COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY

AGAINST BOKO HARAM: A STUDY OF OPERATION LAFIYA DOLE AND

HADIN KAI

BY

TUAMENE TSARO IGBARIA

REG NO

BEING A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

*************** FOR THE AWARD OF **************

SEPTEMBER, 2021

i
 ABSTRACT
This study assessed the Counter-Insurgency Operations of the Nigerian Military
Against Boko Haram: A Study of Operation Lafiya Dole and Hadin Kai. Specific
objectives were to identify the development and security challenges posed by the
Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria. To examine the effectiveness
of Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Hadin Kai Counter-Insurgence strategies
adopted by the Nigerian Military in combating thein the fight against the Boko
Haram Menace and to proffer solutions and suggest more effective policy
options. The study adopted the content analysis research method to qualitative
analyze primary data. The study found out that the Military have pursued
different counterinsurgency models that are nonetheless both enemy-centric;
seeking to target militants with overwhelming force and using forceful methods to
separate insurgents from the population which have proven problematic and
potentially strategically self-defeating. Several factors have constrained the
Nigerian security force response, most notably security sector corruption, weak
interagency collaboration and mismanagement. Nigerian troops are also not
adequately resourced or equipped to counter the insurgency. The study
recommended that; maintaining a functional security sector for
counterinsurgency in Nigeria will require specialized training and adequate and
timely release of funds for maintenance of men, materials and equipment. The
use of intelligence must be deepened to include closer collaboration with local
community actors who are familiar with the terrain in which Boko Haram
operates. The counter insurgency should take a two-pronged approach: The
Kinetic (physical war) and the Non-kinetic (deradicalization, cutting of all forms of
supplies to the insurgents) to bring the insurgency to its knees.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...............................................................................................................................ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT............................................................................................................v
CHAPTER ONE.........................................................................................................................6
1.1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................6
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM....................................................................9
1.3. AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.....................................................10
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTION...................................................................................10
1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY....................................................................11
1.6. SCOPE OF THE STUDY...................................................................................11
REFERENCE.................................................................................................................12
CHAPTER TWO......................................................................................................................14
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK......................................................14
2.1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................14
2.2. CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE...........................................................................14
2.2.1. INSURGENCY.....................................................................................................14
2.2.2. COUNTER-INSURGENCY...................................................................................15
2.3. HISTORY AND DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA........................15
2.4 . EVOLUTION AND EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM..............................16
2.5. SYNOPSIS OF NIGERIA’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY RESPONSE...............18
2.6. NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES.............................................................................19
2.7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK..........................................................................21
Resource Dependence Theory...................................................................................21
2.8. EMPIRICAL REVIEW...........................................................................................22
2.9. GAP IN LITERATURE..........................................................................................25
REFERENCE.................................................................................................................26
CHAPTER THREE...................................................................................................................30

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 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..................................................................................................30
3.1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................30
3.2. METHODOLOGY STRATEGY............................................................................30
3.3. CHOSEN METHODOLOGY.................................................................................30
3.4. DATA COLLECTION...........................................................................................31
3.5. DATA ANALYSIS.................................................................................................31
3.6. LIMITATIONS.......................................................................................................32
3.7. SUMMARY............................................................................................................32
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................33
CHAPTER FOUR.....................................................................................................................34
DATA ANALYSIS AND DICUSSION OF FINDINGS...................................................................34
4.1. DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY CHALLENGES POSED BY THE BOKO
HARAM INSURGENCY IN NORTH EASTERN NIGERIA......................................34
4.2. EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION LAFIYA DOLE AND OPERATION
HADIN KAI COUNTER-INSURGENCE STRATEGIES...........................................37
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS......................................................................................44
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................46
CHAPTER FIVE.......................................................................................................................49
5.1. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................49
5.2. RECOMMENDATION..........................................................................................51

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to express my humble gratitude to Almighty God for guidance and

direction and the opportunity to carry out this study.

I thank my supervisor….

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 CHAPTER ONE
1.1. INTRODUCTION

Insurgency, arguably, is a big threat to global peace, stability and development in the

contemporary times. Since the dawn of this millennium, the incidence has been on a

steady rise worldwide, it has turned out to be one of the leading present-day challenges

facing the modern state with records showing that terrorism has become a truly global

phenomenon over the decades especially in the West African region. The region is

constantly under a wave of various forms of insecurity caused by unending wars, cross-

border conflicts, civil wars, maritime piracy and weak institutions etc. While West African

states may not be homogenous in terms of socio-cultural, ethnic and linguistic

affiliations, what they however have in common is multiple layers of insecurity,

underscored by poverty, under-development, instability and criminality. One striking

factor in today’s insurgencies throughout Africa is the growth in the number of

insurgences based on a fundamentalist ideology. The ruthless attacks, audacity and

adroitness with which they operate have taken security operatives in Africa by surprise.

People are killed, maimed, kidnapped, displaced and facilities wrecked. The implication

of this is that it has exacerbated poverty, brought massive human suffering, and

destroyed property (Ewa, 2017:2). This has given rise to the wave of insurgency in the

Africa and especially in Nigeria. While poverty and economic marginalization do not

automatically result in insurgency, evidence from history of insurgencies, suggests that

the existence of this marginalized sector provides ample manpower for insurgency

(Kwanashie, 2013:76-82).

6
Nigeria is besieged with a surfeit of civil unrest ranging from political to religious based

conflicts such as kidnapping, banditry, insurgency, terrorism and communal clashes,

etc. Socioeconomic inequalities, injustice, corruption, ethnic intolerance and religious

extremism are some of the vices which have culminated and metamorphosed into

fanatical movements. Insurgencies, and the terrorism that accompanies them have

become the order thus posing complex challenges threatening political, social and

economic stability while defying military attempts to suppress or defeat them as seen in

the case of Boko Haram and ISWAP (These groups are referred to collectively as Boko

Haram throughout the thesis).

The Boko Haram insurgency remains the paramount security challenge disrupting the

Lake Chad region, which spans Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Although the

group evolved from Nigeria’s Borno and Yobe states under different names, its violent

campaigns transformed into an insurgency with terrorist tactics in the aftermath of the

July 2009 revolt in northern Nigeria (Onuoha 2020:54-67; Burchard and Burgess

2019:12-15). Having remained a thorn in the flesh of Nigeria as the primary target for

more than a decade. Her activities have lurched Nigeria into a type of catastrophic

irregular conflict that the country is poorly prepared for (Felbab-Brown, 2019:10). It has

evolved to seize the headlines among the ranks and files of global terrorist groups. In

line with this ideology, it has fought against everything perceived as “western” ideology

and influence, mostly within Northern Nigeria. Sustained violence by the group has

resulted in massive, forced displacement and a widespread humanitarian crisis in

7
Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. Since 2009, the insurgency has killed over 100,000

persons, displaced over 2.5 million others and destroyed infrastructure worth $9bn in

Nigeria (Onuoha and Oyewole 2018; Punch, 2021; Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2021).

On account of its brutal attacks, Boko Haram emerged as the world’s deadliest terrorist

organisation in 2014 (GTI 2015), and contributed in making Nigeria the third most

terrorized country in the world after Afghanistan and Iraq in 2018 (GTI 2019).

Nigeria has been using what can be described as ‘kinetic strategy’ in its conflict with

Boko Haram (Solomon, 2013:42-45). This strategy focuses on the employment of hard

military power through kinetic operations against Boko Haram. This adherence to

conventional military doctrines, strategies and tactics cost Nigeria dearly throughout the

duration of the major phases of the conflict between 2010 and 2015 (Solomon,

2016:10). In spite of the holistic approach initially adopted in curbing the Boko Haram

insurgency in Nigeria, the frequency of occurrence of her attacks is still on the rise and

therefore mandated the call for international collaboration against all acts of terrorism

and insurgency. In the past years, the Nigerian government through the military have

forcibly rekindled the need to rethink the best possible ways to fight insurgencies, thus

finding a strategy to address these emerging threats. The Nigerian government has

consequently leveraged the military as the preeminent kinetic tool alongside other

paramilitary, security and law enforcement institutions to counter the evolving threat.

