim. The Government concedes, however, that approximately 1,060
hectares are under cultivation and that certain other portions have been used by the claimant
for pasturage. But the doctrine of constructive possession announced in Ramos vs. Director of
Lands ([1918], 39 Phil., 175) cannot be successfully advanced, for the claimant is not holding
the land under color of title. To the tracts, of which applicant is in actual possession, he can
secure title, on submission of proper plans. Color of title- A written instrument that purports to
transfer ownership of property but, due to some defect, does not have that effect. A document
purporting to pass title to land, such as a deed that is defective due to a lack of title in the
grantor, passes only color of title to the grantee. Mere-appearance of ownership given by a
document or evidence. An adverse possessor (see adverse possession) having the color of title
may have his or her claim ripen into fully legal title in less than normal period if he or she
complies with certain regulations such as payment of property taxes.
 Lasam vs. Director, 65 Phil 367

Facts: Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel of land, containing an area of
around 24,000,000 hectares. He presents Exhibit L as proof of his possession over the land.
Exhibit L is a certified copy of an application. This application states that Lasam’s predecessor
in interest, Domingo Narag, has owned the land since time immemorial. However, the property
described in Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only and the property sought to be registered is
24,000,000 hectares. Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of land which is the
same parcel described in another Exhibit K. Apparently, the surveyor of the land delineated the
property based on what the possessor at that time pointed out to him; he based his study mostly
on hearsay. According to the applicant, before his occupation of the land, only about 2 hectares
were cultivated. But then, they justified this by invoking the doctrine of constructive possession
(That a person in possession of the land does not have to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession). Thus, the Director of Lands opposed
the registration on the ground that a) it is not supported by any title fit for registration and b)
that the land sought to be registered is public land.

Issue: Is the applicant entitled to registration because of the required possession during the
time prescribed by law? Is he entitled to the 24,000,000 hectares of land considering that the
area possessed is only 2 hectares?

Held: First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid application because the identity o
the land was not clearly established. Second, although there is proof that Lasam might have
possessed a portion of the parcel land, the proof is lacking in certainty as to the portion occupied
and the extent thereof. Although the counsel invokes the doctrine of constructive possession,
the said application is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe
that among these qualifications is one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy
with reference to the portion of land actually in possession of the claimant. While, therefore,
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession, possession is not gained by mere
nominal CLAIM. The mere planting of a sign or a symbol of possession cannot justify a
Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory.
 People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil 647

Facts: Alberto Estoista and his father, Bruno Estoista, lived in the same house. A little distance
from their house was a 27-hectare property belonging to their family. The property was partly
covered with cogon grass, tall weeds, and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation
100 to 120 meters from the house, Alberto took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima,
a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence was
allegedly not known by Alberto. There was a disparity in how the incident came about.
According to Alberto, he was told by his father Bruno to shoot a wild rooster crowing near
their house. But according to Bruno, he gave his gun to his sharp-shooting son Alberto upon
the latter's request in order to shoot the wild chickens on the plantation. In any event, the trial
court acquitted Alberto for homicide through reckless imprudence but held him guilty for
illegal possession of firearm. The trial court ruled that Alberto be imprisoned from 5 to 10 years
and to pay fines. Alberto filed the instant petition to challenge the constitutionality of the
sentence meted out to him, arguing that the imprisonment of 5 to 10 years is cruel and unusual.

Issue: Whether or not imprisonment from 5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm
cruel or unusual?

Held: No. Imprisonment from 5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or
unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or
curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the
Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful
weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If
imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases.
Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound to be
caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty. The Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court erred when it imposed a penalty below than that provided under
the law. However, considering the degree of malice of Alberto, application of the law to its full
extent would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that the imprisonment imposed be
reduced to six months.
 Caparros vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 758

Facts: On August 14, 1975, private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
docketed as Civil Case No. 5860 against the petitioner before the municipal court, alleging
That plaintiff is the owner of a residential house located at 217 Int. 1 A. Luna St., Mandaluyong,
Rizal; That on January 1975 the contract of lease of defendant with plaintiff expired which
contract was never extended but defendant was allowed to stay at the premises subject to the
payment of a monthly rental of P 65.00. Consequently, the current lease is, if any, on a month
to month basis; That on February 24, 1975 plaintiff gave notice to defendant that he will use
the premises being occupied by the defendant for his son who got married and has given
defendant 60 days within which to vacate the premises; That despite said notice and subsequent
demand made dated May 12, 1975 giving defendant 15 days from receipt thereof within which
to vacate the premises, defendant has failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to
vacate the premises to the prejudice and damage of the plaintiff;. That in view of the said acts
of the defendant in illegally detaining the said premises, plaintiff has been forced to retain the
services of legal counsel to institute the present action and has agreed to pay his counsel the
amount of P 500.00 as Attorney's fees. Petitioner filed his answer contesting the validity of
private respondent's title over the property in view of the decision of the CFI of Rizal, Branch
II dated June 21, 1971 in Civil Case No. 8320 which declared all titles derived from CLR
Decree No. 1425 null and void ab initio. The municipal court rendered judgment against the
petitioner, ordering him to vacate and surrender the possession of the premises to the private
respondent, to pay, the accumulated rentals for the use and occupation of the said premises
from August, 1975 up to the time he actually vacates and surrenders the premises, and to pay
attorney's fees and costs.
Issues: Whether or not the municipal court had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case
because ownership of the property is in dispute; that immediate execution of judgment cannot
be availed of because the question of title is involved

Held: No, It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary
consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely upon the defendant. In forcible entry and unlawfully detainer cases, the
main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de
jure that either party may set forth in his pleading Consequently, the municipal court correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case below as the complaint filed before it sufficiently avers that
private respondent seeks to recover possession of the premises from an overstaying lessee.
Records disclose that the petitioner failed to file a sufficient supersedeas bond. The petitioner
also failed to deposit or pay the rents as they fell due. Private respondent no doubt is entitled
to the immediate execution of the municipal court's judgment, without prejudice to the appeal
taking its course. The petitioner cannot avail himself of the protection of P.D. No. 1517 since
this law applies to a case where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.
Should this be the intent, the legitimate tenant may not be ejected should he decide to himself
purchase the property. In the instant case, the property is not being offered for sale. Thus, the
right referred to hereinabove does not apply. Petitioner has no right to continue his occupancy
of the premises. Private respondent is entitled to the use and possession of his property.
 Tan Queto vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 54

Facts: Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot from her mother
Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or by way of purchase with P50 as the alleged
consideration thereof. The donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already
married to her husband Juan Pombuena. Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner
Resitituta an application for a Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted
pronouncing him as the owner of the land. A contract of lease over the lot was entered into
between petitioner, Pershing Tan Quetoand Restituta with the consent of her husband for a
period of 10 years. The lease of contract having expired, Restituta filed for unlawful detainer
against Tan. The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court but on
appeal in the CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan
became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became the owners of a parcel of land
with the house thereon previously owned before the barter by Tan. After the barter agreement,
Tan constructed on the disputed land a concrete building without any objection from Restituta.
Afterwards Restituta sued both Juan and Tan for reconveyance of the title over the registered
but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. The
respondent court’s decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court led to the
reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta from a sale
to a conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents. Hence,
this petition for a motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditaryestate of
her parents was valid hence a paraphernal property.

Held: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral donation of the
lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public instrument
(Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were
not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her
hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual
transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited. The fact is ownership was acquired
by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition(delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale
(See Art. 712, Civil Code) withP50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or
consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the
spouses thru onerous title
 Director vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214

Facts: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario,
acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral
lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain. Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements.
Ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as
the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the land is already a private land

2. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations applies

Held: 1. YES. already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of
the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption.
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels
had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from
said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
 Pascual vs. Angeles, 4 Phil 604

Facts: Miguel Pascua, plaintiff-appellant,l brought an action to recover the possession of a

certain tract of land unlawfully occupied by the defendant, and for the payment of rent due,
damages, and cost. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendant, Angeles, then held under
a lease a certain tract of land 15 yards;that the land formerly belonged to Ciriaca Pascual, his
sister, from whom he inherited it; that, demand having been made upon the defendant for
payment of the rent due for the first two years, he asked for and obtained an extension; that by
virtue of this extension the lease was continued in force; that a subsequent demand was made
upon the defendant about the end of the year 1901 for the payment of rent due and for the
possession of the land; that the defendant refused to do either; and that he had since been in the
wrongful possession of the land. The court, after hearing the evidence, rendered judgment June
20, 1902, in favor of the defendant, with costs to the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or not Pascual has the right to sue?

