CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

3. Origin
General Considerations
Post-Roman. The Magna Charta survived the Roman Empire as the foundation of modern
A. Concept and Origin of the Bill of Rights civilization in Europe, and has provided the fundamental maxim of distributive justice, suum
The Bill of rights is a formal and emphatic legislative assertion and declaration of popular cuique tribuere.
rights and liberties; or the summary of the right and liberties of the people or of the
principles of constitutional law deemed essential and fundamental. (Hamill vs. Hawks, C.C.A.
England. The concessions of Magna Charta were wrung from the king as guaranties against
Okl. 58 F.2d 41, 47)
the oppressions and usurpations of his prerogative. It did not enter into the minds of the
barons to provide security against their own body or in favor of the commons by limiting the
1. Concept
power of parliament; so that bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws declaring forfeitures
of estates, and other arbitrary acts of legislation which occur so frequently in English history,
Inherent and fundamental. One’s rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free were never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land. The omnipotence of
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be parliament over the common law was absolute, even against common right and reason. The
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. The preservation of actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a
liberties does not depend on motives. The Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less free public opinion represented by the commons. In this country written constitutions were
fortunate that must be observed. (PBMEO vs. PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June 1973]) deemed essential to protect the rights and liberties of the people against the encroachments
of power delegated to their governments, and the provisions of Magna Charta were
Not absolute. Police power constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. It is rooted incorporated into bills of rights, They were limitations upon all the powers of government,
in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government legislative as well as executive and judicial.
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary United States. The constitution of the United States was ordained by descendants of
measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. The Bill of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of the English law and history; but it was made for
Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties. an undefined and expanding future, and for a people gathered, and to be gathered, from
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to many nations and of many tongues. While the bill of rights were applied in England only as
one’s will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater guards against executive usurpation and tyranny; in the United States, they have become
number. (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August 1989]) bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation; but in that application, as it would be incongruous
to measure and restrict them by the ancient customary English law, they must be held to
2. Purpose guaranty, not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to
life, liberty, and property.
 to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small B. Classification
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles. (Justice Cardoso, Nature of Judicial Process, 90-93; Tañada and a. Civil Rights, or civil liberties, are personal, natural rights guaranteed by the
Fernando Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed., 71.) Constitution, e.g. freedom of speech, press, freedom from discrimination, etc.
 to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place Constitutionally, they are restraints on Government (Sowers vs. Ohio Civil Rights
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal Commission, 20 Ohio Misc. 115, 252 N.E.2d 463, 479)
principles to be applied by the courts. (West Virginia State Board of Education vs. b. Political Rights are those which may be exercised in the formation or
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638) administration of the government. Rights of citizens established or recognized by
 to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of police power. This constitutions which give them the power to participate directly or indirectly in the
bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include establishment or administration of government. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th
personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its Edition, 1159)
branches or instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights c. Social and Economic Rights
takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed
against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former. (Allado vs. Diokno
C. Doctrine of Preferred Freedom (Hierarchy of Rights)
[GR 113630, 4 May 1994], citing Hernandez vs. Albano, 19 SCRA 95 [1967])
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over d. They all presuppose an equivalent compensation for the private rights interfered
property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression with.
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and e. They are exercised primarily by the legislature.
vitality of our civil and political institutions and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity
and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.” 2. Differences

Imprescriptibility of human rights; Rationale. Property and property rights can be lost thru a. Police power regulates both liberty and property. The power of eminent domain
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the and the power of taxation only affect property rights.
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government b. Police power and the power of taxation may be exercised only by the government.
and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the The power of eminent domain may be exercised by some private entities.
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise. (PBMEO vs. c. The power taken in the exercise of the police power is destroyed because it is
PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June 1973]) noxious or intended for noxious purpose. The property taken under the power of
eminent domain and the power of taxation is intended for a public use or purpose
Tests. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the tests to and is therefore wholesome.
determine the validity of laws affecting property and human rights. d. The compensation of the person subjected to the police power is the intangible
altruistic feeling that he has contributed to the general welfare. The compensation
1. Property rights involved in the other powers is more concrete, to wit, a full and fair equivalent of
the property expropriated or protection and public improvements for the taxes
paid.
A mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive —
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. (PBMEO vs. PBM, 3. Limitations
[GR L-31195, 5 June 1973])
The exercise of the fundamental powers is subject at all times to the limitations and
2. Human rights requirements of the Constitution and may in proper cases be annulled by the courts of
A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, justice.
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent. (PBMEO vs. PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June 1973])
!!! Case(s)
1. PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973) Police Power
D. The Fundamental Powers of the State
A. Definition, Scope & Basis
The fundamental powers of the State are the 1. Definition / Description

a. police power, Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
b. power of eminent domain, and use of liberty and property. (Freund, The Police Power [Chicago, 1904]).
c. power of taxation.

Police power is the power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and
1. Similarities property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the
promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to
a. They are inherent in the State and may be exercised by it without need of express limitations of the Constitution, and especially to the requirement of due process. Police
constitutional grant. power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety,
b. They are not only necessary but indispensable. The State cannot continue or be security, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential
effective unless it is able to exercise them. attribute of government (Marshall vs. Kansas City, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 877, 883)
c. They are methods by which the State interferes with private rights.
Police power has been defined as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere Pervasive and non-waivable. The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” As defined, it authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — or
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the the public order — of the general community. (Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez, [GR 78164, 31
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in July 1987])
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169,
25 August 1989]) Essential, insistent and illimitable. The police power of the state has been described as the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers, which enables it to prohibit all things
2. Scope hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Lozano vs. Martinez, [GR L-63419, 18
Police power regulates not only the property but, more importantly, the liberty of private December 1986])
persons, and virtually all the people.
Dynamic. Police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of
The scope of police power, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a
anticipate the future where it could be done provides enough room for an efficient and constitutional guaranty, such as that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. contracts must yield to the police power of the state. (Lozano vs. Martinez, [GR L-63419, 18
(Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August 1989]) December 1986]) Police power is dynamic, not static, must move with the moving society it is
supposed to regulate. Once exercised, it is not deemed exhausted and may be exercised
3. Basis repeatedly, as often as it is necessary for the protection or the promotion of the public
The justification for police power is found in the ancient Latin maxims, Salus populi est welfare.
suprema lex, and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual benefit to the interests of the greater number. Police power may sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for the attainment of a
legitimate police objective.
Salus populi est suprema lex. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. (Lingo Lumber
Co. vs. Hayes, Tex. Civ. App. 64 SW 2d. 835, 839) C. Who exercises said power?

Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. (Common law maxim meaning that) one should use his On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another (1 Bl. Comm. 306. Chapman exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
vs. Barnett, 131 Ind. App. 30, 169 N.E. 2d 212, 214). health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty
plenary, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power
organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard may be considered as capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal courts. (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor, [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967])
peace, safety, good order and welfare. (Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323)
1. Police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature. By virtue of a valid
The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
termed the ‘law of overwhelming necessity.’ It may be said to be that inherent and plenary administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels,
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and including the barangay. Police power cannot be bargained away through the
welfare of society. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not medium of a contract or even a treaty.
owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in 2. Police power under the general welfare clause authorizes the municipal council to
the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. It is the plenary power of necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon
the State “to govern its citizens.” (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August 1989]) it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
B. Characteristics
protection of property therein. (Villanueva vs. Castaneda, [GR L-61311, 21
September 1987])
The exercise of police power, the choice of measures or remedies if indeed action is made, Test of a valid ordinance
and the ascertainment of facts to which police power is to be based, lies in the discretion of An ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
the legislative department. No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police (1) it must not contravene the constitution or any statute,
power. The only remedy against legislative inaction is a resort to the bar of public opinion, a (2) it must not be unfair or oppressive,
refusal of the electorate to return to members of the legislature who have been remiss in the (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory,
discharge of their duties. The remedy chosen by the legislature cannot be attacked on the (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade,
ground that it is not the best suggested solution, that it is unwise, impractical, inefficacious, (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy, and
or even immoral. These issues are political in nature, and cannot be inquired into by the (6) it must not be unreasonable. (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July
legislature. 1994])
!!! Case(s)
D. Tests of Police Power 5. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
6. Sangalang vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719 (1989)
1. Lawful subject. The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of 7. Villanueva vs. Castaneda, 154 SCRA 142 (1987)
a particular class, require the exercise of the police power. The enjoyment of 8. Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
private rights, when within the scope of police power, may be subordinated to the 9. Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)
interests of the greater number.
2. Lawful means. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the 10. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994)
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The 11. Tano v. Socrates, G.R. 110249, August 27, 1997
lawful objective must be pursued through a lawful method. The means employed
for the accomplishment of the police objective must pass to the test of Administrative Rules and Regulations
reasonableness and conform to the safeguards embodied in the Bill of Rights for !!! Case(s)
the protection of private rights. 12. Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
13. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 119 SCRA 597 (1982)
a. Rational Relations Test (property rights) 14. Anglo-Fil Trading vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983)

A mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive —
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. (PBMEO vs. PBM,
[GR L-31195, 5 June 1973]) Notwithstanding the “new equal protection approach” with its Eminent Domain
emphasis on “suspect classification” and “fundamental rights and interests standard,” the
“rational relation test” still retains its validity. (Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January A. Definition
1984]) Eminent domain is the power to take private property for public use by the state,
municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public
b. Clear and present danger Test (human rights) character. (Housing Authority of Cherokee National of Oklahoma vs. Langley, Okl., 555 P.2d
1025, 1028)
A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular organization, to
the right to prevent. (PBMEO vs. PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June 1973]) reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the
state on account of public exigency and for the public good. Eminent domain is the highest
and most exact idea of property remaining in the government or in the aggregate body of the
!!! Case(s)
people in their sovereign capacity. It gives a right to resume the possession of the property in
2. Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986) the manner directed by the Constitution and the laws of the State, whenever the public
3. Del Rosario vs. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989) interest requires it. (Black’s law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 523)
4. Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)
The term “expropriation” is practically synonymous with the term “eminent domain.”
Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances: (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. vs. Violet Trapping Co., La. App. 200 So.2d. 428, 433)
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously,
there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable C. Constitutional limitation
to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. Art. III, Sec. 9
(Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1) It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot
accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests
of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
of the people is the supreme law. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines Inc. vs. authorized agents, is necessary in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is
Secretary of Agrarian Reform [GR 78741, 14 July 1989]) that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right
B. Who exercises the power?
and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent,
the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. (Bensley vs.
Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation. (Republic v. De Knecht, 182 Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306, and cases cited 73 Am. Dec., 576)
SCRA 142 [1990]). The power of eminent domain is lodged primarily in the national
legislature, but its exercise may validly delegated to other government entities and even to
The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the
quasi-public corporations serving essential public needs or operating public utilities. The
constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any
utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction,
recognition of it in the constitution. The provisions found in most of the state constitutions
the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the
relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to
consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are questions which are
the government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit.
essentially political and which are to be exclusively determined by the legislature, and are
(Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus [40 Phil. 550]). The constitutional restraints are public use
usually not subject to judicial review.
and just compensation.

The following may exercise the power of expropriation:

D. Distinguished from destruction due to necessity
1. The Congress
2. The President of the Philippines
3. The various local legislative bodies The destruction of the property does not come under the right of eminent domain, but under
4. Certain public corporations the right of necessity, of self-preservation. The right of necessity arises under the laws of
5. Quasi-public corporations (Example, quasi-public corporation: PEZA) society or society itself. It is the right of self-defense, of self-preservation, whether applied to
persons or to property. It is a private right vested in every individual, and with which the right
of the state or state necessity has nothing to do (American Print Works vs. Lawrence, 23
Section 23 (Eminent Domain) of Presidential Decree 66, provides that:
N.J.L. 590). Destruction from necessity may be validly undertaken even by private
individuals. Such is not allowed in the case of eminent domain. Further, destruction from
For the acquisition of rights of way, or of any property for the establishment of export necessity cannot require the conversion of the property taken to public use, nor is there any
processing zones, or of low-cost housing projects for the employees working in such zones, need for the payment of compensation.
or for the protection of watershed areas, or for the construction of dams, reservoirs,
wharves, piers, docks, quays, warehouses and other terminal facilities, structures and
E. Objects of Expropriation
approaches thereto, the Authority shall have the right and power to acquire the same by
purchase, by negotiation, or by condemnation proceedings. Should the authority elect to
exercise the right of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings shall be maintained by and Anything that can come under the dominion of man is subject to expropriation. This include
in the name of the Authority and it may proceed in the manner provided for by law. real and personal, tangible and intangible properties. Even property already devoted to
public use is still subject to expropriation, provided this is done directly by the national
legislature or under a specific grant of authority to delegate. The only exceptions to this rule
!!! Case(s)
are money and choses in action. Expropriation of money is futile inasmuch as payment of just
15. City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery of Manila, 40 Phil 349 (1919) compensation is also money. A chose in action is essentially conjectural as to its validity and
16. Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997) its value.
A chose in action is the right of proceeding in a court of law to procure payment of sum of The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
money, or right to recover a personal chattel or a sum of money by action (Gregory vs. regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
Colvin, 235 Ark. 1007, 363 S.W.2d 539, 540); or is the right to receive or recover a debt, US 393)
demand, or damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or omission of a duty
(Moran vs. Adkerson, 168 Tenn. 372, 79 S.W.2d 44, 45) 1. Taking under police power and power of eminent domain distinguished

Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and Taking under police power and taking under the power of eminent domain, however, should
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may be distinguished. The power being exercised was eminent domain when the property
not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the
loss of title and possession. Real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of
easement of right of way. collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
Property subject of expropriation must be by its nature or condition wholesome, as it is compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires
intended to be devoted to a public use. the payment of just compensation to the owner. (City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 106 Phil. 144)

!!! Case(s) A. Taking under police power

17. RP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)
If an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State’s police power, the property
F. Where Expropriation Suit is Filed is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to
promote the general welfare.
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property. Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power
(Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor [GR 138896, 20 June 2000]) deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment
by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to
See Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The
!!! Case(s) restriction is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in
18. Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20, 2000
the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state
merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the
public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further
G. Taking
changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and the owner
Definition and Scope
will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

Common. A physical dispossession of the owner, as when he is ousted from his land or
B. Taking under the power of eminent domain
relieved of his personal property, and is thus deprived of all beneficial use and enjoyment of
his property.
“Taking” under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon
private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal
Legal. To take is to lay hold of, to gain or receive in possession, to seize, to deprive one of the
authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
use or possession of, or to assume ownership (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 1453).
affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
There is taking of property when government action directly interferes with or substantially
enjoyment thereof. (Penn. vs. Carolina Virginia Coastal Corporation, 57 SE 2d 817)
disturbs the owner’s use and enjoyment of the property (Brothers vs. US., [Link]., 594 F.2d
740, 741). To constitute a “taking,” within constitutional limitation, it is not essential that
there be physical seizure or appropriation, and any actual or material interference with In the context of the State’s inherent power of eminent domain, there is a “taking” when the
private property rights constitutes a taking (Board of Com’rs of Lake County vs. Mentor owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical
Lagoons Inc., [Link]., 6 Ohio Msc. 126, 216 N.E.2d 643, 646). Also, taking of property is destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of
affected if application of zoning law denies property owner of economically viable use of his the ordinary use thereof. (U.S. v. Causby, 382 U.S. 256, cited in Municipality of La Carlota v.
land, which can consist of preventing best use of land or extinguishing fundamental attribute NAWASA, 12 SCRA 164.) There is a “taking” in this sense when the expropriator enters
of ownership (Vari-Build Inc. vs. Reno, [Link]., 596 F. Supp. 673, 679). private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for
the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof (Republic v. Vda. de Castelvi, 58 SCRA
336 [1974]). For ownership, after all, “is nothing without the inherent rights of possession, Deprivation of Use
control and enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his
property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the
1. In General
Constitutional sense.” (Municipality of La Carlota v. NAWASA, 12 SCRA 164)

Easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a
2. Stages
fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the
surface of the land. (United States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27 May 1946])
The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
2. Local Government Units
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
the date of the filing of the complaint.” The second phase of the eminent domain action is taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and
concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of
sought to be taken.” This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr.
commissioners. (Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584 [1989]) It is only Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116). A regulation which substantially deprives an
upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. owner of all beneficial use of his property is confiscation and is a deprivation within the
Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs.
to the government. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114). Specifically, while property may be
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]). Therefore, until the action for expropriation has regulated in the interest of the general welfare such as to regard the beautification of
been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents), and in its pursuit,
with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of
owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
ultimately to acquire it through expropriation. practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community. (People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958])
Requisites
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property
1. The expropriator must enter a private property.
without just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period.
of the opinion of zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without
3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority.
compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our government nor in the
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of
or injuriously affected.
public benefit that property remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property under
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs.
Woolhiser (1933) 352 111. 212, 185 N.E. 827)
!!! Case(s)
19. Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
!!! Case(s)
20. City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983) 21. Republic vs. Fajardo , 104 Phil.443 (1958)
22. Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
23. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

