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DP Operations: ASOG and Safety Guidelines

The document outlines Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) for safe Dynamic Positioning (DP) operations, detailing the Critical Activity Mode (CAM) and Task Appropriate Mode (TAM) configurations for different operational risks. It emphasizes the importance of Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) to prevent undesired loss of position-keeping capability and describes the creation of DP Capability and Footprint Plots to assess vessel performance under various conditions. Additionally, it categorizes DP Class systems and operational consequence classes, along with a list of essential DP operational procedures.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
43 views2 pages

DP Operations: ASOG and Safety Guidelines

The document outlines Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) for safe Dynamic Positioning (DP) operations, detailing the Critical Activity Mode (CAM) and Task Appropriate Mode (TAM) configurations for different operational risks. It emphasizes the importance of Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) to prevent undesired loss of position-keeping capability and describes the creation of DP Capability and Footprint Plots to assess vessel performance under various conditions. Additionally, it categorizes DP Class systems and operational consequence classes, along with a list of essential DP operational procedures.
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG)

ASOG are generally presented in tabulated format and set out the operational, environmental and equipment performance limits
considered necessary for safe DP operations while carrying out a specific activity. The table also sets out various levels of operator
action, as these limits are approached or exceeded. The ASOG will vary depending on the activity and are unique to that activity.
The process of developing the ASOG table always includes the development of CAM and TAM tables if applicable.

Critical Activity Mode (CAM)


Sets out the most robust fault tolerant configuration of the DP system ensuring that a single failure does not exceed the vessel’s
identified worst case failure. CAM is applied to all critical activities.
The CAM defines the DP system set-up that will assure the vessel will be able to maintain position and heading after whatever
contingency event will occur: in other words this set-up can guarantee that any failure mode or any changing in the environmental
conditions will not have any effect on thevessel's station-keeping ability, for that particular DP operation. This means that, when
operating in CAM, the vessel is considered as if it was under Worst Case Failure conditions, and its capability will be “downgraded” to
the one related to the WCFDI.

Task Appropriate Mode (TAM)


Is a risk-based mode. TAM is the configuration that the vessel’s DP system may be set up and operated in, accepting that a single
failure could result in exceeding the Worst Case Failure and could result in blackout or loss of position. TAM is applied to less critical
activities where position loss is found acceptable before the project/operation

DP Mobilization / DP Field Arrival


DP Trials and Checklists should be vessel specific and be developed from detailed information contained in the DP FMEA. They should
confirm vessel performance, particularly following worst-case failure, and that the vessel’s DP system is set up properly and provides
the required level of redundancy.

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)


The FMEA a systematic analysis for identifying potential design and process failures before they occur, with the intent to eliminate
them or minimize the risk associated with them.
The FMEA is required to demonstrate that no single failure will cause an undesired loss of position-keeping capability of the vessel.
This report is required by classification societies for the acceptance criteria for DP Class 2 and DP Class 3 vessels.

Worst-Case Failure (WCF)


The identified single fault in the DP system resulting in maximum detrimental effect on DP capability of the vessel

DP Capability Plots
DP Capability Plots are theoretical plots calculated from detailed information of the vessel’s hull and superstructure form and available
thruster power. The calculations should use environmental data (sea state, wind and current) appropriate to the area in which the DP
vessel is to operate. These plots should show the limiting wind speed 360-degree envelopes for the scenarios below, where each point
on the envelope represents the wind speed at which it is calculated that the vessel will be unable to maintain position in DP.
DP Capability Plots should include the following scenarios at current speeds of 0kts, 1kt and 2kts, or at other current speeds that are
representative of the location in which the DP vessel is to operate:
 Fully intact power generation and thrusters.
 Loss of most effective thruster(s).
 Following the worst case failure
DP Footprint Plots
DP Footprint Plots should also be produced on board. DP Footprint Plots are not theoretical. They are actual measurements of the
vessel’s DP station keeping performance in the actual environmental conditions and thruster configuration at the time the plot was
taken. DP Footprint Plots should be taken whenever opportunities arise, such as during standby periods, weather downtime or on
arrival at the field. Plots should be taken for the thruster configurations used in the DP Capability Plots, i.e. fully intact, loss of most
effective thruster(s) and after worst case failure. Some DP systems have a software application that produces DP Footprint Plots
electronically. DPOs can also produce DP Footprint Plots by manual methods using a plotting sheet.
DP Footprint Plots serve two main purposes.
 They provide a scatter plot of vessel positions at regular intervals around the required set position (this shows accuracy of
station keeping)
 They also provide comparison points on the limiting wind speed envelope given in the theoretical DP Capability Plots (this
shows wind speeds at which it was seen that the vessel was unable to maintain position, thus validating or contradicting the
theoretical DP Capability Plots for the various thruster configurations.)

DP Incident Reporting
Vessel operators should have their own incident reporting procedures, which give guidance on how incidents might be categorized in
their systems and for developing their own DP incident reporting procedures.

