Chapter 10

• Mandated topic: Global Demography

References:
 Lee, Ronald. 2003. “The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 17(4):167–190.
 [Link]
 [Link]
 [Link]

Intended Learning Outcomes

Within the orientation, the students are expected to:
 Explain how globalization affects religious practices and beliefs (CLOs 2,3);

 Analyze the relationship between religion and global conflict and, conversely, global peace
(CLO 2,3);

Lesson Preparation/ Review/Preview

Observe the given picture.

 What did you notice?

 Which side presents larger community?
 Why more people tend to live in a crowded place that's very crowded?
 How are we going to identify its human population?
Source: [Link]

Find and mark  the countries with the most people:

China Brazil
India Nigeria
United Bangladesh
States
Indonesia Russia
Pakistan Mexico
Concept Notes Presentation

Global Demography
Introduction

The demographic transition theory is a widespread description of the changing pattern of

mortality, fertility and growth rates as societies move from one demographic regime to another.
The term was first instituted by the American demographer Frank W. Notestein during the
twentieth century. To determine the demographic transition is highly important in a fast-growing
population. People are sharing fixed resources that alarm the future generation. What else may
the globe offer? What are the ramifications of a change in globalization? Our history may not
provide a well-functioning, satisfying answer to these delicate questions. Somehow, the
modification of the history of a population can help not to repeat itself.

Before the Demographic Transition

In the pre-industrial, there was a slow growth of population due to wages, causing fertility to fall
and mortality to rise due to famine, war, or disease, therefore population size in equilibrium with
the slowly growing economy, Thomas Malthus (1798). Before 1800 In Western Europe centuries,
marriage required the resources to establish and maintain a separate household, so age at first
marriage for women was late, averaging around 25 years, and a substantial share of women
never married (Flinn, 1981, p. 84; Livi-Bacci, 2000, pp. 99 –107). Its total fertility rate was
moderate for a married woman at 4 to 5 births (Livi-Bacci, 2000, p. 136). The life expectancy at
birth was moderately between 25 and 35 (Flinn, 1981, pp. 92–101; Livi-Bacci, 2000, pp. 61–90),
infancy and childhood mortality is influencing. Early 1700, Western Europe population growth
rates were 0.3 percent/year population growth rates and rises above 1 percent in 1900. China
may have been closer to the European experience (Lee and Feng, 1999). In Canada and the
United States population grew because of much earlier marriage due to landmass but decelerated
in 1900. In India, life expectancy is in the low twenties, while fertility was six or seven
births/woman (Bhat, 1989), similarly in Taiwan around 1900.

Although pretransitional fertility was typically high in third-world countries because of fertility
levels were far below the biological upper limit for a population (as opposed to an individual),
which is around 15 to 17 births per woman (Bongaarts, 1978). The contraceptive effects of
prolonged breastfeeding, often combined with taboos on sex while breastfeeding, led to long
birth intervals and reduced fertility. Abortion and sometimes the practice of coitus interruptus
also minimize birth rate.

Its population growth declined in the 14th and 17th centuries, and more rapid growth in the 15th
and 18th centuries. While exchanges of disease through exploration and trade may have played
some role, global climatic change was probably the main driving force (Galloway, 1986).

Mortality Declines

In Northwest Europe, mortality began to decline in 1800. Before the Second World War, mortality
rates decreased and rose again after it. The first stage of mortality declines due to reductions in
contagious and infectious diseases. In Europe, smallpox vaccine developed in the late 18th
century, health preventive measures of 1900, and increases in income led to improved nutrition
and hygiene that decreases its mortality rates. Famine mortality stagnated by the development
of the storage and transportation of regional and international food markets. Likewise, reductions
in chronic and degenerative diseases, like heart disease and cancer reduces mortality (Riley
2001).

The high – income countries generally accomplished a mortality decrease. They freely composed
and supported biomedical examination, human genome task, and undifferentiated cell research
for future additions.

