TOPIC: ARTICLE 2

TEMPLATE: DO NOT ALTER!

#1 Case Title: KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
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FACTS:
GR No. [Insert Here]
ISSUE:
Date Promulgated:
[Insert Here] RULING:

Topic Discussed:
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Student Assigned:

#2 Case Title: KEY POINTS :

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GR No.
FACTS:
Date Promulgated:

Topic Discussed: ISSUE:

Student Assigned: RULING:

I. General Considerations
#1 Basco v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
PAGCOR, G.R.
FACTS:
No. 91649, May
14, 1991 Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)

Topic Discussed: Charter— P.D. 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. They also claim that the
Not self-executing: decree is said to have a “gambling objective” and therefore is contrary to Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human
Sec. 11 (Human
Dignity), 12 (Family), Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
and 13 (Role of (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
Youth)

Student Assigned: It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal
Amac Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the
National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government’s income share, the President’s
Social Fund and Host Cities’ share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored socio-cultural and charitable projects on its
own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. As of
1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2 Sections 11, 12, and 13 of the 1987 Constitution are self-executing provisions

RULING:
No, Sections 11, 12, and 13 of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions.

Provisions in Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution are merely statements of principles and policies. They are basically not
self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

"In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the Courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and
the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles, the available remedy was not judicial or political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of
 the ballot." (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)

Ergo, Article 2 Sections 11, 12, and 13 of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing

Fallo/Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

#2 BCDA v. COA, KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
G.R. No. 178160, This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction.
February 26, ***It seeks to nullify Decision No. 2007-202 dated April 12, 2007 of the COA
2009
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: ● On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 creating the Bases Conversion
General and Development Authority (BCDA).
welfare/worker’s
welfare ● On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which included a
₱10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and
Student Assigned:
Board member. In a memorandum dated 25 August 1997, Board Chairman Victoriano A. Basco
Aniñon
(Chairman Basco) recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) the approval of the
new compensation and benefit scheme. In a memorandum dated 9 October 1997, President Ramos
approved the new compensation and benefit scheme.
● In 1999, the BSP gave a ₱30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the BSP
increased the year-end benefit from ₱30,000 to ₱35,000. Pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which
states that the compensation and benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be at least equivalent to that of the
BSP, the Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees from ₱10,000 to
₱30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and employees received a ₱30,000 year-end benefit,
and, on 1 October 2002, the Board passed Resolution No. 2002-10-193 approving the release of a
₱30,000 year-end benefit for 2002.
● Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members, the full-time
consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.
● On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Españo of the COA issued Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-004 stating that the grant of year-end benefit to Board members was
contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2
January 2002. In Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 03-001-BCDA-(02) dated 8 January 2004, Director IV
Rogelio D. Tablang (Director Tablang), COA, Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the
grant of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants. In Decision No. 2004-013
dated 13 January 2004, Director Tablang "concurred" with AOM No. 2003-004 and ND No. 03-001-
BCDA-(02).
● In a letter dated 20 February 2004, BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer Rufo Colayco requested
the reconsideration of Decision No. 2004-013. In a Resolution dated 22 June 2004, Director Tablang
denied the request. The BCDA filed a notice of appeal dated 8 September 2004 and an appeal
memorandum dated 23 December 2004 with the COA.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not Article 2, Section 5 and 18 of the constitution are binding as a legal basis for the claim of
granting year- end benefit.
II. Whether or not the denial of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants violates Section
1, Article III of the Constitution.
III. Whether or not the Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are entitled to the year-end benefit.
RULING:

[Link] to BCDA, Board can grant the Year-End-Bonus to its members and full-time consultants, citing Section 10
RA 7227, the function of the Board includes the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme. And board members
and fulltime consultants should be granted.

II. The BCDA failed to show that RA No. 7227 unreasonably singled out Board members and full-time consultants in
the grant of the year-end benefit. It did not show any clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

III. The Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are not entitled to the year-end benefit. Section 9,
specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting: limits the amount of per diem to not
more than Php 5,000.00 and limits the total amount of per diem for one month to not more than Php 5,000.00 and
limits the total amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings.

The specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute indicate that Board
members are entitled only to per diem authorized by law and no other.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION:
Republic Act No. 7227-The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
“An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservation into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefore and for other Purposes”
Section 9: Board of Directors: Composition- The power and functions of the Conversion Authority shall be
exercised by a Board of Directors to be composed of nine (9) members, as follows:
● A full-time chairman who shall also be the president of the Conversion Authority and
● Eight (8) other member from the private sector, two (2) of whom coming from the labor sector
**states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and functions of the BCDA.
Section 10: Functions of the Board- the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational
structure and the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

***Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried
officials they are not entitled to Year-end Bonus and retirement benefit unless expressly provided by law.
R.A. No. 7227 does not state that the Board members are entitled to a year-end benefit.

CONCLUSION:

The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Commission on Audit Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
Board members and full-time consultants of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority are not required to
refund the year-end benefits they have already received.
#3 BFAR KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Employees
FACTS:
Union v. COA, ● On October 18, 1999 petitioner Bureau of the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Employees Union
G.R. No. 169815, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City issued Resolution No. 01 series of 1999 requesting the BFAR Central office
August 13, 2008 for a Food Basket Allowance.
● It justified its request on the high cost of living, the increase in prices of petroleum products which catapulted
Topic Discussed: the cost of food commodities, has greatly affected the economic conditions and living standard of the
Social justice government employees of BFAR Region VII and could hardly sustain its need to cope up with the four basic
provisions needs like food, shelter, clothing and education.
● Employees Suggestion and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS) pursuant to Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
Student Assigned: or the Administrative Code of 1987, and approved by the Civil Service Commission on December 3, 1996. It
Arcenal includes the granting of incentives to help employees prior to the present economic difficulties increase
morale, further commitment and dedication to public service and BFAR officials recommended their approvals
for the authority to Grant a Gift Check or Food Basket Allowance for 10,000 pesos each to the 130 employees
total amount of P1,322,682.00 pesos.
● The Commission on Audit - Legal and Adjudication Office disallowed the grant of the Food Basket Allowance.
● Regional Director Corrales, moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Social justice provisions contravene the allowances in question by the BFAR
unconstitutional?

RULING:
No, It ruled that the allowance had no legal basis and that it violated:
a. Sec. 15(d) of the General Appropriations Act of 1999, prohibiting the payment of honoraria, allowance, or other
forms of compensation to any government official or employee, except those specifically authorized by law
b. par. 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16 dated November 28, 1998 prohibiting the grant of food, rice, gift checks or
any other form of incentives/ allowances, except those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the
President.
c. Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law of 1989, which includes all allowances in
the standardized salary rates, subject to certain exceptions.

Conclusion:
Therefore in view of the petition, DENIED. The decision and Resolution of the Commission on Audit Legal and
Adjudication Office dated April 8, 2005, respectively in LAO-N-2005-119, are AFFIRMED.
#4 Manila Prince KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Hotel v. GSIS,
Dissenting opinion of J. Puno
supra
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at
Topic Discussed:
Constitutional the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and
provisions are concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from
generally self- assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners
executing; Read the are qualified, too.
dissent of J. Puno
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of our State policy-
Student Assigned: makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to develop our economy and patrimony
Aribas
with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the
framers of the Constitution did not define the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They
knew that for the right to serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-
makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined
by degree as time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of
the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice versa.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at any given time is
addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right primarily belongs to Congress as the
lawmaking department of our government, other branches of government, and all their agencies and instrumentalities,
share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and
regulations defining the degree of this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national
economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate the policy

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out .thousand times, they
can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the
highest bidder cannot be awarded block of shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad.
It qualified as bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest
bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did
not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not
grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the
latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules
FACTS:

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) through public bidding decided to sell 30%-50% of the issued
outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on September 18, 1995 only 2(two) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corp (Filipino Corp) offered to buy 51% of MHC 15,300 shares at P41.50
per share and Renong Berhad a Malaysian firm, which bid at P44.00 per share for the same number of share. More
than P2.42 than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share of Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
which respondent GSIS refused to accept. Petitioner came to the court on prohibition and Mandamus, where the court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Malaysian firm.

ISSUE:

WON Section 10 par 2 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing or non self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Section 10 par 2 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing, which states: “In the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

In the instant controversy, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any... legislation to put it in operation. It is enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained
to enforce such right in spite of the absence of any legislation; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted
to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

Therefore, Section 10 par 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing.

II. Republicanism (Sec.1)
#1 Rulloda v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, G.R.
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801
No. 154198,
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. – There shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang
January 20, 2003 kabataan officials
Topic Discussed:
In case of doubt,
construe election laws FACTS:
to give life to the
popular mandate July 15, 2002- Barangay elections. 2 contending for Barangay Chairman position: Romeo Rulloda and Remegio
freely expressed Placido
through the ballot June 22, 2002- Romeo Rulloda had a heart attack and died
June 25, 2002- The widow, Petronila “Betty” Rulloda wrote a letter to COMELEC seeking permission to run as
COMPARE to
candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband.
July 14, 2002- Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and Members of the
Aquino v.
COMELEC, G.R. No.
Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as follows:
120265, September
18, 1995 Just in case the names "BETTY" or "PETRONILA" or the surname "RULLODA" is written on the ballot, read the
same as it is written but add the words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY NOT COUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT
Student Assigned: COUNTED.
Aton
During the July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received
290 votes. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.

After the election, COMELEC issued a resolution denying due course the Certificates of Candidacy of
PETRONILA S. RULLODA and directing Election Officer of San Jacinto, Pangasinan to delete the name of
PETRONILA S. RULLODA, candidate for Barangay Captain in Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan

Basis for abovementioned resolution is Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and
Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute
candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her as the
duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that she be
allowed to run for elections.

RULING:

There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a prohibition
against said substitution cannot be said to exist.

Petitioner’s letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its resolution
denying the same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities
and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

The instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as
it denied due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, is declared NULL and VOID. The proclamation of
respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan is SET ASIDE,
and the Board of Canvassers of the said Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Barangay Chairman thereof.
#2 Estrada v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Arroyo, supra
(concurring Art. VII. §8 provides in pertinent parts:
opinion of J.
Mendoza) In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
Topic Discussed: office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
Sovereignty & right of inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-
the people to change President shall have been elected and qualified.
their government vs.
republicanism

Student Assigned: FACTS:

Ceniza
-Petition for quo warranto seeks a declaration that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is the lawful President of
the Philippines and that respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is merely acting President on account of the
former's temporary disability.

-Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo contends that the matter is not justiciable because of "the virtual
impossibility of undoing what has been done, namely, the transfer of constitutional power to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as a result of the events starting from the expose of Ilocos Sur Governor Luis 'Chavit' Singson in October
2000."

