Special Civil Actions

Civil Procedure (Bar Lecture Series) of Riano (2019 or 2016)

I. Concept and Nature of Special Civil Action

● Concepts:
○ A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
○ Both ordinary and special civil actions are governed by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special
civil action.
○ There are however certain rules applicable only to special civil actions.
The fact that that an action is subject to certain special rules, other than
those applicable to ordinary civil actions, is what makes a civil action
special.
○ The fact that an action is subject to certain special rules, other than those
applicable to ordinary civil actions, is what makes a civil action special.
○ While ordinary civil actions are initiated by the filing of a complaint, some
special civil actions are initiated by filing a petition.
○ Special Civil Actions may be found on the Rules of Court (Rules of Civil
Procedure) Rules 62-71
● Cases:
○ Teraña v. Hon. Antonio de Sagun, G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009
◆ An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not
be properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an
ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for
unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary
procedure.
◆ Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he
may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
◆ (b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;

○ PDIC v. Court of Appeals, [Link]., G.R. No. 126911, April 30, 2003
◆ Without doubt, a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially
entail an executory process. There is nothing in its nature,
however, that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the
same action.
 
II. Interpleader

● RULE 62. Interpleader.

○ Section 1. When interpleader proper. — Whenever conflicting claims upon
the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims
no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or
in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves. (1a, R63)
○ Section 2. Order. — Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue
an order requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another.
If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct in such order that
the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court. (2a, R63)
○ Section 3. Summons. — Summons shall be served upon the conflicting
claimants, together with a copy of the complaint and order. (3, R63)
○ Section 4. Motion to dismiss. — Within the time for filing an answer, each
claimant may file a motion to dismiss on the ground of impropriety of the
interpleader action or on other appropriate grounds specified in Rule 16.
The period to file the answer shall be tolled and if the motion is denied,
the movant may file his answer within the remaining period, but which
shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of
denial. (n)
○ Section 5. Answer and other pleadings. — Each claimant shall file his
answer setting forth his claim within fifteen (15) days from service of the
summons upon him, serving a copy thereof upon each of the other
conflicting claimants who may file their reply thereto as provided by these
Rules. If any claimant fails to plead within the time herein fixed, the court
may, on motion, declare him in default and thereafter render judgment
barring him from any claim in respect to the subject matter.
○ The parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims,
third-party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by
these Rules. (4a, R63)
○ Section 6. Determination. — After the pleadings of the conflicting
claimants have been filed, and pre-trial has been conducted in
accordance with the Rules, the court shall proceed to determine their
respective rights and adjudicate their several claims. (5a, R63)
○ Section 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as
liens. — The docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a
complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and litigation expenses,
shall constitute a lien or change upon the subject matter of the action,
unless the court shall order otherwise. (6a, R63)
 ○ Basically interpleader is where the plaintiff has no interest in the subject
matter, or his liability is not disputed, and asks the court to have the
interested parties to plead among themselves.
○ Requisites:
◆ There must be two or more claimants with adverse or conflicting
interests upon a subject matter
◆ The conflicting claims involve the same subject matter
◆ The conflicting claims are made against the same person (the
plaintiff)
◆ The plaintiff has no claim upon the subject matter, or if he has interest
such interest is not disputed by the claimants.
○ There would be no interpleader if even though the claims are against the
same subject matter, but the claims are not against the plaintiff.
○ The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but
to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one’s liability.
○ The court with jurisdiction over an action for interpleader shall depend on:
◆ If personal property being claimed is < 300k/400k it is the MTC. If
greater then RTC.
◆ If real property being claimed by the parties is < 20k/50k then MTC. If
greater then RTC.
◆ If incapable of pecuniary estimation then RTC.
○ Interpleader is commenced by the filing of complaint by the person who
was being claimed against.
○ Grounds for motion to dismiss:
◆ Impropriety (applies when the requisites of the interpleader is not
complete, i.e. plaintiff has interest in the subject matter)
◆ Rule 16 grounds (Litis pendencia, Res judicata, Lack of jurisdiction)
○ Answer should be filed within 15 days from service.
○ Court may not motu proprio declare a claimant in default, it has to be upon
motion.
○ If a claimant is declared in default, the judgement is one that bars him
from any claim in respect to the subject matter.
○ Counter-claims, cross-claims, third-party complaints and responsive
pleadings may be filed in an interpleader complaint
○ When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there
arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and
in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint
in interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