Priority in Expropriation
1. Urban Land Reform Over many years and in a multitude of cases the courts have vainly attempted to define
comprehensively the concept of a public use and to formulate a universal test. They have
The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land found here as elsewhere that to formulate anything ultimate, even though it were possible,
reform and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) would, in an inevitably changing world, be unwise if not futile. (Matter of New York City
and Sections 9 and 10 of which specifically provide as follows: Housing Authority v. Muller, 1 NE 2d 153)

Section 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. — Lands for socialized housing shall be Public Use, as traditionally understood, means any use directly available to the general public
acquired in the following order: as a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or accommodation. (Justice Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, 74)
a. Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or Public Use is “the constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain.
-controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; For condemnation purposes, ‘public use’ is one which confers some benefit or advantage to
b. Alienable lands of the public domain; the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public
c. Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of
d. Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a ‘public advantage’ or ‘public
Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program benefit’ accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.” (Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont.
sites which have not yet been acquired; 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.)
e. Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which
have not yet been acquired; and Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private
f. Privately-owned lands. property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as
distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. (Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County,
units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands. 262 U.S. 700, 43 [Link]. 689, 692, 67 [Link]. 1186). The term may be said to mean public
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to
the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a
Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. — The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this
particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be
Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A ‘public use’ for which land
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement,
may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new
negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be
appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and
resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further,
other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of
That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners
communication and transportation. (Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586.)
shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as
herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the
procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be
for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be
allowable. It is not any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily
eminent domain comes into play. The constitution in at least two cases determines what is
through negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual
public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost
occupants of the land shall be given the right of first refusal.
to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
!!! Case(s) whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
24. Filstream International v. CA, 284 SCRA 716 (1998) public use. (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed., pp. 523-524)
25. Estate or Heirs of Reyes vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 132431, February 13, 2004
26. City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001 !!! Case(s)
27. Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983)
H. Public use 28. Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
 29. Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993) payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for then the property owner is made to
30. Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait
for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
(Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001])
I. Genuine Necessity

!!! Case(s)
In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the
legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term “necessary”, in this connection, does not 37. Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the 38. RP vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 71176, May 21, 1990
stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Mitchel, 39. City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No. 142 971, May 07, 2002
50 Phil 832, 837-838 [1927]).

The Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, Determination of Just Compensation
the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it,
the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
A. In General
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for
those of the representatives of the people. In the absence of some constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent The determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and
domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. (City of Manila v. may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. (Export Processing
Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349 [1919]) Zone Authority vs. Dulay [GR L-59603, 29 April 1987])

!!! Case(s) Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three
32. Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988) (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the
court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment
33. De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the
34. Republic vs. De Knecht, G.R. 87351, February 12, 1990 commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court.
35. PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995) (Section 5, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) The commissioners shall assess the
36. NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411. June 19, 2003 consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or
J. Just Compensation purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
Defined carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the
and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (Section 6, Rule 67, 1997
its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. (Export Processing Rules of Civil Procedure)
Zone Authority vs. Dulay [GR L-59603, 29 April 1987])
Still, according to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners’ report. It
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
owner by the expropriator (Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasques, 32 Phil. 286). It has been essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of
loss. (Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467) The word “just” is used to intensify the the value as gathered from the record (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample (City of Manila v. Estrada, B. Local Government Units
25 Phil. 208).
Section 19, Republic Act 7160. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its
Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss
laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken.
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., ”just not only to the
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take individual whose property is taken,” “but to the public, which is to pay for it.” (Republic v.
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making Lara, 50 O.G. 5778 [1954])
a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of
the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: !!! Case(s)
Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be 41. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, G.R. 50147 August 3, 1990
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of
the property.
42. NPC v. CA, 254 SCRA 577 (1996)

Manner of Payment
!!! Case(s) A. Manner
40. EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
1. Traditional

Although it may be said that “where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for
it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as ‘the
When Determined compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and
all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount.’” (Lewis, Law of
A. When Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, pp. 1166-1167); the method of expropriation adopted in
Philippine jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be
finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. (Visayan
Where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property subject Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 40 Phil. 550) Further, the Rules provide that “upon the
thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time of the filing of the complaint. This is so filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the
provided by the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
being conditioned on its deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to
property as provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject
There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
to the expropriation suit. In these instances, the just compensation shall be determined as of authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the
the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. (Ansaldo vs. Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal
Tantuico [GR 50147, 3 August 1990]) property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be
deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court. xxx” (Section 2, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil
When plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the Procedure)
value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the
complaint and the latter should be the basis for the determination of the value, when the 2. Revolutionary
taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the
proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that
compensation ‘be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint’ would never be Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that “Upon receipt by the landowner of the
operative. (Republic v. Philippine National Bank, 1 SCRA 957 [1961]) corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
B. Why shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.” (Association of Small Landowners in
thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the the Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [GR 78741, 14 July 1989])
plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been
a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to B. Medium
general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for
1. Traditional innovations as “progressive compensation” and “State-subsidized compensation” were also
proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. (Record of the Constitutional
is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 647, 704; Vol. 3, pp. 16-20, 243-247.)
possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss The expropriation in Comprehensive Agrarian Reform affects all private agricultural lands
which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
(Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286) retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit
not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire
Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-
taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes
compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision
of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Such a program will involve not mere
value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property millions of pesos but hundreds of billions of pesos, far more indeed than the amount of P50
is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not billion initially appropriated. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. Since
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions the Court is
to be given and received for such property. (J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner
31 SCRA 413) of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator, the Court declared that the content and
manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot
of the Constitution. The invalidation of Section 18 will result in the nullification of the entire
compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the
program, killing the farmer’s hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the
condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the
spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not the intention of the
time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of
Constitution.
eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon
both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. (Mandl v. City of Phoenix,
18 p 2d 273.) SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner
in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in
accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as
provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for
a reliable and constant standard of compensation. (Sacremento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron,
the land.
156 Cal. 408, 104 pp. 979, 980.)

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
“Just compensation” for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money,
landowner:
which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the
power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other
valuable advantage. (City of Waterbury v. Platt Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76 Conn, 435 citing 1. Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
Butler v. Ravine Road Sewer Com’rs, 39 N.J.L. 665; Bloodgood v. Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. a. For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess
18 Wend. 9 35, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Sanborn v. Helden, 51 Cal 266; Burlington & C.R. Co. v. hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the
Schweikart, 14 p. 329, 10 Colo, 178; 23 Words and Phrases, pl. 460.) balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
b. For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50)
2. Revolutionary
hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
The records of the Constitutional Commission do not provide any categorical agreement c. For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five
among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the financial instruments negotiable at any time.
suggestion to “fine tune” the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was 2. Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
also felt that they should “leave it to Congress” to determine how payment should be made preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in
to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
 3. Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability; In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation,
4. LBP bonds, which shall have the following features: a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on
a. Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. the issue of just compensation. Trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right
Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. (Manila Electric
every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Company (MERALCO) vs. Pineda [GR 59791, 13 February 1992])
Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash !!! Case(s)
portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid 45. Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)
correspondingly in LBP bonds; 46. NPC v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998
b. Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used
by the landowner, his successors-in-interest or his assigns, up
to the amount of their face value, for any of the following: Legal Interest for Expropriation Cases
i. Acquisition of land or other real properties of the
government, including assets under the Asset
Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which provides that “If the obligation consists in the payment
Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no
government financial institutions in the same
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
province or region where the lands for which the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is 6% per annum.” Central Bank Circular 416
bonds were paid are situated;
does not apply as it only applies to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to
ii. Acquisition of shares of stock of government owned
judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. (National Power
or controlled corporations or shares of stock owned
Corporation vs. Angas [GR 60225-26, 8 May 1992])
by the government in private corporations;
iii. Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the
provisional release of accused persons, or for !!! Case(s)
performance bonds; 47. NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992)
iv. Security for loans with any government financial 48. Republic v. Salem Investment Corp., G.R. 137569 23 June 2000
institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall 49.
be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a
small and medium-scale industry, in the same
province or region as the land for which the bonds
are paid;
v. Payment for various taxes and fees to government:
Provided, That the use of these bonds for these
purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of Writ of Possession
the outstanding balance of the financial instruments;
Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the 1. Issuance of writ of possession
percentages mentioned above;
vi. Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a
the original bondholder in government universities, complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the
colleges, trade schools, and other institutions; government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to
vii. Payment for fees of the immediate family of the expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of
original bondholder in government hospital; and possession becomes ministerial. (Biglang-awa v. Bacalla, GR 139927 and 139936, 22
viii. Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time November 2000.)
allow.
!!! Case(s)
It is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation
43. Assoc. of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)
proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for
44. DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995) expropriation sufficient inform and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court
on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit
Trial with Commissioners
requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with. (Ignacio v. Guerrero [GR L- Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with
49088, 29 May 1987]) the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make
available at affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to under-privileged and
2. Remedy for party assailing validity of writ of possession homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate
employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State
shall respect the rights of small property owners.
A petition for review could not have been resorted to inasmuch as the order of the trial court
granting a writ of possession was merely interlocutory from which no appeal could be taken.
Rule 45, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to final judgments or orders of Property held by a municipal corporation in its private capacity is not subject to the
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial Court. A petition for unrestricted control of the legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived of such
certiorari is the suitable remedy in view of Rule 65, §1 which provides “When any tribunal, property against its will, except by the exercise of eminent domain with payment of full
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of compensation.” (McQuillin Municipal Corporation, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, pp. 670-681).
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the In its private capacity a municipal corporation is wholly different. The people of a compact
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper community usually require certain conveniences which cannot be furnished without a
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or franchise from the State and which are either unnecessary in the rural districts, such as a
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental system of sewers, or parks and open spaces, or which on account of the expenses it would be
reliefs as law and justice may require.” financially impossible to supply except where the population is reasonably dense, such as
water or gas. But in so far as the municipality is thus authorized to exercise the functions of a
!!! Case(s) private corporation, it is clothed with the capacities of a private corporation and may claim
49. City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001 its rights and immunities, even as against the sovereign, and is subject to the liabilities of
such a corporation, even as against third parties. (19 R.C.L. p. 698)