-Gloria cites statements made from this court about the legitimacy of the Aquino government since she believes
that they are the same.

-Reason why Estrada was impeached because of allegations concerning graft and corruption.

-Estrada’s confession is the clearest proof that he himself is permanently disabled and that was subject to the
transfer of presidency to Arroyo.

-Republicanism is
a theory of government that emphasizes the participation of citizens for
the common good of the community.

ISSUE:
-whether respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's ascension to the Presidency was in accordance with the
Constitution.

RULING:

- From this judgment that petitioner became permanently disabled because he had lost the public's trust, I accept
extravagant claims of the right of the people to change their government. While Art. II, §1 of the Constitution says
that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them," it also says that
"the Philippines is a democratic and republican state." This means that ours is a representative democracy
— as distinguished from a direct democracy — in which the sovereign will of the people is expressed through the
ballot, whether in an election, referendum, initiative, recall (in the case of local officials) or plebiscite. Any
exercise of the powers of sovereignty in any other way is unconstitutional.

-Indeed, the right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional principle. A constitution to provide for the
right of the people to revolt will carry with it the seeds of its own destruction. Rather, the right to revolt is affirmed
as a natural right. Even then, it must be exercised only for weighty and serious reasons.

-Declaration of independence statement:

We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness — That to
secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the
Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient
Causes; and accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long
Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under
absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for
their future Security.
III. Supremacy of Civilian Authority (Sec. 3); Commander-in-Chief Clause (Sec. 18,
Art. VII); The AFP (Art. XVI, Sec. 4 &5); Private armies & paramilitary forces (Sec. 24,
Art. XVIII)
#1 Alih v. Castro, KEY POINTS: Supremacy of Civilian Authority
G.R. No. L-
FACTS:
69401, June 23,
1987 Dreaded Zona Incident-On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than (200) two hundred Philippine
marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov.
Topic Discussed:
Military cannot
Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives.
bypass civil courts in Petitioner (Alvarez team)-On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition
determining probable and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized
cause to conduct from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
search) photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination. More so, the petitioners
demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search warrant as
Student Assigned: required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but
Cruz with avoidance

ISSUE: WON the search and seizure illegal?

RULING:
Article III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article III Sec. 3(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
ANALYSIS:

Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution as it was assailed that the absence of warrant
was their act under superior orders. The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace,
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. In the case at bar, the
precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-
observance of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of
hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners.
CONCLUSIONS:
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and
all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings.
However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have
been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
#2 IBP v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Zamora, G.R. No.
FACTS:
141284, August
15, 2000 The case is about the issuance of a TRO seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine National
Topic Discussed: Police (the "PNP") invisibility patrols around the metropolis.
Example of allowable
participation of To stem the tide of rising violence and crime in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings, and carnappings, invoking
military force in his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP
civilian law Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
enforcement assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. In response to such an order, the PNP,
through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, issued a Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 02/2000, which detailed
Student Assigned: the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan.
Dacuyan
The President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary and for
a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.

Petitioner's Argument
The IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000, arguing that the deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an
incursion by the military on the civilian functions of government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4)
of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 3 Article II. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is
the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the
national territory.

Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated
in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any
of their subsidiaries.

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION IN
THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY,
THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN
DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION
OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE
CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE
CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING
THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN IT SHOULD BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

Respondent's Argument
The Solicitor General in relation to our topic is that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which
feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy
clause in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

W/N the calling of the AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

RULING:
No. The calling of the AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols does not violate the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Under Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries.

Also, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances in our
Constitution. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally "civil" functions.

Analysis
In the case at bar, the calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the
metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. The Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting
the patrols. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP.

Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.

Conclusion
As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.
IV. The Incorporation Clause (Sec. 2)
#1 Kuroda v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Jalandoni, G.R.
FACTS:
No. L-2662,
● Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
March 26, 1949
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during 1943
Topic Discussed: and 1944 who is now charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of
Incorporation Clause Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
Student Assigned: atrocities and other high crimes against non combatant civilians and prisoners of the
Dizon Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war".

● A military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the
President of the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an act
establishing a national war crimes office and prescribing rules and regulation governing
the trial of accused war criminals.

● Kuroda comes before this court seeking to (1) establish the illegality of Executive Order
No. 68 of the President of the Philippines, (2) to enjoin and prohibit respondents
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's
case before the Military Commission and (3) to permanently prohibit respondents from
proceeding with the case of petitioners.

● Kuroda’s arguments were:

○ (1)EO No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of
our constitutional law but also our local laws;
○ (2) That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before
the Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville
Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court
to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an
independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our
Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
○ (3) That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the
 United State not being a party in interest in the case.

ISSUE: (1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? (2) WON rules and regulations of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law of the nation even if the Philippines was
not a signatory to the conventions embodying them? (3) WON the American lawyers could
participate in the prosecution of this case?

RULING: “For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.”

(1) Yes, EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional. Art. 2 Sec. 3 provides that, “The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or
civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor.

Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of
the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of our Constitution.

(2) Yes, the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law
of the nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the convention based on the
generally accepted principles of international law.

In fact these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United
State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive
in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
continued in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States and thus we were equally bound
together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by
our assumption of full sovereignty.

The change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth
because it is an offense against the same sovereign people.

(3) Yes, the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case.

In the first place, the Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed
by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already
been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military
commissions is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which
requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to
practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact it is common in
military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither
attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation's
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the United States, which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should
be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any
relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State
Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that
we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.

DISSENTING OPINION of Justice Perfecto

(1) Executive Order No. 68., is null and void because, through it, the President of the
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the
Supreme Court.

EO No. 68 confers upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charged with war
crimes. It is clearly legislative in nature. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the
prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in
Congress. It also appropriates the sum of P700,000 for the expenses of the National War
Crimes office established by the said EO No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of
legislative power as the power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.

It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial. This provision on procedural subject
constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme
Court.
(2) Respondents suggest that the President issued EO No. 68 under the emergency powers
granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620,
and Commonwelath Act No. 671.

The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, because they ceased to have effect much before
Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had elapsed upon the
liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the surrender of
Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945. It has never been the purpose of the
National Assembly to extend the delegation of legislative powers to the President beyond the
emergency created by the war, as to extend it farther would be violative of the express
provisions of the Constitution. EO No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it
violates the fundamental guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law
because it permits the admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can
afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilty
or not beyond all reasonable doubt.
#2 PHAP v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Duque, G.R. No.
Doctrine of transform and incorporation
173034, October
9, 2007 Doctrine of incorporation- which “mandates that the Philippines is bound by generally accepted principles
Topic Discussed: of international law which automatically form part of Philippine law by operation of the Constitution.”
Incorporation Clause
Doctrine of transformation- “which holds that the generally accepted rules of international law are not per
Student Assigned: se binding upon the State but must first be embodied in legislation enacted by the lawmaking body and so
Ganzan transformed will they become binding upon the State as part of its municipal law.

Petitioners: Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines (representing its members that
are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes.

Respondent: Health Secretary, Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health.

The DOH is deemed impleaded as co-respondent since the aforementioned respondents issued the
assailed RIRR in their capacity as officials of the said Agency.

FACTS:
● Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of EO
No. 51 aka The “Milk Code”, Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations, and for
other Purposes (RIRR) w/ Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
● October 28, 1986: Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution.
● One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA
(World Health Assembly) in 1981.
● In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of
the instrument mandates that States should take measures to diminish infant mortality and should
ensure that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
● May 15, 2006 – DOH issued the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7,2006.
● The RIRR imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
● June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
 the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction from implementing RIRR
● August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining the respondents from
implementing the assailed RIRR.
● The main issue raised in the petition is whether respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
● DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various international
instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said international
instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the DOH
in the RIRR.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not RIRR issued by DOH is not unconstitutional
**If the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of The Milk Code
II. Whether or not the pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of
the law of the land. If yes, whether the RIRR is in accord with the international agreements.
III. Whether or certain sections of the RIRR violate the due process clause and are in restraint of
trade.
IV. Whether Section 13 of the IRR on the Total Effect provides sufficient standards
RULING:
I. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code’s coverage is limited only to 0-12 months
old. The coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on the kind of product
being marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk
substitute as separate and distinct product categories.
The court finds no inconsistency between the Milk Code and the RIRR.

Under Section 12(b) of the Milk Code, the DOH shall be principally responsible for the implementation of
the Code therefore the prohibition of the RIRR on milk companies participating in any policymaking body is
in accord with Milk Code

II. There are two ways an International Agreement can become part of the law of the land:

By Transformation (Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution) ‘no international agreements shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate)

The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land because it did
not have a legislative blessing of the Senate.
By Incorporation (Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution) “The Philippines….adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land…”

‘Generally accepted principles of internal law’ refers to norms of general customary internal law which are
binding on all states, i.e. renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, principle of sovereign
immunity, a person's right to life, etc.

According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules.
The herein respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA resolutions were in fact
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states.

Neither have they proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory
in nature.
*WHA has regulatory and recommendatory functions. The ICMBS was adopted by WHA in a
recommendatory nature.

III. The petitioners failed to show that the prohibition of milk manufacturers’ participation in any
policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of
assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32), and the giving of donations (Section 52) would
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to show that the prohibited
activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes and that the aforementioned provisions are
unreasonable and oppressive to trade.

IV. Yes. Section 13 of the RIRR sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen promotional
materials on breastmilk substitutes before they are made public.
*Total Effect – should not suggest that buying their milk product produces better individuals.
Referring to Equi-Asia Placement, Inc vs. DFA, the court accepted as sufficient standards the ff.: public
interest, justice and equity, public convenience and welfare, and simplicity, economy and welfare.
In this instant case, the court believes that correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused
with public interest and welfare.

Conclusion:
The Petition is partially granted. Sections 4(f), 11, and 46 of the RIRR are declared Null and Void for being
ultra vires. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from implementing said provisions.
The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of the RIRR is concerned.
-#3 Liban v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Gordon, G.R.
No.175352, July The PNRC is sui generis (Unique) in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
15, 2009 FACTS:
(decision); ● Petitioners who are officers of the Board of Directors of Quezon City Red Cross
January 18, 2011 Chapter Dante Liban, Reynaldo Bernardo, and Salvador Viari filed in the Supreme
(resolution) Court, filed a petition to declare Richard Gordon forfeited from his seat in the
Senate, for accepting the chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross Board
Topic Discussed: of Governors.
Incorporation Clause ● They allege that by accepting the position, respondent has ceased to be a member
of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution:
Student Assigned:
Gloria
○ Sec 13. No Senator … may hold any other office or employment in the
Government,... including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
● They cited “‘Camporedondo v. NLRC, decided from August 9, 1999” which held
that PNRC is a government owned or controlled corporation to support their
argument that respondent automatically forfeited his post in senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of PNRC Board of Governors.