Some low-income countries' mortality progress was accomplished at some point in the 20th
century. The future in India rose from 24 out of 1920 to 62 years today, and increase .48 years
for every schedule year more than 80 years, in China rose from 41 out of 1950–1955 to 70 out
of 1995–1999, an addition of .65 years out of each year more than 45 years.

On the optimistic side, Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) offer a remarkable graph that plots the highest
national female life expectancy attained for each calendar year from 1840 to 2000. The points
fall close to a straight line, starting at 45 years in Sweden and ending at 85 years in Japan. If we
boldly extend forward in time, it reaches 97.5 years by mid-century, and by the end of the 21st
century decreases 90 years of average life expectancy (Lee and Carter, 1992; Tuljapurkar, Li and
Boe, 2000).

Oddly, some of the most pessimistic estimates of the future improvement in life expectancy come
from official government projections. Social Security Administration project life expectancy of 83
years for 2080 (sexes combined). However, past projections by official government agencies of
longevity gains have been systematically too low relative to actual outcomes (Keilman, 1997;
National Research Council, 2000).

According to the recent economic development status of the United Nations Classification, the
More Developed Countries, with 1.2 billion people, including all of Europe, North America, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand. The Least Developed Countries, with 0.7 billion, include most of sub-
Saharan Africa, plus Bangladesh, Cambodia, and a few other countries. All other countries are
Less Developed, including India, China, and the bulk of the world’s population—4.2 billion people.
One can question the relevance of using membership-based on recent experience to categorize
groups of countries in earlier periods or far in the future.

Figure 1, UN projected the life expectancy since 1950 to 2050 to the Least Developed Countries,
life expectancy rises from 35.7 years in 1950–1954 to 48.7 years in 1995–1999; Less Developed
Countries, increases from 41.8 to 65.4 years; and More Developed Countries, the increase has
been from 66.1 to 74.8.

It also shows stagnation in mortality gain in the Least Developed Countries in the 1990s in sub-
Saharan Africa due to HIV/AIDS (highest number of deaths). More than 60 million people were
infected by HIV/AIDS worldwide, but only 40 million are still alive. More than two-thirds of children
aged 15 years acquired with HIV/AIDS before they reach 50 years of age (United Nations, 2002),
and the other 35 countries in Africa are infected. On the other hand, life expectancy over the past
two or three decades declined in Soviet Union due to the difficulties of the transition to market
economies.
Figure 1 Fertility Transition
Past and Projected Life Expectancy at Birth,
by Major Development Groups, 1950–2050
Between 1890 and 1920, marital
fertility began to decline in most
European provinces, with a median
decline of about 40 percent from
1870 to 1930 (Coale and Treadway,
1986, p. 44). Although most couple
wishes to raise their children, the
mortality and fertility interact in
complicated ways. For example,
increased survival raises the return
on postbirth investments in children
(Meltzer, 1992). Some of the
Sources: Historical and Middle Series forecasts are taken from United Nations improvement in child survival is
(2003). Record life expectancy trend is taken from Oeppen and Vaupel (2002).
itself a response to parental
decisions to invest more in the health and welfare of a smaller number of children (Nerlove,
1974). This economic change
Figure 2 influences the costs and benefits of
Past and Projected Total Fertility Rate by Major childbearing. Relative to good
Development Groups, 1950–2050 1950 1960 consumption, childbearing is
expensive. For an example of this,
the physical capital may substitute
for human strength, reducing or
eliminating the productivity
differential between male and
female labor, and thus raising the
opportunity cost of children (Galor
and Weil, 1996), especially on
education. Furthermore, parents
with higher incomes choose to
devote more resources to each child,
and since this raises the cost of each
Source: Historical and Middle Series forecasts are taken from United Nations
(2003).
child resulting to fewer children
(Becker, 1981; Willis, 1974, 1994).

In Europe, contraceptive technologies is less important due to coitus interruptus, and extends
from interpretation from the past to prescription to current policy (Pritchett, 1994; Gertler and
Molyneaux, 1994; Schultz, 1994).

