TUNISIA

Breaking the Barriers to

Youth Inclusion

# 13235B
# 39A9DC
# 622181
# E41270
# DFDB00
 Tunisia

Breaking the Barriers to

Youth Inclusion

# 13235B
# 39A9DC
# 622181
# E41270
# DFDB00
Copyright © 2014

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /

The World Bank Group
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433, USA

All rights reserved

Report No. 89233-TN

Tunisia
ESW: Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion
P120911–ESW

Disclaimer
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Di-
rectors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
The World Bank, Tunisia, and governments represented do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this
work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply
any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or accep-
tance of such boundaries.
The present report is based mostly on the quantitative analysis of the Tunisia Household Surveys on Youth in
Rural Areas (THSYUA 2012) and its companion, the Tunisia Household Surveys on Youth in Rural Areas (THSYRA
2012). The Tunisia National Youth Observatory (ONJ) is not responsible for the data and figures presented in this
report. Electronic copies in Arabic and English can be downloaded free of charge upon request to the World Bank.
For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the
Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax
978-750-4470, [Link].
All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Pub-
lisher, World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522-2422, email: pubrights@world-
[Link].

Vice President: Inger Andersen

Country Director: Neil Simon M. Gray
Sector Director: Junaid Kamal Ahmed
Sector Manager: Franck Bousquet
Task Team Leader: Gloria La Cava

Photo credits: World Bank.

Cover photo credit: Malika Drissi, World Bank.
 Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
Youth Unemployment, Inactivity, and NEET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Economic Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Skills for Employment and Entrepreneurship Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Key Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Developing a Multidimensional Youth Inclusion Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

Chapter 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background and Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 What is Youth Inclusion? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Report Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 2. Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.1 Trust in Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Access to Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Youth Participation in Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Promoting Inclusive Youth Participation in Public Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Provide Incentives for Youth-Led NGOs and Volunteering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Scale up of Youth-Led Community Development Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Build Youth-Led Institutions to Strengthen Voice in Decision Making and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . 20

iii
iv | Contents

Chapter 3. Youth Inactivity and Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.1 Youth Inactivity; Young People Who Are Not in Education, Employment, or
Training; and Unemployment—An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Discouraged Youth without Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Education and Inactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Leaving School Early . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Educational Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Counseling for Better School-to-Work Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Pathways and Obstacles to Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Barriers to Finding Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Chapter 4. Economic Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

4.1 Employment Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Regional Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Gender Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Job Informality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Education and Low-Skill Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Youth Underemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Youth Employment by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 Self-Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Innovation and Entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Tunisia’s Self-Employed Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Skill Levels of Self-Employed Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Youth Entrepreneurship: Challenges and Investment Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Chapter 5. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.1 Programs of the Ministry of Professional Training and Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Perceptions of Active Labor Market Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Participation in Active Labor Market Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Benefits from Active Labor Market Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.2 Entrepreneurship Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Perceptions of Entrepreneurship Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
 Contents | v

Participation in Entrepreneurship Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

5.3 Other Youth Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Programs of the Ministry of Youth and Sports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Youth Services Provided by Religious Welfare Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.4 Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Key Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Strategic Areas for Further Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Chapter 6. The Way Forward: Inclusive Youth Policy and Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

6.1 Taking Stock of Young People’s Gains Since the Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.2 Guiding Principles for Strengthening Youth Inclusion and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.3 Developing a Multidimensional Youth Inclusion Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
1. Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2. Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3. Youth Inactivity and Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4. Economic Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Boxes
2.1 Defining Active Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Young Artists and Freedom of Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 The IDMEJ Project: Investing in Youth Inclusion in Lagging Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Houkoumetna: The “Our Government” Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 Young People Who Are Not in Education, Employment, or Training—
A Joint Indicator for Youth Unemployment and Inactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1 Family Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
vi | Contents

4.2 Education in Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

5.1 Online Platforms Najja7ni and Tounes Ta3mal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2 Jovenes “Training Plus” Programs for Disadvantaged Youth in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3 Youth Entrepreneurship Program in Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.1 Eleven Principles of a National Youth Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Figures
0.1 Multidimensional Policy for Youth Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii
1.1 Map of Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Dimensions of Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Population of Tunisia by Age Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 NEET Rates among Working Age Population by Youth and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Trust in Public and Religious Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Use of Internet to Access Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Access to Information and Communication Technology—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Distribution of Youth Volunteers by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Influences on Youth’s Life, Education, and Work Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6 Youth Influence on Local Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7 Politically Knowledgeable Youth—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.8 Politically Knowledgeable Youth—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1 Youth Employment and NEET Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Youth NEET in Rural Versus Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Youth NEET by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Labor Market Discouragement among NEETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.5 Reasons for Being Out of the Labor Force by Gender (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6 Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 15–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.7 Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, Urban Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.8 Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 25–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.9 NEETs Registered as Unemployed—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.10 Main Reasons for Finding Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.11 Main Difficulties in Finding Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.12 Sources of Information about Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.1 Employment of Young Tunisians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2 Destinations of Rural Migrants by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
 Contents | vii

4.3 Perceived Gender Discrimination in Private Versus Public Sectors, Rural Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4 Contract Type of Employed Youth (Ages 15–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.5 Satisfaction with Education System and Attainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.6 Youth Employment in Low-Productivity Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.7 Education Levels of Young Working Tunisians—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.8 Urban Youth Underemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.9 Youth Employment by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.10 Global Competitiveness Index (2011–12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.11 Youth Self-Employment—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.12 Youth Entrepreneurship by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.13 Barriers Faced by Youth in Establishing Small Businesses (Rural Tunisia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.14 Youth Entrepreneurship by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.15 Youth Entrepreneurship in Low-Productivity Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.16 Entrepreneurship by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.1 Beneficiaries of Programs Financed by the FNE (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2 Awareness of Active Labor Market Programs—Urban Versus Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.3 Awareness of Active Labor Market Programs, by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.4 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs—Urban Versus Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.5 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.6 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by NEET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.7 Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs—Urban Versus Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.8 Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.9 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs—Urban Versus Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.10 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.11 Matrix of Labor Market Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.1 Multidimensional Policy for Youth Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A2.1 Trust in Public and Religious Institutions by NEET (Urban) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A2.3 Importance of Community Organizations for Local Development (Rural Tunisia) . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A2.2 Trust in Public and Religious Institutions by NEET (Rural) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A2.4 Trust in Community Organizations—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A2.5 Youth Volunteering (Urban Tunisia) by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A2.6. Youth Participation in Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A2.7 Active Engagement in Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A3.1 Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 30–59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
viii | Contents

A3.2 Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 30–59), Disaggregated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

A3.3 NEET by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A3.4 Highest Education Among NEETs by Gender (Ages 15–29), Disaggregated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A3.5 Highest Education among NEETs by Region (Ages 15–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A3.6 NEETs Registered as Unemployed by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A4.1 Contract Type of Employed Adults (Aged 30–59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A4.2 Adult Employment in Low-Productivity Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A4.3 Adult Employment by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A4.4 Intention to Work in Public Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A4.5 Adult Self-Employment—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A5.1 Awareness of Active Labor Market Programs by Region and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A5.2 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A5.3 Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A5.4 Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by NEET and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A5.5 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A5.6 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by NEET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A5.7 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Tables
A3.1 Probit Model of Early School Leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A4.1 Determinants of Employment (Probit Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A4.2 Determinants of Wage Income (Heckman Selection Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A4.3 Determinants of Informal Employment, Conditional on Being in Employment
(Probit Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A4.4 Determinants of Educational Attainment (Ordered Probit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A4.5 Determinants of Wage Income by Sector (Least Squares) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A4.6 Determinants of Self-Employment, Conditional on Being in Employment
(Probit Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
 Acronyms and Abbreviations

ALMP Active Labor Market Programs GDP gross domestic product

ANETI National Agency for Employment and ILO International Labour Organisation
Independent Work
INS National Statistical Institute
(Agence Nationale de l’Emploi)
(Institut National de la Statistique)
ATFP Agency for Professional Training
MVTE Ministry of Professional Training and
BTS Tunisian Solidarity Bank Employment
(Banque Tunisienne de Solidarité)
NCA National Constituent Assembly
CAIP Labor Market Access and
NEET Individuals who are Not in Education,
Employability Program
Employment, or Training
(Contrat d’Adaptation et d’Insertion a
la vie Professionnelle) OECD Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development
CES Employment Solidarity Program
(Contrat Emploi Solidarité) PAPPE Program for Small Enterprises
(Program d’accompagnement des
CIDES Employment Program for Graduates of
promoteurs des petites entreprises)
Higher Education
SCV Voluntary Civil Service
CNSS National Social Security Fund
(Service Civil Volontaire)
(Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale)
SMS Short Message Service
CSO civil society organization
SIVP Professional Internship Program
FNS National Solidarity Fund
(Fonds National de Solidarité) THSYRA Tunisia Household Survey on Youth in
Rural Areas
FONAPRA National Fund For the Promotion of
Craft and Small Entrepreneurs THSYUA Tunisia Household Survey on Youth in
(Fonds National de Promotion de Urban Areas
l’Artisanat et des Petits Métiers)

ix
 Foreword

Youth inclusion is a central theme of the Post-2015 together with voices that are heard, and actively partici-
Development Agenda. Young people account for one- pating in civil society and politics at local, regional, and
quarter of the world’s population, and especially since national levels.
the Arab Spring, youth have been shaping social and eco- This report attempts to identify the causes for wide-
nomic innovations, challenging social norms and values, spread youth inactivity based on quantitative survey re-
and breaking new ground. Connected as never before, sults along with extensive qualitative research and direct
young women and men are increasingly influencing the consultations with young people and relevant service
course of their communities and countries. At the same providers and policy makers. Quantitative and quali-
time, this young generation faces many obstacles, rang- tative analysis is combined with a review of successful
ing from discrimination, marginalization, and lack of international youth employment programs. The conclu-
access, to opportunities and voice in decision making. sions drawn from this extensive research and analysis
Globally, while more than one-quarter of young people form the basis of a series of proposals for new youth-
are not in education, employment, or training (NEET), specific policies and approaches for Tunisia.
the share in the Middle East and North Africa region is a Tunisia is undergoing dramatic changes. With a new
staggering 41 percent. government and constitution, the moment is right to en-
To address this mounting crisis of youth exclusion, gage in a conversation on how best to support young
we must look beyond unemployment. This report devel- women and men in achieving their full potential. Break-
ops a comprehensive framework for youth inclusion that ing the Barriers to Youth Inclusion will be an essential
highlights how economic, social, political, and cultural guide to mapping the way forward. This well-researched
dimensions need to be addressed simultaneously to de- and thoughtful report provides a good starting point
velop solutions that can help young Tunisians to believe from which to begin the conversation between the Gov-
in their future again by enjoying the benefits of quality ernment of Tunisia and its hopeful youth.
education, finding work or starting a business, working

Simon Gray
Director, Maghreb Department
Middle East and North Africa Region

x
 Acknowledgements

This report was prepared by the World Bank in partner- The team is grateful for the ongoing support of Franck
ship with the National Youth Observatory (Observatoire Bousquet, Sector Manager, Urban and Social Develop-
National de la Jeunesse, ONJ) of Tunisia. The report’s ment, Middle East and North Africa Region; Simon
preparation was jointly led by Gloria La Cava, MENA Gray, Country Director for the Maghreb; and Eileen
Region Youth Coordinator, World Bank Global Practice Murray, Tunisia Country Manager.
for Urban, Rural and Social Development, and Professor The report benefitted greatly from early comments
Mohamed Jouili, Director of the ONJ, in close collabo- provided by Professor Abelwahab Ben Hafaiedh, Con-
ration with Tobias Lechtenfeld, Economist, World Bank sultant; Kamel Braham, Lead Education Specialist;
Global Practice for Urban, Rural and Social Develop- Balakrishna Menon Parameswaran, Lead Social Devel-
ment, following extensive consultations with Tunisian opment Specialist; Nina Bhatt, Lead Social Development
youth stakeholders and academics. Additional core team Specialist; Diego Angel-Urdinola, Senior Economist;
members of this report include Professor Ahmed Khouja, Nina Arnhold, Senior Education Specialist; Professor
Université de Tunis; Professor Hayet Moussa, Université Niall O’Higgins, University of Salerno; Professor Emma
de Tunis; Houcine Abaab, Public Policy Specialist; Imen Murphy, Durham University; and Paul Dyer, Knowl-
Ben Daadouch, Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales, edge Program Manager at Silatech. Peer reviewers were
Université de Tunis; Raja Marzougui, Faculté des sciences Wendy Cunningham, Program Leader, and Sarah Mi-
humaines et sociales, Université de Tunis; Neji Letifi, chael, Senior Social Development Specialist.
Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales, Université de The team would like to express its appreciation for
Tunis; Mohamed Ali Naceur, Social Sciences, Univer- the technical contributions of the members of the Steer-
sity of Tunis; and Sofia Trommlerova, IHEID Graduate ing Committee, including representatives of Tunisia’s
Institute Geneva. For the collection of the rural house- Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Profes-
hold data, the team is grateful to the survey team at sional Training and Employment, and the National Em-
Emrhod Tunis, especially Nebil Belaam. ployment Observatory; the methodological contribution
In addition, important contributions were made by of the Institute National de Statistique, which provided
Tara Vishwanath, Lead Economist; Wendy Cunningham, the sampling frame of the urban and rural surveys; and
Program Leader (LCC1C), Nandini Krishnan, Senior the generous financial contributions and research inputs
Economist; Professor Irene Jillson, Georgetown Univer- of Silatech, a social initiative based in Qatar that works
sity; Professor Imed Melliti, Université de Tunis; Paul to create jobs and expand economic opportunities for
Francis, Consultant; and Atsuko Muroga, Consultant. young people throughout the Arab world.

xi
 Executive Summary

Overview dialogue between Tunisia’s youth and public institutions,

together with broader civil society, political organiza-
Over three years have elapsed since the Tunisian Rev- tions, and the private sector, will be critical in addressing
olution. Yet the aspirations of the younger generation the most pressing barriers to youth inclusion. Facilitat-
that sparked sweeping changes across the Middle East ing youth inclusion enables the mobilization of the new
and North Africa Region remain unmet. Unemployment generation as an economic and social resource, which
among young people aged 15–29 increased after the revo- can directly contribute to sustaining the stability and
lution, with an official youth unemployment rate of 33.2 economic growth of the country. Participatory decision
percent in 2013, according to the most recent Interna- making in the design and implementation of youth poli-
tional Labour Organisation School-to-Work Transition cies and programs and in the management of civil society
survey (ILO 2014). Even though youth played a leading organizations (CSOs) yields benefits for all stakeholders,
role in bringing about a change in the regime, they have and is likely to increase the impact of public investments.
been unable to secure a role in decision making and feel This report identifies specific categories of excluded
that they are not consulted on issues that directly affect youth and characterizes them according to multiple fac-
them. Nevertheless, there are positive manifestations in tors, including regional disparities, gender inequalities,
the post-revolution period. The new Tunisian Constitu- and limited access to education, employment, and social
tion, passed in January 2014, enshrines youth participa- goods. The findings help to identify crucial barriers to
tion as a key pillar of the social, economic, and political youth inclusion faced by young women and men from
development of the country.1 However, given the time re- different backgrounds, especially from marginalized
quired to translate and implement constitutional princi- regions, and describe the youth’s perceived and actual
ples into laws and practice, youth participation remains exclusion from social, economic, and political opportu-
at the formative stage. nities that drove the Tunisian Revolution (Ayeb 2011).
The study provides an analysis of the aspirations and Overall, the report notes that while the situation of un-
needs of young Tunisians, taking into account both non- employed university graduates has often dominated dis-
economic and economic measures of exclusion that were course and policy, other socioeconomic groups of youth
at the root of the revolution. In particular, it highlights: face distinct challenges to inclusion, which also require
• the continuing rise of youth activism outside for- the attention and actions of policy makers.
mally established political institutions as well In particular, the report highlights NEETs as the
as the need to support the transition of Tunisian most excluded group. NEETs exemplify youth inactiv-
youth from protest to active citizenship; and ity and discouragement, a more worrisome condition
• young people who are not in education, employ- than youth unemployment, which does not include dis-
ment, or training (NEETs) as the category most engaged youth who have given up looking for formal
affected by economic exclusion, and the need to sector (or other) employment (United Nations 2013).
ensure their socioeconomic integration through In Tunisia, young women are more likely to be NEETs.
tailored policies and programming. Highly educated youth, although affected by exclusion,
constitute less than one-fifth of all NEETs. Early school
Active citizenship and civil participation among leavers are the most highly represented in the NEET sub-
young Tunisians will be critical to sustaining the coun- group, irrespective of gender.
try’s regained positive forward momentum. Constructive

xiii
xiv | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

A multidimensional approach is used to identify and Among the few youth active in CSOs, the most fre-
address the social, economic, political, and cultural bar- quently mentioned types of volunteering are for CSOs in
riers encountered by young Tunisians. Marginalization the fields of regional development, charity and poverty,
associated with social exclusion tends to occur simulta- religious affairs, and science. Sports and leisure clubs are
neously along multiple axes, so policies that address only also frequently mentioned in qualitative interviews.
one aspect of marginalization, such as improved access While political participation is a key pillar of active
to education, may be too narrow to overcome exclusion citizenship, very few young Tunisians engage in any form
more generally (World Bank 2013f). A combination of of political participation, except mobilizing for demon-
quantitative and qualitative research methods is used as strations. The low participation rate by youth in the Tu-
well as an assessment of current youth programs and ser- nisian national elections of October 2011 was especially
vices in order to ask a range of questions: Why do young worrisome. Only one-half of under-30-year-olds voted.
people continue to be active outside formal institutional In addition, very few young Tunisians are active in po-
venues as opposed to inside them? What channels are litical parties, reflecting the large disconnect between the
needed to increase youth trust in institutions and voice younger generation and the political establishment. Most
in decision making? Why are certain groups of youth young Tunisians say that they do not follow domestic pol-
over-represented among the inactive and unemployed or itics, and self-reported knowledge about politics is low,
those working in the informal sector? How effectively especially in rural areas. A youth provision in the new
is public policy at addressing the constraints that youth electoral law, which incentivizes political parties to nom-
face? While also drawing on quantified measures, the inate at least one young candidate under age 35 among
analysis benefits from qualitative, narrative interpreta- the top four candidates on any electoral list, provides an
tions and solutions that emerge from young respondents, important entry point for political participation.2
thereby attempting to avoid technocratic prescriptions Young Tunisians have little trust in public institu-
that do not resonate with the discourse of youth them- tions, and only 8.8 percent of rural youth and 31.1 per-
selves. This approach allows an analysis of the range cent of urban youth trust the political system. There is
of economic, social, and political exclusion, as well as also a low level of trust in the police, especially in rural
examination of the ways in which they are mutually areas. In comparison, the military, the local Imam, and
reinforcing. religious organizations receive the youth’s highest trust
rating of up to 80 percent, which is nearly the same level
of trust given to family. Like their counterparts in Egypt
Key Findings and Libya, young Tunisians express little trust in the
press, which they see as commercial and manipulative.
Youth Participation, Voice, and Active
More than any other medium, young Tunisians are
Citizenship
using the Internet to access information. About 50 per-
Very few young Tunisians are active in civil society, al- cent of all Internet users (43.3 percent in rural areas and
though CSOs are on the rise. Since the revolution, civil in 53.2 of percent urban areas) use the Internet for ed-
society groups have been able to register with the state, ucation, and between one-quarter and one-half of all
and an increasing number of organizations focused on youth uses the Internet to look for jobs (45.9 percent in
civic engagement have emerged. However, only a small rural areas and 26.8 percent in urban areas). In addition,
fraction of young Tunisians are active in CSOs, and as more than 9 out of 10 young Tunisians in rural Tunisia
little as three percent of rural youth participate in CSOs own a mobile phone. To advance citizenship in a sustain-
(ONJ 2013). Despite the low levels of participation in as- able way, however, youth must progress beyond “virtual
sociations, 9 out of 10 young Tunisians consider volun- citizenship” to formal political participation at the local
teering in CSOs to be important for their communities. and national levels.
 Executive Summary | xv

Youth Unemployment, Inactivity, and NEET account for 62 percent of university students, and 26
percent complete their university education compared
One of the most pressing barriers for youth inclusion
with 16.8 percent of young men.
is the large share of NEETs. This category includes all
Youth and student organizations should have the op-
officially unemployed youth aged 15–29 as well as dis-
portunity to voice concerns and offer solutions about
couraged young Tunisians who are no longer searching
educational policies and regulations. International expe-
for jobs despite their young ages. NEET has been pro-
rience from other middle-income countries shows that,
posed as a core indicator for the Post-2015 Development
apart from its immediate value in curbing corruption and
Agenda to measure the degree to which young people
malpractice in the school system, greater student partici-
effectively transition into the labor market.3
pation in schools increases the accountability of teachers
NEET rates display significant gender and regional
and school administrators while providing students with
disparities, and in rural areas more than two out of five
greater opportunities to influence how curricula are de-
youth are NEET, compared with almost one in three in
signed (La Cava and Michael 2006, 58–60). Initiatives at
urban Tunisia. In rural Tunisia, half of all young women
secondary and tertiary school levels could be supported
are NEETs (50.4 percent), compared with one in three
through a competitive grant scheme to which students
young men (33.4 percent). This compares with urban
and youth organizations could apply.
Tunisia—the primary destination for many young job
seekers—where about one-third of young women (32.4
Economic Opportunities
percent) and one-fifth of all young men (20.3 percent)
are NEETs. Gender gaps are significant among NEETs, Ability, opportunity, and dignity are key requirements
which affects one in two young women in rural Tunisia for youth inclusion. Ability and skills are needed to suc-
(50.4 percent) and one in three rural young men (33.4 ceed in today’s economy and to master the challenges
percent). While these rates are slightly lower in Tunisia and risks of a globalized world. Access to equal oppor-
compared with other countries in the region, such as tunity is important to reduce social and economic barri-
Morocco, they do highlight a large untapped potential ers to youth inclusion and is central to achieving shared
for economic inclusion. prosperity for the next generation. Dignity was a central
High rates of school dropouts appear to be strongly demand in the demonstrations of the Arab Spring across
linked to unemployment and inactivity. Systemic bar- the region, including Tunisia.
riers affecting transitions at the end of grade six and The principal barrier to economic opportunities is re-
grade nine cause high dropout rates and prevent many gional disparities between governorates in the coastal,
youth from completing secondary education. The major- interior, and southern regions, which in many economic
ity of young Tunisians leave school long before obtain- aspects are greater than the urban-rural divide. Exclu-
ing a secondary school degree. Reportedly, more than sion of Tunisia’s interior and southern regions is a funda-
140,000 students drop out of school annually, 80,000 mental driver of social, economic, cultural, and political
of these without having completed their basic education youth exclusion. Young Tunisians face poor odds in find-
(Romdhane 2010, 127).4 As with other indicators, spa- ing employment, especially in the interior and the south,
tial differences abound: more than four out of five rural according to a recent report on the spatial divide of labor
and one out of two urban young people do not complete market outcomes (World Bank 2013b). In fact, among
secondary schooling. It is this group that comprises the the underlying causes of the 2011 revolution is the spa-
bulk of NEETs: 83 percent in rural areas and 57 percent tial, economic, and political marginalization of society in
in urban areas. On the other hand, girls tend to stay in parts of the country in favor of the coastal region (Ayeb
school longer than boys and are more likely to complete 2011).5 Rural youth continue to move to cities as they at-
both their high school and university education. Women tempt to escape rural areas, despite the lack of good jobs
xvi | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

in urban areas. Nearly 90.2 percent of rural households (71.9 percent) where agricultural employment and infor-
report that members of the direct family6 have migrated mal day-labor contracts remain the most common form
to urban areas, mostly siblings of rural youth. of employment. Nonetheless, even in urban Tunisia, more
Gender gaps remain significant barriers limiting equal than half of all working youth are employed informally
access to economic opportunities. Despite Tunisia’s gen- (55.4 percent). Young Tunisians are very discontent with
der equality policies, surprisingly few young Tunisian informal employment. Job informality and exploitation
women are working. Less than one in five women in rural are cited as the primary concern among employed youth
Tunisia (18.5 percent) and less than two in five women in in the qualitative research for this report.
urban Tunisia (39.8 percent) have a job. Wages of young The great majority of employed young Tunisians
women are one-quarter lower than wages of young work in low-skilled jobs in low productivity sectors:
men. In addition, gender exclusion remains a daunting 82.5 percent youth in rural areas and 67.0 percent in
challenge for young Tunisian women trying to enter the urban areas work in jobs that do not require a secondary
workforce. Nearly two-thirds (61.4 percent) of female degree. Young women are especially likely to work in the
respondents report that women are discriminated against low-skill sectors: 69.0 percent in urban areas and 85.9
when seeking work in the private sector. Yet even in the percent in rural areas. Notably, the public sector provides
public sector, discrimination against women is reported relatively little employment for young Tunisians—only
by nearly half (44.4 percent) of all female respondents. 6.8 percent of working youth in rural areas and 12.4
In rural areas, only 8.3 percent of young women from percent in urban areas are employed in that sector. Agri-
the southern and 15.4 percent from interior regions are culture remains an important sector for rural youth em-
working, compared with 23.6 percent in coastal region. ployment even though many young people want to leave
Schools and universities fail to impart essential skills the sector due to the difficult working conditions and
to equip young people confronting the challenges of the the negative image associated with it. It provides more
labor market for transition to adulthood and active citi- than one-fifth of all rural jobs for young Tunisians (21.9
zenship. Youth are particularly critical of an overly the- percent). Manufacturing and industries provide less than
oretical orientation of public education, which includes one-third (32.2 percent) of youth employment in urban
a minimal focus on skills to prepare them for the labor Tunisia and less than one-quarter (23.8 percent) in rural
market. Overall, discouragement among students shapes Tunisia. Most young Tunisians work in the service sector,
the way in which teachers and students interact. Career including tourism, which also provides most of the jobs
counseling in secondary schools and universities is very in the informal sector.
limited, resulting in students receiving scant guidance Tunisia is well positioned to become a regional
concerning their critical career decisions. There were champion in innovation and entrepreneurship if it rec-
many criticisms of successive educational reforms, which ognizes the potential of young aspiring businesswomen
students felt were arbitrary and poorly considered and and businessmen. Self-employment is relatively com-
for which many teachers were not well prepared to im- mon among young Tunisians: one in ten youth are self-
plement. In effect, even those young women and men employed microentrepreneurs. Notably, self-employment
who complete secondary school and continue to a uni- among young women is virtually nonexistent—only 2.2
versity emerge lacking practical skills and ill-equipped to percent in rural areas and 1.5 percent in urban areas.
face the labor market. However, modern technology could make it easier for
Informal work is pervasive.7 Few young people have young women to start businesses and generate incomes.
access to secure jobs, with most available job openings Self-employment could also help to overcome regional
being informal, without a contract. The few formal jobs disparities. Currently, self-employment is more common
come in the form of fixed-term contracts. As a result, in the coastal region (12.1 percent) and in the south (12.1
fewer than one in three young workers have a secure percent), compared with only 8.1 percent in the interior.
work contract and access to social protection. Predict- About 30–40 percent of young entrepreneurs work
ably, informal work is most prevalent in rural areas in sectors with high returns on average, demonstrating
 Executive Summary | xvii

the potential of entrepreneurship. More than half of all Youth entrepreneurship can play an important role in
self-employed youth operate small businesses in the ser- addressing youth exclusion while strengthening income
vice sector, including modern technologies: 45.4 percent generation and reducing youth unemployment. A num-
in rural areas and 52.1 percent in urban areas. Only one ber of programs are designed to support entrepreneurs
in five young urban entrepreneurs works in the manu- or potential entrepreneurs. However, awareness of ex-
facturing and industries sectors (20.9 percent). In rural isting entrepreneurship programs remains low, and only
areas, 36.4 percent of young entrepreneurs work in ag- one-third of rural youth and about half of urban youth
riculture and food processing; in urban areas, it is 10.8 are aware of existing programs. Program take-up is very
percent. However, in rural areas, almost all young entre- low, especially in urban areas, where only about one in a
preneurs work informally, often in unfavorable locations. hundred youth has participated in entrepreneurship pro-
Young entrepreneurs struggle to gain access to finance, grams. On the positive side, a substantial proportion of
which remains the main challenge in successfully estab- rural youth who participated reported that they benefit-
lishing a business. Existing microfinance programs seem ted from microloan programs.
to have limited reach and are widely perceived as ineffi- Tunisian youth could benefit from an innovative ap-
cient. One-third of all young entrepreneurs struggle with proach that connects education to jobs in a three-way col-
the heavy cost of bureaucracy, including difficulties in laboration among the school system, technical colleges,
and local corporate partners.8 Many workplace skills, in-
obtaining required licenses and slow administrative pro-
cluding teamwork and other social skills, problem-solv-
cedures. The education level among young entrepreneurs
ing, and verbal and writing skills should be embedded
is relatively low, and most self-employed youth have not
in the curriculum. Course learning should be based on
completed secondary school, rendering it more difficult
actual projects to enable students to work in teams,
to participate in available programs and negotiate and
solve problems, practice presentation skills, and create
manage microfinance assistance. Additional business
business plans. Structured visits to companies partnering
training and enhanced access to business information
with the model should be part of the academic program.
would be helpful to many young entrepreneurs.
In addition, a mentoring program covering each student
from his or her school’s corporate partner would provide
Skills for Employment and Entrepreneurship
in-depth career counseling and provide opportunities for
Programs visiting workplaces and learning through internships.
Tunisia has developed a large system of Active Labor
Market Programs (ALMPs), which constitute the core Key Recommendations
of its labor market policy, but the perceived benefits
remain limited. ALMPs are mostly unknown to young
Tunisians. Most programs reinforce spatial disparities Developing a Multidimensional Youth
by overly focusing on urban areas along the coast. Only Inclusion Policy
a few programs are available to youth in the interior A multidimensional youth policy is needed to reduce bar-
and southern regions. Most ALMPs are also tailored riers to youth inclusion and facilitate youth contributions
for young university graduates, despite the fact that the to Tunisian society. The approach to youth development
absolute number of young Tunisians without work and is now ready to move from piecemeal initiatives to an
without a secondary or university degree is about 3.5 integrated set of policies and investments, maximizing
times larger than the number of university graduates. In the use of financial resources. To ensure equity, this can
addition, most programs lack rigorous monitoring and best be achieved through national youth policies and any
evaluation, interagency coordination, and enforcement related reforms that cut across sectors but that have a
of criteria, which creates disincentives for young people common focus on youth inclusion. These will also need
to search for employment. to complement sector-specific policies—such as those in
xviii | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 0.1. Multidimensional Policy for Youth Inclusion

1. Participation and active citizenship

Participation • Youth-led community development
• Volunteering
• Youth councils for participation and voice
• Human rights

NEETs 2. Access to economic opportunities

• Job counseling in secondary and tertiary education
Informal youth
Economic • Skills training
Young women opportunities • Apprenticeships/internships
Youth in peri-urban areas • Job intermediation
and lagging regions • Youth entrepreneurship

3. Youth-friendly services at the local level

• Life skills training
• Information and communication technology and language skills
Integrated
youth • Healthy lifestyles
services • Legal support services
• Peer mentoring
• Sports

Source: World Bank.

education, employment, and regional development—to Participation, Voice, and Citizenship

address the needs of young people with greater efficiency.
Local Level
These policies should be reformulated with the participa-
• Youth-led community development
tion of youth stakeholders—especially youth representa-
• Competitive grant scheme to support the capacity
tive bodies—as partners in decision making. Moreover,
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to en-
policy implementation needs to be supported by perfor-
gage/provide services to excluded youth
mance-based management of institutions, strengthened
• Institutional channels to influence local poli-
by mechanisms for close interagency coordination that
cy—i.e., local youth councils
bring together government and youth organizations, and
• Legal protection for young disadvantaged people
informed by systematic data collection and participatory
in conflict with police
monitoring and evaluation systems. As highlighted in fig-
• Confidence/trust building between youth, local au-
ure 0.1, a multidimensional youth policy would include
thorities and police
the following three pillars: (1) participation and active
• Joint youth initiatives between religious and non-
citizenship; (2) access to economic opportunities; and (3)
religious organizations
youth-friendly services at the local level.
These three dimensions of youth inclusion policy,
which involve participation, economic opportunities and
youth-friendly services require a specific set of measures
at the national and especially at the local level, as indi-
cated below.
 Executive Summary | xix

National Level skills, legal support services, peer mentoring, cul-

• Capacity support of youth-led national NGOs and tural activities, volunteering, and sports)
coalition building
• Competitive grant scheme to support student and National Level
youth organizations • Capacity building of NGOs providing youth services
• Student consultative bodies at secondary and ter- • Quality standards of content
tiary education levels • Certification of skills
• Voice in national policy and reforms—e.g., through • Beneficiary feedback and monitoring and evaluation
National Youth Councils
While the revolution has given young Tunisians a
Access to Economic Opportunities glimpse of the possibilities of a new future, the task of
building that future largely remains to be done. It is a
Local Level
task that cannot be accomplished by youth alone—any
• Job counseling services in secondary schools in
more than it can be accomplished without them. This
partnership with the private sector and NGOs
is also not an undertaking that government can pursue
• Gender-sensitive youth-led community develop-
singlehandedly. New forms of partnerships between
ment, also with small cash transfers incentives
government, the private sector, civil society, and com-
• Job intermediation
munities will be needed to imagine and accomplish the
• Gender-sensitive individual and group entrepre-
task that Tunisia faces of simultaneously reforming its
neurship, through equity building grants and ac-
politics, economy, and society. Young people require the
cess to finance
space to participate fully in this process of renewal and,
• Apprenticeships and internships tailored to less ed-
indeed, to benefit from it. The stakes could hardly be
ucated youth and NEETs through gender-sensitive
higher: the possibility of a productive and equitable econ-
approaches
omy and vibrant political and civil society is set against
the possibility of growing polarization, frustration, and
National Policy Level
cynicism. Moving toward a constructive outcome holds
• Job counseling services in universities through
the promise of a multitude of rewards, including the en-
public/private/NGO partnerships
ergy, awareness, goodwill, and commitment of the young
• Access to information—e.g., rigorous monitoring
men and women of Tunisia for whom this report bears
and evaluation, data, and youth policy dialogue
witness.
on employment policy and Active Labor Market
Programs
• Youth consultations and participation—also vir- Notes
tual—on labor market reform 1. Article 8 of the new Tunisian Constitution, January 27, 2014.
• Beneficiary feedback and monitoring and evaluation 2. The Tunisian National Assembly passed the new Electoral Law on May 1,
2014 (Jasmine Foundation 2014).