● Respondent, as a counter-argument, first

○ asserts that the petitioners have no standing to file a petition, which
appears to an action for quo warranto. Petitioners do not claim to be
entitled to the Senate office of respondent, citing Rule 66 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
○ Even if said petition was a taxpayer’s suit, petitioners can’t raise a
constitutional question in absence of any claim that they suffered actual
damages or threatened injury as a result of allegedly illegal act of
respondent
○ Relevant to the topic: he insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned
or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article
VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer
service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
First ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in sec. 13 article VI of the Constitution.

First RULING:
● the Court, voting 7-5, held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government
office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he
is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover,
the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and
privately-run charitable organization; essentially the majority of its capital stock are
privately owned.

● Moreover , it is controlled by a Board of Governors 4/5 of which are private sector

individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
● However, the Court further held that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264
and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7,
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations,
unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the
Corporation Code and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants
to be a private corporation.

Hence, Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the
Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC
Charter.

Second ISSUE:
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of
the PNRC charter? What is truly the nature of PNRC?

HELD:
Second RULING:
This Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the
Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some
other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the
entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence
in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953,
August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No.
6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the
PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the
creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms
of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the
State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure
is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935
Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The
PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional
grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

This Court must recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique
status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force
and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be
 reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter
to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any
other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can
neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as
well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international
humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although the PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor
a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code. The sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC
on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a
sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties.
-#4 Razon v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Tagitis, G.R. No.
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
182498,
December 3, Writ of Amparo: A protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty
2009 and security. As a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified course of action to
address the disappearance of an individual.
Topic Discussed: FACTS:
Incorporation Clause
ISSUE:
Student Assigned:
Lanzaderas RULING:

#5 Bayan Muna KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
v. Romulo, G.R.
No. 159618, Rome Statute: Article 1 The Court An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby
February 1, 2011 established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to
Topic Discussed: in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction
Incorporation Clause
and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.
Student Assigned:
Lim 1987 Constitution: Article II.2’s relevant part provides: “The Philippines … adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land …”

The application of the “doctrine of incorporation,” which “mandates that the Philippines is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law which automatically form part of
Philippine law by operation of the Constitution.” (Justice Carpio, in his dissent in Bayan
Muna, 2011; citing Agpalo, International Law, 2006)

Merit of the case: This assails and seeks to nullify the Non-Surrender Agreement by and between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

FACTS:
Instant Facts (For recits): The petitioner, BAYAN MUNA, sought to nullify the Non-
Surrender Agreement concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America. They claimed that the agreement contravened the obligations of the
Philippines under the Rome Statute of International Criminal Law, which had been signed,
but not ratified, by the Philippines. The petitioner also argued that the Agreement was void
ab initio because it created obligations that were contrary to the universally recognized
principles of international law.

Further Facts (relevant information):

● The Republic of the Philippines through its Charge d’Affaires signed the Rome
Statute which is subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval by the
signatory states.
● Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
● Via the exchange of notes with the US Government the Republic of the
Philippines finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect
certain persons of the state (RP and US) from harassment suits that might be
brought against them in international tribunal.
● In response to the query of the Solicitor General about the status of non-
surrender agreement the ambassador to the US replied that the exchange of
diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international...
law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.
● BAYAN muna requested that the Non-Surrender Agreement be struck down
as unconstitutional, or declared to be without force and effect.
● Petitioner stresses that the overall object and purpose of the Rome Statute is
to ensure that those responsible for the worst possible crimes are brought to
justice in all cases, primarily by states, but as a last resort, by the ICC; thus,
any agreement like the non-surrender... agreement that precludes the ICC
from exercising its complementary function of acting when a state is unable to
or unwilling to do so, defeats the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.
● Petitioner would add that the President and the DFA Secretary, as
 representatives of a signatory of the Rome Statute, are obliged by the
imperatives of good faith to refrain from performing acts that substantially
devalue the purpose and object of the Statute, as signed.

ISSUE: (only relating to the incorporation doctrine, you can refer to your full text for further
issues) Thank you!

Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.

RULING:

No, the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is not void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized
principles of international law.

Art. 1 of the Rome Statute pertinently provides that the ICC x x x shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as
referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.

Under par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the
jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC. As far as relevant, the provision states that
"no person who has been tried by another court for conduct x x x [constituting crimes within
its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same
conduct x x x."

The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, show that the Rome
Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious
crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC
coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
 Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or
the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind
both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals,
like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime
under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative
of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

Application: According to Supreme Court

The Agreement merely reinforces the primacy of the national jurisdiction of the US and the
Philippines in prosecuting criminal offenses committed by their respective citizens and
military personnel, among others. The jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to the Rome Statute
over high crimes indicated thereat is clearly and unmistakably complementary to the
national criminal jurisdiction of the signatory states.

RA 9851 clearly: (1) defines and establishes the crimes against international
humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes against humanity; (2) provides
penal sanctions and criminal liability for their commission; and (3) establishes special
courtsfor the prosecution of these crimes and for the State to exercise
primary criminal jurisdiction. Nowhere in RA 9851 is there a proviso that goes against the
tenor of the Agreement.

Conclusion:

Ergo, the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is not void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized
 principles of international law.

(In connection to the current issue of our state, does the ICC have any jurisdiction to charge the
state even if it withdraws already?)
V. Duties of the Government: Serve and Protect the People, Defend the State, Etc.
(Sec. 4 & 5)
#1 People v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Lagman, G.R. People v. Lagman
No. L-45892, July G.R. No. L-45892
13, 1938 July 13, 1938

Topic Discussed: TOPIC:

Duties of the
Government: Serve Duties of the Government: Serve and Protect the People, Defend the State, Etc. (Sec. 4 & 5)
and Protect the
People, Defend the
Under 1987 Constitution:
State, Etc.
Sec 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the people and the government may
Student Assigned: call upon the people to defend the state and the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required under
Lungay conditions provided by law to render personal military or civil service.

Under 1935 Constitution (Take Note on the year of the case)

Sec. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of the government, and in the fulfillment of this duty
all citizens may be required to render personal military or civil service.

Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law

Sec. 60. Any person failing to register for military service as herein provided shall, upon conviction,
be sentenced to serve not more than one year in prison or to pay a fine of not to exceed two thousand
pesos or both, at the discretion of the court. Conviction for this offense shall not exempt the person
convicted from the military service herein required.

Sec. 65. Deferments may likewise be granted by the Acceptance Boards for those who are
indispensable to the support of their dependent families, for agricultural reasons, and for certain key
men in industry, commerce or agriculture; provided that such deferments shall not exceed one year,
after which they shall be liable to such training in the same manner as that prescribed for any other
citizen.
 Sec 69. Where dependency was the cause for deferment and that condition continues after the
termination of the period of deferment, the young man shall be liable to trainee instruction, and if
drawn therefore he shall enter upon such instruction. During the period of his absence undergoing
instruction, an allowance for the partial support of his dependent or dependents, who have no other
means of support, shall be made by the Philippine Government. The corresponding acceptance board
shall determine the dependent or dependents entitled to this allowance, which shall be fixed by
Executive Order.

FACTS:

- Appellant Tranquilino Lagman was charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No.
1, known as the National Defense Law.
- It is alleged that the appellant being Filipino and has reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully
and unlawfully refused to register in the military service even though he had been required to do so.
- The appellant was duly notified to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military
service but still did not register up to the date of the filing of the information.
- Appellant argued that he did not register because he has a father to support, has no military learnings,
and does not wish to kill or be killed.
- Appellant invoked his freedom of religion by claiming he belonged to a religion which prohibits
killing in times of war.
- Appellant claimed that the statute was unconstitutional.
- The Court of First Instance sentenced him to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.
- The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

ISSUE:

WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was unconstitutional.

RULING:

No, the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was not unconstitutional.

Sec. 2 of the 1935 Constitution provides that “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in
the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required to render personal military or civil service.”

In the case at bar, The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not
go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. Also, the
circumstance of the appellant does not excuse him from his duty to present himself before the Acceptance
Board because he can ask for deferment and obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to his family
responsibilities. (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1)

Thus, the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was not unconstitutional.

ADDED INFO:

Court cites cases from U.S. as an example: In US cases, it was stated that the right of the Government to
require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its
duty to defend the life, liberty and property of the citizen; and, that a person may be compelled by force to
take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.
-#2 Marcos v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Manglapus, G.R.
FACTS:
No. 88211,
September 15, In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into
1989 exile.

Topic Discussed: Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.
Duties of the
Government: Serve Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of
and Protect the Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the support of “Marcos loyalists” and the unsuccessful plot
of the Marcos spouse to return from Hawaii awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to
People, Defend the
the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country.
State, Etc.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
Student Assigned:
Mahilum President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines.

RULING:

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty
of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it
is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold
the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the
national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power, is also a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds
everyone that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with
impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the
VI. Renunciation of War; Independent Foreign Policy; Nuclear-Free Policy (Sec. 2, 7,
and 8); Also Sec. 25, Art. XVIII (re former US Military Bases)
#1 Bayan v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Zamora, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Renunciation of War; -March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which
Independent Foreign formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel.
Policy; Nuclear-Free
Policy To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a
Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
Student Assigned: attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft. 1
Manaig
-The Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement.

-September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines

-July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange
notes on "the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region."

-President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon
and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.

-On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA

-On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially
transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution(Section 21. No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.) The
Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its
Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint consideration and
recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two Committees.

-On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3)
vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.

-On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.

-The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the
Philippines

ISSUE:

Whether or not the VFA constitutes an abdication of Philippine sovereignty.

Whether or not the VFA violates the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8.

RULING:

1. No. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by
the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state..As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article
VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the
treaty be "duly concurred in by the Senate." The records reveal that the United States Government, through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the united States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds
itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the
Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation’s consent to be bound by said treaty, with
the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the
case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic
legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by
ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States
agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to
ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The
role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the
Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the
principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct
of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon any particular
branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations
committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral part of the community
of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international
obligation. Hence,we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our
obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commission
in 1949 provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to
perform this duty."
Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith." This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves
the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive international law, supported
by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.

2. No. By virtue of Article II of the VFA, the United States commits to respect the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, including the Constitution, which declares in Article II, Section 8(The Philippines, consistent with the
national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.) thereof, a policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons consistent with the national interest.
#2 Nicolas v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Romulo, G.R.
NICOLAS--Petitioner
No. 175888, ROMULO—Respondent
February 11,
2009 The case is about petitions for certiorari or review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Lance Corporal Daniel J.
Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al
Topic Discussed:
Renunciation of War; Note: This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. This was
Independent Foreign in Bayan v. Zamora, brought by Bayan, one of the petitioners in the present cases.
Policy; Nuclear-Free
Policy
FACTS:
Student Assigned:
Manguilimotan · Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed
Forces who was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina- Suzette S. Nicolas,
a 22-year old unmarried woman and was convicted under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati on December 4, 2006.