Hence, it has initiated successive military operations with different code names:

Operation Restore Order, Operation Boyona, Operation Zaman Lafiya, Operation Lafiya

Dole, Operation Last Hold and currently Operation Hadin Kai. Besides the formation of

Multinational Joint Task Force by countries of the Lake Chad region, the military-led

8
counterinsurgency operations are augmented by voluntary policing outfits in Nigeria

such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Hunters Association, Pulaaku Brigade,

and Vigilante Group of Nigeria. However, the resurgence of audacious attacks by Boko

Haram has raised concerns that the jihadist group is far from being decimated. A review

of the nature and impact of military operations against the Boko Haram insurgency is,

therefore, crucial in uncovering major factors that could be linked to the success (and

failure) of this kinetic effort for policy and operational purposes. The strategies applied in

counterterrorism operations in Nigeria have not yielded visible effects in reducing or

eliminating terrorism there, it is against this background, that this study seeks to assess

the Counter-Insurgence (COIN) Operations of the Nigerian Military against the Boko

Haram Insurgency.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The issue of the Islamist fundamentalist group known as Boko-Haram since 2009 has

continued to pose serious challenge to Nigeria's national life (Onuoha, 2020:54-67). In

the government attempts to quell the insurgency, it has adopted several counter-

insurgence strategies towards ending the Boko Haram menace. In-spite of the best

efforts of its armed forces, Nigeria has not been able to evolve proactive and holistic

strategies that could curb and contain the insurgents. The implications emanating from

Nigeria’s experience with insurgency and counter insurgency is, that the state, today,

unlike in the pristine of its development, no longer holds unchallengeable monopoly of

the means, instruments, and use of force and coercion. This means that there is a

dangerous trend in which the control of the means and instruments of force and

coercion is being increasingly shared with the state by its real and potential enemies,

9
thereby eroding the power of the state. Various agencies in Nigeria and its neighboring

countries have been established to fight terrorism, but without success. This is evident

in the steady increase in casualties, which include the military and other security

agencies and expatriates, despite the heavy presence of counterterrorist agencies.

Thus, the strategies applied in counterterrorism operations in Nigeria have not yielded

visible effects in reducing or eliminating terrorism. Therefore, this study seeks to assess

the counter-insurgent operations of the Nigeria military against the Boko Haram

Insurgency.

1.3. AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The Aim of this study is to assess Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Hadin Kai

adopted so far by the Nigerian Military in tackling the Boko Haram Menace. Specific

objectives are:

i. To identify the development and security challenges posed by the Boko

Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria.

ii. To examine the effectiveness of Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Hadin

Kai Counter-Insurgence strategies adopted by the Nigerian Military in

combating thein the fight against the Boko Haram Menace

iii. To proffer solutions and suggest more effective policy options.

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTION

i. What are the development and security challenges posed by the Boko Haram

insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria?

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 ii. How effective and efficient has Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Gadin

Kai been in the Fight Against Boko Haram?

iii. What effective policy solutions can be implemented in the region to positively

influence the trend of event as regards to the current dynamics in the North

East?

1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is timely because it recommends measures to tackle the ongoing insurgency

challenge in Nigeria. Hence, the study findings and recommendations could contribute

to improving Nigerian National Security. This study will provide insight with the

realization that countering an insurgency, which is often done with brutality, only helps

to institutionalize insurgencies and take it to the level of wider terrorism. Finally, this

study adds to the available literature in the area of Conflict and Peace studies and will

also serve as a reference point to the present and future researchers who are or might

be eager to find solution to the myriad of problems facing insurgency in the world.

1.6. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study is limited to the counter-insurgency strategies adopted by the Nigerian

Military in fighting the Boko Haram menace. Drawing from this, the study seeks to

examine the various operations carried out by the military from 2015 till date (2021).

11
REFERENCE

Burchard, S., and Burgess, S. 2019. U.S. training of African forces and military

assistance, 1997– 2017: Security versus human rights in principal–agent

relations. African Security, [Link] .

Pp.12-15

Ewa, I.O. 2017. Insurgency, counterinsurgency and national security. African Journal for

Security and Development, 2(2)

Felbab-Brown, V., 2019 Militias (and Militancy) in Nigeria’s North-East not going away,

in: Day, Adam, Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace- How militias and paramilitary

groups shape post-conflict transitions, United Nations University, accessed 25

July 2021.

[Link]

Pp.10

Global Terrorism Index. 2015. Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism.

Brussels: Institute for Economics and Peace.

Global Terrorism Index. 2019. Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism.

Brussels: Institute for Economics and Peace

12
Global Terrorism Index. 2021. Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism.

Brussels: Institute for Economics and Peace

Kwanashie, M. 2013. Diagnostic review of insurgencies in Nigeria: sources, causes, and

remedies – the economic dimension in O. Obafemi H. Galadima (Eds). Complex

insurgencies in Nigeria Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic

Studies. 76-82

Onuoha, F.C., and Oyewole. S. (2018). Anatomy of Boko Haram: The rise and decline

of a violent group in Nigeria. Doha: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies

Onuoha, F.C. 2020. The Islamist challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram crisis explained.

African Security Review 19 (2): 54–67.

Punch. 2021. North and Nigeria’s development, Punch Editorial, April 21.

[Link] Accessed 24th May 2021.

Solomon E. U., (2013)., Boko Haram: Developing New Strategies to Combat Terrorism

in Nigeria, unpublished Master of Strategic Studies Degree thesis, United States

Army War College. Pp. 42-55 Accessed from

[Link]/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/[Link]

Solomon E. U., (2016) The Nature of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A

Strategic Analysis, Perspectives on Terrorism, 10 (1), Accessed from

[Link]/pt/[Link]/pot/article/view/488

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 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides background information on insurgency and counterinsurgency. It

reviews the few studies the researcher was able to access. The chapter also provides a

theoretical framework that guides the study outlining its relevance and limitations.

2.2. CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE

2.2.1. INSURGENCY
According to Kilcullen, (2006) “Insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political

space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers), and one or more

popularly based, non-state challengers”. Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines

insurgency as “an armed rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an

authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the

rebellion are not recognized as belligerents.” The British Army counter-insurgency

14
manual, Army Field Manual (AFM) defined insurgency as: “The actions of a minority

group within a state, who are intent on forcing political change by a means of a mixture

of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the

broad mass of the people to accept such a change. It is an organised, armed political

struggle, the goals of which might be diverse.” In all, insurgencies connote an internal

uprising often outside the confines of state’s laws and it is often characterized by social-

economic and political goals as well as military or guerrilla tactics. To launch their anger

on the state, insurgents often target civilians and infrastructures. However, other than

the violence of insurgency is its political and social-economic dimension, where often

lies its causes and effects.

2.2.2. COUNTER-INSURGENCY
The term “counterinsurgency” has been conceptualized in a number of ways, frequently

referred to by the acronym COIN. COIN is a blend of comprehensive civilian and

military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address

its root causes (Joint Publication, 2013: iii-1). COIN is an integrated set of political,

economic, social and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of

armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic and social structures,

and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the

conditions necessary for lasting stability (Scott, 2007:13-15).

2.3. HISTORY AND DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

Insurgency in Nigeria evolved with different dynamics, resulting from various motives,

and began in 1967 heralding the Nigerian Civil War. Although it classified as a civil war,

it had all the trappings of Insurgency and would be categorized as such today (Richard,

15
2016). Insurgency in Nigeria shifted with the emergence of religiously motivated terrorist

groups. Groups, such as Maitatsine, existed in the 1980’s and caused havoc in northern

Nigeria with the help of foreign nations that already had Insurgency, motivated by

religious ideologies (Felbab-Brown, 2019:10). This and other groups that emerged had

similar motives, tactics, and levels of impact on the government and civilians. However,

up till 2006, when the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and other

terrorist groups in the south of Nigeria emerged, it was easy for the government to

address these groups.

Boko Haram became well known in 2006 when the Nigeria’s Department of State

Security began arresting, detaining, and prosecuting its members. The terrorist group’s

motives were identified to include religious extremism, resentment over the killing of

their founder and other members, and poverty (Matfess, 2017:15-17). Most of the

tactics of the Niger Delta militants, such as bombing locations with international interests

and kidnapping for ransom and exchange of detained members, were adopted by Boko

Haram.

2.4 . EVOLUTION AND EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM

The group traces its early beginnings in 1995 as a religious study group called the

Muslim Youth Organization led by Abubakar Lawan at the University of Maiduguri in

Borno state, northern Nigeria (Onuoha, 2020:54-67). But then Abubakar Lawan was

later said to have travelled for studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia;

conceding the group’s leadership to Mohammed Yusuf (Omar and Ndubuisi, 2018:12-

16). However, it was in the early 2000s that Boko Haram emerged as an extremist

religious organization advocating for the strict implementation of Sharia law according to

16
the group’s own radical interpretations (Onapajo and Uzodike, 2012:24-39). The sect

has a founding philosophy centered on its opposition to the totality of Western culture

upon which its educational system is founded. The group which is better known by its

Hausa name ‘Boko Haram’ meaning ‘Western education or civilization is forbidden’ is a

local radical Salafist group which transformed into terrorist organization after 2009

(Cook, 2013:11). It is based in the Northeast of Nigeria, in the areas predominated by

the Kanuri people.