● Concepts:
○ Rule 62.
● Cases:
○ Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma, March 12, 2014
 ◆ In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of
parties in the nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the
interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification
case filed in the Davao trial court.
◆ Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the
interpleader case.
◆ A The requisites of litis pendentia are:
◆ (1)Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions;
◆ (2)Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and
◆ (3)The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

○ Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Metro Container Corporation,

G.R. No. 127913, Sept. 13, 2001
◆ In the case before us, it is undisputed that METROCAN filed the
interpleader action (Civil Case No. 4398-V-94) because it was unsure
which between LEYCON and RCBC was entitled to receive the
payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON was
claiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC
was making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the
property in its name.
◆ Hence, the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC
rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6202 whereby the court directed
METROCAN to pay LEYCON "whatever rentals due on the subject
premises x x x." While RCBC, not being a party to Civil Case No. 6202,
could not be bound by the judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by
the MeTC decision. When the decision in Civil Case No. 6202 became
final and executory, METROCAN has no other alternative left but to
pay the rentals to LEYCON.
◆ It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded
to protect a person not against double liability but against double
vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable
requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or
in part is not disputed by the claimants.” The decision in Civil Case
No. 6202 resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of
rentals was concerned.

○ Ocampo v. Tirona, April 6, 2005

 ◆ The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria
Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used
reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court.
Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo
against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person
to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.

○ Cebu Woman’s Club v. Hon. Loreto De La Victoria, [Link]., March 9, 2000

◆ Verily, the alleged grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction
raised in the petition is misplaced. First, there is no question that the
trial court has jurisdiction over the interpleader case. Second,
petitioner’s claim that the trial court failed to observe the
procedure for an interpleader action does not constitute grave
abuse of discretion for the extraordinary writ to issue. It is only an
error of judgment correctible by an ordinary appeal. The
extraordinary writ does not issue to correct errors of procedure or
mistake in the findings and conclusions of the judge.
◆ A scrutiny of the issues raised in this case shows that it includes
factual matters. The resolution of the interpleader case
necessitates a determination of whether the other pending cases
relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the former case
involves the same matters covered by the latter cases. There is a
need to determine whether the pending civil cases arise out of the
same facts and circumstances as those involved in the interpleader
case. As such, petitioner’s direct resort to this court must fail
considering that this court is not a trier of facts.

○ Arreza v. Diaz, Jr., August 30, 2001

◆ The elements of res adjudicata are:
◆ (a) that the former judgment must be final;
◆ (b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter;
◆ (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
◆ (d) there must be between the first and second causes of action
identity of the parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
◆ As stated by the Court of Appeals, the court in a complaint for
interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties
and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations, and
claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party
in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to
respondent Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an
 interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party
complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, "as provided by these
Rules." The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly
authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in
the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its
incidents.
◆ Respondent should have filed his claims against petitioner Arreza
in the interpleader action.
◆ Although the alternative defense of being builders in good faith is only
permissive, the counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of the
improvements is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim.
Thus, the failure by the private respondents to set it up bars their
right to raise it in a subsequent litigation (Rule 9, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court). While We realize the plight of the private
respondents, the rule on compulsory counterclaim is designed to
enable the disposition of the whole controversy at one time and in one
action. The philosophy of the rule is to discourage multiplicity of suits.
◆ Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of
respondent Diaz being in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim
is now barred.
◆ In the present case, we find there is an identity of causes of action
between Civil Case No. 94-2086 and Civil Case No. 96-1372.
Respondent Diaz’s cause of action in the prior case, now the crux
of his present complaint against petitioner, was in the nature of an
unpleaded compulsory counterclaim, which is now barred.