!!! Case(s)

K. Expropriation of Utilities, Landed Estates and Municipal Property

50. City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 114 (1959)

Art. XII, Sec. 18 51. Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968)

Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, effective 1 July 1997
operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government. Rule 67, Expropriation

Art. XIII, Sec. 4 Section 1. The complaint. — The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a
verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation,
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all
right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein,
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If the title to any
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the
may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall effect shall be made in the complaint. (1a)
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing. Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. —
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the
Art. XIII, Sec. 9 defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation. — Upon the rendition of the order of
the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested
Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within
be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court. which their report shall be submitted to the court.

After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be
report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. (2a) resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the
objections. (5a)
Section 3. Defenses and objections. — If a defendant has no objection or defense to the
action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. — Before entering upon the performance of their
manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform
claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in
entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same. the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are
authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless
the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties, to attend, view and
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any
examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the
objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time
same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners
stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in
shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the
adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-
public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation
claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent
or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no
pleading.
case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed,
or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (6a)
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of
justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from
Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. — The court may order the
the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation whether or not a
commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been
defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount
passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the
of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the
commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought
award. (n)
to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The
commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and
Section 4. Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the defenses against the right of such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and
the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise
as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies
determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which
whichever came first. to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. (7a)

A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party Section 8. Action upon commissioners’ report. — Upon the expiration of the period of ten
aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period
just compensation to be paid. but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement
of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or judgment in accordance therewith, or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the
discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a) commissioners for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part and it may make such
order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the expropriation for public use or purpose of property belonging to such minor or person
exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or person judicially declared to be
property so taken. (8a) incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or competent. (14a)

Section 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken
is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum
or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of
the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall Taxation
require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before
the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry A. Definition and Nature
has already been made. (9a)
1. Definition
Section 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. — Upon payment by the plaintiff a. Taxation
to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon
from the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to him of the amount so  the method by which enforced proportional contributions are exacted.
fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the property  the power by which the sovereign, through its lawmaking body, raises revenue to
expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or defray the necessary expenses of government.
to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of  a way of apportioning the costs of government among those who in some measure
section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent themselves from the court, or are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burden.
decline to receive the amount tendered, the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court  a “Symbiotic” relationship, whereby in exchange for the protection that the citizens
and such deposit shall have the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or get from the government, taxes are paid.
the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)

b. Taxes
Section 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. — The right of the plaintiff to
enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or
purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property levied by the
determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering lawmaking body of the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government
the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of the and for public needs. (Cooley, Taxation, 4th edition, Section 1)
possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained
and may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a) Distinction with license fees. The term “tax” applies — generally speaking — to all kinds of
exactions which become public funds. The term is often loosely used to include levies for
Section 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of revenue as well as levies for regulatory purposes. Thus license fees are commonly called
the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, taxes. Legally speaking, however, license fee is a legal concept quite distinct from tax; the
shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the former is imposed in the exercise of police power for purposes of regulation, while the latter
judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner. (12a) is imposed under the taxing power for the purpose of raising revenues (MacQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, Vol. 9, 3rd Edition, p. 26).
Section 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. — The judgment entered in expropriation
proceedings shall state definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or Distinction with special assessments. While the word “tax” in its broad meaning, includes
interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or purpose for which it is both general taxes and special assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment,
expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be and an assessment is a tax, yet there is a recognized distinction between them in that
recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and its effect assessment is confined to local impositions upon property for the payment of the cost of
shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or public improvements in its immediate vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to
purpose. (13a) the property assessed. The differences between a special assessment and a tax are that (1) a
special assessment can be levied only on land; (2) a special assessment cannot (at least in
most states) be made a personal liability of the person assessed; (3) a special assessment is
Section 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. — The guardian or guardian ad litem of a based wholly on benefits; and (4) a special assessment is exceptional both as to time and
minor or of a person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the locality. The imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in a prescribed area, is
court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the a tax and not an assessment, although the purpose is to make a local improvement on a
street or highway. A charge imposed only on property owners benefited is a special properly be invoked to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. (Sison v.
assessment rather than a tax notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax. (Apostolic Prefect of Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July 1984])
the Mountain Province vs. the Treasurer of Baguio City [GR 47252, 18 April 1941]; citing
Cooley) B. Purpose

