1. THAT MS.

ANJALI PRIYA IS LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES FOR ALLEGED

1.1 ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS BEING MET

Entrick v Carrington, (1975)

To constitute the wrong of trespass neither force, nor unlawful intention, nor actual damage, nor the breaking of
an enclosure is necessary. Every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.

Here,.Ms. Anjali Priya along with the Sindhu women clearly invaded the private trust‟s owned land which was
not even minute, but a full fledged intrusion.

Fowler v Lanning, 1959

A man is not liable for a trespass committed involuntarily, but he is liable if the entry is intentional, even though
made under a mistake. This position, of essentiality of intention to constitute a tort, has further been concreted in
Fowler v Lanning .

Here intention of entry is clearly established through the conduct of the respondent who, despite several
warnings, entered the inner sanctum and disrupted the ceremony. Their later conduct of subtly eulogizing their
conduct to the media further clarifies the intent affirmatively.

Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd, 2010

In Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd, Lord Hope defined trespass to land, in his words: “it is common
ground that a trespass occurs when there is an unjustified intrusion by one party upon land which is in the
possession of another”.

In the present case also, the intrusion to land is unjustified. No legal remedy has been sought after by the
respondents for the alleged problem they had with the use of the land.

Minister of Health v. Bellotti, (1944)

In Minister of Health v. Bellotti, it was held that an official whose license has expired or terminated can be sued
as a trespasser if he does not vacate on request (and the lapse of a reasonable time).
Here, in the present case, request was made by the appellant and the guards to the respondent (Ms. Anjali Priya)
to vacate the premises which they failed to oblige .

1.2 The Appellant is eligible to seek Damages

As per Wallis v Hands, to maintain an action for trespass, the appellant must prove that he was in possession,
either actual or constructive (of the land in the present case), at the time of trespass. Any possession is a legal
possession against the wrongdoer. The same was reiterated in the case Grahm V. Peat.
In the present case, the appellant was in possession of the very land. The frequent performance of the animal
sacrifice in itself is an indicator for this very requisite element.

Apart from that, the appellant was also the head of the religious trust who owned the site. This gives the
necessary ownership as required to be eligible as the legal possessor .

Kalyan Dass vs State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr., AIR 1973 Mad 264.
“Under Article 26(b), a religious denomination or organization enjoys composite autonomy in the matter of
deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no
outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.

Here, acting suo motu by Ms. Anjali Priya and the members of her organization, to interfere with the
decisions of the Klux religion goes against this very observation .

Danani Das v Govinda Gedi.,1916

The deprivation caused to the exercise of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of Indica to the appellants
because of the act of the respondents was done (on the part of the respondents) illegally, forcibly and without any
legal authority. This gives rise to an action for trespass as per the requisites of Danani Das v Govinda Gedi.

Panna Lal Ghosh v The Adjai Coal Co. Ltd., (1926)

The claim for the damages includes not merely the damages for unlawful entry but also extends to the extent of
mischief committed by the trespasser after entry. 14 Acts of insult and malice are matters of aggravation, for
which substantial damages would be given.

In the present scenario, the “mischief” and “aggravation” (includes insult and malice) as laid out in the above
para. could be construed as the act of breaching and defiling the place of worship of the Klux religion by the
Sindhu women. Therefore, the respondent should also be liable to pay for the „Shuddhikaran‟ ceremony .

1.3 The Respondent is not eligible to seek Defences

In Thomas v Sorell, it was held that a license only makes an action lawful which without it would be unlawful.

This therefore is an indication of the act of trespass by Ms. Anjali Priya being unlawful in addition to the
necessary conclusion of she (Ms. Anjali Priya) being deprived of this particular type of defence.

Growther v Ramsbottan, (1798)

Semayne’s case, (1604)

Semayne’s case, which is a leading authority on this subject does not envisage any private person to act suo motu
but only deals with a lawful officer (eg. Sheriff) being eligible for actions.

Here, the respondent was not a lawful officer, but merely a private person not empowered to take up such
measures by herself.

Cope v. Sharpe, (1912)

Other than failing to meet the eligibility of defence dealt in abovementioned paragraphs, the act was also not an
act of necessity, inconsistent with the requisites laid down under Cope v. Sharpe, which is limited to public
safety, defence of the realm etc.

Kalyan Dass vs State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr. , AIR 1973 Mad 264

Hon‟ble Madras HC in Kalyan Dass v St. of Tamil Nadu and [Link] on the point observed by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Shri Laksmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Sirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC that “it is well-known that there could be no such thing as
an unregulated and unrestricted right of entry in a public temple or other religious institution, for persons who
are not connected with the spiritual functions thereof. It is a traditional custom universally observed not to allow
access to any outsider to the particularly sacred parts of a temple as for example, the place where the deity is
located. There are also fixed hours of worship and rest for the idol when no disturbance by any member of the
public is billowed .