Youth-Friendly Services 3. The indicator is preferable to traditional unemployment measures because

it shows the scope of potential problems in the youth labor market.
Local Level 4. Base Education is defined as grades one through nine.

• Youth-friendly services tailored for NEETs and 5. The term “Jasmine Revolution” is arguably a misnomer, as it refers to the
plant from the relatively lush and prosperous northern coast. Instead, Ayeb
other disadvantaged youth, particularly inactive argues that “Alfa Grass Revolution” might be a better term, based on the
young women, with youth participation (i.e., life plant growing in Tunisia’s interior region.
skills, information and communication technology 6. The concept of the direct family includes children, spouse, and parents of
the head of household.
and e-learning, entrepreneurship and employability 7. This report refers to job informality based on survey responses of having
a written formal work contract.
8. Based on Litow 2013.
 Chapter 1
Introduction

1
2 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

What is a revolution? Why did we take it to the streets? Employment, freedom, and national
dignity! But if we were to dissect these slogans, what would they show? We want an equal
distribution of wealth, a fair development plan between the regions—[in] the inland regions,
between first-class Tunisia and the other Tunisia. University student, Tunis1

1.1 Background and Objective 2010b). The 2005–09 Labor Force Survey data showed
that 85 percent of the unemployed were between 15 and
Prior to the revolution, Tunisia had been praised by 35 years of age (Angel-Urdinola 2012). The Labor Force
international institutions for its substantial progress in Survey also revealed that unemployment among younger
economic growth and poverty reduction. It enjoyed an aged groups had increased between 2005 and 2009,
annual average gross domestic product (GDP) growth while for older cohorts, the rate actually decreased. In
rate of 5 percent between 1997 and 2007, placing itself particular, unemployment among 15- to 24-year-olds
among the leading performers in the Middle East and rose from 28 to 31 percent, and that of 25- to 34-year-
North Africa Region (average 4.3 percent). In 2009, olds increased from 17 to 19 percent. Public opinion sur-
the per capita income of Tunisians worsened slightly veys highlighted the political significance of these trends.
and stood at US$7,200, close to the level it had been in In a poll conducted after the revolution in January 2011,
2005. Yet the overall decline was not dramatic, and the the majority of the respondents believed that the revo-
level still remained higher than any neighboring country lution was induced by young people (96 percent), the
except Libya, surpassing Algeria (US$6,600), Morocco unemployed (85.3 percent), and the disadvantaged (87.3
(US$3,800), and Egypt (US$4,900). Tunisia’s life expec- percent) (SIGMA Group 2011).
tancy and literacy rates compared very favorably with However, unemployment was by no means the only
other Arab countries. factor. Arab observers viewed the youth uprising in Tu-
Nevertheless, Tunisia experienced a revolution in Jan- nisia as a response to a sense of closed possibilities, given
uary 2011 driven in large measure by longstanding griev- that young Tunisians had been excluded from express-
ances about social, economic, and political exclusion. ing their voice and exercising active citizenship (Bamyeh
Significantly, the revolutionary movement was ignited 2011). The 2005 National Youth Observatory’s survey,
by the anger and despair of a 26-year-old unemployed covering 10,000 young people (aged 15–29), revealed
vegetable vendor in one of Tunisia’s most underserved a low rate of participation by young people in deci-
governorates, Sidi Bouzid. It resonated with the many sions affecting their lives, limited youth membership in
Tunisians who faced similar day-to-day challenges and associations and a dearth of structures through which
triggered waves of protests (Saleh 2010). Such protests they could articulate their opinions. It also showed that
were not new: as early as 2008, unemployed youth had young people were generally less optimistic about the
been involved in demonstrations in Gafsa, a poor mining future than they had been in 2000. Similarly, in 2007,
area which still suffers from one of the highest unem- a United Nations report pointed out the lack of active
ployment rates in the country (Filiu 2011). youth participation in decision making at community,
One of the root causes of this disaffection can be traced municipal, regional, and national levels; a lack of youth
back to the lack of opportunities available to young peo- engagement in the design, implementation, and evalua-
ple. Tunisia’s youth unemployment rate was particularly tion of youth-targeted services and programs; limited op-
high at 30.7 percent (for ages 15–24), while the overall portunities for volunteering or community service; and
unemployment rate was 14 percent, making the ratio of lack of consultations (United Nations 2007). Therefore,
youth-to-adult unemployment ratio 3.2 (World Bank youth demands for dignity should be understood in the
 Introduction | 3

Figure 1.1. Map of Tunisia

4 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

broader context of an absence of opportunities for voice • the continuing rise of youth activism outside the
regarding the direction of the country as well as a lack of formally established political institutions as well
accountability on the part of public authorities. as the need to support the transition of Tunisian
In this context, the objective of this policy study, con- youth from protest to active citizenship; and
ducted in 2012/2013, is threefold: (1) to identify and • young people who are not in education, employ-
analyze key barriers to youth inclusion encountered by ment, or training (NEET) as the category most
young Tunisian men and women (aged 15–29) with a affected by economic exclusion, and the need to
special emphasis on participation, active citizenship, and ensure their socioeconomic integration through
economic opportunities; (2) to assess the access, quality, tailored policies and programming.
and impact of various public services and programs for
young people, including Active Labor Market Programs;
and (3) to provide recommendations for policy and pro-
1.2 What is Youth Inclusion?
gramming on how to address such barriers. This report uses a multidimensional approach to identify
The study provides an analysis of the aspirations and and address the social, economic, political, and cultural
needs of young Tunisians, taking into account essen- barriers encountered by young Tunisians. A variety of
tial noneconomic and economic measures of exclusion paradigms have been used to define and explain Arab
that were at the root of the revolution. In particular, it youth, ranging from a demographic “bulge” and “div-
highlights: idend;” to frameworks of human capital formation, in-
cluding educational and employment failures; to a state

Figure 1.2. Dimensions of Exclusion

Source: World Bank 2014.

 Introduction | 5

of transition to adulthood, when Arab youth are de- Figure 1.3. Population of Tunisia by Age Group
picted as being in a stage of “waiting;” to a set of youth
identities and subcultures.2 Taken individually, these par- 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
adigms present some analytic limitations, as marginal- 100+

ization associated with social exclusion tends to occur 90–94 Female Male
80–84
simultaneously along multiple axes (see figure 1.2).
70–74
According to a compelling interpretation of the Arab
60–64
youth’s uprisings, young people share as an experience
50–54
“a generational narrative of exclusion, which traverses 40–44
public and private life and results from the political, 30–34
economic and social failures of authoritarian regimes” 20–24
(Murphy 2012). As a result, policies that address only 10–14
one aspect of marginalization—such as improved access 0–4
to education—may be too narrow to overcome exclusion 0 100 200 300 400 500 600
more generally (World Bank 2013f).3
This study uses a combination of quantitative and Source: United Nations 2010.
qualitative research methods—as well as an assessment Note: Measured in ‘000, year 2010, medium variant.
of current youth programs and services—to ask a range
of questions, such as: Why do young people continue to
be primarily active outside formal institutional venues?
What channels are needed to increase their voice in deci- the amelioration of one source of exclusion will not nec-
sion making? Why are certain groups of youth over rep- essarily lead to inclusion if exclusionary dynamics persist
resented among the inactive and unemployed or among in other spheres. Fostering youth inclusion requires in-
those working in the informal sector? How effectively terventions that simultaneously address a range of exclu-
is public policy addressing the constraints that youth sionary dynamics, specifically in ways that enable greater
face? While drawing on quantified measures, the report youth voice and participation in the decision-making
also heavily weights interpretations and solutions from processes that affect their lives. The evidence presented
young respondents themselves in an attempt to avoid in this report indicates that interventions are needed to
technocratic prescriptions that do not resonate with the rebuild trust between youth and public institutions to
discourse of the youth. foster a sense of agency and ownership among young
Fostering youth inclusion requires recognizing the people. The report therefore highlights the importance of
multiple dimensions of exclusion. The range of exclu- fostering voice, participation, and active citizenship for
sionary dynamics that affect young Tunisians is set out in addressing socioeconomic youth exclusion.
figure 1.2. Not all young people are subject to all exclu- In this report, young Tunisians are considered those
sionary dynamics, but some young people suffer exclu- aged 15–29. This broader age segment better captures
sion across many or all political, economic, social, and issues of exclusion and delayed transition to socio-
cultural spheres. For example, young people who are not economic autonomy than the 15- to 24-year-old group-
in education, employment, or training may be simultane- ing used in other studies and surveys (see, for example,
ously disengaged from community life, originate from a World Bank. 2012c). According to recent population es-
poor household, and lack social networks, which in turn timates, youth aged 15–29 make up 29 percent of Tuni-
preclude their access to opportunities in the labor market. sia’s total population and 43 percent of the working age
These may be the most marginalized and disempowered population—aged 15–59 (see figure 1.3).4 Today’s youth
youth. It is important to identify and recognize the het- represent one of the largest social cohorts of Tunisia, fac-
erogeneity of experiences to most effectively target inter- ing very distinct social, economic, cultural, and policy
ventions to those who are most excluded. Nonetheless, challenges, many of which have yet to be addressed.
6 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Young Tunisians are not a homogeneous group. discouraged from looking for work. The NEET indica-
While the situation of unemployed university graduates tor ensures a more accurate assessment of inactivity that
has often dominated national discourse and policy, other includes discouraged and disengaged youth who have
socioeconomic groups of youth face distinct challenges given up looking for formal sector (or other) employment
to inclusion. This report identifies specific categories of (United Nations 2013). Tunisia currently has one of the
excluded young people and characterizes them accord- highest NEET rates in the Middle East and North Africa
ing to regional disparities, gender differences, access and Region, estimated at approximately 33 percent of the
opportunities, employment and education status, and total number of young people aged 15–29 years, accord-
educational attainment. This analysis helps to identify ing to calculations from the European Training Founda-
crucial barriers to inclusion faced by young women and tion (ETF 2014). Highly educated youth, although still
men from different backgrounds. It also contributes to suffering exclusion, are less likely to become NEET than
an understanding of youth frustration with and percep- those with less education. Youth who leave school early
tion of exclusion from social, economic, and political are the most highly represented NEET subgroup and, ac-
opportunities, which drove the Tunisian Revolution. It cording to a recent analysis by the National Employment
was, after all, a young street vendor from the interior and Training Observatory and the ILO, there are very
region of Sidi Bouzid whose self-immolation catalyzed few policy instruments currently addressing NEETs (Ob-
the revolt by the younger generation from marginalized servatoire National de la Jeunesse-Social Science Forum
regions (Ayeb 2011). 2013). Figure 1.4 presents an overview of NEET rates for
The analysis introduces a more comprehensive indi- Tunisians of working age, comparing young Tunisians
cator of youth economic exclusion. The indicator is the (aged 15–29) to those aged 30 and above.5 Through-
share of NEETs, which is consistent with the goals of out the country, young men are about 2.5 times more
the Post-2015 Development Agenda. This measure goes likely to be NEET than men above 29 years.6 In addi-
beyond the narrow definition of youth unemployment, tion, young women are nearly twice as often affected by
which does not include young people who have been NEET than young men. On a positive note, NEET rates

Figure 1.4. NEET Rates among Working Age Population by Youth and Gender

100

90 88.6
81.5
80

70 69.0
60.2
60
percent

50 46.9 Youth male

40 Youth female
34.6 30 years old and above male
30 30 years old and above female
20.6
20
13.1
10

0
Rural Urban

Source: World Bank 2012c; 2012d.

Note: Youth refers to age 15–29. Comparison group refers to age 30–59.
 Introduction | 7

among young women are slightly lower compared with • A qualitative component, designed to elicit the
women above 29 years, suggesting a shift in the social narrative perceptions of youth with regard to the
roles of younger women. Nevertheless, NEET rates re- phenomenon of their experience with social inclu-
main very high for young women (60.2 percent in urban sion and exclusion, supplements and helps explain
and 81.5 percent in rural areas). the quantitative findings. This component was
Overall, this report contributes to research and pol- comprised of 21 focus groups and 35 individual
icy studies in the areas of youth participation, educa- interviews undertaken in 2012 with a total of 199
tion, employment, and labor market policy in Tunisia. young people in seven regions of Tunisia.
The concepts of social inclusion and social exclusion are • A desk review and analysis of institutions and pro-
rarely used in either the Francophone or Arab language grams serving Tunisian youth was undertaken in
research literature about Tunisia. The latter tends to 2012.
focus on local traditions, identity, and cultural heritage.
In the dominant strand of Francophone social research, This report compares youth living in rural and urban
the issue of social inclusion/exclusion has been articu- areas as well as in different geographic regions. Tunisia
lated primarily through the lens of the economic inte- has 24 governorates aggregated into seven administrative
gration or marginalization of youth (Mahfoudh-Draouti regions, each comprised of several contiguous governor-
and Melliti 2006). Dropping out of school, unemploy- ates. For the purpose of this report, the governorates are
ment, inactivity, and precarious work are portrayed as grouped into three distinct survey regions: the coast, the
outcomes of marginalization. Some of the existing litera- interior, and the south, based on the structural differences
ture, primarily through in-depth interviews, also captures the country is facing in terms of regional disparities and
the subjective experience of living the life of a marginal- social and economic inclusion.7 The analysis also builds
ized, vulnerable, and unemployed young person (Melliti on two separate surveys in urban and rural Tunisia.
2011). A related concept is that of public acknowledge-
ment (reconnaissance), in contrast to the invisibility ex-
perienced by an unemployed or inactive young person.
1.4 Report Structure
The plight of unemployed graduates is also seen in social The report is organized along the different dimensions of
justice terms as the breaking of a social contract with a youth inclusion. Chapter 2 investigates voice and partici-
state that encouraged tertiary education as a means of pation of young Tunisians and identifies both constraints
accessing secure employment (Dhillon and Yousef 2009). and opportunities for their engagement in civic and polit-
ical life. The report then analyzes economically excluded
groups in decreasing order. Chapter 3 highlights the
1.3 Data and Methodology severity of the situation faced by young Tunisians that
This study draws on primary data derived from qualita- are NEET. Chapter 4 describes the available economic
tive and quantitative methods and on secondary sources. opportunities for young Tunisians; the state of employ-
A full overview of data sources can be found in annex 1. ment and entrepreneurship, including informal work as
The main primary sources are as follows: well as gender and regional disparities; and relevant so-
• A quantitative survey of urban youth from 4,214 cioeconomic and educational data. Chapter 5 discusses
urban households undertaken in 2012–13 and programs and services relevant to employment—such
known as the Tunisia Household Survey on Youth as Active Labor Market Programs, including the quality
in Urban Areas (THSYUA). and impact of the programs. Chapter 6 presents conclu-
• A quantitative survey of rural youth from 1,400 sions and recommendations, recognizing the need to ad-
households across Tunisia undertaken in 2012–13 dress the interrelatedness of the different dimensions by
called the Tunisia Household Survey on Youth in combining a strong focus on inclusive youth policy and
Rural Areas (THSYRA). institutions with a call for youth participation in decision
making.
8 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Notes 5. The official retirement age in Tunisia is 60 years for men and women.
6. In rural areas, 20.6 percent of older men are NEET compared with 46.9
1. As quoted in British Council 2013, 34. percent among young men, a NEET ratio of 2.3. In urban areas, the NEET
2. The following contributions exemplify the various paradigms used to an- ratio among old versus young men is 2.6 (NEET affects 13.1 percent of older
alyze the youth dimension: Assad and Roudi-Fahimi 2009, British Council men versus 34.6 percent of young men).
2013, Dhillon and Yousef 2009, and World Bank 2007. 7. For the purposes of this report, the northwest, center-west, and southwest
3. The report also builds on the framework of socioeconomic constraints are collectively referred to as the interior or as interior regions. The north-
(i.e., job relevant skills constraints, lack of labor demand, and social con- east, which includes Greater Tunis, is treated separately from the rest of
straints on the supply side) and interventions identified by Cunningham et southeast for the purpose of some of the study’s analysis. The center-east is
al. 2010. the coast or the coastal region.
4. Data is from United Nations (2010), “World Population Prospects” data-
base. 2010 estimate. Young people aged 15 to 24 represent nearly 20 percent
of the total population.
 Chapter 2
Youth Participation, Voice,
and Active Citizenship

9
10 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

We must advance hand-in-hand to achieve the aims of the revolution. We must be active in
society, working in associations. We must not be divided, for the stakes are very high for
our country. People must be woken up, and that is the role of the political class. They have to
be aware of the critical phase through which the country is passing, to invest in this
organization building, to be less selfish, and to make the goals of the revolution triumph.
Female high school student, Mahdia (coastal Tunisia)

Since 2010, young Tunisian women and men have stood citizenship can be considered social engagement to real-
at the forefront of social change, continually expressing ize the ideals of the revolution.
their desire to participate actively in the public sphere. The positive interrelationship between the exercise
Yet, as this chapter shows, as of early 2013, when the of active citizenship and economic outcomes for youth,
data collection for this study was completed, young particularly for young people who are not in education,
Tunisians believed that they continued to lack the insti- employment, or training (NEETs), is validated by new
tutional channels necessary to effectively participate in global evidence. Recent econometric analysis finds that
postrevolutionary Tunisia, and they expressed little con- improvement in civil liberties, in addition to economic
fidence in the country’s political and public institutions freedoms such as the reduction in taxation and price sta-
(Parker 2013). bility, leads to a significant reduction of youth inactivity
Youth inclusion has direct economic, political, social, (i.e., NEETs) in the long run. As a consequence of this
and cultural implications, and it requires the availability finding, the World Bank estimates that improving the
of institutional channels for active engagement in com- level of freedom in various developing regions to that of
munity and public life. Broadly speaking, youth inclusion developed countries is likely to reduce youth inactivity
includes the ability to make social contributions and to by more than half in the Middle East and North Africa
earn recognition and dignity. It also means having con- and Sub-Saharan Africa or by 30 percent in Latin Amer-
fidence and commitment to economic initiatives. Such ica (Ivanic and La Cava, forthcoming). Although the
inclusion is, in effect, active citizenship, which is further quantitative survey data available for Tunisia does not
defined in box 2.1. In the recent Tunisian context, active allow for a rigorous assessment of the causal relationship

Box 2.1. Defining Active Citizenship

The European Youth Forum, one of the world’s best established and most influential youth advocacy platforms,
has defined active citizenship as a legal status and a role. A combination of specific attitudes and institutional
arrangements must be in place for individuals to exercise “involvement, participation, and influence.” This
definition of citizenship also encompasses an individual’s relations with others and the labor market, as well as
questions of cultural identity, given that individuals belong to and participate in many different communities—
social, economic, and cultural. Citizenship defined as status in a political, legal, and social community is based
on a set of legal rules that defines membership in the political community. These rules include legal rights—e.g.,
freedom of speech, thought, and religious belief, and the right to own property—as well as and political rights—
e.g., the right to participate and exercise power.

Source: European Youth Forum 2002b.

 Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 11

between civil liberties—which enable active citizenship Like the rest of their peers in the Middle East and
of the youth—and a decrease in youth inactivity at the North Africa, young Tunisians have little trust in public
country level, the global evidence leads to the conclusion institutions. According to the Gallup World Poll 2013,
that as civil liberties take root in the country, particularly with respect to standards of living, life evaluation, social
following the new constitutional provisions, NEETs are well-being, community attachment, volunteering, and
expected to substantially decrease. trust in national government, youth perceptions in the
While prospects for Tunisia appear promising, this Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa
chapter shows that young Tunisians still encounter sig- score at the bottom when compared with other regions.
nificant barriers to their full exercise of active citizenship. However, the Middle East and North Africa had more
Young people spoke in interviews of disappointments and youth reporting worsening standards of living in 2013
broken dreams, as they face continuing social injustice, compared with 2012 and less confidence in national gov-
lack of opportunities for civic and political engagement, ernment than African youth (Gallup World Poll 2013).
and unemployment, which they perceive is exacerbated Young Tunisians rely on their families and religious
by favoritism and regionalism. The deep divide perceived institutions. The military, the local Imam, and religious
between the older generation that dominates decision organizations receive the youth’s highest trust rating of
making and the younger one that feels excluded from up to 80 percent, which is nearly the same level of trust
opportunities and lacks the voice to shape the future is given to family (see figure 2.1). In contrast, trust in polit-
also a critical issue that must be addressed for the long- ical institutions was at its lowest during the data collec-
term stability of the country. tion: only 8.8 percent of rural youth and 31.1 percent of
At the same time, the qualitative research shows that, urban youth had trust in political institutions. In urban
irrespective of gender and region, young Tunisians have Tunisia, schools and universities are rated as trustworthy
developed a set of coping strategies. These strategies com- by about 80 percent of youth as public spaces for dia-
bine family and religion as a refuge from instability while logue. Stark differences exist between rural and urban
focusing on the values of merit, hard work, innovation, youth. As a whole, youth in rural areas express substan-
self-seeking, and efforts to strengthen their autonomy. tially less trust in the police, the government, the justice
The opportunities for participation in community and
political processes at the local and national levels, while
not extensive, do exist and are expanding. Two key fac- Figure 2.1. Trust in Public and Religious Institutions
tors that directly affect whether youth engage in society
are trust in institutions and the use of social media. Universities Banks Community
100% organizations

80%
2.1 Trust in Institutions Schools
60% Country

Active citizenship depends on trust and a willingness to 40%

constructively engage with institutions. Without a mini- Religious 20%
Family
organizations
mum level of confidence in institutions, such as local pol- 0%

iticians, courts, police, and political or religious groups,

it is difficult for youth to work constructively with insti- Press Imam
tutions. Trust is an enabling condition for active citizen-
ship and crucial to the engagement of youth in the issues Politics Rural
Justice
that affect their community or country. Trust must be Urban
earned by institutions. Unfair treatment, injustice, or po- Police Military

lice violence erodes confidence in institutions and with-

out trust, societies tend to resort to confrontation. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29.
12 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

system, the press, and the country.1 Across institutions,

the trust level in rural Tunisia is, on average, 20 percent Box 2.2. Young Artists and Freedom
lower than in urban areas. The trust levels among youth of Speech
are independent of work status, both within rural and
urban areas (see annex 2, figures A2.1 and A2.2). The The arts, most particularly rap music, have been
trust levels of Tunisian youth in banks and the press are used to express young people’s anger at unemploy-
slightly higher among those who are working, but other- ment, poverty, and political repression. The rap-
wise, they mirror the trust levels among their peers who per El General emerged as one of the revolution’s
are NEET. icons. His song “Rais Lebled” (Head of State) is
The overall discontent and the lack of trust in pub- regarded as the “anthem” of the revolution.
lic institutions resonate among young Tunisians through Since the revolution, rappers have continued
cultural channels, including rap and other musical forms. to give voice to youth disillusionment. Along with
Since the protests began in December 2010, rap has been journalists, many musicians fell afoul of the gov-
the soundtrack to the Tunisian Revolution, while pop, ernment elected in 2012. They continued criticizing
folk, and rock genres have also provided musical accom- police brutality, expressing their disappointment
paniment (see box 2.2). with the revolution, and advocating for freedom
Like their counterparts in Egypt and Libya, young Tu- of expression. Seven rappers were arrested in the
nisians express little trust in the press, which they see as first six months of 2012. The rapper Weld El 15
commercial and manipulative. While social media is rec- received a 21-month jail sentence in absentia on
ognized as having raised awareness and supported social charges of performing songs deemed insulting to
mobilization during the revolution, it is now viewed more the police at a concert in the eastern town of Ham-
ambiguously, as expressed by a young school teacher:2 mamet. After he surrendered to the authorities, he
was retried and received a four-month sentence,
Facebook played a big role at the beginning of the rev-
against which he appealed. Rapper Klay BBJ was
olution. Since the revolution, the followers of the dif-
finally acquitted on appeal in September 2013,
ferent parties have their own pages and publish their
after being charged and retried twice for criticizing
programs. It is common to see mutual insults, and in-
the police.
stead of serving the revolution, these arguments drag it
Sources: Al Jazeera 2013b; Auffray 2013.
backwards. Facebook, one of the sources of the revolu-
tion’s success, has since turned into a space for attacking
other parties. Male primary school teacher, Tunis
Access to basic information and communication
technology is widespread. More than 9 out of 10 young
Tunisians in rural Tunisia own a mobile phone. In com-
2.2 Access to Information parison, between one to two-thirds of respondents used
More than any other medium, young Tunisians are using the Internet in the previous month (34.3 rural, 60.0
the Internet to access information. The Internet is primar- urban; see figure 2.3). About one-quarter of interviewed
ily used for entertainment, email, and news, but young youth are members of a social networking site such as
men and women also spend part of their time online to Facebook, which is primarily used to interact with friends
study, work, or look for jobs (see figure 2.2). About 50 per- and to read news. Television remains the main source of
cent of all Internet users (43.3 percent rural, 53.2 percent news (68 percent), followed by the Internet (13 percent),
urban) use the Internet for education, and many youth use and personal discussion (12 percent). Relatively few re-
it to look for jobs (45.9 percent rural, 26.8 percent urban). lied on radio (6 percent), and even fewer on newspapers
Almost one out of six young Tunisians also uses the Inter- (1 percent). Access to the Internet is still limited in many
net for work (14.4 percent rural, 15.9 percent urban). rural areas, which also has implications for accessing
 Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 13

Figure 2.2. Use of Internet to Access Information Current and former graduate students spoke fre-
quently about the Internet in the focus groups and in-
Education dividual interviews. Young people have a very positive
100%
attitude toward information and communication tech-
80% nology, seeing it as a source of information, communi-
60% cation with other youth (virtual networking), connection
Work Email
with the world media and entertainment, and an effec-
40%
tive way to find employment. One Master’s student from
20%
Sidi Bouzid (Central West Tunisia) called the Internet
0% “a second family” for the young. However, respondents
also perceived a spatial dimension to Internet access—a
digital divide exacerbating the feeling of exclusion from
News Entertainment broader Tunisian society among youth living in the inte-
rior of the country.
Rural
Urban People in the interior have nothing apart from football,
Job Search
the street, and the café. Students are bored at school,
and can’t develop their abilities through creative activi-
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. Multiple answers were allowed ties or entertainment. Male student, Gafsa
during survey.
To find a job, you have to go on the Internet. This must
be the one part of the country where there is no em-
labor market information. However, the relatively high ployment bureau. As for “Publinet Cybercafés,”3 there
level of connectivity has facilitated the emergence of a are only a few in the center of Médenine, and that is an
“youth culture” with its own styles, spaces, channels of hour’s journey, costing TND2 [US$ (PPP) 2.76]. Imag-
communications, and leisure activities, distinct from the ine, for anyone who lives in the villages around here,
“official youth culture” of the former regime. they have to pay for transport to the center of town,

Figure 2.3. Access to Information and Communication Technology—Rural Versus Urban

Rural male
100 Rural female
92.4 92.8
Urban male
90 85.2
82.4 Urban female
80
70 64.3
percent

60 55.8
50
40 36.5
31.9
30
20
10
0
Cell phone Internet

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth; use of cell phone and Internet in last month.
14 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

wait for an hour, and then pay TND10 [US$ (PPP) 2.3 Youth Participation in Civil Society
13.79] just to register at the employment bureau. How
can someone here get access to information? Male un- Since the revolution, religious and other civil society
employed high school leaver, Médenine groups have been able to register with the state, and an
increasing number of organizations focused on civic en-
To advance citizenship in a sustainable way, youth gagement have done so. Trade unions and student unions
must progress beyond “virtual citizenship” to “real” po- are playing particularly significant roles in civil society
litical participation at local and national levels. While (British Council 2013). For example, the National Di-
youth were enthusiastic about political engagement and alogue between the country’s political factions has been
associational life, it has yet to be implemented in a fully mediated by four influential civil society organizations
active manner. In contrast to the idealistic aspirations as- (CSOs), including the country’s largest trade union. The
sociated with the revolution, the following youth’s senti- Center for Information on the Formation, Study, and
ments highlight the potential risk of engaging exclusively Documentation of Associations estimates that the num-
in a virtual public space. ber of registered nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
has increased by almost 50 percent since the revolution,
I combed through all the information on Facebook to from almost 10,000 to approximately 15,000 (British
uncover the weaknesses of the administration. On Face- Council 2013; Khouja and Moussa 2012). In particu-
book, I take a critical stance, I am free and neutral, and lar, religious welfare organizations have been growing in
what I don’t like, I attack. The Revolution of 14 Janu- urban neighborhoods and in the interior regions most
ary is above all a psychic revolution, a transition from affected by poverty and exclusion.
one situation to another. We feel liberty after repression, Nonetheless, only a small fraction of young Tuni-
liberty to communicate our ideas. … After 14 January, sians are active in CSOs. According to a recent survey, as
the Internet is completely free of censorship. Male un- little as three percent of rural youth participate in CSOs
employed graduate, Médenine, southeast Tunisia (ONJ 2013). Among the few youth active in CSOs, the
most frequently mentioned types of volunteering are for
We watch TV. We surf the Internet. We go to check our CSOs in the fields of regional development, charity and
Facebook pages at Publinet. We contact our friends in poverty, religious affairs, and science. Sports and leisure
Tunis. We follow the news. We know what is going on. clubs were also frequently mentioned in qualitative inter-
I would like to participate, express my views, but I don’t views. Despite the low levels of participation in associa-
know how I should do it …. Female unemployed grad- tions, 9 out of 10 young Tunisians consider volunteering
uate, Mahdia, Central East Tunisia in CSOs to be important for their communities. In rural
Tunisia, about 92 percent of young women and 85.2
Making the transition from virtual to active citizen- percent of young men identify community organiza-
ship will require new associational skills, which are as tions as important for local development (see annex 2,
important as entrepreneurial skills in building effective figure A2.3). Trust levels toward community organiza-
agency. Youth can benefit from opportunities to learn tions are relatively lower in rural Tunisia, perhaps re-
how to establish and manage associations, including flecting the heterogeneity in quality and the degree of
understanding the legal environment for doing so, man- political orientation displayed by existing organizations.
aging budgets, being financially accountable and trans- Only 40.7 percent of young women and 39.9 percent of
parent, lobbying effectively, handling public relations young men from rural areas trust community organiza-
and communications strategies, mapping democratic in- tions (see annex 2, figure A2.4). Trust is much higher
ternal processes against effective management structures, in urban Tunisia, where 63.6 percent of young women
and engaging in strategic networking. and 60.7 percent of young men say they trust community
organizations.
 Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 15

Figure 2.4. Distribution of Youth Volunteers society, and particularly in volunteering, could be sup-
by Region ported as an avenue to promote greater social inclusion,
especially at the local level and among disadvantaged
youth, who are currently the least engaged. Volunteer-
14.2% Coast ing should include the less educated; NEETs, including
Interior young women; and youth in marginalized regions and in
South
peri-urban areas. Box 2.3 describes a World Bank-sup-
13.2%
ported project that provides incentives for disadvantaged
youth to volunteer in their communities while offering
opportunities to obtain job-related skills.
72.5% Generally, young people say they have limited control
over the course of their own lives, including decisions
regarding education and work. This may be a reflection
of their lack of engagement in civic society or in political
affairs. Fewer young women than men report that they
have influence on important life decisions. This differ-
Source: World Bank 2012e. ence is much more pronounced with respect to work and
Note: Figure refers to all urban youth. No data is available for rural youth.
marriage than with education (see figure 2.5).
Young Tunisians do not feel that their voice is heard
at the local level. When asked about whether the mayor
or governor listens to local concerns, a mere one in eight
young rural Tunisia said that politicians listen. Only 11.5
Levels of youth volunteering in Tunisia are very low, percent of young men and 12.4 percent of young women
however, with less than 1.5 percent of all urban youth in rural Tunisia say they feel that local politicians are
giving time to CSOs, pointing to the need to develop listening (see figure 2.6). Perceived youth influence on
more effective public policy to support youth participa- local development is more than three times higher in
tion in civil society, particularly in volunteering. Volun- urban areas, where 38 percent of young men and 38.9
teering among young urban men (2.12 percent) is almost percent of young women said that local concerns mat-
twice as common as among young urban women (0.89 ter to the mayor or governor. These regional disparities
percent) (see annex 2, figure A2.5). Almost three-quar- underscore the intensity of youth exclusion, especially in
ters of all urban youth volunteers live in the coastal re- rural Tunisia.
gion (figure 2.4). By comparison, only a marginal 13.2 Young Tunisians believe that they cannot easily in-
percent of youth volunteers live in Tunisia’s interior, fol- fluence the political process or the postrevolution tran-
lowed by 14.2 percent of youth volunteers who live in sition. Lacking channels to engage constructively with
the southern regions. The low overall level of volunteer- the political process, young Tunisians take their under-
ing and its regional disparities highlight the scope and standable frustrations to the streets in the protests that
need to support youth volunteerism in Tunisia, particu- characterize postrevolutionary Tunis. The café remains
larly in the interior and southern regions. the main venue to discuss politics. According to a recent
Although youth participation in civil society is still youth survey, 72 percent of those interviewed said they
limited—particularly if participation is youth led—it discussed politics mostly in cafés, but politics is also an
should be viewed as a promising area for youth to engage important topic of family conversation (50 percent) (Ob-
in active citizenship in view of the positive perception as- servatoire National de la Jeunesse-Social Science Forum
sociated with volunteering. Youth participation in civil 2013).
16 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Box 2.3. The IDMEJ Project: Investing in Youth Inclusion in Lagging Regions
Project Design: Following the Tunisian Revolution, the Government of Tunisia launched the IDMEJ youth proj-
ect to strengthen youth inclusion, with the support of a grant by the World Bank’s Japanese Social Development
Fund. IDMEJ means “inclusion and cooperation” in Arabic. The project provides a scalable alternative to exist-
ing public works programs. It promotes youth-led community development and participation while providing
participants with small stipends.
The project provides emergency income support and short-term employment to 3,000 youth with a sec-
ondary education or less—mostly youth who are not in education, employment, or training (NEETs)—in the
disadvantaged governorates of Kasserine and Siliana in the central-western region of Tunisia. Implemented by
the National Youth Observatory, the project combines skills training with community volunteering, apprentice-
ships, and self-employment opportunities. The project is relatively cost effective with a per capita beneficiary
cost of less than US$1,000, which could be further reduced through scaling up.
Results: As part of the project, youth aged 15–29 receive training in life skills, including financial literacy.
Beneficiaries volunteer for up to five months in community projects managed by local civil society organizations.
Initial project results show that over 85 percent find the training useful. New technical and social competencies
were acquired by 76 percent and 80 percent of respondents, respectively. These positive results are in line with
an assessment of more than 200 international civil service programs, which exhibited an increase in work skills,
career options and education, as well as higher self-esteem and sense of civic responsibility (McBride, Sherra-
den, and Benítez 2003). IDMEJ has indeed led to improved relations between local youth nongovernmental
organizations and local governments. Additional funds have already been mobilized by local governments in the
Siliana and Kasserine Governorates to replicate and scale up this component based on its success on the ground.
Overall, the project benefits youth by helping to break the cycle of inactivity, supporting young women, and
promoting social inclusion and trust.
Management and Monitoring and Evaluation: The project is supported by an innovative cost-effective
approach to monitoring and evaluation, using an online platform that allows real-time data entry and analysis
that is accessible by multiple stakeholders. The project collects direct beneficiary feedback about the quality of
services and their impact on employability via mobile phones.