· Prior to the conviction, the United States requested for the custody of Smith while the case was
still pending and the same was granted- pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
between the Philippines and United States.

· On December 19 and 22, 2006, after Smith’s conviction, an agreement relative to the detention
of Smith was entered into between then Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo and former
United States Ambassador Kristie Kenney – which was known as Romulo-Kenney Agreement –
that allows L/Cpl. Smith to be returned to US military custody at the US Embassy in Manila and
be detained in the Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, US Embassy Compound.

· Thus, by virtue of the Romulo-Kenney Agreement, Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and
brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government.

· Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith
because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the VFA is valid and binding even though it was not ratified by the Senate of the
United States.

2. Whether or not the Romulo-Kenny concurrence is valid.

RULING:

1. Yes, VFA is valid and binding even though it was not ratified by the Senate of the United States.

VFA was agreed upon by the Senate of the Philippines and has been recognized as a treaty by the United
States as attested and certified by authorized representatives through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard of
the United States government. VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate
however it is not detracted from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the
said State. The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was then signed and duly ratified with agreement of both the
Philippine Senate and United States Senate.

In this case, the said VFA is considered to be the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US
Military exercises, and is simply an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Simply
put, it is the continuation of the said treaty. Therefore since it is a continuation and considered as an
implementing agreement to the “MAIN'' RP-US Military Mutual Defense treaty it is no longer necessary to
submit the VFA to the US Senate for the said advice and consent but only to the US Congress under the
Cse-Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it
recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with
the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.

Therefore, VFA is valid and binding even though it was not ratified by the Senate of the United States.
 2. No, the Romulo-Kenny agreement is invalid.

The SC finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody in the
provision of the VFA. When the accused has to be detained, after the conviction the rule that governs is the
one from VFA article V Criminal Jurisdiction, which states:

Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried
out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel
serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.

It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and
detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this
specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the
accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not
"by Philippine authorities."

Therefore, the Romulo-Kenny agreement is invalid.

The Court’s decision in this case:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998,
is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006
are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is
hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate
agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the
VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.
#3 Saguisag v. IMPORTANT KEY:
Ochoa, G.R. No. Sec 2 The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equally, justice, freedom,
212426, January cooperation, and amity with all nations.
12, 2016
Sec 7 The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount
Topic Discussed: consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
Renunciation of War;
Independent Foreign Sec 8 The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
Policy; Nuclear-Free weapons in its territory.
Policy
FACTS:
Student Assigned: The petitions question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Monsanto Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.). Petitioners alleged that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered EDCA with the U.S. claiming
that the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions. In reply, respondents argue that petitioners lack standing
to bring the suit. To support the legality of their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial
Precedents.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties.

RULING:
Yes. The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
Under Section 1 Power of Control. - The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed In this case, no court can tell the President to desist from
choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls squarely
within Article VIII, Section 25. The discussions of the Constitutional Commissioners stated that Executive agreements
are generally intended to implement a treaty already enforced or to determine the details of the implementation thereof
that do not affect the sovereignty of the State. Moreover, executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign military
forces if it merely involves detail adjustments. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent
requirements that must be fulfilled by the international agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President may choose the
form of the agreement (i.e., either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided that the agreement dealing with
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal agreement that first allows their entry or presence in the
Philippines. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and standards set by the law
and/or treaty that the former purports to implement; and must not unduly expand the international obligation expressly
mentioned or necessarily implied in the law or treaty. The executive agreement must be consistent with the
Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties. Thus, the President may enter into an executive agreement on
foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities.

Yes. The provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties.
Under the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty, an executive agreement such as the EDCA was
well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties and should not be declared unconstitutional.

In this case, EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's concurrence. The Visiting Forces
Agreement – a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 – already allowed the entry of US troops. Once entry is authorized,
the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine
law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. The "agreed locations," or areas
where US personnel will be allowed to perform are "activities approved by the Philippines," so Philippine
law remains in force therein, and it cannot be said that jurisdiction has been transferred to the US. In the event that an
agreed location comes under attack, Philippines has ample legal protection under international law "that would
ensure its territorial integrity and national security."

Therefore, there is no basis to invalidate EDCA on fears that it increases the threat to our national security. If anything,
EDCA increases the likelihood that, in an event requiring a defensive response, the Philippines will be prepared
alongside the US to defend its islands and ensure its territorial integrity pursuant to a relationship built on the
MDT and VFA.

Thus, the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties.
#4 Magallona v. KEY POINTS: (Based on the concurring opinion of J. Velasco)
Ermita, supra The 1982 LOSC did not matter-of-factly open our internal waters to passage by foreign ships, either in
(concurring the concept of innocent passage or archipelagic sea-lane passage,
opinion of J.
FACTS:
Velasco) This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the Baselines Law , R.A. 9522
on the following grounds:
Topic Discussed: 1.) It reduces the maritime territory of the Philippines which is a violation of Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution
Renunciation of War; 2.) it opens the country’s waters to maritime passage by all vessels and aircraft, including nuclear-
Independent Foreign weapon-carrying vessels/aircraft
Policy; Nuclear-Free 3.) RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands prejudices the livelihood of fishermen.
Policy

Student Assigned: ISSUE:

Paciencia WON RA 9522 reduces the maritime territory of the Philippines
WON the baselines law open our internal waters to passage by foreign vessels or aircraft including nuclear
weapon-carrying vessels

RULING:

The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and
the right to self-determination.
1.) Our position that all waters within our baselines are internal waters, which are outside the
45
jurisdiction of the 1982 LOSC, was abundantly made clear by the Philippine Declaration at the
time of the signing of the LOSC on December 10, 1982. Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Declaration
state:

- [Link] Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws and
Presidential decrees of Proclamation of the republic of the Philippines; the Government x x x
maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any amendments to such laws, decrees or
proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Constitution

- 6. The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or
impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic State over the sea lanes and do not
deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence and security
 - 7. The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the
Constitution of the Philippines

2.) In effect, contrary to petitioners’ allegations, the Philippines’ ratification of the 1982 LOSC did not
matter-of-factly open our internal waters to passage by foreign ships, either in the concept of innocent
passage or archipelagic sea-lane passage, in exchange for the international community’s recognition of
the Philippines as an archipelagic state.

The Filipino people, by ratifying the 1987 Constitution, veritably rejected the quid pro quo petitioners
take as being subsumed in that treaty.

Harmonized with the Declaration and the Constitution, the designation of baselines made in RA 9522
likewise designates our internal waters, through which passage by foreign ships is not a right, but may
be granted by the Philippines to foreign states but only as a dissolvable privilege
VII. Separation of Church and State (Sec. 6); Also: Art. III, Sec. 5 (the establishment
and free-exercise clauses) & Art. VI, Sec. 29(2) (prohibition against sectarian
appropriations)
#1 Aglipay v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Ruiz, G.R. No. L-
45459, March 13, Section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as
1937
follows:
Topic Discussed:
Separation of Church No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for
and State
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of
Student Assigned: religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
Padrigao
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

FACTS:

The government had authorized a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance in Manila of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The
petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the measure, contending that it
violated the Constitution because it benefited a particular religion; thus he sought to prohibit the
issuance and selling of the stamps commemorative of the event.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the authorized stamp issue be declared invalid for violating the principle of
separation of Church and State.

RULING:
No.

The Supreme Court, on examining the background facts, discovered that although the original

design of the stamp featured a Catholic chalice, this was later rejected in favor a map of the

Philippines under which appeared the caption, “”Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,

Feb. 3-7,1937.” What was emphasized, therefore, is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila,

as the seat of that congress. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by

any sectarian denomination. The only purpose was “to advertise the Philippines and attract more

tourists to this country.” The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman

Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The

officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance “to

give publicity to the Philippines and its people”.

While it is obvious that the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be

inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received

by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government

should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less

religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by

appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere
incidental results not contemplated.

Therefore, the stamp issue was held to be not invalid and a petition for writ of prohibition is hereby
denied.
#2 Estrada v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Escritor, A.M.
No. P-02-1651,
August 4, 2003 Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (Section 5, Article 3)
(decision); June “Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
22, 2006 thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
(resolution) preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.”
Topic Discussed:
Separation of Church
and State

Student Assigned: FACTS:

Perez ● The controversy is all about the complaint of Alejandro Estrada regarding the cohabitation of
Soledad Escritor (who is a court interpreter at the Regional Trial Court) with a man that is not her
husband.
● Alejandro filed a charge against Soleded on the grounds that Soledad is committing an immoral act
that tarnishes the image of the court.
● Soledad denied the accusation, and challenged Alejandro to “appear in the open and prove his
allegation in the proper forum”.
● A preliminary conference happened where Soledad testified that when she worked at the RTC in
1998, she was already a widow.
● She also admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years, and that they have a son.
● But as a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, her
cohabitation with Luciano is in conformity with their religious beliefs.
● She also stated that after ten years of living together, her and Luciano executed a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness”, a document and a pledge from their congregation (Jehovah’s Witnesses)
that gives them a right to marital relationship.
● Both parties stated in their respective memoranda to the investigating judge that the issue for
resolution is whether or not the relationship between Soledad and Luciano is valid and binding in
their own religious congregation.
● Alejandro argued about the effect of the relationship to Soledad’s administrative liability. He also
argued that even though the relationship between Soledad and Luciano is morally right under their
religious belief, it cannot override the norms of conduct required by law for government employees.
● The investigating judge Maceda found the evidence presented by Soledad in Court as credible
 because they are supported by testimonial and documentary evidence and voted to dismiss the
case on the grounds that religious freedom is a fundamental right entitled to the highest priority and
the highest protection among human rights.
● However, the Office of the Court Administrator, agreed with the findings of Maceda, but did not
agree with the dismissal of the case.
● DCA Lock (Deputy Court Administrator) said that court personnel must abide by the exact standards
of morality and decency to preserve the integrity of the Court. He recommended that Soledad must
be found guilty and be suspended for six months and one day without pay.

ISSUE:
● Whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively
liable.

RULING:
● August 4 2003 (Decision)
○ The case was sent back to the Office of the Court Administrator.
○ The Solicitor General is given the opportunity to examine the sincerity of Soledad’s religious
belief and practice, and present evidence on the state’s compelling interest to override
Soledad’s religious belief, and to show that the means of the state in pursuing its interest is
the least restrictive to Soledad’s religious freedom.