2. Attributes / Characteristics of taxation Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary
hindrance. Despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of one’s hard-earned income to
1. A forced charge, imposition or contribution and as such it operates in invitum. the taxing authorities, every person who is able to must contribute his share in the running of
(Rochester vs. Bloss, 175 NY 42, 27 NE 794, 61 LRA [NS] Ann 7, Cas. 15) Taxes are the government. The government for its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible
not in the nature of contracts between the party and party but grow out of a duty and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral
to, and are the positive acts of the government, to the making and enforcing of and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel
which, the personal consent of individual taxpayers is not required (Republic vs. the erroneous notion that it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power.
Mambulao Lumber [GR L-17725, 28 February 1962]). (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue [GR L-28896, 17 February 1988])
2. It is a pecuniary burden payable in money, but such a tax is not necessarily
confined to those payable in money (1 Cooley 3). 1. Revenue: The purpose of taxation is to provide funds or property with which the
3. It is levied by the legislative body of the State because the taxing power is State promotes the general welfare and protection of its citizens. (51 Am. Jur. 71-
pecuniary and exclusively legislative in character. (51 Am. Jr. 71) 73) Raising of revenues is the principal object of taxation. (Bagatsing vs. Ramirez
4. It is assessed in accordance with some reasonable rule of apportionment, [GR L-41631, 17 December 1976])
conformably with the constitutional mandate on progressivity of a taxing system. 2. Non-Revenue:
(Article VI, Section 28[1], 1987 Constitution). a. Regulation: Taxes may also be imposed for a regulatory purpose as for
5. It reaches even the citizen abroad and his income earned from sources outside his example, in the promotion, rehabilitation and stabilization of industry
State; as well as all income earned in the taxing State, whether by citizens or aliens, which is affected with public interest. (See Lutz vs. Araneta [GR L-7859,
and all immovable and tangible personal properties found in its territory, as well as 22 December 1955] , and Caltex Philippines vs. Commission on Audit [GR
tangible personal property owned by persons domiciled therein, are subject to its 92585, 8 May 1992])
taxing power (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, 86) b. Promotion of general welfare: If objective and methods are alike
6. A tax is levied for a public purpose as taxation itself involves a burden to provide constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not be levy
revenue for public purposes of a general nature. taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may
be made to implement the state’s police power. (Lutz V. Araneta, 98 Phil.
3. Nature of taxing power 148 [1955]; citing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S.
412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M’Culloch v.
 Inherent. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. )
the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. c. Reduction of social inequality: Made possible through the progressive
Taxes being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is system of taxation where the objective is to prevent the undue
of the essence. (Sison v. Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July 1984]) concentration of wealth in the hands of a few individuals. (Aban,
 High prerogative of sovereignty. As the power of taxation is a high prerogative of Benjamin. Law of Basic Taxation in the Philippines, Second Edition 1994,
sovereignty, the relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or page 6).
diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate, must be strictly construed, d. Encourage economic growth: In the realm of tax exemptions and tax
and the same must be coached in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may reliefs, the purpose of taxation (the power to tax being the power also
be applied. (84 C.J.S. pp. 659-800) not to tax. — Ed.) is to grant incentives or exemptions in order to
 Legislative. Taxing power is peculiarly and exclusively legislative in character and encourage investments and thereby promote the country’s economic
remains undiminished in the legislative in character and remains undiminished in growth. (Ibid.)
the legislature in the absence of an express surrender thereof, clear and explicit in e. Protectionism: In some important sectors of the economy, taxes
its terms. (51 Am. Jur. 71-73) sometimes provide protection to local industries like protective tariffs and
customs duties. (Ibid.)
 Constitutionally limited. The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is the !!! Case(s)
strongest of all the powers of government. For all its plenitude, the power to tax
has restrictions. The Constitution sets forth such limits. Adversely affecting as it
52. CIR vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988)
does property rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses may 53. Commissioner vs. Makasiar, 177 SCRA 27 (1989)
 That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat
and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one
C. Scope (The power to tax is the power to destroy) government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, with
respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the
control, are propositions not to be denied. But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the
Philippine internal revenue laws are not political in nature and as such were continued in
magic of the word confidence. Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably
force during the period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the
destroy. To carry it to the excess of destruction, would be an abuse, to presume which,
occupation government. As a matter of fact, income tax returns were filed during that period
would banish that confidence which is essential to all government. (Chief Justice Marshall,
and income tax payment were effected and considered valid and legal. Such tax laws are
McCulloch vs. Maryland, 17 US 316 [1819]) In those days (the case of McCullough vs.
deemed to be the laws of the occupied territory and not of the occupying enemy. (Hilado vs.
Maryland [1819] — Ed.) it was not recognized as it is today that most of the distinctions of
CIR [GR. L-9408, 31 October 1956.])
the law are distinctions of degree. If the States had any power it was assumed that they had
all power, and that the necessary alternative was to deny it altogether. But this Court which
So pervasive is the power of taxation that it reaches even the citizen abroad and his income so often has defeated the attempt to tax in certain ways can defeat an attempt to
earned from sources outside his State. In other cases, all income earned in the taxing State, discriminate or otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power
whether by citizens or aliens, and all immovable and tangible personal properties found in its to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits. The power to fix rates is the power to
territory, as well as tangible personal property owned by persons domiciled therein, are destroy if unlimited, but this Court while it endeavors to prevent confiscation does not
subject to its taxing power (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, 86) Tariff and prevent the fixing of rates. (Dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes, Panhandle Oil Co. vs. State
customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the public revenue which are of Mississippi Ex Rel. Knox, 277 US 218 [1928]). Construing the “power to tax is the power to
the lifeblood that enables the government to carry out functions it has been instituted to destroy,” it merely describes “not the purposes for which the tax may be used bt the degree
perform. (Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar [GR 79307, 29 August 1989]) of vigor with which the taxing power may be employed in order to raise revenue (1 Cooley
179-181).
Legislative taxing power or discretion extends to the following:
D. Who exercises the power?
1. Subjects and objects of tax
2. Amount and rate of tax 1. In general
3. Purpose for which taxes are to be levied
4. Apportionment of the tax ( general, limited to a particular locality, or mixed)
Taxing power is peculiarly and exclusively legislative in character and remains undiminished
5. Situs of taxation
in the legislative in character and remains undiminished in the legislature in the absence of
6. Manner and mode of enforcement and collection
an express surrender thereof, clear and explicit in its terms. (51 Am. Jur. 71-73) It is inherent
in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
(Aban, Benjamin. Law of Basic Taxation in the Philippines, Second Edition 1994, page 8). repeatedly held that “inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation” (Carmichael vs. Southern Coal &
The taxing authority can select the subjects of taxation (Gomez vs. Palomar (GR L-23645, 29 Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245, citing numerous authorities, at p. 1251).
October 1988). The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the differentiation conforms to the practical Still, tax collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the
dictates of justice and equity, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is very reason for government itself. It is a requirement in all democratic regimes that it be
therefore uniform. There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. It is therefore
that is required is that the tax applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the
similar situation. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. It is enough that the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common good,
classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. (Sison v. may be achieved. If it is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will
Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July 1984]) Thus, a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based then come to his succor. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the law has not been observed.
of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue [GR L-28896, 17 February 1988])
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class (Felwa v. Salas [GR L-26511, 29 Oct
2. Local Government Units
1966]). Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. (Ormoc Sugar Company vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City [GR L-23794, 17
February 1968])
Previously, a municipal corporation has no inherent power of taxation. To enact a valid 2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
ordinance, the City must find in its charter the power to do so, for said power cannot be limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
assumed. A municipal corporation, unlike a sovereign state, is clothed with no inherent tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
power of taxation. Its charter must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
corporation cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed strictissimi development program of the Government.
juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used must be resolved against the 3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
municipal corporation. (Santos Lumber Co. vs. City of Cebu, et al., 102 Phil., 870; See also appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
Arong vs. Raffiñan, 98 Phil., 422). Now, direct authority has been conferred to local buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
government units by the 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 5, Article X thereof, which religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
provides that “Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of taxation.
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the 4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.”
Art. XIV, Sec. 4 (3)
Except as otherwise provided in the Local Government Code (RA 7160), the province may Section 4.
levy only the taxes, fees, and charges as provided in Article I, Chapter II, Title I, Book II; such xxx
the Tax on Transfer of Real Property Ownership; Tax on Business of Printing and Publication; 3. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions
Franchise Tax; Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources; Professional Tax; used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be
Amusement Tax; Annual Fixed Tax For Every Delivery Truck or Van of Manufacturers or exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the
Producers, Wholesalers of, Dealers, or Retailers in, Certain Products (Section 134). Further, corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
municipalities may levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces (Section in the manner provided by law.
142). Furthermore, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or Art. X, Sec. 5
municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and
collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them and Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
distributed in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code, and Provided revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
further that the rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees,
for the province or municipality by not more than 50% except the rates of professional and and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
amusement taxes (Section 151).
Tax Exemptions
Section 130 of the Local Government Code provides for fundamental principles that shall
govern the exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local government
1. Nature
units, that is, (a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit; (b) Taxes, fees,
charges and other impositions shall: (1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the
taxpayer’s ability to pay; (2) be levied and collected only for public purposes; (3) not be Tax exemptions are either constitutional or statutory. Exemption is granted religious and
unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory; (4) not be contrary to law, public policy, charitable institutions because they give considerable assistance to the State in the
national economic policy, or in the restraint of trade; (c) The collection of local taxes, fees, improvement of the morality of the people and the care of the indigent and the
charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private person; (d) The revenue handicapped. (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 Edition, 92-93) Statutory exceptions are
collected pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code shall inure solely to the granted in the discretion of the legislature, but such law should be passed with the
benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress. Where the taxation is granted
fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and, (e) Each gratuitously, it may be validly revoked at will, with or without cause. However, if the
local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation. exemption is granted for valuable consideration it is deemed to partake of the nature of a
contract and the obligation thereof is protected against impairment (Ibid., 94-95)
Art. VI Sec. 28
Section 28.

1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
By its very nature, the law that exempts one from tax must be clearly expressed because the Double Taxation
exemption cannot be created by implication. Exemption from taxation are highly disfavored
in law; and he who claims an exemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant There is double taxation when additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the same
of organic or statute law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be permitted to taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing period and for the same purpose. (Cooley on
exist upon vague implication. (Asiatic Petroleum Co. vs. Llanes, 49 Phil., 466; See also House Taxation, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 48) Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer
vs. Posadas, 53 Phil., 338.) is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity (cf. Manila vs. Interisland Gas
Service, 52 Off. Gaz. 6579, Manuf. Life Ins. Co. vs. Meer, 89 Phil. 357).
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution (Apostolic Prefect of the Mountain Province vs. the Treasurer of Baguio City [GR National vis-a-vis local. Where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by
47252, 18 April 1941]). The phrase “exempt from taxation,” as employed in the Constitution the city, the argument against double taxation may not be invoked, as there is nothing
should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption from inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to
the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated in the Constitution are the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions
property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property thereof. (Punsalan v. Municipal Board of Manila [GR L-4817, 26 May 1954])
tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. Its
assessment was not on the property themselves. It does not rest upon general ownership,
Possibly both local, Tax and license fee. Both a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the
but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
same business or occupation, or for selling the same article, this not being in violation of the
receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious
rule against double taxation (Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Manila [GR L-
purposes do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. (Lladoc v. Commissioner of
16619, 29 June 1963]; citing Bentley Gray Dry Goods Co., vs. City of Tampa 137 Fla. 641, 188
Internal Revenue [GR L-19201, 16 June 1965])
SO. 758; MacQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 9, 3rd Edition, p. 83).