Source: Observatoire National de la Jeunesse-Social Science Forum 2013 and World Bank 2014.

2.4 Political Participation and an exercise of active citizenship by young people,

especially given their central role in the revolution.
Political participation is a key pillar of active citizenship. The low participation rate by youth in the Tuni-
Participation entails taking part in mainstream politics, sian national elections of October 2011 was especially
including voting, joining a party or pressure group, cam- worrisome. Only one-half of under-30-year-olds voted.
paigning, or standing for election. Participation encom- Participation in urban areas was slightly higher than in
passes more than elections; it involves participating in the rural areas (see annex 2, figure A2.6). The voting rate of
public discourse through organized channels, petitions, young women and men are very similar. Only 17 percent
and other forms of expression. Nevertheless, participa- of youth aged 18 to 25 registered to vote, according to a
tion in elections in postrevolutionary Tunisia is an im- survey by the British Council and the American Univer-
portant indicator of public trust in political institutions sity of Cairo’s Gerhart Center (Parker 2013).
 Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 17

Figure 2.5. Influences on Youth’s Life, Education, and Work Decisions

90
79.6 Coast male
80 78.9
73.2 Coast female
70 68.2 68.7 68.8 Interior male
65.4 63.5 65.5
Interior female
60 56.6 58.0 54.3 South male
51.5
47.4 48.5 South female
percent

50 47.3
43.5 43.2
40

30

20

10

0
Education Work Marriage

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth. Survey questions: “Does your family have a strong role in decisions about: (1) your education; (2) where and what you
work; (3) who you will marry?”

Low levels of political participation by youth reflect youth of disillusionment and lack of faith in formal po-
the limited space that young people perceive for them- litical parties, as illustrated in the quote below:
selves within established parties. During focus group
discussions, young people repeatedly said that the rev- A youth revolution has produced an assembly with very
olution was initiated by the young but co-opted by the old people. Young Tunisian activist (Parker 2013)
“old” and established politicians. Persistent unemploy-
ment, worsening social justice, and the continuing pa- Young Tunisians are extremely underrepresented in
tronage and regionalism of the old order have dampened the Constitutional Assembly. Only 4 percent of the 216
the optimism ignited by the revolution. With scant tangi- members of the Constitutional Assembly are aged 30 or
ble gains since the revolution, the level of disillusionment younger. While 17 percent of the members are between
for many has intensified to a sense of betrayal. Relatively 30 and 40 years old, the remaining 79 percent of mem-
low participation in the elections was a clear indication bers are more than 40 years old. All parties registering
in the 2011 elections had to include youth candidates
on their slates. The fact that so few were actually elected
Figure 2.6. Youth Influence on Local Development proved to young people that the system privileged older
people in spite of the law. The revolution represented an
50 explosion of disaffection—especially among the youth—
40 38.0 38.9 and a rupture with earlier forms of activism. Dissent was
amplified through direct horizontal communications, a
percent

30 Male
20 Female
loose network without clear leadership and operations
11.5 12.4 without hierarchy or organizational structure. However,
10
many youth were quickly disillusioned with the func-
0
Rural Urban tioning of electoral politics. The lack of openness among
established parties and the striking of deals behind
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
closed doors ran contrary to the principles of fairness
Note: Figure refers to all youth.
18 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 2.7. Politically Knowledgeable Youth— Figure 2.8. Politically Knowledgeable Youth—
Rural Versus Urban Rural Versus Urban
40 40
34.3
30.0
30 30 25.6 Coast
24.0 24.2 23.4
percent

percent
20.3 Interior
20 20 17.2 15.7
14.4 Male South
10 Female 10

0 0
Rural Urban Rural Urban

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure refers to all youth. Note: Figure refers to all youth.

and transparency, excluding the very generation that had say they were current on politics. The relatively small
brought about political change. A young female activist portion of young people who consider themselves knowl-
observed: edgeable about politics—even in such politicized times—
highlights the difficulty of following the tortuous daily
I have many friends who joined political parties after developments in the political processes and accessing
the revolution, but just after the elections, they with- independent political information. Qualitative research
drew because they were disappointed in the strategies also suggests that young people without much political
of these parties, as there was no collaboration between understanding may be vulnerable to manipulation.
the youth and the elders in the party. Female political
activist, Tunis (Parker 2013) Yes, I voted, and noticed two things after the elections:
people have their religious beliefs, and they don’t re-
A youth provision in the new electoral law, which in- ally understand politics. Those who voted for Ennahda
centivizes political parties to nominate young candidates, made a connection between the party and their religion.
provides an important entry point for political participa- People who were sincere believers, but not politicized,
tion.4 Specifically, Article 25 of the electoral law requires believed it was the right thing to vote for the triumph of
every candidate list to nominate among its top four can- Islam. Male student, Mahdia, East Central Tunisia
didates at least one candidate less than 35 years old.
Importantly, the youth article affects national, regional, Self-reported knowledge about politics is about one-
and local elections because it applies to all electoral lists third lower in rural areas compared with urban centers.
for constituencies with four or more seats. However, the Young Tunisians from rural areas in the coastal prov-
youth provision is not a requirement but instead formu- inces (17.2 percent) and the interior (15.7 percent) have
lated as a financial incentive. Any electoral list not meet- relatively limited knowledge about politics (see figure
ing the youth requirement has half of its public funding 2.8). Their counterparts in urban areas report being bet-
withheld. ter informed (25.6 percent in the coastal region and 24.2
Most young Tunisians say that they do not follow do- percent in the interior region). The exception seems to be
mestic politics. In rural Tunisia, less than one-quarter of young Tunisians in the rural south who report the high-
all males (24.0 percent) and less than one out of seven est knowledge of politics, where more than one out of
young women state that they are knowledgeable about three youths considers themselves well informed.
Tunisian politics (see figure 2.7). Knowledge about pol- Very few young Tunisians are active in political par-
itics is somewhat greater in urban areas, where some 30 ties, reflecting the large disconnect between the younger
percent of young men and 20.3 percent of young women generation and the political establishment. As few as 1.6
 Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 19

Box 2.4. Houkoumetna: The “Our Government” Movement

The movement known as Youth Decides is calling for youth to play a full role in national politics. The use of
social media is central to its efforts. In December 2013, Tarec Cheniti, a human rights activist, nominated him-
self as prime minister by posting his resume on Facebook. Other young Tunisians soon followed suit, including
Bassem Bouguerra, the president of Reform, an organization seeking to reform Tunisia’s police force. Bouguerra
nominated himself as deputy minister for security reform. Soon, multiple “Youth Decides” subpages emerged
on Facebook, with young Tunisians posting their resumes online and volunteering to be part of the government.
The movement is a clear expression of the youth’s frustration at their lack of voice in the new political config-
uration. All of the prime ministers since the revolution were older than aged 50—one was 92-years-old. Rached
Ghannouchi, the leader of the ruling Ennahdha party, is 72 years old, and Beji Caid Essebsi, the head of the
opposition Nidaa Tounes party, is 87 years old. Tunisian youth view the current political struggles as merely a
resurgence of stale political ideologies and rivalries aligned with vested interests from the old regime.
As Cheniti explained, “There are thousands of young Tunisian men and women who have gained enough
education and experience to be able to run our country. These people deserve to be given a chance to lead the
democratic transition because, after all, the revolution is theirs.” According to Bouguerra, “It’s about time that
the youth started deciding for themselves, instead of being used by older politicians for political interests.”

Sources: Al Jazeera. 2013a; Poetic Politico 2013; Samti 2013.

percent of those interviewed in the rural survey were ac- legislation for Tunisia’s future. Suggestions were then
tively engaged in politics as members of political parties brought as recommendations to the elected NCA mem-
(see annex 2, figure A2.7). Only 11 percent expressed bers. Three of the six youth suggestions were reportedly
any intention of joining a political party, while the great chosen by the NCA members to be implemented (Parker
majority (82 percent) did not even have a preferred po- 2013). In addition, a new youth movement is proposing
litical party (ONJ 2013). Only about half of young rural a group of young Tunisians to participate as volunteer
Tunisians (54 percent) intended to vote in the next elec- members to the new government (see box 2.4).
tion, reflecting participation rates in the previous election In January 2014, after the new constitution was ap-
(ONJ 2013). These findings are consistent with an opin- proved, some degree of optimism was restored. After two
ion poll conducted by the National Youth Observatory years of work by the Constitutional Assembly, a draft
in April 2013, which showed that youth participation constitution was completed and put to a vote on January
in political life was very low: youth engagement did not 26, 2014. The assembly adopted the document with a
exceed 2.7 percent, while preference for a political party majority of 200 to 12 and 4 abstentions. Drafted during
did not exceed 19 percent of interviewees (Observatoire a period of turmoil and sporadic violence, the new Tu-
National de la Jeunesse-Social Science Forum 2013). nisian constitution seems to have successfully brokered
Despite this disconnect between mainstream politics political differences—including the role of religion in
and the realities faced by young Tunisians, elements within government—to produce a progressive and widely ac-
the younger generation are pursuing innovations to voice cepted constitution. The new constitution gives Tunisia
distinctively democratic aspirations to rebuild Tunisian a decentralized and open government, recognizing Islam
society. Shortly after Tunisia’s National Constituent As- as the state religion while protecting freedom of belief.
sembly (NCA) was elected, I Watch, a youth-led NGO Equally important, Article 8 enshrines youth inclusion
established after the revolution, held a “Model NCA” in along multiple dimensions as a key principle of nation
which 217 youths from throughout the country proposed building:
20 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Youth is a driving force in the building of the nation. Scale up of Youth-Led Community Development
The state shall ensure that youth has the necessary con- Initiatives
ditions for the development of their capacities, their
Youth-led community development initiatives have been
taking of responsibilities, and the broadening and ex-
successfully piloted in Tunisia. Such activities include
pansion of their participation in social, economic, cul-
small physical improvements of local infrastructure, envi-
tural, and political development.5
ronmental management, eco-tourism initiatives, income-
generation activities tailored to young women and men,
and activities aimed at improving local governance. The
2.5 Promoting Inclusive Youth IDMEJ project is one such example, implemented in
Participation in Public Life the Kasserine and Siliana Governorates by the National
Youth Observatory (see box 2.3). These activities, which
The new constitution opens the possibility of a new
are mainly aimed at inactive youth with a secondary
phase in Tunisia’s political history, including the poten-
education or less in exchange for a small monthly stipend,
tial to increase youth involvement in decision making—a
are identified and implemented by youth organizations
civil society space that youth are keen to fill. The time
or local youth groups with the support of local NGOs
is opportune to consider interventions to support youth
and governments. Among other positive outcomes,
aspirations, to foster their participation at the local and
IDMEJ has increased trust between youth, local NGOs,
national levels, and to rebuild their trust in policy mak-
and local administrations, despite the rising tensions
ing institutions as they reach toward the roles they have
in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. International
long been seeking and the path that is at last now open to
evidence on similar programs showed a greater inci-
them. The following policy recommendations are there-
dence of post-program civic engagement and employ-
fore intended to offer concrete avenues for supporting
ability than the labor-intensive public works programs
youth engagement from the bottom up, starting at the
(Cunningham, Puerta, and Wuermli 2010). More spe-
local level.
cifically, it could be opportune to reallocate financial
resources from labor-intensive public works programs
Provide Incentives for Youth-Led NGOs and
toward scaling up youth-led community development ini-
Volunteering
tiatives as a more effective and empowering mechanism.
While several international organizations are providing
youth NGOs friendly grants, the complexity of their re- Build Youth-Led Institutions to Strengthen Voice
quirements often tends to privilege more educated youth in Decision Making and Human Rights
from the urban coastal areas. Such efforts can be com-
plemented by providing competitive grant schemes to Tunisian youth representatives have attempted to es-
develop the capacity of youth NGOs at the local level tablish these institutional channels in the past, but these
to service and engage young people in peri-urban, rural, have yet to be formalized and appropriately supported
and lagging regions. Grant applications should be sim- to ensure their long-term sustainability. For example,
plified to allow greater access from a broader spectrum in September 2012, youth representatives met with the
of youth stakeholders. In addition, there should be clear leadership of the National Constituent Assembly and the
incentives for establishing partnerships with local pub- former Minister of Human Rights and Transitional Jus-
lic institutions, charities, and foundations to ensure the tice to convey a report that included recommendations
scale and sustainability of youth-led NGOs activities regarding the creation of a Youth Advisory Council.
and community-based volunteering. The grant scheme Prepared by 217 youth from all governorates across the
should also offer capacity building with respect to how country, the report also included results from five work-
to manage associations, ensuring their financial account- ing groups: (1) fight against corruption and administra-
ability and results measurement. tive reform; (2) martyrs and victims of the revolution;
(3) planning, development, and finance; (4) premise and
 Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 21

general principles of the constitution; and (5) structure makers and/or commune or provincial-level authori-
of the constitution. Although the report and the overall ties. Such a process could be also be supported by the
initiative were well received by Tunisian high-level repre- European Youth Forum and/or well-established national
sentatives, youth leaders point out that there has been no youth councils through peer learning and exchanges.
subsequent follow-up (Actualités Tunisie News 2012).
Appropriate institutional channels will need to be
created to strengthen youth participation in the devel-
Notes
opment and implementation of national youth policy. In 1. “La justice s’acharne sur les jeunes révolutionnaires tunisiens,” Le
Monde, June 16, 2014, reports that young people who participated in the
most European countries, for example, young people and revolution have been continuously accused of and prosecuted for violence
their representative bodies are recognized as stakeholders and arson against police stations. Following the hunger strikes and pressure
exerted by the families of these protesters, an amnesty law was passed on
in the implementation of national youth policies, a sys- June 2, 2014, covering the period from December 17, 2010 to February 28,
tem referred to as co-management. This means engaging 2011. However, confrontations with police continued to occur well after
a range of youth and student organizations, as well as February 2011.
2. These overall findings are confirmed by British Council 2013.
national- and local-level youth councils that can serve as
3. Publinet is a subsidized Internet service in rural areas.
channels for the voice of youth on critical public policy
4. The Tunisian National Assembly passed the new Electoral Law on
issues. In Tunisia, the establishment of such youth rep- May 1, 2014 (Jasmine Foundation 2014).
resentative bodies could facilitate the effectiveness and 5. Constitution of the Tunisian Republic, Final Edition, January 26, 2014
coordination of youth services and other youth-related (unofficial translation).

programs and their articulation with national policy

 Chapter 3
Youth Inactivity and
Unemployment

23
24 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

For us, unemployment is a kind of blasphemy; an unemployed is not a person, society itself does
not accept him, he is not part of the circle of society. That is the true meaning of “unemployed”:
a person who is not active in the heart of the society. Tell me, what use is that person?
Unemployed graduate, Sidi Bouzid

3.1 Youth Inactivity; Young People Who unemployed young women and men see little chance of
Are Not in Education, Employment, ever finding work and starting their careers. Formal em-
or Training; and Unemployment— ployment grows ever more distant for the long-term job-
An Overview less without connections; few young Tunisians are able
to find employment. This chapter presents the key chal-
Youth inactivity is a massive problem in Tunisia. Young lenges related to unemployment and inactivity. The chap-
people who are not in education, employment, or train- ter presents youth labor exclusion in decreasing order of
ing (NEETs) comprise a substantial proportion of the exclusion and starts with youth inactivity (NEETs) and
potential youth labor force in Tunisia (see figure 3.1 and unemployment, while the subsequent chapter proceeds to
box 3.1). Young people without work who are no longer highlight the underemployed and informally employed,
attending any school or training program spend on aver- and ends with youth who are formally employed.
age more than three years searching before finding a job. One in three young men in rural Tunisia (33.4 per-
Tunisia’s youth are not only struggling economically; cent) and one in five in urban Tunisia are NEET. Rates
they are marginalized and economically excluded. Many are even higher for young women. One out of every two

Figure 3.1. Youth Employment and NEET Framework

1. Labor Force Status 2. Time Use 3. Employment Status 4. Work Status 5. Formality

Wage employed
Formal

Full-time worker Self-employed

Unpaid or family worker Employed

In Labor Force
Voluntary part-time employed
Part-time worker
Informal
Involuntary underemployed

Job seeker Unemployed

Discouraged NEET
Inactivity or housework
Out of Labor Force Inactive

In education or training Student Student

Source: Adapted from AfDB 2012a.

 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 25

Box 3.1. Young People Who Are Not in Education, Employment, or Training—
A Joint Indicator for Youth Unemployment and Inactivity
The acronym NEET refers to young people who are not in education, employment, or training. NEET is
comprised of all youth who are either unemployed or inactive. By going beyond the arguably narrow lens of
unemployment, the NEET concept helps policy makers consider the needs of all young people who have fin-
ished education and training and should be working. The NEET indicator is a powerful tool to analyze youth
exclusion by focusing on all young people experiencing difficulties in transitioning from education to work life.
NEET is important because it more comprehensively defines youth inactivity, which standard unemployment
statistics generally overlook. Inactive youth are those young men and women already discouraged from looking
for work despite their young ages. Instead of neglecting these young people, the NEET indicator encourages
policy makers to consider that discouraged young people require at least as much government support as the un-
employed. Discouraged youth—often referred to as inactive youth—are particularly vulnerable. Inactive youth
are the litmus test for the effectiveness of youth policies aimed at fostering social inclusion.
NEET is a well-established concept. Many member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and a growing number of developing countries are using the NEET indicator to com-
plement youth unemployment statistics. It is systematically measured by the International Labor Organization
and presented in its annual flagship report, “Global Employment Trends for Youth” (ILO 2013). The OECD is
also reporting NEET shares, and the organization has prominently applied the indicator in its recent “African
Economic Outlook 2012,” which focused on promoting youth employment in Northern and Sub-Saharan
Africa, including Tunisia (AfDB 2012a), and in the World Economic Forum’s Global Youth Unemployment
Study (WEF 2013). Recently, NEET was proposed by the United Nations High Level Panel to be used for the
Post-2015 Development Goals (United Nations 2013). Originally coined by the government of the United
Kingdom, the acronym “NEET” is used officially by statistical agencies in Canada, Ireland, Japan, Mexico,
Spain, and South Korea. While more efforts are needed to measure NEET globally, most labor force surveys
already include the required variables to establish reliable NEET rates.

Source: World Bank 2014.

young women in rural Tunisia (50.4 percent) is NEET; than one-fifth of young men (20.3 percent) and about
about one in three urban areas (32.4 percent) (see figure one-third of young women (32.4 percent) is NEET (see
3.2). The economic loss caused by this lack of productive figure 3.2).
activity is enormous. Equally important, however, is the The severity and regional incidence of NEET reflect
social exclusion that millions of young Tunisians experi- the extent of despair among youth, which is particu-
ence as they are forced to squander their skills, creativity, larly acute in the interior and south, the cradle of the
and potential. 2011 revolution. NEET affects more than one-quarter
A large number of young Tunisians are leaving the in the coastal region (23.6 percent urban, 37.3 percent
countryside and often migrating to desolate urban areas. rural), more than one-third in the south (35.9 percent
The proportion of NEET in urban Tunisia are less se- urban, 47.9 percent rural), and about one-third of youth
vere than in rural areas. However, in urban areas, the in the interior region (31.4 percent urban, 42.4 percent
primary destination for many young job seekers—more rural, see annex 3, figure A3.3). These young people, ex-
cluded from the labor market for years, are referred to as
26 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

“Generation Jobless” (Economist 2013). Youth in the in- also the area where most regular street protests for jobs
terior face an especially unproductive abyss of years tran- and better governance have been occurring during the
sitioning between their school and work lives. As focus political transition period.
groups revealed, youth have little faith in their skills or The NEET rate is highest for young women in the
qualifications as they attempt to navigate a system they south, reflecting a virtual absence of adequate employ-
perceive to be rife with corruption. The interior region is ment opportunities that correspond with the norms and
expectations of a more traditional society. More than
one out of two young women in the south is NEET (53.7
Figure 3.2. Youth NEET in Rural Versus Urban Areas percent). Female NEET rates are similarly high in the in-
terior region (45.4 percent) and still affect one out of
60 three young women in the coastal region (31.3 percent)
50.4
50 (see figure 3.3). Extended periods without work for hun-
40
33.4 dreds of thousands of young and relatively well-educated
percent

32.4
30 Male
young women risk further reinforcing traditional gender
20.3
20 Female roles. It is also likely to delay much needed progress in
10 gender equality and female labor market participation
0
for decades to come. Helping young women without
Rural Urban work obtain employment or self-employment will re-
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
quire renewed government efforts, investments, and in-
Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. novative strategies.

Figure 3.3. Youth NEET by Region 3.2 Discouraged Youth without Work
a. Rural Systemwide nepotism, together with regional disparities
in the labor market, have convinced many potential job
80
seekers without the benefit of bribery, family connections,
63.0
60 or certain regional affiliations that seeking employment
50.3
44.1 is an exercise in futility. Furthermore, graduates may pre-
percent

40 35.5
31.3 32.3 Male fer to hold out for offers of employment that are either
Female commensurate with their level of education or profes-
20
sional qualifications or that provide some potential for
0 long-term job security and financial stability. In addition
Coast Interior South
to being intellectually stimulating and personally fulfill-
ing, a position that directly corresponds with a graduate’s
b. Urban
educational background and/or substantive professional
60
experience ensures that whatever unique skill sets and
48.2
subject matter expertise that he or she has acquired im-
37.4
40
28.3 proves rather than atrophies, as would be the case for
percent

18.8
25.2 23.2 Male example with a “temporary” position in the service in-
20 Female dustry. Conversely, a position that does not correspond
with one’s educational background or substantive pro-
0 fessional experience but that would provide a graduate
Coast Interior South with some form of long-term job security and financial
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. stability, provides male graduates with the social respect-
Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. ability, financial resources, and professional prospects
 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 27

critical to a successful courtship and family formation Figure 3.4. Labor Market Discouragement among
with his partner. NEETs
Although low-skilled temporary jobs do not provide
100
the same stability or potential for advancement, many 85.0
80
unemployed Tunisian youth have begun to view these
58.3

percent
positions less as temporary arrangements and more as 60 Male
46.0 42.2
being among the few viable options for employment. A 40 Female

young unemployed Tunisian may justify his or her de- 20

cision to pursue such an arrangement as purely instru- 0
Rural Urban
mental, a meager means to an immediate end. Young
Tunisian males in particular may make the calculation Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
that, as far as marriage prospects are concerned, an em- Note: Figure refers to NEETs aged 15–29 who identify themselves as
discouraged.
ployed graduate or nongraduate will consistently trump
his unemployed counterparts. Therefore, such a position
may still afford one some modicum of social recognition youth said, “treat you like a beggar or tell you, ‘God
and personal validation that would have been impossible will provide for your needs.’ They do not listen to me.”
to achieve otherwise. Nevertheless, these modest bene- Moreover, youth have little faith in the likelihood that
fits and shifts in perspective may still be insufficient for they will be able to use the skills or qualifications they
some, as one young man described it: have obtained. They believe that they face a system that
is rife with multiple and complex barriers to their social
When I have my official work, I will not be zero. I do inclusion. Some report witnessing the failure of individ-
not really know when is it going to come, but I still have uals whom they regard as more brilliant or talented than
hope. I do not want my next new job to be a menial themselves to secure stable, long-term employment, and
one because spending my time studying and then taking subsequently lapse into self-defeating apathy:
a position that has nothing to do with this training is
quite bad. Tunisian youth Unemployed male graduate, We see people who are brilliant. They are geniuses, but
Médenine they still end up unemployed. So what about me? I am
really average. In my case, I am. That is what worries
About half of all NEETs seem to be discouraged from me. I am afraid of the future. Male high school drop-
searching for work for several reasons. Young discour- out, Sidi Bouzid (interior Tunisia)
aged women and men require even greater assistance
than unemployed youth to transition to the labor market Many young women are dissuaded from seeking
and to break the cycle of youth exclusion. Discourage- employment by societal norms and expectations, par-
ment is particularly high among young women in rural ticularly in the interior and south, where patriarchal tra-
Tunisia—85 percent (see figure 3.4). Also, one of out two ditions are deeply rooted. Whereas Tunisian men remain
young rural men are discouraged—58.3 percent. Labor generally unrestricted in their choice of employment
market discouragement among NEETs is only slightly sector and venue, Tunisian women often find themselves
better in urban Tunisia, affecting 46 percent of young restricted to education and nursing. One young woman
urban men and 42.2 percent of young urban women. reported that her wish to work as a hotel receptionist
Many young job seekers who spend years transition- was not “acceptable from the standpoint of morality”
ing between their school and work lives are eventually to her family. For young female graduates, the state of
discouraged from continuing the job search due to feel- public space is such that many have few opportunities to
ings of exclusion, humiliation, and judgment. Many socialize and network beyond the confines of the home
young people decry what they perceive to be a total lack and marketplace. A woman’s decision to pursue employ-
of empathy on the part of potential employers who one ment outside the home may be considered subversive and
28 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 3.5. Reasons for Being Out of the Labor Force personal needs (e.g., a phone card, bus fare, or clothing)
by Gender (2010) is humiliating for them.

80
Male You talk about unemployment, well that has broken us,
70 Female trying to find work. Now it is the only goal, this aim to
60 find work. At an age when we should be paying back
50 what we owe our family, we have become a burden to
percent

40 them. Unemployed graduate, Mahdia (coastal Tunisia)

30
20
10 3.3 Education and Inactivity
0
Student Family reasons Illness/disability Other The largest proportion of inactive youth is found among
less educated young people in both rural and urban
Source: World Bank staff based on Tunisia Labor Force Survey 2010. areas, with the rural share of inactive youth being sub-
stantially higher. In rural areas, more than four out of
five NEETs do not have a secondary degree (81.5 per-
as such, severely diminish her marriage prospects. Thus, cent male, 83.8 percent female; see figure 3.6). However,
a young Tunisian woman must carefully weigh the fi- also in urban areas, more than half of NEETs do not
nancial and professional benefits of seeking employment have a secondary degree (58.8 percent male, 55.8 percent
against the potential social consequences for herself and female). Notably, about one-fifth of rural NEETs have
for her family. Before the revolution, family concerns not even completed primary education (15 percent male,
were the most common reason for women to withdraw 24.7 percent female; see annex 3, figure A3.4) compared
from the labor force (see figure 3.5). with 6.2 percent of urban male NEETs and 8.4 percent
of urban female NEETs.1
If a girl wanted to work as a secretary in a hotel that Very few young NEET Tunisians have completed
would be beyond acceptability from the moral point of secondary or tertiary education. In urban areas, only
view. Female graduate, Médenine (South Tunisia)

Extended periods of youth unemployment result Figure 3.6. Highest Education among NEETs
in negative material, social, and psychological conse- by Gender (Ages 15–29)
quences. When hundreds of thousands of young Tunisian
100 3.2
women and men are unable to find work, adverse effects 4.7 0.2 11.4
6.0
0
on economic output and social cohesion are quickly evi- 13.8 12.8
80 19.4 28.4 Vocational training
dent. Enduring a prolonged state of material dependence
University
on the family denies the discouraged youth opportunities 60
10.4
9.8 Secondary
percent

to develop as fully autonomous social beings, to marry, Below secondary

have children, live in their own dwellings, and confi- 40 81.5 83.8
dently assert an autonomous worldview, deepening their 58.8 55.8
sense of frustration and exclusion. Long periods without 20

work or education also affect how young Tunisians value

0
their lives and the decisions they make. Economic de- Rural Rural Urban Urban
male female male female
pendence on parents runs counter to the cultural expec-
tation that mature children should repay their families Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
for the care given to them. Asking parents for money for Note: Figure refers to all NEETs aged 15–29.
 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 29

one-quarter of the urban NEETs aged 15–29 have uni- The low educational levels among many young Tuni-
versity degrees (25.0 percent total—19.4 percent male, sians without work suggest that additional professional
28.4 percent female), as shown in figure 3.6. Secondary training will be needed to enable NEETs to find jobs.
education (Bac) remains the highest level of education Without training to help young women and men acquire
for another 10.0 percent of urban youth (10.4 percent the skills needed to participate in a modern economy,
male, 9.8 percent female), followed by vocational train- today’s NEETs risk becoming a lost generation that will
ing in urban areas (8.0 percent total—11.4 percent male; face difficulties finding employment throughout their
6.0 percent female). Combined, these young women and productive lives.
men who represent 43.0 percent of all urban NEETs
are considered skilled but remain unable to find work. Leaving School Early
By comparison, in rural areas, only 17.1 percent of all
NEETs are skilled: 13.2 percent with secondary edu- The vast majority of NEETs never obtain a second-
cation and 3.8 percent with vocational degrees, mostly ary degree, leaving most of the next generation under-
because skilled youth migrate to urban areas.2 In both equipped for tomorrow’s job market. When looking at
rural and urban areas, the interior regions show the low- all young Tunisians who are not attending school (i.e.,
est education among NEETs (see annex 3, figure A3.5). employed, self-employed, or NEET), four out of five
The creation of employment opportunities for these hun- youth have not completed secondary education in rural
dreds of thousands of less-educated young women and areas—80.7 percent of males and 85.3 percent females
men remains an immense challenge. (see figure 3.8). This compares to one out of two youth
However, individuals with higher education face in urban areas that have stopped going to school before
higher rates of unemployment. When only looking at un- completing secondary education (50.6 percent of males
employment in urban areas, it shows that unemployment and 47.0 percent of females).3 These young people can
rates are especially high among individuals with tertiary be considered early school leavers and are a cause of
education (see figure 3.7). Particularly in urban areas in concern. Early exit from education leaves the coming
the interior and southern regions, unemployment rates generation underequipped to take up the technical and
among university graduates reach levels approaching 40 service sector jobs that a globalizing economy is likely
percent. to offer. The additional disadvantages faced by youth in

Figure 3.7. Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, Urban Tunisia

0.45

0.40

0.35
Below primary
0.30 Primary
0.25 Low secondary
Secondary
0.20 Tertiary
0.15 Vocational

0.10

0.05

0
Northwest Northeast Tunis Midwest Mideast Southwest Southeast

Source: World Bank. 2013b.