● June 22, 2006 (Resolution)

○ Yes, the respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.
○ The court used the three-step process of the compelling state interest test: which is to (a)
examine the sincerity of Soledad’s religious belief and practice, (b) present evidence on the
state’s compelling interest to override Soledad’s religious belief, and (c) to show that the
means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to Soledad’s religious
freedom.
○ In the case at bar, the Office of the Solicitor General failed to prove that the state has a
compelling interest to override Soledad’s religious belief and practice. The free exercise of
religious is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in the Constitution. It is
the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. It is not enough to contend that the state’s
interest is important, because the Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom
 sacred.
○ Therefore, the respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.
#3 In Re: Letter KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any): As pointed out by Judge Lutero, “The Roman
of Tony Q. Catholics express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to
the free exercise of their religion. Our Muslim brethren, who are government employees, are allowed to worship their
Valenciano, A.M. Allah even during office hours inside their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted from rendering
No. 10-4-19-SC, Saturday duty because their religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. Even Christians have been allowed to
March 7, 2017 conduct their own bible studies in their own offices. All these have been allowed in respect of the workers' right to the
free exercise of their religion. Xxx"
Topic Discussed:
Separation of Church Allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent to a fusion of Church and State.
and State

Student Assigned:
Silorio FACTS:
This controversy originated from a series of letters, written by Tony Q. Valenciano (Valenciano) and addressed to
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno).
In Valenciano’s first Letter, dated January 6, 2009, he
1. reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted into a Roman
Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ,
and a projector;
2. believed that such practice violated the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and
the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect,
church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred the following:
1. Holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice tended to favor Catholic litigants.
2. It caused great disturbance to other employees during choir rehearsal.
3. The public could no longer use the basement as resting place.
4. The employees and litigants of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), Branches 82 and 83 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Legal Library, Philippine Mediation Center, and Records Section of the Office of the Clerk of
Court (OCC) could not go to the lavatories during mass.
5. The court employees became hostile toward each other as they vied for the right to read the epistle.
6. The water supply in the entire building was cut off during the mass because the generator was turned off
to ensure silence.
Judge Maceran of the MTC clarified that the basement of the QC Hall of Justice was a prayer corner. Holding masses
there did not violate the constitutional prohibition against the use of public property for religious purposes because the
religious character of such use was merely incidental to a temporary use.
Judge Bay of the RTC recommended that daily masses be permitted to continue, provided that (1) the mass be limited
to 30 minutes; (2) no loud singing so as not to disturb others; and (3) the inconveniences caused by the mass be
addressed.

Valenciana sent two more letters, dated May 13, 2009, and March 23, 2010:
1. complaining that masses continued to be held at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice
2. praying that rules be promulgated by the Court to put a stop to the holding of Catholic masses, or any
other religious rituals, at the QC Hall of Justice and in all other halls of justice in the country.

They were referred to the incumbent RTC Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. and incumbent MTC Executive
Judge Caridad M. WalseLutero.
Judge Sagun Jr. reported that
1. masses were shortened to 30 minutes (but during special holy days mass went beyond one 1:00 P.M.);
2. the pathways leading to the lavatories were open and could be used without obstruction;
3. there was no vying to read the epistle during mass, no backbiting and irritation among themselves;
4. the water generator had been broken beyond repair and decommissioned since December 2009; and
5. the court employees prepared for the mass on their personal time.
Judge Lutero reported that
1. Catholic masses were being held only during lunch breaks
2. the basement of the QC Hall of Justice could still be used as waiting area for the public
3. court personnel and the public were never physically prevented from reaching the lavatories during mass
as there was a clear path;
4. water service interruptions were caused by maintenance problems and not because the water pump was
being shut off during mass; and
5. the elevators could not be used during mass because elevator attendants took their lunch break from 12
to 1 P.M..

Judge Lutero recommended that holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice be allowed to continue
considering that it was not inimical to the interests of the court employees and the public.

The Office of the Court Administrator believed that the practical inconveniences cited by Valenciano were unfounded.
It, thus, recommended that his letter-complaints, dated January 6, 2009, May 13, 2009 and March 23, 2010, be
dismissed for lack of merit and that the RTC and MTC Executive Judges of QC be directed to closely regulate and
monitor the holding of masses and other religious practices within the premises of the QC Hall of Justice.
ISSUE:
Whether the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional principle
of separation of church and state as well as the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or
property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion

RULING:

No, the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice does not violate the constitutional
principle of separation of church and state as well as the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public
money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion.

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. However, the holding of religious rituals in the Halls of Justice
does not amount to a union of church and state. The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have
some form of belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright
rejection of religion.
Jurisprudence recognizes the Filipinos’ deep relationship with their church and God.
1. In Imbong v Ochoa, the phrase "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested the spirituality innate in our
nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. In recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious
officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
2. In Aglipay v. Ruiz (Aglipay), the Court acknowledged how religion could serve as a motivating force behind
each person's actions.

Further, several laws have been enacted to accommodate religion.

1. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 has declared Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Christmas Day
as regular holidays.
2. RA No. 9177 proclaimed the FIRST Day of Shawwal, the tenth month of the Islamic Calendar, a national
holiday for the observance of Eidul Fitr (the end of Ramadan).
3. RA No. 9849 declared the tenth day of Zhu/ Hijja, the twelfth month of the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday
for the observance of Eidul Adha.
4. PD No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, expressly allows a
Filipino Muslim to have more than 1 wife and exempts him from the crime of bigamy punishable under Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The same Code allows Muslims to have divorce.

Non-Establishment Clause
"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion," otherwise known as the non-establishment clause. The
non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. Its minimal sense is that the
state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.

No Appropriation of Public Money or Property for the Benefit of any Church

Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."

The basement remains to be for public use. It just so happens that mass is held there during lunch break. Whether
there is a mass or not, the lights will still be used.
VIII. Social Justice (Sec. 9, 10, 11, 18 and 21); Also: Art. XIII (Social Justice and
Human Rights)
#1 Calalang v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Williams, G.R.
FACTS:
No. 47800,
December 2, Maximo Calalang brought a petition for a writ of prohibition against the following respondents: Chairman of the
1940 National Traffic Commission (A.D. Williams), Director of Public Works (Vicente Fragante), Acting Secretary of Public
Works and Communications (Sergio Bayan), Mayor of the City of Manila (Eulogio Rodriguez), and the Acting Chief of
Topic Discussed: Police of Manila (Juan Dominguez).
Prohibiting animal-
drawn vehicles from It is alleged in the petition that the respondents have caused and enforced the prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles
passing along certain from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street (from 7:30am-
streets vis-à-vis social 12:30pm and from 1:30-5:30p.m.); and Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
justice Echague Street (from 7-11a.m.) for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge, to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Student Assigned:
Sta. Maria The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548, infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people

ISSUE: WON CA No 548 constitutes as an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right
to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion

RULING: No.

In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies
at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.

Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state.

Conclusion: In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner
#2 Association KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
of Small
- The 1935 Constitution mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of
Landowners v. all the people," especially the less privileged.
Secretary, G.R. - The 1973 affirmed the goal of the 1935 Constitution adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
No. 78742, July acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property
14, 1989 ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an
agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
Topic Discussed: -
CARL as
implementation of the FACTS:
agrarian reform The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
program under Sec. provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings
4, Art. XIII do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be
forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their
Student Assigned: own land. In short, they want to be exempted from the agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a
Tariao different class.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

RULING:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform
program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled
to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter.
In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights. On the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform
program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law
which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can
be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is
even so provided by RA 6657: “Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the
court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation”.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain.
The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos
in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
IX. Family, Women and Youth (Sec. 12, 13, 14); Also: Article XIII, Sec. 3 & 14 and
Article XV, Sec. 1-4
#1 Falcis v. Civil KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Registrar
FACTS:
General, G.R. No.
217910, · May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed a petition to "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family
September 3, Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code."
2019
· Falcis further argues that his Petition complied with the requisites of judicial review: (1) actual case or
Topic Discussed: controversy; (2) standing; (3) was raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) that the constitutional question is
Marriage under the the very lis mota of the case.
Constitution vs.
marriage as defined in · As to standing, he claims that his standing consisted in his personal stake in the outcome of the case, as
the Family Code he "is an open and self-identified homosexual" who alleges that the Family Code has a "normative impact" on
the status of same-sex relationships in the country. He was also allegedly injured by the supposed "prohibition
Student Assigned: against the right to marry the same-sex[,]" which prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines.
Tompong
· The constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code were the very lis mota of his case.

· According to Falcis, a facial challenge on Articles 1 and 2 is permitted as these two (2) provisions regulate
fundamental rights such as "the right to due process and equal protection, right to decisional and marital
privacy, and the right to found a family in accordance with religious convictions."

· Falcis claims that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny the existence of "individuals belonging to
religious denominations that believe in same-sex marriage" and that they have a "right to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions." He claims that the religious weddings conducted by these
denominations have been denied civil recognition "unlike the religious convictions of Catholics and Muslims."

· June 30, 2015, this Court ordered the Civil Registrar General to comment on the Petition.

· June 22, 2015, Fernando P. Perito (Perito) filed pro se an Answer-in-Intervention to the Petition. He claims
that the Petition failed to comply with several requirements of Rule 65, including: (1) the annexing of a
certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject of the case; (2) there being no act of any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; and (3) that the Petition had to be filed
within 60 days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, or resolution.

· Perito also claims that Falcis did not present any statistics or evidence showing discrimination against the
LGBTQI+ community and that Falcis did not show any specific injury, such as the denial of a marriage license
or refusal of a solemnizing officer to officiate a same-sex marriage.

· Perito further points out that Falcis is estopped from questioning the validity of the Family Code, it having
 been effective since 1987. He also extensively cites the Christian Bible as authority for defending Articles 1 and
2's limitation of marriage as between a man and a woman.

· The Civil Registrar General, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment (Ad Cautelam) on
March 29, 2016. It prays that this Court deny due course to or dismiss the Petition. It notes that the Petition
was not in the nature of a class suit, but was instead personal only to Falcis. Because of this, it claims that
Falcis failed to show injury-in-fact and an actual case or controversy, but was rather seeking an advisory
opinion that this Court cannot issue.

· The Civil Registrar General also faults Falcis for not impleading Congress, as his Petition actually
challenged the current legislative policy on same-sex marriage, and not any act committed by the Civil
Registrar-General. Finally, it claims that Falcis has not proven that the issues in this case are of such
transcendental importance, there being no law or facts contained in his Petition to determine any principles
concerning the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in the Philippines.

· April 7, 2016, LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church) ask this Court to allow them to intervene in
the proceedings, claiming similar petition that was filed by Falcis.

· March 28, 2017, this Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Petition-in-Intervention
and required the Civil Registrar General and Perito to comment on the Petition-in-Intervention.