Held: Yes. Those in the actual possession of the land under a claim of ownership, right of
usufruct, or any other right entitling them to use the same, can maintain an action for the
ejectment of the person wrongfully in possession Miguel Pascual, as testamentary heir of his
sister, was in actual and adverse possession of a tract of land in Navotas, of which the land in
question was part. His possession dated from the death of the testatrix who must have died
prior to April 7, 1984, when her executor asked for and obtained a copy of her will executed in
January of the same year. The plaintiff was recognized by the lessee, Angeles, as such owner
and lawful possessor and as heir and successor to the deceased Cicaria Pascual. Angeles paid
him rent for the land from the time of death of the former lessor until the year 1898, as shown
by the record. It was not until the year 1901, when he decided to keep the land, that defendant
refused to pay rent for that and the two preceding years, 1899, 1900. In an action for ejectment
it is presumed that the plaintiff is the owner of the property, or that he has the right to the
possession of the same, he cannot accordingly be compelled to show his title thereto. The tenant
is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation
of landlord and tenant between them. Testatrix- a woman who has made a will or given a legacy
Action for ejectment- one does not own the land he possesses, he has limited rights. He may
be ejected based on two types of legal action: (1) ejectment (i.e., forcible entry or unlawful
detainer) (accion interdictal); or (2) accion publiciana (or the plenary action to recover the
better right of possession)
 USUFRUCT

Alunan vs. Veloso, 52 Phil. 545

Facts: An account filed in these intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Rosendo Hernaez by his judicial administrator, Rafael Alunan, and approved by the
court below. Jose Hernaez, one of the heirs interested in this proceedings, assigned the whole
of his portion to Eleuteria Ch. Veloso, and the latter objects to some of the items of the account
filed, assigning four errors to the resolution. During the two years Jose Hernaez produced less
than 8,000 piculs, and only 12 per cent of what he did produce was collected from him as rent,
thus leaving him indebted in an amount equal to the difference between 12 per cent of the sugar
he produced, and 12 per cent of 8,000 piculs which he had to pay at least.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing a preferred lien to Panaogao Hacienda
which is adjudicated to Eleuteria Ch.

Held: The Panaogao Hacienda to which the first error refers is the value of this difference and
is therefore a legal debt of Jose Hernaez's transmitted to the appellant, and affecting here
participation in the intestate estate. According to an agreement previously entered into by and
between the heirs, the share belonging or which may belong to each heir shall be liable and
subject to a lien in favor of all the heirs for any account or debt pending which the heirs may
owe to the intestate estate.
 Belonio vs. Novella, 105 Phil. 756

Facts: On April 19, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, Pasig a
petition for consolidation of ownership, entitled "In Re: Petition to Consolidate Ownership
Under Pacto de Retro Sale, Jesus F. Ignacio, Petitioner versus Renato Yalung and Marina T.
Yalung, Respondents." The petition was filed as a land registration case and docketed as LRC
Case No. R-3936. Private respondents filed a Manifestation admitting the execution of the
"Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro." They claimed, however, that the parties only intended to
enter into an equitable mortgage to secure prompt payment of the loan given them by petitioner.
They alleged that the interest rate of the loan was "unconscionable, excessive and
unreasonable" and that notwithstanding the sale, they had remained in actual possession of the
property. These circumstances according to them qualified the agreement as one of equitable
mortgage under Articles 1602 (1) and (2)and 1603 of the Civil Code of the . They prayed for
the dismissal of the petition or, in the alternative, for the declaration of the
deed of sale as an equitable mortgage.

Issue: Whether by it in its limited jurisdiction as a land registration court is not a jurisdictional
question.

Held: The distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the Regional Trial Court and
its limited jurisdiction when acting as a land registration court, has been eliminated by P.D.
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree of 1979 (Quiroz v. Manalo,
210 SCRA 60 [1992]; Philippine National Bank v. International Corporate Bank, 199 SCRA
508 [1991]; Averia, Jr. v. Caguioa, 146 SCRA 459 [1986]). This amendment was aimed at
avoiding multiplicity of suits and at expediting the disposition of cases. Regional Trial Courts
now have the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all
petitions filed after the original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising from such applications or petitions. Indeed, the land registration court can
now hear and decide controversial and contentious cases and those involving substantial issues.
 Pichay vs. Querol, 11 Phil. 386

Facts: The plaintiff, Juan Pichay, in April, 1905, conveyed to the defendants an undivided one-
third interest in twenty- five parcels of land situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, as payment
of a debt of P1,500 which she owed them. The defendants and appellants claim that their
agreement gave plaintiff no right of usufruct in the land, saying that it appears that she only
asked for this right and it does not appear that the defendants gave it to her. On the 10 th of
August, 1905, the owners of the twenty- five parcels of land made a partition thereof among
themselves, in which the plaintiff took no part, and in this partition certain specific tracts of
land were assigned to the defendants as the third to which they were entitled by reason of the
conveyance from the plaintiff to them. They have been in possession of the tracts so assigned
to them in partition since the date thereof, and are now in such possession, and have refused to
recognized in the plaintiff any right of usufruct therein.

Issue: Whether or not the usufructuary is bound by the partition made by the owners of the
undivided property although he took no part therein.

Held: The usufructuary shall be bound by the partition made by the owners of the undivided
property although he took no part in the partition but the naked owner to whom the part held
in usufruct has been alloted must respect the usufruct. The right of the usufructuary is not
affected by the division but is limited to the fruits of said part alloted to the co-owner. known
as the Luis Palad High School.
 Reyes vs. Grey, 21 Phil. 73

Facts: Remedios Grey, wife of the plaintiff, died intestate in 1905 without ascendants or
descendants, leaving a surviving husband and one sister and three brothers. Under the law, the
sisters and brothers are called to inherit all of the estate of the deceased, subject only to the
right of the surviving husband, the plaintiff, to a usufructuary interest in one-half thereof.
Administration proceedings in the estate of the deceased wife not taken out until June 15, 1907,
when Jose Grey, one of the defendants, was appointed administrator. In these administration
proceedings, the Court of First Instance of this city issued a decree on December 3, 1910,
declaring that each one of the defendants in the case at the bar was entitled to one-fourth part
of the estate of the deceased Remedios Grey, subject to the plaintiff's (Vicente Reyes') right to
usufruct.

Issue: Whether or not property can be attached and sold upon execution.

Held: The plaintiff's second contention that the defendants, by failing to appeal from the order
of the court in the administration proceedings dated December 3, 1910, wherein the right of
plaintiff to a usufructuary interest in the property was recognized, have lost their right to refuse
such payment to him at this time, is not well founded. The plaintiff had no interest in this
property at the time the probate court issued this order. The order only set out the fact that
under the law the plaintiff was entitled to a usufructuary interest in one-half of the estate of his
deceased wife. It was not a finding that in the meantime the plaintiff had not sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed of or lost such right of participation. This order merely fixed the legal status
of the plaintiff and did not have the effect of canceling or annulling the sale made by the sheriff.
Again, the plaintiff instituted the action in the case at bar on June 1, 1910, several months prior
to the order of December 3, 1910. The right to recover was traversed by the defendants on July
1 of that same year, and the question was pending and undetermined at the time the probate
court issued its order.
 Tufexis vs. Municipal Council of Guinobatan, 32 Phil 629

Facts: Counsel for plaintiff, by a writing of the 27th of the said month, set forth: That he
objected to the above ruling as he believed it erroneous and contrary to law; that he did not
desire to amend his complaint, wherefore, in accordance with the provisions of section 101 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the court should render such judgment in the case as the law might
warrant, and his exception to the said ruling should be entered on the record. By an order of
September 1, 1913, the court, overruling the motion made by the defendant Olaguera,
dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiff, Vergo D. Tufexis, against the municipal council
of Guinobatan on the ground that plaintiff had not amended his complaint. Plaintiff's counsel,
when notified of this ruling, excepted thereto and moved for a rehearing and a new trial. This
motion was overruled, whereupon the plaintiff excepted and filed the proper bill of exceptions.

Issue: Whether a building of strong materials, erected by the said debtor's father, Ricardo Pardo
y Cabañas, on land belonging to the municipality of Guinobatan and intended for a public
market

Held: The land on which the building was erected and which is referred to in the foregoing
articles, contained in the franchise granted by the Government of the former sovereignty,
belongs to the municipality of Guinobatan. Although the building was constructed at the
expense and with the money of the grantee, Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas, it is, nevertheless, the
property of the state or of the said municipality, and was temporarily transferred to the grantee,
Pardo y Cabañas, in order that he might enjoy the usufruct of its floor space for forty years, but
on the termination of this period the said right of usufruct was to cease and the building was to
belong finally and absolutely to the state or the municipality in representation thereof. For these
reasons, then, there is no question that the building and the land on which it was erected, since
they did not belong to the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, nor do they belong to his son and heir,
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, could not be attached or sold for the payment of a debt contracted by
the latter.
 Fabie vs. David, 75 Phil. 536

Facts: Petitioner Miguel Fabie applied for the registration of his property in Manila free from
any encumbrances except the easement of right of way in favor of respondents Julita Lichauco
and Hijos de Roxas. In addition to the said right of way, respondents also claim that of light
and view and drainage. However, the claim was later reduce only to that of the light and view.
Lichauco cliamed that when Juan Bautista Coloma, the original owner of both estates,
established not only an easement of right of way but also that of light and view and that when
both the properties were alienated, the apparent signs were not removed. The apparent sign
allegedly consists of a gallery with windows through which light is admitted. It was supported
on columns erected on the ground belonging to the petitioner and the balcony on Lichauco’s
property is supported by uprights erected on the land by petitioner. The parties admitted the
existence of such gallery. The house was now a frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of
which 16 meters and 60 centimeters correspond to the main part of the same, and 1 meter and
90 centimeters to the gallery in question. Therefore, at the present day the house is erected
partly on the land belonging to the owner and partly, the gallery, over a lot belonging to another;
that is, over that of the petitioner. When it was sold in October, 1848, no portion of the house
occupied the lot last mentioned, but the entire building was erected over a lot belonging to the
owner as set forth in the instrument of sale.

