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~upreme <!Court
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SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 248306

PHILIPPINES,
Members:
Petitioner,
PERLAS-BERNABE, Chairperson,
-versus- LAZARO-JAVIER,
LOPEZ, M.,
ROSARIO, and
SCIENCE PARK OF THE LOPEZ, J.,* JJ.
PHILIPPINES, INC., rep. by its
Executive Vice-President and Gen. Promulgated:
Manager, MR. RICHARD ALBERT
I. OSMOND,

Respondents.

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This petition I seeks to reverse the following dispositions of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 109103, entitled In Re: Application for
Registration of Original Title; Science Park of the Philippines, Inc., herein
represented by its Executive Vice President and General Manager, Mr.
Richard Albert I. Osmond v. Republic of the Philippines:

1. Decision 2 dated March 28, 2019 affirming the Decision dated April
12, 2017 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mal var-

* Designated as additional member per S.O. No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.
1
Rollo, pp. 16-36.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legasp i, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon
and Edwin D. Sorongon, concu1Ting; id. at 37-44.
 Decision 2 G.R. No. 248306

Balete, Batangas in Land Registration Case No. N-138 which

granted respondent's application for original registration of title; and

2. Resolution 3 dated July 9, 2019, denying petitioner's motion for

reconsideration.

Antecedents

On September 3, 2015, respondent Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.

filed an application for original registration of title with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tanauan City, Batangas under Section 14( 1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529).4 In its Order dated September 10, 2015, the RTC
delegated the hearing and disposition of the application to the MCTC, Malvar-
Balete.5

Respondent essentially alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of a

5,255-square meter parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3394, Psc-4 7, Mal var
Cadastre, 6 situated in Brgy. Luta Sur, Malvar, Batangas.7 It acquired the
property from one Antonio Aranda through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 6, 2014. It has been, by itself or through its predecessors-in-interest,
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Finally, the prope1iy is within the alienable and
disposable po1iion of the public domain.

On the other hand, petitioner Republic of the Philippines entered its

appearance through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The MCTC,
however, issued an Order of general default dated April 26, 2016 as no
oppositor allegedly objected to respondent's application.8

During the trial, respondent sought to establish the history of the

ownership of the land, viz:

January 29, 1944: Segunda Kalaw sold the

land to her sister Micaela
Kalaw

November 5, 1953: After Micaela passed, her

heirs sold the land to
Crisanto Laydia and his
wife Agrifina Arcillas

3
Id. at 45-46.
4
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
appl ication for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
( I) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
5
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A dated November 15, 1995; rollo, p. 38.
6 Id.
7
Id. at 59.
8
Id. at 38.
 Decision 3 G .R. No. 248306

through a Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa

June 26, 1996: Antonio A. Aranda bought

the land from Crisanto
through a deed of absolute
sale.

January 6, 2014: Respondent bought the land

form Antonio A. Aranda9

A representative of the Office of Municipal Assessor of Malvar

confirmed this sequence based on the tax declarations issued in relation to the
property. The oldest tax declaration on file was dated 1955 in the name of
Segunda Kalaw.

Meanwhile, witnesses from the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR), DENR-City Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR-CENRO), Batangas City and the National Mapping
and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) all testified that the
property was within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain
based on Land Classification Map No. 3601 and DENR Administrative Order
No. 97-37 issued by then Secretary Victor 0. Ramos on December 22, 1997. 10

Finally, respondent's immediate predecessor-in-interest Antonio

Aranda and one Eliseo Garcia (born on June 4, 1933), both residents of
Malvar, Batangas, gave their personal accounts relating to the property. 11

Eliseo Garcia testified that as a resident of Brgy. Luta Sur since birth,
he had sufficient knowledge of the property. 12 In fact, he lived just one ( 1)
kilometer away from Lot No. 3394 and three (3) houses from the house of
Segunda's sister !\1icaela. 13 When he was about seven (7) years old, he and his
friends used to play and gather fruits from the property and its surroundings
as children of his age casually did at that time. It was of public knowledge that
the Kalaws owned several parcels of land adjoining each other, including Lot
No. 3394. Segunda, in particular, was the owner of Lot No. 3394 until she
sold it to her sister Micaela before the Second World War erupted. 14 Not long
after, Micaela sold the subject prope1iy in favor of Agrifina Arcillas and
Crisanto Laydia who occupied and exercised all acts of possession and
ownership thereon. Subsequently, the property got sold to Antonio Aranda
who also cultivated the same. No one made an adverse claim of ownership
over the prope1iy. 15

