SULIT

WORKSHOP KESELAMATAN
PERKERETAAPIAN 2021

RAPIDRAIL SDN BHD

22 NOVEMBER 2021

1
SULIT
 WORKSHOP KESELAMATAN PERKERETAAPIAN 2021

CONTENT:
1. Brief information on Rail services under Rapid Rail
2. Ampang Line system – Operating hours and Mode of operations
3. CBTC system
4. Common Operation Risk
5. Summary
 Ampang Line Kelana Jaya Line Monorail Line MRT SBK Line

➢ Opening Date ➢ Opening Date ➢ Opening Date

➢ Opening Date
• 1 Sept 1998 • 31 August 2003 • 16 Dec 2016 (Phase 1)
• 16 Dec 1996
• 30 June 2016 (LEP) ➢ 8.6 km • 17 July 2017 Phase 2)
• 31 Oct 2015 (LEP –
➢ 46.7 km (including 17.4 km ➢ 11 Station ➢ 51 km
Phase 1)
LEP) ➢ 12 train ➢ 31 station
• 30 June 2016 (LEP –
➢ 37 station. (including 13 • 5 4-Car ➢ 58 train 4-Car
Phase 2)
station LEP • 6 2-Car ➢ Automatic Driverless System
➢ 44.7 km (including 17.7
➢ 84 train ➢ Manual System with Train (ATO)
km LEP)
• 35 2-car Driver
➢ 36 station. (including 11
• 35 4-car
station LEP)
• 14 4-Car KLAV
➢50 train 6-Car
➢ Automatic Driverless
➢Supervised ATO
System (ATO)
❖ 25 traction power substation with 33kv intake from TNB.
❖ 2 Depot located at Ampang and Kg Kuala Sungai Baru.
❖ 1 Operation Control Centre located at Ampang.
❖ 50 trains manufactured by CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Co Ltd
from China.
❖ The Ampang Line operated using Communication Based Train
Control (CBTC) system from Thales Canada.
❖ 36 stations with at grade and elevated station.
❖Travel time from Ampang to Sentul Timur,
- 32 min for one way
- 64 min for one round trip
❖Length of the trains are 86.4m consist of 6 car.
❖Platform length is 93m.
❖Seated for passengers is 154 pax.
❖Maximum passenger load is 1166 pax.
❖Maximum speed allowable is 70kmh.
● AM Peak 4 Hours of
Engineering Work
● 0700H – 0900H (0100H – 0430H)

● AM Peak Off Peak

2000H – 2400H
● 0700H – 0900H
PM Peak
1700H – 1900H

Off Peak
1000H – 1700H AM Peak
0700H – 0900H
 GRADE OF TYPE OF SETTING STOPPING DOOR OPERATION
AUTOMATION TRAIN TRAIN IN TRAIN CLOSURE IN EVENT OF
OPERATION MOTION DISRUPTION

GoA1 ATP with Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver

ATP and ATO Automatic

GoA2 Automatic Driver Driver
with Driver

GoA3 Driverless Automatic Automatic Train Attendant Train Attendant

Automatic
GoA4 UTO Automatic Automatic Automatic
DC2 TC1 TC2

DC1 CAM COC

❖ Supervisory function with centralized train control, power, equipment supervisory and
communication facilities.
❖ To ensure a safe, efficient operations and service delivery under normal, degraded and
emergency situations.
❖ Overall strategic and decision-making command center.
❖ Planning and arranging trains for operation and monitor the performance.
❖ Centralized information dissemination center for passengers on board train, passengers at
stations, staff and third parties.
❖ Initiate Emergency Respond Procedure according to Rules and Procedure.
❖ To detect and report any abnormalities of the system or equipment.
❖ Control and monitoring alarms of railway systems.
❖ Coordinate working activity within Ampang Line territory.
❖ Main Subsystem of CBTC consist of,
- Central (Automatic Train Supervision - ATS)
- Wayside (Zone Controllers - ZC)
- On Board Train (VOBC)
❖ There are 10 sets of ZC at mainline and 3 sets of ZC at Depot.

