31. CARUMBA V.
CA, 31 SCRA 558 (1970)
FACTS:
Amado Canuto and Nemesia Ibasco sold a parcel of land located in the barrio of Santo Domingo,
Iriga, Camarines Sur, to the spouses Amado Carumba and Benita Canuto. The deed of sale was never
registered. On January 21, 1957, a complaint for a sum of money was filed by Santiago Balbuena against
Amado Canuto and Nemesia Ibasco. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The ex-officio
sheriff issued a “Definite Deed of Sale” of the property in favor of Santiago which was subsequently
registered. The CFI, finding that after the execution of the document, Carumba had taken possession of
the land, planting bananas, coffee and other vegetables, declared him to be the owner of the property
under a consummate sale; held void the execution levy made by the sheriff, pursuant to a judgment
against Carumba’s vendor, Amado Canuto; and nullified the sale in favor of the judgment creditor,
Santiago Balbuena. The Court, therefore, declared Carumba the owner of the litigated property. The
Court of Appeals declared that there having been a double sale of the land, Balbuena’s title was superior
to that of his adversary since the execution sale had been properly registered in good faith and the sale
to Carumba was not recorded.
ISSUE:
Whether the rule on double sale would apply on the case at bar.
RULING:
No. While under Article 1544, registration in good faith prevails over possession in the event of a
double sale by the vendor of the same piece of land to different vendees, said article is of no application
to the case at bar. The reason is that the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution sale only
steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor. He merely acquires the latter’s interest in the property sold
as of the time the property was levied upon. Hence, the latter must yield the land to petitioner
Carumba.
32. DAGUPAN V. MACAM, 14 SCRA 179 (1965)
FACTS:
Sammy Maron and his seven brothers and sisters were pro-indiviso owners of a parcel of
unregistered land located in barrio Parayao, Binmaley, Pangasinan. In 1955, while their application for
registration of said land under Act No. 496 was pending, they executed, on June 19 and on September
21, two deeds of sale conveying the property to herein respondent Rustico Macam who thereafter took
possession of the property and made substantial improvements upon it. On October 14, 1955, OCT No.
6942 covering the land was issued in the name of the Marons, free from all liens and encumbrances.
On August 4, 1956, however, by virtue of a final judgment of the Municipal Court of Manila in a
civil case in favor of Manila Trading and Supply Co. (Manila Trading) against Sammy Maron, levy was
made upon whatever interest he had in the subject property. Thereafter, said interest was sold at public
auction to the judgment creditor Manila Trading. The corresponding notice of levy, certificate of sale
and the sheriff's certificate of final sale in favor of Manila Trading - because nobody exercised the right
of redemption - were duly registered, and on March 1, 1958, the latter sold all its rights and title in the
property to herein petitioner Dagupan Trading Company (Dagupan Trading). On September 4, 1958,
Dagupan Trading filed an action against Macam, praying that it be declared owner of one-eighth portion
of the subject property. The CFI of Pangasinan dismissed the said complaint, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed its
ISSUE:
Who has the superior right over the one-eight portion of the subject property?
RULING:
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed both decisions of the lower courts. At the time of the levy,
Sammy Maron already had no interest on the one-eight portion of the property he and his siblings have
inherited because for a considerable time prior to the levy, said interest had already been conveyed
upon Macam "fully and irretrievably" - as the Court of Appeals held. Consequently, the subsequent levy
made on the property for the purpose of satisfying the judgment rendered against Sammy Maron in
favor of the Manila Trading Company was void and of no effect.
The unregistered sale and the consequent conveyance of title and ownership in favor Macam
could not have been cancelled and rendered of no effect upon the subsequent issuance of the Torrens
title over the entire parcel of land. Moreover, upon the execution of the deed of sale in his favor by
Sammy Maron, Macam had immediately taken possession of the land conveyed as its new owner and
introduced considerable improvements upon it himself. To deprive him, therefore, of the same by sheer
force of technicality would be against both justice and equity.