9 Id
10
Id at 63-64.
11
lc/.at6J.
12
Id. at 116-117.
13
/datll7.
14
Id at 63 and 11 7.
15
Id. at 11 7.
 Decision 4 G.R. No. 248306

Antonio Aranda admitted that he bought Lot No. 3394 from Crisanto
Laydia and later sold it to respondent via Deed of Absolute Sale, 16 dated
January 6, [Link] he was still owner of the property, he cultivated it with
agricultural plants, harvested its fruits, and also paid realty taxes thereon.

Respondent offered the following documentary evidence: Technical

Description for Lot 3394; 17 Sepia copy of Plan, Lot No. 3394, Psc-47, Malvar
Cadastre; 18 Land Classification Map No. 3601 , 19 and tax declarations, among
others. The Sepia copy of Plan of Lot No. 339420 bears the technical
description and sketch of the boundaries of Lot No. 3394 and an annotation
indicating, thus:

x xxx

Lot 3394, Psc-47, Malvar Cadastre is inside alienable and

disposable zone as per Project No. 39, L. C. Map No. 360 I certified on
December 22, l 007 as per CERTIFICATION approved by Laudemir S.
Salac, OIC, CENR Officer ofBatangas City on Jul 2 1, 2014.

xxxx

The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

By Decision 21 dated April 12, 2017, the MCTC granted respondent's

appli cation, viz. :22

WHEREFORE, the foregoing discussion considered, upon

confirmation of the Order of General Default, this Court resolves to
adj udicate and decree Lot No. 3394, Psc-47, Malvar Cadastre, Ap-04-
016437 with an area of FIVE THOUSAND TWO H UNDRED FIFTY
FIVE (5,255) SQUARE METERS in favor of and in the name of
SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC, with office address at 17th
Floor, Robinsons Summit Center, 6783 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529 otherw ise known
as the Property Registration Decree.

SO ORDERED.

It found respondent's evidence to have sufficiently proved that it has

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of a parcel of land classified to be within the alienable and disposable zone of
the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 23

16
Id. at 117- 118.
17
Marked Exhibit "L"; Original Record, p. I 06.
18
Marked Exh ibit "O", id. at I 08.
19
Marked Exhibit " II"; id. at 324.
20
Approved by Chief of Regional Surveys Division Edgar S. Barraca of the DENR Land Management
Services, Calabarzon Region and Atty. Marlou Pelayo Alutaya, OIC, Regional Techn ical Director For Lands.
21
Penned by Presiding Judge Charita M. Macalintal-Sawali.
22 Rollo, pp. 57-65.
23
/d. at 63 .
 Decision 5 G.R. No. 248306

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal 24 the OSG faulted the MCTC for granting the application
despite respondent's alleged failure to prove a registrable title under Section
14, PD 1529. 25

For one, respondent did not adduce evidence that it has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property since June 12,
1945 or earlier. 26 Although respondent's claim of ownership dates back to the
1940s, the earliest tax declaration presented was dated 1955. 27

For another, respondent could not have acquired the property through
prescription. 28 For there had been no manifestation from the government that
the property was already declared patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or for the development of national wealth pursuant to Article 422 of
the New Civil Code. 29

Respondent riposted30 that it had successfully proven its registrable title

over the property. Curiously, the OSG anchored its opposition on its purported
failure to comply with Section 14(2), PD 1529. As it was, however, its
application was based on Section 14( 1), PD 1529. The two provisions have
two different sets of requirements. 3 1

At any rate, it complied with Section 14(1 ), thus: first, Land

Classification Map No. 3601 and DENR Administrative Order No. 97-37
proved the alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 3394; second, Eliseo
Garcia, an octogenarian resident of Malvar, Batangas, testified on how
respondent's predecessors-in-interest enjoyed open, exclusive, adverse,
continuous and notorious possession of the property; finally , the transfer of
24
Id. at 20.
25
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
( I ) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
conti nuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alie nable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acq uired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acqu ired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right
of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
xx x x
26
CA rol/o, p. 40, citing Buenaventura v. Republic, 546 Phil. IO I (2007):
" From the aforesaid provisions of the Property Registration Decree, we can deduce that there are three
requisites fo r the filing of an application fo r registration of title under the first category, to wit: ( I ) that the
property in question is al ienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by
themselves or through the ir predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945 or earlier. The second classification relates to the acquisition of private lands by prescription. "
27
CA Decision, p. 4.
28
CA rollo, pp. 43 -44.
29
ART. 422. Propeny of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
,o CA rollo, pp. 67-86.
31
Id. at 77-79.
 Decision 6 G.R. No. 248306

ownership of the property from Segunda Kalaw in 1944 to the present was
traced through documents kept intact at the Assessor's Office of Malvar,
Batangas.32