According to Danjibo (2008), Boko Haram is the product of the “Maitatsine” doctrine or a

brand of Islamic zealots and fundamentalists introduced to Northern Nigeria in 1945.

The first known attack by Boko Haram was in December 2003, and included

approximately 200 militant fighters attacking a Nigerian police station along the border

of Niger (CNN, 2016). Boko Haram continued to carryout terrorist attacks from 2003 to

2009; however, they were mostly small in scale and limited in scope. This limited form

of warfare drastically changes following the Boko Haram uprising in 2009 after Yusuf’s

Death. Yusuf’s deputy, Abubakar Shekau, subsequently took over the movement and

pursued a path of dedicated violence, engaging in assassinations, bombings and

suicide attacks across an expanded operating range.

In August 2016, Boko Haram officially split into two groups; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna

Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), led by late Abubakar Shekau and Islamic State-West

Africa Province (ISWAP), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi (Yusuf’s Son) (Phil, 2016) but

now led by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi. The split occurred after al-Barnawi and

Mamman Nur opposed the continuation of Shekau’s rule secured the support of Islamic

State (ISIS), replacing him with al-Barnawi. Shekau rejected the demotion, and instead

17
began commanding a faction comprised of fighters loyal to him but did not renounce his

allegiance to ISIS, and continues to operate under his old banner, JAS (Omar and

Ndubuisi, 2018:12-16). According to the UN Security Council, (2020) In 2019, a third

faction of Boko Haram emerged called Bakura, a Lake Chad-based faction, led by

Bakura. In March 2020, it was reported that the Nigerian military claimed to have killed

Bakura along the Nigeria-Niger border.

JAS been establishing bases in north-western Nigeria, particularly Niger state (CFR,

2020), while ISWAP’s stronghold lies in Lake Chad and has a permanent presence in

the Alagarno forest (ISPI, 2020) Its influence also extends into the northern Borno

countryside, and southwards into Yobe state and parts of south-central Borno. It has a

presence around Maiduguri, particularly in the Konduga local government area. Some

commentators suggest operations extend into North Adamawa and that ISWAP is trying

to deploy networks into Taraba, Kogi and Plateau states and is also capacity building

radical groups in the north-west of Nigeria in Kebbi state by offering livelihood support

(ICG, 2020). Both sects generate revenue by extorting those living in areas of their

influence, taxing the trade of commodities such as cattle and fish, and conducting high-

profile kidnapping operations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). On 19 May 2021,

JAS’s leader Abubakar Shekau with his troops were ambushed and captured by ISWAP

in the Sambisa Forest, which resulted to his death.

2.5. SYNOPSIS OF NIGERIA’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY RESPONSE

Prior to the release of NACTEST under the President Goodluck Jonathan

administration, Nigeria had no coherent policy in place to counter terrorism threats. At

18
the outbreak of the Boko Haram threat, Nigeria relied heavily on conventional military

means to tackle and curb the activities of the group. (Solomon, 2013:42-55). This

strategy focuses on the employment of hard military power through kinetic operations

against the group.

When it could not make substantial headway against Boko Haram, Nigeria formed a

Joint Task Force (JTF) that launched ‘Operation Flush’ to contain the group in 2007

(Rafael and Pieri, 2016:200). The JTF was made up of security personnel from both the

military and police force. Owing to the inability of the JTF to contain Boko Haram’s

activities, Nigeria established the Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) in 2011

(Oluwafemi, 2016:23-34). The SMJTF comprised all the military, paramilitary,

intelligence and security agencies in the country. However, despite the best efforts of

this security outfit, Nigeria could not contain the incessant and ubiquitous attacks of

Boko Haram on combatants and non-combatants in the northeastern states of

Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. In 2013, Nigeria created the Civilian Joint Task Force

(CJTF) to complement the counterterrorism efforts of the security agencies and act as

first responders to any incursion of Boko Haram fighters to vulnerable villages and town

in the northeast (Oluwafemi, 2016:23-34).

All these counter terrorism measures failed to contain the activity of the group. In 2015,

Nigeria employed foreign mercenaries from South Africa to help in its fight against Boko

Haram. By this period, Boko Haram had already established bases of operations on

territories in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. This meant in essence that it became easier

for the group to launch trans-border attacks into Nigeria and vice versa. The realization

that Boko Haram now has transnational capability pushed Nigeria to expand the

19
mandate and operational activity of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2015

(Lauren, 2016:10). The MNJTF is made up of forces from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and

Niger and it played a prominent role in the country’s counterinsurgency and

counterterrorism operations. With the help of both the foreign mercenaries and the

MNJTF, Nigeria was able to turn the tide against Boko Haram. The country had

succeeded in reclaiming most its lost territories from the Boko Haram. On the legal

front, Nigeria fast-tracked the passage of the ‘Anti-Terrorism Act’ in 2013 to empower

the state to execute convicted terrorists and insurgents and thwart terrorist financing

operations (Terrorism Amendment Act, 2013).

2.6. NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES

The Nigerian Armed Forces comprise the army, navy (including the coast guard), and

the air force. Sources estimate the 2021 size of the armed forces active military

personnel between 120 000 (Global Firepower, 2021) and 135 000, including 100 000

in the army, 20 000 navy/coast guard, and 15 000 Air Force (CIA World Factbook,

2020). Paramilitary personnel (like the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps

(NSCDC), which is an agency of the Ministry of the Interior, but assists the military) is

estimated around 80 000 (CIA World Factbook, 2020). In 2021 Nigeria was the 35 th

most powerful military power in the world (Global Firepower, 2021). The army, navy and

air force are administered and coordinated by a Defence Headquarters, which is

headed by a Chief of Defence Staff (Nigeria, Defence Headquarters, 2020).

The Nigerian Army is the land branch of the armed forces and by far the largest of the

three branches, facing the brunt of the country’s security challenges, notably the Boko

20
Haram insurgency (DefenceWeb, 2013). Hierarchically, the army is organised into the

army headquarters, divisions, brigades, battalions/ regiments, regiments, companies,

platoons and sections. The Naval Headquarters is the administrative and policy-making

organ of the Nigerian Navy, which is commanded by the Chief of the Naval Staff. There

are five commands headed by Flag Officers Commanding (FOCs) and five autonomous

units and three operational commands, Western, Eastern and Central Naval

Commands, which are responsible for the protection and policing of the nation’s

maritime environment (Nigerian Navy, 2020). The Nigerian Air Force is commanded by

the Chief of the Air Staff from the Air Force Headquarters. It has six operational

commands and ten staff branches, as well as several direct reporting units (Nigerian

Airforce).

2.7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Resource Dependence Theory

Resource dependency theory propounded by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik (1978)

highlights the relationship between organizations and the resources they need to

operate, such resources may include training, workforce, infrastructure, and funding. If

one organization maintains the majority of a resource, then another will become

dependent on it to operate, creating a symbiotic relationship. For organizations or

countries to resist or overcome hardship, there must be a considerable amount of

exchange in terms of human and capital resources (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2016: 23-29).

Its relevance will be found in highlighting the importance of resources and

empowerment through education and training, in the fight against terrorism.

21
In Nigeria, security agencies depend on the government to operate and this creates the

risk of external control, resulting in uncertainty. External control, such as funding or

policies, in Nigeria is enforced by the government and can have a negative effect on

tasks of counterterrorist operations (Mc Dowl, 2016). While the military depends on the

legislature to approve policies and funding for the fight against terrorism, politics are at

play and act as one of the reasons affecting the military and other counterterrorist

agencies from effectively fighting terrorism.

Resource dependence is not applied to only policies and finances and does not affect

terrorism in only ways where finance or policies by those in power must be exchanged

for effective engagement of terrorists. The role that the wealth or hoarding of natural

resources plays as either a financing mechanism or promotional tool for agitation by

state and non-state actors can be determined by a government, as a strategy for peace

and reconciliation. Regarding motivational elements of civil conflict, abundance of

natural resources may spur would-be rebels to gain political control of territory they can

extract resource wealth from, for economic dependence on the trading of commodities

(Wayland, 2017). Since economic motivations trump the grievance motivations in most

cases of terrorism in Nigeria practical strategies can be mapped out to use natural

resources as means of peace and stability in Nigeria

2.8. EMPIRICAL REVIEW

Afongu (2019) carried out a study on “The Nigerian State Response to Conflict and

Resolution: A Case of Boko Haram in the North East”. The paper investigates the state

and conflict resolution in Nigeria. The paper recommends among other things that,

every Nigerian, community, religious groups, ethnic nationality and governments at

22
every level should manage its excesses and inculcate the culture of tolerance,

forbearance and love to better the lots of other people. Finally, there should be

legitimate representation of the parties involved in conflict for a better resolution of

conflicts.