33. HANOPOL V. PILAPIL, 7 SCRA 452 (1963)
FACTS:
This is a case of double sale of the same parcel of unregistered land decided in favor of
defendant-appellee Pilapil, originally appealed by plaintiff-appellant Hanopol to the CA, but later
certified to this Court for proper adjudication, the issues involved being exclusively of law.
Appellant Hanopol claims ownership of the land by virtue of a series of purchases effected in
1938 by means of private instruments, executed by the former owners Teodora, Lucia, Generosa,
Sinforosa and Isabelo, all surnamed Siapo. On the other hand, appellee Pilapil asserts title to the
property on the strength of a duly notarized deed of sale executed in his favor by the same owners
on December 3, 1945, which deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Leyte on
August 20, 1948 under the provisions of Act No. 3344.
ISSUE:
Whether the registration of the second deed of sale in favor of appellee Pilapil affects his right
as the first vendee?
RULING:
Yes. It thus appears that the “better right” referred to in Act No. 3344 is much more than the
mere prior deed of sale in favor of the first vendee.
In the case at bar, there appears to be no clear evidence of Hanopol’s possession of the land in
controversy. In fact, in his complaint against the vendors, Hanopol alleged that the Siapos took
possession of the same land under claim of ownership in 1945 and continued and were in such
possession at the time of the filing of the complaint against them in 1948. Consequently, since the
Siapos were in actual occupancy of the property under claim of ownership, when they sold the said land
to appellee Pilapil on December 3, 1945, such possession was transmitted to the latter, at least
constructively, with the execution of the notarial deed of sale, if not actually and physically as claimed
by Pilapil in his answer filed in the present case. Thus, even on this score, Hanopol cannot have a better
right than appellee Pilapil who, according to the trial court, “was not shown to be a purchaser in bad
faith”.
34. SANCHEZ V. RAMOS, 40 PHIL. 614 (1919)
FACTS:
The land is in the defendant's possession and formerlybelonged to Ciriaco Fernandez . On July 1, 1910,
Ciriaco Fernandez sold it to the spouses Marcelino Gomez and Narcisa Sanchez under pacto de retro for
the period of one year.
On July 3, 1912, Ciriaco Fernandez again sold the same land,by means of a private document, to Roque
Ramos who immediately took material possession thereof. The RTC ruled that by applying article 1473
of the Civil Code, declared preferable the sale executed to the defendant andabsolved him from the
complaint. The Supreme Court said that by the same article applied by the lower court, the Courtis of
the opinion that the sale executed to the plaintiff must bedeclared preferable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale executed to defendant Ramos should be declared preferable
RULING:
No. The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the realty sold
(Art. 1462) and its possession by the vendee (Art. 438).
Under these conditions, the sale is considered consummated and completely transfers
to the vendee all of the vendor’s rights of ownership including his real right over the thing. The vendee
by virtue of this sale had acquired everything and nothing, absolutely nothing, is left to the vendor. As
the thing is considered delivered, the vendor has no longer the obligation of even delivering it.
35. QUIMSON V. ROSETE, 87 PHIL. 159 (1950)
FACTS:
The estate belonging to the deceased Dionysus Quimson was first transferred in favor of his
daughter Tomasa Quimson through a deed of conveyance, but continued in his possession and
enjoyment. He sold it to Francisco Rosete, with a repurchase agreement for the term of five years
granting to this effect the writing of sale. Since then Rosete is the one in his possession and enjoyment,
in a peaceful and quiet manner, even after the death of Dionisio Quimson, which occurred on June 6,
1939 until January of 1943. Tomasa Quimson petitioned that the property should be given to her as she
is the true owner and possessor of the property.