○ Del Carmen v. Spouses Sabordo, G.R. No. 181723, August 11, 2014
◆ Consignation [is] the act of depositing the thing due with the court or
judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to
accept payment, and it generally requires a prior tender of payment.
◆ Petitioner and her co-heirs, upon making the deposit with the RTC, did
not ask the trial court that respondents be notified to receive the
amount that they have deposited. In fact, there was no tender of
payment. Instead, what petitioner and her co-heirs prayed for is that
respondents and RPB be directed to interplead with one another to
determine their alleged respective rights over the consigned amount;
◆ For a consignation or deposit with the court of an amount due on a
judgment to be considered as payment, there must be prior
tender to the judgment creditor who refuses to accept it.
◆ Take Note Section 2 of the Rule, “the order may order for the delivery
of the thing or payment”. It implies that an interpleader be filed before,
and await the order for the court for delivery.
 ○ Pasricha v. Don Luis Dizon Realty, Inc., March 14, 2008
◆ What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was
petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they did
not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not
justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they
were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation
of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.
◆ Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment must be accompanied
by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be
produced.
 
III. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

● RULE 63. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

○ Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
○ An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (1a, R64)
○ Section 2. Parties. — All persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties; and no
declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, prejudice
the rights of persons not parties to the action. (2a, R64)
○ Section 3. Notice on Solicitor General. — In any action which involves the
validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other
governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the
party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such
question. (3a, R64) [what type of party is the OSG? What happens if the
OSG is not notified? What can the court do if the OSG is not notified?]
○ Section 4. Local government ordinances. — In any action involving the
validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or
attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified
and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to
be heard. (4a, R64)
○ Section 5. Court action discretionary. — Except in actions falling under
the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or
○

upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to
construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate
the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case
where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under
the circumstances. (5a, R64)
○ Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action. — If before the final
termination of the case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into
an ordinary action, and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings
as may be necessary or proper.

○ The only issue in a declaratory action is the question of construction or

validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.
○ Purpose:
◆ To determine any question of construction or validity arising from the
subject of the action
◆ Seek for a declaration of the petitioner’s rights thereunder.
○ The purpose is to ask the court for the validity or rights under a written
instrument, and not to ask for affirmative reliefs.

○ There are two types of actions referred under Rule 63.

◆ The first paragraph is declaratory relief
◆ The 2nd paragraph refers to similar remedies, these are:
◆ Action for reformation
◆ Action for quieting of title
◆ Action for consolidation of ownership

○ In declaratory relief, the court may motu proprio or upon motion, refuse to
exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments if:
◆ Such interpretation would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy which gave rise to the action.
◆ In any case where the declaration is not necessary and proper under
the circumstances.

○ In declaratory relief, the court is given the discretion to act or not to act on
the petition.
○ Such refusal of the court is equivalent of the dismissal of the petition.
○ The Court may not however refuse to act on the remedies under the 2nd
paragraph.
○ Requisites for an action for declaratory relief:
◆ Subject matter must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance.
 ◆ Terms of said statute or document and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction
◆ There must have been no breach of the statute of document in
question
◆ There must be an actual controversy
◆ The issue must be ripe for judicial determination
◆ Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.

○ The parties who may assail a will, deed, contract, written instrument, or
ordinance are:
◆ A party interested in the written instrument.
◆ If it is an ordinance, the proper party are those whose rights are
affected.
◆ If an LGU ordinance is involved: LGU prosecutor or attorney should be
notified. If its constitutionality is questioned: OSG shall be notified
◆ If validity of statute is in question: OSG shall be notified.

○ Declaratory relief is not appropriate to assail a judicial act. Other remedies

are available, and such judgement/order is not listed in the exclusive list
under the Rule. It cannot be considered as “other instrument” because a
judgement if ambiguous can be assailed through a petition for
classificatory judgement.
○ If the action is for quieting of title: Court to take cognizance depends on
the value of the property because it is a real action.
○ Only the first paragraph, action for declaratory relief, is required to be filed
in the RTC.
○ If the action is for action for reformation of instruments, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, hence it should be with RTC.
○ If the action is for consolidation of ownership (failure to redeem in
foreclosure sale), is also incapable of pecuniary estimation hence JD is
with RTC as well. (An action for consolidation is merely to obtain a judicial
order to effect the registration of the consolidated ownership in the
Registry of Property).
○ Compulsory counterclaim arising from the same transaction or subject
matter may be filed in an action for declaratory relief.
◆ There is nothing in the nature of a SCA for declaratory relief that
proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction,
deed, or contract, subject of the complaint.
○ If the complaint spells out a case for affirmative reliefs in a declaratory
relief action, if not assailed, the Court could grant affirmative reliefs.
○ No executory process in an action for declaratory relief
○ The petition should be filed before there occurs any breach or violation of
 ○
the deed, contract, written instrument, ordinance.
○ If there already has been a breach, the appropriate ordinary civil action
should be filed. The Court would already have no JD over the action for
declaratory relief.
○ If after the filing of the petition, a violation of the ordinance/written
instrument happens, the proper procedure is not to dismiss the petition
but to convert the action into an ordinary civil action. Parties should be
allowed to then filed such pleadings as may be necessary or proper.
○ The concept of cause of action does not strictly apply in a declaratory
relief:
◆ The breach or violation should be impending, imminent, or at least
threatened. It must not be hypothetical (as if there is an EO but no
IRR)
◆ Even in an action for declaratory relief, there must be an actual or
justiciable controversy, not mere theoretical.
◆ The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

