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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 134

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56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission

*
No. L-43642. January 17, 1985.

SOLFRIDO FEDILLO, petitioner, vs.

WORKMENÊS COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and ANTONIO ESTEBAN,
respondents.

WorkmenÊs Compensation Act; Pre-existence of

illness before employment not valid ground for
denial of compensation benefits.·It is true that
by the very nature of tuberculosis, it is likely that
the petitioner could not have instantly acquired
such an illness. (Leonardo v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 581;
Villones v. EmployeesÊ Compensation Commission,
92 SCRA 320; Corales v. EmployeesÊ
Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 547)
However, the pre-existence of an illness is not a
ground for disallowance of claims for
compensation benefits (Vicente v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 9 SCRA 825).

Same; Tuberculosis which is a latent disease

is compensable where body resistance is weakened
by nature or conditions of work.·From the nature
of the petitionerÊs duties, there is no doubt that
his working conditions aggravated his ailment.
Medical science has it that tuberculosis is an
ailment latent in persons regardless of age, sex,
and occupation. When given favorable conditions,
this disease becomes active and prominent. Some
of these favorable conditions are: too much
physical exertion without the corresponding rest;
exposure to excessive heat and cold, lack of good
food as to pulmonary tuberculosis (Villones v.
EmployeesÊ Compensation Commission, supra;
citing Corales v. EmployeesÊ Compensation
Commission, supra). These conditions, save
perhaps for the last, have been found present in
the case at bar, thereby weakening petitionerÊs

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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VOL. 134, JANUARY 17, 1985 57

Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission

resistance to any latent tuberculosis infection or

reactivating the same (Leonardo v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, supra; Batangas
Transportation Co. v. Perez and WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 11 SCRA 797:
Lorenzo v. WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission
and Philippine Glass Manufacturing Co. Inc., 81
SCRA 430, 440). The compensability of
petitionerÊs illness cannot be denied.

Same; Evidences; Evidences that suffice to

support compensability of PTB.·The physicianÊs
report submitted by the petitioner taken with the
petitionerÊs sworn statement and the claim for
SSS sickness benefits, the uncontroverted claim
for workmenÊs compensation benefits, and the
undisputed fact that he had to stop working
because of sickness, suffices to substantiate the
claim for compensation. The report of the
attending physician was made part of the record
and there is no showing that the same is false or
erroneous.
 Same; Same; X-ray not necessary to support
claim for compensation benefits.·We reiterate,
therefore our pronouncements in cases falling
under the WorkmenÊs Compensation Act that an
x-ray or some other laboratory report is not an
indispensable requisite to compensation; that a
report of an attending examining physician may
be received as evidence and used as proof of the
fact in dispute; that the nature and the conditions
of work contribute to and aggravate in large
measure the employeeÊs ailment and hence,
entitle him to compensation; that when an illness
supervenes in the course of the employment,
there is a presumption that the same arose out of
or was at least aggravated in the course of the
employment, and that this legal presumption can
be overcome only by substantial evidence by the
employer.

Same; Employee who later had to stop

working due to compensable illness is also entitled
temporary total disability benefit.·Finally, the
petitioner asserts entitlement to compensation
under Section 14 of the WorkmenÊs Compensation
Act for loss of earning capacity from the time he
was forced to stop working due to his work-
connected illness. The circumstances warrant the
granting of the same. The object of the law in
allowing compensation during temporary
disability under Section 14 is to compensate the
employee for what he might have earned during
the period of treatment for his injury (Comments
and Annotations on the WorkmenÊs Compensation
Act, Pucan and Besinga, 1971 Edition, page 256).
In the case at bar, the employee was forced to stop
working October 31, 1973 and was, from then on,
under treatment. He was unable to return to
work. He

58

58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission

thus suffered loss of earning capacity from said

date entitling him to compensation under Section
14 for temporary total disability.

PETITION to review the decision of the

WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the

Court.
Jose R. Edis for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of

the WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission
reversing the decision of the WorkmenÊs
Compensation Unit, Sub-Regional Office
No. VI, Bacolod City which granted
petitionerÊs claim for compensation as a
consequence of his illness of pulmonary
tuberculosis (PTB).
Petitioner was employed by private
respondent Antonio Esteban as truck driver
sometime in the year 1972. He was not
known to have been suffering from any
illness at the time of employment.
PetitionerÊs job was to drive trucks
which were used in hauling sugar cane. The
nature of his work exposed him to heat,
rain, dust and other elements of nature
while working in the fields. Strenuous
effort was sometimes called for especially in
fixing a truck whenever it broke down.
When busy with his work, particularly
during the milling seasons, the petitioner
could not eat his meals on time.
Sometime in January, 1973, the
petitioner experienced body weakness, pain
in his joints, dizziness and coughing at
night. He consulted a doctor about his
illness. He was subjected to x-ray
examination by Dr. Alexander Araneta and
was found suffering from „PTB Moderately
Advanced, Active.‰ As a result, the
petitioner was advised to stop working.
Nevertheless, he continued working until
October 31, 1973 when he was compelled to
stop because of his illness.
Petitioner filed a claim for sickness
benefits with the Social Security System
(SSS) with the respondent employer
certifying as to the payment of premiums.
The sickness claim was