Figure 2, the United Nations extended the improvement status on fertility for nations from 1950
to 2050. The times of increased birth rates and busts after World War II in More Developed
Countries, the second fertility transition fell far beneath in numerous industrialized countries. In
contrast to South Asia and Latin America, richness in East Asia has been early and quick.
Practically all the industrialized nations and other nations like Taiwan, South Korea, and China,
the all-out richness rate diminishes. When fertility declines, it declines most at the youngest and
oldest ages and becomes concentrated in the 20s and early 30s. Birth rates above age 35 are
only one-seventh as high in the More Developed Countries as in the Least Developed Countries
and only one-fifth as high below age 20. The rising age of childbearing itself depresses the total
fertility rate, which is a synthetic cohort measure, below the underlying completed fertilities of
generation s. When the average age of childbearing stops rising, as it must sooner or later, the
total fertility rate should increase to this underlying level of 1 to 0.

The U.N. fertility projections in Figure 2 show a continuing slow transition in sub-Saharan Africa
and the other Least Developed Countries, while fertility decline for the Less Developed Countries
decelerates as it approaches replacement level. These projections are plausible, but fertility has
proven very difficult to forecast in the past. But these theories point to no natural lower bound
for fertility. Nor do they provide a mechanism for fertility to respond to economic signals in such
a way that population would equilibrate, as I have argued it did in the preindustrial past.

Population Growth

The combination of fertility and mortality determines population growth, as shown in Figure
3. The horizontal axis of the figure shows life expectancy at birth. The vertical axis shows the
total fertility rate.

An actual and projected trajectories for the More, Less and Least Developed Countries are plotted
between1950 and 2050. first trajectory for Europe from 1800 to 1950 when the endpoint is quite
close to the start point for the more developed countries; and followed India from 1896 to 1970,
illustrating the earlier stages of the demographic transition that are missing for the Less and Least
Developed Countries before 1950.1950.

India had higher initial fertility and mortality than Europe, as did the Least Developed Countries
relative to the Less Developed Countries in 1950, which in turn had far higher mortality and
fertility than the More Developed Countries in that year. Except for India, the starting points all
indicate moderate to rapid population growth. All three groups are projected to approach the
zero-growth contour by 2050, the More Developed Countries from below and the Less and Least
Developed Countries from above.

The starting points of these demographic paths differ somewhat. India had higher initial fertility
and mortality than Europe, as did the Least Developed Countries relative to the Less Developed
Countries in 1950, which in turn had far higher mortality and fertility than the More Developed
Countries in that year. Except for India, the starting points all indicate moderate to rapid
population growth. But in all cases, the initial path is horizontal to the rightmost strikingly for
India—indicating that mortality decline preceded fertility decline, causing accelerating population
growth approaching 3 percent for the Less and Least Developed Countries. After fertility begins
to decline, the trajectories slope diagonally down toward the right, recrossing contours toward
lower rates of population growth. Europe briefly attains 1.5 percent population growth, but then
fertility plunges, a decline picked up after 1950 by the group, ending with population decline at
1 percent annually. However, the actual European population growth rate is very near zero:
slightly higher than the hypothetical steady-state growth rate due to changes in the age
distribution and in immigration. All three groups are projected to approach the zero-growth
contour by 2050, the More Developed Countries from below and the Less and Least Developed
Countries from above.
Figure 3
This convergence of fertility and
Life Expectancy and Total Fertility Rate with Population
Growth Isoquants: Past and Projected Trajectories for mortality is in marked contrast to
More, Less and Least Developed Countries per capita GDP, which has tended
to diverge between high-income
and low-income countries during
this time.