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By Decision 33 dated March 28, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It

noted that contrary to the submission of the OSG, the requirements under
Article 422 of the New Civil Code 34 are inapplicable here. For the provision
comes into play only when the applicant invokes Section 14(2) of PD 152935
to support its application for registration of title.36

As for respondent's compliance with the requirements of Section 14( 1)

of PD 1529, the Court of Appeals held that the totality of respondent's
evidence sufficiently established its continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.37

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration on July 9, 2019.

The Present Petition

The Republic, through the OSG now asks the Court to exercise its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the assailed
issuances of the Couti of Appeals. 38

It brings to fore the two (2) ways by which to acquire and register
property under PD 1529, viz.: through (1) open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public dom ain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 under
Sectionl4(1) of PD 1529; and, (2) acquisition of private lands by prescription
under Section 14(2) of the same law. Regardless of the ground invoked,
however, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of law for
registration of property.

Respondent failed to establish that it has been, by itself or through its

predecessors-in-interest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
32
i d. at 79-81 .
33
Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon
and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring.
34
[Link] 422 . Property of public dominion, when no longer in tended for public use or for public service,
shal l form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (34 1a).
35
Section 14. Who may apply. The fo llowing persons may fi le in the proper Cou11 of First Instance an
application fo r registration of title to land, whether personally or through their dul y authorized
representatives:
( I) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownershi p since June 12, I 945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws. x x x
36
Rollo, p. 43.
37
id. at 40-42.
38
id. at 16-36.
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 248306

possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Based on its own
declarations, respondent and its predecessors-in-interest could only trace its
ownership of Lot No. 3394 beginning 1940s - a timeframe too ambiguous to
even deserve any credibility. 39

Further, under the second mode, it is not sufficient for respondent to

offer various certifications from appropriate government agencies describing
the property as alienable and disposable. Before lands in the public domain
are converted to patrimonial property, there must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth under Article 422 of the New
Civil Code. It is only upon such declaration that a prope1iy has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of such prope1iy of
the public dominion begin to run. 40 Here, respondent offered no proof of such
government declaration.

In its Comment,41 respondent counters that the OSG has merely

reiterated its arguments in its petition which the Court of Appeals had already
passed upon in full. In any event, it anchors its application for original
registration of title on Section 14(1), PD 1529. Thus, it is only required to
prove that: (1) the land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; (2) the applicant by itself and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof; and (3) it has been in possession of the property under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 42 Notably, it was able to
duly establish these requirements through competent evidence, among them
the Land Classification Map No. 3601 issued by the NAMRIA; DENR
Administrative Order No. 97-37; CENRO Certification which verified the
classification of the property as within alienable and disposable zone of the
public domain; and the testimonies of its witnesses. 43

As for the OSG's argument that it was only able to produce tax
declarations for 1949, 1966, 1974, 1980, 1985, 1994-1999 and 2004,
respondent argues that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. Hence, other pieces of evidence may be presented to establish
actual possession and occupation, as it did here. Any prior irregularity in the
payment of real property taxes should not be taken against its cause. 44
Respondent, thus, maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in its
favor.

Issues

Under which framework in Section 14 of PD 1529 should the Court

39
Id. at 23 -25 .
40
Id. at 26-29.
41
Id at 144-155.
42
Id. at 148.
43
Id at 148 -149.
44
Id. aI 15 I - I 54.
 Decision 8 G.R. No. 248306

evaluate respondent's application for registration of title?

Did respondent sufficiently establish the requisites for land registration

under the governing provision?

Ruling

We reverse.