Lake Chad Basin Commission (2019) conducted a study on “The Effectiveness of the

Lake Chad Basin Commission Alliance against Boko Haram”. The study discovered that

efforts at addressing the security challenges in the region have yielded limited results

due to poor supply of military hardware, poor intelligent gathering and sharing, low

morale of the troops, poor human capital and infrastructural development,

unemployment, corruption, lack of political will to deal with suspected members of the

sect decisively and failure to propagate the right information that can counter the

ideological aspect of the sect, thereby affecting the effectiveness of the alliance. The

study recommends that the alliance members embark upon a massive drive towards the

acquisition of modern military hardware, strengthen the institutions of government, the

intelligent unit must be strengthened and information shared among the alliance

members, the propagation of the right information to deal with the ideological aspect of

the group and peace building initiatives towards addressing the root causes of

insurgency in the region.

Anthony (2019) carried out a study on “Assessment of the Socio-Economic Effects of

Military Operations against Boko Haram Terrorism in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.

Findings revealed that the military counter-terrorism operation against Boko Haram

terrorists in Maiduguri negatively affected the local population which made them to lose

confidence and trust in the military. The study further revealed that military colluded with

23
some politicians with the aim of perpetuating the crisis. The study recommended among

others that the Federal Government should constitute a task force that would

periodically monitor the activities of military including the ranks and file; and those found

wanting be commensurably punished.

Wazeer (2019) conducted a study on “The Challenges and Prospects in the Counter

Terrorism Approach to Boko Haram: 2009- 2018”. The study looked at the many efforts

that have been adopted to combat Boko Haram. It looked at the challenges faced in the

counter-terrorist campaign and how the strategies have failed or succeeded so far. The

study found that Nigeria failed in at least two broad ways. First; the government largely

showed a sheer inability to recognize the possible localization of the global terror threat

as well as work towards the renewed threats posed by the proliferation of weapons.

They perfected their models so much that it took them a few years to even surpass ISIS

in terms of the number of casualties. The study recommended that Nigeria needs to

channel more funds into the military industry of the country to save the country from

over-reliance on imported military hardware which has hampered the operation and may

continue to hamper similar military operations elsewhere. Adequate moral support and

welfare should also be made available to officers and men of the Nigerian military, most

especially those who are at the forefront of the operation against Boko Haram.

Modu et al (2018) conducted a study on “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: The

Conduit for Ending Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria’s North”. This study analyzed the

existing counterinsurgency approaches of Nigeria government in combating an Islamist

insurgent Boko Haram in Nigeria. this study explored that the sustenance of Boko

Haram insurgency in spite of the successive counterinsurgency measures eventuated

24
from the adoption of enemy-centric approach in the combating activities. The study

revealed the repressive military action coupled with draconian laws and policies by the

state created public dissension toward the counterinsurgency campaign, therefore,

undermine the successes of the campaign. In conclusion, the paper recommends that

to effectively tackle the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria government need to deviate

from the enemy-centric approach and to the population centric paradigm that should

focus on addressing the socioeconomic factors fueling the insurgent recruitment and

support.

Edeh et al (2016) conducted a study on “Human Security and Counter-Insurgency

Strategies in the War Against Boko Haram in Nigeria”. The study examined the nexus

between human security and counter-insurgency in Nigeria. Findings show that rather

than the Nigerian government policy makers focusing more on military approach to

resolving the current impasse in the insurgency crisis in Nigeria especially in the north

eastern part of the country, attention should be directed at developmental programmes

that satisfy the expectations of the people based on people-oriented approach.

Habibu (2016) carried out a study on “Nigeria’s military failure against the Boko Haram

Insurgency”. This article attempts to explain the apparent failure of Nigeria’s military

action against the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east of the country. This article

argues that the failure of the military action can be attributed to three factors: the

erosion of military professionalism under civilian administrations since 1999; the poor

handling of the war by the top military officers; and a lack of decisiveness in the

leadership of President Jonathan and the military to end the insurgency.

25
2.9. GAP IN LITERATURE

Although several scholars have conducted research on Boko Haram, limited attention

has been given on Military operations in the fight against Boko haram. Most Literatures

did not focus on specific military operations as well as its impact on the fight against

Boko Haram. This study is important because despite the problems encountered by the

Military in the fight against Boko Haram, it will demonstrate its importance so far in

combating insurgency in order to maintain stability and give peace. Therefore, this study

will proffer recommendations to how the military can win the fight against the Boko

Haram Insurgency.

REFERENCE
Afongu, A, I. 2019 The Nigerian State Response to Conflict and Resolution: A Case of
Boko Haram in the North East. Makurdi, Benue State

Anthony, A., E. 2019. Assessment of the Socio-Economic Effects of Military Operation

against Boko Haram Terrorism in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria. DOI:
10.9790/0837-2401021127 [Link]

26
CNN, 2016 Boko Haram militants kill five hostages kidnapped in Nigeria's northeast, UN
says, [Link]
killed/[Link], accessed 8 August 2021

Council on Foreign Relations 2020. Nigeria’s Boko Haram and heavy weapons. Council
on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from [Link]
haram-and- heavy-weapons

Cook E. C. 2013. History and dynamics of terrorism in Nigeria: Sociopolitical dimension.

International Journal of Innovative Research and Development,1(11).
[Link]
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DefenceWeb, 2013. France to help Nigeria with Boko Haram militants.

[Link]
21097:france-to-helpnigeria-with-boko-haram-militants&catid=56:diplomacy-a-
peace&-Itemid=-111

Edeh, H. C., Ozioko, N. H. and Fyneface D. F. 2016. Human Security and Counter-
Insurgency Strategies in The War Against Boko Haram in Nigeria. Department of
Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

Felbab-Brown, V., 2019 Militias (and Militancy) in Nigeria’s North-East not going away,
in: Day, Adam, Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace- How militias and paramilitary
groups shape post-conflict transitions, United Nations University, accessed 25
July 2021.
[Link]
Pp.10
Global Firepower, 2021. Nigeria Military Strength
http:/[Link]/[Link]?
country_id=nigeria

Habibu, Y. B., 2016: Nigeria's military failure against the Boko Haram insurgency,
African Security Review, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2016.1151799

27
ISPI (Institute per gli studi di politica internazionale), 2020. The Jihadi Proto-State in the
Lake Chad Basin, [Link]
chad-basin-25441, accessed 20 July 2021

Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2013, pp. III-1. Available at

[Link] (accessed 14 June 2021)
Kilcullen, D., 2006. “Three Pillars of Counter-insurgency” (PDF).

Lake Chad Basin Commission (2019) Effectiveness of Lake Chad Basin Alliance
against Boko Haram. LCBC. 2(14)

Lauren P. B., 2016. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions”,

Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, p. 10. Available at
[Link]/sgp/crs/row/[Link] (accessed 14 March 2021)
Matfess, H. 2017. Boko Haram: History and context. Pp. 15-17. Oxford University
Press. Doi 10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.119
Mc Dowl, B. 2016 [Link]. Retrieved from
[Link]
[Link]

Modu, L. G., Ku, H. S., and Mohd, M, 2018 Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: The
Conduit for Ending Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria’s North. European Journal
of Behavioral Sciences ISSN 2538-807X

National Counter Security Strategy (NACTEST)”, Office of the National Security Adviser
(ONSA), Abuja, Nigeria, (1 August 2016). Available at [Link]/Nigerian-
national-security-strategy-2016/ (accessed 14 July 2021)

Nigeria, Defence Headquarters, 2020 The DHQ Story, n.d.,

[Link] accessed 20 July 2021

Nigeria, Nigerian Air Force, Organisation, n.d., [Link]

accessed 20 July 2021

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Nigeria, Nigerian Navy, Structure, n.d., [Link] accessed
20 July 2021

Nwangwu, C., and C. Ezeibe. 2019. Femininity is not inferiority: Women-led civil society
organizations and ‘countering violent extremism’ in Nigeria. International Feminist
Journal of Politics 21 (2): 168–193.

Omar, M., and Ndubuisi, C., 2018. Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region:
Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods. ISS RESEARCH REPORT 3 (2), 12-16

Onapajo, H., & Uzodike, U. O. 2012. Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: Man, the state,
and the international system. African Security Review, 21(3), 24-39

Onuoha, F.C. 2020. The Islamist challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram crisis explained.
African Security Review 19 (2): 54–67.