ISSUE:
1. What were the effects of the registration of plaintiff’s document? Who was prior in possession?
RULING:
The Court held that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the
realty sold and its possession by the vendee. Under these conditions the sale is considered consummate
and completely transfers to the vendee all of the vendor’s rights of ownership including his real rights
over the thing. This means that after the sale of a realty by means of a public instrument, the vendor,
who resells it to another, does not transmit anything to the second vendee and if the latter, by virtue of
this second sales, take material possession of the thing, he does it as a mere detainer, and it would be
unjust to protect this detention against the rights to the thing lawfully acquired by the first vendee.
Hence, the Court ruled that Tomasa Quimson is the rightful owner of the property.
36. BEATINGO V. GASIS, G.R. NO. 179641, 9 FEBRUARY 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Dolorita Beatingo bought a piece of land, denominated as Lot No. 7219 from Flora G.
Gasis on May 19, 1998. Petitioner went to the Register of Deeds to have the sale registered. She,
however, failed to obtain registration as she could not produce the owner’s duplicate certificate of title.
She, thus, filed a petition for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title but was opposed by
respondent Lilia Bu Gasis, claiming that she was in possession of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) as
she purchased the subject property from Flora on January 27, 1999. Petitioner filed a Complaint for
Annulment and Cancellation of Sale, Reconveyance, Delivery of Title and Damages against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court. Respondent claimed that she purchased the subject property from Flora
without knowledge of the prior sale of the same subject property to petitioner, which makes her an
innocent purchaser for value. The RTC considered the controversy as one of double sale and since the
two sales that of petitioner and that of respondent were not registered with the Registry of Property,
the RTC held that whoever was in possession had the better right. Hence, it decided in favor of
respondent. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Notice of Appeal.
However, due to pressures of work in equally important cases with other clients, counsel for
petitioner requested for an extension of ninety (90) days within which to file the brief. Instead of filing
the Appellant’s Brief within the extended period, petitioner twice moved for extension of time to file the
brief. The CA denied the motions for extension to file brief. Thus, for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief,
the appellate court dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has a better right over the thing subject of double sale.
RULING:
Yes. Evidently, petitioner’s counsel was negligent in failing to file the required brief not only
within 45 days from receipt of the notice but also within the extended period of ninety (90) days granted
by the appellate court.
The excuse forwarded above is unacceptable. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the
best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence, more so if the delay results in the dismissal of the appeal. The failure to file the Appellant’s
Brief, though not jurisdictional, results in the abandonment of the appeal which may be the cause for its
dismissal. Nevertheless, to put an end to the controversy, the Court carefully perused the records of the
case and reached the conclusion that the decision dated December 29, 2005 of the RTC is in perfect
harmony with law and jurisprudence. The rules on double sales, as discussed above, apply.
37. ROMAN V. GRIMALT, 6 PHIL. 96 (1906)
FACTS:
In between the 13th to the 23d of June, 1904, petitioner Pedro Roman, the owner, and
respondent Andres Grimalt, the purchaser, verbally agreed upon the sale of the schooner Santa Marina.
In his letter on June 23, Grimalt agreed to buy the vessel and offered to pay in three installments of P500
each on July 15, September 15, and November 15, provided the title papers to the vessel were in proper
form. The title of the vessel, however, was in the name of one Paulina Giron and not in the name of
Roman as the alleged owner. Roman promised to perfect his title to the vessel, but failed so the papers
he presented did not show that he was the owner of the vessel. On June 25, 1904, the vessel sank in the
Manila harbor during a severe storm, even before Roman was able to produce for Grimalt the proper
papers showing that the former was in fact the owner of the vessel in question and not Paulina Giron. As
a result, Grimalt refused to pay the purchase price when Roman made a demand on June 30, 1904.
On July 2, 1904, Roman filed this complaint in the CFI of Manila, which found that the parties
had not arrived at a definite understanding, and later dismissed said complaint.
ISSUE:
Who should bear the risk of loss?
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and declared Roman as the one
who should bear the risk of lost because there was no actual contract of sale. If no contract of sale was
actually executed by the parties, the loss of the vessel must be borne by its owner and not by a party
who only intended to purchase it and who was unable to do so on account of failure on the part of the
owner to show proper title to the vessel and thus enable them to draw up the contract of sale. Grimalt
was under no obligation to pay the price of the vessel, the purchase of which had not been concluded.