Sri Venkatramana Devaru & Ors. v St. of Mysore and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 255.

In Sri Venkatramana Devaru & Ors. v St. of Mysore and Ors. the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India23 observed
that excluding persons from denominational temples on the ground that they are not objects within the benefit of
the foundation will be protected by Art. 26 of the Constitution.

Hence, parallel to the findings of Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India, Sindhu Mahasabha who were not connected
with the spiritual functions of the Klux religion were not entitled to unregulated and unrestricted entry to the
religious edifice. The guards and Ms. Akhtar were empowered to stop them from entering, (in fact they were
exercising their fundamental right) the commands of whom Ms. Anjali Priya disobeyed .

2. That Ms. Shafaq Akhtar is liable to pay damages to Ms. Anjali for
committing defamation.

2.1 The statement delivered by the appellant is not following the essentials of the
defamation and because of that, it is not defamatory
Mst. Ramdhara v. Mst. Phulwatibai, 1969 (MP H.C)

It was held in the case of Mst. Ramdhara v. Mst. Phulwatibai, that “the standard to be applied is that of a right-
minded citizen, a man of fair average intelligence, and not that of a special class of persons whose values are not
shared or approved by the fair minded members of the society generally”.

Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Color your world Corp., 1998

The rationale of defamation is injury to a person's reputation. “A defamatory statement is one which has a
tendency to injure the reputation of the person to whom it refers; which tends, that is to say, to lower him in the
estimation of right thinking members of society generally and in particularly to cause him to be regarded with
feelings of hatred, contempt ridicule, fear, dislike or disesteem.

In the present case the statement won‟t suffice for this reasoning because this statement is not likely to lower the
reputation of appellant in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society as the respondent has
already lowered her reputation in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society by her act of
disrupting the ceremony despite being warned of not doing such as it goes against the accepted affairs of their
religion provided to them by constitution under Article 25 and Article 26 of Part 3 as Fundamental rights or more
precisely , the Right to freedom of religion.

Deepak Kumar Biswas v. National Insurance [Link], AIR 2006 Gau. 110 .

In Deepak Kumar Biswas v. National Insurance [Link]., it was held by the Guwahati High Court that „the
Insurance Company had no motive or ill will to defame the appellant as the statement so made was not
defamatory‟ because it was the laches on the part of lawyer that caused delay so referring it is not defamatory .

Hence, it could be asserted by help of these principles and arguments that the statement delivered by the
appellant is not defamatory, and there cannot be any action for damages.

2.2 The statement delivered by the appellant is only abuse out of anger and doesn’t
possess any potential to harm the reputation of the appellant
Parvathi v. Mannar, I.L.R. (1885) 8 Mad H.C

Mere hasty expression spoken in anger, or vulgar abuse to which no hearer would attribute any set purpose to
injure character would not be actionable.

Venkata Surya Rao v. Nandipati Muthayya, A.L.R. 1964 A.P.

Mere vulgar abuse and vituperative epithets if intended as a mere abuse and so understood by those who hear
those words only hurt a man's pride. Such words are not considered defamatory as they do not disparage the
reputation. No action for damages can lie for mere insult.
Girish Chunder Mitter vs Jatadhari Sadukhan , (1899)

In a case, where the appeal arises out of a suit brought by the appellant to recover damages from the respondent
for insult, loss of reputation, and mental pain, caused by the respondent, the respondent has used abusive
language as „sala, (wife's brother), haramzada (bastard), soor (pig)‟. It was held that, “no one who heard him did
or could imagine that he (the respondent) really meant to asperse the chastity of the appellant's mother or
thought the appellant a pig, There was no defamation nor intent to defame: what the respondent did was
insulting to the appellant, but did not affect the appellant's reputation a whit”. Therefore, the suit was
dismissed.

Ramdhara And Anr. vs Mst. Phulwatibai, 1970

In Ramdhara And Anr. vs Mst. Phulwatibai33, two women got engaged in a heated argument (quarrel), here one
woman used nasty abuses for the other. Here, the relation between the two parties were already strained. One of
the learned justices observed that “if it is found that those words were uttered by the defendants, they amounted
to mere abuses without intending or conveying their natural meaning. The objectionable words cannot be read
as to convey an imputation that the plaintiff had become Jagatram's (a family member of her) mistress or that
she had illicit relations with him. It is true that although mere vulgar abuse and vituperative epithets may hurt a
man's pride, yet they do not disparage his reputation, if intended as mere abuse and so understood by those who
heard those words” The court observed that “in the present case, if the defendants had merely uttered the word
"chhinal", I would have held that the word did not convey its literal meaning, that is, a woman of easy virtue, but
was only a vulgar abuse, which is not uncommon in villages when women quarrel among themselves.