Respondent applied for registration of title

under Section 14(1) ofPD 1529

Section 14, PD 1529 enumerates the valid grounds for registration of

title to land, viz.:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(l) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by

prescription under the provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned

river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law. (emphases added)

Heirs [Link] Malabanan v. Republic ofthe Philippines45 aptly drew

the distinctions between the first and the second grounds, thus:

( l ) In c01rnection with Section I 4( l ) of the Property Registration

Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that
"those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June

1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable
and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon
as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe

45
605 Phil. 244. 284-286 (2009).
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 248306

imposed by Section 4 7 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as
a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the prope11y has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial prope11y is private prope11y of the government.

The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civi l Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial

property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least
ten (I 0) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person's uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. ( emphases and
underscoring added)

In fine, an applicant invoking Section 14(1) of PD 1529 needs to prove

the fo llowing elements: (a) the property forms pait of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain at the time of the filing of the application
for registration; (b) it has been, by itself or through its predecessors-in-
interest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the prope1ty; and (c) the possession is under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 46

On the other hand, an application for registration based on Section

14(2) of PD 1529 must establish the following requisites: (a) the land is an
alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b)
the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with _just title, or for at least 30
years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been
converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the
beginning of the said IO-year or 30-year period of possession. 47

46
See £:spiri111, Jr. v. Republic, 811 Phil. 506, 517 (2017); and Republic v. £stale o/Sanlos, 802 Phil. 800,
8 I 1-8 12 (2016).
47
Republic v. Zurbaran Really and Developmenl Corporation, 730 Phil. 263,275(201 4).
 Decision 10 G.R. No. 248306

Here, the OSG claims that respondent failed to offer proof of an express
government manifestation that the subject prope11Y is no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth in accordance with
Article 422 of the New Civil Code. Notably though, this is required for
app lications under Section 14(2) of PD 1529 only.

As stated, respondent filed its application under Section 14(1) of PD

1529. It consistently claimed that by itself or through its predecessors-in-
interest, it had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or even earlier. It
never alleged acquiring the subject property through acquisitive prescription.
Thus, Article 422 of the Civil Code does not come into play here.

Respondent failed to establish that it has been,

by itself or through its predecessors-in-
interest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property since
June 12, 1945 or earlier

To reiterate, respondent is tasked to establish three requisites: (a) the

property forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain
at the time of the filing of the application for registration; (b) it has been, by
itself or through its predecessors-in-interest, in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the prope1iy; and ( c) the
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

Here, the OSG essentially asserts that respondent failed to establish the
second and third requisites in the present case.

We agree.

Preliminarily, the OSG's main argument -- that respondent's

documentary and testimonial evidence failed to establish it's supposed right
to a registrable title, involves a purely factual issue requiring recalibration of
evidence which is generally beyond the purview of the Comi. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions48 which obtain here. Specifically, the assailed
dispositions of the Court of Appeals were based on misapprehension of facts,
if not contrary to law and prevailing jurisprudence.

8
~ The general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits exceptions, to wit: ( I ) When the conclusion is a
findin g grou nded entirely on speculation, surmi ses or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken. abs urd or impossib le; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fac t are conflicting; (6) When the Cou11 of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on wh ich they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as we ll as in the petitioner's main a nd reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents ; and ( I 0) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the ev idence o n record; Miano v. Manila Electric Co., 800 Phil.
I 18, 123 (2016).
 Decision 11 G.R. No. 248306

The case is by no means novel. In fact, it is on all fours with Republic

v. Science Park of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 237714 dated November
12, 2018. 49 That case involved the same parties, issues, attendant
circumstances, and pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence. The only
distinction between the two cases hinges on the identity of the subject
properties which neve1iheless are both situated in Malvar, Batangas, and the
persons from whom respondent bought these properties.

The predecessors-in-interest here and in G.R. No. 237714 were armed

with tax declarations from the Municipal Assessor's Office in Malvar,
Batangas. In both cases, the earliest tax declaration presented pertained to year
1955. Too, for the purpose of proving possession of the subject property in the
concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier, respondent offered the
testimony of octogenarian Nelia Linatoc-Cabalda in G.R. 237714, just as how
he presented the testimony of octogenarian Eliseo Garcia in the present case.
Both Nelia and Eliseo gave similar testimonies: they personalty knew of the
subject properties and their respective owners; and when they were about
seven (7) years old, they played and gathered fruits from the subject properties
together with their friends.