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VOL. 134, JANUARY 17, 1985 59

Fedillo vs. WorkmenÂs Compensation
Commission

based on „an illness of PTB advance (sic).‰

He likewise filed a notice of sickness and
claim for compensation with the WorkmenÊs
Compensation Unit, Bacolod City on
December 4, 1973. The Notice of Sickness
and Claim for Compensation was
transmitted to the respondent by the Office
of the WorkmenÊs Compensation Unit,
Bacolod City on December 15, 1973 through
registered mail under Registry Receipt No.
3543.
The claim was not controverted by
respondent, who did not file any answer to
the claim. The WorkmenÊs Compensation
Unit through its Referee Pacifico V.
Militante, rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

„WHEREFORE, an award is hereby adjudged in

favor of the claimant and respondent is ordered to
pay:

„1) The claimant Under Sec. 18 of the Act, as

compensation the sum of TWO
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-
SIX PESOS and 08/100 (P2,446.08)
computed as follows: 50% of his average
 weekly wage of P49.00 equals P24.50
multiplied with 48% NSD or 99.84 weeks
equals P2,446.08.
„2) To Atty. Pedro P. Requieron, under Sec.
31, of the Act, as attorneyÊs fee the sum of
ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO PESOS
and 30/100 (P122.30).
„3) To this Office, under Sec. 55 of the Act,
the sum of TWENTY-FIVE PESOS
(P25.00).

„All payments must be coursed thru this

Office.‰

No benefits under Section 14 of the Act

were awarded After the decision was
rendered, the petitionerÊs counsel filed a
Rejoinder and Manifestation claiming that
the petitioner was entitled not only to the
benefits under Section 18 of his non-
scheduled disability (NSD) but also under
Section 14, on account of his loss of
earnings effective October 31, 1973 when
he was no longer able to work on account of
his illness.
On the other hand, the private
respondent filed a Motion for New Hearing
which was denied by the WorkmenÊs
Compensation Unit for lack of merit. The
case was elevated to the

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60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission

WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission for

review. The Commission, on a finding that
the evidence submitted by the petitioner
was insufficient to support his claim,
reversed the decision appealed from and
dismissed the case for lack of merit,
prompting the petitioner to institute the
present petition for review.
RespondentÊs main objection to the
petitionerÊs claim is that the latterÊs illness
is not work-connected, and is therefore,
non-compensable. He argues that because
of the very nature of PTB as a lingering
illness, taking years to develop, incubate
and become active, petitioner could not
possibly have contracted the disease while
working for the respondent over a short
period of only one year from 1972 to 1973.
Thus, the question arises whether or not an
illness contracted by the petitioner prior to
employment, but which is discovered and
which disables the employee only during
employment, is compensable under the
WorkmenÊs Compensation Act.
It is true that by the very nature of
tuberculosis, it is likely that the petitioner
could not have instantly acquired such an
illness. (Leonardo v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 581;
Villones v. EmployeesÊ Compensation
Commission, 92 SCRA 320; Corales v.
EmployeesÊ Compensation Commission, 88
SCRA 547) However, the pre-existence of an
illness is not a ground for disallowance of
claims for compensation benefits (Vicente v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 9
SCRA 825). Section 2 of the WorkmenÊs
Compensation Act 3428 as amended,
provides:

„SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation.·When an

employee suffers personal injury from any
accident arising out of and in the course of
employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other
illness directly caused by such employment, or
either aggravated by or the result of the nature of
such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter provided. x x x‰

Thus, under the Act, injury or sickness is

compensable·(1) as personal injury from
accident arising out of and in the course of
employment, (2) as illness directly caused
by the employment, (3) as sickness which is
the result of the nature of the employment,
and (4) as sickness aggravated by the
nature of

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VOL. 134, JANUARY 17, 1985 61

Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission

the employment (Comments and

Annotations on the WorkmenÊs
Compensation Act, Pucan and Besinga,
1971 Edition, page 82, citing Quiason &
Fernandez, Labor Law Series, Volume VI,
1964 Edition, page 38). PetitionerÊs case
falls under the rule on aggravation, to wit:
That where claimantÊs disabling disease
was aggravated by the nature of his work,
he is entitled to compensation under the
Act. (Gragasin v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 85 SCRA 222; Bachiller, Sr. v.
Republic of the Philippines, 86 SCRA 99;
Castro v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 87 SCRA 388; delos Angeles v.
Government Service Insurance System, 94
SCRA 308; Balatero v. EmployeesÊ
Compensation Commission, 95 SCRA 608;
Cabreira v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 96 SCRA 269; Philippine
National Railways v. Vda. de Mendoza, 96
SCRA 531; Mirasol v. EmployeesÊ
Compensation Commission, 97 SCRA 307;
Villavert v. EmployeesÊ Compensation
Commission, 110 SCRA 233; Lavilla v.
Secretary of Labor, 122 SCRA 657). Thus, if
employment contributes to the development
of the disease even in a small degree, the
claim is compensable and the claimant
under the WorkmenÊs Compensation Act is
relieved of showing the burden of causation
due to the legal presumption of
compensability in his favor (Valencia v.
Republic of the Philippines, 83 SCRA 713;
Ulibas v. Republic of the Philippines, 83
SCRA 819).
From the nature of the petitionerÊs
duties, there is no doubt that his working
conditions aggravated his ailment. Medical
science has it that tuberculosis is an
ailment latent in persons regardless of age,
sex, and occupation. When given favorable
conditions, this disease becomes active and
prominent. Some of these favorable
conditions are: too much physical exertion
without the corresponding rest; exposure to
excessive heat and cold, lack of good food as
to weaken the body constituents and
contact with people suffering from
pulmonary tuberculosis (Villones v.
EmployeesÊ Compensation Commission,
supra; citing Corales v. EmployeesÊ
Compensation Commission, supra). These
conditions, save perhaps for the last, have
been found present in the case at bar,
thereby weakening petitionerÊs resistance
to any latent tuberculosis infection or
reactivating the same (Leonardo v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation

62

62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission

Commission, supra; Batangas

Transportation Co. v. Perez and WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 11 SCRA 797;
Lorenzo v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission and Philippine Glass
Manufacturing Co. Inc., 81 SCRA 430, 440).
The compensability of petitionerÊs illness
cannot be denied.
Respondent further takes exception to
the sufficiency of the evidence presented by
the petitioner to support his claim.
Presented before the court were (1) an
undated consultation with Dr. Alexander
Araneta showing petitioner to be suffering
from pulmonary tuberculosis moderately
advanced, active; (2) Premium certification
of petitionerÊs employer showing the
amount of premiums paid by the employee
to the Social Security System; and (3)
PetitionerÊs affidavit dated October 31,
1973 stating the circumstances under
which the petitioner contracted the disease.
It is argued that no x-ray, no physical
examination of petitioner and no evaluation
by the WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission physician was made.
In San Valentin v. EmployeesÊ
Compensation Commission (118 SCRA 160)
we held that in workmenÊs compensation
cases, the strict rules of evidence are not
applicable (See also Cristobal v. EmployeesÊ
Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329).
In testing the evidence on the relation
between the injury or disease and the
employment, probability and not certainty
is the touchstone (San Valentin v.
EmployeesÊ Compensation Commission,
supra citing Acosta v. EmployeesÊ
Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 216;
National Housing Commission v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 79
SCRA 281; Vda. de Laron v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 73 SCRA 84).
To be compensable it is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workmenÊs claim is
based is probable (Delegente v. EmployeesÊ
Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 67
citing Lao v. EmployeesÊ Compensation
Commission, 97 SCRA 780 citing Abana, et
al., v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278 citing
Manila Railroad Co. v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission and Pineda, 21
SCRA 98). The substantial evidence rule
and not the preponderance of evidence rule
is followed in the determination of
compensability of an injury or illness
(Galceran v. Secretary of Labor, 115 SCRA
300 citing Iloilo Chinese Commercial School
v. Fabrigar, 3 SCRA 712;

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VOL. 134, JANUARY 17, 1985 63

Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission

Vda. de Olib v. City of Manila, 68 SCRA

380) to give effect to the social justice
purposes of the law.
The physicianÊs report submitted by the
petitioner taken with the petitionerÊs sworn
statement and the claim for SSS sickness
benefits, the uncontroverted claim for
workmenÊs compensation benefits, and the
undisputed fact that he had to stop working
because of sickness, suffices to substantiate
the claim for compensation. The report of
the attending physician was made part of
the record and there is no showing that the
same is false or erroneous. Section 49 of the
WorkmenÊs Compensation Act itself
provides:

„SEC. 49. Procedure.·x x x the Commissioner

may receive as evidence and use as proof of any
fact in dispute the following matters; in addition
to sworn testimony presented at open hearing:
„(1) Reports of attending examining physician,
x x x.‰

