State formation is the process of the development of a centralized government structure in a

situation where one did not exist prior to its development.

State formation has been a study of many disciplines of the social sciences for a number of years, so
much so that Jonathan Haas writes that "One of the favorite pastimes of social scientists over the course
of the past century has been to theorize about the evolution of the world's great civilizations.

The study of state formation is divided generally into

a) the study of early states (those that developed in stateless societies) and

b) the study of modern states (particularly of the form that developed in Europe in the 17th century and
spread around the world).

What is a State?

According to Painter & Jeffrey, there are 5 distinctive features of the modern state:

1) They are ordered by precise boundaries with administrative control across the whole;
2) They occupy large territories with control given to organized institutions;
3) They have a capital city and are endowed with symbols that embody state power;
4) The government within state creates organizations to monitor, govern and control its population
through surveillance and record keeping;
5) They increase monitoring over time.

Additionally, Herbst holds that there is another relevant characteristic of modern states:
nationalism. This feeling of belonging to a certain territory plays a central role in state formation
since it increases citizens' willingness to pay taxes.

2 distinct focuses of theories of state formation:

1. The early transition in human society from tribal communities into larger political organizations.
Explores the initial development of basic administrative structures in areas where states
developed from stateless societies. This is the focus of Anthropology
2. Formation of the modern state. This is the focus of Political Science and Sociology

Ancient or Primary state formation

States are minimally defined by anthropologist David S. Sandeford as socially stratified and
bureaucratically governed societies with at least four levels of settlement hierarchy (e.g., a large capital,
cities, villages, and hamlets).

Primary states are those state societies that developed in regions where no states existed before. These
states developed by strictly internal processes and interaction with other non-states societies. The exact
number of cases which qualify as primary states is not clearly known because of limited information
about political organization before the development of writing in many places, but Sandeford lists ten
likely cases of primary state formation in Eurasia, the Americas, and the Pacific.
Studies on the formation of early states tend to focus on processes that create and institutionalize a
state in a situation where a state did not exist before.

Examples of early states which developed in interaction with other states include the
 Aegean Bronze Age Greek civilizations and the
 Malagasy civilization in Madagascar.

NOTE: Unlike primary state formation, early state formation does not require the creation of the first
state in that cultural context or autonomous development, independently from state development
nearby. Early state formation causation can thus include borrowing, imposition, and other forms of
interaction with already existing states.

Early state formation

Early state formation in Europe happened in the late 9th century to the early 11th century, as stable
kingdoms formed in
a. Germany, France, England, and Scotland;
b. three stable, large kingdoms formed in Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), as well as
c. three in East Central Europe (Poland, Bohemia and Hungary).

Historian R.I. Moore argues that 970–1215 was the crucial period in European state formation.

Historian Sverre Bagge argues that "in its main features, the European state system seems to have been
formed between the division of the Carolingian Empire and around 1200.

At the latter date, there were fifteen kingdoms in Europe: England, Scotland, France, Castile, Aragon,
Portugal, Navarra, Sicily, Germany, Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Den- mark, Norway and Sweden."

Of these 15 kingdoms, seven were still in existence by 1648. Of those that disappeared, it was usually
due to marriage alliances and hereditary succession.

Modern state formation

Theories on the formation of modern states focus on the processes that support the development of
modern states, particularly those that formed in late-medieval Europe and then spread around the
world with colonialism.

Starting in the 1940s and 1950s, with decolonization processes underway, attention began to focus on
the formation and construction of modern states with significant bureaucracies, ability to tax, and
territorial sovereignty around the world.

However, some scholars hold that the modern state model formed in other parts of the world prior to
colonialism, but that colonial structures replaced it.

Scholarship on modern state formation frequently uses European state formation as its referent point.
Theories about early state development

There are a number of different theories and hypotheses regarding early state formation that seek
generalizations to explain why the state developed in some places but not others. Other scholars believe
that generalizations are unhelpful and that each case of early state formation should be treated on its
own.

The earliest forms of the state emerged whenever it became possible to centralize power in a durable
way. Agriculture and a settled population have been attributed as necessary conditions to form states
Certain types of agriculture are more conducive to state formation, such as grain (wheat, barley, millet),
because they are suited to concentrated production, taxation, and storage.

Voluntary theories

Voluntary theories
 contend that diverse groups of people came together to form states as a result of some shared
rational interest. The theories largely focus on the development of agriculture, and the
population and organizational pressure that followed and resulted in state formation. The
argument is that such pressures result in integrative pressure for rational people to unify and
create a state. Much of the social contract philosophical tradition proposed a voluntary theory
for state formation.
 hydraulic hypothesis
o One of the most prominent theories of early and primary state formation
o contends that the state was a result of the need to build and maintain large-scale
irrigation projects.
o This theory was most significantly detailed by Karl August Wittfogel's argument that, in
arid environments, farmers would be confronted by the production limits of small-scale
irrigation. Eventually different agricultural producers would join together in response to
population pressure and the arid environment, to create a state apparatus that could
build and maintain large irrigation projects.
 automatic hypothesis
o Carneiro contends that the development of agriculture easily produces conditions
necessary for the development of a state. With surplus food stocks created by
agricultural development, creation of distinct worker classes and a division of labor
would automatically trigger creation of the state form.
 A third voluntary hypothesis, particularly common with some explanations of early state
development is that long distance trade networks created an impetus for states to develop at
key locations: such as ports or oases. For example, the increased trade in the 16th century may
have been a key to state formation in West African states such as Whydah, Dahomey, and the
Benin Empire.