○ Reformation of an instrument is a remedy in equity where a written

instrument already executed is allowed by law to be reformed or construed
to express or conform to the real intention of the parties. It is to rectify the
mistake on the written instrument with regard to what is written and what
was the agreement of the parties. It presupposes that there is FAMEn.
○ An action for consolidation of ownership is when there is legal redemption,
and it has not been redeemed. The foreclosure-r will file this to have
authority to register the property in the Registry of Property.
○ An action to quiet title is to remove a cloud on title or to prevent a cloud
from being imposed on a title. A cloud is any instrument, record, claim,
which appears to be valid and effective but in truth and in fact, the same
is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable.

● Cases:
○ Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila
◆ Petition for certiorari is used to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
◆ The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly
pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of
Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent
Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of
legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
◆ Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for
certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
 ◆

unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and

executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not
original, jurisdiction

○ Ollada v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 115 Phil. 284

◆ Petitioner commenced this action as, and clearly intended it to be one
for Declaratory Relief under the provisions of Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court. On the question of when a special civil action of this nature
would prosper, we have already held that the complaint for declaratory
relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been
breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the
situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory
relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had
already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury — all these
giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate
ordinary civil action or proceeding.

○ Rosello-Bentir, [Link]. v. Hon. Leanda, April 12, 2000

◆ Reformation of an instrument is that remedy in equity by means of
which a written instrument is made or construed so as to express or
conform to the real intention of the parties when some error or
mistake has been committed.
◆ A suit for reformation of an instrument may be barred by lapse of time.
The prescriptive period for actions based upon a written contract and
for reformation of an instrument is ten (10) years under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code.
◆ In the case at bar, respondent corporation had ten (10) years from
1968, the time when the contract of lease was executed, to file an
action for reformation. Sadly, it did so only on May 15, 1992 or twenty-
four (24) years after the cause of action accrued, hence, its cause of
action has become stale.
◆ Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that the
instant action for reformation is not time-barred, respondent
corporation’s action will still not prosper. Under Section 1, Rule 64
of the New Rules of Court, an action for the reformation of an
instrument is instituted as a special civil action for declaratory
relief. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of
the parties for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the
breach or violation of the law or contract to which it refers. Here,
 respondent corporation brought the present action for
reformation after an alleged breach or violation of the contract
was already committed by petitioner Bentir. Consequently, the
remedy of reformation no longer lies.

○ DILG v. Gatuz, G.R. No. 191176, October 14, 2015

◆ DILG Memorandum subject of his petition for declaratory relief was
an implementation of the Ombudsman's decision in OMB-L-
A-08-0126-C: the memorandum was in the nature of a writ of
execution. Therefore, the declaratory relief action was essentially
against a quasi-judicial action of the Ombudsman - a subject matter
beyond the RTC's declaratory relief jurisdiction.
◆ Where the decisions of certain administrative bodies are
appealable to the Court of Appeals, these adjudicative bodies are
co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and
stature; their actions are logically beyond the control of the RTC,
a co-equal body. Notably, the decisions of the Ombudsman in
disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA via a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. As a co-equal body,
the RTC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or to restrain the
execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases.

○ Sarming [Link]. v. Dy, [Link]., June 6, 2002

◆ An action for reformation of instrument under this provision of law
may prosper only upon the concurrence of the following
requisites:
◆ (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties
to the contact;
◆ (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the
parties; and
◆ (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention
of the parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident.