· The Civil Registrar General claims that the issues raised in the Petition are political questions, saying that
marriage's legal definition is a policy issue for Congress to determine, and that any amendment to the
definition in Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code should be addressed to Congress.

· The Civil Registrar General filed its Supplemental Comment with Leave of Court on June 14, 2018.
Addressing the substantive issues of the Petition, it claims that since the Constitution only contemplates
opposite-sex marriage in Article XV, Section 2 and other related provisions, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code
are constitutional.

· the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and the Petition-in-Intervention are DISMISSED
ISSUE:

(1)W/N the petitioner has a locus standi.

(2)W/N the right to Marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the Right of life and Liberty.

RULING:
(1)NO, the petitioner has no locus standi.

Locus standi is the “right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” They must show a party’s personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. Interest in the case means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

In the case at bar, the petitioner has no actual facts that present a real conflict between the parties of the case, there is
no actual case or controversy. There is no legal standing to file his petition. Petitioner’s desire to find and enter into
long-term monogamous same-sex relationship and to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country
does not constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. The Court will not witlessly indulge
petitioner in blaming the FC for his admitted inability to find a partner. Hence, the petitioner has no legal standing.

(2)Yes. The right to Marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the Right of life and Liberty.

The task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn state recognition is better left to Congress.
Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal rules. Law
stands at its very core. Due to this inherent "legalness" of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be secured
simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself must create the
"thing" to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the
state to establish this legal framework. Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more
inclusive and egalitarian arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Prematurely adjudicating issues in a judicial
forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It may unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+ community's capacity
to create a strong movement that ensures lasting recognition, as well as public understanding, of SOGIESC.

Hence, the right to Marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the right of life and liberty.
#2 Manuel v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
People, G.R. No.
165842 FACTS:
November 29, ● In 1975, Manuel (petitioner) was legally married to Rubylus (first wife). Eventually, Rubylus
2005 was charged with Estafa and was imprisoned.
● In 1996, Manuel met Tina (complainant). Assuring Tina that he was single, Manuel then
Topic Discussed: proposed marriage to her –and they got married on the same year.
Duty of the state ● But in 2001, Manuel left, no longer returned, and even stopped giving financial support to
to protect and Tina (second wife).
strengthen the ● Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) where
family: judicial she learned that Manuel had been previously married.
declaration of ● Ultimately, Manuel was charged with Bigamy for contracting a second marriage without the
presumptive first marriage having been legally dissolved.
death as ● For his part, Manuel testified that he declared he was “single” in his marriage with Tina for
prerequisite to the reasons, among others, that:
remarriage of 1. He believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid because he had not
present spouse heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years; and
2. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his
Student Assigned: first marriage before marrying Tina.
Viarino
ISSUE:
Whether or not contracting a second marriage without a judicial declaration of presumptive death
as to the first marriage, violates the Constitutional provisions on the sanctity of family life and
marriage

RULING:
Yes, contracting a second marriage without a judicial declaration of presumptive death as to the
first marriage, violates the Constitutional provisions on the sanctity of family life and marriage

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution provides that the State shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. Moreover, Article 41 of the Family Code provides
that there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouses to enable
the present spouse to marry. In a jurisprudence, even assuming that the first marriage was
void, the parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution.

Here, Manuel did not go through the proper legal process of nullifying his marriage. He merely
assumed that his marriage with Rubylus was nullified because he had not heard from her for
almost 20 years. The prosecution proved that Manuel was married to Rubylus in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity –hence, the marriage was presumed to subsist.
Moreover, Manuel’s ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to
know the law. (Ignorantia legis neminem excusat) The burden of proof was on Manuel to prove
that when he married Tina in 1996, he was of well-grounded belief that his first wife was already
dead. A judicial declaration constitutes proof that Manuel acted in good faith, and would negate
criminal intent on his part when he married Tina –where in this particular case, he was not able to
provide.

Therefore, contracting a second marriage without a judicial declaration of presumptive death as to

the first marriage, violates the Constitutional provisions on the sanctity of family life and marriage.
#3 Garcia v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Drilon, G.R. No.
RA 9262 is AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR
179267, June 25,
PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER
2013 PURPOSES.
Topic Discussed:
R.A. 8369 Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
Duty of state to 42
protect and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with said law, the
strengthen the family Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family
vs. policy against Court in each of several key cities identified.
referring VAWC cases
for mediation

Student Assigned: FACTS:

Aguilar
The Factual Antecedents

The wife filed a civil case before the RTC (Bacolod City) for the issuance of a temporary protection order against her husband,
Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.

● The husband admitted that he had extramarital affairs. It spawned a series of fights that left private
respondents physically and emotionally wounded, thus the wife filed a TPO.
● Jesus continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed
new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte
● The trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five
(5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon
petitioner's manifestation,however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a
copy of said motion.
● After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility”
● During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an
 invalid law."
● The appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order 36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the
TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
● The appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the law (RA 9262) does violence to the policy of the
state to protect the family as a basic social institution?

RULING: No, the Court of Appeals did not err in not finding RA 9262 does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution.

The intent of Congress in enacting RA 9262.

● During the deliberations Senator Loi Estrada had originally proposed what she called "synthesized measure”
– an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women
in Intimate Relationships Act" – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at
the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse, nonetheless, it
was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure.
● There is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want
to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing
safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures
for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.
● Senator Estrada: This measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic
social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I
believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their
immediate family members, particularly children. While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to
include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various
NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in
this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone.

● more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The
 abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by
their fathers, even by their mothers.

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment.
The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in this case.

RA 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. A) unequal power relationship between men and women b) victims of
violence c) Gender bias and prejudices.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members,
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

WHY IT WAS DISMISSED?

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal. Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.

The petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality.

However, Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute under R.A.
8369.

Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue
at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic
because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been
sought.
#4 PT&T KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Company v.
FACTS:
NLRC, G.R. No.
118978, May 23,
1997 · Grace De Guzman that the motivation of PTand in terminating her services was her marriage during her
employment which is prohibited by company policies.
Topic Discussed:
Protection of women · She claims that there was discrimination. Under art 136 of article prohibits such
workers against illegal
employment policies · She stated that she was single on the day of her employment and she was unaware of the policy of the
company
Student Assigned:
Alferez · She was dismissed from the company despite her regular status

· NLRC ruled that the respondent’s dismissal from the company was unjust and unlawful.

· The decision was modified and reduced to suspension for 3 months in view of dishonest nature of
acts.

ISSUE:

· Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate an employee

Major Premise

· Under Article 136 of the Civil Code one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee.

RULING:
 · No, the respondent’s concealment on the true nature of her status cannot be characterized as bad faith
as she only wanted to have a stable job.

Application

· With the case at bar, the company has all the right to regulate employment from hiring to firing except
for those unlawful discrimination. De Guzman’s termination was an act of discrimination under article 136
since she only wanted to have a stable job.

Conclusion

· Therefore, the alleged concealment of status cannot be ground for termination of an employee
-#5 Imbong v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Ochoa, G.R. No.
FACTS:
204819, April 8,
2014 ISSUE:

Topic Discussed: RULING:

Protection of the lives
of the mother and the
unborn; CAVEAT:
statements in the
ponencia NOT
doctrinal, only the
personal opinion of J.
Mendoza

Student Assigned:
Amac
X. Rights to Health and to Healthful and Balanced Ecology (Sec. 15 and 16); Also:
#1 Imbong v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Ochoa, supra
Petitioners: James M. Imbong, et al- Citizens, taxpayers, and organizations assailing the RH Law for its
Topic Discussed: unconstitutionality
Sec. 15 self-executing OSG- Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. Executive Secretary- Proponents of the RH Law.
Petition: To declare provisions of Republic Act. No. 10354 as unconstitutional
Student Assigned:
Aniñon FACTS:

● The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables, and family products and supplies in the National
Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of
all national hospitals.
● Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer
is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They
point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued.
● Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold
increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischemic stroke, and an
indeterminate effect on the risk of myocardial infarction.
● The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being
a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits
that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptives pose a danger to the health of women.
● A component of the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution
provides:
● Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates:
a. Right to life
b. Right to Health
c. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
d. The Family
e. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
f. Due Process
g. Equal Protection
h. Involuntary Servitude
i. Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM
 j. Natural Law

RULING:

I. A. Right to Life- NO
1. Conception refers to the time of fertilization
2. Protection of the unborn upon said fertilization
3. Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those that kill a fertilized ovum)
4. It is intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to prevent the enacting of a law that legalizes
abortion.
4.1 RH law prohibits abortion
4.2 RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
4.3 RH law prohibits abortifacients
B. Right to Health- NO
The provision of Republic Act 4729 is still in place, the status quo on the sale of contraceptives is
maintained and the Court believes that there are adequate measures that ensure the public has access to
contraceptives that have been determined safe following testing, evaluation, and approval by the FDA.
C. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
● RH Law does not violate the guarantee of religious freedom via the state-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of the people including the petitioners. The state would
be adhering to one religion, making a de facto state religion that is contrary to religious freedom.
● RH Law does not violate the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition
for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding, and
infant nutrition.
● RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals,
and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their
conscientious objections.
D. The Family and the Right to Privacy- YES
● RH Law contains provisions that might destroy the family as a solid social institution. It deprives the
parents of their minor daughter if she is already a parent or she has sufferred a miscarriage.
● · It permits RH procedures even with just the consent of the spouse who is undergoing the procedures,
which intrudes into marital privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution and Sec 3 of Article XV.
● A minor who is a parent or who has had a miscarriage can have access to family planning services even
without consent of her parents or guardian. This is unconstitutional because parents are mandated by the
Constitution to have the natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and the Court finds that after a
miscarriage or when a minor becomes a parent is when the minor needs her parents/guardians the most
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION:

The Constitution, Article 2, Section 15 provides:

"The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them."

Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p) and (w) of the RH Law, the
petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex
lives.

Section 4(p)

(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely
the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and
processes. This implies that people are able to have a responsible, safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that they
have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to do so. This further implies that
women and men attain equal relationships in matters related to sexual relations and reproduction.

Section 4(w) (w) Sexual health refers to a state of physical, mental and social well-being in relation to sexuality. It
requires a positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships, as well as the possibility of having
pleasurable and safe sexual experiences, free from coercion, discrimination and violence.

Art. II - Declaration of Principles and State Policies

The case is relevant to Sections 5, 6, 12, and 15 of Art. II of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 5 - The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Sec. 6 - The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Sec. 12 - The State the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Sec. 15 - The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

These provisions are relevant because the petitioners anchored their petitions on the violations of the right to life,
religious freedom, the protection of the family, and the right to health. The alleged unconstitutionality of the RH Law
was based on the encroachment of these constitutional mandates.

CONCLUSION:

Petitions partially granted. RA 10354 is declared constitutional, and Status Quo ANte Order lifted with respect to
provisions of RA 10354 that have been declared as constitutional.