Oluwafemi, O. 2016. Boko Haram Insurgency and the Challenges of Counter-Terrorism

Policy in Nigeria. Pp. 23-34. Kampala International University, Kampala, Uganda

Rafael, S., and Pieri, Z., 2016. “By the Numbers: The Nigerian State’s Efforts to Counter
Boko Haram”, in Montclos, Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the
State in Nigeria, p. 200

Richard, M. 2016. Ojukwu remembrance day: A repeated Biafran war for Igbo people.
Nigerian Reporter. Retrieved from
[Link]
igbo-people-nigerian-history

Scott R. Moore, 2007 “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal 2 (12).
Pp. 13-15 Available at
[Link] (accessed 21 April
2018)
Shafritz, J. M., Ott, J. S., & Jang, Y. S. (Eds.). 2016. Classics of organization theory.
(8th ed), pp. 23-29. Belmont, CA: Wadworth, Cengage Learning.

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Solomon E. U., (2013)., Boko Haram: Developing New Strategies to Combat Terrorism
in Nigeria, unpublished Master of Strategic Studies Degree thesis, United States
Army War College. Pp. 42-55 Accessed from
[Link]/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/[Link]

Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013”, National Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria.

[Link]
%20ACT%[Link] (accessed 4 July 2021)

UNSC, 2020. Security Council Press Statement on Acts of Terrorism in North-East,

Nigeria. [Link] accessed 3 August
2021

US, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), The World Factbook, 2020: Nigeria, n.d.,
[Link] accessed 19 July 2021

Wazeer, M., 2020 Challenges and Prospects in the Counter-Terrorism Approach to

Boko Haram; 2009-2018. Global Politics Review 6, no. 1-2: 40-56 ISSN 2464-
9929, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3772281

30
 CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets out the procedures and method employed by researchers to arrive at

a reliable and dependable finding. Research methodology provides rules of evidence

which helps to establish credibility of claims of knowledge made by scholars.

3.2. METHODOLOGY STRATEGY

Basic qualitative research design will be employed in this study because it aligns with

the research questions, purpose and the nature of the topic. Basic qualitative research

design encompasses the study of a particular issue in the context of a real-life

experience (Yin, 2009:23). Basic qualitative design will be used to understand the

implications of Nigeria’s counter-insurgence against Boko Haram.

A basic qualitative design is often used in studying phenomena within the context of

certain temporal or geographic parameters, or both to provide a comprehensive

understanding of the phenomenon or phenomena being studied (Creswell, 2013:6).

3.3. CHOSEN METHODOLOGY

For the purpose of gathering adequate data for investigating the problem, Qualitative

Research method will be employed. Qualitative research method is consistent with

exploring and understanding the characteristics of a group of people or individuals in a

given environment in relations to a social or human problem (Creswell, 2013:8). This

methodology is best suited considering that it aligned with the research intent, purpose

31
and the nature of the topic. Creswell (2009:12) argued that this methodology is best

suited for “exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a

social or human problem or phenomenon”. Generally, qualitative study is subjective and

at the same time inductive, which focuses on individual meaning, interpretation, and

understanding of issues based on the views of the participants, in their own natural

settings and environment (Creswell, 2009:13).

3.4. DATA COLLECTION

Given the nature of this study, primary source of data collection will be employed.

Raimo (2018:21), primary source provides raw information and first-hand evidence. It

gives you direct access to the subject of your research. usually data from interview

transcripts, statistical data, official documents are primary data. Consequently, the study

will depend on official documents from the military and other governmental and non-

governmental organization, textbooks, journals articles, conference papers, newspapers

and magazines and internet documents and other survey evidence or empirical study by

researchers. The reliance of study on primary sources (Official documents) is in view of

the researcher’s inability to embark on trips to the areas of particular interest due to

security risk.

3.5. DATA ANALYSIS

Qualitative content analysis provides researchers with a better understanding of social

reality using a scientific method (Zhang & Willdemuth, 2009:11). It is a tool that helps

the testing phase of hypothesis or research questions developed from theories or

previous research. Qualitative content analysis will provide the researcher with a

32
framework to organized data into categories based on the researcher’s interpretation of

the data. This step uses the process of inductive reasoning depending on the generated

themes from the data (Patton, 2002:17). The process of qualitative content analysis is

inductive reasoning starting from the bottom building its way to the result through

themes (Marshall & Rossman, 2006:7). Qualitative content analysis is the best tools to

use in investigating this topic as the researcher will be using historical and current data

on the phenomenon under study. The researcher will be able to grasp the meaning of

the text, document and speeches that are included in the literature.

3.6. LIMITATIONS

A major limitation envisage may be getting truthful information from the military sources,

as it may seem to tarnish their image as an effective security agency, having failed to

meet with expectations to dislodge terrorists over a prolonged period. Given that the

collection of data from the military may be falsified to cover their weaknesses.

3.7. SUMMARY

The methodology adopted by the researcher serves as the process driver for the study,

and the research method aligns with the research purpose and the collection of the data

that will eventually answer the research questions. Data collected will be analyzed for

themes, patterns, and concepts before their interpretation through the content analysis

process. Chapter four and five will address the collected data, its analysis,

interpretation, findings, conclusions and recommendation.

33
REFERENCES

Creswell, J.W. 2009. Research Design. Qualitative and mixed methods approaches.
Third edition. India: SAGE Publications Inc

Creswell, J. W. 2013. Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five
approaches (2nd ed.). India, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Patton, M.Q. 2002. Qualitative research and evaluation methods. (3 rd ed). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.

Raimo S 2018. Primary and secondary sources. [Link]

sources/primary-and-secondary-sources/

Scotland, J. 2012 “Exploring the philosophical underpinnings of research: Relating

ontology and epistemology to the methodology and methods of the scientific,
interpretive, and critical research paradigms,” English Lan Teach., vol. 5, no. 9,
pp. 9–16.

Yin, R. K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.

Zhang, Y, & Willdemuth, B. M., 2009. Applications of Social Research Methods to

Questions in Information and Library Science, Libraries Unlimited. Pp 1-12

34
 CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DICUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1. DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY CHALLENGES POSED BY THE BOKO

HARAM INSURGENCY IN NORTH EASTERN NIGERIA

The impact of the heinous activities of Boko Haram terrorism on the security and

development of the North-East is over-whelming and devastating. It is manifest that the

scourge of the Boko Haram has led to development dearth in North Eastern Nigeria.

Boko Haram, which started as a weak, disorganized, loosely coordinated and inchoate

movement, mutated to pose serious threats to national security. It developed a

capability for strategic power projection, strategic intelligence, and the building of wide-

ranging linkages to subvert the state. Boko Haram’s proficiency in explosives and

operational tempo as well as its tactical sophistication and aggressiveness have

become a source of concern to many observers (Obafemi and Galadima 2013). The

group has also become more vicious and daring in methods, scale of attacks,

geographical reach and selection of targets. The members of the group caused a lot of

damages and unpleasant moments to the people by burning and destroying the

communities’ using arms and arsons (Plouch, 2014).

The resultant public security volatility in the North-East has been an impediment to trade

and investment, peaceful co-existence and stability, as well as sustainable livelihood

and development (Okoli and Iortyer 2014). Boko Haram’s Insurgency has led to food

scarcity in North East Nigeria. This is because the traders from the Northern Nigeria are

35
finding it extremely difficult to transport their commodities to other parts of the country.

Residents are sporadically migrating from the North-east in their large numbers for their

life. The danger is that they have abandoned their profession which is largely farming

and this has drastically reduced food production and compounded the problem of food

insecurity.

Boko Haram’s insurgency has made citizens’ trust in formal security forces erode, due

to corruption, inefficiency, and weak accountability. Insufficient coordination between

security actors often resulted in delayed and heavy-handed responses to local security

threats. The insurgency dramatically exacerbated these challenges. The severity and

sophistication of the attacks on Nigeria’s military asset have been bizarrely different and

have even made the military cluster in super camps leaving the residents in some

villages at the mercy of Boko Haram (Lerum, 2020). According) to Felbab-Brown,

(2018:3-4), the military’s inability to protect civilians in the early years of the conflict

generated widespread resentment. Communities accused security forces of targeting

the population, collaborating with the insurgents, and prolonging the fighting for financial

gain. As Boko Haram has been pushed back, relations between citizens and security

forces have improved in some localities. Yet fear and mistrust are still pervasive, and

civilians often prefer turning to community militia; such as the Civilian Joint Task Force

(CJTF) for protection Lerum, (2020).