DP Class 1 has no redundancy. Loss of position may occur in the event of a single fault
DP Class 2 has redundancy. Loss of position should not occur from a single fault of an active component or system such as
generators, thruster, switchboards, remote controlled valves etc. excluding loss of a compartment and after failure of a static
component such as cables, pipes, manual valves etc.
DP Class 3 has redundancy. Loss of position should not occur from a single fault of an active component or system including loss of a
compartment by fire or flood and after failure of an static component such as cables, pipes, manual valves etc. (At least two
independent computer with a back-up system separated by A60 class division).

Consequence Classes of operations,

 Class 0 operations: was a sort of “never mind” operations where nothing could go seriously wrong.
 Class 1 operations: those where loss of position may cause some pollution and minor economical damage, but excluding
severe harm to people.
 Class 2 operations: those where loss of position may cause severe pollution, large economical damage, and accidents to
people.
 Class 3 operations: those where major damages may occur, severe pollution, and fatal accidents.

List of DP Operational Procedures


 Arrival checks
 Communications
 Approaching the installation
 DP location set-up checks
 Close proximity time
 Separation distance
 Selecting a safe working location
 Safe working heading
 Escape route
 Environmental forces monitoring
 DP watch-keeping handovers
 Critical and allowable vessel excursions
 Position and heading alarms settings
 Power consumption and thruster output limits
 Consequence analyzer
 DP alert status

Common questions

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DP incident reporting procedures guide operators in categorizing and reporting incidents systematically, which enhances safety and operational integrity across all DP Classes. Class 1 has no redundancy and can lose position with a single fault, whereas Class 2 and 3 have redundancy mechanisms to prevent position loss from single faults. Established procedures ensure that incidents are analyzed, understood, and mitigated, bolstering confidence in operational safety and reliability .

CAM is essential for critical activities as it sets up the DP system in the most robust configuration, ensuring that a single failure does not exceed the vessel’s worst-case failure limits, thus maintaining position and heading. In contrast, TAM is used for less critical tasks, accepting the risk that a single failure might result in position loss, which is acceptable depending on the project’s risk levels .

DP Capability Plots are theoretical calculations based on detailed vessel data and environmental conditions to determine the limiting wind speeds at which a vessel can maintain position. They consider scenarios with intact or failed components. In contrast, DP Footprint Plots are actual measurements of the vessel’s DP performance in real environmental conditions, providing empirical data. Together, they verify the DP system’s performance, with DP Footprint Plots serving to either confirm or refine the theoretical DP Capability Plots by showing practical limits .

Consequence classes in DP operations categorize potential outcomes based on the severity of consequences ranging from minor disruptions to severe pollution or fatal accidents. These classes guide operational decision-making by aligning the operational protocols, risk acceptance levels, and contingency planning according to the potential impact of loss of position. This ensures that safety measures and operational controls are appropriately matched to the severity of possible incidents .

ASOG are detailed guidelines that define the operational, environmental, and equipment performance limits necessary for conducting safe dynamic positioning (DP) operations for specific activities. They ensure that the vessel’s positioning capabilities are not exceeded during operations. The process of developing ASOG involves creating tables specific to each activity, which include Critical Activity Mode (CAM) and Task Appropriate Mode (TAM) tables if needed. CAM ensures the system's robustness such that a single failure does not exceed the worst-case failure capacity, whereas TAM allows for operations where a single failure could exceed the worst-case failure capacity, accepting some degree of risk .

FMEA is a systematic analysis method that identifies potential design and process failures before they occur, aiming to eliminate or minimize associated risks. For DP Class 2 and Class 3 vessels, FMEA is crucial as it demonstrates that no single failure can lead to an undesirable loss of position-keeping capability. This analysis reassures classification societies of the vessel's redundancy and reliability in maintaining position under adverse conditions .

Upon arriving at a DP field, vessels are required to undergo several operational checks and preparations. These include arrival checks, communication protocols, setting up DP location checks, proximity and separation distance assessments, selecting a safe working location and heading, establishing an escape route, monitoring environmental forces, and ensuring proper DP alert status and power consumption limits .

DP Class 3 vessels possess higher redundancy levels compared to Class 1 and Class 2 vessels. They are designed to avoid loss of position even with the failure of an active component or complete loss of a compartment due to fire or flooding, incorporating protections like A60 class divisions for systems. This differs from Class 1, which has no redundancy, and Class 2, which can sustain a single fault without losing position but not compartmental losses. This high redundancy in Class 3 vessels mitigates against multiple simultaneous hazards, ensuring greater operational safety in high-risk environments .

A consequence analyzer in dynamic positioning operations assesses the potential outcomes and risks associated with different operational scenarios, considering various system failures and environmental conditions. It impacts decision-making by providing operational insights and potential risk exposure, allowing operators to preemptively adapt strategies to avert adverse outcomes. This tool aids in enhancing both safety and efficiency in DP operations, ensuring that decisions are informed by comprehensive risk evaluations .

Environmental forces monitoring complements DP system functionalities by providing real-time data on external conditions such as wind, currents, and sea state, which can affect the vessel’s position-keeping capabilities. This data helps adjust thruster outputs and system configurations to maintain optimal station keeping, ensuring the system can effectively counteract environmental influences, thus maintaining safety and operational effectiveness .

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