As to franchise grantees and other entities specifically granted exemption by the legislature,
National vis-a-vis another country. Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the
“tax exemption must be strictly construed and that the exemption will not be held to be
taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity (cf. Manila vs.
conferred unless the terms under which it is granted clearly and distinctly show that such
Interisland Gas Service, 52 Off. Gaz. 6579, Manuf. Life Ins. Co. vs. Meer, 89 Phil. 357). Where
was the intention of the parties.” (Philippine Acetylene vs. CIR [GR L-19707, 17 August 1967]
the taxpayers would have to pay two taxes on the same income (one in the Philippines and
one in the United States, for example), the Philippine government only receives the proceeds
2. Burden of Proof of one tax. As between the Philippines, where the income was earned and where the
taxpayer is domiciled, and the United States, where that income was not earned and where
The cardinal rule in taxation is that exemptions therefrom are highly disfavored in law and he the taxpayer did not reside, it is indisputable that justice and equity demand that the tax on
who claims tax exemption must be able to justify his claim or right thereto by the clearest the income should accrue to the benefit of the Philippines. Any relief from the alleged double
grant of organic or statute law. (Wonder Mechanical Engineering vs. CTA [GR L-22805 & L- taxation should come from the United States, and not from the Philippines, since the
27858, 30 June 1975]) The burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed former’s right to burden the taxpayer is solely predicated on his citizenship, without
deduction. It is the universal rule that he who claims an exemption from his share of the contributing to the production of the wealth that is being taxed. (CIR vs. Lednicky [GR L-
common burden of taxation must justify his claim by showing that the Legislature intended 18169, L-18286, & L-21434; 31 July 1964.])
to exempt him by words too plain to be mistaken. (Statutory Construction by Francisco, citing !!! Case(s)
Government of Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, 25 Phil. 42.) 60. Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil.46 (1954)

It is axiomatic that when public property is involved, exemption is the rule and taxation, the License Fees
exception. (SSS vs. Bacolod City [GR L-35726, 21 July 1982])
!!! Case(s) There are three kinds of licenses recognized by law: (1) licenses for the regulation of useful
54. YMCA vs. CIR, 33 Phil. 217 (1916) occupations; (2) licenses for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
55. Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) enterprises; and (3) licenses for revenue only. Non-payment of a license fee for a business
56. Lladoc vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 292 (1965)
makes the business illegal unlike tax.
57. Province of Abra vs. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104 (1981)
The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered in determining whether it is a tax or
58. Abra Valley College vs. Aquino , 162 SCRA 106 (1988)
an exercise of the police power. The amount may be so large as to itself show that the
59. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957) purpose was to raise revenue and not to regulate, but in regard to this matter there is a
marked distinction between license fees imposed upon useful and beneficial occupations
which the sovereign wishes to regulate but not restrict, and those which are inimical and “Due process of law” mean law in its regular course of administration, according to
dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the latter case the fee may be very large prescribed forms, and in accordance with the general rules for the protection of individual
without necessarily being a tax. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. IV, pp. 3516-17) rights. (Hurtado vs. California, citing Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129) Due process, in any
particular case, means such an exercise of the powers of the government as the settled
The power to regulate as an exercise of police power does not include the power to impose maxims of law permit and sanction under such safeguards for the protection of individual
fees for revenue purposes. Fees for purely regulatory purposes “may only be of sufficient rights as those maxims prescribe. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534, 572 [1918])
amount to include the expenses of issuing the license and the cost of the necessary
inspection or police surveillance, taking into account not only the expense of direct Due process is described as “responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
regulation but also incidental expenses. (Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818) The regulatory dictates of justice .”(Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR
fee “must be no more than sufficient to cover the actual cost of inspection or examination as L-24693, 31 July 1967]) It has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
nearly as the same can be estimated. If it were possible to prove in advance the exact cost, embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. (Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
that would be the limit of the fee (Manila Electric Co. vs. Auditor General, 73 Phil. 129-135). Supreme Court (1938) pp. 32-33.)
!!! Case(s)
61. Physical Therapy Org. vs. Mun. Board of Manila, G.R. 10448, August 30, 1957 b. Nature

Dynamic. Due process continues to be dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation
V-A. Individual Rights: Due Process calling for its application. The very elasticity of the provision makes this possible and thus
enlarges the rights of the individual to his life, liberty or property. (Justice Cruz,
Art. III, Sec. I Constitutional Law, 200 Edition, 98-99)

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall Waivable. The right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly so, as long as
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf. If he opts to be silent where he
has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced
(Stronghold Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 88050,30 January 1990]).
Art. III. Sec. 14 (1)
c. Scope
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
Due process applies and protects all persons, without regard to any difference of race, color
1. Definition, Nature and Scope or nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their
property is concerned (Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163). It includes aliens and
their means of livelihood (Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978]).
a. Definition / Concept
Even the State is entitled to due process (Uy vs. Genato, 57 SCRA 123, People vs. Bocar, 138
SCRA 166).
The concept of due process is that it is a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial, so that every citizen shall hold
2. Purpose of the guaranty
his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which !!! Case(s)
govern society. (Hurtado vs. People of State of California [110 U.S. 516, 3 March 1884]) It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. (Ermita
62. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)

Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967])

3. Meaning of Life, Liberty, and Property

No attempt was made to spell out the meaning of due process or to define the concept with
some degree of exactitude. Due process continues to be dynamic and resilient, adaptable to
every situation calling for its application. The very elasticity of the provision makes this a. Life
possible and thus enlarges the rights of the individual to his life, liberty or property. (Justice
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 200 Edition, 98-99) Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, and extends to the use
of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable (Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional
Law, 380; Buck vs. Bell, 274 US 200).
The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just the protection of the right to be 2. The law must be intended for the interest of the public rather than for private
alive or to the security of one’s limb against physical harm. The right to life is also the right to interest.
a good life. (Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A !!! Case(s)
commentary, 1996 Edition, 102). 63. Villegas vs. Hu Chong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 275 (1978)
64. Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)
b. Liberty 65. Ople v. Torres, 292 SCRA 141. (1998)
66. Lawrence and Garner v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
Liberty means the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or 67. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
servitude. It includes the right of the citizen to be free to use facilities in all lawful ways (Rubi,
et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919]) 5. Procedural Due Process

c. Property The justice that procedural due process guarantees is the one “which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.” (Daniel
Property means anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of Webster, Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518) The twin requirements of
contract. It represents more than the things that a person owns; it includes the right to notice and hearing constitutes the essential elements of due process and neither of these
secure and dispose of them (Tonaco vs. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197). elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty. (Vinta
Maritime Co. Inc. vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 656)
Protected property has been deemed to include vested rights as a perfect mining claim, or a
perfected homestead, or a final judgment. It also includes the right to work and the right to Requisites:
earn a living (Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
commentary, 1996 Edition, 101). One’s employment, profession, trade, or calling is protected 1. There must be an impartial tribunal clothes with judicial power to hear and
property (Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines Inc., 145 SCRA 268, 279 [28 October 1986]). determine the matter before it.
2. The court must have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and over the
A license is not considered protected property, but is deemed a privilege withdrawn when property which is the subject matter of the proceeding, if any.
public interest required its withdrawal. Still, a privilege may evolve into some form of 3. There must be opportunity to be heard.
property protected by the Constitution when a holder of such privilege has been enjoying it 4. The judgment must be rendered after trial and in accordance with law.
for so long and has put in substantial investment making the business the source of
employment for thousands. Once licenses are issued, continued possession may become Publication Requirement
essential in the pursuit f a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses involve state action that
adjudicated important interests of the licensees. (Bell vs. Burson, 402 US 535, 539 [1971])
The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” refers not to the need of publication but to the
requirement of 15 days. The 15 days can be lengthened or shortened but not to the point of
Public office is not property but a public trust or agency. The right to office, however, is allowing no publication at all. There can be no such thing as a law that is effective
protected right. Due process may be relied upon by public officials to protect the security of immediately, even if the law is not penal in nature. The underlying reason for this rule is that
tenure which in the limited sense is analogous to property (Morfe vs. Mutuc, [GR L-20387, 31 due process, which is a rule of fairness, requires that those who must obey a command must
January 1968]). first know the command. Related to the rule on publication is the rule on vagueness. A law
that is utterly vague is defective because it fails to give notice of what it commands. (Fr.
4. Substantive Due Process Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A commentary, 1996
Edition, 122). As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights comprehensible standards that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
of the person to his life, liberty or property. The inquiry is whether the law is a proper meaning and differ as to its application (Tribe, American Constitutional Law 718 (1987), citing
exercise of legislative power. Connally vs. General Construction Co., 269 US 385 [1926]). It is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
Requisites:
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. (People vs. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196)
1. The means are reasonable for the accomplishment of the purpose of the law; and
!!! Case(s) justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands
68. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986) as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business
69. PITC v. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 (1996) of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done,
and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.
70. Pilipinas Kao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105014, December 18, 2001
(Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995])
71. Republic v. Extelcom, G.R. 147096, January 15, 2002