The conversations between the parties and the letter Grimalt had written to Roman did not establish a
contract sufficient in itself to create reciprocal rights between the parties.
38. NORKIS V. CA, 193 SCRA 694 (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc. is the distributor of Yamaha motorcycles in Negros Occidental. On
September 20, 1979, private respondent Alberto Nepales bought from the Norkis Bacolod branch a
brand new Yamaha Wonderbike motorcycle Model YL2DX. The price of P7,500.00 was payable by means
of a Letter of Guaranty from the DBP, which Norkis agreed to accept. Credit was extended to Nepales for
the price of the motorcycle payable by DBP upon release of his motorcycle loan. As security for the loan,
Nepales would execute a chattel mortgage on the motorcycle in favor of DBP. Petitioner issued a sales
invoice which Nepales signed in conformity with the terms of the sale. In the meantime, however, the
motorcycle remained in Norkis’ possession. On January 22, 1980, the motorcycle was delivered ¬to a
certain Julian Nepales, allegedly the agent of Alberto Nepales. The motorcycle met an accident on
February 3, 1980 at Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. An investigation conducted by the DBP revealed that
the unit was being driven by a certain Zacarias Payba at the time of the accident. The unit was a total
wreck was returned.
On March 20, 1980, DBP released the proceeds of private respondent’s motorcycle loan to
Norkis in the total sum of P7,500. As the price of the motorcycle later increased to P7,828 in March,
1980, Nepales paid the difference of P328 and demanded the delivery of the motorcycle. When Norkis
could not deliver, he filed an action for specific performance with damages against Norkis in the RTC of
Negros Occidental. He alleged that Norkis failed to deliver the motorcycle which he purchased, thereby
causing him damages. Norkis answered that the motorcycle had already been delivered to private
respondent before the accident, hence, the risk of loss or damage had to be borne by him as owner of
the unit
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a transfer of ownership of the motorcycle to Alberto Nepales.
RULING:
[Link] issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the
buyer. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing
sold and has been considered not a bill of sale. In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of
delivery whether constructive or actual, be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. The act,
without the intention, is insufficient. When the motorcycle was registered by Norkis in the name of
private respondent, Norkis did not intend yet to transfer the title or ownership to Nepales, but only to
facilitate the execution of a chattel mortgage in favor of the DBP for the release of the buyer’s
motorcycle loan. Article 1496 of the Civil Code which provides that “in the absence of an express
assumption of risk by the buyer, the things sold remain at seller’s risk until the ownership thereof is
transferred to the buyer,” is applicable to this case, for there was neither an actual nor constructive
delivery of the thing sold, hence, the risk of loss should be borne by the seller, Norkis, which was still the
owner and possessor of the motorcycle when it was wrecked. This is in accordance with the well¬
known doctrine of res perit domino.
39. SUN BROS. V. PEREZ, 7 SCRA 977 (1963)
FACTS:
Sun bros and Perez entered into a Conditional Sale Agreement of an Admiral air conditioner, the
price of which is 1,678php. The agreement contains the ff. stipulations:”2. Title to said property shall
vest in the Buyer only upon full payment of the entire account as herein provided, and only upon
complete performance of all the other conditions herein specified:”3. The Buyer shall keep said property
in good condition and properly protected against the elements, at his/its address above-stated, and
undertakes that if said property or any part thereof be lost, damaged, or destroyed for any causes, he
shall suffer such loss, or repair such damage, it being distinctly understood and agreed that said
property remains at Buyer’s risk after delivery;”
Pursuant to the contract, sun bros. delivered the item and was received by Perez. Perez made a
down payment of 274php and the item was installed by sun bro representatives. The said air conditioner
was burned where it was installed by the plaintiff (no details about the fire in the case). The defendant
claims that the destruction was due to force majeure. Perez did not pay any of the monthly installments
leaving a balance of 1,404php.