Note: The rural survey did not find enough university graduates to report meaningful figures.
30 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

rural areas are further confirmed by regression analysis Figure 3.8. Highest Education among NEETs by
of early school leaving (see annex 3, table A3.1).4 The Gender (Ages 25–29)
econometric results also highlight the key roles played by
parental education and household wealth. 100 3.4 2.9
0.1 0.6 11.1 7.0
Dropping out of school is a phenomenon that affects 15.8 11.2
80 27.1 Vocational training
both young men and women. More than half of Tuni- 36.2
University
sia’s children leave school without completing upper sec- 60 Secondary

percent
11.1
ondary education. About 140,000 students drop out of 9.7 Below secondary
school annually, 80,000 of whom have not completed 40 80.7 85.3
their basic education (Ben Romdhane 2010). Two-thirds 50.6 47.0
of these dropouts obtain no further training and to vary- 20

ing degrees, generally find themselves in exploitative

0
forms of casual labor. Often, they express a degree of Rural Rural Urban Urban
male female male female
bitterness or regret at having left school due to family
circumstances over which they had no control—e.g.,
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
poverty, family instability, or the geographic area where Note: Figure reports the highest level of educational attainment among all
they were raised. Youth dropouts may be vulnerable to young people aged 25–29 who have left education, including the employed
and NEET.
being recruited by radical religious organizations or may
have few viable options beyond clandestine emigration,
as pointed out by one young school dropout.
I would like to complete my studies. What am I going
to do if I stay at home? Watch the TV? It’s just further
One of us stopped school so that another in the family
training, but it passes the time. Female university stu-
could study. Like that our family can avoid getting into
dent, Tunis
debt. Better that one of us makes the sacrifice, and I
repeat—it is a sacrifice. Male school dropout, Mahdia
Once economic reforms begin to create economic
(CE)
growth, firms will shift toward sectors of higher produc-
tivity with higher demands for skilled labor. The need
It is remarkable these days how the state just bypasses
for unskilled manual labor will be replaced by demand
the young. That’s why there is so much clandestine emi-
for creative skills, innovative capacity, and technical spe-
gration. Male school dropout, Mahdia (CE)
cializations. Such skills typically require a secondary de-
gree or vocational training. It is therefore a serious cause
Girls stay longer at school than boys and account for concern that large portions of young Tunisians are
for 62 percent of university students. School and uni- unlikely to benefit from future productivity-driven eco-
versity attendance by girls has increased markedly since nomic growth. As a result, workers will continue to re-
the 1960s and 1970s, and their academic performance ceive low wages and will face increased job insecurity
has also overtaken that of boys. In urban Tunisia, more and increased income inequality.
than one-third of all young women complete a university
education (36.2 percent), a figure much higher than the
Educational Quality
proportion of young men (27.1 percent) (see figure 3.8).5
However, women’s higher tertiary enrollment reflects the Despite high enrolment rates, educational outcomes are
absence of employment opportunities for young women, poor across Tunisia. The findings of the 2011 TIMSS
at least in part. Qualitative research revealed than many survey indicate that 75 percent of eighth graders in Tu-
young women chose to prolong their studies to postpone nisia perform “low” and “below low” in mathematics,
facing the reality of unemployment. despite marginal improvements since 2003. Like most
 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 31

other Middle East and North Africa countries, Tunisia Career counseling in secondary schools and at the
performs much lower than similar middle-income coun- university level is very limited, and students lack guid-
tries in other regions (Mullis et al. 2012). Overall, sec- ance on critical career decisions. Many young people
ondary schools do not seem to provide students with the emphasize the absence of support and advice regarding
basic competences necessary to competitively perform in the choice of courses and their career implications. In
a globalized economy (World Bank 2012f, 2013c). addition, the centralized and rigid university admission
Schools fail to impart life skills that would equip system that is in place limits the choice offered to pro-
young people to transition to adulthood and active cit- spective students and access to many popular courses.
izenship. Practical skills training is largely lacking in
schools, as is instruction and extracurricular activities I requested Sociology and English and got Arabic. I
that help to develop social, personal, and communica- hadn’t filled in the ninth and tenth choices on the form,
tion skills that would enable young people to reach their and the boy sitting next to me suggested putting Arabic.
full potential and impart the values of work and citizen- […] I dropped the phone when I got the news. Male
ship. According to a study published by CNIPE in 2008, entrepreneur, Tunis
among the many factors related to the perceived declin-
ing standards was the abandonment of the examination Much criticism is lodged against the successive reforms
at the end of the sixth year of primary school, known of the past few decades, which youth believe affected the
as the concours.6 Successive curriculum reforms failed education sector and that students view as ill-considered
to improve basic learning skills by Tunisian students. As and arbitrary. The reforms resulted in policies that teach-
one student commented: ers were ill prepared to incorporate in the classroom. One
such contested policy was “Arabization,” which is using
Before, they weren’t like us; they knew the value of Arabic as the language of instruction at the primary and,
things. They knew what the human sciences were. Now, in part, at the secondary and tertiary levels, including for
there are lots of books, but nothing in the head. We science courses.7 Initiated in the 1980s, the Arabization
study lots of complicated subjects, but they serve for policy is considered by the youth to have been imple-
nothing. Student, Zaghouan (Northeast Tunisia) mented in an unsuccessful and hurried manner. As one
young woman described her experience:
A perception exists that the quality of teachers also
plays a role in the quality of education. Qualitative re- For three years I studied in secondary school, years 6 to
search suggests that problems of poorly trained teach- 9, I studied mathematics, physics, and sciences in Ara-
ers start from the lowest level of the education system, bic. But we had teachers trained in French. Personally,
where too many primary school teachers are recruited being among the best students, I think that the teacher
straight from college, without specialized teacher train- was confused. He couldn’t communicate, and I couldn’t
ing. As one young respondent said: understand, because it was in Arabic, and I had the
impression that it had been learned unwillingly. If the
It’s not a question of training or recruitment; there are course was not in Arabic from the beginning, and the
teachers who simply cannot control their classes, who teacher has not taught in Arabic before, he is not going
are simply not suited to the profession. Female unem- to be able to teach the knowledge. […] It helps neither
ployed graduate, Madhia (interior Tunisia) the student nor the teacher. It is exhausting. Female
graduate student, Sidi Bouzid (interior Tunisia)
Most teachers don’t explain to their students what ap-
proach to take. They just give the equation and the re- The final secondary assessment (baccalaureate) is an-
sult. Male nurse, 28, Tunis (coastal Tunisia) other area of contention. Some 25 percent of the final eval-
uation is based on evaluations derived from continuous
32 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

assessment, meaning that teachers can assign grades arbi- and offer solutions regarding educational issues. The ex-
trarily. This grading system is open to manipulation, fa- perience of other middle-income countries shows that,
voritism, and score inflation. In addition, the timing and apart from its immediate value in curbing corruption
manner of how foreign languages are introduced into the and malpractice in the school system, greater student and
curriculum are criticized by many students. parental participation in schools increases the account-
While most industrialized countries are pursuing a ability of teachers and school administrators while pro-
strategy of life-long learning, in Tunisia, opportunities viding students with greater opportunities to influence
for additional training are very limited after leaving how curricula are designed. In Tunisia, this would likely
school. On-the-job training for employed youth is very lead to a focus on introducing skills that are valuable for
infrequent—only 1 in 10 young employed Tunisians have the job market (La Cava and Michael 2006).
received professional training in the past year. According University youth organizations can play a construc-
to the National Employment Observatory-International tive role in improving the educational system. For ex-
Labour Organisation 2013 School-to-Work Transition ample, a regional network of student organizations from
Survey (SWTS), only 10.4 percent of young employed several countries in Southeastern Europe, established in
Tunisians had taken part in professional training, mostly the aftermath of the post-Yugoslavia conflicts, helped to
for further specialization (ILO 2014). Nearly half of implement several crucial reforms. These organizations
these training activities were funded through public pro- succeeded in introducing student ombudswomen and
grams (40.8 percent). Access to these training activities is ombudsmen in several universities, quality of education
similar for young men and women.8 assessments, and governance changes affecting education
ministries as well as university administrators and faculty
Counseling for Better School-to-Work Transition (La Cava and Michael 2006). In the United Kingdom, all
university departments have staff-student consultative
Given the high levels of school dropouts from second-
committees that review everything from research strat-
ary education, counseling services need to be established,
egies to program quality assurance to student demands.
particularly for students in the grades most affected
Students sit on all internal university review boards, and
by early school leaving. To be effective, these services
student representatives sit on university governing bod-
should be professionally managed by private-sector pro-
ies. There is an enormous range of opportunities for in-
viders in partnership with youth-led nongovernmental
cluding student unions more fully in university reform
organizations to ensure proper outreach to teachers and
and oversight. Similar initiatives at secondary school lev-
parents and, most importantly, peer mentoring. Coun-
els could be supported in Tunisia through a competitive
seling could be incrementally introduced in secondary
grant scheme to which students and youth organizations
public schools across Tunisia to provide professional
could apply.
orientation, relevant information, life skills, and psy-
cho-pedagogical support to facilitate the school-to-work
transition, including the identification of apprenticeship 3.4 Pathways and Obstacles to
opportunities. By developing inclusive information and Employment
orientation spaces and coaching Tunisian youth toward
long-term work goals—especially disadvantaged youth Unemployment Registration
at risk of dropping out of school—counseling services
Despite the high NEET rates, few young Tunisians are
would also serve as a preventative measure to reduce
registered with the unemployment office. In rural Tuni-
early school leaving. This proposed reform is intended
sia, only 14.5 percent of young men and 8.1 percent of
to complement necessary structural, long-term reforms
young women without work are formerly registered as
across the education sector in Tunisia.
unemployed (see figure 3.9). The registration rates are
A final key recommendation is to ensure that youth
somewhat higher in urban Tunisia—46.0 percent of men
organizations have the opportunity to voice concerns
and 63.3 percent of women—but are far from universal.
 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 33

Tunisia’s unemployment offices must greatly improve and Figure 3.9. NEETs Registered as Unemployed—
expand services to reach young NEETs, provide helpful Rural Versus Urban
services, and effectively support youth without work to
70
find employment, especially in rural areas. The current 63.3
60
system barely reaches one in ten rural youth without
work and only one out of two urban NEETs. 50 46.0
Male
40

percent
Female
Barriers to Finding Work 30
20 14.5
Unemployment offices provide only limited support,
10 8.1
and most NEETs are not even registered as unemployed,
0
especially in rural Tunisia. Information about new job Rural Urban
openings is difficult to obtain and is rarely available
without connections. In a labor market with widespread Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
unemployment affecting most families, the few new jobs Note: Figure refers to all NEETs.

that become available are first reserved for relatives and

friends before regular applicants are considered.
3.10). Qualifications are thought to be of equal impor-
Tunisia’s unemployment registration system requires
tance, expressed by levels of education (50.2 percent of
substantial investments and technical assistance. The
rural youth and 56.9 percent of urban youth) and work
lack of unemployment services in urban and especially
experience (20.9 percent of rural youth and 14.7 percent
in rural areas further strengthens rural-urban disparities.
of urban youth).
More detailed analysis reveals that little regional varia-
Regionalism describes the phenomenon of favoring
tion exists, even though registration in the interior region
youth from the coastal region for many private sector
is the lowest overall (see annex 3, figure A3.6).
jobs. Regionalism is prevalent and contributes to inequi-
ties. The favoritism may be because of the perceived abil-
In order to find work, it is necessary to consult the In-
ity of coastal youth to draw on cross-regional networks
ternet, go to an employment office, but this is one of
of patronage. At many private sector institutions, in-
the few regions where there is no employment office.
cluding banks and factories, hiring decisions are heavily
…It costs 2 dinars for one-hour Internet access … and
influenced by regional elites. This is not only a character-
10 dinars just to register to the employment office.
Unemployed graduate, Sidi Maklouf, Médenine

Recruitment processes are widely considered unfair, Figure 3.10. Main Reasons for Finding Work
especially for public sector jobs. Job competitions, which Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban
are the formal avenue for recruitment, were dismissed as 80
a sham during qualitative focus group discussions. The 70 62.6
60 56.9
53.6
following factors, among others, were considered as com- 50
50.2
percent

Rural
mon practice in influencing recruitment: (1) connections, 40
Urban
(2) bribery, (3) nepotism, and (4) regionalism. While 30
20.9
these types overlap, each has its own characteristics. 20 14.7
10
However, corruption and nepotism are essential to 0
actually getting a job. When asked about the two most Relations and Education Experience
nepotism level
important aspects in their job searches, young Tunisians
underscored the importance of relations—53.6 percent Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure refers to all youth. Because multiple answers were allowed,
of rural and 62.6 percent of urban youth (see figure percentages do not equal 100 percent.
34 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 3.11. Main Difficulties in Finding Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban

80
70 67.5 67.8

60
52.8
50 45.4
percent

Rural
40 Urban
30
23.5
20 16.4 17.7 16.2
12.2 11.9
10 8.4 6.7
0
No opportunities No relationships No financial Recruitment No work in No information
resources qualification specialization
difficult

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth. Because multiple answers were allowed, shares do not add up to 100 percent.

istic of the interior. A female student at Zaghouan, only disadvantaged youth without secondary education de-
15 km from Tunis, said of a factory established there: grees spend years searching for work. Moving forward,
the integration of disaffected (NEET) youth into a labor
They never employ people from around here. They re- market that is largely driven by regional disparities, per-
cruit people from Tunis or Sousse, because the bosses sonal connections, traditional norms, and family prefer-
and the university professors are not from here. Every- ences should be a central policy concern for boosting the
body takes on the people that they know. Female stu- country’s path to socially sustainable economic growth
dent, Zaghouan (coastal Tunisia) and stability. The following chapters will highlight mea-
sures to be considered for reducing the exclusion among
Lack of personal contacts is a key obstacle in the the most affected youth categories.
search for employment among young Tunisians, in ad- Instead of relying on the labor office for information
dition to the overall lack of opportunities. When asked about job openings, most young people use informal
about the two most important difficulties in finding social networks to find employment. Only 31.0 percent
work, the lack of opportunities and lack of contacts of rural youth and 44.8 percent of urban youth rely on
ranked the highest in both urban and rural Tunisia (see the labor office for information on new jobs. Instead,
figure 3.11). Other important aspects frequently cited are more than two-thirds of rural youth (67.2 percent) and
the lack of financial means and qualifications. These are nearly half of urban youth (42.3 percent) learn about job
interrelated, creating multiple layers of barriers. In focus openings through networks and personal contacts (see
group interviews, participants identified a vicious cycle: figure 3.12). This creates large information asymmetries,
lack of work experience makes it difficult to break into whereby many qualified youth do not learn about job
the job market, especially into the private sector. openings, further contributing to longer periods of un-
Three years after the beginning of the revolution, the employment and fewer job placements.
Tunisian government continues to face the enormous Among young Tunisians, the Internet has become the
challenges of expanding youth access to labor opportu- second most important source of information about job
nities in a gender- and spatial-inclusive manner. Young openings. In urban areas, 43.3 percent of youth use the
Tunisians view informal networks and other unfair prac- Internet to find jobs, compared with a still much lower
tices as barriers to the few existing available jobs. In 27.6 percent in rural areas (see figure 3.12). The Internet
particular, young Tunisians from poor households and has surpassed traditional media such as television and
 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 35

Figure 3.12. Sources of Information about Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban

80
70 67.2

60
50 44.8
percent

42.3 43.3
40
31.0 Rural
30 27.6 Urban
23.9 21.9
20 14.3
10
2.5 0.9 1.3
0
Relationship Labor office Internet Print media Radio SMS
network and television

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth. Because multiple answers were allowed, percentages do not add up to 100 percent.

radio for 14.3 percent of rural and 2.5 percent of urban 2. The survey did not capture sufficient rural youth with university degrees
to make qualified statements about their share.
youth, and it has surpassed newspapers for 23.9 percent
3. These results refer to young people living in rural and urban areas, respec-
of rural and 21.9 percent of urban youth. However, many tively; they do not account for migration.
young Tunisians do not have Internet access, especially 4. The table reports the results of a Probit model of early school leaving
disadvantaged youth and young women and men in rural and largely confirms the results also found for educational attainment as a
whole. As before, the very large and strongly statistically significant coef-
areas. Alternative technologies, such as Short Message ficients make it plausible that household wealth is playing a strong causal
Service (SMS), provided by public-private initiatives, role in determining educational outcomes. Some of the reasons for this were
suggested above.
hold the potential to reach many more young Tunisians.
5. The rural sample did not include enough university graduates to make a
The current rate of SMS subscription for new jobs open- meaningful comparison.
ing remains very low among young people—0.9 percent 6. A 2008 study by CNIPE (2008) revealed that a good proportion of year
in rural areas and 1.3 percent in urban areas. seven and eight students, in the aftermath of the discontinuation of the
practice of repeating years in 1996, could neither read nor write Arabic or
French.

Notes 7. Officially, Arabic is the language of instruction at the basic education

level, and French is taught as a foreign language. French becomes the lan-
1. These rates of educational achievement are better than those of older guage of instruction for technical, scientific, and mathematic subjects, while
generations. The share of Tunisians aged 30-59 who are NEET and have all other classes are taught in Arabic. However, focus groups indicate that
not completed secondary education is 91.7 percent (male) and 98.3 percent mathematics and some science classes are being taught in Arabic in locations
(female) in rural areas, compared with 71.3 percent (male) and 80.9 percent throughout the country.
(female) in urban areas (see annex 3, figures A3.1 and A3.2). 8. See annex 1 for more details on the results of the 2013 School-to-Work
Transition Survey.
 Chapter 4
Economic Opportunities

37
38 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Whether you’re a girl or a boy, you tell yourself: “All the same, after all of these
years of studying and sacrifice, you end up staying home. Even if you try to work
past it, it affects you psychologically … this life does not satisfy you anymore.
You would rather live in better conditions, in a better environment.”
Female unemployed graduate, Tataouine (South Tunisia)

This chapter highlights the economic opportunities all young men who, in principle, could work are without
available to young Tunisian women and men, and pres- employment, implying a substantial amount of forgone
ents the state of employment and entrepreneurship in economic output.
both formal and informal sectors. The results underscore The chances of young people to find employment de-
that significant regional and gender disparities exist in pend first and foremost on family background. Regres-
youth employment prospects, also documented in a re- sion analysis suggests that paternal education counts
cent World Bank study on labor market outcomes in more than a young person’s own education in determin-
Tunisia (World Bank 2013b). Most employment is of- ing whether the young person finds work, while house-
fered without written contracts, providing limited job hold wealth also appears to play a strong role (see annex
security and little access to social security.1 Lastly, a sep- 4, table A4.1).3 This suggests that factors that cannot be
arate section on self-employment highlights the substan- directly controlled for in the regression—such as family
tial entrepreneurial potential of young Tunisians while connections and educational quality, both of which are
also discussing limited access to finance and the impli- likely to be correlated with paternal education—play sig-
cations of excessive regulations on self-employed youth. nificant roles in youth finding employment.

Regional Exclusion
4.1 Employment Opportunities
[President] Bourguiba developed the Monastir region,
Despite Tunisia’s policies on gender equality, few young [President] Ben Ali developed Sousse, but the regions of
Tunisian women are employed. Less than one in five the interior are forgotten. The State should deal with the
young women in rural Tunisia (18.5 percent) and less than regions fairly. Given the rate of unemployment in Sidi
two in five in urban Tunisia (39.8 percent) have jobs.2 Bouzid, which is twice that in Sousse, they should stop
Among Tunisian young people who are not in education, investing in Sousse until the other regions catch up, then
employment, or training (NEET), rates of employment everyone would be happy. With such measures, equality
are substantially lower among women than among men could be established between the regions. Male unem-
(see figure 4.1). Female employment is particularly low ployed graduate, Sidi Bouzid
in the south (8.3 percent in rural areas and 17.2 percent
in urban areas) and in the interior region (16.1 percent in Young Tunisians face poor odds in finding employ-
rural areas and 34.3 percent in urban areas), compared ment, especially in the interior and the south, according
with young women working in the coastal region (27.5 to a recent report on the spatial divide of labor market
percent in rural areas and 45.9 percent in urban areas). outcomes (World Bank 2013b). In fact, among the un-
Male youth employment is very low overall, even in the derlying causes of the 2011 revolution was the spatial,
coastal region (58.1 percent in rural areas and 68.0 per- economic, and political marginalization of society in
cent in urban areas), followed by the south (53.6 percent parts of the country that favors the coastal region (Ayeb
in rural areas and 60.3 percent in urban areas), and the 2011).4 A more recent analysis argues that the uprisings
interior (48.9 percent in rural areas and 56.6 percent in spread between marginalized communities through-
urban areas). Overall, between one-third and one-half of out the country in what was coined “socioeconomic
 Economic Opportunities | 39

Figure 4.1. Employment of Young Tunisians

a. Rural b. Urban
80 80
68.0
58.1 60.3
60 53.6 60 56.6
48.9 45.9
percent

percent
Male
40 Male 40 34.3
27.5 Female
Female
20 16.1 20 17.2
8.3
0 0
Coast Interior South Coast Interior South

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or training programs.

proximity,” rather than geographic proximity (Egel and Nearly one-quarter of male migrants have moved to
Garbouj 2013). Greater Tunis (24.6 percent), to other cities (31.7 per-
Youth migration further reinforces existing regional cent), or abroad (15.3 percent), while just over one-quar-
disparities and urban-rural divisions. Youth migration ter (28.4 percent) of male migrants from rural households
deprives rural areas of its limited skilled young labor force has moved to another rural location (see figure 4.2). In
while feeding the ever-growing poor suburbs of urban contrast, relatively few young women migrate to Greater
Tunisia. In effect, migration cements the inability of Tunis (16.7 percent), other towns (32.2 percent), or
the rural hinterland to shift toward a high-productivity abroad (2.4 percent). Nearly half of all migrated female
economic model. In this vicious circle, the youth of the siblings have moved to other rural areas (48.8 percent).
interior see themselves as victims of neglect and regional Unemployed youth compete for the few jobs that are
bias. Youth migration further adds to the social pres- available. Rural migrants are sometimes seen as under-
sure in urban areas that are unable to absorb the rapidly cutting the already low wages for unskilled workers in
growing numbers of young unskilled workers. Young urban Tunisia.
Tunisians migrate not only for work but also to exit from
the social pressure in rural communities, delaying many Those who come from rural areas are willing to work at
life decisions, and thereby creating additional frustra- lower wages. Tunis is invaded by migrants, while other
tions among young men and women. Migration is seen areas of the country are empty, and Tunis residents can-
as traumatic by many—an exile from family and com- not find a job. I think there should be a visa to live in
munity. Many young people depict leaving home and the city, so that young people don’t just overcrowd the
the emotional and material support of family, friends, place. In Tunis, there is no more space anywhere. Male
neighborhood, and the café for urban areas as a sacrifice
informal worker, Tunis (coastal Tunisia)
“where no one sees me” rather than as an adventure.
Rural youth continue to move to cities as they attempt
to escape rural areas, despite the lack of good jobs in
Gender Exclusion
urban areas. Nearly 90.2 percent of rural households
report that members of their direct family5 have mi- Exclusion based on gender remains a daunting challenge
grated to urban areas, mostly the siblings of rural youth. for young Tunisian women trying to enter the workforce.
Rural-urban migration continues to be an important Tunisia has made admirable progress in closing gender
pathway for rural youth, especially for young men. gaps in education and health outcomes, but investments
40 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 4.2. Destinations of Rural Migrants by Gender

a. Male b. Female

Greater Tunis 2.4% Greater Tunis

15.3% Other urban 16.7% Other urban
24.6% Rural Rural
Abroad Abroad

28.4% 48.8%
32.2%

31.7%

Source: World Bank 2012d.

Note: Figure refers to all current migrants who are siblings of rural youth.

in human development have yet to translate into higher respondents report that women are discriminated against
rates of female participation in economic life.6 Several when seeking work in the private sector. A smaller but
established methods are available to better understand still considerable number (44.4 percent) perceive gender
the prevailing gender discrimination, including self- discrimination in the public sector. A large proportion of
reported experience and perceptions and wage regres- young men agree that discrimination against the recruit-
sion analysis (see annex 4, table A4.2). Figure 4.3 pres- ment of women exists: 44.1 percent in the private sector
ents the perceptions of young men and women in rural and 32.4 percent in the public sector.
Tunisia regarding gender discrimination in the labor Discrimination against women in the labor market
market.7 Nearly two-thirds (61.4 percent) of female is detrimental to female labor market participation and
to Tunisia’s development potential. As the World Devel-
opment Report 2012 states, “gender equality is smart
Figure 4.3. Perceived Gender Discrimination in Private economics” and matters for development (World Bank
Versus Public Sectors, Rural Tunisia 2011). Providing women and men with equal access to
education, economic opportunities, and assets has the
70
61.4 potential to boost productivity. Qualitative research
60
shows that many young men believe the importance of a
50 44.4 woman having a job is less than that of a man, given that
44.1
Male
40 the man is traditionally seen as the breadwinner. How-
percent

32.4 Female
30 ever, increasingly, two incomes are becoming necessary
20 to sustain a household, and employability can be an asset
10 for young women. As one graduate commented:
0
Private sector Public sector Men today are not looking for a housewife, they prefer
a woman who works and brings in money. And they are
Source: World Bank 2012d.
Note: Figure only refers to youth in rural Tunisia.
right. Female unemployed graduate, Tunis
 Economic Opportunities | 41

Familial concerns for women’s safety and social pro- considered appropriate, female graduates can face years
priety continue to limit young women’s participation of unemployment pending their assumed transition to
in the labor market. Fewer options exist for women wives and mothers.
to work outside the home, especially in the southern
region, due to a lack of economic diversification and Our parents encouraged us to study and work. But it is
the limited availability of work considered appropriate always within limits defined for us, which we can’t go
for young women by their families. The qualitative data beyond. It is a question of mentality. People here think a
show that social norms continue to limit the mobility girl can work as a teacher or nurse; these are respectable,
of young women for employment (see box 4.1 on fam- decent occupations. I am only allowed to be a teacher
ily formation). A young woman living away from her and nothing else. I couldn’t work as a tourist guide, or
family would be tolerated by some families only if the in a factory, or anything else. And worse, the job would
job were considered socially acceptable and increased have to be in the south of Tunisia. I couldn’t even dream
her marriage prospects—i.e., work that is appropriate of working far from home. Female graduate, Médenine
to her training, preferably in the public sector. Some of (South Tunisia)
the young female survey respondents indicated that stay-
ing in their home regions may be seen as an imposition However, driven by the economic needs of their fam-
rather than an aspiration. Unlike young men, they can- ilies, a significant proportion of young women from the
not take on casual, short-term “filler” jobs that may re- interior and southern regions are working. These young
sult in gaining relevant skills. Given the scarcity of jobs women are typically working in factories in coastal towns

Box 4.1. Family Formation

Some segments of Tunisian society perceive the possession of a degree from an institution of higher learning as a
burden in several respects, especially among young women. These young women effectively become constrained
by their own initiative and academic success because men may perceive women graduates as possessing more
autonomy than is their lot in a predominantly patriarchal culture and subsequently consider them inappropriate
as potential wives. Furthermore, if the degree does not lead to employment, a young woman must return home
to what, in some cases, is a mostly isolated life, particularly in the interior regions and in the south. Moreover, a
woman’s sector of employment largely determines whether or not she remains suitable for marriage. Prevailing
social norms permit a young woman to work as a nurse or teacher, but they preclude most other lines of work.
Nevertheless, young Tunisian women believe that education and professional qualifications are significant
assets for potential marriages as economic conditions make it progressively more difficult to manage households
on single wages. The notion that both spouses can work is just as common among female nongraduates, who
expressed the importance of contributing to household finances. In the words of one young woman “Life is even
harder nowadays. It is necessary that both members of the couple work.”
Employment status and educational credentials affect marriage prospects for young Tunisian men as well,
albeit in a different way. On a societal level, many families would prefer that their daughters marry an employed
man, regardless of his degree. Thus, unemployed male graduates possess little-to-no comparative advantage rel-
ative to unemployed nongraduates. The resultant lack of social status assigned to unemployed male graduates
may dissuade potential couples from seeking an engagement for fear of being refused by the bride-to-be’s family,
or worse, having the engagement broken off prematurely due to prolonged unemployment and intense pressure
on the man to provide for his fiancée.
Source: World Bank and ONJ 2012.
42 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

such as Sfax, where they share accommodations with labor market for young Tunisians is dominated by tem-
others. In this case, there is a trade-off: on one hand, be- porary and seasonal contracts and day-labor arrange-
tween the norms governing the type of work considered ments. Over one-fifth of both rural (20.1 percent) and
appropriate for a university graduate and, on the other, urban (20.9 percent) youth work with fixed-term con-
the family’s need for income and the young woman’s de- tracts, which provide limited job security.8 Predictably,
sire to escape the tedium of the domestic sphere. As one informality is the highest among rural youth, with over
female graduate put it: half (51.7 percent) working as day laborers. Overall,
while these shares highlight job insecurity among young
I worked in a factory for a year after graduating. I no- Tunisians, contractual stability is much higher than
tice that most graduates do the same since they can’t among older generations with much lower shares of
find suitable work in their field of study. Female gradu- open-ended contracts.9
ate, Sfax Job informality affects young Tunisians from all
walks of life. Regression analysis shows that informality
is independent of household wealth, meaning that poor
Job Informality and better-off youth are equally affected by informality.
Job informality is common among Tunisian youth: less Youth in the interior region face a higher probability of
than one in three young workers has a formal work being informally employed, while young Tunisians with
contract and access to social protection. Under Tuni- higher education face a lower probability of being infor-
sian labor market regulations, only open-ended work mally employed. The same is true for young women, for
contracts provide full access to social protection and whom informal jobs are less acceptable for social and
extended job security. But only 15.3 percent of rural cultural reasons (see annex 4, table A4.3).
youth and 38.8 percent of urban youth have open-ended Young Tunisians are largely discontented with infor-
work contracts. Figure 4.4 shows the contract types mal employment and the risk of exploitation that comes
held by employed youth in rural and urban areas. The with it. This is corroborated by the young men and

Figure 4.4. Contract Type of Employed Youth (Ages 15–29)

a. Rural b. Urban

Open-ended Open-ended
15.3% Fixed term 19.1% Fixed term
Temporary Temporary
Seasonal Seasonal
Day laborer 3.9% Day laborer
38.8%

51.7% 20.1%

17.2%

6.0%
6.9% 20.9%

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure only refers to working youth and excludes self-employed youth.
 Economic Opportunities | 43

women interviewed who frequently cite the short-term a lack of educational qualifications in rural areas (see
nature of contracts as a major aspect of job insecurity. annex 4, table A4.3). Controlling for individual factors,
Young women and men associate short-term contracts informality appears to be particularly pronounced in
with exploitative treatment by employers. In turn, stable the southern governorates.12 The estimations also illus-
employment, including medium- or long-term contracts trate that young women are less likely to have informal
with social security benefits, is cited among the main ca- contracts. Given social norms regarding the appropriate
reer aspirations. Registration in the social security sys- forms of employment for young women, the absence
tem, the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS), is of formal employment seems to exclude young women
frequently cited as the most important benefit of any job, from the labor market.
even among workers without formal contracts. To many
young workers, being registered in the social security Education and Low-Skill Jobs
system is perceived as a means of maintaining dignity in
the face of job loss. Work that does not meet these crite- What I studied in university has no relation to what I
ria is considered “false work” (faux travail), undertaken now do at work, even though it is virtually in the same
only for the sake of survival. field. We had lots of theoretical courses, but the practi-
cal side was almost nonexistent. Female bank employee,
I have no goals as regards choice of work. I have no 28, Tunis
ambition. I accept any work I find. The most import-
ant thing for me is that I be registered legally under the Tunisia’s recent history of providing basic education
CNSS. Male informal worker, 21, Gafsa (South Tunisia) throughout the country is impressive, achieving nearly
universal literacy rates. In 2008, official literacy rates
The predominance of informal youth employment were 96.1 percent among young women and 98.2 per-
may be partly due to labor market distortions, which cent among young men, although rates in rural areas
could be addressed by reform. According to a recent tend to be lower (UNICEF 2012).13 Similarly, the rate
study on Tunisia’s labor market regulations, several fac- of enrollment in tertiary education has risen from only
tors appear to drive job informality (World Bank 2013c). 6 percent in 1987 to 35 percent in 2007, with nearly
First, inflexible labor regulations, associated with open- half a million young Tunisians currently participating in
ended contracts, make it very difficult to terminate higher education (Haouas et al. 2012).14 Much of the in-
employment, leading firms to use informal short-term crease has happened in recent years when, for example,
contracts instead (World Bank 2013c).10 Second, high in- the number of annual university graduates more than
come taxes on wages—approaching 29 percent—create doubled in five years from 24,500 in 2001 to 52,300 in
financial incentives for workers and employers to avoid 2006 (Haouas et al. 2012).
formal contracts. Third, the social security contribution Despite achieving high rates of literacy and university
is perceived as an additional tax because individual pay- enrolment, Tunisia’s education sector is failing to meet
ments are not linked to respective benefits (World Bank the needs and aspirations of the young generation. Young
2013c). Balanced reforms in labor market regulation people are increasingly disenchanted with the overly the-
are needed to provide greater flexibility to firms while oretical knowledge they are taught, leaving them unpre-
increasing protection for young workers. In particular, pared for the labor market, as are youth in other Middle
the entitlements and rules for dismissal associated with East and North African countries (World Bank 2008).
fixed-term and open-ended contracts should be aligned This section presents young people’s views on the edu-
with international standards.11 cational system, which they see as synonymous with ill-
In addition, limited education is one of the key drivers equipped classrooms, poorly trained teachers, outdated
for labor market informality. Regression analysis shows curricula without relevance to the contemporary labor
that informal employment is strongly associated with market, lack of advice on the practical steps needed to
44 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

obtain employment, and a failure to promote the entre- Figure 4.5. Satisfaction with Education System and
preneurial spirit and potential of the private sector (see Attainment
box 4.2 for an overview of the education system).
Educational attainment is strongly related to fam- 80 73.9
ily background. Paternal education plays an important 70

role, as one would expect, but so does household wealth. 60

An estimation of educational attainment suggests that 50 43.9

percent
Rural
household wealth plays an important role in determining 40 35.8
33.1 Urban
educational attainment (see annex 4, table A4.4).15 This 30
may be due to the relationship between family wealth 20
and educational quality as well as the high opportunity 10
cost for low-income families in allowing their children to
0
pursue further education. However, it also may be due to Satisfaction Satisfaction
with own with quality of
the importance of connections, as noted above. Coming educational level educational system
from a wealthy background may be a key factor in being
able to realize the potential returns to higher education. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or training programs.
Notwithstanding advances in literacy and enrollment,
the quality and performance of the education system is
among the most challenging areas of public policy in Students and former students, including graduates,
Tunisia. The limited quality of education, as measured were particularly critical of the overly theoretical orien-
by objective criteria, and the limited capacity of the state tation of most school and university courses, which they
to deliver education and training for employment con- believe fail to provide them with the skill mix necessary
tinue to be the most urgent policy areas to address. The for the labor market. School imparts little knowledge of
quality of education and training and their value on the the labor market and few of the skills relevant to enter-
labor market is perceived by young Tunisians to have ing it. The education system does not provide the critical
declined over time. thinking and reasoning skills that are essential for engi-
neers and scientists (TIMSS 2007). As one graduate put it:
My mother, when she passed the sixth grade exams (con-
cours), could speak French well. Now students at that I studied at the technical secondary school at Mahdia. I
level cannot even read. I have given private lessons to think that these twelve years of study we did up to the
primary school students who couldn’t even write their baccalaureate were too theoretical. The practical side
names. Female unemployed graduate, Madhia (CE) was almost nonexistent. Even the study trip was just for
show. The teachers knew nothing. I found that later, in
As many as two-thirds of young Tunisians are unsat- the world of work. There were so many gaps. We had
isfied with their national education system. Rates of sat- never tried to apply what we had learned. Male student,
isfaction are very low among both rural (33.1 percent) Mahdia (CE)
and urban (35.8 percent) youth (see figure 4.5). Rural
respondents were particularly unsatisfied with their While the poor quality of education has been lamented
educational attainment, with only 43.9 percent express- about for years, this issue has now reached a critical point
ing satisfaction with their educational level, which is in Tunisia. In the eyes of Tunisia’s youth, schools have be-
a reflection of the mediocre quality of schools in rural come “manufacturers of the unemployed.” Although they
areas. In urban areas, while satisfaction rates are higher, produce increasing numbers of graduates each year, a cul-
more than one in four young people are unsatisfied with ture has arisen in which credentials are valued over skills
their educational attainment. (Haouas, Sayre, and Yagoubi 2012). Student degrees are
 Economic Opportunities | 45