In evaluating these pieces of evidence in G.R. No. 23 7714, the Court

ruled:

For purposes of land registration under Section 14 (I) of PD

1529 proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate
the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subj ect of the application. Actual possession consists
in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would actually exercise over his own property. Possession is: (a) open when
it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not c landestine;
(b) continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intemiittent or
occasiona l; (c) exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;
and (d) notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in

possession and occupation of the subj ect land since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
SPPI presented, among others, the testimony of Nelia Linatoc-Cabalda
(Nelia). Nelia, who was born in 1936, claimed to have known of
Gervacio's ownership and cultivation of the subject land when she was
about seven (7) years old, xxx However, such testimony was insufficient
to establish possession in the nature and character required by law that
would give right to ownership. ln a number of cases, the Court has
repeatedly held that to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of owner, the claimant must show
the nature and extent of cultivation on the subject land, or the number of
crops planted or the volume of the produce harvested from the crops
supposedly planted thereon; failing in which, the supposed planting and
harvesting of crops in the land being claimed only amounted to mere
casual cultivation which is not the nature of possession and occupation

9
~ G. R. No. 23 77 14, Novembe r 12, 20 I 8 (Per Second Division, (now SAJ) Perlas-Bernabe] .
 Decision 12 G.R. No. 248306

required by law. Consequently, SPPI failed to satisfy the requisite

exclusivity and notoriety of its claimed possession and occupation of the
subject land because exclusive dominion and conspicuous possession
thereof were not established.

Furthennore, SPPI's evidence were insufficient to prove that its

possession and occupation were for the duration required by law. The
earliest tax declaration in Gervacio's name presented by SPPI, i.e., Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 6243, dates back to 1955 only, short of the
requirement that possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or earlier. xxx The payment of
realty taxes and declaration of the subject land in the name of Gervacio in
1955 gives ri se to the preswnption that he claimed ownership and
possession thereof only in that year.

In sum, the Court finds that SPPI's unsubstantiated and self-

serving assertions of possession and occupation do not constitute the
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the
subject land of the nature and duration required by Section 14 (1) of
PD 1529. Accordingly, the CA erred in affirming the MCTC's grant of
SPPI's application for original registration of its imperfect title over the
subject land. (Emphases supplied ; citations omitted)

Verily, the Court deemed Nelia's testimony insufficient for purposes of

establishing the nature and extent of possession required by law. For she
testified on events which supposedly happened when she was only about
seven (7) years old. At any rate, the planting and harvesting of crops she
allegedly witnessed merely amounted to casual cultivation and did not rise to
the level of exclusivity and notoriety of possession required by law. Notabl y,
too, the earliest tax declarations offered by respondent in G.R. No. 237714
was dated 1955 - short of the reckoning point required under Section 14(1) of
PD 1529.

Here, the same respondent also seeks to register another parcel of land
in Malvar, Batangas. As in G.R. No. 237714, respondent presented an
octogenarian witness, albeit a different one, in the person of E li seo Garcia
who nonetheless gave a strikingly similar story as Nelia's in G.R. No. 2377 14.
Finally, respondent also offered intermittent tax declarations, the earliest of
which was dated 1955, as in G.R. No. 237714.

[n light of the foregoing considerations, the CoUii finds no reason to

deviate from its ruling in G.R. No. 237714. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. When a cou1i has laid down a principle of law applicable to a certain
set of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in
°
which the facts are substantially the same. 5 Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. The Insular Life Assurance Co Ltd. 51 elucidates:

Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a

5
° Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. Insular Life, 735 Phil. 287, 291 (20 14), citing Chinese Young Men's
Christian Association o_f the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, 573 Phil. 320, 337 (2008),
citing Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, 511 Phil. 5 10, 520-52 1 (2005).
s1 Id.
 Decision 13 G.R. No. 248306

conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if

the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. (Emphases suppli ed)

In fine, the present application for land registration should also be

dismissed.

ACCORDINGLY~ the petition is GRANTED. The Decision 52 dated

March 28, 2019, and Resolution 53 dated July 9, 2019 in CA-G.R. CV No.
109103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Land Registration Case No.
N-138, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

AhLl;:i~ Associate Justice

52
Penned by Associate Justi ce Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Ses inando E. Villon
and Edwin D. Soro ngon, concurring; rollo, pp. 37-44.
53
Id at 45-46.
 Decision 14 G.R. No. 248306

WE CONCUR:

ESTELA A~ERNABE
Chairperson

-
\
RICARD

JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

l attest that the conclusion in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

110.L;J/
ESTELA M.'i>ERLAS-BERNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

AL~~
Chief Justice

/Y