Issue: Whether or not Respondents are entitled to the easement of light and view.

Held: No. The burden is not on the petitioner to prove on what time the gallery in controversy
was constructed inasmuch as he limits himself to sustaining nad defending the freedom of his
property, denying the easement o flight and view of the respondent pretends to impose over it.
A property is assumed to be from all encumbrance unless the contrary is proved. Respondent
who claims the said easement is obliged to prove the aforementioned gallery, in which the
apparent sign of the easement is made to consist in the present case, existed at the time of
ownership of her property and that of the petitioner were separated. And inasmuch as this issue
has not been proved, the claim of the respondents as to the easements of the light and view
which the petitioner does not admit, must of necessity be dismissed. Therefore, it does not
appear from the agreement of the parties that the respondents has balconies over the land of the
petitioner; and as it is, since it has been positively shown that the said balconies exceed the
limit of the lot owned by the former, nor less that they invade the atmospheric area of the lot
belonging to the latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory maintained by the
respondents with which on account of its lack of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal
herein as to its other aspect, the easement of view, which might result in such case from the
existence of the balconies alluded to, would be negative and not a positive one, because the
erection of the same would not constitute, according to their own statement, an invasion of the
right of another, but the lawful exercise of the right inherent to the dominion of the respondents
to construct within their own lot. And as said easement is negative, it cannot have prescribed
in favor of the property of the respondents in the absence of any act of opposition, according
to the agreement, by which they or their principals would have prohibited the petitioner or his
principals to do any work which obstruct the balconies in question, inasmuch as said act of
opposition is what constitutes the necessary and indispensable point of departure for computing
the time required by law for the prescription of negative easements. Thus, the judgment
appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court.
 Orozco vs. Araneta, 90 Phil. 399

Facts: Eugenio del Saz Orozco died on February 7, 1922, leaving a will which he had executed
on March 5, 1921. That said will provided that certain properties should be given in life usufruct
to his son Jacinto del Saz Orozco y Mortera, with the obligation on his part to preserve said
properties in favor of the other heirs who were declared the naked owners thereof. On
September 11, 1934, the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company declared and distributed
stock dividends out of its surplus profits, the plaintiff receiving his proportionate portion of
11,428 shares. On November 17, 1939, said Mining Company again declared stock dividends
out of its surplus profits, of which the plaintiff received 17,142 shares, making a total of 28,570
shares.

Issue: Whether the stock dividend is part of the capital which should be preserved in favor of
the owners or an income of fruits of the capital which should be given to and enjoyed by the
life usufructuary, the plaintiff herein, as his own exclusive property.

Held: The Court ruled based on a previous case decided some time in 1950, where they ruled
that: A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should go
to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend
can be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for it were declared out of the capital it
would be a serious violation of the law. (in the Matter of the Testate Estate of Emil Maurice
Bachrach, October 12, 1950) With regard to the sum of P3,428.40 which is alleged to have
been received by the plaintiff from the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, as a result of
the reduction of its capital in January, 1926, it appears that it has not been proven that the
plaintiff has received said sum; on the contrary, it was denied by him as soon as he arrived in
the Philippines from Spain. There is no ground, therefore, for ordering the plaintiff to deliver
such sum to the defendants. The Court declares that the stock dividends amounting to 28,570
shares, above mentioned, belongs to the plaintiff-appellant Jacinto del Saz Orozco y Mortera
exclusively and in absolute ownership.
 Bachrach vs. Seifer, 97 Phil. 483

Facts: The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary
McDonald Bachrach, in his last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed
the remainder of his estate. The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock
of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing
50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald
Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize
the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to
transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the
corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form
of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie
Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that
the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore
belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash
dividend is an income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but merely represents an
addition to the invested capital.

Issue: Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary

Held: The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of
the property in usufruct. The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The
54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent
profits, and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the
payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares, just as
the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother. If the dividend be
in fact a profit, although declared in stock, it should be held to be income. A dividend, whether
in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking
into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of
profits of the corporation, for if it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation
of the law. Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the capital and
belongs to the remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation,
when declared as dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime of the usufructuary,
belong to the latter. The Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the
Massachusetts rule.
 Bautista vs. Marcos, 113 Phil. 421

Facts: Gloria Ferrer claims ownership a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey
of Aringay, La Union by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT
T-3280, which is immediately north of the land in question. On the other hand, Balanag and
Domondon equally assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation and by
virtue of Certificate of Title P-168, in the name of Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to Free
Patent 309504 issued on 24 January 1966. On 23 March 1976, Ferrer filed a complaint with
the CFI La Union to “Quiet Title to Real Property” against Balanag and Domondon. On 07
December 1976, Judge Bautista issued an order dismissing Ferrer’s complaint; because it
constitutes a collateral or indirect attack on the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title.
Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Pursuant to the SC’s Resolution,
Ferrer was allowed to file the petition for review on certiorari under RA 5440 considering that
only questions of law had been raised. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of interest due
to the failure of Ferrer’s counsel to submit the requisite memorandum in support of the petition.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 1978, however, the Court resolved to reconsider the
dismissal and to reinstate the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the questioned
order of dismissal of the trial court, and rendered judgment declaring Ferrer to be the owner of
the disputed parcel of land and ordering Balanag and Domondon to reconvey the same to
Ferrer; without costs.

Issue: Whether or not Ferrer the lawful owner of the questioned property.

Held: Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that “to the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters.” Undoubtedly, Ferrer is the lawful owner of the accretion, she being the registered
owner of Lot 1980 which adjoins the alluvial property. Alluvion gives to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion which is gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters The rationale for the rule is to provide some kind of
compensation to owners of land continually exposed to the destructive force of water and
subjected to various easements The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent
over land that has passed to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be public land.
Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not from
fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands, the latter’s authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those
that are privately owned. In the present case, Balanag and Domondon acquired no right or title
over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was issued in 1966, it was
already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain.
 Gaboya vs. Cui, 38 SCRA 85

Facts: Don Mariano Cui, widower, as owner of 3 lots situated in the City of Cebu, sold said
three lots to three of his children named Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de Ramas
and Antonio Ma. Cui, pro indiviso for the sum of P64,000. However one-third of the property
corresponding to Rosario C. de Encarnacion was returned to the vendor because she was not
able to pay for the purchase price which resulted to the cancellation of the 1/3 sale. Because of
the sale of these lots pro indiviso and because of the cancellation of the sale to one of the three
original vendees, Don Mariano and his children Mercedes and Antonio became coowners of
the whole mass in equal portions. In the deed of sale vendor Don Mariano retained for himself
the usufruct of the property. Subsequently, a building was erected on a portion of this mass
facing Calderon street and was occupied by a Chinese businessman for which he paid Don
Mariano P600 a month as rental. The date when the building, was constructed and by whom
do not appear in the record. The 12-door commercial building was eventually constructed and
the builder-owners thereof Mercedes and Antonio received and continued to receive the rents
thereof amounting to P4,800 a month and paying therefrom the installments due for payment
on the loan to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. The complaint alleges that the
usufructuary right reserved in favor of Don Mariano Cui extends to and includes the rentals of
the building constructed by Antonio Cui and Mercedes Cui on the land sold to them by their
father; that the defendants retained those rentals for themselves; that the usufructuary rights of
the vendor were of the essence of the sale, and their violation entitled him to rescind (or resolve)
the sale. It prayed either for rescission with accounting, or for delivery of the rentals of the
building with interests, attorneys’ fees and costs.

Issue: Whether the action for rescission due to breach of the contract could still be enforced
and was not yet barred.

Held: Under the articles of the Civil Code on industrial accession by modification on the
principal land (Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code) such accession is limited either to
buildings erected on the land of another, or buildings constructed by the owner of the land with
materials owned by someone else. Articles 447 and 445, in turn, treat of accession produced
by the landowner’s building, planting and sowing “with the materials of another” and when
“the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person other than the landowner or the builder,
planter or [Link] in these articles on industrial accession is there any mention of the
case of landowner building on his own land with materials owned by himself (which is the case
of appellees Mercedes and Antonio Cui) The Civil Code itself limits the cases of industrial
accession to those involving land and materials belonging to different owners. The usufruct
over the land did not entitle the usufructuary to either the gross or the net income of the building
erected by the vendees, but only to the rental value of the portion of the land occupied by the
structure (in so far as the usufructuary was prevented from utilizing said portion), and that
rental value was not liquidated when the complaints were filed in the court below, hence, there
was no default in its payment. Actually, this theory of appellants fails to take into account that
Don Mariano could not retain ownership of the land and, at the same time, be the usufructuary
thereof. His intention of the usufructuary rights in itself imports that he was no longer its owner.
For usufruct is essentially jus in re aliena; and to be a usufructuary of one’s own property is in
law a contradiction in terms, and a conceptual absurdity.
 Hemedes vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 347

Facts: Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory
Conditions” conveying ownership a parcel of land, together with all its improvements, in favor
of his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the resolutory condition that upon the latter’s death
or remarriage, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or heirs, of
the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE. Pursuant to said condition, Justa Kausapin
executed a “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion” conveying to
Maxima Hemedes the subject property. Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez
constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of R & B Insurance to
serve as security for a loan which they obtained. R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even. The land was sold at a public
auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder. A new title was subsequently issued in
favor the R&B. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the
new title. Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes,
Justa Kausapin executed a “Kasunduan” whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson
Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in
her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two declarations
of real property, when the assessed value of the property was raised. Also, he has been paying
the realty taxes on the property from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him. In
the cadastral survey, the property was assigned in the name of Enrique Hemedes. Enrique
Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.