○ Quiros v. Arjona [Link]., March 9, 2004

◆ The object is a 1-hectare parcel of land representing petitioners
inheritance from their deceased grandmother. The cause of the
contract is the delivery of petitioners share in the inheritance. The
inability of the municipal court to identify the exact location of the
inherited property did not negate the principal object of the
contract. This is an error occasioned by the failure of the parties
to describe the subject property, which is correctible by
reformation and does not indicate the absence of the principal
 object as to render the contract void. It cannot be disputed that
the object is determinable as to its kind, i.e. hectare of land as
inheritance, and can be determined without need of a new
contract or agreement. Clearly, the Paknaan has all the earmarks
of a valid contract.
◆ Although both parties agreed to transfer one-hectare real property,
they failed to include in the written document a sufficient description
of the property to convey. This error is not one for nullification of the
instrument but only for reformation.

○ Ortega v. The Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 161400, September 2,

2005
◆ In another vein, if this petition was to be considered as one for
declaratory relief, as observed by the OSG, it is not embraced
within the original jurisdiction of this Court. (It is with the RTC; if
certiorari, cannot go directly to court as well bc they can only review
judgements of lower courts to review such ordinance per the
Constitution)

○ Malana, [Link]., v. Tappa, [Link]., September 17, 2009

◆ Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the
second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
◆ As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as
stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore,
petitioners' Complaint involving title to and possession of the said
property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not
the RTC.
◆ In the present case, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was
filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused
to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only
subsequent to the latter's express claim of ownership over the subject
property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to
petitioners' title. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that
they had already been deprived of the possession of their
property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory
relief.

○ Ferrer v. Mayor Roco, G.R. No. 174129, July 5, 2010

◆ In this case, the issue raised by petitioners is clearly not yet ripe for
judicial determination. Nowhere in the assailed resolutions and
ordinance does it show that the public respondents acted on private
 ◆

respondent’s application with finality. What appears therefrom is that

the application of private respondent for development permit has
been endorsed to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) for appropriate action, the latter being the sole regulatory
body for housing and land development.
◆ Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for
resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact. In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative
body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within
their proper jurisdiction.

○ DBM v. Manila’s Finest Retirees Association, Inc., May 9, 2007

◆ The execution of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not
necessarily indefensible.
◆ Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim
based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially
different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally
governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the
former deals with a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their
fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing
ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not
inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
◆ Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file
such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an … ordinance,
should take place.

○ Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp. v. Bonifacio, [Link]., June 8, 2011

◆ In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites
must concur:
◆ (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and
◆ (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
 ◆
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
◆ Thus, the cloud on title consists of:
◆ (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding;
◆ (2) which is apparently valid or effective;
◆ (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable; and
◆ (4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. The fourth
element is not present in the case at bar.
◆ While it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera
is an instrument that appeared to be valid but was subsequently
shown to be invalid, it does not cover the same parcels of land that
are described in petitioner’s titles. Foremost, Rivera’s title embraces a
land measuring 14,391.54 square meters while petitioner’s lands has
an aggregate area of only 8,694 square meters. On the one hand, it
may be argued that petitioner’s land could be subsumed within
Rivera’s 14,391.54-square meter property. Yet, a comparison of the
technical descriptions of the parties’ titles negates an overlapping of
their boundaries.

○ Galicto v. Pres. Aquino, February 28, 2012

◆ Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are
availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts.
Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper
recourse to assail the validity of EO 7.
◆ Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition
for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not
original, jurisdiction.

○ Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corp., February 1, 2012

◆ Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in
the implementation of CMO 27-2003.
◆ Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial
determination, because litigation is inevitable for the simple and
uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the
enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers.
 ◆

Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case each
time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
◆ It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right
remedy given the circumstances of the case.

○ Spouses Sabitsana v. Muertegui, August 5, 2013

◆ On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an
action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of
the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC (?).

○ The Honorable Monetary Board v. Phil. Veterans Bank, January 21, 2015
◆ Court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be
subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason
that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of
law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the
Rules of Court.
◆ In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board
cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief
since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial powers or functions.