!!! Case(s)
Impartial Court or Tribunal
78. Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995)

A court affected by bias or prejudice cannot be expected to render a fair and impartial 79. People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 121039, October 18, 2001
decision. Every litigant is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (Gutierrez vs.
Santos [GR L-15624, 30 May 1961]). There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches Notice and Hearing:
a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already waiting only to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. The judge Notice to a party is essential to enable it to adduce its own evidence and to meet and refute
will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the evidence submitted by the other party. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and
the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law (Javier vs. Commission on Elections, void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally (David vs. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707).
144 SCRA 194). Due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever
reason, not to be heard. If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced (Stronghold Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Court of
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as Appeals [GR 88050,30 January 1990]).
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed !!! Case(s)
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, 80. Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita, 330 SCRA 153 (2000)
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his 81. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139466, October 17, 2000
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
82. People vs. Estrada G.R. No. 130487 June 19, 2000
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
83. Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 111397, August 12, 2002

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, 84. Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 134278, August 7, 2002
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. 85. Roxas v. Vasquez, G.R. 114944, June 21, 2001
!!!Case(s)
72. Tanada vs. PAEC, 141 SCRA 307 (1986) Exceptions to notice and hearing requirements
73. Anzaldo vs. Clave , 119 SCRA 353 (1982)
74. Tumey vs. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1997) Due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require trial-
type proceedings. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to
75. People v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452 (1996)
be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. “’To be
76. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997) heard’ does not only mean verbal arguments in court. One may be heard also through
77. People v. Medenilla, G.R. No. 131636-39. March 25, 2001 pleadings. Where opportunity to be head, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded , there is no denial of procedural due process. (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 166
Prejudicial Publicity SCRA 316)

Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
due process right to fair trial. However, pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as
right of an accused to fair trial. The mere exposure of judges to publications and publicity generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive,
the barrage of publicity. (People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001]) Still, the administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a
Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general
publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is
entitled to notice and hearing (73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, 94. Alcuaz vs. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (1988)
pages 452 and 453; cited in Philcomsat v. Alcuaz [GR 84818, 18 December 1989]). 95. Non vs. Hon. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 30, 1990

The right to appeal is not essential to the right to a hearing. Except when guaranteed by the
constitution, appeal may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretions. But as long
as the law allows him to appeal, denial of that remedy is a denial of due process. The
legislature cannot deprive anyone of the right to appeals in (1) all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
(2) all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto; (3) all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue; (4) all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher; and
(5) all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved; as specified in Article VIII, Equal Protection
Section 5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Definition
!!! Case(s)
86. Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989) Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
87. Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833 (1957) alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. (Association of Small
88. De Bisshop vs. Galang, 8 SCRA 244 (1963) Landowners in the Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [GR 78741, 14 July 1989];
89. Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Achacoso, 161 SCRA 232 (1988) Ichong vs. Hernandez, 11 Phil. 1155)

Application
6. Administrative Due Process
1. Equal Application
Requisites:
Substantive equality is not enough. It is also required that the law be applied equally. Even if
1. There must be a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit the law is fair and impartial on its face, it will still violate equal protection if it is administered
evidence in support thereof; “with an evil eye and an uneven hand,” so as to unjustly benefit some and prejudice others.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself; 2. Valid Classification
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least The clause “equal protection of the laws” does not preclude classification of individuals, who
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties; may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323)
consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. (International
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
Harvester Co. vs. Missouri, 234 US 199) To be valid, it must conform to the following
and the reasons for the decision.
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
!!! Case(s) apply equally to all the members of the class. (People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12)
90. Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940)
91. Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation, 77 SCRA 321 (1977) Political, Economic and Social Equality
92. Meralco vs. PSC, 11 SCRA 317 (1964)
93. Ateneo vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 (1986) Art. XIII, Sec. 1 and 2 (social justice)
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect Id., Sec. 2, par. 2 (reservation of marine resources)
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and Section 2. xxx
political power for the common good.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
property and its increments. citizens.

Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic Art. III, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts)
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
Id., Sec. 3 (protection to labor) shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (legal aid to poor)
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
all. xxx

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
rights and benefits as may be provided by law. inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. Supreme Court.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right Art. IX-C, Sec. 10 (protection of candidates)
of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns to investments, and to expansion and growth. Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.
Art. XII, Sec. 10 (nationalization of business)
Art. II, Sec. 26 (public service)
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress
shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
Art. II, Sec. 14 (equality of women and men)
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

Sexual Discrimination
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective
sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity only proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of
if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be
(PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon [GR L-81958, 30 June 1988]) reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending
cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision.
!!! Case(s) (Lacson v. Executive Secretary [GR 128096, 20 January 1999])
96. Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
!!! Case(s)
98. People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
99. People vs. Isinain, 85 Phil. 648 (1950)
100. Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. 130716, December 9, 1998
Taxation
101. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982)

The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. This requirement is met when the tax
102. Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found. The 103. Soriano v. C.A., 304 SCRA 231 (1999)
rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is
hardly attainable. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. It is enough that the Public Policy
classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. (Sison v.
Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July 1984]) !!! Case(s)
104. Unido vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17 (1981)
!!! Case(s)
105. PJA vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993)
97. Sison vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654 (1984)
106. Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700 (1995)
Administration of Justice 107. Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999
108. ISAE v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
Although the constitutional guaranty requires the treatment alike, in the same place and 109. PHILRECA vs. DILG, G.R. No. 143076. June 10, 2003
under like circumstances and conditions, of all persons subjected to state legislation; a state,
as a part of its police power, may exercise a large measure of discretion, without violating the
equal protection guaranty, in creating and defining criminal offenses, and may make
classifications as to persons amenable to punishment, so long as the classifications are
reasonable and the legislation bears equally on all in the same class, and, where a reasonable
classification is made as between persons or corporations, the persons or corporations in
each class may be dealt with in a manner different from that employed with regard to the
persons or corporations in other classes. (People v. Isinain [GR L-2857, 28 February 1950])

Once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its
dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge, once
jurisdiction is acquired by the trial court. The government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth Non-Impairment Clause
cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases pending in the courts, for said
dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. This is a direct encroachment on judicial Art. III, Sec. 10
powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. (Chavez v. PCGG [GR 130716, 9
December 1998])
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

The classification between those pending cases involving those whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments, as against those Section 10 dissected
cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not
 a. Law. It includes statutes enacted by the national legislature, executive orders and While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute,
administrative regulations promulgated under a valid delegation of power, and since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. (Ortigas v. Feati [GR
municipal ordinances passed by the local legislative bodies (Lim vs. Register of L-24670, 14 December 1979]) The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and
Deeds, 46 OG 3665). It does not include judicial decisions or adjudications made by requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to read with literal exactness
administrative bodies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers. (Justice Cruz, like a mathematical formula for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the
Constitutional Law, 2000 Edition, 253) constitutional prohibition the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
b. Impairment. It is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract (Clements vs. interests of its people. (Abella v. NLRC [GR 71813, 20 July 1987])
Nolting, 42 Phil. 702)
c. Obligation. The obligation of a contract is the law or duty which binds the parties to A contract cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote
perform their undertaking or agreement according to its terms and intent. health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights,
(Sturgees vs. Crownshields, 4 Wheat. 122) whenever necessary. (Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) [GR 71169, 22
d. Contracts. It refers to any lawful agreement on property or property rights, December 1988]) Legislation appropriate to safeguard said interest may modify or abrogate
whether real or personal, tangible or intangible. The agreement may be executed contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
or executory. (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 Edition, 252) it does not the obligations as between the parties but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
include licenses and public office. power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with
reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be
1. Purpose understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power. (Abella v. NLRC [GR
71813, 20 July 1987])
The purpose of the non-impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual
agreements against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, the will of the obligor Police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract.
and the obligee must be observed and the obligation of their contract must not be impaired. Every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an
(Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 Edition, 252) implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power
can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it
2. When impairment occurs entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. (Villanueva v. Castaneda [GR
L-61311, 21 September 1987])
To impair, the law must retroact so as to affect existing contracts concluded before its
enactment. A later law (except if it involves police power) which enlarges, abridges, or in any Emergency Powers
!!! Case(s)
manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract
itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition 112. Rutter vs. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953)
against impairment of contracts. (Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) [GR 71169, Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances
22 December 1988]) !!! Case(s)
113. Ortigas vs. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533 (1980)
Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. The degree of diminution 114. Villanueva vs. Castaneda, 154 SCRA 142 (1987)
is immaterial. As long as the original rights of either of the parties are changed to its 115. Sangalang vs. IAC, 168 SCRA 634 (1988)
prejudice, there is an impairment of the obligation of the contract. (Justice Cruz, 116. Ortigas & Co. v. CA, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000
Constitutional Law, 2000 Edition, 254-255) Labor Contracts
!!! Case(s)
In case of remedies, there will be impairment only if all of them are withdrawn, with the 117. Abella vs. NLRC 152 SCRA 140 (1987)
result that either of the parties will be unable to enforce his rights under the original Administrative Regulations
agreement. There will be no impairment as long as a substantial and efficacious remedy !!! Case(s)
remains. This rule holds true even if the remedy retained is the most difficult to employ and 118. Tiro vs. Hontanosas, 125 SCRA 697 (1983)
it is the easier ones that are withdrawn. (Manila Trading Co. vs. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461) Rental Laws
!!! Case(s)
3. When allowed 119. Caleon vs. Agus Development Corp., 207 SCRA 748 (1992)