ISSUE:
Who should bear the loss?
RULING:
The buyer. The agreement making the buyer responsible for any loss whatsoever, fortuitous or
otherwise, even if the title to the property remains in the vendor, is neither contrary to law, nor to
morals or public policy .Citing American decisions, the court held that the loss did not relieve the buyer
from his obligation to pay. Reason for the rule:
1. The absolute and unconditional nature of the vendee’s promise to pay for the goods. The
promise is nowise dependent upon the transfer of the absolute title.
2. The fact that the vendor has fully performed his contract and has nothing further to do except
receive payment, and the vendee received what he bargained for when he obtained the right of
possession and use of the good sand the right to acquire title upon making full payment of the
price
3. Providing an incentive to care properly for the goods, they being exclusively under the control
and dominion of the vendee
40. LAWYER’S COOP. V. TABORA, 13 SCRA 762 (1965)
FACTS:
Perfecto Tabora bought from the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company a complete set of
AmJur, plus a set of AmJur, General Index. The contract provides that: “Title to and ownership of the
books shall remain with the seller until the purchase price shall have been fully paid. Loss or damage to
the books after delivery to the buyer shall be borne by the buyer.”
Tabora made a partial payment of P300.00, leaving a balance of P1,382.40. The books were
delivered and received for by Tabora. On the same day, a fire broke out, burning down Tabora’s law
office and library. Tabora immediately reported it to LCPC. The company replied and as a token of
goodwill it sent to Tabora free of charge 4 Philippine Reports volumes. As Tabora failed to pay the
monthly installments agreed upon, LCPC filed an action to recover of the balance.
According to Tabora, title to and the ownership of the books shall remain with the seller until
the purchase price shall have been fully paid, so LCPC should bear the loss. Even assuming that the
ownership was transferred to Tabora, he should not answer for the loss due to force majeure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tabora should bear the loss?
RULING:
Yes. The general rule is that the loss of the object of the contract of sale is borne by the owner
or in case of force majeure the one under obligation to deliver the object is exempt from liabilit. This is
not applicable here as the contract provides that loss or damage after delivery shall be borne by the
buyer.
The defense of force majeure also failed. The rule only holds true when the obligation consists in
the delivery of a determinate thing and there is no stipulation holding him liable even in case of
fortuitous event. This is not present in this case. The obligation is pecuniary in nature, and the obligor
bound himself to assume the loss after the delivery.
41. SONG FO V. ORIA, 33 PHIL. 3 (1915)
FACTS:
Song Fo sold a launch to Oria for P16,500 payable in quarterly installments of P1,000 with an interest
rate of 10% per [Link] launch was delivered to Oria in Manila but was shipwrecked and became a
total loss while en route to Oria’s place of business in Samar. No part of the purchase price has ever
been paid. This action wasinstituted for the recovery of the total amount the price.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Song Fo, failing to insure the launch, should suffer the loss resulting from the
shipwreck?
RULING:
No. An examination of the terms of sale discloses that Song Fo did not expressly obligate
themselves to insure the launch. The contract only expressly authorized them to insure it in their own
name. There is nothing in the record which would hold that Song Fo obligated themselves to insure the
launch at all events. There is nothing in the written contract which justifies an inference that there was
any though in the mind of the parties that Song Fo, as vendor, would insure the launch against loss or
damage during the long period allowed for the payment of the price.
On the contrary, the language of the contract which authorized Song Fo to take out insurance in
their own name and to charge the amount of the premium to Oria, when read in light of the transaction,
imposed at most a duty upon Song Fo to take such reasonable measures as might be required of a
prudent man in connection with the insurance of his own property. Hence, The security for the
payment of the price of the launch itself having disappeared as a result of an unforeseen event, and no
other security having been substituted therefor, Song Fo were clearly entitled tore cover not only for the
installments of the indebtedness due but also for all installments which, but for the loss of the vessel
had not matured at the time.