Provisions and their corresponding provisions in the RH-IRR have been declared unconstitutional:
● Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH
● Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
● Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
● Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
● Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
● Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
● Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
● Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR

Therefore, the Court does not find the RH Law to be unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable and quality reproductive health services, methods, devices
and supplies. The Court also maintains that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior
existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures.
#2 Oposa v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Factoran, G.R.
FACTS:
No. 101083, July This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
30, 1993 associate with the twin concepts of intergenerational responsibility and intergenerational justice. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
Topic Discussed: 1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country.
Sec. 16 self-executing 2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or appraising new TLAs.

Student Assigned: In granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that they have a clear
Arcenal and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest constitutes a misappropriation and impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for
the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforest?

RULING:
Yes, Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well as the generation to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue

#3 Resident KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Marine Mammals
Note:
v. Secretary
Reyes, G.R. No. The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 seeks to enjoin implementation and to nullify SC-46. Petitioners are the
180771, April 21, Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, e.g., toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises,
2015 and other cetacean species represented by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (a.k.a the
Stewards).
Topic Discussed:
Citing Oposa as basis Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the
for the SC’s Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region
permissive position VII in connection with SC-46. Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center
on the issue of locus (FIDEC), Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal
standi in capacities and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
environmental cases Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Student Assigned: Overview: This is a novel case recently decided by the Supreme Court where a suit was filed by resident marine
Aribas mammals, like whales, dolphins, etc. in order to prevent the exploration, development and exploitation of petroleum
resources within Tanon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. One of
the basic questions is whether they have the capacity to sue or otherwise known in constitutional law as locus standi.

Stewards – are natural persons who are considered as the legal guardians and friends of the animals

J. Leonen: The present generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at
a different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will
inevitably result in preventing future generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests
and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we
again restricted their ability to make their own arguments.

It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a)
there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing
legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or
those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of
catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and
risks, we abandon the precedent all together.

It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should
be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-
interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental
cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the
outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's
paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and
facilitating court access in environmental cases.

In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Furthermore,
we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to
possess the legal standing to file this petition

FACTS:

This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) entered into an agreement for the
exploration, development and production of petroleum resources at the offshore of Tanon Strait.

The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, “claimed” that they have the legal standing to file this action
since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also
asserted their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in
their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they propounded that they have the right to demand that they be
accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the Philippine Government had
signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.

The Stewards contended that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals
as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of
Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to
protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine. They also contended that the Court may lower the
benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. Public respondents argued that the Resident
Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be
either natural or juridical persons.

They also contested the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural persons,
albeit some of them were still unborn. As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenged their
claim of legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
Moreover, the public respondents argued that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to
show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case. Since the petition was not brought in the
name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners have Locus Standi to file the instant petition.

RULING:

Yes, petitioners in GR No 180771 have legal standing.

The Supreme Court held that inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a
fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable
adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a “person” for purposes of the adjudicatory
processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes

The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects
standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997
Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-ininterest, even if filed by a
representative, viz.:

In Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow “Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws.” This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and
collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature

The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions
before courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law. In Oposa, the Court
allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
Furthermore, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in
our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment.
In light of the foregoing, Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows a "citizen suit,"
and permits any Filipino citizen to file an action for violations of our environmental laws on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature. The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce
our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition
and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and EismaOsorio,
having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
#4 Taguiwalo v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Duque, G.R. No.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to do an act required
252556, to be done, as when he/she/it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
September 1, duty, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
2020
Executive Order No. 2, s. 2016- Right to Information
Topic Discussed: SECTION 3. Access to information. Every Filipino shall have access to information, official records, public records and
Rights to Health and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as to government research data
to Healthful and used as basis for policy development.
Balanced

Student Assigned: FACTS:

Aton
-Petitioners lament the delayed government response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of a comprehensive public
health approach which required severe restrictions on liberty, giving rise to human rights violations, and the absence of
a proactive plan or effort to increase testing capacity.

-Petitioners argue that they are entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, asserting their right to health. (Basis:
lmbong v. Ochoa, held to be self-executing constitutional provision)

ISSUE:

1. WON petitioners are entitled to a writ of mandamus

2. WON petitioners right to information is violated

xxx

[of the [petition]

( 1) Whether the Constitution and the laws mandate the government to implement a proactive find, test, treat, and
isolate strategy
(2) Whether the government's refusal to conduct mass testing, efficient treatment or isolation violates the Constitution
and the laws
(3) Whether the government's refusal to provide timely, accurate, and complete information on the pandemic violates
their right to information
RULING:

Mandamus will not lie to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way

Petitioners utterly failed to show that they are entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is not
available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. It can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act, which is sought to be compelled, is clear and complete.
Where administrative remedies are available, mandamus does not apply.

Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies

There is no showing in their Petition that they have exhausted administrative remedies. Their claim that the questions
raised are purely legal is also not well-taken because the issue on whether the government's alleged refusal to conduct
mass testing, efficient treatment or isolation violates the Constitution and the laws necessarily involves a factual
determination.

A plain and speedy remedy exists

Petitioners may likewise avail of the plain and speedy remedy of requesting for particular information under Executive
Order No. 2, s. 2016 which operationalizes the people's right to information and implements the Constitutional policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest, subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
in the Executive Branch. Hence, while the Court may direct the release of information when there is ministerial duty to
do so, mandamus will not lie to compel the Executive Branch to provide such information in a certain manner.

The Petition is DISMISSED for failure of petitioners to show that they are entitled to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus
XII. Sec. 19: National Economy; Read also Art. XII (National Economy and Patrimony)
#1 Manila Prince KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Hotel v. GSIS, As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources
supra
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
Topic Discussed: Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental
National patrimony ability or faculty of our people.

Student Assigned: FACTS:

Ceniza - The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51%
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.

- Petitioner’s Arguments
- invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos
who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the
full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony
- argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business
of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term
national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
- Also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid
offer of the Malaysian firm.

- Respondent’s Arguments
- Argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
 policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the
said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may
be done."
- granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in
its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution.
- granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is
still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC
cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.

ISSUE:
- WON Manila Prince Hotel is part of our National Patrimony

RULING:
- Yes. We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as
the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
- Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House
of the Philippine Government. It plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality.
- For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony.
#2 Ichong v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Hernandez, G.R. Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business
No. L-7995, May SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any
31, 1957 person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
Topic Discussed:
Retail Trade
FACTS:
Nationalization Law PETITIONER-(LOST)- CHALLENGED THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 1180. Petitioner filed and brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, Petitioner attacks the
Student Assigned: constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
Cruz
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not
expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or
entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
RESPONDENTS (WIN)- the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the
title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the
form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of
statutory origin.
ISSUE: 1. WON THE RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law.
2. WON the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
3. WON the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines
4. WON the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage
in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution

RULE:
POLICE POWER- it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State;
what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause
and the equal protection clause. Limitations on police power-These constitutional guarantees which embody
the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are
admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
The, equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either
in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. The due process clause- has to
do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Legislative discretion
not subject to judicial review
ANALYSIS:
[Link] protection of the laws - There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
2. No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.
3. The treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never
curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
4. A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already
engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the
right to continue is accorded associations of aliens
CONCLUSION.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and
future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the
law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere;
that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not
misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and
the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less
harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the
liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely
to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of
due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law
should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction
#3 Espina v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Zamora, G.R. No.
FACTS:
143855, This case is about the determination of the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which has
September 21, been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of a self-reliant and independent national
2010 economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Topic Discussed: President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization
Retail Trade Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail
Liberalization Law trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories:

Student Assigned: Category A

Dacuyan Less than US$2,500,000.00
Exclusively for Filipino citizens and corporations wholly owned by Filipino citizens
Category B
US$2,500,000.00 up but less than US$7,500,000.00
For the first two years of R.A. 8762’s effectivity, foreign ownership is allowed up to 60%. After the two-year period,
100% foreign equity shall be allowed.
Category C
US$7,500,000.00 or more
Maybe wholly owned by foreigners. Foreign investments for establishing a store in Categories B and C shall not be
less than the equivalent in Philippine Pesos of US$830,000.00.
Category D
US$250,000.00 per store of foreign enterprises specializing in high-end or luxury products
Maybe wholly owned by foreigners.

Petitioner's Argument:
-Assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
● First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to
place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities,
promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and
trade policies.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
xxxx
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
xxxx
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
● Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together
with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the
economy.
● Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors,
destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.
● Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the
government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
● Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint
of trade.

Respondent's Argument
● First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition.
● Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
● Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could
not specify how the new law violates the constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II
of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
● Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs
Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA
and when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of Congress whether or
not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners
into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. R.A. 8762 is not unconstitutional.
The Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.

The court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of
principles, and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a
cause of action in the courts.

In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos
certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact
laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police power. The State had an
interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is
not arbitrary.

Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving
them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such a policy.
#4 Tañada v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Angara, GR No.
FACTS:
118295, May 2,
1997
● This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the World Trade
Topic Discussed:
Trade liberalization/
Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of
globalization Ratification and the Senate concurring in the said treaty.
● Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to
Student Assigned: discuss the global economy. This led to the establishment of three great institutions:
Dizon International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International
Monetary Fund and International Trade Organization.
● However, the ITO failed to materialize. Instead, there was the General Agreement on
Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then
established.
● The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of
tariff and barriers.
● Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the
1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to
promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods.”
● It is the petitioners' position that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the
WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of
the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled
by Filipinos.”

ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

RULING:
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy
that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained
by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean
autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international
community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national
economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources
and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
“equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries
that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect
and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in
themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive
in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So
too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is
balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross”
arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is
not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree
with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate
Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our
own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization
and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their
policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be
the political desire of a member.
#5 Tatad v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Executive
FACTS:
Secretary, G.R.
No. 124360, ● This is a petition against Republic Act No. 8180 entitled, “An Act Deregulating the Downstream
November 5, Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.”
1997
● Petitioners contend that the provisions of Section 5, 6 and 9 are contrary to Section 9 Article XII of
Topic Discussed: the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are as follow:
Oil deregulation

Student Assigned: ● (1) Section 5 (b) – “Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this
Ganzan Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%)
and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG,
the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided that beginning on
January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the
same. Provided, further, that this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.
● (2) Section 6 which states — "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and
products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply,
whichever is lower," and
● (3) Section 9 (b) which states — "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in
the downstream oil industry, the following acts shall be prohibited:

● They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable”, decline of crude oil prices in the word
market” and stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and in
concrete since they do not provide determinable standards that can guide the President in his
decision to fully deregulated the downstream oil industry.