Issue: Whether or not the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?

Held: NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over
the subject property. Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had
earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes – the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the
first condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband. Thus, the donation
in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist
at the time of the transfer, having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of
the subject property by Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot
acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser
for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.
The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his
being designated as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna
and in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat
a certificate of title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations
and tax receipts, this Court has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves
conclusively prove title to land.
 Lopez v. Constantino, 74 Phil 160

Facts: In January, 1936, appellant sold to her daughter, the appellee, a parcel of land with all
the buildings and improvements thereon situated at Nos. 1215, 1217, 1219, and 1221 Juan
Luna, Tondo, Manila, in consideration of the sum of P4,000. In civil case No. 49536 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which was instituted by the present appellant against the
present appellee in order that the sale be either rescinded or declared subject to the condition
presently to be mentioned, final judgment was rendered in which the court found that the
purchase price of the house was far below its assessed or market value and that the sale was
subject to the condition that the vendor shall receive from the vendee by way of life pension
one half of the rents from Nos. 1215, 1217 and the ground floor of Nos. 1219 and 1221 Juan
Luna. By virtue of that judgment said condition was annotated on the back of the certificate of
title. On May 3, 1941, without appellee’s fault, the building or buildings above mentioned were
totally destroyed by fire. Appellee and appellant, however, collected P5,000 and P1,000,
respectively, on the insurance of their respective interests. After the destruction of the building
appellee sought by motion in the land registration case to cancel the annotation on the
certificate of title of the condition of the sale above mentioned, on the theory that her obligation
to pay appellant a life pension had terminated upon the destruction of the building out of the
rents from which said pension was payable. The Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance
of Manila granted the motion over the opposition of the appellant and ordered the cancellation
of the annotation and the issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of the appellee without
such annotation. Appellant contends (a) that her right to receive a life pension as a condition
of the sale affected not only the building but also the lot on which it was erected and, hence,
such right was not extinguished upon the loss of the building; and (b) that the proceeds of the
fire insurance policy which appellee collected should be ordered invested in the construction
of another building. The trial court believed that the life pension was an incumbrance on the
building alone, and held that said building having been destroyed without appellee’s fault, and
there remaining nothing but the lot, "which in Manila constitutes a liability when it has no
building," the life pension could no longer subsist.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is a co-usufructuary of the said building.
Held: Yes. Right of pensioner as co-usufructuary of building. — But even granting that the
obligation of the appellee to pay to the appellant during the latter’s lifetime one half of the rents
of the building in question or of certain portions thereof is an incumbrance on the building
alone, such obligation may properly be considered as constituting the appellant a co-
usufructuary of said building. Article 469 of the Civil Code provides that usufruct may be
created on the whole or a part of the fruits of a thing, in favor of one or more persons,
simultaneously or successively, and in any case from or to a certain day, conditionally or
unconditionally. And article 517 of the same Code pertinently provides that if the usufruct be
created upon the building only and the latter should be destroyed, the usufructuary shall be
entitled to enjoy the use of the land and materials. It is clear, therefore, that from whatever
aspect the case is viewed, the conclusion is inescapable that appellee’s obligation towards
appellant under the contract above mentioned has not been extinguished.
 Baluran vs. Navarro, 79 SCRA 309

Facts: Spouses Domingo and Fidela Paraiso owned of a residential lot which they bartered
with spouses Avelino and Benilda Baluran (D) for their unirrigated riceland. The agreement
was covered by a document entitled "BARTER" wherein they agreed to "barter and exchange"
their properties subject to a condition that stated that if any of the children of spouses Paraiso's
daughter shall choose to reside in the municipality and build his/her own house in the
residential lot, spouses Baluran (D) shall be obliged to return the lot to such children. Eleven
years thereafter, Antonio Obendencio (P) filed a case to recover the bartered property from
Baluran (D). In his answer, Baluran (D) alleged that the "barter agreement" transferred to him
the ownership of the residential lot in exchange for the unirrigated riceland.

Issue: Was there transfer of ownership of the properties covered in the "barter agreement.”

Held: No. It is a settled rule that to determine the nature of a contract courts are not bound by
the name or title given to it by the contracting parties. (Shell Co. of the Philippines vs. Firemen's
Insurance Co., 100 Phil. 757, 1957.) This Court has held that contracts are not what the parties
may see fit to call them but what they really are as determined by the principles of law.
(Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, 47 SCRA 65, 1972.) Thus, the use of the term "barter" in
describing the agreement is not controlling. The agreement is clear that there was no intention
on the part of the signatories thereto to convey the ownership of their respective properties; all
that was intended, and it was so provided in the agreement, was to transfer the material
possession thereof. It is also clear that the parties retained the right to alienate their respective
properties, which right is an element of ownership.
 Palad vs. Navarro, 46 SCRA 354

Facts: The purpose of the trusteeship of the aforesaid lots as constituted by the last will and
testament of the deceased Luis Palad dated January 25, 1892 and duly protocolized on July 27,
1897, was to erect or establish a high school in the town of Tayabas out of the income of the
aforesaid two lots for the benefit of the said town of Tayabas; that the said trust was duly
fulfilled upon the complete establishment in or about 1932 of a high school now known as
"Luis Palad High School" in the town of Tayabas financed with the income of said lots and is
actually self-supporting, that the town of Tayabas has been enjoying the income of the said lots
as beneficiary for the last 54 years since November 9, 1904 up to the present time (when
complaint was filed), while the defendant provincial governor continues to be the trustee and/or
administrator of the two lots in violation of Article 605 of the Civil Code; that the pertinent
facts are well-established in the decision of the Supreme Court on December 10, 1924 in the
case of "The Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Anastacia Abadilla, et al.,";1 that the
aforesaid lots have a net annual income of P7,000; and that since the establishment of the Luis
Palad High School in 1932 or since November, 1904 in accordance with Article 605 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiffs were already entitled to the reversion of the two lots in their favor
and to the dissolution and/or termination of the trusteeship.

Issues: Whether or not declaring the termination of the usufruct of the trust estate as provided
in Art. 515 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Held: No. From a reading of the testamentary clause under discussion it seems quite evident
that the intention of the testator was to have the income of the property accumulate for the
benefit of the proposed school until the same should be established."5Article 515 of the Old
Spanish Civil Code prohibiting the creation of a usufruct for more than thirty (30) years in
favor of any town, province or association, does not apply to the instant case; because what
was constituted by thelast will and testament of the late Luis Palad is a trust, not a usufruct.
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition of the testator
declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years, is not violated by the trust
constituted by the late Luis Palad; because the will of the testator does not interdict the
alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income of said two parcels
be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and operation of the high school. And even if
the trust herein involved falls within the prohibition of the said Article 870, the same cannot be
given retroactive effect, the testator having died long before the effectivity of the New Civil
Code.
.
 RIGHT OF WAY

Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas, 22 Phil 450

Facts: Pedro P. Roxas owns the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati. To enable his tenants to travel
from the Hacienda to Calle Tejeron, he filed a claim for a right of way across parcel L is
bounded on the north by an estero; on the west by hacienda, on the southwest by Calle Tejeron;
and on the west by lands of Francisco Managen. The eastern line, which joins the hacienda, is
265 meters long. The claim of right of way starts across parcel L, the lot owned by the
Archdiocese of Manila. Parcel L at a point 198 meters from the southern extremity of this line.
During the trial, the parties established the following facts: The tract of land (located in parcel
L) which connects Calle Tejeron and the Hacienda, has grown from a 1.5 to 2 meters wide to
4 meters wide. Since time immemorial, it has been used by the tenants of the Hacienda for the
passage of carts entering and leaving the Hacienda. A church is constructed near the said tract,
thus it is not only for the exclusive use of the tenants of Roxas’ hacienda, it is also used by the
churchgoers, and sometimes by the people living in the Sitio of Suavoy, and other people.

Issue: Whether the claim of right of way should be granted.