Over a span period, the population

growth rates were graph in Figure 4.
Population growth rates in the More
Developed Countries, including
Least Developed Countries, rose
about a half percent above those in
the Less Developed Countries before
1950. But after World War II,
population growth surged in the Less
Developed Countries in the mid-
Sources: Historical and Middle Series forecasts for Least, Less and More
Developed Countries are taken from the United Nations (2003). Data for India 1960s, then dropped
are taken from Bhat (1989) for the period 1891–1901 to 1941–1951, and from instantaneously. The global
the United Nations (2003) for the period 1950–1970. Data for Europe are based
on Tables 6.2–6.5 in Livi-Bacci (2000) for the period 1800–1900 and Mitchell
population share of the More
(1975) for the period 1900–1950. For the period 1800–1900, European total Developed Countries ends to subside
fertility rate and e(0) are derived as a population-weighted average of country-
specific data. Where unavailable, these data are estimated based on
from its current 20 percent to only
regression using the crude birth rate and death rates to predict total fertility rate 14 percent in 2050. U.N. projections
and e(0), respectively, for other European countries in this period. For the suggest that global population
period 1900–1950, a single series of crude birth rates and death rates for all
Europe are assembled. A regression based on data from 1900 to 1950 is used growth will be close to zero by about
to predict total fertility rate and e(0) based on the crude birth rate and death 2100.
rate, respectively. The growth isoquants are derived from Coale and Demeny
(1983) using the Model West Female life table when the mean age of
childbearing is 29. There has been rapid global
convergence in fertility and mortality
among nations over the past 50 years, although important differences remain. This convergence
of fertility and mortality is in marked
Figure 4 contrast to per capita GDP, which
Population Growth Rates, 1750–2150 has tended to diverge between
high-income and low-income
countries during this time.

Actual trends in population growth

rates can be seen over a longer time
period in Figure 4. Population
growth rates in the More Developed
Countries rose about a half percent
above those in the Less Developed
Countries in the century before
1950. The global population share
Source: The population growth rates are calculated as instantaneous (exp(rt))
rates based on population data. The data for 1750–1950 are taken from Tables
of the More Developed Countries is
1 and 2 of United Nations (1999) and for 1950–2150 are taken from United projected to drop from its current 20
Nations (2000). percent to only 14 percent in 2050.
 Figure 5
Population by Major Development Groups, 1950–2050, with
High and Low Scenario Forecasts for Total World Population Global population growth will be
close to zero by 2100 according
to UN long-term projection.

The National Research Council

(2000, p. 213), in light of a
cautious examination of past
gauging mistakes by the United
Nations and the U.S. Census
Bureau, inferred that there is a
95 percent likelihood that the
real populace in 2050 will fall
Source: Historical and Middle Series forecasts are taken from United Nations somewhere in the range of 8.2
(2003), as are High and Low scenarios.
and 10.2 billion. An equivalent
examination is impossible for
the 2100 conjectures, however, the United Nations' high-low range reaches out over an extremely
wide span from 5.2 to 16.2 billion. This incredible vulnerability must be remembered while thinking
about all the projections of fertility, mortality, and population size for the twenty-first century.

The projection for the More Developed Countries populace is about level, with populace decline in
Europe and Japan balance by populace increment in the United States and different territories.
Most of the projected population increase takes place in the Less Developed Countries, which gain
1.8 billion, or 43 percent. However, the greatest proportional gain comes in the Least Developed
Countries with their higher fertility and more rapid growth. These countries gain 1 billion in
population or 151 percent. The population growth of More DC, Less DC and Least DC will change
for the next 50 years.

Shifts in Age Distribution: The Last Stage of the Demographic Transition

The examples of progress in fertility, mortality and growth rates over the demo-realistic change
are broadly known and perceived. Less surely knew are the methodical changes in age
dissemination that are an essential piece of the segment progress and that proceed with long
after different rates have settle.
 Classic Example:
India Case