Mere vulgar abuse, which does not tend to lower a person addressed in the estimation of others or to bring him
into obloquy, contempt or ridicule, does not amount to defamation. In such a case, the abuse is uttered merely to
put an affront upon the feeling of the person abused, or as an insult to his dignity or self-respect without other
persons knowing of it or without producing such an impression in their mind as its natural meaning would
convey”.

The statement in present case merely constitutes insult but not defamation as it does no injury to the reputation of
the appellant. And hence the statement is not defamatory and civil action for it could not be brought for claiming
the damages as in the present case.

2.3 The statement delivered by appellant is well protected by the defence of

McPherson v. Daniels, (1829)

In case of McPherson v. Daniels34, it was proposed that, „the law will not permit a man to recover damages
in respect of an injury to a character which he either does not or ought not to possess‟. Therefore, in the
Civil Law, barely proving that the proclamation was true is an adequate defence.

In the present case as well, the essence/meaning of statement delivered by the appellant in the media
interview is also true concerning the act of the appellant and their behavior. The statement delivered here by
the appellant is, „disgusting Sindhu roaches being led by an unprincipled swine masquerading as a leader‟.
And if we account for the act of respondent, i.e., Ms. Anjali Priya and Sindhu women then we would find
that their act was grossly unprincipled and condemnable as they disrupted the ceremony of worship being
performed by the Klux religion after being cautioned and warned by the guards and subsequently by the
appellant.

Alexander v. North Eastern Ry, (1885)

The only contention left here after proving that the statements delivered by the appellant were substantially true
with regard to the fact and conditions is that the statement despite containing the substance of truth, still seems to
be more exaggerated or rather containing some minor differences in the statement. This could be tackled by the
observation proposed in the case of Alexander v. North Eastern Ry that if the statement is substantially true but
incorrect in respect of certain minor particulars, the defence will still be available. The appellant has been made
liable to pay a fine and imprisonment of two weeks but respondent disseminated that appellant is convicted with
fine and three weeks, and it was held that the statement is substantially accurate and respondents were not held
liable. This could be correlated to the present case where the statement is substantially true and has minor
differences, thus making statement protected by the defence of justification of truth. And no action for damages
could be brought as there is no defamation in the present case.

2.4. The statement delivered by the petitioner is well protected under the defence of fair
comment

Vishan Sarup vs Nardeoshastri and Anr. , AIR 1965 All 439, 1965

In the case of Vishan Sarup vs Nardeoshastri and Anr, the court asserted the principle that defence of fair
comment is opt when the comment is based on a true fact that serves public interest . The comment must not be
malicious and is made in public interest. The court also asserted that mere exaggeration or inaccuracy of the
details does not amount to defamation if the substance of publication is materially true for public interest.

Silkin v. Beaverbook Newspapers Ltd , (1956)

In order to understand that what is considered to hold a comment as fair comment, whether it is assigned by
someone or by the honest view of commentator, we need to look at the proposition of Silkin v. Beaverbook
Newspapers Ltd „Diplok, J.‟, has proposed that, „the basis of our public life is that the enthusiast may say what
he honestly thinks just as much as the reasonable man or woman who sits on a jury, and it would be a sad day for
freedom of speech in this country if a jury were to apply the test of whether it agrees with the comment instead
of applying the true test : was this an opinion, however exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, which was honestly
held by the writer?‟. This means that it is not the opinion of the court as to the fairness of the comment but the
opinion of the commentator which is material. The similar proposition stands in the case of Turner v. M.G.M.
Pictures Ltd.40, and in the case of McQuire v. Western Morning News Co. Ltd.

Vishan Sarup vs Nardeo Shastri and Anr., AIR 1965

The third essential required for the defense of fair comment is that it must be issued in public interest. The case
of Vishan Sarup vs Nardeo Shastri and Anr, proposes that the fair comment should be made on matter of public
interest. Administration of Govt. departments, public companies, courts, conduct of public men like ministers or
officers of State, public institutions and local authorities, public meetings, pictures, theatres, public
entertainments, textbooks, novels, etc. are considered to be matters of public interest.

In the present case when appellant went to a local media and delivered heated arguments about the practices of
petitioner‟s religious affairs because the appellant was warned and cautioned for her act when she disrupted the
religious ceremony performed by the petitioner‟s religion. This act of making heated arguments in local media
invited response from several other people and they began accusing the practices of Klux religion because of the
wrong impression conveyed to them by the appellant. And this could be asserted firmly because these people
have not accused Klux religion before listening to the appellant.

These accusations made it worst for the followers of Klux religion and it directly associates with the public
interest. So it could be said that the fair comment delivered by the petitioner was of public interest. And hence is
protected by the defense of fair comment and does not constitute defamation and no claim of any damages can
be entertained