Held: No, A right of way is a charge imposed upon real property for the benefit of another
estate belonging to a different owner. It is a privilege or advantage in land existing distinct from
the ownership of the soil. the use of the road by the tenants of Roxas has not been such as to
create an easement by prescription or in any other manner (in other words, Roxas failed to
establish that the right of way was essential for the beneficial enjoyment of the hacienda)
Roxas’ claim of right of way cannot prosper as his basis for such claim is not the necessity
growing out of the peculiar location of his property, but by prescription – the immemorial use
by his tenants. It has not been shown that the tenants’ use of the road was absolutely necessary
y in order to cultivate the hacienda, as to deprive other people their right to pass by the same
road. the use of said road by all has been by permission or tolerance of the Archbishop of
Manila (in other words, Roxas failed to prove that there was adverse use, hence the presumption
of permissive use was not overthrown). Where a tract of land, attached to a public meeting
house (the church in this case), is designedly left open and unenclosed for the convenience of
the members, the mere passage of persons over it in common with those for whose use it was
appropriated is to be regarded as permissive and under an implied license, and not adverse.
Until the owner of the land thinks proper to enclose it, such use is not adverse and will not
preclude it for enclosing the land when other views of its proper to do so. frequently than
another, the same rule will apply unless there be some decisive act indicating a separate and
exclusive use under a claim of right. The road was intended by the Archbishop of Manila for
the convenience of the members or worshippers of the church; that the tenants and other people
were allowed to use it more frequently was just mere toleration on the part of the archbishop.
Roxas failed to establish that he has a claim of right over the said tract of land, hence, their use
of the land remains permissive and not adverse.
 Cuaycong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781

Facts: Ramona Benedicto owns Hacienda Toreno which is located in Victorias, Negros
Occidental. Two roads pass through the said hacienda: the Dacuman-Toreno Road and the
Nanca-Victorias Road. For forty years, the owners of the nearby hacienda, Eduardo Cuaycong
et. al., had been using the said roads to transport their products. But in 1911, Benedicto decided
to close the roads and began asking for toll fees for wagons passing through their hacienda. In
1912, Cuaycong et. al. sued Benedicto. Cuaycong claimed that they have a right of way over
the said Nanca-Victorias Road considering that they have been using it since time immemorial.
The lower court dismissed the claim over the Dacuman-Toreno Road for the other parties were
in default, but the lower court declared that Cuaycong et. al. do have a right of way over the
Nanca-Victorias Road. Benedicto appealed. Cuaycong then averred that the road is a public
highway.

Issue: Whether or not Cuaycong et. al. was able to establish their right over the Nanca-Victorias
Road.

Held: No. The Nanca-Victorias Road is not a public highway. First it was shown that in the
Torrens title held by Benedicto, there was no encumbrance attached to the hacienda, that it is
nowhere nearby a road, nor does it border a road. Second, the road was not maintained by the
local government. Its upkeep was solely supported by the road users for their benefits,
convenience and interest. There was no adverse possession by the government. Third, there
was no evidence which shows that the land is of the nature of a public highway. It was shown
that the road was in existence since 1885, but it was not shown as a public highway, in fact, the
other evidence shown pertain to Dacuman-Toreno Road. Fourth, the road was closed in 1911;
it was only in 1912 that Cuaycong et al filed their suit. Neither did Cuaycong et al acquire a
right of private easement. The lower court ruled that Cuaycong et al and their predecessors in
interest had been using the said road since time immemorial yet they only showed evidence
that it was in use in 1885 but no other evidence to show a further time of usage was ever shown
to prove their claim.
 Valderrama vs. North Negros, 48 Phil. 492

Facts: Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract
with Miguel Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of
300 tons for the milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners
who in turn would furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for
30 years from the execution of the contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests were
acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. 2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino
Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made other milling contracts identical to the
first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda owners, however, could not
furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so the North Negros
made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
This prompted Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against North Negros. The CFI entered
1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. al’s favor finding that North Negros
had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the transportation of sugar
cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar
cane from the hacienda owners’ lands.

Held: No The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that
granted the North Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon
their properties for the construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could
permit the transportation of sugar cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their
intent but the SC held that it is clear that the easement was established for the benefit of all
producers and of the corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract. Since the easement
is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the corporation, it is contrary
to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient estates
since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by
reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing in the contract
prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources. Transporting cane from Cadiz also does
not make it more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art. 543 of the CC is that in extending
the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a greater area or deposit excavations outside the
granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when the North Negros transports sugar
cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it continues to occupy the same area and
the encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times it passes through the estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if the
owners no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has the
right to the easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be limited to the
canes produced by the owners has no basis.
 North Negros vs. Hidalgo, 63 Phil vs 664

Facts: North Negros Sugar Co. (NNSC) is the owner of a site known as the “mill site.” It is
where its sugar central, with its factory building and residence for its employees and laborers
are located. It also owns the adjoining sugar plantation known as Hacienda “Begoña.” Across
its properties NNSC constructed a road connecting the “mill site” with the provincial highway.
Through this road it allowed vehicles to pass upon payment of a toll charge of P0.15 for each
truck or automobile. Pedestrians are allowed free passage through it. Immediately adjoining
the above-mentioned “mill site” of the NNSC is the hacienda of Luciano Aguirre, known as
Hacienda “Sañgay,” where the Hidalgo has a billiard hall and a tuba saloon. Like other people
in and about the place, Hidalgo used to pass through the said road of the NNSC because it was
his only means of access to the Hacienda “Sañgay”. Later on, by order of the NNSC , every
time that the Hidalgo passed driving his automobile with a cargo of tuba plaintiff ,the
gatekeeper would stop him and prevent him from passing through said road. Hidalgo in such
cases merely deviated from said road and continued on his way to Hacienda “Sañgay” across
the fields of Hacienda “Begoña,” likewise belonging to the NNSC.

Issue: Whether or not NNSC can enjoin Hidalgo from passing the property.

Held: No. The Civil Code articles 531 and 594. As may be seen from the language of article
594, in cases of voluntary easement, the owner is given ample liberty to establish them: “as he
may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider desirable.” The plaintiff
“considered it desirable” to open this road to the public in general, without imposing any
condition save the payment of a fifteen-centavo toll by motor vehicles, and it may not now go
back on this and deny the existence of an easement. Voluntary easements under article 594 are
not contractual in nature; they constitute the act of the owner. If he exacts any condition, like
the payment of a certain indemnity for the use of the easement, any person who is willing to
pay it may make use of the easement. If the contention be made that a contract is necessary, it
may be stated that a contract exits from the time all those who desire to make use of the
easement are disposed to pay the required indemnity. The plaintiff contends that the easement
of way is intermittent in nature and can only be acquired by virtue of a title under article 539.
The defendant, however, does not lay claim to it by prescription. The title in this case consists
in the fact that the plaintiff has offered the use of this road to the general public upon payment
of a certain sum as passage fee in case of motor vehicles. The cases of Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas and Cuaycong vs. Benedicto, are not controlling, as there the
attempt was to establish that the right to an easement of way had been acquired by prescription.
Here defendant’s contention is, that while the road in question remains open to the public, he
has a right to its use upon paying the passage fees required by the plaintiff. Indeed, the latter
may close it at its pleasure, as no period has been fixed when the easement was voluntarily
constituted, but while the road is thrown open, the plaintiff may not capriciously exclude the
defendant from its use. Furthermore, plaintiff’s evidence discloses the existence of a forcible
right of way in favor of the owner and occupants of the Hacienda “Sañgay” under the Civil
Code, article 564, because, according to said evidence, those living in Hacienda “Sañgay” have
no access to the provincial road except thru the road in question.
 Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 131

Facts: Parties made agreement: Bernardo paid P100 for respondent to give right of way. But
they disagreed on the interpretation of a disagreed on the interpretation of a clause in the clause
in the agreement. "that for the convenience of Amado Bernardo, in going to and from the Barrio
Road, Juana del Rosario, Sixta del Rosario and Pedro de Jesus, will allow and tolerate the said
Amado allow and tolerate the said Amado Bernardo to pass by foot thru their own individual
lots Nos. 117; 27 and 28-A respectively indicated in Annex "A, as in the past he had been e
had been so doing, and Pedro de Jesus allowing so doing, and Pedro de Jesus allowing further
Amado Bernardo to put stones or gravel, which may facilitate passage thru his Lot sage thru
his Lot 28-A." Bernardo tried to register it as annotation. This requires giving duplicate copies
of certificate from respondents to annotate. Wanted to compel submission, but respondents
refused. Trial court said: Bernardo already had a right of way over lot 119-A of Juana from his
lot southeastward to the provincial highway, and that there was the provincial highway, and
that there was no need no need for him to have another one (Referring for him to have another
one (Referring to the foot-path from his lot westward to the barrio road) the tenor of the
paragraph clause 5, did not abuse, did not recognize or establish an easement of right of way
but only expressed the tolerance and permission of the lot owners to pedestrian using the foot-
path, as shown by the phrase "will allow and tolerate."

Issue: Whether the contract/agreement created a right of way easement, and not merely an
agreement to tolerate petitioner to use the path?