❖ Train Operation Mode,

> ATO >ATB > SATO
> ATPM >ATP Cut Out (CO) > Off Mode
> Restricted Manual Mode (RM)
 PIES
Platform Intrusion Emergency Stop PIES LCP (Local Control Panel)
System
Walkway at Legacy Line Centre Walkway at LEP Side Walkway at LEP
Local Announcer inside Train Train EB Button
Station Local Announcer
Train Emergency Door Glass
Train Emergency Door Glass
Train Fire Extinguisher inside Train Fire Extinguisher inside saloon car
Driver’s Cab
 Train PECU for standing Train PECU for disable person
(Passenger Emergency Communication Unit) (Passenger Emergency Communication Unit)
End Gate LEP End Gate Legacy Line
Earthing Switch Panel Power Cut Out Switch (PCOS)
same as BLS
Yellow Line Passenger Help Point (PHP)
with PESB
Bomba Hydrant Pipe Fire Extinguisher & Hose Reel at Station
 SCADA Main Page
Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition
Emergency Exit Door at LEP Station
 COMMON OPERATION RISK

No Operation Risk Mitigation

Train Collisions
• Reassess critical function staff competency
Possible caused:
• Review training module and schedule
1 • Staff competencies
• Enhance SOP and revisit on site safety
• Violation of rules
assessment for improvement
• Lack of verification tools

Derailment
Possible caused:
• Technical failures such as defective switches and • Rigorous maintenance systems
crossings, wear and fatigue in the wheel-rail • High levels of staff competence through
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interface, vehicle suspension faults. comprehensive training
• Operator errors such as incorrect setting of • Enhance control procedures
switches, excessive speed and poor driving
behavior – manual operations.

• Safety awareness through multimedia

3 Trespassers / Track intrusion
• Safety signages
 COMMON OPERATION RISK

No Operation Risk Mitigation

• Monitoring project along the way railway track

4 Foreign objects on guideways. • Installation of CCTV
• Guideway sweep before revenue service

• To provide more simulator-based training tools.

• Sunday exercise to enhance the staff competency level and
Staff Competencies - Lack of exposure in
5 reducing numbers of incident/accident
handling emergencies situations
• Conduct Toolbox meeting before start work by supervisor
• Competency assessment – Functional Competency Index

Damage or total loss to office premises, • Enhance Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
6 depots, stations, trains, equipment and • Inspection by FMAD and SHC on fire extinguisher at station.
machines. • Quarterly SHC workplace inspection
 COMMON OPERATION RISK
No Operation Risk Mitigation
1. Roving technician at mainline during operational hours.
Traction Power Supply
Interruption 2. Alternate service plan i.e Rapid Bus.
• Service disruption. 3. Standby Mobile Genset availability.
7 4. Monitoring and supervision on upgrading work of power supply system.
• Loss of revenue.
• Reputational risk. 5. Proper planning during shutdown of power supply system for upgrading
works.
• Affect Level of Service (LOS).
6. Optimize total trains in service to minimize power intake.
Low Productivity of Corrective 1. Strategize rail grinding activities.
Maintenance Operation
• High wear and tear of wheel 2. Train ride daily inspection to identify critical area for rail grinding.
and rail due to ineffective rail 3. Frequent visual inspection to monitor defective tracks.
grinding maintenance.
8 • Increase repair cost. 4. Currently sharing the grinding material/spare between lines.
• Low availability & low rail 5. Effective rail grinding works by the enhancement of grinding mode
reliability.
speed requirement from existing 3KM /hour to 10KM/hour for MRTC
• Passenger discomfort due to
noise and vibration.
 COMMON OPERATION RISK
No Operation Risk Mitigation

1. Implementation of Safety Isolation Power as per SOP.

2. Staff awareness on power boundary isolation issues.
OCC Systems Discrepancies. 3. Power boundary marker on tracks completed for entire system.
Risk of wrong decision made by
9 OCC due to false or inaccurate 4. Implemented buffer zone to avoid conflict.
indications between OCC systems 5. Special Operating Incidents completed. Manual procedure for
and at actual site. unsynchronized mimic PSCADA display.
6. Bombardier roll out ATS Software Version (6.00.3) on 17 August
2020 with introduction of PVI64 software release.

Legal claims and prosecution arising 1. To train Rapid Rail management on legal proceedings and how to
from the train accident that involving respond to a legal investigation and inquiry from the authority, media
passengers or third party and the public.
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2. Appointment of external counsels (by Prasarana and Insurance
adjuster) to oversee all the legal action filed against Prasarana
 WORKSHOP KESELAMATAN PERKERETAAPIAN 2021
Summary:
1. On site verification
• Track markers
• Lightings
• Visibility
• CCTV
2. Tools for ground staff on duty
• Checklist
• Mobile Radio
• PPE
• Safety Verifier (Depend on situation)
3. SOPs and Competencies
• Verified and certified
4. System reliability
• Safety features such as secondary detection
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Thank You.