(See also Vallo v. WorkmenÊs Compensation

Commission, 73 SCRA 623; National
Development Corporation v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861,
864). Thus, it was error on the part of the
Commission not to give credence to the
findings of Dr. Araneta in the light of the
other corroborative evidence.
We have categorically ruled that an x-
ray or some other laboratory report is not
necessarily an indispensable prerequisite to
compensation. The physicianÊs report does
not require for credibility that the x-ray or
laboratory findings be attached thereto.
Their absence in the physicianÊs report will
not invalidate the diagnosis appearing
therein. Moreover, from the attending
physicianÊs report it can be logically
inferred that a previous x-ray examination
was made, otherwise, the physician could
not have arrived at his diagnosis of the
illness (Flores v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 71 SCRA 633; Ybañez v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 77
SCRA 501; Romero v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 482;
Guillen v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 97 SCRA 327; Bautista v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 88
SCRA 121; Mercado v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 81 SCRA 730;
Bandayan v. WorkmenÊs

64

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ANNOTATED
Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission

Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 305;

and Jacob v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 72 SCRA 575).
We reiterate, therefore our
pronouncements in cases falling under the
WorkmenÊs Compensation Act that an x-ray
or some other laboratory report is not an
indispensable requisite to compensation;
that a report of an attending examining
physician may be received as evidence and
used as proof of the fact in dispute; that the
nature and the conditions of work
contribute to and aggravate in large
measure the employeeÊs ailment and hence,
entitle him to compensation; that when an
illness supervenes in the course of the
employment, there is a presumption that
the same arose out of or was at least
aggravated in the course of the
employment, and that this legal
presumption can be overcome only by
substantial evidence by the employer.
(Mercado v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 81 SCRA 730 citing Monsale v.
Republic of the Philippines and WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 80 SCRA 448;
Despe v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 75 SCRA 350; Gomez v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 75
SCRA 395; Vallo v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission and Republic of
the Philippines, 73 SCRA 623; Ayuso v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 73
SCRA 233; Caparas v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 73 SCRA 221;
Leorna v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 73 SCRA 228; Pros v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 73
SCRA 92; Vda. de Laron v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 73 SCRA 84;
Jacob v. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission, 72 SCRA 575; Mercado v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 12
SCRA 260; Valencia v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 72 SCRA 242;
Aranzanso v. Saguit, 71 SCRA 608; Talip v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 71
SCRA 218).
Further, considering that the foregoing
evidence remains unrebutted because of the
respondentÊs failure to controvert the
petitionerÊs claim, we are constrained to let
the same stand. (Section 45, WorkmenÊs
Compensation Act; and an unbroken line of
cases from Victorias Milling Co. v.
WorkmenÊs Compensation Commission, 108
Phil. 1208 to Tortal v. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 124 SCRA 211).

65
 VOL. 134, JANUARY 17, 1985 65
Fedillo vs. WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission

Finally, the petitioner asserts entitlement

to compensation under Section 14 of the
WorkmenÊs Compensation Act for loss of
earning capacity from the time he was
forced to stop working due to his work-
connected illness. The circumstances
warrant the granting of the same. The
object of the law in allowing compensation
during temporary disability under Section
14 is to compensate the employee for what
he might have earned during the period of
treatment for his injury (Comments and
Annotations on the WorkmenÊs
Compensation Act, Pucan and Besinga,
1971 Edition, page 256). In the case at bar,
the employee was forced to stop working
October 31, 1973 and was, from then on,
under treatment. He was unable to return
to work. He thus suffered loss of earning
capacity from said date entitling him to
compensation under Section 14 for
temporary total disability.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the WorkmenÊs Compensation
Commission under review is hereby
REVERSED. The private respondent is
ordered to pay to:

1) Petitioner under Sections 14 and 18

of the Act, as compensation, the
sum of SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000.00) PESOS;
2) Atty. Pedro Requieron, under
Section 31 of the Act as attorneyÊs
fees the sum of SIX HUNDRED
(P600.00) PESOS; and
3) To the Ministry of Labor and
Employment as administrative fee,
the sum of SIXTY ONE (P61.00)
PESOS.
 SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana and De la

Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee (Chairman), in the result.
Relova, J., took no part.

Petition granted. Decision reversed.

Notes.·Social justice in WorkmenÊs

Compensation cases is not equality but
protection of the laborer as against the
employer. (De los Santos vs. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission, 120 SCRA 730).

66

66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Vda. de Cardiente vs. WorkmenÊs
Compensation Commission

Illnesses arose out of or aggravated by

employment are presumed compensable.
(Lavilla vs. Secretary of Labor, 122 SCRA
657).
For failure to controvert, the employer is
deemed to have renounced the right to
challenge the claim and to have waived all
non jurisdictional defenses. (Lavilla vs.
Secretary of Labor, 122 SCRA 657).

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