Held: Bernardo foot-path is only about 71 71 whereas, his right of way southeastward from
his lot to the provincial highway is according to Annex "Y" is 90 meters long, and from said
junction to the church partly over the provincial highway and partly over the barrio road is a
distance of about 1,168 meters or a total of 1 kilometer and 258 meters, which is certainly,
quite far. Juana del Rosario Sixta del Rosario Pedro de Jesus -admitted existence of foot-path
for many years, -fence is so low that a child could pass over it merely objected to establishment
of regular road saying it would cause incalculable damage to their properties. CA held thar the
clause in the contract did not create a right of way easement disagrees with lower court.
Defendants not only tolerated said passage but in a written agreement signed by them before a
notary public and later submitted to the court for judgment, promised and undertook to allow
and tolerate Bernardo to continue using said footpath. This agreement was a compromise In
other words, they practically said to Bernardo, that provided that he did not insist in having the
court compel them to allow the establishment of a regular 2-meter road over their properties,
they promised to allow and permit him to continue using the foot-path which runs over their
lots and which he had been using in the past. And to show the element of permanence of said
use of the foot-path by Bernardo, de Jesus even allowed him to improve it by Jesus even
allowed him to improve it by placing ston placing stones and gravel on that portion es and
gravel on that portion included in his lot 28-A. Bernardo was only concerned that when third
parties acquire s acquire the lot owned by defendants, the lot owned by defendants, they would
not respect the agreement, which is why he needs a real right of way through annotation.
 Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527

Facts: Ramos acquired by sale from the Eugenio sisters a parcel of land which is isolated from
the Parada Road. In March 1972, after having set up a piggery on his newly acquired property,
Ramos had his lawyer write to Eusebio Francisco — owner, to ask for a right of way through
the latter's land. Negotiations thereafter had however failed to bring about a satisfactory
arrangement. Francisco's proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of one (1) square meter
from him to three (3) square meters from Ramos, as was supposedly the custom in the locality,
was unacceptable to Ramos. Later that year, Ramos succeeded, through the intercession of
Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela, in obtaining a three-meter wide passageway through the lot
of Epifania Dila. Yet, in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a ten-foot high concrete wall on
his lot and thereby closed the very right of way granted to him across Dila's lot. It seems that
what he wished was to have a right of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering
this to be more convenient to him. Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by
replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Ramos then
insituted a case where the court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing
Francisco to remove his stone fence and keep his lot open for Ramos' use.

Issue: Whether or not Ramos is entitled to an easement of right of way over the property of
Francisco considering that another 3-meter passage was made available to him through the lot
of Epifania Dila.

Held: Ramos is without right of to the easement. Since another passage to the highway wide
enough to be traversable by a truck is available to Ramos through the lot of Epifania Dila and
considering that Ramos himself constructed a ten-foot concrete wall on his lot thereby isolating
himself from such passage, the requisites for the legal easement of right of way have not been
met. The third requisite specifically requires that the isolation must not be due to the acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate. This not being the case since it was Ramos himself who built
a wall thereby closing the passage through the lot of Dila, there is no right over a compulsory
easement.
 Costabella vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 333

Facts: Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such
construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the
provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner’s property. As a
result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the private
respondents also alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the
latter’s property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local
fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also claim that
the have acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-opening of the
“ancient road right of way” (what they called the supposed easement in this case) and the
destruction of the dike. Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interest’s act of
allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private
respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.

Issue: 1) Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription?

2) Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form
of a passageway, on the petitioner’s property?

Held: 1) NO. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive
prescription.
2) NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to
the servient estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from
their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that there is
another outlet for the private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private
respondents). Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant
estate was never a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real
necessity and not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also,
the private respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The
SC also clarified that “least prejudicial” prevails over “shortest distance”
 Encarnacion vs Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 74

Facts: Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino
Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates. The servient estate owned by
respondent stands between the dominant estate owned by Encarnacion and the national road.
In 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath
measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the
highway. One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other
one-half meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. The road path
was used by Encarnacion and the customers of his nursery business as passage. When his
business flourished, Encarnacion was able to purchase in 1984 an owner-type jeepney to be
used in transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the road path and so
he approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and Elena Romero Vda. de
Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to
be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. Such request was
turned down. Hence, petitioner instituted an action to seek the issuance of a writ of easement
of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-
square-meter parcel of land.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Encarnacion is entitled to a widening of an already existing

easement of right-of-way, considering that the servient estate is only 405 square meters in size
and that there is an alternative passage of only 80 meters away from the national road through
the dried upriver.

Held: The petitioner Encarnacion is entitled to a widening of the existing easement of right of
way. The Court recognized that while there is a dried riverbed less than 100 meters from the
dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be
demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if
there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the present case, the
riverbed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from
the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to
five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the riverbed is impassable due to the
floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages
of the riverbed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at
all. Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over
adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.
 Solid Manila Corp. vs. Bio Hong, 195 SCRA 748

Facts: Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita. The same lies in
the vicinity of another parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading whose title came from a prior
owner. In the deed of sale between Bio Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved
as an easement of way. The construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hong’s title
stating among other things "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions
whatsoever shall be placed thereon; and (7) that the owner of the lot on which the alley has
been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for
sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof” The
petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other residents of neighboring estates) made use
of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983,
when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered use. On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against
the private respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The
trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the latter argued that the easement has been
extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the
purchase of the property from its former owner. CA reversed holding that an easement is a
mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that
since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an
extinguishment of the easement. Thus, Solid went to the SC alleging that the very deed of sale
executed between the Bio Hong and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in
question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement
notwithstanding the sale.

Issue: 1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from the tenement or mortgaged
separately.
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: 1) No. The sale included the alley. The court rejected Solid’s contention that the alley
was not included in the sale. It was included but there was a limitation on its use-the easement.
As a mere right of way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence. (Art. 617) Even though Bio Hong acquired ownership over the property –– including
the disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley
or otherwise put-up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as
a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

2) No. genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and
servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full ownership of both
estates. Note that the servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the benefit
of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong).
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and
the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large.
Thus, merger could not have been possible.
 Quimen vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 163

Facts: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and
sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They 109 agreed to
subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia,
Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of
Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C
which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B.
The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros.
Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia
who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her
the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia
prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on
her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as
her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda
finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. Later,
Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6B, located directly
behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the
lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store
is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four meters
wide and nine meters long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate
for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store
itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the
store to reach the road. Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right
of way through Anastacia's property.

ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible
to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing
thereon.

HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a
public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation
was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and (d) the right of way being claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial
appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so
as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other
hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to
pass 110 through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several
tenement’s surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause
the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage
should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. As between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of
way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second
alternative should be preferred.
 PARTY WALL:

Lao vs. Heirs of Alburo, 33 Phil. 48

Facts: On May 8, 1914, counsel for the said husband and wife filed a written application in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of four parcels of land, together with the
buildings thereon, of which they claimed to be the absolute owners. After due service of
notice, counsel for the administrator of the estate of the deceased Lorenza Alburo filed in
court a written objection, alleging that in the part of the application relative to the second parcel
of the plan No. 1, a stone wall shown in that plan to be northeast of the said parcel had been
improperly included; that this wall had belonged to the 3aid Lorenza Alburo, for it had existed
since March 8, 1881; that the principal timbers of the building that had belonged to the
said deceased had rested on it for more than thirty-five years, and the latter's successors
had been and were now in the quiet, peaceable and uninterrupted possession of the said
wall

Issue: Whether or not disputed wall is a party wall.

Held: No. Article 572 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of party walls is
presumed, unless there is a title or exterior mark or proof to the contrary in the dividing walls
of adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation. Article 573 of the Civil Code also
declares that it shall be understood that there are exterior signs which conflict with the easement
of party wall, when, among other circumstances, the entire wall is built on one of the lots
and not on the line dividing the two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being
constructed of stone and cement, has stones projecting at intervals from the surface on one
side only and not on the other; and when it supports joists, beams, floors, and the roof timbers
of one of the houses but not of the adjoining building. The record shows it to have been duly
proven that the stones of the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the rear enclosing wall of the
applicants' property in such wise that the two walls that in close the lot form but a single
construction, the exterior signs of which show that the wall in question is not a party wall, but
that it forms a part of the applicants' building and belongs to them.
 LIGHT & VIEW:

Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo, 2 Phil 24

Facts: House No. 65 Calle Rosario, the property of the plaintiff’s wife, has a certain window
through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63 of
the same street. These windows have been in existence since the year 1843. The defendant, the
tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to raising the roof
of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in said house No. 65 has been
covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received
through the window. The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted
use of the windows during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired by prescription an easement
of light in favor of the house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63, and, consequently,
has acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which
might in any manner be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the said easement. He contends that the
easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the
acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same
commenced, or from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge of the owner
of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part. The defendant, on the contrary,
contends that the easement is negative, and that therefore the time for the prescriptive
acquisition thereof must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may
have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which
would be lawful but for the existence of the easement.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the easement of light is a negative easement; and
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs have acquired right to such easement by prescription.