Box 4.2. Education in Tunisia

Basic Education.a Basic education from grades 1–9 is compulsory and is comprised of six years of primary edu-
cation and three years of preparatory education, which is also referred to as lower secondary or middle school.
At the end of grade six, students must score above 50 percent on their exams to continue to middle school.
Traditionally, many students have to repeat the sixth year of primary education, which has led to increased
dropout rates after only six years of education. In the early 1990s, about one-fifth of young Tunisians had to
repeat the sixth year, and while the rate of this repeating has gradually reduced over the past twenty years, it is
still relatively high (8 percent in 2012) (Ministère de l’Education 2012). The official primary level dropout rate
was 12 percent in 2000 and 6 percent in 2009 (World Bank 2009a). Those primary education students who
cannot make it to the general preparatory education are offered the opportunity to access technical preparatory
schools, which can lead either to secondary education or vocational training programs. At the end of the ninth
year, additional dropouts occur because students must obtain the Basic Education Completion Diploma.
Secondary Education.b Passing the ninth grade exam is required to enroll in the four years of secondary
education from years 10–13 (previously 10–12). At the end of grade 11, secondary education students have
to choose between nine streams that focus on academic and specialized studies. While these are meant to help
students prepare to enter a university or to join the workforce, course content is mostly designed to prepare stu-
dents to take the final exam of secondary education. Passing the final exam of secondary education is required
to continue to public universities, as the exam is both a school-leaving and a university-entrance examination.c
Until 2000, some 60–70 percent of secondary students failed the final exam each year, an outcome related to
a number of factors, including—but not limited to—those associated with the educational system and youth
engagement. The improvements in the baccalaureat pass rates observed since 2000 (from 32 percent in 2000 to
64 percent in 2011) is mostly due to a change in the exam rules. The failure rate further highlights the fact that
youth have not acquired sufficient knowledge to prepare them for employment.
Vocational Training. Three different types of technical training are open to students. Basic technical training
is an alternative to secondary education and lasts two years.d The professional technical degree requires at least
two years of secondary education, followed by two years of practical training.e The advanced professional tech-
nical degree is available to vocational students by adding another two years of study to the advanced technical
degree—i.e., two years of secondary school plus four years of technical training.f By 2007, about 10 percent of
Tunisian students were enrolled in a vocational training program (World Bank 2007b).
Tertiary Education. Tunisia has rapidly expanded access to tertiary education during the past decade, cur-
rently enrolling over 35 percent of young Tunisians and spending more than two percent of its gross domestic
product on public universities. Tertiary education used to be structured in three phases of two years each,
but has recently been transformed toward the European and British system of Bachelor’s (3 years), Master’s
(2 years), and Doctorate (3–5 years).g
a. Referred to in French as Enseignement de base.
b. Referred to in French as Enseignement secondaire.
c. The exam is referred to in French as Examen National du Baccalauréat.
d. Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle in French.
e. Brevet de Technicien Professionnel in French.
f. Brevet de Technicien Supérieur in French.
g. Licence-Mastère-Doctorat (LMD) in French.
Source: World Bank. 2008.
46 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

devalued by their very numbers as well as by their declin- The challenge of providing better education cannot be
ing quality and credibility. Regional disparities in the qual- met by the Tunisian government alone. To achieve higher
ity of education are pervasive. Urban and coastal areas quality in education at all levels, greater effort is needed
have benefitted from a history of colonial Franco-Arab to bring together all relevant stakeholders. These include
education, which the rural zones and the interior and public and private education providers, civil society,
mountain areas lack. As a result, a “two- or even three- public sector policy makers and administrators, private
speed system” has developed. Increasingly differentiated employers, and—above all—Tunisia’s young people.
by the rise of private education, with sizable tuition fees Few partnerships exist between employers and educa-
and regional variation, the education system reflects and tional institutions. While the comprehensive dual appren-
amplifies Tunisia’s generational, spatial, and social divi- ticeship systems of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
sions. One student commented on the quality of education have proved difficult to effectively implement in other
with specific regard to the “Arabization” of education: countries, in many industrialized countries, modern edu-
cational systems routinely involve work experience and
The most important thing that I wish to bring to light internships for students (OECD 2012). Key enablers
is the story of the three years that I studied in high for such partnerships that could promote high quality
school, from the seventh year through the ninth. I stud- and appropriate education are missing. In this regard,
ied math, physics, and the sciences in Arabic and we, three weak areas stand out: (1) standards and indepen-
we had professors who taught these subjects in French. dent quality assurance, (2) funding mechanisms such as
I think personally, owing to my having been among training vouchers tailored to the needs of young Tuni-
the best students, that the teacher was confused, [that] sians in rural and urban areas with different education
he could not communicate the information, as he had backgrounds, and (3) tools for information transpar-
done before. And I could no longer understand him. ency and matching between employers and students in
Because it was in Arabic and I had impression that it training (OECD 2012). In view of the overall regulatory
had been implemented by force. If the course has not environment and coordination needs across multiple
been [taught] in Arabic since the beginning, and the government entities, organizations from civil society and
person has not taught in Arabic previously, he or she the private sector can have important roles in organizing,
will not manage to pass on the information. So over the monitoring, or providing crucial educational and match-
course of these three years, I was under the impression making services.
that I was translating …. In basic education, the Arabi- To provide adequate employment for graduates and
zation of the sciences benefits neither the student nor the other skilled youth, the Tunisian economy requires many
professor because it is tiring. Female university student, more jobs in both low- and high-skill sectors. Most
aged 26, Sidi Bouzid highly skilled Tunisians with secondary, vocational,
or university-level education are currently working
Youth are demanding better quality education, as in low-skilled jobs. These are typically defined as jobs
are potential employers. Many manufacturers require in sectors with limited productivity and relatively low
technical and analytical skills, while the service sector wages. Generally speaking, most low-productivity firms
needs young people with soft skills (IFC 2011). Young that offer the majority of low-skill jobs can be found in
Tunisians express strong doubts about both the qual- agriculture, basic industries, and low value-added man-
ity and the relevance of curricula. Many young people ufacturing, construction, mines, energy, and much of the
are willing to pay for more useful education to enhance textile industry (World Bank 2014). Most jobs in these
their job opportunities and indeed, some do so. Not sectors require little specialized training and tend to yield
even half of new graduates are ready for the workplace lower wages. Annex 4, table A4.5 presents additional
when hired, according to private employers (IFC 2011). evidence on the determinants of wage levels and high-
Consequently, many employers must provide substantial lights youth employment in sectors that can be charac-
training for their new hires to ensure work readiness. terized by low-productivity firms.
 Economic Opportunities | 47

Figure 4.6. Youth Employment in Low-Productivity Figure 4.7. Education Levels of Young Working
Sectors Tunisians—Rural Versus Urban
100 100 3.2 2.6
85.9 0.1 0.4 8.8 6.4
81.4
80 12.1 10.6
65.9 69.0 15.4 23.1
Male 80 Vocational training
percent

60
Female 29.0 31.1 9.5 University
40 11.3
60 Secondary

percent
20 27.4 Middle school
25.8
40 Primary
0
Rural Urban 42.5 40.1 Below primary

20 33.2 26.4
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure only refers to working youth and excludes self-employed 13.1 15.2
5.6 7.0
0
youth.
Rural Rural Urban Urban
male female male female

The great majority of employed young Tunisians Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure only refers to working youth, including self-employed youth,
(82.5 percent in rural areas and 67.0 percent in urban and excludes youth in education and training.
areas) work in sectors with limited productivity.16
Figure 4.6 shows the share of jobs held by young Tu-
nisians between 15–29 years in sectors of largely low In rural areas, almost three out of four (71.5 percent)
productivity. Young women are especially likely to work working youth have dropped out of school before com-
in these low productivity sectors—69.0 percent in urban pleting secondary education (lycée). An additional 13.5
areas and 85.9 percent in rural areas. However, the sit- percent of rural working youth did not complete their
uation for young men is only slightly better, with 65.9 primary education; many of them never attended any
percent of young men working in the low productivity school (see figure 4.7). Similarly, in urban areas, more
sector in urban areas and 81.4 percent in rural areas. than half of all working youth lack a secondary degree
Young women in urban areas (69 percent) have an es- (57.6 percent), and an additional 6.1 percent has no
pecially higher probability to work in low-productivity education. However, a modern knowledge-based econ-
sectors than do older women in urban areas (58 percent), omy generates skilled jobs requiring personnel with the
while the rates are similar across age groups for urban ability to develop complex technical products reliant on
men.17 knowledge and creative innovation.
Tunisia’s economy, based on its low-skill economic The Tunisian economy is underequipped for future
model, provides insufficient skilled jobs for young grad- growth.19 Because of Tunisia’s lack of high productiv-
uates (World Bank 2014). Although many young gradu- ity job opportunities, the demand for skilled workers is
ates are seeking work, firms continue to employ unskilled weak. Consequently, many young Tunisians drop out of
youth. In urban areas, 59.6 percent of all working youth school because the investment in their education pays
are unskilled.18 The proportion is even higher in rural poor returns. In the short-term, young Tunisians may
areas at 83.7 percent. The virtual absence of secondary rationalize dropping out of school even before complet-
and university education among working youth reflects ing secondary education. However, in the medium-term,
the dominance of low-skill jobs generated by the Tuni- the large number of unskilled youth reflects a serious na-
sian economy. The dearth of skilled jobs also explains tional underinvestment in human capital, affecting indi-
why university graduates face such serious difficulties in viduals and the country’s long-term potential. Unskilled
finding qualified work. young women and men will find it difficult to benefit
Most employed young Tunisians have not completed from future economic growth driven by increased pro-
secondary education, and promoting their participation ductivity. The challenge presented by the lack of a skilled
in a modern globalized economy will remain a challenge. workforce is discussed further below.
48 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

One important message emerging from the analysis is than choice. The highest rates of underemployment for
that any future attempt to reform the education system young women are found in the urban south (84.8 per-
should be founded on a strong partnership with the pri- cent). The interior region has the highest proportion of
vate sector and young people themselves. The challenge is underemployed young men in urban areas (74.6 percent).
for all of these stakeholders to work together to counter In contrast, underemployment is virtually absent in rural
the practice of imposing top-down reforms and artifi- areas, where only 7.6 percent of young men and 7.4 per-
cial barriers to education while introducing innovative cent of young women work for six hours or less per day.
thinking and solutions and, most importantly, upholding
the promises to a generation of young people. Although Youth Employment by Sector
a full prescription for education reform is beyond the
The public sector provides relatively little employment
scope of this report, young Tunisians should play an
for young Tunisians—only 6.8 percent of working youth
active role in the process of identifying challenges, devel-
in rural areas and 12.4 percent in urban areas. These low
oping solutions, and monitoring the implementation of
percentages challenge the notion that young Tunisians
reforms, while private sector entities could become part
choose to remain unemployed while awaiting public sec-
of the suite of solutions.
tor jobs. In fact, the proportion of young people wanting
to work in the public sector has fallen markedly over the
Youth Underemployment
past few years, from about 46 percent21 in 2009 to less
Underemployment is a significant problem in urban than 5 percent22 in 2012. This seems to reflect a shift
Tunisia, affecting two out of three employed urban youth. in understanding among young Tunisians that, despite
Underemployment is defined as part-time work with job security, the public sector is no longer nearly as at-
workdays of six hours or less. This is the norm for most tractive as it once was. Now employing only one in ten
youth working in urban areas. By this definition, 65.7 young working Tunisians—including teachers, doctors,
percent of all young men and 70.6 percent of all young and nurses—the public sector no longer dominates in the
women in urban areas are underemployed (see figure aspirations of unemployed youth.
4.8).20 Underemployment levels are only slightly higher The agriculture sector remains a major employer for
among women, suggesting that part-time work among young Tunisians in rural areas, providing more than one-
young women is a result of labor market conditions rather fifth of all rural jobs for the youth (21.9 percent). This
share remains consistent with data from 2009, when
agriculture generated 12 percent of the gross domes-
Figure 4.8. Urban Youth Underemployment tic product, provided work for 22 percent of the total
100 workforce, and contributed approximately 5.4 percent
84.0 84.8 to overall economic growth (Oxford Business Group
80 74.6
70.6 2009).23 However, many young rural Tunisians are un-
64.0 67.9 interested in rural life and employment even though ag-
60
percent

riculture is a major employment sector (see figure 4.9).24

Male
40 Research shows that four out of five young Tunisians
Female
working in urban areas are employed in the service sec-
20 tor (37.9 percent). In rural Tunisia, most jobs, includ-
ing most informal employment, are in the service sector,
0
Coast Interior South which accounts for 29.7 percent of all employed youth.
Tunisia’s service sector has a strong comparative
Source: World Bank 2012e.
Note: Figure only refers to working youth in urban areas and excludes advantage and significant potential for exports, espe-
self-employed youth. Underemployment is defined as workdays of six cially in information and communication technology,
hours or less.
 Economic Opportunities | 49

Figure 4.9. Youth Employment by Sector

a. Rural b. Urban

6.8% Agriculture 6.8% Agriculture

Construction 12.4% Construction
21.9% Industry and 10.6% Industry and
manufacturing manufacturing
29.7% Services Services
Public sector Public sector

17.8%
37.9% 32.2%

23.8%

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure only refers to working youth and excludes self-employed youth. The agricultural sector includes jobs in the food processing industry.

professional services, transport and logistics, tourism, construction (12 percent), and agriculture (6.6 percent).
and health (ITCEQ 2010). Trade of services, particularly Apart from the large public sector in urban areas, these
with the European Union, is one of the most promising shares show that, on average, Tunisia’s young genera-
sectors as a source of economic growth and job creation, tion has better jobs than their parents. Regression anal-
especially for skilled youth (World Bank 2013a). Cur- ysis shows that the sectors which yield the highest wages
rently, more than half of all youth from rural Tunisia are industry and services, apart from the public sector
(52.8 percent), and nearly two-thirds (64.9 percent) of (Annex 4, table A4.5). Traditional labor intensive sec-
urban youth plan to work in services (see annex 4, fig- tors, such as agriculture and construction, yield relatively
ure A4.4). The tourism sector has been hit hard by the low wages. Young people with better skills tend to earn
ongoing political transition, and hotels and restaurants more, while youth on informal contracts earns less, as do
currently provide few jobs for young people (6.9 per- women and young people in the interior of the country.
cent in urban areas and 5.4 percent rural areas).25 How-
ever, tourism is bound to recover. New services, such as
ecotourism, could provide important opportunities for 4.2 Self-Employment
youth in nontraditional vacation locations.
However, Tunisia’s young generation works in more The poor also have a right to buy and sell. Salem
productive sectors than their parents in both rural and Bouazizi, brother of Mohamed Bouazizi, Sidi Bouzid,
urban areas. Annex 4, figure A4.3 presents the sector of interior region, as quoted in De Soto 2011.
employment among working age Tunisians aged 30–59
by sector: 32.2 percent of Tunisians in rural areas work
in agriculture, followed by 22.4 percent in services, 22.0
Innovation and Entrepreneurship
percent in construction, 12.9 percent in manufacturing,
and 10.5 percent in the public sector. In urban Tunisia, Tunisia is relatively well positioned to become a cham-
the generation aged 29 or older works mostly in ser- pion in innovation and entrepreneurship, provided that
vices (35.1 percent), followed by the public sector (29.0 it recognizes the potential of its aspiring generation of
percent), industry and manufacturing (17.3 percent), self-employed youth (De Soto 2011; World Bank 2010).
50 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 4.10. Global Competitiveness Index (2011–12) into existing and new economic sectors; and supporting
service industries such as the banking sector, which is
Institutions crucial for economic success. Tunisia is already boasting
Innovation 7 Infrastructure
6 some social entrepreneurs, such as the Cogit Dialogue
Business 5 Center, and others, such as the Digital Mania Studio, are
4 Macroeconomic
sophistication also among the many start-ups in the Middle East and
3 environment
2 North Africa Region that have achieved market success
1
Market size 0 Health and since the Arab Spring (Korenblum 2013).
primary education

Tunisia’s Self-Employed Youth

Technological Health education
readiness and training Self-employment is relatively common among young
Financial
men—1 in 10 are self-employed. Specifically, in urban
Goods market Egypt
market Labor efficiency Tunisia, about 13.1 percent of all young men are self-
development market Jordan
efficiency Morocco employed, a rate that is nearly twice as high as rural
Tunisia Tunisia’s 7.9 percent (figure 4.11). The relatively high
share of youth entrepreneurship among men reflects the
Source: WEF 2011. presence of an enormous entrepreneurial spirit combined
with a lack of employment opportunities. In compari-
son, self-employment among older generations is much
Compared with other Middle East and North African
higher, especially among men, ranging from 18 percent
countries, Tunisia’s performance is above average in
in rural areas to 22.7 percent in urban areas among
terms of innovation (see figure 4.10). The Global Com-
30–59 years olds (see annex 4, figure A4.5).
petitive Index, which ranks the competitiveness of 142
In contrast, self-employment among young women is
countries by several dimensions on a seven-level scale,
virtually nonexistent—2.2 percent in rural areas and 1.5
ranked Tunisia 40th, well before Morocco, 73rd; Alge-
percent in urban areas. These results are confirmed by
ria, 87th; Egypt, 94th; Jordan, 71st; and Lebanon, 89th
a regression analysis that controls for other factors (see
(WEF 2011). Tunisia also ranked better than Turkey
annex 4, table A4.6).26 The qualitative research shows
(59th), which is often considered a champion in compet-
that public and private investments in female entrepre-
itiveness. Tunisia’s recently approved microfinance leg-
neurship could lead to high returns and viable enterprises,
islation enables international microfinance institutions
to provide access to finance to previously underserviced
areas and communities and will likely introduce new and Figure 4.11. Youth Self-Employment—
innovative microfinance products. Rural Versus Urban
Stimulating economic innovation through the right
14 13.1
mix of targeted regulations and economic incentives
12
present policy challenges to most governments around
10
the world. Innovations can be loosely defined as any new Male
7.9
method, idea, or product, and permanent innovation is 8
percent

Female
largely considered an essential ingredient to economic 6

growth in modern economies. To better foster innova- 4

2.2
tion and entrepreneurship in high-performance sectors, 2 1.5
different approaches have been developed, which include 0
manufacturing complex products in innovation hubs; Rural Urban

supporting the vertical and horizontal integration of

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
the information and communication technology sector Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or training programs.
 Economic Opportunities | 51

especially in view of the limited opportunities for formal self-employment is a rare phenomenon, and even in the
employment. The combination of a wide array of market coastal region, which has the highest share of female
niches, relatively high education levels, and strong online self-employment, it only reaches 2.1 percent.
skills, would likely enable young women working from Almost all self-employed youth work without any
home or in offices or shops to create value-added busi- formal registration, leaving them without access to fi-
nesses. Women in rural and urban areas alike expressed nance and often vulnerable to exploitation and extortion
a strong interest in starting their own income-generating by police and other public officials. The fact that vir-
activities. As a young woman who received a microloan tually all self-employed youth work informally reflects
through the microfinance institution Enda indicated: the complexity of the administrative procedures and reg-
ulations that are required to register a small firm. The
It is comforting, especially for a young woman, to work qualitative research also shows widespread skepticism
for herself. Personally, I detest having a boss. I have of young people about the role of the public sector and
worked in a dry cleaner, in a taxi call center, and as a banks when it comes to supporting small businesses.
salesperson in a boutique. In each case, there was an
awful amount of pressure … no mercy. It was a shock The state should find a solution, but instead of encour-
for me to work in such circumstances. Now I work well aging us [to start a business], they put barriers in our
for myself after being unemployed for two years. Young way. Student of agriculture, 22 years. Zaghouan (coastal
self-employed woman in the informal sector, Tunis Tunisia)

Overall, self-employment is most common in the Graduates from 1992 or 1996 still haven’t been able
coastal region and in the south. The interior region has to find jobs. What remains? The private sector. I could
the lowest rate of youth self-employment, and only 8.1 tell you about the exploitation that happens there, the
percent of young men are self-employed (see figure 4.12). favoritism, the bribes. … People are at the end of their
In comparison, 12.1 percent of young men are self- tether. There is nothing else left [but to work for one-
employed in the coastal region and in the southern gov- self]. Male self-employed, Tunis
ernorates. As pointed out above, among young women,

Figure 4.12. Youth Entrepreneurship by Region

18
17.0
16

14
12.5 12.5
12 11.1
Male urban
percent

10
Male rural
8 Female urban
6.1 Female rural
6 5.1 5.1
4
2.2 2.0
2 1.3
0.9
0
0
Coast Interior South

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or training programs.
52 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 4.13. Barriers Faced by Youth in Establishing Small Businesses (Rural Tunisia)
100 93.7 95.4 94.5
90

80

70

60 Coast
percent

Interior
50 43.9 South
40 34.6 36.7
29.0 26.9
30 26.4

20
10.1 9.9 7.4
10 6.7 6.0
4.8 2.3 4.2 5.0
0
Finance Location Information Training Bureaucracy Corruption

Source: World Bank 2012d.

Note: Figure refers to all self-employed youth.

Self-employed youth struggle to gain access to Female entrepreneur and graduate in biomedical engi-
finance, which remains the main challenge in successfully neering. Tunis (coastal Tunisia)
establishing a business. The rural survey asked young en-
trepreneurs about the most significant difficulties in es- When credit agencies have a good idea presented to
tablishing a business. As figure 4.13 shows, “Access to them, they will have their own grounds for not giving
Finance” was considered the single most important bar- finance. Then they will sell the idea to someone else.
rier for young entrepreneurs in all regions—93.7 percent Hence, you will find the idea for a project in Zaghouan
in the coastal region, 95.4 percent in the interior region, resurfaces in Sousse. Unemployed graduate, Zaghouan
and 94.5 percent in the south. These results demonstrate (coastal Tunisia)
the higher barriers met by young entrepreneurs compared
with those encountered by firms in general. As indicated The amended microfinance law is bound to open fi-
by the recent report, “Investment Climate Assessment,” nancial market to new financial intermediaries and could
access to finance is also regarded as a major constraint provide more innovative products tailored to small
by 39 percent of small- and medium-size Tunisian firms firms led by youth. In July 2014, the National Assem-
(World Bank 2013j). bly amended the 2011 microfinance law with the aim of
Existing microfinance programs have limited reach strengthening the supervision and regulation of banking
and are widely perceived as inefficient. Specialized bank- institutions providing microfinance while opening the
ing products tailored to young people are largely absent, sector to international competition. This could mean
although the 2014 microfinance law is designed to fa- that up to half-a-dozen new institutions could begin of-
cilitate the increase of institutions offering new services, fering products within the coming months, with more to
such as savings, transfer, and insurance.27 The current follow. Increased competition will require providers of
lack of available finance for young entrepreneurs was microcredit to become more innovative and flexible in
mentioned in several focus group discussions. the design of their financial products, including collat-
eral, interest rates, delayed repayment plans, and other
When all of the other doors are closed, it is best to have aspects crucial to youth-led firms. To better manage risk
one’s own project, be one’s own boss, and realize one’s and portfolios, providers of financial products are also
dreams. But, there is a problem of finance, of markets. likely to target niche groups such as rural women or
 Economic Opportunities | 53

certain sectors such as small information and communi- or requests for bribery. Many self-employed youth,
cation technology firms. Nontraditional financing, such especially mobile street vendors and other more flexible
as crowd-funding, could complement the credit market microbusinesses, therefore chose to operate in locations
for Tunisia’s self-employed youth. However, while this away from their primary customer base. This issue is cru-
new law will have a rapid short-term impact on access to cial and at its heart is caused by regulations and rules
finance, in the rural areas, where most smaller microfi- designed under the old regime that were aimed at large
nance associations are located, it could also generate ad- firms. The resulting vulnerability of self-employed youth
verse effects on the market and on stability, which could should be urgently addressed, not only because it can be
mean young graduates may not have access to micro- argued that it triggered the Arab Spring throughout the
credit in the medium-term if their risk-pricing profile is region (De Soto 2012).
above the regulatory ceiling. Additional business training and enhanced access
However, one-third of all self-employed youth strug- to business information would be helpful to many self-
gle with the burden of bureaucracy, including the costs, employed youth. The survey results show that “limited
difficulties, and delays entailed in obtaining the required access to information,” as well as “needs for additional
licenses. The rural youth survey finds that bureaucracy skills training” are currently holding self-employed
represents a major challenge for more than one-third youth back (see figure 4.13). Business training is an
of self-employed youth in the coastal region (34.6 per- important field for youth investment, can be vitalized
cent), more than one-third in the south (36.7 percent), through public-private partnerships, and has the poten-
and more than one-quarter in the interior (26.9 percent), tial to strengthen local economies and to generate youth
as shown in figure 4.13. Especially for small businesses, employment.
bureaucracy represents a high burden because these
firms tend to lack the means to employ qualified staff Skill Levels of Self-Employed Youth
to process the administrative requirements. As a conse-
The education levels of self-employed youth are very low,
quence, high levels of bureaucracy induce small firms
and most have not completed secondary education. Ed-
to remain informal. Put another way, the bureaucratic
ucation levels are the lowest in rural areas where most
burden imposes a de facto tax on the competitiveness
self-employed youth left school before reaching sec-
of firms and forces businesses to use informal credit and
ondary education (83.0 percent). About one out of 10
to work without licenses (De Soto 2012). These findings
self-employed youth in rural Tunisia do not have any
are confirmed by the recent Tunisia Investment Climate
Assessment, which indicates that firms spend about 13
Figure 4.14. Youth Entrepreneurship by Education
percent of annual sales to address regulations (World
Bank 2013j). This expense reflects the cumulative cost 100 3.6 4.8
of interacting with the administration and includes com- 0 0 10.7 17.1
14.2 8.7 6.4
pliance time. 80 7.2 3.5
Vocational training
Driven by informality, many self-employed youth 31.1
39.3 23.4 University
27.3 Secondary
operate their businesses in unfavorable locations to 60
percent

Middle school
avoid fines and extortion, very much like the self- Primary
40
employed young man from Tunisia’s interior who trig- 41.1 33.0 39.5 Below Primary
41.8
gered the Arab Spring. Business location is the main con- 20
cern among half of self-employed youth in the southern 10.0
10.0 14.1
governorates (43.9 percent), followed by the interior 0 6.5 6.6
Rural Rural Urban Urban
region (29.0 percent), and the coastal region (26.4 per- male female male female
cent), as shown in figure 4.13. The qualitative research
highlights that youth attempt to avoid problems with Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure refers to all self-employed youth and excludes youth in educa-
law enforcement, which can reportedly lead to fines tion and training.
54 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 4.15. Youth Entrepreneurship in firms operate in productive sectors. While specific busi-
Low-Productivity Sectors ness activities were not addressed in the survey, this sug-
gests that about one-third of firms that are run by young
80
68.8 Tunisians are in fields with growth potential.
70
60.1 58.9
Half of young entrepreneurs operate small businesses
60 57.2
in the service sector, including modern information and
50
communication technologies—45.4 percent in rural areas
percent

Male
40 and 52.1 percent in urban areas (see figure 4.16). The pri-
Female
30 oritization of services is important for future growth since
20 services provide the backbone of modern economies and
10 are essential for endogenous growth. A growing num-
0 ber of young and mostly urban Tunisian entrepreneurs
Rural Urban are targeting Internet and smartphone users. This young
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. wave of entrepreneurs holds enormous potential because
Note: Figure refers to all self-employed youth. of the high productivity environment in which these firms
operate, allowing for rapid firm growth and job creation.
The versatility of many information technology products
formal education (see figure 4.14). In urban areas, av-
favors export. The most common examples are smart-
erage education levels are only slightly higher, although
phone apps, which can be sold worldwide. Technology
some university graduates operate small firms in urban
firms have started to spring up all over the Middle East
areas, especially young men (6.4 percent). Overall, it ap-
and North Africa Region (Schroeder 2013).
pears that self-employment is mostly driven by economic
Modern technology makes it easier for young women
exclusion from employment opportunities, especially
to start businesses and generate incomes. Working
among youth with low levels of education. These find-
mostly in Arabic, women-owned technology firms help
ings are also supported by a regression analysis of self-
families achieve a work-life balance, offer collaborating
employment, which shows that the lack of secondary and
crowd-sharing platforms, and sell products to women.
tertiary education are key factors in increasing the prob-
Nevertheless, challenges remain because it is more difficult
ability of being self-employed (see annex 4, table A4.6).
for young women to obtain credit than men and because
Most young entrepreneurs work in low-productivity
women are constrained by social norms. The Internet
sectors with limited economic returns. However, 30–40
opens young people’s minds to possibilities, and youth-
percent of young entrepreneurs work in high-productiv-
led firms from Tunisia will be important in that regard.
ity sectors, demonstrating the potential of entrepreneur-
In rural areas, 36.4 percent of young entrepreneurs
ship.28 Low-productivity sectors are characterized by low
work in agriculture and food processing; the rate is 10.8
return on investments, which limit the ability of young
percent in urban areas. The agricultural sector has sig-
entrepreneurs to obtain the necessary resources to ex-
nificant potential for young entrepreneurs. Nevertheless,
pand and grow. Many firms in low-productivity sectors
qualitative research emphasizes that the aspirations of
face difficulties in growing beyond small- or medium-size
young entrepreneurs to develop family farms are often
enterprises. Even though some low-productivity firms
thwarted by a lack of finance.
manage to survive for the relatively long-term, they tend
to face many challenges and struggle with low returns.
It would be good to give work to people here and par-
In rural Tunisia, 67.5 percent of all youth entrepreneurs
ticipate in the development of the village, but the con-
work in low-productivity sectors; the rate is 57.3 percent
ditions are difficult. To get credit, one needs property as
in urban areas (see figure 4.15). Nonetheless, the survey
collateral, or one’s own funds. But we are poor. Male
data show that even though almost 90 percent of young
school dropout, Mahdia (coastal Tunisia)
entrepreneurs are unskilled, some 30–40 percent of their
 Economic Opportunities | 55

Figure 4.16. Entrepreneurship by Sector

a. Rural b. Urban

4.8% Agriculture 1.4% Agriculture

10.8%
Construction Construction
Industry and Industry and
manufacturing manufacturing
Services 14.7% Services
36.4%
Public sector Public sector

45.4% 52.1%

20.9%
6.3%
7.1%

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all self-employed youth.

One in five young urban entrepreneurs works in man- become formally established. New innovation hubs and
ufacturing and industry (20.9 percent) compared with cyber parks, including business incubators and work-
only 7.9 percent of rural entrepreneurs. This difference is spaces that regularly conduct competitive startups with
a reflection of the disparity in investments between rural investors, have begun to generate success stories that
and urban Tunisia, itself a driver of the higher levels of inspire young entrepreneurs (Yaros 2012). Online net-
unemployment and inactivity in rural Tunisia (World works help to bring people together and provide addi-
Bank 2013b). tional training and mentorship to young entrepreneurs,
especially in rural areas where face-to-face meetings and
Youth Entrepreneurship: Challenges and trainings are costly to organize (World Bank 2013e).
Investment Opportunities Online training can help self-employed youth gain
skills not taught in schools and universities (La Cava et
al. 2011). By teaching business skills, financial literacy,
It feels good to work, especially for oneself. Personally, I
marketing, and languages such as English and French,
hate to work for a boss. I worked in a laundry, in a taxi
online platforms provide bottom-up solutions. Platforms
phone line, and as a salesgirl in a shop. There is always
including MobiWorks, MobiSouk, and Ta3mal help to
a lot of pressure, and never any consideration for the
overcome the structural shortcomings of Tunisia’s edu-
employee. No mercy. It really shocked me. Now, after
cation system, which yields too few science, math, and
two years unemployed, with my family pressuring me to
informatics graduates for a modern economy.29 Online
work, I have a profession and the work is good. Female
learning can bring quality education to more people, in-
informal sector worker, Tunis (coastal Tunisia)
cluding adults, and especially to young women. How-
ever, the digital divide—diminished Internet access in
Tunisia’s young entrepreneurs could benefit from
rural areas—may be a barrier to online training.
local innovation hubs to create an environment con-
ducive to business and to help informal entrepreneurs
56 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Notes played by wealth in employment determination suggests that family wealth

is playing a key role.
1. Employment is defined as paid work. The quantitative results are based on 16. For this report, productivity is classified by sector. Sectors with pre-
survey questions inquiring about recent employment history. dominantly high productivity firms include trade, communications, tourism
2. These employment statistics exclude youth enrolled in education or train- (hotels and restaurants), banks and insurance companies, social and cul-
ing programs. tural services, and real estate services. Sectors with mostly low-productiv-
ity firms include primary economic activities—e.g., agriculture and fishing,
3. The regression analysis simultaneously controls for differences in age, ed-
food industry, building materials, ceramics and glass, mechanical, chemical
ucational level, parental background, and regional disparities. The potential
and electrical industries, textile and shoes industries, other industries, con-
endogeneity of the variable suggests that not too much weight be placed on
struction and public works, mines and energy, transportation, repair, and
the coefficient values related to household wealth.
manufacturing.
4. The term “Jasmine Revolution,” is arguably a misnomer, as it refers to the
17. See annex 4, figure A4.2 on adult employment in low-productivity
plant from the relatively lush and prosperous northern coast. Instead, Ayeb
sectors.
argues that “Alfa Grass Revolution” might be a better term, based on the
plant growing in Tunisia’s interior region. 18. Skilled jobs are defined as requiring at least a secondary school degree
or vocational training.
5. The concept of the direct family includes children, spouse, and parents of
the household head. 19. For a more detailed analysis, refer to World Bank 2014.
6. This finding resonates with the conclusion of the recent MENA Devel- 20. For many youth, particularly those still in school or interested in search-
opment Report on gender equality (World Bank 2013h). These findings are ing the job market, part-time work can be an optimal choice and should be
further supported by the regression results on different forms of employment encouraged. However, qualitative research shows that youth usually do not
reported in annex 4. choose part-time work.
7. One survey question asked: “Do you think women searching for work in 21. Based on Gallup Data reported in AfDB 2012a.
the private/public sector are discriminated against?” 22. Only 4.3 percent of rural and 2.2 percent of urban young Tunisians plan
8. There is an argument in favor of fixed-term contracts since the increased to work in the public sector.
flexibility could enable employers to increase hiring of youth. However, 23. Agriculture could become an important source of growth and youth
without access to social protection, fixed-term contracts are widely per- employment, especially in the fertile northern parts of Tunisia. Supporting
ceived by youth as exploitative. labor-intensive crop production for the many small farmers in the interior
9. See annex 4, figure A4.1 on contract type of employed adults (aged regions could also help to reduce regional disparities. In addition, Tunisia
30–59). could take advantage of existing opportunities for agricultural exports to the
European Union, which does not subsidize its fruit and vegetable production.
10. While originally intended to protect workers, it can be argued that
labor regulations have encouraged informality. To allow greater flexibil- 24. See annex 4, figure A4.3 on sector of employment of employed adults
ity in adapting staffing to economic conditions, fixed-term contracts were (aged 30–59).
introduced in the early 2000s. Fixed-term contracts can be used to hire 25. Tourism is included in the service sector.
workers under flexible short-term contracts, which are renewable for up to 26. In addition to gender, the Probit model of self-employment controls for
four years. For workers, such contracts provide only a limited improvement age, family background, and region.
compared with informal employment since both are characterized by high
27. Chapter 5 presents a more extensive review of existing microfinance
job insecurity. In addition, because of the flexibility allowed by fixed-term
programs.
contracts, firms tend to avoid open-ended contracts for new hires altogether.
28. Low productivity sectors include agriculture and fishing, food industry,
11. For a detailed discussion of recommended labor market reforms, please
building materials, ceramics and glass, mechanical, chemical and electrical
see World Bank 2013c.
industries, textile and shoes industries, other industries, construction and
12. The Probit estimation includes controls for differences in age, educa- public work, mines and energy, transportation, repair, and manufacturing.
tional level, parental background, and regional disparities. High productivity sectors include trade, communications, hotels and restau-
13. Ages 15–24. rants, banks and insurance companies, social and cultural services, and real
14. The total number of students is expected to peak in 2014 at 449,000. estate services.
15. As before, the model controls for gender, age, parental background, and 29. For more details, see, for example, [Link].
region. Once again, the potential endogeneity of wealth may play a role.