Conflict theories

Conflict theories
 regard conflict and dominance of some population over another population as key to the
formation of states. In contrast with voluntary theories, these arguments believe that people do
not voluntarily agree to create a state to maximize benefits, but that states form due to some
form of oppression by one group over others. A number of different theories rely on conflict,
 dominance, or oppression as a causal process or as a necessary mechanism within certain
conditions and they may borrow from other approaches.
 In general the theories highlight: economic stratification, conquest of other peoples, conflict in
circumscribed areas, and the neo-evolutionary growth of bureaucracy.

Conquest theories
 contends that a single city establishes a state in order to control other tribes or settlements it
has conquered.
 has its roots in the work of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and of Jean Bodin (1530–1596), but it was
first organized around anthropological evidence by Franz Oppenheimer (1864-1943).[38][39]
Oppenheimer argues that the state was created to cement inequality between peoples that
resulted from conquest.

Theories about modern state development

In the medieval period (500-1400) in Europe, there were a variety of authority forms throughout the
region. These included feudal lords, empires, religious authorities, free cities, and other authorities.
Often dated to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, there began to be the development in Europe of modern
states with large-scale capacity for taxation, coercive control of their populations, and advanced
bureaucracies.[52] The state became prominent in Europe over the next few centuries before the
particular form of the state spread to the rest of the world via the colonial and international pressures of
the 19th century and 20th century.[53] Other modern states developed in Africa and Asia prior to
colonialism, but were largely displaced by colonial rule.[54]

Political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists began studying the state formation processes in
Europe and elsewhere in the 17th century—beginning significantly with Max Weber. However, state
formation became a primary interest in the 1970s. The question was often framed as a contest between
state forces and society forces and the study of how the state became prominent over particular
societies.[55] A number of theories developed regarding state development in Europe. Other theories
focused on the creation of states in late colonial and post-colonial societies.[56] The lessons from these
studies of the formation of states in the modern period are often used in theories about State-building.
Other theories contend that the state in Europe was constructed in connection with peoples from
outside Europe and that focusing on state formation in Europe as a foundation for study silences the
diverse history of state formation.[57]

Based on the model of European states, it has been commonly assumed that development is the natural
path that states will eventually walk through. However, Herbst holds that in the case African states, as
well as in developing countries of other regions, development need not be the natural step. States that
struggle their consolidation could remain permanently weak.[6]

There are three prominent categories of explanations for the emergence of the modern state as a
dominant polity:
(1) Security-based explanations that emphasize the role of warfare,
(2) Economy-based explanations that emphasize trade, property rights and capitalism as drivers behind
state formation, and
(3) Institutionalist theories that sees the state as an organizational form that is better able to resolve
conflict and cooperation problems than competing political organizations.
 According to Philip Gorski and Vivek Swaroop Sharma, the "neo-Darwinian" framework for the
emergence of sovereign states is the dominant explanation in the scholarship. The neo-Darwininian
framework emphasizes how the modern state emerged as the dominant organizational form through
natural selection and competition.

How does the modern state differ from the early stats that develop?

(1) Modern states have greater capacity to intervene in their societies, and
(2) Modern states are buttressed by the principle of international legal sovereignty and the juridicial
equivalence of states.

The two features began to emerge in the Late Middle Ages but the modern state form took centuries to
come firmly into fruition. Spruyt notes that sovereign equality did not become fully global until after
World War II amid decolonization. Adom Getachew writes that it was not until the 1960 Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that the international legal context for
popular sovereignty was instituted.

Warfare theories

A woodcut of the Defenestrations of Prague in 1618—which began the Thirty Years' War and ended with
the Peace of Westphalia that started the recognition of the modern state

Two related theories are based on military development and warfare, and the role that these forces
played in state formation.

Charles Tilly developed an argument that the state developed largely as a result of "state-makers" who
sought to increase the taxes they could gain from the people under their control so they could continue
fighting wars. According to Tilly, the state makes war and war makes states. In the constant warfare of
the centuries in Europe, coupled with expanded costs of war with mass armies and gunpowder,
warlords had to find ways to finance war and control territory more effectively. The modern state
presented the opportunity for them to develop taxation structures, the coercive structure to implement
that taxation, and finally the guarantee of protection from other states that could get much of the
population to agree. Taxes and revenue raising have been repeatedly pointed out as a key aspect of
state formation and the development of state capacity. Economist Nicholas Kaldor emphasized on the
importance of revenue raising and warned about the dangers of the dependence on foreign aid. Tilly
argues, state making is similar to organized crime because it is a "quintessential protection racket with
the advantage of legitimacy." Tilly's theory is prominent in the field of historical sociology, where
scholars have tended to identify the onset of modern state formation as coinciding with the military
revolution in the 16th century.

Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker, in contrast, finds that the primary causal factor was not the
"state-makers" themselves, but simply the military revolutions that allowed development of larger
armies. The argument is that with the expanded state of warfare, the state became the only
administrative unit that could endure in the constant warfare in the Europe of this period, because only
it could develop large enough armies. This view—that the modern state replaced chaos and general
violence with internal disciplinary structures—has been challenged as ethnocentric, and ignoring the
violence of modern states.
War has played a key role not only in the consolidation of European states but also of some third world
states. According to Herbst, external security threats have had a fundamental role in the development
of the South Korean and Taiwanese states. However, Chin-Hao Huang and Dave Kang argue that Tilly's
bellicist theory of state formation does not account for Korea and Japan, as they did not face intense
security threats. A 2017 study which tests the predictions of warfare theories of Tilly and others found
that the predictions do not match the empirical record. The study found that median state size
decreased from 1100 to 1800, and that the number of states increases rapidly between the twelfth and
thirteen centuries and remained constant until 1800.

Historian Sverre Bagge argues that neither external nor internal wars were important per se in processes
of state formation. To what extent warfare was important in state formation, it was indirectly "by
mobilizing the aristocracy in the king’s service and by necessitating drastically increased taxation and
bureaucratization." Furthermore, he argues that the chronology of events in China and Europe are
inconsistent with Tilly's argument that increasing costs of warfare led to processes of state formation.
Substantial technological and organizational changes that raised the cost of warfare happened in Europe
during the same period as when China unified, but Europe did not have unification during that period.
Bagge also argues that the number of states did not meaningfully reduce, even though new military
technology gave advantages to larger and wealthier units. He writes that "there are relatively few
examples in Europe of kingdoms formed by conquest." Historian Ian Morris similarly disagrees with
Tilly's thesis; Morris turns it around and says "War made the state and the state made peace."

Marriage and dynastic politics

Sverre Bagge argues that the key factors behind the consolidation of European kingdoms were marriage
alliance and hereditary succession. He notes that kingdoms frequently failed to conquer one another
through warfare, but ended up merging with one another when marriage ties led the king of one
kingdom to become the rightful heir to a second kingdom. He cites as examples: the union of Denmark
and Norway under King Oluf of Denmark; King James VI of Scotland inheriting the English throne; and
dynastic marriages in Spanish kingdoms ultimately leading to the union between Isabella of Castile and
Ferdinand of Aragon in 1469.

Outside Europe
While modern states existed without European influence around the world before colonialism,[83] post-
colonial state formation has received the most significant attention.[84] While warfare is primary in
theories about state formation in Europe, the development of the international norm of non-
interventionism means that other processes of state formation have become prominent outside Europe
(including colonial imposition, assimilation, borrowing, and some internal political processes.[85][84]
John W. Meyer's World Society Theory contends that the state form was exported from Europe,
institutionalized in the United Nations, and gradually the modern nation-state became the basis for both
those in power and those challenging power.[86] In addition, because many of the early modern states
like the United Kingdom and France had significant empires, their institutional templates became
standard for application globally.[86]

Africa

According to academics on state formation in Africa, most notably Jeffrey Herbst, in his States and
Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (2000) many contemporary African states
lack the empirical qualities of states found in their counterparts in the developed world. This is due to
the differences in the state building experience between Europe and Africa. Statebuilding in Europe was
characterized by the threat of territorial wars, as such states formed as a by-product of ruler's efforts in
preparing for and waging war. As states in Africa were formed out of decolonization and born in an
international system that respected the sovereignty of international borders, this meant that the threat
of territorial conquest, which highlighted the European state building experience, was absent from
Africa. As such, ruling elite in Africa did not have the impetus to develop strong and effective
institutional structures as the survival of the state was guaranteed by the international community. In
doing so this led to the proliferation of weak states in Africa, with only juridicial statehood, in reality
they lacked effectiveness and legitimacy.

Latin America as Trade-Led State Formation

Sebastián L. Mazzuca's Latecomer State Formation. Political Geography and Capacity Failure in Latin
America (2021) compares state formation in Latin America and Europe. A key argument is that state
formation in Latin America was trade-led rather than war-led and that this difference explains why Latin
American states have low state capacity relative to their European counterparts. In early modern
western Europe, Mazzuca argues, "state formation had multiple linkages to state building. Violence
monopolization required great efforts at fiscal extraction, which in turn caused the abolition of the
intermediary power of local potentates and incited social demands for new public goods." In contrast, in
Latin America, "the obstacles to the development of state capacities were the result of mutually
convenient bargains struck by central state-makers and peripheral potentates, who, far from being
eliminated during state formation, obtained institutional power to reinforce local bastions.

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