The panels of
Figure 6 display a
classic
demographic
transition, using
India as an
example. The
starred points in
the figures are
actual data from
India from 1896to
Notes: The simulation is based on a fertility transition in which the total fertility rate follows a
quintic path declining from 5.9 in 1953 to 2.1 in 2025 and a mortality transition in which the
2000. The hollow
mortality index follows a sinusoidal path as e(0) increases from 24.7 in 1900 to 80.0 in 2100. points are based
Sources: Actual India data for the period 1891–1901 to 1941–1951 are taken from Bhat
(1989). Actual and projected data are taken from United Nations (2003).
on the
U.N. projections
for India’s
mortality, fertility, and population up through 2050. India’s mortality decline leads to its fertility
decline by 50 years. The fertility transition here is slow relative to East Asia’s, but similar to Latin
America’s. These trends interact to create a population growth rate that rose from less than 0.5
percent per year in 1900 to more than 2 percent per year by 1950 before starting to decline. These
shifts can be seen in the “dependency ratios”, which take either the younger or the older
population and divide by the working-age population. For example, the child dependency ratio is
the population aged 0 –14 divided by the population aged 15–64. The old-age dependency ratio
is usually defined as the number of those 65 and older divided by the population aged 15– 64.
In the first transition phase, when mortality begins to decline while fertility remains high at the
youngest ages, causing an increase in the proportion of children in the population and raising
child dependency ratios, as shown in Panel E. thus resulting its populations younger rather than
older that can last for 70 years. Both families and governments may struggle to achieve
educational goals for the unexpectedly high number of children. Both families and governments
may struggle to achieve educational goals for the unexpectedly high number of children.
 Figure 6
A Classic Demographic Transition: Actual and Projected fo

r India and Simulated, 1900–2100

This second phase may last 40 or 50 years. Rapidly growing labor force in this phase might cause
rising unemployment and falling capital labor ratios (Coale and Hoover, 1958). Others have
stressed the economic advantages of having a relatively large share of the population in its
working years, calling these a demographic gift or bonus (Williamson and Higgins, 2001; Bloom,
Canning and Malaney, 2000). In India, the bonus occurs between 1970 and 2015. There was
considerable controversy about whether this demographic bonus really affects economic
development (National Research Council, 1986; Kelley, 1988; Birdsall, Kelley and Sinding, 2003).

In a third phase, increasing longevity leads to a rapid increase in the elderly population while low
fertility slows the growth of the working-age population. If the elderly are supported by
transfers, either from their adult children or from a public sector pension system supported by
current tax revenues, then a higher total dependency ratio means a greater burden on the
working-age population. To the extent that the elderly contribute to their own support through
saving and asset accumulation earlier in their lives and dissave in retirement, population aging
may cause lower aggregate saving rates as life cycle savings models and some empirical analyses
suggest. No country in the world has yet completed this phase of population aging, since even
the industrial countries are projected to age rapidly over the next three or four decades.

At the end of the full transitional process for India shown in Figure 6, the total dependency ratio
is back near its level before the transition began, but now child dependency is low and old-age
dependency is high.
The Transition in Age Distribution by Current Development Category

Remember that even in 1950, the Least Developed Countries had higher fertility and higher
mortality than the Less Developed Countries and change since then has been slower for them. The
Least Developed Countries moved slowly out of the phase of rising youth dependency and entered
the bonus phase around 1980. For these countries, the total dependency ratio is projected to fall
sharply from 2000 to 2050. They already have the median age that the Less Developed Countries
are projected to achieve by 2050, at which time the median age in the More Developed Countries
will have risen another eight years to 45.2 years.

The total dependency ratio in the More Developed Countries is projected to rise sharply over the
next 50 years as their low fertility increasingly affects labor force size and the baby boom
generations move into old age.

Lower Fertility or Longer Life Expectancy?

Both low fertility and longer life contribute to the aging of the population. But the implications of
these factors for causes of shifts in the population distribution and for how society might react to
the aging of the population are rather different.

When population aging is due to declining fertility, it raises the share of the elderly population
without altering the remaining life expectancy of older individuals. The desire to have fewer
children may be related to the rise of public sector pensions, which disconnect old-age support
from individual fertility, and may have played some role in causing low fertility in industrial
nations. While lower fertility may go with reduced total parental expenditures on children, it also
raises the ratio of elderly to working-age people, other things equal, with no corresponding
improvement in health to facilitate a prolongation of working years.

By contrast, population aging due to declining mortality is generally associated with increasing
health and improving the functional status of the elderly. While such aging puts pressures on
pension programs that have rigid retirement ages, that problem is a curable institutional one, not
a fundamental societal resource problem, since the ratio of healthy, vigorous years over the life
cycle to frail or disabled years has not necessarily changed.