Chapter 5
However, the size and strength of the relationship, as well as the weaker role
Skills for Employment and
Other Youth Services
58 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

These [employment] programs are the tools of a policy aimed at calming a

people in rebellion who are demanding work. They are not a durable solution.
Unemployed male, Jendouba, North West Tunisia

This chapter provides an overview of access to economic 5.1 Programs of the Ministry of
opportunities through Active Labor Market Programs Professional Training and
(ALMPs) offered by the Ministry of Professional Train- Employment
ing and Employment (MVTE) and other available youth
In response to youth unemployment and inactivity, the
services. It also presents young people’s perceptions re-
MVTE has put in place a number of ALMPs aimed at
garding the benefits and quality of the programming. The
easing young people’s labor market transition. The Na-
effectiveness of the programs is assessed both in terms of
tional Agency for Employment and Independent Work
their impact on employability and social inclusion. A set
(ANETI) is responsible for implementing the largest em-
of recommendations is presented to make existing youth
ployment programs and services in the country. Specifi-
programming and services more effective and inclusive.
cally, ANETI is responsible for:
Tunisia has invested a substantial share of its gross do-
• providing general guidance for jobseekers,
mestic product (GDP) for ALMPs, but beneficiaries con-
• providing jobseekers with information about em-
sider the benefits from these programs limited. ALMPs
ployment opportunities,
accounted for almost one percent of GDP in 2011, the
• matching jobseekers with open positions,
highest in the Middle East and North Africa at the time
• implementing Active Labor Market Programs, and
of the revolution, lately stabilizing at around 0.5 percent • promoting small businesses and supporting
(World Bank 2013c). These programs are not well known self-employment.
to most young Tunisians. Youth participation in the pro-
grams is fairly low and, most importantly, the programs ANETI falls under the MVTE and has 91 offices dis-
tend to be primarily focused on urban areas along the tributed over Tunisia’s 24 governorates. Its budget was
coast. Few programs are available to youth in the interior TND 420 million (US$ (PPP) 579 million) in 2012. In
and southern regions, reinforcing spatial disparities. total, these programs currently support around 270,000
The majority of ALMPs are tailored for young grad- job seekers each year (World Bank 2013c). The number
uates. The current bias toward graduates should be re- of beneficiaries has more than doubled in five years, and
vised to ensure that young Tunisians without university ANETI is currently planning to further expand its activ-
degrees—particularly young people who are not in ed- ities (World Bank 2013c). ANETI employs nearly 900
ucation, employment, or training (NEETs)—can have employment councilors—more than 70 percent of them
equitable access to programs tailored to their needs and are helping university graduates (Abaab 2012). On aver-
labor market opportunities. In 2011, university grad- age, Tunisia’s employment councilors are responsible for
uates accounted for 66 percent of the total number of 1,200 unemployed youth, which is far above the ratio of
beneficiaries, while youth with limited education, that about 100 job seekers per councilor recommended by the
constitute the largest group of youth without work, ac- International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Abaab 2012).
counted for about 34 percent. In absolute terms, young ANETI’s programs aim to prepare job seekers for the
Tunisians without work and lacking a secondary or uni- job market and place them in employment through a
versity degree is about 3.5 times larger than the number combination of on-the-job training, employer incentives,
of university graduates. subsidized social security coverage, and small monthly
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 59

stipends. Most of these programs are focused on unem- provides useful lessons for rethinking ALMPs in
ployed graduates.1 Many of ANETI’s programs overlap Tunisia, particularly to avoid costly subsidies with
or have similar approaches. In addition, there is a gen- limited impact on employability. It is nevertheless
eralized lack of program coherence or monitoring and worth noting that AMAL was a transition pro-
evaluation of programs.2 ANETI’s monitoring system gram, which was later adjusted to serve disadvan-
is not results-based and only provides data on take-up taged youth. No evidence is available to measure
rates—i.e., outputs. There have been some attempts to the results of that program (Abaab 2012, 23).
evaluate ANETI’s employment programs, but the results • Professional Internship Program (SIVP)3 subsidizes
are outdated, sporadic, donor driven, and lack scientific the costs of hiring university graduates in firms
credibility (World Bank 2013c). and targets university graduates who remain job
Ninety percent of ANETI beneficiaries have enrolled seekers six months after graduation. The program
in one of its three main programs (World Bank 2013b). seeks to introduce educated first-time job seekers
• AMAL (meaning “hope” in Arabic) was originally to the labor market by placing them in internships
designed to provide unemployed university degree- with a stipend, which usually run for a year. SIVP
holders with employment services for up to 12 is among the largest of the Tunisian ALMPs, with
months. Launched by the interim government in almost 47,000 beneficiaries in 2011, of which
response to the 2011 revolution, AMAL quickly about 60 percent were young women. The pro-
became the largest of ANETI’s schemes; it has since gram gives beneficiaries a stipend of TND 300/
been discontinued because it was unsustainable. month (US$ (PPP) 414/month) and covers social
The program was expected to offer beneficiaries security contributions as well as up to 200 hours of
career coaching, training in hard and soft skills, training costs (World Bank 2012b). SIVP beneficia-
on-the-job training, job search assistance, and a ries are heavily concentrated in coastal/industrial
monthly stipend of TND 200 (US$ (PPP) 275.70). regions. Most SIVP contracts are signed in Tunis
While originally designed as an activation program, (25 percent), followed by Ariana and Sfax (10 per-
in practice, AMAL primarily provided cash assis- cent each). An evaluation of SIVP’s performance
tance to unemployed graduates. Design flaws and revealed that program beneficiaries have very low
conditions that were difficult to enforce meant that rates of job insertion after program completion (at
incentives to search for jobs and accept job offers 23.7 percent in 2010) (World Bank 2012b).
were actually reduced (Robalino et al. 2013). The • Labor Market Access and Employability Program
program was designed to offer participants a sti- (CAIP)4 began in January 2009 for graduates
pend of TND 200 (US$ (PPP) 275.70)—equivalent and nongraduates. CAIP is Tunisia’s third largest
to 80 percent of the minimum wage—and a series ALMP program with approximately 40,000 ben-
of services, ranging from training in life and tech- eficiaries annually, of which about 90 percent are
nical skills, counseling, job search assistance, and nongraduates. CAIP pays small monthly stipends
wage subsidies. In practice, only 20,000 partici- of TND 100 (US$ (PPP) 138) plus social security
pants received the stipend along with various ser- coverage. Essentially, CAIP provides subsidies to
vices, while an additional 120,000 only received the hire unskilled and blue-collar workers. The pro-
stipend. The program design did not recognize the gram was designed to provide capacity training to
capacity constraints of ANETI that prevented the assist young Tunisians in gaining professional qual-
implementation of the coaching and internships in ifications to further their employment prospects by
the private sector. The lack of technical leadership tailoring training to specific jobs. In reality, such
at the central and local levels and the absence of trainings rarely take place (World Bank 2013c). Al-
meaningful coordination between the implement- though the rate of insertion of CAIP is by far the
ing agency ANETI and the MVTE made matters highest among the ALMPs, the rate of termination
worse (Abaab 2012). Discontinued in 2013, AMAL of contracts also remains very high. The main reason
60 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

given by companies and union leaders is the lack • Fifty Percent Wage Subsidy Program8 aims to en-
of appropriate skills and limited matching between courage private companies to hire first-time job
candidates and firms, which is done by ANETI. Ad- seekers with a university degree by paying half of
ditional training for young workers could be help- their wage up to a maximum of TND250 (US$
ful to fill skill gaps between unemployed youth and (PPP) 344.63) per month for up to 12 months. The
available vacancies (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2012). program is limited to regional development zones
(as defined in the Investment Code) and only ap-
ANETI also manages a number of smaller programs plies to new firms active in certain high value-added
with overlapping objectives and youth beneficiary activities with a strong knowledge component. The
categories. Fifty Percent Wage Subsidy Program is a relatively
• Voluntary Civil Service (SCV)5 subsidizes the small program with only about 500 graduates in
costs of hiring university graduates in civil soci- 2011.
ety organizations. The program arranges up to 12
months of work placements, providing a monthly In 2012, a decree was passed to fundamentally amend
stipend of TND 200 (US$ (PPP) 276). In 2011, all ALMPs under ANETI and to introduce a “wage
the program had about 8,000 participants (Angel- voucher” and a “training voucher,” effectively merging
Urdinola et al. 2012). Associations do not have to all existing programs into two interventions.9 In principle,
meet any quality criteria to participate in the pro- the decree allows ANETI to subcontract with nongovern-
gram. Indeed, most associations that participate mental (NGOs) and private providers for the provision of
are very small, often with low capacity, which re- employment services, including intermediation and soft-
duces the attractiveness of the program (Angel-Ur- skills training, and it introduces a mandate to promote
dinola et al. 2012). better monitoring and evaluation for ALMPs. This new
• Employment Program for Graduates of Higher regulatory framework for ANETI signals some positive
Education (CIDES)6 targets university graduates evolution and simplification of ALMPs in Tunisia. How-
who have been unemployed for more than two ever, the slow implementation of the reform raises ques-
years. The program subsidizes wages and provides tions as to the level of commitment to pursue this reform
monthly stipends of TDN 150 (US$ (PPP) 207) for by decision makers and other immediate stakeholders.
internships and jobs (World Bank 2012b). In addi- Apart from ANETI, several parallel programs exist,
tion to the stipends, the program pays part of the such as the Employment Solidarity Program (CES),10
employer’s contribution to social security for up which includes Labor Intensive Public Works. Together
to seven years, contributing a declining share over with a number of regional programs, CES is funded
time. The program reached about 3,000 beneficia- through the Fund 21–21 of the MVTE. CES provides
ries in 2011. In theory, employers are required to short-term jobs for young Tunisians who have left
hire beneficiaries after program completion, but in school. It does not target one specific group of unem-
practice, placement rates are very low—21 percent ployed individuals. Instead, CES aims to integrate the
in 2010. unemployed within the framework of regional and local
• Youth Back-to-Work Program7 provides benefi- employment promotion initiatives. The largest CES ac-
ciaries with a monthly stipend of TND 200 (US$ tivity provides short-term labor-intensive employment
(PPP) 276) and additional social security coverage. in public works projects, which supported about 14,000
The program further covers the costs of up to 200 youth in 2010 (World Bank 2012b). The program also
hours of training and associated travel costs. The includes a number of smaller initiatives targeted at un-
program is relatively small, with only about 1,000 skilled youth. However, many CES programs lack co-
interns in 2011, and operates mainly in the cities herence with other programs. Some CES instruments
of Monastir and Tunis. Most (approximately 90 overlap extensively with existing ANETI programs—e.g.,
percent) participants are nongraduates. internship programs for young graduates—while others
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 61

duplicate similar programs implemented by the Minis- responsibility of vocational training. Its budget is TND
try of Regional Development and other donors—e.g., 200 million (US$ (PPP) 276 million), all from public
Labor Intensive Public Works. There have been cases of funds. ATFP manages 137 training centers across all of
public works projects that were never completed or that Tunisia’s governorates, including specialized centers for
have paid wages to workers who did not show up for training in particular sectors—e.g., construction, elec-
work. In addition, there is evidence that CES programs tronics, mechanics, tourism, and textiles (48 centers)—
do not have clear governance frameworks or procedures as well as centers for apprenticeship (61), young rural
or transparent allocation of funds (World Bank 2013c). women (15), for crafts (13). These centers train around
CES programs largely lack monitoring and do not gener- 60,000 students per year and employ about 7,300 staff.
ally cross-reference beneficiaries with ANETI records, al- ATFP offers a range of training, including (1) residential
lowing some individuals to simultaneously benefit from courses at training centers; (2) apprenticeship agreements
various programs. The long-term labor market impact of involving a company, with the apprentice spending up to
public works programs can be insignificant, and research a half of his or her time in training; and (3) courses tai-
has found a stigma attached to public works jobs, which lored to the industry of a particular region.
may decrease the employability of participants over the Figure 5.1 illustrates the 2011 distribution of young
long run (Robalino et al. 2013). Alternative approaches beneficiaries of ALMPs. The majority were university
for a scalable project design to activate unemployed graduates—66 percent versus 33 percent of less-educated
youth without a secondary education—mostly NEETs— youth. The number of beneficiaries was higher than
is presented in the following chapter. average in 2011 because of the large coverage of the now
Apart from ANETI, the Tunisian government also discontinued AMAL program. Nevertheless, the figure
implements a number of training programs through the provides a good basis for comparing youth beneficiaries
Tunisian Agency for Professional Training (ATFP).11 by category.
ATFP was established in 1993 under the MVTE with the

Figure 5.1. Beneficiaries of Programs Financed by the FNE (2011)

450,000
405,500
400,000

350,000

300,000 Mainly targeted to high-skilled youth

250,000
Mainly targeted to low-skilled individuals
200,000
155,000
150,000
113,500
100,000 90,000

50,000 30,000
17,000
0
AMAL progam ANETI Microcredits Regional employment ANETI Total
(programs to promote programs (coaching for
insertion into entrepreneurship)
wage employment)

Source: National Employment Fund 2011.

62 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 5.2. Awareness of Active Labor Market Figure 5.3. Awareness of Active Labor Market
Programs—Urban Versus Rural Programs, by Education

AMAL AMAL
100%
50%
CES Regional 80%
40% SCV
CES Regional Program 60%
SCV
Program 30% 40%
20% 20%
0%
10%
Public works SIVP
0%

Public works SIVP

Nongraduate rural
Other employment CAIP Nongraduate urban
programs
Rural Graduate urban
Other employment CAIP Urban
programs
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure refers to all youth who are not in education or training. The
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. rural sample does not include sufficient graduates to allow a comparison.
Note: Figure refers to all youth.

Perceptions of Active Labor Market Programs under CES, the regional development program (35.2 per-
cent).13 Awareness of programs by young Tunisians does
Overall, it appears that limited knowledge about most
not vary much by region or gender, although youth in the
ANETI programs leads to very low rates of participa-
rural south have an increased awareness of the Labor In-
tion by eligible youth. One-third of youth think that they
tensive Public Works Program (see annex 5, figure A5.1).
are not eligible for these programs, and more than one-
The awareness of young urban nongraduates of
quarter do not know how to register, according to recent
employment programs is very low, even for the few pro-
survey results presented below.12 Lack of information on
grams that are open to nongraduates. Only one out of
how to register seems even more problematic in the case
five young urban Tunisians without a university degree is
of programs that are not managed nationally.
familiar with the Labor Intensive Public Works Program
Awareness of existing programs is very low, espe-
(20.4 percent), and only one out of 10 knows about
cially in rural areas. Few of the programs designed to
CAIP (10.1 percent), as shown in figure 5.3. Other pro-
support unemployed youth in their search for employ-
grams, including AMAL, SIVP, and SCV are much bet-
ment are known to more than one-quarter of young
ter known by young graduates. Importantly, programs
respondents (see figure 5.2). Even the largest program,
that are open for young Tunisians without a university
AMAL, which provided wage subsidies for unemployed
degree, such as Labor Intensive Public Works or CAIP,
university graduates, was only known by 42.5 percent of
are largely unfamiliar to their target group in both rural
urban respondents and a meager 20.5 percent of rural
and urban Tunisia.
youth. Similarly, SIVP, another program that subsidizes
Overall, young people who know about ALMPs have
wages for unemployed graduates, was only known by
a very low assessment of these programs, as reflected in
33.2 percent of young urban respondents and by 19.5
the qualitative analysis. Programs, including AMAL, are
percent of young rural Tunisians. CAIP, which targets
seen as a kind of sinecure implemented for political rea-
nongraduates, remains largely unknown: only 10.7 per-
sons. Youth have little faith in the programs. They are
cent of urban youth and 21.1 percent of rural youth have
considered ineffective and even as “a sham” and a pan-
heard of the program. The two best-known programs in
acea designed to artificially reduce the number of unem-
rural areas are the Labor Intensive Public Works Pro-
ployed (Abaab 2012).
gram (35.2 percent) and other ALMP activities provided
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 63

I haven’t tried them [programs]. I no longer have any Participation in Active Labor Market Programs
confidence in the state. Even when there is a good job
The participation level in the programs is very low.
going, those who work in the employment bureau sell it
Barely one in 10 youth interviewed ever participated in
dear. Male unemployed graduate, Mahdi, Tunisa coast
a major program such as AMAL or SIVP. Overall pro-
gram take-up is low in urban areas, and even lower in
I know many people who have jobs thanks to influence
rural areas (see figure 5.4). The programs with the high-
with contacts or parents working at the employment
est take-up were AMAL (11.0 percent in urban areas and
bureau. Female department head in bank, 28, Tunis
9.8 percent in rural areas), SIVP (12.1 percent in urban
areas and 8.0 percent in rural areas), and SCV (3.9 per-
Public Works and SIVP courses are not far-reach-
cent in urban areas and 11.5 percent in rural areas). All
ing solutions. There is a big difference between public
of these programs targeted university graduates, which
works, training, or the AMAL program, and for exam-
explains why the overall youth participation, comprised
ple, the establishment of a factory, which might employ
of less educated youth, is so low. A further breakdown
700 people. Male student, Gafsa, South Tunisia by region shows that among other programs, including
the regional program, CES had their highest take-up in
Young people consider employers, especially the pri- the rural coastal region and virtually no take-up in the
vate sector, to be the main beneficiaries of active employ- rural interior and the rural south, further reinforcing
ment programs. Wage subsidies are largely considered to regional disparities (see annex 5, figure A5.2).
be providing disincentives for firms to permanently hire Young people who participated in youth training pro-
unemployed youth. In particular, subsidies can lead to a grams complained in interviews of overcrowded classes,
further expansion of exploitative practices, as indicated old and obsolete equipment, poor administration, and
by a young respondent. lack of opportunities after the completion of training. A
school dropout, currently working on his family’s farm,
What does the company do? It profits from the system described his attempts to obtain further training:
to recruit personnel under SIVP, pays them miserably,
dismisses them at the end of the contract, and sends the In the welding workshop, there were eight welding sta-
money gained out of the country. Unemployed male tions for 35 people. The trainer did not convey any in-
graduate, Zaghouan, North-East Tunisia formation. There were no work materials available. It’s

Figure 5.4. Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs—Urban Versus Rural

14
12
Rural
10
Urban
8
percent

6
4
2
0
AMAL SCV SIVP CAIP Other Public works CES
employment Regional
programs Program

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth.
64 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 5.5. Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by Education

40
35
30
25 Nongraduate rural
percent

Nongraduate urban
20 Graduate urban
15
10
5
0
AMAL SCV SIVP CAIP Other Public works CES
employment Regional
programs Program

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth who are not in education or training. The rural sample does not include sufficient graduates to allow a comparison.

nothing unusual—lots of things like that affect trainees. the time of the 2012 survey, which is much lower than the
… Half of us abandoned the course before the end. average rate of employment (see figure 5.6). In compar-
Male school dropout, 23, Sidi Bouzid, interior Tunisia ison, 24.2 percent of previous urban SIVP participants
were working at the time of the survey. While the data do
After the revolution, urban university graduates en- not allow a causal analysis, the correlations suggest that
rolled in considerable numbers in the largest programs— the SIVP apprenticeship program was substantially more
AMAL and SIVP. More than one in three young urban effective in improving employability when compared
graduates (37.2 percent) said they had participated in with the largely untargeted cash transfers of AMAL.14
AMAL and over one-quarter (26.5 percent) in SIVP (see If anything, AMAL appears to have reduced the chances
figure 5.5). About 6.2 percent had, in fact, participated for employment among registered youth.
in both programs. Other programs for graduates are less
subscribed, such as SCV (6.6 percent). Surprisingly, a Benefits from Active Labor Market Programs
large number of nongraduate youth reported that they
had participated in major programs designed for gradu- It is difficult to assess the impact of these labor market
ates, such as AMAL (4.5 percent in urban areas and 8.2 programs, both because of a lack of systematic moni-
percent in rural areas) and SIVP (11.3 percent urban areas toring data and the issue of attribution. The attribution
and 7.0 percent in rural areas), raising questions about problem occurs because a graduate may have obtained
the targeting mechanism and financial management of a given job without a program. Reported labor market
the graduate-only programs. The limited design of these insertion rates vary between sources and are not based
programs was also revealed in qualitative research, which on a causal analysis but rather on self-reported survey
found that most programs are perceived merely as politi- results. Insertion rates vary between 10–20 percent
cal tools mainly benefitting the private sector. for the three main programs—CAIP, CIDES, and SIVP
Take-up of Tunisia’s ALMPs is relatively high, but (Abaab 2012).
little is known about their impact on employability and The cost per successfully placed beneficiary is high
job placement. For example, only 8.2 percent of previous for most programs, and in some cases extremely high.
participants of AMAL in urban areas were employed by For example, SIVP cost TND 9,000 (US$ (PPP) 12,407)
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 65

Figure 5.6. Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by NEET

30
25 Non-NEET rural
Non-NEET urban
20 NEET rural
percent

15 NEET urban

10
5
0
AMAL SCV SIVP CAIP Other Public works CES
employment Regional
programs Program
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure refers to all youth.

per successful placement (Abaab 2012). ALMPs need 5.2 Entrepreneurship Programs
to be implemented more effectively to address the mis-
match between inactivity and skills. Indeed, with more Youth entrepreneurship can play an important role in
addressing youth exclusion while strengthening income
and more potential workers becoming discouraged and
generation and reducing youth unemployment. Pilot
remaining out of the labor force, the risk of skills deg-
projects have recently been launched throughout the
radation and obsolescence is increasing. However, the
Middle East and North Africa Region, including Tuni-
fiscal impacts of such extensive programs have serious
sia (see for example, Premand et al. 2012). While many
macroeconomic implications for a small economy such
of these projects show important impacts, they focus
as Tunisia’s. Even in Organisation for Economic Coop-
mainly on university graduates and other skilled youth.
eration and Development (OECD) countries, which tend
However, disadvantaged youth without a secondary
to have relatively advanced institutions and practices in
education, who, overall, constitute the largest share of
this respect, an average of less than 0.6 percent of GDP
NEETs in rural and urban areas, do not have access to
was spent on ALMP measures in 2011 (ILO 2013).
many of the programs. Many of these young women and
Available evidence shows that most ALMPs, such as men already have entrepreneurial experience in the infor-
AMAL and SIVP, are largely regressive and primarily mal sector, and additional training can empower disad-
support better-off youth mostly with higher education. vantaged youth to develop thriving firms.
The vast majority of programs systematically exclude A number of programs are designed to support entre-
NEETs and young Tunisians with less education, many preneurs or potential entrepreneurs. ANETI administers
of whom come from poorer backgrounds, even though the Program for Small Enterprises (Program d’accom-
they constitute over three-quarters of the unemployed pagnement des promoteurs des petites entreprises or
youth population. In the absence of any rigorous at- PAPPE), which is focused on the self-employed and is
tempt to evaluate the impact of Tunisia’s large ALMPs, open to both graduates and nongraduates. The pro-
basic correlation analysis suggests that AMAL—the gram provides loans of up to TND 100,000 (US$ (PPP)
country’s largest program—has made the employability 137,850) per project; although the average loan size in
of it participants worse.15 Employment rates of previ- 2011 was TND 247 (US$ (PPP) 340.50). In addition,
ous AMAL beneficiaries are substantially lower than the the PAPPE program provides coaching and support in
average employment rate among Tunisian youth. Place- project design and the development of business plans as
ment rates of SIVP appear somewhat higher, although it well as the possibility of a practical internship with a
remains unclear if the program creates any net benefits firm for up to a year. A monthly stipend of TND 100
to participants. (US$ (PPP) 137.85) is provided for nongraduates for up
66 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

to 12 months. The stipend for university graduates is percent, the National Fund For the Promotion of Craft
twice that amount. The program reportedly had 17,000 and Small Entrepreneurs (Fonds National de Promotion
beneficiaries in 2011 (World Bank 2013c). de l’Artisanat et des Petits Métiers or FONAPRA)—33.9
The Tunisian Solidarity Bank (BTS)16 also manages percent, the National Solidarity Fund (Fonds National
microcredit and entrepreneurship programs. These pro- de Solidarité or FNS)—34.1 percent, microloans offered
grams provide concessional loans to prospective entre- by BTS—36.5 percent, and other microloans—36.2
preneurs, including youth, either directly or through percent. In urban areas, on the other hand, only FNS
associations. The program of direct loans provides credit (56.9 percent) and BTS’s microloans (42.4 percent) are
of up to TND 100,000 (US$ (PPP) 137,850) repayable well known. As for the remaining programs, less than
between six months and seven years, with a grace period one-quarter of urban youth is aware of FONAPRA (23.5
of between six months and three years, and an interest rate percent), only one-fifth knows about microloans other
of five percent (Abaab 2012). The operational objectives than BTS’s loans (20.5 percent), and only one out of
of the BTS include: (1) facilitation of access to finance nine are familiar with PAPPE (11.3 percent). Young Tu-
for small developers with limited resources and without nisians’ levels of awareness about the programs do not
bank guarantees; and (2) financing of income-generating differ much by region, with the exception of youth in
projects and job creation in different sectors—e.g., small the rural south who seem to have a higher awareness of
trades, crafts, agriculture, and services across the country PAPPE compared with their peers. But at the same time,
(rural and urban) (Abaab 2012). they have a lower awareness of microloans, other than
BTS’s loans (see annex 5, figure A5.3).
Perceptions of Entrepreneurship Programs Awareness of programs is very low among young
urban Tunisians without university degrees. Most entre-
Awareness of existing entrepreneurship programs exceeds
preneurship programs are much better known by young
that of ALMP programs but remains low. As shown by fig-
graduates than by youth without university degrees, as
ure 5.7, approximately one-third of rural youth is aware
shown by figure 5.8. The difference in awareness of these
of entrepreneurship programs such as PAPPE—34.0
programs is lowest for other microloan programs (10.3
percentage points) and highest for BTS microloans (23.4
Figure 5.7. Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs— percentage points). Awareness among nongraduates in
Urban Versus Rural rural areas is consistently high at around one-third, while
among urban nongraduates, the FNS especially is known
Program for by more than half of all respondents (53.0 percent).
Small Enterprises
(PAPPE) Even though the programs target unemployed youth,
60% young Tunisians without work have lower awareness of
40%
existing programs than youth with work. Young Tuni-
Microloans,
sians who are NEET have substantially less knowledge
other 20% FONAPRA of existing programs than their non-NEET peers. This
0%
information gap is substantial, especially for microloans
and small self-employment programs, and leads to fur-
ther economic exclusion of young Tunisians from disad-
vantaged backgrounds. With regard to gender, very few
Rural differences exist. Nevertheless, it appears that in urban
Microloans, FNS
BTS Urban areas, young women have a higher awareness of FON-
APRA and microloans than of the loans offered by BTS.
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. In rural areas, no clear difference exists (see annex 5,
Note: Figure refers to all youth.
figure A5.4).
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 67

Figure 5.8. Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by Education

80
70
60 Nongraduate rural
Nongraduate urban
50 Graduate urban
percent

40
30
20
10
0
Program for small FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans,
enterprises (PAPPE) BTS other

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth who are not in education or training. The rural sample does not include sufficient graduates to allow a comparison.