○ Mananquil v. Moico, November 21, 2012

◆ Contrary to petitioners’ stand, the issue relating to the grant of rights,
title or award by the NHA determines whether the case for quieting of
title may be maintained. If the petitioners are legitimate successors to
or beneficiaries of Iluminardo upon his death – under the certificate of
title, award, or grant, or under the special law or specific terms of the
NHA program/project – then they possess the requisite interest to
maintain suit; if not, then Civil Case No. 2741-MN must necessarily be
dismissed.
◆ From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have
failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his
rights under the NHA program/project. They failed to present any title,
award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper
government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla
have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18
and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or beneficiaries
under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardo’s
rights after his death.
 ○ De Guzman v. Tabango Realty, Inc. (2015)
○ Heirs of Datu Dalandag Kuli v. Pia (2015)
○ Aquino v. Quiazon (2015)

—————————————————————————————————————

Rule 64 - Rules of Court

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit

Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final
orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit. (n)

Section 2. Mode of review. — A judgment or final order or resolution of the

Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as
hereinafter provided. (n; Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)

Section 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than
five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (n)

Section 4. Docket and other lawful fees. — Upon the filing of the petition, the
petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court the docket and other lawful fees and
deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs. (n)

Section 5. Form and contents of petition. — The petition shall be verified and filed
in eighteen (18) legible copies. The petition shall name the aggrieved party as
petitioner and shall join as respondents the Commission concerned and the
person or persons interested in sustaining the judgment, final order or
resolution a quo. The petition shall state the facts with certainty, present clearly
the issues involved, set forth the grounds and brief arguments relied upon for
review, and pray for judgment annulling or modifying the questioned judgment,
final order or resolution. Findings of fact of the Commission supported by
substantial evidence shall be final and non-reviewable.
The petition shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment, final order or resolution subject thereof,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are
referred to therein and other documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The
requisite number of copies of the petition shall contain plain copies of all
documents attached to the original copy of said petition.
The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within
the period fixed herein, and shall contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
The petition shall further be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof on
the Commission concerned and on the adverse party, and of the timely payment of
docket and other lawful fees.
The failure of petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (n)

Section 6. Order to comment. — If the Supreme Court finds the petition sufficient
in form and substance, it shall order the respondents to file their comments on the
petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof; otherwise, the Court may dismiss
the petition outright. The Court may also dismiss the petition if it was filed
manifestly for delay or the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant
further proceedings. (n)

Section 7. Comments of respondents. — The comments of the respondents shall

be filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. The original shall be accompanied by
certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein together with other supporting papers. The requisite number of copies of
the comments shall contain plain copies of all documents attached to the original
and a copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner.
No other pleading may be filed by any party unless required or allowed by the
Court. (n)

Section 8. Effect of filing. — The filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the
execution of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed,
unless the Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem
just. (n)

Section 9. Submission for decision. — Unless the Court sets the case for oral
argument, or requires the parties to submit memoranda, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision upon the filing of the comments on the petition, or of such
other pleadings or papers as may be required or allowed, or the expiration of the
period to do so. (n)