Security forces continue to treat civilians trapped in Boko Haram (JAS or ISWAP)

controlled areas as likely terrorist suspects, and they starve the countryside to deprive

Boko Haram of its resources. In some places, farmers are still unable to grow tall crops

as they obstruct ongoing security operations; the military has also limited the sale of

36
fertilizers and fuel. Cross-border trade has suffered, while accusations of military

corruption abound. Fishermen and traders around Lake Chad have accused soldiers of

seizing their deliveries and working with local authorities to collect illicit taxes (Mare,

2020). These practices cut directly against efforts to rebuild communities’ economic

resilience. Also, Boko Haram insurgency has caused disruptions in grazing routes as

herdsmen redirect their route for fear of being killed or kidnapped by the insurgents and

this has exacerbated conflicts between farmers and herders, while protracted

displacement has caused friction between internally displaced persons (IDPs),

returnees, and host communities.

The Boko Harm insurgency has brought a halt to academic activities to most of the local

governments area except for Maiduguri and Biu Local Government Areas which are

relatively peaceful. They have demolished schools and even when the government

renovates them, they still go ahead to demolish them (Lerum, 2020). As a result of this,

the number of schools drop outs have increased astronomically. This has equally led to

underdevelopment of the young people and has also increased unemployment and

thuggery bringing about a hard troll on education. Likewise, investors are fleeing the

region as their lives and properties are not guaranteed; this has seen many transport

companies leave as transport owners are scared of their lives and investment thereby

relocating to the other parts of the country (Mare, 2020). This adds to the cost of

transportation. Added to this is the problem of food insecurity and lack of agricultural

produce caused by displacement of farmers and plundering of foodstuff and livestock. It

is manifest that the scourge of the Boko Haram has led to food scarcity in the North

East, this has skyrocketed food prices especially in Maiduguri and Biu. Majority of

37
farmers especially in Borno state has been displaced by Boko Haram’s violence making

them no longer able to cultivate their lands for fear of being attacked by Boko Haram

members.

Furthermore, Felbab-Brown (2020:14) state that Boko Haram violence has led to the

destruction of health facilities in the North east, forcing health workers to either flee or

shut down clinics. This in turn has compelled residents to seek medical attention in

other states of Nigeria and even Cameroon, Niger and Chad thereby adding to the

pressure on limited health facilities in the host communities. The activities of Boko

Haram have led to loss of jobs and brought hardship to individuals in the state. Most

entrepreneurs have left the state or are at the mercy of donor agencies for livelihood

and survival (EASO. 2021:23).

The overall effect of this insurgence on development is that the economy is fast

deteriorating. It has constituted the hallmark of socio-economic development. This has

led to the problem of micro economic instability, distortion and leakages in the economy

with the attendant problem of infrastructural decay and hyperinflation. To a large extent,

the implication is that more people are trapped into the vortex of interlocking vicious

circle of poverty.

4.2. EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION LAFIYA DOLE AND OPERATION HADIN

KAI COUNTER-INSURGENCE STRATEGIES

In August 2013, the 7th Infantry Division of the Nigerian security forces replaced the

Joint Task Force and assumed overarching command of security operations in Borno

and parts of Adamawa and Yobe States all in North-eastern Nigeria. The 3rd Infantry

38
Division was tasked with containing the Boko Haram threat in the areas surrounding the

epicenter of military operations (Gombe State and parts of Adamawa and Yobe States).

In mid-2015, the 8th Infantry Division was also deployed to curtail Boko Haram’s

activities in parts of southern Borno State. Collectively, the three infantry divisions

dubbed Operation Lafiya Dole were responsible for military operations against Boko

Haram Insurgency.

Renamed from Operation BOYONA by Lieutenant General TY Buratai on assumption of

Office as Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff in 2015, Operation Lafiya Dole’s mandate was to

“Restore law and order, rescue all persons abducted by the Boko Haram insurgents

including the Chibok girls and to restore civil authority areas that were previously

captured by the Boko Haram; thereby facilitating the movements of NGOs and

Government agencies to provide relief materials to Internally Displaced Persons”

(James 2017:309-322). This mandate however, is directly related to that of denying the

insurgent’s ability to operate within the same axis, as the Operation Lafiya Dole.

According to the Theater Command (2015), to counterbalance this practically invincible

enemy, the Nigerian Military’s three objectives were;

i. To create a rear area, secure from further external offensives. Certainly, that

the insurgent would remain embedded within these “built-up” areas for a while

hence, was almost inevitable (OPLD, 2015). Yet, weapons caches; seemingly

innocuous materials which nonetheless could be used for IEDs (ammonium

nitrate for instance) (Adeoye, 2016); and lorry loads of fighters coming in for

39
 major offensives, could not be an option of ingress into these areas, if

aggregate progress was to be made.

ii. To detach the Military from its omnipresent image of an offensive force with

guns, armored units and camouflaged fatigues, to one where trained

personnel in mufti could beginning building local trust. This change of action

set, from offensive, where the Army took the lead, to defensive, where

roadblocks were manned and soft targets were hardened, would then allow

for the third objective:

iii. A safer environment for the intelligence-gathering taskforce components to

facilitate precision and tactical military offensives. The local police and DSS,

as well as the DIA (military intelligence) would play an instrumental role here

as plain clothed operatives intermingled with the local populace.

According to the Theatre Command, (2020:17-22), “Operation Lafiya Dole re-

strategized its operations in the North East leading to the exploitation of Open-Source

Intelligence (OSINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to gather publicly available

information on specific targets, restructuring, introduction of new platforms and

equipment which has considerably changed the tide against the insurgents and has led

to so many successes recorded in the theatre of operations which include: Coordinated

Strategic Communication and Information Operations which is done to influence,

disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries

while protecting own troops and allies”. According to the Theatre Command (2020: 25-

32), this strategy includes employing the Directorate of Islamic Affairs of the Nigerian

Army to conduct sermons in the worst hit areas of Boko Haram activities using

40
publications and CD recordings in a bid to sway public opinions to denounce terrorism,

periodic briefings and interviews, press releases, publication of Soja Magazine, Airman

Magazine, information journals and regular updates of Nigerian Military social media

platforms (Facebook and Twitter accounts), as well as embedding journalists in some of

its operations. Similarly, the Nigerian Military has established the LAFIYA DOLE FM to

bolster its information and media operations drive (NA, 2020:12). The radio station

which broadcasts in English, Hausa and Kanuri, and other major local languages with a

view to sensitize them on the danger of the Boko Haram ideology as well as reorient the

locals on the tenets of the two religions which both uphold peaceful coexistence, love

and denounce violence of any sort.

The operation began conducting counterinsurgency campaign, focusing essentially on

shelling Boko Haram bases in the Sambisa forest, Baga and several other enclaves in

the savannah parts of Borno State (Ugwueze and Onuoha 2020:6-8), employing aerial

operations from the Nigerian Air Force which have given tremendous success to the

forays occasioned on Boko Haram insurgents by the deployment of Intelligence,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and foray of aerial bombardments. Also,

cordon and search operations which were carried out based on intelligence reports

about sect members in certain locations. Such operations have in many cases led to the

capture of some suspected members of the Boko Haram sect and the recovery of arms,

ammunition, and explosives as well as some equipment used in the production of

improvised explosive devices. There were, however, a few cases where surprise and

security were lost due to the lack of proper coordination, and casualties were suffered

on both sides (Umar, 2016:234-237). Coupled with the fact that the Nigerian military has

41
left a lot of its equipment to become moribund, it should come as little surprise therefore

that the tide of war, over the years, has taken its current direction.

In 2019 the Nigerian Defense headquarters changed military strategy and consolidated

its forces into bigger and better equipped so-called “super camps”, to improve their

defense against insurgents (OPLD, 2020:24). The aim was to increase the capacity of

the army to mobilize quickly, to take the fight to their adversary, and “deny terrorists,

bandits and kidnappers the freedom of action”. However, Felbab-Brown (2020:12)

indicates that the move to “super camps” instead created space for militants to move

more freely, deepen their roots in communities and strengthen their supply chains. It

also eroded the protection of civilians in areas from which troops withdrew. Operation

Lafiya Dole response to Boko Haram became more effective, with most militants on the

run or hiding in the Sambisa forest with the groups no longer capable of keeping

territory for a significant amount of time, or conducting a sustained asymmetric

campaign. Nigerian soldiers have reportedly killed dozens of Islamist Boko Haram

militants in a major operation in the North-east of the country. However, evidence of

Boko Haram’s resurgence is piling up (EASO. 2021:22-25). According to Radio

Universe (2021 February) “Troops stormed the jihadists’ strongholds in Kidari, Argude,

Takwala, Chowalta and Galdekore. The soldiers are said to have gained access into the

notorious Timbuktu Triangle in the vast Sambisa Forest, located between Borno and

Yobe States. The insurgents no longer control huge swathes of territory in Nigeria's

northeast, but continue to carry out attacks on both military and civilian targets - mostly

ambushes.