Held: The easement of light in this case is a negative easement since the window from which
the light and air were received was opened on the plaintiff’s own property as an exercise of
dominion, as such, it does not establish in itself any easement. The mere toleration of such an
act does not imply on the part of the abutting owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon
his land as high as he may see fit. It being a negative easement, it cannot be acquired by
prescription under article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession
from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may, by a formal act have prohibited
the owner of the servient estate from doing something which it would be lawful from him to
do were it not for the easement. Since no formal prohibition has been executed by the plaintiff
in this case, it has not acquired right over the easement of light by prescription since the
prescriptive acquisition of the title thereto must be counted, not from the time of the opening
of the windows, but from the time at which the owner thereof has executed some act of
opposition tending to deprive the owner of the servient tenement of his right to build upon it to
such height as he might see fit in the legitimate use of his rights of ownership.
 Fable vs. Lichauco, 11 Phil 14

Facts: Petitioner applied for the registration of his property in Manila free from any
encumbrances except the easement of right of way in favor of respondents Julita Lichauco and
Hijos de Roxas. In addition to the said right of way, respondents also claim that of light and
view and drainage. However, the claim was later reduced only to that of the light and view.
Lichauco claimed that when Juan Bautista Coloma, the original owner of both estates,
established not only an easement of right of way but also that of light and view and that when
both the properties were alienated, the apparent signs were not removed. It was supported on
columns erected on the ground belonging to the petitioner and the balcony on Lichauco’s
property is supported by uprights erected on the land by petitioner. The parties admitted the
existence of such gallery. The house was now a frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of
which 16 meters and 60 centimeters correspond to the main part of the same, and 1 meter and
90 centimeters to the gallery in question. It results, therefore, that at the present day, the house
has nearly 2 meters more frontage than when it was alienated by Coloma. Therefore, at the
present day the house is erected partly on the land belonging to the owner and partly, the
gallery, over a lot belonging to another; that is, over that of the petitioner. When it was sold in
October 1848, no portion of the house occupied the lot last mentioned, but the entire building
was erected over a lot belonging to the owner as set forth in the instrument of sale.

Issue: Whether or not Respondents are entitled to the easement of light and view.

Held: No. The burden is not on the petitioner to prove on what time the gallery in controversy
was constructed inasmuch as he limits himself to sustaining and defending the freedom of his
property, denying the easement o flight and view of the respondent pretends to impose over it.
A property is assumed to be from all encumbrances unless the contrary is proved. Respondent
who claims the said easement is obliged to prove the aforementioned gallery, in which the
apparent sign of the easement is made to consist in the present case, existed at the time of
ownership of her property and that of the petitioner were separated. Therefore, it does not
appear from the agreement of the parties that the respondents has balconies over the land of the
petitioner; and as it is, since it has been positively shown that the said balconies exceed the
limit of the lot owned by the former, nor less that they invade the atmospheric area of the lot
belonging to the latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory maintained by the
respondents with which on account of its lack of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal
herein as to its other aspect, the easement of view, which might result in such case from the
existence of the balconies alluded to, would be negative and not a positive one, because the
erection of the same would not constitute, according to their own statement, an invasion of the
right of another, but the lawful exercise of the right inherent to the dominion of the respondents
to construct within their own lot. And as said easement is negative, it cannot have prescribed
in favor of the property of the respondents in the absence of any act of opposition, according
to the agreement, by which they or their principals would have prohibited the petitioner or his
principals to do any work which obstruct the balconies in question, inasmuch as said act of
opposition is what constitutes the necessary and indispensable point of departure for computing
the time required by law for the prescription of negative easements. Thus, the judgment
appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court.
 Saenz vs. Figueras Hermanos, 13 Phil. 666

Facts: Plaintiff intends to build a house in his lot for business purposes and had already
deposited some lumber in the said lot. Defendants, on the other hand, have constructed a two-
story house wherein they use the ground floor for stores and the upper as dwelling. The house
was erected at a distance of 71 cm from the dividing line in the fround and 70 cm at the rear.
Defendants have opened three windows on the ground floor of their house, in the part that
overlooks the lot of the plaintiff, each window being 1 meter and 20 centimeters wide and 2
meters high; on the upper floor they have opened 5 windows, each 2 meters and 11 centimeters
high and 1 meter and 60 centimeters wide; they have also constructed a balcony at the front
part of the house above the ground floor, opening directly upon the lot of the plaintiff, and
another balcony at the rear part of the house, which up to the present time opens directly upon
the plaintiff’s lot, although the defendants state that, according to the plan, said part is to be
closed with boards. All of said windows and balconies are at a distance of less than one meter
from the dividing line of the plaintiff’s lot and that of the defendants are looking directly over
the same. Plaintiff was claiming that defendant is prohibited from constructing his house and
opening the windows and balconies looking directly upon his property. However, the court
ruled in favor of the defendant.

Issue: Whether or not defendant is entitled to the easement of light and view.

Held: No. Defendant is not entitled to the easement of light and view which the windows and
openings, which he was made in the house in question, give him, and, because of the fact that
he has constructed his houses nearer than 2 meters to the dividing line between his property
and the property of the plaintiff, he is only entitled to the easement of light and view provided
for in article 581. Article 581 provides for the character of the windows or openings in the
walls of adjoining property when it its constructed nearer the dividing line contrary to the
requirement of 2 meters. In the present case the defendant constructed his house so that the
wall looking upon the property of the plaintiff was less than 2 meters from the dividing line.
Therefore, he can only construct such windows as are provided for in said article. It was the
duty of the defendant to construct his house in accordance with the provisions of the law. The
plaintiff was not obliged to stand by for the purpose of seeing that the defendant had not
violated the law.
 Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil 403

Facts: Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The
house had and still has on the north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one
on the ground floor. Through these windows the house receives light and air from the lot where
the camarin stands. On September 6, 1885, Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house
and the land on which it is situated to Gabriel Florentino, one of the respondents herein, and to
Jose Florentino, father of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the
warehouse and the lot where it is situated to Maria Encarnacion Florentino. Upon the death of
the testatrix in 1892, nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to the windows in
question. On July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the warehouse
thereon to the petitioner, Severo Amor, the deed of sale stating that the vendor had inherited
the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. In January 1938, petitioner destroyed the old
warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house. On March 1st of that year,
respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from building higher than the original
structure and from executing any work which would shut off the light and air that had for many
years been received through
the four windows referred to.

Issue: Whether or not the easement of light and view under review has been established in
favor of the property of respondents through prescription

Held: Yes. The easement involved in this case is of two aspects: light and view and altius non
tollendi. These two aspects necessarily go together because an easement of light and view
prevents the owner of the sevient estate from building to a height that will obstruct the
windows. The original heirs of Maria succeeded to these two estates either in 1885 or in 1892
and as petitioner bought one of the lots in 1911, the prescriptive period under any legislation
that may be applied. According to article 537 of the Civil Code, continuous and apparent
easements may be acquired by prescription for 20 years. The respondents did not renounce the
use of the windows, either by stipulation or by closing them permanently. On the contrary, they
exercised the right of receiving light and air through those windows. Neither did the petitioner’s
predecessor in interest, Maria Encarnacion, object to them or demand that they be closed. The
easement was therefore created from the time of the death of the original owner of both estates,
so when petitioner bought the land and the camarin thereon from Maria Encarnancion, the
burden of this easement continued the real property so acquired because according to Article
534, “easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively pertain.” It
is well known that easements are established, among other cases, by the will of the owners.
(Article 536 of the Code.) It was an act which was, in fact, respected and acquiesced in by the
new owner of the servient estate, since he purchased it without making any stipulation against
the easement existing thereon, but, on the contrary, acquiesced in the continuance of the
apparent sign thereof. As is stated in the decision itself, “It is a principle of law that upon a
division of a tenement among various persons — in the absence of any mention in the contract
of a mode of enjoyment different from that to which the former owner was accustomed — such
easements as may be necessary for the continuation of such enjoyment are understood to
subsist.” It will be seen, then, that the phrase “active enjoyment” involves an idea directly
opposed to the enjoyment which is the result of a mere tolerance on the part of the adjacent
owner, and which, as it is not based upon an absolute, enforceable right, may be considered as
of a merely passive character.
 Gargantos vs. Yanon, 108 Phil. 888

Facts: In 1927 Tan Yanon purchased a parcel of land with a house of strong materials. This
house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the parcel of land acquired
by Juan Gargantos, herein petitioner, together with the camarin and small building thereon. In
May 1955 Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for a permit to construct a
combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this
application. Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a
building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through the
window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters
from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant.

Issue: Whether or not the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view
against the property of petitioner Gargantos.

Held: Respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's
property. The two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that owned by respondent, were
formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements
on both properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house
in such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion
now belonging to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and
doors which serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence
when respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that
the easement of light and view would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered
by Article 624 of the New Civil Code which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one
of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless
at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of
alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed.
The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house,
is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that
characterizes its existence. Thus, by reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his
land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary
line separating the two estates.
 DRAINAGE, WATERS, ETC:

Tanedo vs. Bernad, 165 SCRA 86

Facts: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On the said
two lots, a septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots.
Cardenassold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Tañedo and the other Lot 7501-B was also
mortgaged to Tañedo as a security for the payment of loan with an agreement that
Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him. However, said Lot 7501-B was sold to herein
respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the said sale, Tañedo offered to
redeem the property from Sim, but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe
connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot
7501-B. He also asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching on Lot 7501-
B. Tañedo was then constrained to file an action for legal redemption and damages invoking
Article 1622 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondent Spouses claimed they are the
absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem the land under
Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land
owned by Tañedo.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot
7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners
who do not have the same interest.