Participation in Entrepreneurship Programs (1.7 percent urban and 4.7 percent rural), and BTS (3.0
percent urban and 3.0 percent rural), as shown in figure
Program take-up is very low, especially in urban areas
5.10. This finding suggests that while university gradu-
where only about one in 100 youths has participated in
ates are more inclined to seek wage employment, less ed-
entrepreneurship programs. Overall program take-up is
ucated youth are more likely to pursue self-employment,
low in rural areas, and even lower in urban areas (see
figure 5.9). The programs with the highest take-up were
FNS (4.7 percent rural and 1.6 percent urban), the Pro-
gram for Small Enterprises (3.8 percent rural and 0.8 Figure 5.9. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs—
percent urban), and other microloans (4.6 percent rural Urban Versus Rural
and 3.4 percent urban). A breakdown by region shows
that PAPPE, FONAPRA, and FNS programs have the Program for
highest take-up in the rural coast and the interior. Young Small Enterprises
(PAPPE)
Tunisians in the rural south, on the other hand, are more 5%
interested in microloans programs than their coastal 4%
peers (see annex 5, figure A5.5). Overall, youth entre- 3%
Microloans,
preneurship should be used more extensively in lagging other 2% FONAPRA
regions. 1%
Urban university graduates, a priority group for pol- 0%

icy makers, have barely enrolled in any entrepreneur-

ship programs. Microloan programs have the highest
Rural
take-up among urban youth without university degrees.
Urban
Only one in 100 university graduates enroll in any of Microloans, FNS
BTS
the publically provided entrepreneurship programs. The
take-up is substantially higher among youth without uni- Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
versity degrees, particularly for the microloan programs Note: Figure refers to all youth.
PAPPE (1.9 percent urban and 3.8 percent rural), FNS
68 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure 5.10. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Education

7
6
5
Nongraduate rural
percent

4 Nongraduate urban
3 Graduate urban

2
1
0
Program for small FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans,
enterprises (PAPPE) BTS other

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth who are not in education or training. The rural sample does not include sufficient graduates to allow a comparison.

notwithstanding the fact that these available entrepre- 5.3 Other Youth Services
neurship programs currently exclude youth who are
self-employed in the informal sector.
Program take-up among young Tunisians without Programs of the Ministry of Youth and Sports
work is substantially higher in rural areas. While the The Ministry of Youth and Sports has a range of pro-
take-up among NEETs and working youth reaches sim- grams for youth; the longest established and best known
ilar levels in rural areas, urban NEETs participate in are the Youth Centers. These centers are aimed at pro-
entrepreneurship programs with a substantially lower moting healthy lifestyles and preventing risky behaviors.
probability than working urban youth. For instance, The first center was established in 1963. They offer a
6.7 percent of young working Tunisians in urban areas range of leisure and occupational training activities in
participated in microloan programs other than BTS’s mi- technology, language, and the arts, and aim to promote
croloans (3.8 percent in BTS microloans), as compared citizenship and the integration of the young into soci-
with only 2.2 percent of urban NEETs (0.6 percent in ety. There are 316 permanent centers with sports fields
BTS microloans) (see annex 5, figure A5.6). Further- and other facilities in towns across the country, 224 rural
more, different patterns in take-up by poverty status and centers (Maisons des Jeunes Rurales), 14 more extensive
area of residence can be observed (see annex 5, figure complexes, and 44 mobile clubs (Clubs de Jeunes Mo-
A5.7). While in urban areas the take-up is clearly higher biles) bringing activities to otherwise underserved rural
among youth from poor households, there is substantial areas.
heterogeneity in rural areas. In particular, young Tuni- The image of the Youth Centers was tarnished by
sians from poor rural households participate mainly in their use for propaganda events under the old regime.
FNS (6.1 percent), the Program for Small Enterprises Soon after the revolution, Decree 119 of 2011 loos-
(4.1 percent), and other microloans (3.0 percent). Youth ened central control of the Youth Centers, providing
from richer rural households, on the other hand, tend more democratic management systems and greater fi-
to participate in all entrepreneurship programs: other nancial autonomy, allowing them to more effectively
microloans (5.4 percent), FNS (3.9 percent), the Pro- cater to local needs and preferences. Additional staff,
gram for Small Enterprises (3.7 percent), BTS microloans notably young graduates, has also been recruited. Offi-
(3.5 percent), and FONAPRA. cial statistics indicate that the permanent Youth Centers
attracted almost 90,000 users in 2011, and the rural and
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 69

mobile centers attracted 390,000. But given the lack of have sprung up in peri-urban areas since the revolution,
a rigorous monitoring system, it is unlikely that such fig- and banners and signboards are ubiquitous. Many of
ures reflect the actual number of users. According to the these organizations are filling a void left by the collapse
Ministry of Youth and Sports, the most popular activi- of the old regime, which used to dominate civil society
ties were sports and accessing the Internet. Attendance through the activities of its political party. In compar-
was reported to have fallen by 36 percent since 2010, ison with other much longer-established civil society
reflecting a declining trend of attendance over a number organizations, the new religious welfare organizations
of years. Funding remains one of the main problems fac- tend to be better funded (Khouja and Moussa 2013). Re-
ing the Youth Centers, along with lack of adequate in- portedly, some welfare organizations started providing
frastructure and equipment, including computers. Most scholarships to pay for private courses for high-school
importantly, Youth Centers would require a more com- students and medical services and, in some cases, they
prehensive set of youth-friendly services with relevant provide small funds to young people wanting to marry
content and direct youth engagement in service delivery (Khouja and Moussa 2013). Moving forward, new in-
to attract the optimal number of users. centives should be put in place to promote partnerships
between local governments, NGOs supporting youth in-
Youth Services Provided by Religious clusion, and welfare associations to build on their effec-
Welfare Organizations tive outreach to disadvantaged youth at the community
level, to mainstream their approaches, and to bring them
Since 2011, religious welfare organizations have
closer to other institutions operating at the local level
developed an alternative approach to service delivery
(Khouja and Moussa 2013).
for excluded youth from marginalized communities,
filling some of the gaps in public services and programs.
In sheer numbers, religious welfare organizations have 5.4 Conclusions and Recommendations
registered and expanded after the revolution (Khouja
and Moussa 2013). Within a few months of the revolu-
Key Challenges
tion, religious welfare organizations stepped in to fill the
vacuum created by deteriorating public services in mar- Programs to promote youth opportunities in Tunisia
ginalized areas, becoming key economic actors in some currently face a number of challenges, which cannot be
places (International Crisis Group 2013). It has been re- addressed by central ministries and agencies alone. As
ported that some of these groups started helping with highlighted by good practices in Tunisia and abroad,
schooling, serving as mediators in local conflicts, assist- these challenges can be addressed more effectively by
ing with administrative issues, and advising in marital directly engaging the private sector, the emerging NGO
problems (International Crisis Group 2013). In several sector concerned with youth employment issues, local
poor villages and urban areas, religious welfare organi- governments, and young people as partners. With nearly
zations are also engaged in the informal economy, and in 100,000 young Tunisians entering the labor market each
some cases have started to provide interest-free loans to year,17 the reform of ALMPs is urgently needed (ILO
self-employed youth (International Crisis Group 2013). 2013).
Most of the new associations operate in poorer Key challenges preventing the good performance of
peri-urban areas near the big cities along Tunisia’s coastal ALMPs include the following:
region, where economic and social exclusion are ram- • A large set of costly ALMPs have been “piling up”
pant. Extensive qualitative research has been conducted over time, resulting in duplications, insufficient
to inform this study. Results from Ettadham-Douar, capacity to manage them, and a lack of measurable
a major suburb of Tunis with a population of approx- results on the ground (Melliti 2011). The govern-
imately 600,000, highlight the situation (Khouja and ment has already passed a decree that integrates all
Moussa 2013). Several religious welfare organizations existing programs into four sets of interventions:
70 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

(1) training and job-search assistance; (2) wage assessing how different design features of a given pro-
subsidies; (3) support to entrepreneurship; and (4) gram, including interactions with other programs, affect
regional employment support programs, notably labor market outcomes for youth (Robalino et al. 2013).
public works/workfare programs. If implemented,
this integration could result in substantial savings. Strategic Areas for Further Action
However, ALMPs continue to offer the same num-
Tunisia’s greater political stability offers a unique op-
ber of activities, often ineffectively.
portunity to reform its broad set of youth programming
• ALMPs are regressive and predominantly cater to
and services while making them more inclusive, cost
university graduates. About 80 percent of expen-
effective, and accountable. As shown by the analysis
ditures in employment support programs go to
throughout this report, Tunisian youth are not a homo-
tertiary education degree-holders (Abaab 2012),
geneous group. There are several subgroups, each with
although they constitute only about one-quarter of
its own set of constraints to accessing economic and
NEETs.18 Existing ALMPs tend to exclude young
social opportunities, and ALMPs and youth services
people from less-educated, lower-income back-
need to consider the needs of the various subgroups in
grounds residing in peri-urban, rural, and lagging
their programming. The following policy recommenda-
regions.
tions are intended to improve the effectiveness and cov-
• The state’s statutory monopoly over employment
erage of ALMPs’ programs and youth services, building
intermediation inhibits choice and the entry of a
on the continuous policy dialogue since 2011 between
wider range of providers and services into the mar-
the Government of Tunisia and various agencies, includ-
ket, particularly private-sector providers (Abaab
ing the World Bank.
2012).
• ALMPs tend to be overcentralized. There is lack
Upgrading of ANETI’s Employment Services
of scope for local ownership and participation by
local administrations, relevant NGOs, and char- Ensuring coverage for all relevant youth subgroups ne-
itable organizations with strong local outreach cessitates the following actions, which build on the
in disadvantaged areas, and among youth stake- recommendations of several technical reports. Other re-
holders. Centralization of program delivery inhib- ports emphasized measures to improve ANETI’s capacity
its innovation and adaptation to Tunisia’s diverse to provide its beneficiaries with state-of-the-art employ-
circumstances. ment services, including counseling, training in hard and
• Current monitoring and evaluation arrangements soft skills, and labor intermediation. They also recom-
continue to be sporadic, lack rigor, and are insuf- mended simplifying the administration and delivery of
ficiently developed to assess the respective impacts ALMPs (Robalino et al. 2013). Moving forward, the fol-
of the various programs. Follow-up support to for- lowing actions are critical:
mer beneficiaries after completion of their activi- • Remove regulatory constraints to allow the private
ties is often lacking. sector to participate in providing intermediation
services. The importance of including the private
The next generation of ALMPs youth employment sector in the delivery of employment services,
needs to build on an increased knowledge base. Informed notably intermediation, is confirmed by the Private
program design needs to focus on three fundamental Employment Agencies Convention adopted by the
tasks, namely: (1) better understanding of the causes and International Labor Organization in 1997, which
consequences of poor labor market outcomes for youth; Tunisia should ratify (Convention 181 supported
(2) developing tools to guide the design and implemen- by Recommendation 188). Also, the labor code
tation of youth employment programs; and (3) support- should be adjusted to allow the operation of pri-
ing a new generation of impact evaluation that focus on vate intermediation agencies.
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 71

• Develop public-private-NGO partnerships through mobile phones could provide information on the
performance-based contracts to provide employ- quality and relevance of the training and intern-
ment services to youth aligned with labor market ships, on the timeliness of cash transfers to young
demands, while reaching out to disadvantaged beneficiaries, and the employability impact of such
young people in peri-urban, rural, and interior re- interventions on beneficiaries over time. These are
gions. Partnerships would enable ANETI to deliver low-cost solutions, allowing for access to informa-
more tailored skills, entrepreneurship training, in- tion about the progress of programs, which can
ternships, and on-the-job training to unemployed guide evidence-based budget reallocations and/or
graduates and other youth, such as less educated cuts to ALMPs.
and inactive young men and women who may not
be registered as unemployed. In any case, ANETI Establish Integrated Local Youth-Friendly Services
should no longer function as a monopoly for the with Youth Participation
provision of employment and intermediation ser-
Integrated Local Youth-Friendly Services offering a one-
vices in Tunisia, as this limits its ability to effec-
stop shop to young Tunisians can be established at the
tively serve young people’s needs.
local level, serving the less educated and NEETs in par-
• Improve and expand placement services by the
ticular. Integrated Local Youth-Friendly Services can
systematic use of new technologies. ANETI’s pro-
be provided by building on and expanding services of
grams could be connected to newly-established on-
ANETI and by using the existing venues of the Ministry
line and mobile-based employment intermediation
of Youth and Sports. These services can provide youth
and skills training platforms, such as Ta3mel and
with life skills; relevant information and coaching on
Najja7ni (see box 5.1). ANETI’s staff currently has
local economic opportunities; job intermediation; infor-
limited capacity and numbers to meet the various
mation and communication technology training; access
needs of job-seeking youth or to connect them to
to social, cultural, and sports activities; access to legal
private employers. Information and communica-
protection services; information about healthy lifestyles;
tion technology solutions can be cost-effective,
volunteering opportunities; and opportunities for other
accountable, and youth-friendly complements to
constructive uses of free time. Such services should es-
scale-up outreach and increase the number of ben-
tablish linkages with other interested institutions, such
eficiaries served. In addition, Tunisia has a very
as local youth-led NGOs, charities, local governments,
vibrant set of young information and communica-
and employment services to maximize youth outreach,
tion technology entrepreneurs that ANETI could
particularly to disadvantaged youth in peri-urban, rural,
engage to develop solutions in this area.
and lagging regions. The most successful international
• Develop state-of-the-art monitoring systems
experiences include the strong youth participation ele-
through online and mobile solutions. Online plat-
ment in the management of integrated local youth ser-
forms like the one utilized to monitor results in
vices and structured partnerships with local governments
real time by the Idmej project19 could be easily
to ensure their long-term sustainability. In addition to
adapted by ANETI and other youth service pro-
positive outcomes for youth employability, evidence
viders to enter and analyze data pertaining to mul-
shows that integrated, local, youth-friendly services have
tiple ALMPs throughout the country. The online
contributed to greater social cohesion and trust with
platform would provide valuable information as
local authorities by promoting active youth participation
to whether funds are spent correctly—i.e., whether
and cross-cutting engagement with a variety of local in-
training activities and internships with firms are
stitutions (World Bank 2007c).
indeed conducted and what type and how many
young people are benefitting from them. In addi-
tion, an easily accessible beneficiary feedback via
72 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Box 5.1. Online Platforms Najja7ni and Tounes Ta3mal

The online platform “Tounes Ta3mal” offers a virtual career and entrepreneurship center for Tunisian youth.
Co-funded by Silatech and Microsoft, this initiative is designed to provide Arab youth with resources ranging
from online career guidance, employability and entrepreneurship education, work experience, and employment
opportunities. Launched in October 2013, the “Tounes Ta3mal” site (Tunis Works) offers free, ad-free access
to more than 600 e-learning courses available in Arabic, English, and French. Integration with the mobile
“Najja7ni” service is underway to expand reach and access.
Young users can register and engage with the platform by themselves. Silatech works to deploy the plat-
form in the context of local partnerships with academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and other
youth-serving organizations, including Tounes Ta3mal, as an integrated element of their youth programming.
The resources on the platform complement and expand the services offered by these organizations to better
address the needs of their youth. For example, career centers can use the online job-matching service to help
students find relevant internships or jobs in their area. Other organizations have used e-learning content on
Tounes Ta3mal to design blended learning courses that rely on the platform for content but actually take place
in the classroom.
“Najja7ni mEmploi” is the region’s first mobile-based career center, offering employability support service
that connects young people without Internet access to employability resources, financial inclusion, and job
opportunities via basic mobile phones. Free services include career guidance, labor market and training oppor-
tunities, English-language learning, financial literacy, CV (resume) writing, self-awareness, and setting up busi-
nesses, among others. Quizzes, Short Message Service (SMS) alerts, and personality tests keep the user updated
with information regarding vocational areas of work. They can also reach out to potential employers by posting
a mini-CV with Najja7ni Employment.
Najja7ni mEmploi’ is complemented by mEducation and mEnglish programs. Between these three initia-
tives, Najja7ni reaches almost one million registered users, although there may be some replication due to peo-
ple subscribing to more than one service. The mEmploi service was relaunched with job-matching functionality
in January 2014 and is in its first quarter of operation. It has already gained a registered user base of nearly
300,000, of which over 200,000 used employability mLearning and 96,000 created mini-CVs to receive job
alerts for about 2,500 jobs.
The initiative is a partnership among Silatech, Tunisiana,a ProInvest, and EduPartage and works closely
with youth-focused initiatives of the World Bank, the National Agency for Employment and Independent Work
(Agence Nationale de l’Emploi or ANETI), and Microsoft Citizenship. The initiative has won many global
awards, including the Stevie Silver Award and the Global Telecom Business Innovation Award.
a. Tunisiana is a Tunisian mobile phone provider and part of the Ooredoo group.
Source: Silatech, May 2014.

Prioritizing Inclusive and Comprehensive with private sector partners to provide internships to its
“Training Plus” Programs clients. Training Plus programs have proven more ef-
fective than traditional vocational classroom trainings
“Training Plus” programs successfully combine technical (Cunningham et al. 2010). The total hours spent in class-
training with behavioral skills training, internships, em- room training result in a lower impact on the program’s
ployment services, and project accreditation. It empha- rate of return than the time spent with on-the-job train-
sizes demand-driven skills training based on agreements ing (Lee et al. 2012). Such programs have succeeded in
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 73

Box 5.2. Jovenes “Training Plus” Programs for Disadvantaged Youth in

Latin America
The Jovenes programs offer comprehensive training to unemployed and economically disadvantaged youth,
aged 16–29, to improve their human and social capital and employability. The demand-driven model has been
implemented in eight Latin American countries, customized to local contexts and labor markets.a Technical
training and internship experiences with employers are combined with training in basic life skills and other
support services to ensure the social integration and job readiness of beneficiaries. Private and public institu-
tions contracted through public bidding mechanisms provide training and organize internships. The program
targets the poor, with more than 60 percent of participants coming from low-income families, including early
school-dropouts.
Impact evaluations show that the programs increased the probability of beneficiaries finding employment
after graduation, especially among young women. In Argentina, the program increased the probability of em-
ployment for young adult women (aged 21 and older) by about 10 percentage points over a control group. In
Chile, the program increased the probability of employment by 21 percentage points with strongly significant
results for youth aged 21 and younger. In Argentina, the program increased monthly wages by about 10 percent
over a control group, with results more favorable for young males and adult females.
a. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
Source: Aedo and Núñez 2001.

increasing the employability and earnings of low-income the PAPPE microfinance program, which mostly benefits
youth in several Latin American countries (see box 5.2). university graduates.
Priority should be given to Training Plus programs while A number of different approaches have been found
the less effective but costly ALMPs, such as vocational to be successful in increasing the effectiveness of youth
training in classrooms and AMAL-type cash transfers, entrepreneurship programs. These include: (1) providing
should be phased out. By integrating and reducing the extensive mentoring and business development services
number of ALMPs, savings can be reallocated to Train- to young beneficiaries throughout the entire project busi-
ing Plus programs aimed at less educated youth from ness cycle through the direct participation of existing
peri-urban, rural, and lagging regions. entrepreneurs, where possible—recruited through cham-
bers of commerce, for instance—to mentor aspiring en-
Establish “Comprehensive Entrepreneurship” trepreneurs; (2) guiding and helping young entrepreneurs
Programs to gradually build the practical and empirical knowledge
necessary to start and consolidate new businesses and
Comprehensive entrepreneurship programs combine to find concrete opportunities to enter already-existing
entrepreneurial skills training, access to capital, and value chains; (3) strengthening beneficiaries’ self-esteem
mentoring for young start-ups with established entre- and confidence as entrepreneurs; and (4) accompanying
preneurs. Youth entrepreneurship is another important young entrepreneurs in their search for and securing of
area of potential investment in Tunisia, especially for sec- financial services to support their businesses (Cunning-
ondary school graduates; graduates of technical training ham et al. 2010). Box 5.3 presents the key features and
courses; informal urban workers; and rural youth with positive outcomes of the Young Micro Entrepreneurs’
promising business ideas, including young women. Such Qualification Program in Peru, considered one of the best
interventions would complement the current focus of global practices in youth entrepreneurship. While these
74 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

recommended programs have been evaluated with largely as well as international good practices. It highlighted
positive results, it will be critical to introduce them incre- current gaps in addressing barriers that cause economic
mentally into Tunisia and to test and evaluate what works exclusion and lack of access to opportunities in the coun-
best before implementing programs on a larger scale. try’s programming. Figure 5.11 concludes the chapter by
Building on previously presented findings on youth summarizing key categories of barriers discussed so far
exclusion in Tunisia, this chapter provides an overview of and offering evidence-based program interventions that
existing programs and services aimed at young Tunisians contribute to address such barriers.20

Figure 5.11. Matrix of Labor Market Interventions

Barriers Policy Intervention

Job counseling at secondary and tertiary levels; second

Insufficient basic skills
chance programs

Technical skills mismatch Comprehensive Training Plus Programs

Job-relevant skills constraints
Behavioral skills mismatch Behavioral skills training

Insufficient entrepreneurial skills Entrepreneurial training

Slow job growth economy Public service programs/youth-led community initiatives

Affirmative action
Lack of labor demand
Employer discrimination Subsidies to employers who hire target groups

Employee monitoring

Employment services
Job matching
Web-based and mobile phone information-sharing
Job search constraints
Skills certification
Signaling competencies
Training center accreditation

Comprehensive entrepreneurship programs

Lack of access to financial or social
Firm start-up constraints
capital
Microfinance

Gender-sensitive outreach of excluded groups

Nontraditional skills training

Exclusion constraints, including
Social constraints on the supply side
gender and birth place Safe training, employment, and income-generation
opportunities for women

Program design adjustment to group needs

Source: Adapted from Cunningham et al. 2010.
 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 75

Box 5.3. Youth Entrepreneurship Program in Peru

The Programa de Calificación de Jóvenes Creadores de Microempresas provides assistance and training to
youth in developing business plans and creating profitable businesses. The program is implemented by the
Peruvian nongovernmental organization Colectivo Integral de Desarrollo and was started in 1999 as an initia-
tive to counteract the significant lack of entrepreneurial skills among low-skilled young people. Its objective is
to improve the earnings and quality of life of beneficiaries. The target population is economically disadvantaged
young people aged 15–25 who own a small and/or informal business in operation for less than a year or who
demonstrate entrepreneurial skills and reside in the targeted localities.
The program offers different types of services. During the preparation phase, interested youth benefit from
mentorship and training to prepare business plans that will be presented for selection. After selection, eligible
youth or beneficiaries of the program are offered mentorship, training, and internship services. Program benefi-
ciaries can also access microcredit. The program has been cost effective, with a beneficiary cost under US$1,000.
Impact estimates suggest an increase of 7.8 percentage points in the probability of beneficiaries having operat-
ing businesses and an 8 percent increase in average incomes. These estimates also show an increase of almost 40
percentage points in the probability of businesses operating for more than a year and an increase in earnings of 40
percentage points. An important secondary effect is job creation. Beneficiaries employ 17.3 percent more workers
than the control group, which consisted of interested but non-enrolled peers. Further evaluation and follow-up is
needed to monitor the success of the program over a longer span—e.g., a follow-up on businesses in operation for
at least two years. Regarding its replication in other localities, increasing the program’s scale may actually hamper
its effectiveness because the executing agency may not have sufficient capacity to offer the types and frequency of
personalized services previously rendered to youth. The institutional capacity of the executing agency and/or of
the institutions involved—as measured by personnel, knowledge, and types and frequency of services—is critical.
Low frequency and low quality of services would dramatically reduce the program’s probability of success.

Source: Puerto 2007.

Notes 8. Prise en charge par l’Etat de 50 pourcent des salaires versés.

9. Decree no. 2012–2369 was passed on October 16, 2012.
1. In 2009, the MVTE undertook the reform of the ALMP portfolio, con- 10. CES—Contrat Emploi-Solidarité.
solidating ALMPs into six programs to facilitate their management and
11. ATFP—Agence Tunisienne de la Formation Professionnelle.
financial control. All wage insertion programs consist primarily of on-the-
job training, include a small monthly stipend, and subsidize social security 12. Estimates from recent survey data (World Bank 2012d; 2012e).
contributions of participants. The number of beneficiaries of wage insertion 13. The Labor Intensive Public Works Program is part of the CES activities.
programs has increased markedly in recent years, from 85,889 in 2008 to 14. These results are only descriptive and do not account for education level,
95,415 in 2009, and to 138,674 in 2010. family backgrounds, access to networks, and other important factors among
2. In 2011, ANETI was able to identify 100,356 vacancies (internships and the program participants.
permanent positions), but they only filled about 46 percent of them. Va- 15. World Bank calculations.
cancies are entered into a database that is open to job seekers, and most
16. Banque Tunisienne de Solidarité.
positions are filled by individuals who contact the enterprise directly and
then inform ANETI of the match. ANETI does not systematically match 17. According to the ILO 2013 School-to-work Transition Survey (SWTS),
registered unemployed youth to available vacancies. 94,000 Tunisians aged 15–19 plan to enter the labor market in 2014. See
ILO. 2014.
3. SIVP—Stage d’Initiation à la Vie Professionnelle.
18. World Bank calculations using recent survey data (World Bank 2012d;
4. CAIP—Contrat d’Adaptation et d’Insertion a la vie Professionnelle.
2012e).
5. SCV—Service Civil Volontaire.
19. Arabic for inclusion and cooperation.
6. CIDES—Contrat d’Insertion des Diplômés de l’Enseignement Supérieur.
20. Based on Cunningham et al. 2010.
7. Contrat de Réinsertion dans la Vie Active.
 Chapter 6
The Way Forward:
Inclusive Youth Policy
and Institutions

77
78 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Young people in Tunisia should take responsibility and take their seat
at the table and not wait for it to be given to them.
Mohueb Garoui, Co-founder I-Watch,
“The Arab Youth and Development Debate,” April 1, 2014, Tunis

6.1 Taking Stock of Young People’s Gains to address their problems. They often lack the
Since the Revolution skills, information, and confidence to challenge ex-
clusionary practices.
Despite Tunisia’s impressive social and political achieve- • Economic exclusion. Unemployment among young
ments, inclusion of young Tunisians remains a largely people aged 15–29 increased after the revolution,
unfinished project. Comprehensively addressing the le- with an official youth unemployment rate of 33.2
gitimate aspirations of youth will be critical for Tunisia percent in 2013, according to the most recent ILO
to sustain its positive forward momentum. This report School-to-Work Transition survey (ONJ 2014).
presents Tunisian youth’s interests, aspirations, and The rate of young people who are not in education,
identities, and shares how young Tunisians experience employment, or training (NEETs), however, is sub-
their frustrating socioeconomic circumstances. The Arab stantially higher. It is one of the highest in the Mid-
Spring demonstrated that, while economic exclusion is a dle East and North Africa Region. In rural areas,
critical issue, it is by no means the only form of exclu- 20.6 percent of older men are NEET compared
sion experienced by young men and women. Youth are with 46.9 percent of young men—a NEET ratio of
subject to a wide range of additional forms of political, 2.3. In urban areas, the NEET ratio among old ver-
social, and cultural exclusion, which in turn can exacer- sus young men is 2.6 (NEET affects 13.1 percent
bate their economic exclusion. of older men versus 34.6 percent of young men).
• Political exclusion. Even though youth played a Young women are nearly twice as often affected
leading role in bringing about a change in regime, by NEET than young men—60.2 percent in urban
they have been unable to secure a role in the sub- areas and 81.5 percent in rural areas. Moreover, a
sequently formed government, and they feel that large proportion of youth depend on the informal
they are not consulted on issues that directly affect sector for income generation, which provides no
them. stable income and no access to social protection.
• Confidence and trust. Like their peers across the
Arab world, young Tunisians have very low confi- Moreover, exclusion continues to be manifest not
dence in government and other public institutions. only in the political and economic sphere, but also in
In late 2012, only 8.8 percent of surveyed rural social and psychological terms. Exclusion inevitably
youth and 31.1 percent of surveyed urban youth influences the identity and self-image of young people,
trusted political institutions, according to this which in turn has an impact on their capacity to fulfill
study’s findings. socially sanctioned roles. This report has highlighted the
• Participation. Despite dynamic online activism, persistent geography of exclusion through which young
community and civic engagement through formal people in lagging regions of the interior and the south as
institutions continues to be slight. well as in peri-urban areas suffer disproportionate exclu-
• Social exclusion. Youth feel socially undervalued, sion. Young women are particularly vulnerable to some
and their potential contribution is thwarted by forms of exclusion due to social norms that restrict their
political and social structures that are not geared economic, social, and political inclusion. Cumulatively,
 The Way Forward: Inclusive Youth Policy and Institutions | 79

these multiple forms of exclusion impact individuals, political stability and economic growth of the country.
preventing them from actively contributing to Tunisian The new constitution provides an excellent framework
society. for innovative pathways to youth engagement and inclu-
The majority of NEET and underemployed youth— sion, provided that the spirit of Article 8 meaningfully
particularly those with lower levels of educational at- guides the development of the policies and programs,
tainment—has been largely ignored by mainstream which are priorities for young Tunisians. Participation
youth programs and services. Rather, they are part of is also one of the eleven guiding principles for effec-
the “other Tunisia,” which was evoked at the beginning tive national youth policy, as outlined in the Council of
of this report by a young activist highlighting the urgent Europe’s Eleven Principles of a National Youth Policy
need for greater equity. They are often the beneficiaries (see box 6.1). These principles range from the need to
of alternative support systems provided by religious wel- offer training in life and technical skills that complement
fare organizations. Bridging the divide with this “other the formal education system to the establishment of rep-
Tunisia” is an urgent imperative for equity. An appropri- resentative youth advisory bodies that contribute to gov-
ate strategy to address this particularly vulnerable pop- ernment decisions.
ulation in Tunisia is the encouragement of partnerships Given Tunisia’s clear commitment to democracy, it
between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and would be valuable to align Tunisian institutions with
welfare organizations as well as local governments, with good international practices that can strengthen the par-
a view toward supporting community-based, youth- ticipation of youth in the design, implementation, and
targeted interventions that address their multifaceted evaluation of relevant policies and programs. Such pol-
needs. These would include services such as free remedial icies and programs include education and employment
education, supporting youth engagement in community policy reform, local economic development, and inno-
life, providing youth-friendly spaces and programs, and vative youth service delivery with youth participation.
promoting active labor market interventions involving To promote greater trust in the interaction with pub-
work-based training and youth entrepreneurship (Inter- lic institutions, it will be essential to ensure that youth
national Crisis Group. 2013a). leaders are selected through transparent and democratic
processes and that they are subject to term and age lim-
its. Top-down selection of youth interlocutors would be
6.2 Guiding Principles for Strengthening rightly perceived as tokenism and would ultimately dis-
Youth Inclusion and Participation courage genuine participation.
Participatory decision making in the design and imple-
mentation of youth policy and programs as well as in the
management of community organizations yields benefits
6.3 Developing a Multidimensional
for all stakeholders and is likely to increase the impact of
Youth Inclusion Policy
public investments (World Bank 2004). A key message A multidimensional youth policy is needed to reduce bar-
of the report is that enabling active citizenship and civil riers to youth inclusion and facilitate youth contributions
participation among young Tunisians will be critical to to Tunisian society. The approach to youth development
sustaining the country’s regained positive forward mo- is now ready to move from piecemeal initiatives to an
mentum. Constructive dialogue between Tunisia’s youth integrated set of policies and investment strategies, allow-
and public institutions, together with broader civil soci- ing efficient use of financial resources. As Tunisia emerges
ety, political organizations, and the private sector, will be from its long recession, public budgets will continue to re-
critical in addressing the most pressing barriers to youth main constrained, requiring judicious resource allocation
inclusion. Facilitating youth inclusion enables the mobi- and selectivity. To ensure equity, this can best be achieved
lization of the new generation as an economic and social through national youth policies and any related reforms
resource that can directly contribute to sustaining the that cut across sectors but that have a common focus on
80 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Box 6.1. Eleven Principles of a National Youth Policy

1. Nonformal learning: Encourage active learning outside of the formal education system—e.g., life skills,
foreign language training, and technical skills—through open and inclusive youth nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs).
2. Youth training policy: Promote the development of good trainers in the youth sector, a prerequisite for the
formation of effective youth NGOs.
3. Youth legislation: Draft legislation that includes youth NGOs in policy decision making and that ensures the
efficiency of government institutions working on youth issues.
4. Youth budget: Allocate an administrative budget and project grants to youth organizations.
5. Youth information policy: Inform young people about opportunities that exist for them and ensure commu-
nication among all stakeholders in youth policy and transparency in the conduct of youth policy.
6. Multilevel policy: Outline youth policies to be implemented at both the national and local levels.
7. Youth research: Regularly identify the key issues for youth well-being, the best practices in addressing these
issues, and the potential role of youth NGOs.
8. Participation: Support the active involvement of youth organizations in the design and implementation of
youth policies.
9. Interministerial cooperation: Implement youth policies in a cross-sectoral manner, ensuring joint ministerial
responsibility, possibly through a designated youth coordinating agency.
10. Innovation: Stimulate creative and innovative solutions to youth problems.
11. Youth advisory bodies: Establish structures—e.g., consultative committees with a mandate to influence gov-
ernment on youth issues.

Source: European Youth Forum 2002a.

youth inclusion. These will also need to complement sec- youth-friendly services require a specific set of measures
tor-specific policies—such as those in education, employ- at the national and especially at the local level, as indi-
ment, and regional development—to address the needs cated below.
of young people with greater efficiency. These policies
should be reformulated with the participation of youth Participation, Voice, and Citizenship
stakeholders, especially youth representative bodies, as
Local Level
partners in decision making. Moreover, policy imple-
• Youth-led community development
mentation needs to be supported by performance-based
• Competitive grant scheme to support the capacity
management of institutions, strengthened by mechanisms
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to en-
for close interagency coordination that bring together
gage/provide services to excluded youth
government and youth organizations, and informed by
• Institutional channels to influence local poli-
systematic data collection and participatory monitoring
cy—i.e., local youth councils
and evaluation systems. As highlighted in figure 6.1, a
• Legal protection for young disadvantaged people
multidimensional youth policy will include the following
in conflict with police
three pillars with their respective measures: (1) participa-
• Confidence/trust building between youth, local au-
tion and active citizenship; (2) Access to economic oppor-
thorities and police
tunities; and (3) youth-friendly services at the local level.
• Joint youth initiatives between religious and non-
These three dimensions of youth inclusion policy,
religious organizations
which involve participation, economic opportunities and
 The Way Forward: Inclusive Youth Policy and Institutions | 81

Figure 6.1. Multidimensional Policy for Youth Inclusion

1. Participation and active citizenship

Participation • Youth-led community development
• Volunteering
• Youth councils for participation and voice
• Human rights

NEETs 2. Access to economic opportunities

• Job counseling in secondary and tertiary education
Informal youth
Economic • Skills training
Young women opportunities • Apprenticeships/internships
Youth in peri-urban areas • Job intermediation
and lagging regions • Youth entrepreneurship

3. Youth-friendly services at the local level

• Life skills training
• Information and communication technology and language skills
Integrated
youth • Healthy lifestyles
services • Legal support services
• Peer mentoring
• Sports

Source: World Bank.