42
Operation Lafiya Dole used airstrikes and ground troops and focused on ISWAP

hideouts in the Alagarno forest (from Damboa in southwest Borno to Goniri in eastern

Yobe) and Boko Haram/JASDJ hideouts in Sambisa forest, near Borno’s border with

Cameroon. According to OPLD Theater Command (2020:19-24) the challenge troops of

Operation Lafiya Dole are facing in the Northeast is the level of how civilians are

concealing the terrorists and declining from giving useful information. Due to the

repression disposition of the Military, Nigerians obviously see the Military as potential

violators of their security rather than providers. The scenario in Operation Lafiya Dole

proved that the Military is heavily present in the Northeast and amidst civilians but are

psychologically far from them in terms of collaborative commitments to end the

insurgents’ activities, hence mitigating the success of the operation.

Operation Lafiya Dole used different physiological operations in its narrative, this

instrument has helped to open doors of opportunities for some Boko Haram terrorist to

surrender which many have done through the introduction of Operation Safe Corridor.

The capture of Camp Zero as well as the decimation of the ranks of the group was

exploited for psy Ops purposes through the upload of pictures and videos to the media

space to play down the assumed superiority of the terror group. In the course of these

complementary operations, military personnel served as teachers in IDP camps for

children of internally displaced persons. An extension to it was Operation Gama Aiki,

which was mandated to serve the same purpose as Operation Crackdown in the

northern part of Borno state. Operation Safe Corridor and Operation Rescue Finale

were set up for the de-radicalization and rehabilitation of repentant Boko Haram

members. It was aimed at giving vocational training to the convicted terrorists. This is in

43
addition to the Yellow Ribbon Initiative anchored by the Neem Foundation since 2017 to

rehabilitate women, children and other young people having an association with the

terrorists to re-orientate them and help them reintegrate back into the society (Adibe,

2020:13). The combination of these operations resulted in the eventual fall of Camp

Zero in the Sambisa forest of the North East (Felbab-Brown, 2018:7-11).

On April 30th, 2021, Lieutenant General Ibrahim Attahiru, the immediate Chief of Army

Staff renamed Operation Lafiya Dole (OPLD) to Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK).

According to Cable NG (2021), Mohammed Yerima, the Nigerian Army spokesperson,

in a statement, said the renaming to Hadin Kai, which means ‘cooperation’, is in line

with the vision of Ibrahim Attahiru, of having “a Nigerian Army that is repositioned to

professionally defeat all adversaries in a joint environment”. “This was premised on the

fact that the Nigerian military has made a lot of progress over the years and needs to re-

align for better efficiency” (NA, 2021). “Also affected in the re-designation are the Army

Super Camps which now reflect the nomenclature of the formations and units followed

by the name of the locations they occupy, while sub-units are redesigned as Forward

Operating Bases (FOBs) followed by the name of their locations.” (Cable NG, 2021)

The Nigerian military response to Boko Haram has become more effective, with most

militants on the run or hiding in the Sambisa Forest. The group is no longer capable of

keeping territory for a significant amount of time, or conducting a sustained asymmetric

campaign. However, evidence of Boko Haram’s resurgence is piling up (Janes, 2021).

As a consequence of Boko Haram’s ability to deny the Nigerian military strategic victory,

an important question some have asked is how the military have struggled against Boko

Haram; and in particular, how the insurgents can move in columns across the arid

44
terrain, capture towns, and defend strategic territory for months. The intensified military

response in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism has forced the group to adopt

guerrilla tactics of ambushes and suicide bombings. Thus, prompting the Nigerian

Government to consider negotiating with the group’s members willing to surrender

(Ndujihe et al., 2018; Sahara Reporters, 2018).

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Nigeria have pursued different counterinsurgency models that are nonetheless both

enemy-centric; seeking to target militants with overwhelming force and using forceful

methods to separate insurgents from the population. These approaches have proven

problematic and potentially strategically self-defeating when facing insurgents who, even

if they coerce those who turn against them, regard winning over the population as a core

part of their strategy. As Omeni (2020:195) notes, the Army’s “capstone doctrine and

culture centres around the idea of planning and operationalizing for a traditional

adversary against whom conventional capabilities can be maneuvered at scale and

overwhelming firepower can be brought to bear”. The same approach has been used

since the beginning of the crisis. using a highly kinetic way, crushing the initial rebellion

in short order, but exacerbating it in the long term.

A key tactic of the Nigerian military has been to forcefully clear civilians living in insecure

militant-influenced areas out of their communities into garrisoned towns and militarily

secure IDP camps (Carsten and Lanre, 2017). From the enemy-centric point of view,

this has the tactical advantage of severing the link between communities and militants

and allowing for the use of unrestricted force against militants without concern for

45
civilian casualties (Berlingozzi & Ed Stoddard 2020:11). However, such operations have

also frustrated the civilian populace and created more hatred for the JTF as innocent

individuals are believed to have been killed in some failed operations or as part of

collateral damage, this feeds into jihadist narratives of insurgents as ‘protectors’ of the

community, contributing to consolidation of their control over populations. This measure

has failed to provide locally apt, population-centric responses (winning the population’s

support through persuasion and the supply of public goods (security and economic

development), and in many cases have aggravated the phenomenon they seek to

counter (Paul et al. 2016, 1022).

Several factors have constrained the Nigerian security force response, most notably

security sector corruption and mismanagement. Nigerian troops are also not adequately

resourced or equipped to counter the insurgency. Soldiers in the northeast are suffering

from malfunctioning equipment, low morale, desertions, and mutinies (Jerome, 2020:6).

Despite a large increase in government spending on the army from a security budget,

(Omeni, 2020:197). Obtaining timely, adequate and credible intelligence; ability to

predict the intentions of, and act before, the adversary; booby traps, landmines and

improvised explosive devices (IEDs); fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA) or military

operations in urban terrain (MOUT); the use of civilians as human shields by insurgent

have given the military operations some challenges.

46
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Adeoye, A. 2016. Author's interview with JTF ORO Police Component Commander and
Chief Superintendent of Police (CSP), Aderemi Adeoye. Maiduguri

Adibe, J. 2020. Negotiating the Nigerian-nation. Essays on state, governance and

development. Abuja, Nigeria: Adonis & Abbey Publishing Company.

Berlingozzi, L. & Ed Stoddard (2020): Assessing Misaligned Counterinsurgency Practice

in Niger and Nigeria, The International Spectator, Pp. 11. DOI:
10.1080/03932729.2020.1833472

Carsten, P., and Lanre, O. 2017. Nigeria Puts Fortress Towns at Heart of New Boko
Haram Strategy. Reuters, 1 December. [Link]
nigeria-security-borno/nigeria-puts-fortress-towns-at-heart-of-new-boko-haram-
strategy-idUSKBN1DV4GU.

European Asylum Support Office, 2021. ISBN978-92-9465-082-5 doi: 10.2847/433197

BZ-08-21-089-EN-N

Felbab-Brown, V.,2018. Nigeria’s Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko

Haram, Foreign Affairs, 2018. Available at
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(accessed 21 August 2021)

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IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) (2019) The Military Balance 2014.
London: IISS

James, Saliba B. 2017. Operation Lafiya Dole and the Reclaiming of Peace in the
NorthEast: An Analysis of Effective Military leadership of Lt. Gen. TY Buratai. In
The Nigerian Army in a Democracy since 1999: A Professional Demonstration of
Military Subordination to Civil Authority – Essays in Honour of Lieutenant
General Tukur Yusufu Buratai, edited by A. M. Ashafa and Hussaini Jibrin, 309-
322. Kaduna: Pyla-Mak Services Ltd

Janes Sentinel Country Risk Assessments. 2019. Armed Forces, subscription only,

Janes Sentinel Country Risk Assessments 2021. World Insurgency and Terrorism -
Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya -, subscription only (copies on request), various dates.

Lerum, B. 2020. Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Development in North-Eastern

Nigeria. Master’s dissertation, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria.

Mare, R. 2020. Insecurity and the Dearth of Development in Borno State: A study of
Boko Haram Insurgency. Master’s Thesis. Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
Kaduna State

Nigerian Army (NA). 2021. Nigerian Army Doctrine. Abuja: Army Headquarter

Nduhije, C. 2018. Security: FG spends N6trn on defence in 11 years. Vanguard

(Nigeria) newspaper, July 29. [Link]
spends-n6trn-on-defence-in-11-years/.