Held: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no statement abolishing or
extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A
to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drainpipe and septic tank by
the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the
septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim
the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501-B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever,
the use of the servitude
 Ayala de Roxas vs. City of Manila, 9 Phil 215

Facts: Petitioner applied to the defendant city engineer for a license to construct a terrace
over “the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of
the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her”; but
the defendant refused to grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace, because,
as the plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason wherefore the license was denied is because
“the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and without any
construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a portion of the
ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the plaintiff
will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the
public in general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said strip of
the property which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and
peacefully during more than seventy years. Additionally, it was agreed between both parties
that the strip above referred to had not been expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality
of Manila, and that neither had the latter offered any compensation for the same to the owner
thereof.

Issue: Whether the non-issuance of a license to the petitioners is tantamount to a taking that
requires just compensation.

Held: Yes. The easement of a zone for public use, authorized by article 73 of the Law of Waters
of 1866, is developed in articles 160 and 161, inclusive, of said law; the general interest on
behalf of which the easement is supported is determined, for navigation, by articles 160 and
161; for flotation, by article 162; for salvage, by article 163; and for fishing, by article 164; in
all of them the owner of the riverside property supports the easement “upon being previously
indemnified for loss and damage.” Said zone for public use, the same as a towpath, is solely
available for the purposes of navigation, flotation, fishing, and salvage, being closed to any
other use which be attempted; therefore, it is erroneous to pretend that the right of the owner
of the property bordering upon the stream can be reduced to the level of the public right; on the
contrary he should only be called upon to bear those burdens which are in the general
interest, but not without prior, or subsequently indemnity. Considering that the easement
intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real right that
will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of
the same, by expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished
unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it
is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is the
only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is
nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power
with which the same is invested. The question involved here is not the actual establishment of
an easement which might be objected to by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a
refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not simply a measure in
connection with building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law,
real rights which are attached to the right of ownership. The imposition of an easement over a
3-meter strip of the plaintiff’s property could not legally be done without payment to it of just
compensation. The Court commanded the defendant to issue said license.
 Lunod vs. Meneses, 11 Phil. 128

Facts: Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Meneses (defendant) alleging that from time in
immemorial and consequently for more than 20 years before 1901, there existed and still exists
in favor of the rice fields on the plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the flow of water
over the said land in Paraanan which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until 1901. o
However, in the year 1901, defendant without any right or reason converted the land in
Paraanan into a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net that prevented the free
passage of the water through said place into the Taliptip River. In consequence thereof, the
lands of the Plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters, there being no outlet
except through the land in Paraanan. Plantations were destroyed causing them loss & damage
to the extent of about PHP1,000.00 which loss and damage will continue if the obstructions to
the flow of the water are allowed. Plantiffs’ Prayer: Judgment be rendered against the defendant
declaring the said tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement. Defendant’s
Contention: Denied the allegations and claimed that no statutory easement existed nor could
exist in favor of the lands in the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not Meneses had the right to construct the works nor the dam which blocks
the passage through his lands

Held: No. but before discussing the ruling, it appears to have been clearly proven in this case
that the lands owned by the plaintiffs, CALALARAN are located in places relatively higher
than PARAANAN where the land & fishpond of defendant are situated. A dam has existed
from time immemorial between the border line of Calalaran & Paraanan constructed by the
community for the purpose of preventing the salt waters at high tide from flooding the land in
Calalaran. According to ART. 530 of the CC, an easement is a charge imposed upon one estate
for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which
the easement is established is called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the
servient estate. Consequently, the lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement
of receiving and giving passage to the waters proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of
Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by agreement between the interested parties; it is
of a statutory nature, and the law has imposed it for the common public utility in view of the
difference in the altitude of the lands in the barrio of Bambang. The owner of the lower lands
cannot erect works that will impede or prevent such an easement or charge, constituted and
imposed by the law upon his estate for the benefit of the higher lands belonging to different
owners; neither can the latter do anything to increase or extend the easement. Therefore, when
the defendant constructed the works on his fishpond in Paraanan, it impeded the outlet of the
waters that flood the fields at Calalaran, to the serious detriment of the growing crops. Under
Art 388 of the said code, the owner is authorized to enclose his estate by means of walls,
ditches, fences or any other device but his right is limited by the easement imposed upon his
estate. Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and maintain a fishpond
within his own land but he was always under the strict & necessary obligation to respect the
statutory easement of waters charged upon his property and had no right to close the passage
& outlet of the waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs. He could not lawfully injure the
owners of the dominant estates by obstructing the outlet to the river of the waters flooding
belonging to the plaintiffs.
 Salazar vs. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242

Facts: Crispino Salazar is the registered owner or Lot 433 situated in Tugo, Balanga, Bataan.
Her lot is bounded by Lot No. 361, NE; Sapang Tuyo, a public stream, SE; Lot 435, SW; and
Lot 433, NW. On the other hand, Guillermo Gutierrez and Damaso Mendoza, are the owners
and lessee of Lot 433 respectively. Private Guillermo Gutierrez acquired Lot 433 by inheritance
which was registered under the Torrens Title way back May 4, 1927, and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 1059 was issued in his name on June 11, 1928. No annotation of any lien or
encumbrance affecting the land appears on either title. Before the controversy arose, Sapang
Tuyo was the source of water for irrigation in its surrounding estates. It delivers water through
a dike which transversed Lots 431, 434, 433 and 436. A portion of the dike passed through Lot
433 and branched into a canal which ran across Lot 433 to Lot 436. Sometime in February
1953, private respondent Mendoza, who was then a lessee of Lot 433 demolished the said canal
stopping the flow of water and deprived petitioner Salazar of the irrigation facilities. She
requested that the canal be rebuild so that the flow of water could be restored, however her
efforts were in vain prompting her to file the present suit for the damages she incurred.

Issue: Whether appellate court erred in holding that petitioner failed to comply with the
requisites laid down by Article 643 in order to claim legal easement set forth in Article 642 of
the New Civil Code.

Held: On the first requisite of Article 643 — that the petitioner must prove that he can dispose
of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended — there is the statement
of the trial court that the disputed canal had been in existence since the Spanish regime, or at
least prior to the original registration of Lot 433 in 1923, and that of the Court of Appeals itself
confirmatory of this second alternative finding. If, as thus found, the petitioner had been using
water from Sapang Tuyo to irrigate Lot 436 since she acquired said lot in 1949, as the
Municipality of Balanga had been doing before her, and that such use had lasted continuously
for at least thirty years, it is a fair presumption that she had a right to do so and that the water
she could dispose of was sufficient for the purpose. Indeed, it would be a superfluity to require
her to produce a permit from the proper authorities, for even without it the right had already
become vested both under Article 194 of the Spanish Law of Waters and under Article 504 of
the Civil Code, which respectively state: ART. 194. Any person who has enjoyed the use of
public waters for a term of twenty years without objection on the part of the authorities or of
any third person, shall continue in its enjoyment, even though he may not be able to show that
he secured proper permission. ART. 504. The use of public waters is acquired: (1) By
administrative concession; (2) By prescription for ten years. The extent of the rights and
obligations of the use shall be that established, in the first case, by the terms of the concession,
and, in the second case, by the manner and form, in which the waters have been used. The third
requisite of Article 643 of the Civil Code refers to the matter of indemnity to the owner of the
servient estate. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner it would be nigh impossible now to
present actual proof that such indemnity has been paid, considering the number of years that
have elapsed since the easement had first come into existence and the subsequent changes in
ownership of the lots involved. It stands to reason, however, that if the easement had
continued for so long in fact, not only before Lot 433 was registered in 1923.
 Relovs vs. Lavarez, 9 Phil. 149

Facts: The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land which is cultivated with the aid of water
brought from a river through an aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. This
was by virtue of an easement the use of which had been with the plaintiff for more than thirty
years. On the land of the defendants there was a dam with a small gate or aperture in its face
which was used to control the flow of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a greater or less
quantity to escape in a drainage ditch, also on the land of the defendants. One of the defendants
completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the drainage ditch, so that none
flowed on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was destroyed the plaintiff had
some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water resulting
from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop. Defendants claim that the
plaintiff is not the owner of any lands watered by the aqueduct of the class known as padagat
(rice lands planted in May). It was also alleged that the plaintiff suffered no damage by the
destruction of the dam, because all the lands of plaintiff which are cultivated with the aid of
water from the aqueduct are of the class known as binanbang (rice lands planted in August or
September), and the destruction of the dam in May and the consequent failure of water in the
aqueduct at that period did not, and could not, damage the plaintiff or interfere with the proper
cultivation of his lands. Lastly, defendants say that that the evidence on record does not
establish the existence of the servitude in the lands of the defendants in favor of the lands of
the plaintiff landowner for the maintenance of the aqueduct and dam in question.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid servitude between the parties.

Held: Save for the issue on the existence of the servitude, all other allegations of defendants
were outrightly disregarded as they were clearly unmeritorious in light of the findings of fact.
However, the Court ruled that there was a valid easement in light of the fact that the aqueduct
and the dam had been in existence for more than 30 years, during which time the plaintiff had
exercised its use. It was alleged that no benefit was granted to the plaintiff since his (plaintiff's)
land is situated higher than defendants' land. Moreover, even if defendants had the right to open
the gates of the dam to prevent destructive overflow upon their land, this does not give them
the right to stop the flow of water altogether.