● Rule 64 governs the review of judgements, final orders, not including

interlocutory orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC and COA.
● It is not all encompassing and not all petitions for review of judgements or final
●
orders of these commissions should be filed under Rule 64.
● Those that may be brought under Rule 64 are those judgements and orders by
the commission in exercise of their adjudicatory and quasi-judicial powers.
● Applies only to rulings and decisions en banc.
● If what is being questioned is the rule-making power of the commission, then
the proper remedy is Declaratory Relief,
● Rule 64 is in essence a petition for certiorari. Thus, questions of facts may not
be entertained. What should be assailed is jurisdiction - GADALEJ.
● CSC is not included. There is another remedy of appeal for them under Rule
43.
● Should be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgement, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC or COA.
● As against Rule 65: Rule 65 may be filed 60days after final judgement of
commission, Rule 64 only may be filed 30 days after.
● In Rule 65, if an MR or MFNT is filed, the 60 days will be reset after the denial
of such following the fresh period rule. In Rule 64, such petitions does not
reset the reglementary period, it stops the counting of the period, and
continues with the remaining days afterwards which shall not be less than 5
days.
● The Court has 2 options upon receipt of the petition: to deny it outright, or to
order the filing of a comment.
● The petition may be denied if the petition is not sufficient in form and
substance. If the petition is filed manifestly for delay. If the questions raised is
too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
● If it is sufficient tho, the Court should order for the commission to comment on
the petition within 10 days from notice.
● Cases:
○ Pates v Comelec:
◆ Rule 64 is a petition for certiorari subject to rules of Rule 65 unless
Rule 64 provides.
◆ It is an essence a petition for certiorari but made especially for final
orders and judgements of COMELEC and COA
◆ One difference is that the reglementary period within which to file
under Rule 64 is 30 days after judgement or final order as opposed to
60 days under Rule 65
◆ Another difference is that filing an MR pauses the reglementary period
for filing Rule 64 but does not refresh the period within which to file.
Unlike in Rule 65 where the fresh period rule is applied.
◆ The reason for the difference in the reglementary periods between
Rule 64 and Rule 65 is because of the constitutional provision that
states that COA and Comelec decisions should be promptly decided.
◆ Comelec Division review is through MR to Comelec en banc. Only then
could it be reviewed via Rule 64 to the SC.
○ Cagas v Comelec
◆ Rule 64 is based on Secion 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
◆ By virtue of it, Rule 64 only applies to Comelec En Banc Final Orders
and Decisions. It does not apply to interlocutory orders of Comelec En
Banc. It also does not apply to interlocutory orders or to judgements
by Comelec Division.
◆ The final orders and decisions that may be reviewed via a petition for
certiorari are only those orders and decisions in exercise of
COMELEC’s adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
◆ The MR from the Division to En Banc is mandatory before you can
elevate via certiorari the En Banc division.
◆ Under Comelec Rules, interlocutory orders of the Division may also
not be MR’d to the En Banc. It has to be decided by the Division. If not
then the main case has to proceed before MR may be done to the En
Banc. (Or when comelec division unanimously agrees to elevate to en
banc)
◆ Per Section 2 Rule of Comelec, Division to Enbanc is only allowed
where:
◆ On pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of he
members of the Commission
◆ In all other cases where a Division is not authorized to act
◆ Upon unanimous vote of all the members of the division.
◆ In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed
grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it
and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned
in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy
of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the
Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its present rules
but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.

○ Villarosa v Festin
◆ Under present Comelec Rules. Interlocutory orders of Division may
now be assailed via an MR to En Banc.
◆ Stark is the contrast between the two cited rules. To reiterate, under
the 1993 COMELEC Rules, the COMELEC en banc is strictly prohibited
from entertaining motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders
unless unanimously referred to the en banc by the members of the
division that issued the same, whereas under COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, all motions for reconsideration filed with regard to
decisions, resolutions, orders and rulings of the COMELEC
 divisions are automatically referred to the COMELEC en banc.
Thus, in view of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804’s applicability in the
instant petition, a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc is available to petitioner herein unlike in Kho.

○ Ejercito v Comelec
◆ A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, is an independent action that is available only if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

○ Osmeña v COA
◆ He argues that the remaining period should be counted not from the
receipt of the COA’s June 8, 2009 Resolution by the Office of the
Mayor of Cebu City on June 29, 2009, but from the time he officially
reported back to his office on July 15, 2009, after his trip abroad.
Since he is being made liable in his personal capacity, he reasons that
the remaining period should be counted from his actual knowledge of
the denial of his motion for reconsideration
◆ We find Osmeña’s reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the
Rules. Although the service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the
COA was validly made on June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to
the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City, we consider July 15, 2009 –
the date he reported back to office – as the effective date when he
was actually notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of
the period to appeal.
◆ Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his
Rule 64 petition should be counted from July 15, 2009, the date
Osmeña had actual knowledge of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the Decision of the COA and given the opportunity
to competently file an appeal thereto before the Court. The present
petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within the reglementary
period.
◆ Rule 64 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the COA. Section 3 of the same Rule provides for a
30-day period, counted from the notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution sought to be reviewed, to file the petition for certiorari.
The Rule further states that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the said judgment or final order or resolution
interrupts the 30-day period.

○ Reyna v COA
 ◆ In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, questions of fact cannot
be raised in a petition for certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court. The office of the petition for certiorari is not to correct simple
errors of judgment; any resort to the said petition under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to
the resolution of jurisdictional issues. Accordingly, since the validity of
the prepayment scheme is inherently a question of fact, the same
should no longer be looked into by this Court.

○ Fortune Life v COA

◆ Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.