Obafemi, O.& Galadima, H. (2013). Complex insurgencies in Nigeria (pp. - xvii). Jos,
Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies

Okoli, C., and Iortyer. P., 2014 Terrorism and human crisis in Nigeria: insight from
Boko Haram insurgency. Global Journal of Human-Social Science (F) (Political
Science)14(1):39–50

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Omale, D.J.O. 2013. Terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical paradigms
and lessons for public policy. Canadian Social Science, 9(3), 96-103. Retrieved
from:[Link]
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Omeni, A. 2020. Insurgency and War in Nigeria: Regional Fracture and the Fight
Against Boko Haram. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Pp 197

Omeni, A. 2020. Boko Haram’s Increasingly Sophisticated Military Threat, Small Wars
and Insurgencies, 29(5). pp.195 [Link]
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Onuoha, F.C. 2020. The Islamist challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram crisis explained.
African Security Review 19 (2): 21.

OPLD Theater Command Report. 2020. 6(6). Pp.19-65. Maiduguri, Borno State

Radio Univers. 2021. [Link]

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Sahara Reporters. 2019. 91.8 Million Nigerians are extremely poor, says World Poverty
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Ugwueze, M.I. and F.C. Onuoha. 2020. Hard versus soft measures to security:
Explaining the failure of counter-terrorism strategy in Nigeria. Journal of Applied
Security Research 15(3): 6-8

49
 CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. CONCLUSION

Nigerian Military have undertaken a range of policies in response to the Boko Haram

menace, including supporting vigilante networks, imposing states of emergency,

adopting programmes to re-integrate former combatants, and initiating reconstruction

projects amongst others. However, such responses have been conducted on an ad hoc

basis in reaction to tactics adopted by Boko Haram. Some of these policies have also

had a negative impact on civilians, engendering local discontent. Amnesty International

(2020) states that many non-combatants have allegedly also been killed by the military

in the counter-insurgency campaigns and others have been wrongly detained. In some

quarters the soldiers were reportedly more feared in Maiduguri than Boko Haram

(Higazi, 2019). One of the factors that has continued to undermine these operations is

corruption. Sharp practices such as alleged part or non-payment of entitlements of

troops engaged in the fight against Boko Haram, reduction of soldier’s ration/cash

(feeding) allowance, rationing of arms and logistics, infiltration of the military and

50
sabotage have combined to diminish troop morale and undermine the success of

military operations (Obi 2016).

Onuoha et al (2020:21) states that contrary to the official refrain that Boko Haram has

been technically defeated, the group has successfully adapted to challenging security

situation imposed by over a decade of national and regional military campaigns in the

Lake Chad region. The military-led counterinsurgency has no doubt registered

significant gains against the insurgents, particularly evident in the recapturing of

territories previously held by the group, freeing of some Boko Haram captives,

occasional interdiction of the group’s logistics routes, and arrest or killing of some of its

foot soldiers. Notwithstanding the notable improvement in the ongoing military

operations, the exploits of Boko Haram, especially the ISWAP faction, have diminished

the claims by the Nigerian government that Boko Haram has been defeated, technically

or not. The insurgents’ audacious attacks on security posts and military bases have led

to the killing of many soldiers, looting of armoury, destruction of military hardware, and

desertion by soldiers Onuoha et al (2020:21).

While it is difficult to specifically measure the level of success of the military-led

counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram, it seems apparent that several

factors have encumbered ongoing operations. Despite huge amounts of money

funnelled into the military to win the fight against Boko Haram, widespread corruption in

the counterinsurgency operations remains a major factor that stands in the way of

success. Manifest challenges such as obsolete weapons, sabotage, infiltration, mutiny,

desertion, poor troop morale and battlefield shortages of arms, which military authorities

are quick to cite as militating against successful military campaign, are actually

51
symptomatic of the level of corruption bedeviling the nation’s counterinsurgency

operations. Boko Haram factions have exploited these deficits to their own advantage

by staging attacks when soldiers’ morale are low or military bases suffering from

shortage of arms and ammunition.

For ongoing military operations to lead to ‘technical defeat’ of the Boko Haram, priority

attention needs to be paid to the viscid sinew of corruption that has hampered

counterinsurgency operations. Concerted measures need to be taken by the

government to implement or strengthen mechanisms for deepening transparency and

accountability in the defense sector, particularly in the military. This should focus

principally on the critical but grey spots: weapons procurement, welfare packages to

troops, stockpile management and the payment of benefits and entitlements to troops or

to the next-of-kin of those killed in action as the case may be. There is equally the need

for a comprehensive inquest into the extent of Boko Haram infiltration of the military to

uncover how corrupt soldiers are compromising the integrity of military operations due

to greed and selfishness.

The imperative of overhauling and strengthening the military-led counterinsurgency

operations by the Nigerian government has become more urgent than ever, given the

complexity of the insurgency brought about by the emergence of splinter groups;

Bakura and Darulsalam, threat of foreign terrorist fighters in the Lake Chad, and an

increasing deployment of technology such as drones by these insurgents (Omeni,

2020:201). As evidence presented in this analysis has shown, the problem with

Nigeria’s military-led counterinsurgency operations is not so much about the adequacy

of funds for military operations, but more about how the fund available is utilized and

52
lack of trust for inter-agency collaboration. If the manacle of weak inter-agency

collaboration, elite conspiracy and prevalence of institutional corruption is not broken at

the strategic, operational and tactical levels of counterinsurgency operation, it is very

unlikely that Boko Haram will be defeated in the battlefield.

5.2. RECOMMENDATION

In theory, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy largely reflects global best practices in

countering terrorism through soft approach. However, what is practically on ground is

antithetical to the content of the document; particularly because counter-terrorism in

Nigeria is still largely shaped by hard approach. Although the application of force has

largely degraded the sect’s capacity to seize and administer territories, the group is far

from being defeated (Onuoha et al., 2020:22).

The counterinsurgency policy towards Boko Haram has to some extent impacted the

fight positively as Boko Haram no longer place claim to any territory in Nigeria, though it

is also evident that Boko Haram has wreaked havoc and violence in the North-East

region for over a decade. Policies which should be able to tackle the ideology espoused

by Boko Haram in a holistic approach should be a priority for making headway. The

main drivers of its insurgency are internal and should be addressed by the country’s

federal and state-level governments. These drivers include: governance failures in the

North East in particular, and Nigeria in general; a poorly coordinated, mainly military,

response; multiple security challenges that stretch the army to the breaking point.

Security service morale and trust of the security services among locals is widely

reported to be low with Boko Haram having a better knowledge of the countryside

than the security services.

53
The operation safe corridor and the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

(DDR) are good programs to carry, but economic empowerment should be the main

focus as many youths are coerced in to joining Boko haram because of financial

hardship. The DDR and Operation safe corridor should teach them useful skills to get

jobs, and to de-radicalise them. Thus, creating economic empowerment programs will

encourage them not to have a rethink of joining the insurgency as it will provide them

with skills on how to provide their basic needs for them. The porous and weak border

enforcement by security personnel has allowed Boko Haram to transport arms,

establish safe havens. Nigeria must revamp its military with adequate equipment and its

alliance with the Multinational Joint Task force countries and better intelligence-

gathering against Boko Haram as it had worked effectively until it was weakened by

chad’s withdrawal of hundreds of troops from Niger republic in October. An improved

regional security response must also incorporate local agents with profound knowledge

of the border areas if it is to be successful. Reviving the Multi National Joint Task Force

is essential to ensure continued hard-hitting military pressure on Boko Haram. Also,

Nigeria needs to address fatigue and low morale among the troops.

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

i. Counterinsurgency should not be seen as a blunt military effort that focuses

solely on capturing and killing high value targets. An important part of

counterinsurgency in Nigeria demands a greater reliance on non-military force.

The military must take absolute control of the population. The population is the

epicenter of insurgency and to record successes, the support of the population

must be won. Adequate efforts should be towards detaching the insurgents

54
 from the population. This is where wining ‘hearts and mind’ becomes

imperative

ii. Maintaining a functional security sector for counterinsurgency in Nigeria will

require specialized training and adequate and timely release of funds for

maintenance of men, materials and equipment. This must be given priority

attention and the grievances of service personnel must be addressed to

improve morale.

iii. The use of intelligence must be deepened to include closer collaboration with

local community actors who are familiar with the terrain in which Boko Haram

operates.

iv. Ideological warfare needs grounded ideology to counter. An ideological trend

requires ideological solution premised on national values and undiluted Islamic

injunctions. The counter insurgency should take a two-pronged approach: The

Kinetic (physical war) and the Non-kinetic (deradicalization, cutting of all forms

of supplies to the insurgents) to bring the insurgency to its knees.

55