● Petitioners also assailed the President’s EO No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation of the
the downstream oil industry in February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied RA No
8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF (Oil Price Stabilization Fund) fund as a factor in
the implementation of full deregulation.
● Section 15 of RA 8180 and EO No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among the three
existing companies- Petron, Caltex and Shell- in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not RA No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade and unfair competition (Section 1, Article XII Constitution).
II. Whether or not Section 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.

RULING:

I. Yes, RA No. 8180 violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations
restraint of trade and unfair competition.
II. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power.
The power of congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION:

It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly.
Petron, Shell, Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new
players. They easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA No 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as ". . . selling or offering to sell any
product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of
competitors." Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new
entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers
imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory
pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of
new players.

The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the
future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon
as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market
contains significant barriers to new entry.
CONCLUSION:

In the end, petitioners are not devoid of a remedy. To paraphrase the words of Justice Padilla in Kapatiran ng
mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v. Tan,if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and
continued application of Republic Act No. 8180 are prejudicial to the general welfare or the interests of the
majority of the people, they should seek recourse and relief from the political branches of government, as they
are now doing by moving for an amendment of the assailed provisions in the correct forum which is Congress or
for the exercise of the people's power of initiative on legislation. The Court, following the time honored doctrine of
separation of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Congress as to the wisdom, justice and
advisability of Republic Act No. 8180.
#6 Garcia v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Corona, G.R. No.
FACTS:
132451,
December 17, After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the Philippines,the government decided in March
1999 1996 to pursue a policy of deregulation by enacting RepublicAct No. 8180 (R.A. No. 8180)or the “Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996.”
Topic Discussed: Oil
Deregulation R.A 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the
opposite result.
Student Assigned:
Congress responded to the decision by enacting on a new oil deregulation law, R.A. No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the
Gloria
offensive provisions found in the invalidated law.

Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price control at a time when the market is still
dominated and controlled by an oligopoly would be contrary to public interest, as it would only provide an opportunity for the Big 3
(Shell, Caltex, Petron) to engage in price-fixing and overpricing. He stated that Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 is “glaringly pro-
oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-people,” and thus asked the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.

Garcia’s plea for nullity was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is susceptible of Judicial Determination.

RULING:
The court dismissed the petition.

It was declared that the issues petitioner Garcia presented to the Court are non-justiciable matters that preclude the Court from
exercising its power of judicial review. The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a
policy determination by Congress which the Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation
of powers.

For a court to exercise this power, certain requirements must first be met, namely:

(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

The petition fails to satisfy the very first of these requirements. An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.

It is not the mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review; more
importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination.

The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be effective. In this regard, what
constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determination. Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant
conditions, political, social and economic. They are not within the appropriate range of evidence in a court of justice. It would be an
extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis for the determination.
XIII. Indigenous Cultural Communities (Sec. 22)
#1 Cruz v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Secretary, G.R.
Constitutional of IPRA
No. 135385,
December 6, Indigenous Cultures Communities: SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
2000 indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.

Topic Discussed: FACTS:

Constitutionality of the
IPRA The constitutionality of RA 8371, otherwise known as the indeginous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 and its
implementing rules and regulations.
Student Assigned:
Lanzaderas ● Petitioners in this case brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of IPRA -
on the ground that they amount to unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over the lands of public
domain, in violation of the regalian Doctrine, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
● Comments:
○ Solicitor General: partly unconstitutional by granting ownership over natural resources to indegenous
people
○ Commission on Human Rights: IPRA is an expression of the principle of Parens Patriae and that the
state has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage.

ISSUE:

RULING:

-#2 Ha Datu KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Tawahig v.
FACTS:
Lapinid, G.R. No.
221139, March ISSUE:
20, 2019
RULING:
Topic Discussed:
Indigenous Cultural
Communities
Student Assigned:
Lim
#3 Datu Malingin KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
v. PO3 Datu Malingin v. PO3 Sandagan
Sandagan, G.R. G.R. No. 240056
No. 240056, October 12, 2020
October 12, 2020 Ponente: INTING, J.

Topic Discussed: TOPIC: Indigenous Cultural Communities

Indigenous Cultural
Communities
1987 Constitution:
Student Assigned: SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
Lungay within the framework of national unity and development.
RA 8371:
SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. — When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,
customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no
such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided
under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

FACTS:

- This resolves the Petition for Mandamus with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioner
praying that the Court:
(a) declares Branch 10, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Abuyog, Leyte to be without jurisdiction to settle
disputes involving Indigenous Peoples (IP);
(b) orders respondent Prosecutor to refrain from prosecuting cases involving IPs; and
(c) declares respondents guilty of Arbitrary Detention
Mandamus - a judicial writ issued as a command to an inferior court or ordering a person to
perform a public or statutory duty.

- Through the criminal Informations issued by respondent Prosecutor, petitioner was accused of having
carnal knowledge of a 14-year-old minor, on six occasions by force, threat, intimidation and by taking
advantage of superior strength.

- Consequently, six Criminal Cases were filed against the petitioner for rape.

Petitioner’s Actions and Arguments (LOST - Lemuel Talingting y Simborio, aka Datu Malingin)

- Filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He averred that he was a member of the
Higaonon-Sugbuanon Tribe, an indigenous group.
- Claimed that the criminal cases filed against him should be resolved first through the customary law and
practices of the indigenous group he belonged to and thereafter, the issues must be referred to the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). (pursuant to Sections 65 and 66 of RA 8371)
- Argued that respondent Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to observe the
rights of members of an indigenous group. He claimed that the IPs are not included in the persons subject
of the country's penal laws because they have the right to use customary laws and practices to resolve
disputes.
- Posited that respondent Police Officers committed Arbitrary Detention because they detained him
without warrant on June 3, 2017.

Respondents’ Actions and Arguments (WON - PO3 SANDAGAN, et al)

- Respondent Judge issued a Joint Order denying the Motion to Quash for lack of merit. He specified that
RA 8371 covered only disputes concerning customary law and practices of Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) and did not extend to those recognized by regular courts such as violations of RA
83539 and the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
- Respondent Judge countered that the petition for mandamus should be denied outright and stressed that
mandamus is the applicable remedy when the complained act involved a ministerial duty. He asserted
that he is exercising judicial, not mere ministerial function, and the issue of lack of jurisdiction is a
matter proper subject of a certiorari petition, not a petition for mandamus.
- Respondent Judge contended that the petitioner cannot rely on RA 8371 because he is not exempt from
criminal prosecution under the RPC; that following the principle of generality, penal laws are binding to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines; that rape cases are excluded in the claims
or disputes involving the rights of petitioner as a supposed member of ICCs or IPs; and that to subscribe
 to the submissions of petitioner that he is exempt from criminal prosecution by a regular court is to
surrender police power and grant him criminal immunity which he is not entitled under the law.
- Respondents Prosecutor and Police Officers manifested that they adopt the Comment filed by
respondent Judge and prayed that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner can invoke his membership from Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous
People as a bar for his criminal prosecution.

RULING:

No, the petitioner cannot invoke his membership from Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous
People as a bar for his criminal prosecution.

Under the principle of generality, penal laws are binding to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines; There must be legal harmony between the national laws and customary laws and practices in
order for the latter to be viable and valid and must not undermine the application of legislative enactments,
including penal laws.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's indictment for Rape has nothing to do with his purported membership in an
ICC, but by reason of his alleged acts that is covered by the RPC. At the same time, Section 22 Article 2 of
the Constitution, and RA 8371 does not serve as a bar for criminal prosecution because crime is an offense
against the society.

Thus, the petitioner cannot invoke his membership from Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous
People as a bar for his criminal prosecution.
XV. Local Autonomy (Sec. 25); Also Art. X (Local Government) & R.A. 7160 (the Local
Government Code)
-#1 Belgica v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Executive
FACTS:
Secretary, G.R.
No. 208566, ISSUE:
November 19,
2013 RULING:

Topic Discussed:
Local autonomy and
the pork barrel
system

Student Assigned:
Mahilum
XVI. Opportunities for Public Service; Prohibition against Political Dynasties (Sec.
26)
#1 Belgica v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Executive
FACTS:
Secretary, supra
Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Topic Discussed:
Political dynasties Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
and the pork barrel annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
system provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void
Student Assigned: for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
Manaig against respondents

ISSUE:

[Link] or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on political dynasties.

[Link] or not Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds and Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993 relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

RULING:

1. No. But the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. One of the petitioners submits that
the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to
accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due
to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and
of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for
legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on
this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since
it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate
political dynasties.

2. Yes,It is unconstitutional. Petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an

undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be used." Respondents, on the other hand, urged
the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe
the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to
refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government. There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that
the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is
called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other
hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law
lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
#2 Pamatong v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, G.R.
FACTS:
161872, April 13,
2004 This case is about the filing of certificates for candidacy for presidency as to the case of the petitioner and
other national offices. COMELEC refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in its
Topic Discussed:
Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004 and declared that petitioner and thirty-five (35) others are
Opportunities for
Public Service; nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political
Prohibition against party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioners
Political Dynasties Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include the petitioner as they believed he had
parties or movements to back up his candidacy, hence the decision was not unanimous.
Student Assigned:
Manguilimotan On January 15, 2004 petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation
of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the
COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power
of the sovereign people to choose their leaders.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the petitioner’s right to equal access to opportunities for public service
under Section 26, Article II of 1987 has been violated.

2. Whether or not a candidate is a nuisance candidate.

RULING:uling on issue # 1.

No, there is no violation of the petitioner’s right because equal access to opportunities for public
service under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 is not a right but privilege.

Article 2 section 26 of the 1987 constitution states that the state shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. The
"equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies."

In this case, the petitioner invoked article 2 section 26 "equal access to opportunities for public
office" – as a constitutional right to run for or hold public office. The court said, there is none. What
is recognized is merely a privilege not a right subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26,
Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a
thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. Most of the policies enumerated in Article II, does not
contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative
or executive action because the provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision.

Therefore, there is no violation of right because equal access to opportunities for public service
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 is not a right but privilege.

Additional information on issue # 1:

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002
outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Ruling on the issue # 2.

To answer this involves both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before the
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. What is at stake is the
petitioner's aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a
hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.

In this case, there is no finality in terms of whether or not the candidate is a nuisance hence, it is remanded
to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly
Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to the
Court with deliberate dispatch.

Therefore, a question whether or not a candidate is a nuisance candidate is still under the probation of the
Comelec.
XVIII. Policy of Full Disclosure (Sec. 28); Also: Art. III, Sec. 7 (right to information)
#1 Province of KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
North Cotabato
FACTS:
v. GRP Peace On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Panel, supra (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP -
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Topic Discussed:
Policy of Full Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
Disclosure disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
Student Assigned: unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Monsanto

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3
Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

RULING:

Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.

In this case, the contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and
for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

Thus, The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).