National Level • Apprenticeships and internships tailored to less ed-

• Capacity support of youth-led national NGOs and ucated youth and NEETs through gender-sensitive
coalition building approaches
• Competitive grant scheme to support student and
youth organizations National Policy Level
• Student consultative bodies at secondary and ter- • Job counseling services in universities through
tiary education levels public/private/NGO partnerships
• Voice in national policy and reforms—e.g., through • Access to information—e.g., rigorous monitoring
National Youth Councils and evaluation, data, and youth policy dialogue
on employment policy and Active Labor Market
Access to Economic Opportunities Programs
• Youth consultations and participation—also vir-
Local Level
tual—on labor market reform
• Job counseling services in secondary schools in
• Beneficiary feedback and monitoring and evaluation
partnership with the private sector and NGOs
• Gender-sensitive youth-led community develop-
Youth-Friendly Services
ment, also with small cash transfers incentives
• Job intermediation Local Level
• Gender-sensitive individual and group entrepre- • Youth-friendly services tailored for NEETs and
neurship, through equity building grants and ac- other disadvantaged youth, particularly inactive
cess to finance young women, with youth participation (i.e., life
skills, information and communication technology
82 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

and e-learning, entrepreneurship and employabil- singlehandedly. New forms of partnerships between
ity skills, legal support services, peer mentoring, government, the private sector, civil society, and com-
cultural activities, volunteering, and sports) munities will be needed to imagine and accomplish the
task that Tunisia faces of simultaneously reforming its
National Level politics, economy, and society. Young people require the
• Capacity building of NGOs providing youth services space to participate fully in this process of renewal and,
• Quality standards of content indeed, to benefit from it. The stakes could hardly be
• Certification of skills higher: the possibility of a productive and equitable econ-
• Beneficiary feedback and monitoring and evaluation omy and vibrant political and civil society is set against
the possibility of growing polarization, frustration, and
While the revolution has given young Tunisians a cynicism. Moving toward a constructive outcome holds
glimpse of the possibilities of a new future, the task of the promise of a multitude of rewards, including the en-
building that future largely remains to be done. It is a ergy, awareness, goodwill, and commitment of the young
task that cannot be accomplished by youth alone—any men and women of Tunisia for whom this report bears
more than it can be accomplished without them. This witness.
is also not an undertaking that government can pursue
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 Annexes

87
Annex 1. Data Sources

This study draws on separate household surveys for THSYUA uniquely combines original data on objec-
rural and urban Tunisia and additional comprehensive tive household and individual characteristics with data
qualitative research. on perceptions and aspirations, particularly among
youth. Based on a questionnaire that is broader and
more detailed than a labor force survey, THSYUA allows
Urban Survey a deeper understanding of the correlations of labor out-
As part of this study, the Tunisia Household Survey on comes and seeks to better understand the job aspirations,
Youth in Urban Areas (THSYUA) was conducted in perceptions, and constraints faced by young Tunisians
2012. The survey was conceived by a group of Tunisian in accessing economic opportunities and basic services.
professors and students, called Projet Citoyen, from var- A unique feature of this survey is that specific modules
ious universities in Tunisia, particularly from Ecole Su- were fielded to all individuals aged 15 and older, in every
perieure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales de sampled household. In contrast to a typical labor force
Tunis (ESSECT). Motivated by the observed differences survey in which only very basic information on employ-
between different parts of the country, including neigh- ment is collected, this survey captured detailed aspects
borhoods in the Grand Tunis area, the aim of the survey of job searches, unemployment, working conditions, and
was to scientifically understand urban inequality, with a job satisfaction. In addition, household members aged
specific focus on economic opportunities for young peo- 15–29 were administered a module to gather informa-
ple. This effort led to collaboration between the Tunisian tion on their attitudes on government and the economy
National Statistical Office (Institut National de la Statis- as well as their participation in skills training programs
tique or INS), the General Commissariat for Regional and other programs to expand job opportunities (World
Development, and the World Bank. The INS provided Bank 2013b).
the sampling frame, the commissariat, as the main gov-
ernment counterpart, provided guidance for the scope of
the survey and its urban focus, and the World Bank pro-
Rural Survey
vided technical and financial support. Building on the data collection in urban areas, a sec-
THSYUA was designed to be regionally representa- ond survey was implemented in 2012 in rural areas.
tive. The survey was representative across the seven re- The Tunisia Household Survey on Youth in Rural Areas
gions of Tunisia—with Grand Tunis counting as a region (THSYRA) has a sample size of 1,400 households in the
separate from the northeast. The survey covered 4,214 entire rural area of Tunisia as defined by the INS. For the
urban households. The sample was drawn in two stages. purpose of sampling, administrative governorates were
The first stage was the selection of 352 enumeration grouped into three survey regions. The data is represen-
areas, using the General Census of Population and Hous- tative on the level of these survey regions, which largely
ing in 2004 as sampling frame. The second stage was the correspond to socioeconomically and geographically
selection of 12 households, after full listing, within each distinct rural zones. The first survey region covered the
sampled enumeration area. Data collection took place coast and included coastal governorates in the north and
mainly in May and June 2012, with additional repeat east of the country. The second survey region covered the
visits taking place later in 2012. Fieldwork was carefully south and included the southern governorates. The third
monitored to maximize response rates; the response was survey region covered the rural interior of Tunisia and
at least 85 percent in each region. included the remote areas of central and western Tunisia,

89
90 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

including the Algerian border. The survey was conducted sampling frame provided by the National Statistics In-
in December 2012 and overlapped with parts of the data stitute. In principle, survey results should be very similar.
collection of the urban survey. The differences in seasons The main differences between the surveys are the sample
may have led to some systematic differences in terms size (ILO surveys are larger) and the survey period (ILO
of employment, which tends to be lower in rural areas survey took place in 2013, while the World Bank youth
during the winter, but probably did not affect other out- surveys took place in late 2012). Overall, the estimates
comes. The data of the rural and urban survey have not of youth unemployment and NEET based on ILO data
been pooled for any of the analysis. are about 5–8 percentage points higher than the World
The THSYRA sample was drawn from the latest Bank estimates. When taking into account the different
available census, the 2004 General Census of Popu- survey times and samples, the differences are within a
lation and Housing, provided by the INS. This census reasonable range of measurement variation.
also provided the sampling frame for the correspond- In a separate publication by the National Employment
ing Urban and Peri-Urban Youth Survey. Proportional- Observatory, using the 2013 ILO Youth-to-Transition
ity of the possible locations for determining the number Survey, estimates are presented for “unemployed youth
of households in rural areas was used to ensure repre- and not in school or training” (ILO 2104). This defi-
sentativeness. Because of the overall research focus on nition appears somewhat similar to the NEET concept
youth, the sampling design ensures representativeness of used in this study, but differs in one important aspect.
the youth population, which is defined by ages 15–29. NEET includes all unemployed youth and all youth who
The proportionality to youth population size is based on are discouraged and are not actively searching for work.
the disaggregation of Tunisia into enumeration areas.1 The NEET definition is more inclusive and considers all
Each enumeration area contains about 100–120 house- young people. Because a large segment of the Tunisian
holds. In total, 70 enumeration areas were randomly se- youth population is discouraged and does not actively
lected—29 along the coast, 10 in the south, and 31 in the search for jobs, these young people are officially not de-
interior survey regions. The relative distribution between fined as “unemployed.” NEET is broader and considers
the survey regions corresponds to their respective shares all unemployed youth and all discouraged youth, except
of youth population. From each of these 70 enumeration those in education or training. In fact, the main ratio-
areas, 20 households were randomly selected, leading to nal for using the NEET concept instead of unemploy-
a total sample size of 1,400 households. ment is to highlight the large segments of youth who are
The random sampling of Primary Sampling Unit excluded from economic opportunities. Because of the
(PSUs) was performed by experts from the INS who narrow definition of unemployment, NEET estimates for
were also responsible for the sample frame of the urban Tunisian youth presented here are nearly twice as large
survey (THSYUA). The drawing of 20 households from as the figures presented for “unemployed youth not in
each PSU is processed on a systematic and clearly defined school or training” (ILO 2104).
approach. A random-walk procedure was conducted for
each of the PSUs of the sample, which included two sep-
arate starting points at opposing ends of the east-west
Qualitative Research
dimension of each PSU, moving toward the population Researchers organized 21 focus groups comprised of
center of the PSU to allow for full coverage of both cen- between 8 and 12 participants each, and conducted 35
trally and remotely located households. individual interviews. In total, the qualitative research
involved 199 young people in all seven regions of the
country: Tunis (NE), Zaghouan (NE), Mahdia (CE), Jen-
Survey Comparisons douba (NW), Sidi Bouzid (CW), Gasfa (SW), and Méde-
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Youth-to- nine (SE). In order to achieve a representative sample,
Transition Surveys and the World Bank Youth Surveys researchers took participant gender, rural/urban resi-
(THSYUA and THSYRA) build on the same official dency, and other characteristics into account to develop
 Annex 1. Data Sources | 91

the following groups: school dropouts, those with sec- interviewed. The facilitator subsequently elicited addi-
ondary school education, students, youth who had ac- tional detailed narrative information from the partici-
quired professional training, unemployed graduates, pant using a semistructured interview guide developed
young people working in the informal sector, micro- by the World Bank in cooperation with the National
entrepreneurs, young salaried workers, and young en- Youth Observatory and consultants. Consultants also
trepreneurs. Interview parameters covered education, conducted interviews with individual service providers
educational reform and quality, experience of unemploy- working for public or NGO institutions and others pro-
ment and employment, and the state of the country since viding services to youth in the 14 communities included
the revolution. in the sample. As with the selection of focus group partic-
The use of personal relationships, social institutions, ipants for individual interviews, facilitators used criteria
and professional networks to identify and recruit respon- that were developed by the National Youth Observatory
dents resulted in a gender bias that favored males and in in cooperation with the World Bank. All interviews were
having a larger proportion of respondents in the upper audiotaped with the permission of the interviewee.
range of ages, including several respondents older than In the case of both the focus groups and individual
age 29. Researchers were concerned that excluding un- interviews, the audio recordings were transcribed, and
employed graduates older than age 29 would alienate the local consultants, with support from the students,
them from their younger peers and, in so doing, disrupt analyzed the data using the Glaser and Strauss grounded
cohesion among Tunisian youth living in the same towns theory method—specifically the editing style of analysis,
or neighborhoods. using the full transcription of the focus groups and the in-
Acting as facilitator and note-taker, respectively, an dividual interviews (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Through
academic consultant and student-conducted focus group this process, using a structured form, the researcher care-
held discussions in French using guides and procedures fully read the responses to identify key words in each
that had been developed and pilot tested by the World response, used these to develop categories of responses
Bank in cooperation with the National Youth Observa- within the questions, and then used these categories to
tory and consultants. Researchers obtained permission develop themes across the question items. This process
from each of the focus group participants in order to is hierarchical, with key words being the foundation and
audiotape the sessions. During the focus groups, partici- the themes being the highest level of answer grouping.
pants were invited to participate in individual interviews. The analysis was also independently carried out by World
Those who expressed an interest in doing so provided Bank advisers to ensure quality control; this is standard
the facilitator with their names and contact information. practice in qualitative research. The consultants used the
Based on selection criteria—primarily the consultant’s software program NUDIST ™ for the analytical process.
assessment of the participant’s active participation and
demeanor in the focus group in which he/she partici-
pated, the facilitator selected a participant from among
Note
those who had originally volunteered to be individually 1. Enumeration areas are also referred to as District de Recensement by INS.
Annex 2. Youth Participation, Voice,
and Active Citizenship

Figure A2.1. Trust in Public and Religious Institutions Figure A2.2. Trust in Public and Religious Institutions
by NEET (Urban) by NEET (Rural)

Universities Banks Community Universities Banks Community

100% organizations 100% organizations

80% 80%
Schools Country Schools Country
60% 60%
40% 40%
Religious 20% Religious 20%
Family organizations Family
organizations
0% 0%

Press Imam Press Imam

Politics Justice Politics Justice

Police Military Urban works Police Military Rural works

Urban NEET Rural NEET

Source: World Bank 2012e. Source: World Bank 2012d.

Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29 who are not in school or Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29 who are not in school or
training. training.

Figure A2.4. Trust in Community Organizations—

Figure A2.3. Importance of Community Organizations
Rural Versus Urban
for Local Development (Rural Tunisia)
94 70
63.6
92.0 60.7
92 60
90 50
Male 39.9 40.7 Male
88 40
percent

percent

Female Female
86 85.2 30
84 20
82 10
80 0
Rural Rural Urban

Source: World Bank 2012d. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. Data is only available for rural Note: Figure refers to all youth.
areas.

93
94 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure A2.5. Youth Volunteering (Urban Tunisia) Figure A2.6. Youth Participation in Elections
by Gender
54
53 52.9
2.5
2.12 Male
2.0 52 51.5
Female
51
percent

1.50
1.5 Overall
50

percent
1.0 0.89 Male
49 48.4 Female
0.5 48 47.4
0 47
Volunteering 46
45
Source: World Bank 2012e. 44
Note: Figure refers to all youth. Rural Urban

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29.

Figure A2.7. Active Engagement in Politics

90
82.0
80
70
60
percent

50
40
30
20
11.0
10
1.6
0
Political party Intention to No preferred
member join political party political party

Source: ONJ 2013.

Note: Figure includes rural youth aged 15–29.
Annex 3. Youth Inactivity and Unemployment

Figure A3.1. Highest Education among NEETs Figure A3.2. Highest Education among NEETs by
by Gender (Ages 30–59) Gender (Ages 30–59), Disaggregated

4.0 0.5 4.0 0.5

100 0.2 4.8 3.4 100 0.2 4.8 3.4
0.6 1.0 7.1 0.6 1.0
3.8 3.8 7.1
14.8 8.7 4.9 14.8
16.1 8.7
80 80 19.3 Vocational training
9.2 9.2
Vocational training 21.9 University
60 University 60 35.7 24.9 Secondary
percent

percent
Secondary Middle school
91.7 98.3 71.3 80.9
40 Below Secondary 40 Primary
74.1
38.3 Below Primary
30.8
20 20 39.9

15.6
0 0 20.7
Rural Rural Urban Urban Rural Rural Urban Urban
male female male female male female male female

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.
Note: Figure refers to all NEETs aged 30–59. Note: Figure refers to all NEETs aged 30–59.

Figure A3.3. NEET by Region Figure A3.4. Highest Education Among NEETs by
Gender (Ages 15–29), Disaggregated
60

50 47.9 100 4.7 3.2

42.4 0 0.2 11.4 6.0
40 37.3 13.8 12.8
35.9 28.4
31.4 80 19.4 Vocational training
30 23.7 University
percent

23.6 27.8 10.4

Rural 60 9.8 Secondary
percent

20 Urban
20.8 Middle school
35.5 22.1 Primary
10 40
38.6 Below Primary
0 31.8
20 25.2
Coast Interior South
24.7
15.0
0 6.2 8.4
Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Rural Rural Urban Urban
Note: Figure refers to all NEETs. male female male female

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all NEETs aged 15–29.

95
96 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure A3.5. Highest Education among NEETs by Region (Ages 15–29)

a. Rural b. Urban

100 4.1 3.5 4.2 100 5.5 6.2

0.2 0 0.3 9.3
11.3 14.3 13.6 25.9
80 Vocational training 80 23.8 28.3 Vocational training
27.9 23.6 25.9 University University
10.7 8.4
60 Secondary 60 9.1 Secondary

percent
percent

Middle school 21.7 Middle school

34.2 Primary 19.9 27.1 Primary
40 38.0 40
41.1 Below Primary Below Primary
29.6 28.8
20 20 20.8
18.4 24.4
14.9 6.7 9.7 8.6
0 0
Coast Interior South Coast Interior South

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all NEETs.

Figure A3.6. NEETs Registered as Unemployed by Region

a. Rural b. Urban

80 80
70 70 63.1 66.2
60.1
60 60 52.1
50 Male 50 45.6 Male
percent

percent

40.0
40 Female 40 Female
30 30
20 14.1 14.9 14.1 20
10 9.1 7.2 8.6 10
0 0
Coast Interior South Coast Interior South

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all NEETs.
 Annex 3. Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 97

Table A3.1. Probit Model of Early School Leaving

Explanatory Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia
Female -0.3551*** -0.3685*** -0.4262*** -0.2608*** -0.2459*** -0.2617***
(0.0669) (0.0695) (0.0725) (0.0511) (0.0516) (0.0524)
Primary Completed* -0.5171*** -0.2838** -0.2079*** -0.0531
(0.1249) (0.1251) (0.0585) (0.0608)
Secondary Completed* -1.2092*** -0.8645*** -0.4319*** -0.1559
(0.1519) (0.1569) (0.1060) (0.1090)
Tertiary Completed* -1.3352*** -0.8738*** -0.9332*** -0.7071***
(0.1456) (0.1508) (0.0999) (0.1038)
Vocational Training Completed* -0.7510*** -0.4287** -0.5310*** -0.3689*
(0.1931) (0.1938) (0.1977) (0.1994)
2nd Wealth Quintile -0.1460 -0.1339
(0.1301) (0.0871)
3rd Wealth Quintile -0.4249*** -0.4382***
(0.1251) (0.0877)
4th Wealth Quintile -0.6567*** -0.5604***
(0.1289) (0.0909)
5th Wealth Quintile (Richest) -1.3011*** -0.8949***
(0.1298) (0.0934)
Interior 0.0208 -0.0902 -0.2921*** -0.1651*** -0.1490*** -0.3616***
(0.0799) (0.0843) (0.0930) (0.0561) (0.0570) (0.0618)
South 0.0842 -0.0215 -0.0650 -0.0656 -0.0292 -0.1356*
(0.0770) (0.0828) (0.0851) (0.0748) (0.0757) (0.0778)
Observations 1,934 1,934 1,934 2,758 2,758 2,758
Pseudo R-squared 0.0217 0.0958 0.1720 0.0142 0.0431 0.0774

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Note: Probit estimation. Dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent did not complete secondary education; 0 otherwise. Single age dummies are
included in the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile
(Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with an asterisk capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 years or
above).
Sample: Young people aged 19–29 years; youth currently in secondary education or below or in vocational training is excluded.
Annex 4. Economic Opportunities
Table A4.1. Determinants of Employment (Probit Model)
Explanatory
Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia
Female -0.6288*** -0.6085*** -0.6076*** -0.5984*** -0.9781*** -0.9664*** -0.9650*** -0.9685***
(0.0764) (0.0772) (0.0771) (0.0773) (0.0592) (0.0596) (0.0599) (0.0603)
Primary Completed 0.3163** 0.4005** 0.3690** 0.2715*** 0.3151*** 0.2574***
(0.1605) (0.1653) (0.1641) (0.0808) (0.0819) (0.0836)
Secondary Completed 0.2570 0.4065** 0.3280* 0.0294 0.1027 -0.0002
(0.1919) (0.1967) (0.1959) (0.1070) (0.1087) (0.1111)
Tertiary Completed 0.0004 0.1650 0.0166 0.4592 0.8384 0.7672
(0.1723) (0.1802) (0.1846) (0.6191) (0.6915) (0.7032)
Vocational Training 0.0993 0.2316 0.1058 -0.0377 0.0595 -0.0237
Completed (0.2036) (0.2109) (0.2146) (0.1677) (0.1680) (0.1734)
Primary Completed -0.1797 -0.2139* -0.0422 -0.1192*
Parent (0.1161) (0.1189) (0.0618) (0.0642)
Secondary Completed -0.5282*** -0.5813*** -0.2534** -0.3662***
Parent (0.1565) (0.1594) (0.1290) (0.1351)
Tertiary Completed -0.3276** -0.4279*** -0.6440*** -0.7674***
Parent (0.1514) (0.1565) (0.1445) (0.1459)
Vocational Training -0.3995* -0.4396* -0.4663* -0.5261**
Completed Parent (0.2231) (0.2276) (0.2632) (0.2558)
2nd Wealth Quintile 0.0055 0.2710***
(0.1247) (0.0886)
3rd Wealth Quintile -0.0315 0.4070***
(0.1271) (0.0929)
4th Wealth Quintile 0.1807 0.5020***
(0.1324) (0.0965)
5th Wealth Quintile 0.3585** 0.5303***
(Richest) (0.1404) (0.1070)
Interior -0.3342*** -0.3389*** -0.3761*** -0.3365*** -0.3065*** -0.2770*** -0.2632*** -0.1236*
(0.0909) (0.0912) (0.0923) (0.0951) (0.0626) (0.0631) (0.0636) (0.0671)
South -0.5477*** -0.5543*** -0.5864*** -0.5836*** -0.3129*** -0.3084*** -0.2911*** -0.2602***
(0.0868) (0.0871) (0.0886) (0.0898) (0.0802) (0.0803) (0.0807) (0.0817)
Observations 1,553 1,553 1,553 1,553 2,419 2,419 2,419 2,419
Pseudo R-squared 0.0765 0.0840 0.0919 0.0989 0.134 0.140 0.148 0.160

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Note: Probit estimation. Dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent worked in the last 12 months; 0 otherwise. Single age dummies are included in
the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region
Coast. Variables marked with “Parent” capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older).
Sample: Young people aged 15–29; youth currently in education or in vocational training is excluded.

99
100 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Table A4.2. Determinants of Wage Income (Heckman Selection Model)

Explanatory Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia
Female -0.3074*** -0.2862*** -0.2638*** 0.1893*** 0.1819*** 0.1558**
(0.0745) (0.0801) (0.0816) (0.0680) (0.0666) (0.0627)
Primary Education Completed 0.2002 0.1473 0.0272 0.0163
(0.1466) (0.1454) (0.0703) (0.0683)
Secondary Education Completed 0.3918** 0.3056 0.3776*** 0.3106***
(0.1862) (0.1887) (0.0946) (0.0922)
Tertiary Education Completed 0.6684*** 0.5094*** 0.1991 0.0409
(0.1592) (0.1603) (0.2590) (0.2411)
Vocational Training Completed 0.4629*** 0.3396** 0.1156 0.0383
(0.1604) (0.1624) (0.1267) (0.1234)
2nd Wealth Quintile -0.0646 -0.0688
(0.0902) (0.0740)
3rd Wealth Quintile 0.0369 0.0135
(0.0853) (0.0723)
4th Wealth Quintile 0.1821** 0.0529
(0.0898) (0.0771)
5th Wealth Quintile (Richest) 0.2645*** 0.3193***
(0.0974) (0.0895)
Interior -0.4678*** -0.4295*** -0.3651*** 0.0912 0.0766 0.1365**
(0.0904) (0.0852) (0.0871) (0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0590)
South -0.4780*** -0.3992*** -0.3826*** 0.0264 0.0299 0.0423
(0.0895) (0.0920) (0.0930) (0.0861) (0.0863) (0.0814)
Observations 1,570 1,570 1,570 2,420 2,420 2,420

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Note: Estimation with Heckman sample selection correction. Dependent variable is logarithm of monthly wage. Single age dummies are included in the esti-
mation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast.
Variables used in the selection equation of Heckman procedure are a set of dummy variables capturing educational attainment of the most educated adult
household member (aged 30 or older): Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, Primary Education Completed, Secondary Education
Completed, Vocational Training Completed, Tertiary Education Completed.
Sample: Young people aged 15–29; youth currently in education is excluded.
 Annex 4. Economic Opportunities | 101

Table A4.3. Determinants of Informal Employment, Conditional on Being in Employment (Probit Model)
Explanatory Variables Rural Tunisia
Female -0.6563*** -0.7160*** -0.7100*** -0.7141***
(0.1073) (0.1092) (0.1097) (0.1106)
Primary Completed -0.4102** -0.3963** -0.3889**
(0.1809) (0.1822) (0.1825)
Secondary Completed -1.1626*** -1.1429*** -1.1025***
(0.2133) (0.2144) (0.2148)
Vocational Training Completed -0.6029* -0.5720* -0.5153
(0.3232) (0.3264) (0.3299)
Primary Completed Parent -0.1340 -0.0775
(0.1051) (0.1056)
Secondary Completed Parent -0.0107 0.0437
(0.2379) (0.2476)
Tertiary Completed Parent -0.1375 -0.0272
(0.2876) (0.2855)
Vocational Training Completed Parent -0.4883 -0.3783
(0.4678) (0.4874)
2nd Wealth Quintile 0.0264
(0.1813)
3rd Wealth Quintile 0.1609
(0.1863)
4th Wealth Quintile -0.2684
(0.1778)
5th Wealth Quintile (Richest) -0.2120
(0.1878)
Interior 0.2491** 0.2634** 0.2519** 0.1952*
(0.1060) (0.1089) (0.1081) (0.1154)
South 0.1871 0.1758 0.1862 0.1389
(0.1427) (0.1485) (0.1480) (0.1478)
Observations 932 932 932 932
Pseudo R-squared 0.0601 0.103 0.105 0.116

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Notes: Probit estimation. Dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent was informally employed in the last 12 months; 0 otherwise. Age dummies
are included in the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile
(Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with “Parent” capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older).
Tertiary university excluded in rural areas due to sample size.
Sample: Young people aged 15–29 years in employment over the last 12 months; youth currently in education or in vocational training is excluded.
102 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Table A4.4. Determinants of Educational Attainment (Ordered Probit)

Explanatory Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia
Female 0.1115* 0.1008* 0.1400** -0.2125*** -0.2210*** -0.2038***
(0.0596) (0.0601) (0.0607) (0.0453) (0.0452) (0.0451)
Primary Not Completed Parent -0.6485** -0.4124 0.0099 -0.0793
(0.2666) (0.2660) (0.0737) (0.0743)
Primary Completed Parent -0.1773 -0.0609 0.2293*** 0.0816
(0.2566) (0.2550) (0.0618) (0.0634)
Middle School Completed Parent 0.1394 0.1327 0.4889*** 0.3245***
(0.2606) (0.2578) (0.0843) (0.0851)
Secondary Completed Parent 0.4633* 0.4648* 0.5283*** 0.3118***
(0.2680) (0.2663) (0.1117) (0.1136)
Tertiary Completed Parent 0.6339** 0.5109* 0.9487*** 0.7321***
(0.2660) (0.2638) (0.1059) (0.1085)
Vocational Training Completed Parent 0.1987 0.1937 0.7284*** 0.6177***
(0.2891) (0.2851) (0.1994) (0.2039)
2nd Wealth Quintile 0.2001** 0.2987***
(0.0947) (0.0705)
3rd Wealth Quintile 0.3744*** 0.5523***
(0.0975) (0.0731)
4th Wealth Quintile 0.6384*** 0.6216***
(0.0990) (0.0771)
5th Wealth Quintile (Richest) 1.1567*** 0.7826***
(0.1054) (0.0847)
Interior -0.0671 0.0498 0.2002** -0.0830* -0.0941* 0.1081**
(0.0733) (0.0756) (0.0806) (0.0489) (0.0494) (0.0527)
South 0.0433 0.1181* 0.1370* 0.1070* 0.0872 0.1440**
(0.0673) (0.0686) (0.0700) (0.0584) (0.0595) (0.0612)
Observations 1,658 1,658 1,658 2,436 2,436 2,436
Pseudo R-squared 0.0344 0.0738 0.108 0.0155 0.0339 0.0515

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Note: Ordered probit estimation. Dependent variable is educational attainment measured by five categories. Categories in urban sample are: Never
Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, Primary Education Completed, Middle School Completed, Secondary Education or Vocational
Training Completed, Tertiary Education Completed. Categories in rural sample are: Never Attended School, Primary Education not Completed, Primary Ed-
ucation Completed, Middle School Completed, Secondary or Tertiary Education or Vocational Training Completed. Single age dummies are included in the
estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with “Parent’
capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older).
Sample: Young people aged 15–29; youth currently in education is excluded.
 Annex 4. Economic Opportunities | 103

Table A4.5. Determinants of Wage Income by Sector (Least Squares)

Variables Urban Tunisia
Age 0.2863** 0.2217 0.2342* 0.2253* 0.2374*
(0.1390) (0.1390) (0.1378) (0.1365) (0.1363)
Age squared -0.0045 -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0040
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028)
Female -0.0859 -0.1249** -0.2108*** -0.2083*** -0.2560***
(0.0535) (0.0511) (0.0528) (0.0488) (0.0506)
Skilled 0.3963*** 0.3573*** 0.3231*** 0.3025***
(0.0514) (0.0535) (0.0517) (0.0548)
Construction 0.1603 0.1725
(0.1543) (0.1501)
Industry 0.3991*** 0.3259**
(0.1454) (0.1426)
Services 0.2625* 0.2503*
(0.1448) (0.1414)
Public Service 0.4571*** 0.3516**
(0.1484) (0.1454)
Informal Employment -0.3156*** -0.2790***
(0.0497) (0.0517)
Interior -0.3432*** -0.3355*** -0.3282*** -0.3116*** -0.3090***
(0.0726) (0.0697) (0.0679) (0.0659) (0.0647)
South -0.2307*** -0.1979*** -0.1297* -0.1446** -0.1002
(0.0686) (0.0682) (0.0726) (0.0684) (0.0712)
Observations 748 748 748 748 748
R-squared 0.1979 0.2620 0.2865 0.3026 0.3158

(continued
104 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Table A4.5. Continued

Variables Rural Tunisia
Age 0.2180*** 0.1836** 0.1823** 0.1583** 0.1632**
(0.0815) (0.0803) (0.0801) (0.0792) (0.0796)
Age squared -0.0042** -0.0037** -0.0037** -0.0032* -0.0033**
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Female -0.1894*** -0.2371*** -0.2805*** -0.2941*** -0.3054***
(0.0455) (0.0438) (0.0482) (0.0465) (0.0489)
Skilled 0.3124*** 0.2383*** 0.2601*** 0.2147***
(0.0463) (0.0493) (0.0460) (0.0483)
Construction 0.0592 0.0590
(0.0594) (0.0591)
Industry 0.1981*** 0.1359**
(0.0571) (0.0574)
Services 0.2160*** 0.1743***
(0.0603) (0.0602)
Public Service 0.4363*** 0.3378***
(0.0943) (0.0953)
Informal Employment -0.2587*** -0.1915***
(0.0474) (0.0483)
Interior -0.0749* -0.1049** -0.0889** -0.0839** -0.0793*
(0.0421) (0.0412) (0.0406) (0.0414) (0.0407)
South -0.1706** -0.1769*** -0.2043*** -0.1623** -0.1874***
(0.0674) (0.0670) (0.0660) (0.0662) (0.0660)
Observations 935 935 935 935 935
R-squared 0.0469 0.0951 0.1294 0.1263 0.1443

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Note: Dependent variable is logarithm of monthly wage. Reference categories are: Sector Agriculture, Region Coast.
Sample: Young people aged 15–29 who earned wage in the last 12 months (rural sample) or in the last seven days (urban sample); youth currently in educa-
tion is excluded.
 Annex 4. Economic Opportunities | 105

Table A4.6. Determinants of Self-Employment, Conditional on Being in Employment (Probit Model)

Explanatory
Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia
Female -0.9099*** -0.8903*** -0.9062*** -0.9066*** -0.2168* -0.2170* -0.2325* -0.2463*
(0.1717) (0.1722) (0.1703) (0.1696) (0.1312) (0.1310) (0.1297) (0.1350)
Primary Completed -0.1445 -0.2068 -0.2237 0.0797 0.0475 -0.0085
(0.2821) (0.2845) (0.2846) (0.1610) (0.1623) (0.1635)
Secondary -0.2379 -0.3461 -0.3359 0.0362 0.0057 -0.1219
Completed
(0.3497) (0.3406) (0.3402) (0.2191) (0.2221) (0.2337)
Tertiary Completed -0.8450*** -0.9766*** -1.0008***
(0.3245) (0.3332) (0.3507)
Vocational Training -0.0700 -0.1756 -0.1926 0.3775 0.3343 0.1772
Completed
(0.3569) (0.3540) (0.3594) (0.3188) (0.3223) (0.3213)
Primary Completed 0.1833 0.1568 0.1754 0.1258
Parent
(0.1945) (0.1940) (0.1153) (0.1176)
Secondary Com- 0.3437 0.3064 0.3801* 0.2770
pleted Parent
(0.2873) (0.2793) (0.2305) (0.2267)
Tertiary Completed 0.2958 0.2514 -0.0961 -0.2294
Parent
(0.2747) (0.2706) (0.3333) (0.3383)
Vocational Training 0.2745 0.3135 0.4578 0.2869
Completed Parent
(0.3941) (0.4070) (0.4670) (0.4261)
2nd Wealth Quintile -0.2049 -0.1367
(0.2280) (0.1840)
3rd Wealth Quintile 0.1084 -0.1362
(0.2191) (0.1919)
4th Wealth Quintile 0.0582 0.1059
(0.2071) (0.1920)
5th Wealth Quintile -0.0026 0.4959**
(Richest)
(0.2404) (0.1989)
Interior 0.1637 0.1182 0.1445 0.1553 -0.3402*** -0.3497*** -0.3399*** -0.2682**

(0.1717) (0.1750) (0.1768) (0.1847) (0.1130) (0.1150) (0.1155) (0.1257)

South 0.3792** 0.3447** 0.3548** 0.3420** -0.5123*** -0.5194*** -0.5308*** -0.4813***
(0.1651) (0.1687) (0.1701) (0.1702) (0.1701) (0.1682) (0.1712) (0.1763)
Observations 719 719 719 719 929 929 929 929
Pseudo R-squared 0.0819 0.1060 0.1100 0.1140 0.0257 0.0276 0.0341 0.0599
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Probit estimation. Dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent was self-employed in the last 12 months (rural sample) or in the last seven
days (urban sample); 0 otherwise. Age dummies are included in the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or
Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with “Parent” capture educational attainment of the
most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older).
Sample: Young people aged 15–29 in employment over the last 12 months; youth currently in education or in vocational training is excluded.
106 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure A4.1. Contract Type of Employed Adults (Aged 30–59)

a. Rural b. Urban

5.8% Open-ended Open-ended

13.3%
Fixed term 17.4% Fixed term
Temporary Temporary
Seasonal 1.5% Seasonal
27.6% Day laborer Day laborer
6.5%

54.5%

6.2%
61.3%
6.0%

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure only refers to working adults and excludes self-employed adults.

Figure A4.2. Adult Employment in Low-Productivity Sectors

100
88.6 89.9
80 Male
68.7
58.0 Female
60
percent

40

20

0
Rural Urban

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure only refers to working adults and excludes self-employed adults.
 Annex 4. Economic Opportunities | 107

Figure A4.3. Adult Employment by Sector

a. Rural b. Urban

Agriculture 6.6% Agriculture

10.5%
Construction Construction
Industry and 12.0% Industry and
29.0%
32.2% manufacturing manufacturing
22.4% Services Services
Public sector Public sector

17.3%

12.9%
22.0%
35.1%

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure only refers to working adults and excludes self-employed adults. The agricultural sector includes jobs in the food processing industry.

Figure A4.4. Intention to Work in Public Sector

a. Rural b. Urban

4.3% Agriculture 2.2% Agriculture

14.4% 16.2%
Construction Construction
Industry and Industry and
manufacturing 0.7% manufacturing
6.9%
Services Services
Public sector Public sector
15.9%
52.8% 21.6% 64.9%

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

108 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure A4.5. Adult Self-Employment—Rural Versus Urban

25 22.7
20 18.0 Male
Female
percent 15

10

5 4.7
1.8
0
Rural Urban

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or training programs.
Annex 5. Skills for Employment and
Other Youth Services
Figure A5.1. Awareness of Active Labor Market Programs by Region and Gender
a. Region b. Gender

AMAL AMAL
50%
50%
CES Regional 40% CES Regional
SCV 40%
Program 30% Program SCV
30%
20% 20%
10% 10%
0% 0%
Public works SIVP Public works SIVP
Coast urban Male rural
Interior urban Male urban
South urban Female rural
Other CAIP Other CAIP
employment Coast rural Female urban
employment
programs Interior rural programs
South rural

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth.

Figure A5.2. Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by Region

18

16

14
Coast urban
12 Interior urban
percent

10 South urban
Coast rural
8 Interior rural
6 South rural

0
AMAL SCV SIVP CAIP Other Public CES
employment works Regional
programs Program

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth.

109
110 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion

Figure A5.3. Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by Region

Program for
Small Enterprises
(PAPPE)
70%
60%
50%
40%
Microloans, 30%
other FONAPRA
20%
10%
0%
Coast urban
Interior urban
South urban
Coast rural
Interior rural
Microloans, FNS South rural
BTS

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth.

Figure A5.4. Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by NEET and Gender

a. NEET b. Gender

Program for Program for

Small Enterprises Small Enterprises
(PAPPE) (PAPPE)
80% 60%
60% 50%
40%
Microloans, 40% Microloans, 30%
other FONAPRA other 20% FONAPRA
20%
10%
0% 0%

Non-NEET rural Male rural

Non-NEET urban Male urban
NEET rural Female rural
Microloans, FNS Microloans, FNS
NEET urban BTS Female urban
BTS

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth.
 Annex 5. Skills for Employment aand Other Youth Services | 111

Figure A5.5. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Region

9
8
7
Coast urban
6
Interior urban
5
percent

South urban
4
Coast rural
3
Interior rural
2
South rural
1
0
Program for FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans,
Small BTS other
Enterprises
(PAPPE)

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth.

Figure A5.6. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by NEET

8
7
6
5 Non-NEET rural
percent

4 Non-NEET urban
3 NEET rural
NEET urban
2
1
0
Program for FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans,
Small BTS other
Enterprises
(PAPPE)

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth.

Figure A5.7. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Poverty

7
6
5
4 Non-poor rural
percent

3 Non-poor urban
Poor rural
2
Poor urban
1
0
Program for FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans,
Small BTS other
Enterprises
(PAPPE)

Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e.

Note: Figure refers to all youth.
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# DFDB00