Tax Exemptions
While tax exemptions contained in special franchises are in the nature of contracts and a part property described therein and bring it before the court. ( Section 1, Rule 126, Revised Rules
of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless are far from of Court)
being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term
and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those b. Origin
agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds
or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government,
The present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and
acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental
seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter (Section 1 [3], Article III) which was worded as “The
immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to be confused
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. (Meralco v.
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
Laguna [GR 131359, 5 May 1999])
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Said provision
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
!!! Case(s) Constitution, which provided that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
120. Meralco v. Province of Laguna, 306 SCRA 750 (1999) houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Arrests, Searches and Seizures (People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991])

Art. III, Sec. 2 and 3 c. Construction

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by them (State vs. Custer
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding
searched and the persons or things to be seized. is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search
warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6
Section 3. Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order The Fourth Amendment’s policy against unreasonable searches and seizures authorizes
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. warrants to search for contraband, fruits or instrumentalities of crime, or “any property that
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense.” Upon proper showing, the
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. warrant is to issue “identifying the property and naming or describing the person or place to
be searched.” Probable cause for the warrant must be presented, but there is nothing in the
Rule indicating that the officers must be entitled to arrest the owner of the “place” to be
searched before a search warrant may issue and the “property” may be searched for and
seized. The Rule deals with warrants to search, and is unrelated to arrests. Nor is there
Preliminaries anything in the Fourth Amendment indicating that absent probable cause to arrest a third
party, resort must be had to a subpoena. (Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May
1. Definition, Source and Construction of provision 1978])

a. Definition (search warrant) Searches and seizures, in a technical sense, are independent of, rather than ancillary to,
arrest and arraignment (ALI, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Commentary 491;
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, Proposed Off. Draft 1975).
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
2. Court’s Function, as to Search and Seizure
a. Issuance of search warrants, and power to quash warrants As explained in People v. Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345): “It
is deference to one’s personality that lies at the core of this right but it could be also looked
It is undisputed that only judges have the power to issue search warrants. (Salazar vs. upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one’s home, but not
Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 [1990]) This function is exclusively judicial. Inherent in the courts’ necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought
power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. In this to be guarded is a man’s prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
connection, the Supreme Court has ruled that the motion to quash should be filed in the haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
court that issued the warrant unless a criminal case has already been instituted in another welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however
court, in which case, the motion should be filed with the latter. (People vs. Court of Appeals, powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in
291 SCRA 400 [1998]). the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of
his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757
Because of the fundamental public interest in implementing the criminal law, the search
[1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in
warrant, a heretofore effective and constitutionally acceptable enforcement tool, should not
his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly
be suppressed on the basis of surmise and without solid evidence supporting the change.
characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a `spiritual concept: the belief that to
Forbidding the warrant and insisting on the subpoena instead when the custodian of the
value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the
object of the search is not then suspected of crime, involves serious hazards to criminal
long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must
investigation. (Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May 1978])
not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards. (ibid, p. 74).”
b. Determination of validity of search and seizure
!!! Case(s)
What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is 121. Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil 637 (1946)
purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
(Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211, 216 [1989]) 2. To Whom Directed

1. Purpose and Importance of the guaranty The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
a. Purpose law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. The modifications introduced in the 1987
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to Constitution (RE: Sec. 2, Art. III; in relation to the phraseology of the 1935 Constitution) relate
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to the judge in the issuance thereof. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. (Adams vs. New York, 192 U. S., 585.) whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed
But it does not prohibit the Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else. (People vs.
by a private person or under authority of state law. (Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383; Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991])
Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465.)
The constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
injury and violence, as for his repose. (Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, his residence, his papers, and other possessions. There the state, however powerful, does
195 [K. B.]) The overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in not as such have the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
our traditions since the origins of the Republic” meant that absent a warrant or exigent traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
circumstances, police could not enter a home to make an arrest. An arrest warrant founded unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Villanueva v. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345
the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. (Payton v. New York , [1972]; Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US
445 U. S. 573, 603-604 (1980]) 616 [1886]).

b. Importance The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and its
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be 125. Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547 (1978)
a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the 126. Wilson v. Layne, 98-0083, May 24, 1999
purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure
4. Valid warrant
by process duly served. (Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 US 465 [1921], 41 S Ct. 547; 65 [Link].
1048)
A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer,
!!! Case(s)
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. (Alvarez vs.
122. People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937]; citing Section 95, General
Orders 58, as amended by section 6 of Act 2886)

Crime should exist first. In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a
finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill
these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. (Solid Triangle Sales Corp.
3. Who May Invoke the Right?
vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23 November 2001])

a. In general

Alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
Conditions for a valid warrant
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. (People vs.
Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991])
a) Existence of Probable Cause
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and 1. Probable cause defined, construed
cannot be availed of by third parties. (Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. [GR L-19550, 19 June
1967]) Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
b. Corporations that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. (People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 262
[1998]; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984]) In the determination of
Although, an officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the
probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify
state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional
the issuance or quashal of the search warrant. (Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR
powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, a corporation is
144309, 23 November 2001])
entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name
and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no In applying the “probable cause” standard “by which a particular decision to search is tested
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness,” it is necessary “to focus upon the
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion” and that in criminal
under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 investigations a warrant to search for recoverable items is reasonable “only when there is
L. ed. 652.) ‘probable cause’ to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling.” The critical
element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime
!!! Case(s)
but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific “things” to be searched for and
seized are located on the property to which entry is sought. (Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436
123. Bache and Co., vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323 (1971)
US 547, 31 May 1978])
124. Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
2. Probable cause in issuance of warrants distinguished from probable cause in preliminary In fine, probable cause exists in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of
investigation marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; (People v. Claudio, 160
SCRA 646 [1988]) (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed
While the power to issue search warrants upon showing probable cause is a function which is to be acting suspiciously; (People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990]) (c) where the accused
exclusively judicial, “the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier
has been described as an executive function.” (People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 received confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana;
[1998]) The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the (People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751 [1990]) (d) where Narcom agents had received
one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession
proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the other’s finding as prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of
regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the other. The a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification
first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second, whether papers when requested to do so; (People v. Malmsteadt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991]) (f) where the
an information should be filed in court. (Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23 moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and
November 2001]) clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong — that said accused were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country; (People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]) (g)
3. Reliable information as basis for probable cause
where the arresting officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose
identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous test-buy operation, would be
Notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him; (People v. Saycon, 236
yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding one’s abdomen, SCRA 325 [1994]) (h) where police officers received an information that the accused, who
or of standing on a corner with one’s eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to
came near, does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does putting Manila; (People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 [1995]) and (i) where the appearance of the
something in one’s pocket, handing over one’s baggage, riding a motorcycle, nor does accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian
holding a bag on board a trisikad sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing asset. (People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 [1999])
the street per se. Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria.
Recently, in People v. Binad Sy Chua, the Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, !!! Case(s)
who was walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the exception in
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, the Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to
127. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)

be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually 128. Chandler v. Miller, April 15, 1997, D-96-126
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the 129. People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432) (1999)
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. 130. People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001
In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of 131. Solid Triangle Sale v. Sheriff, G.R. No. 144309 November 23, 2001
“suspicious” circumstances: People v. Tangliben (accused was “acting suspiciously”), People
v. Malmstedt (a bulge on the accused’s waist), and People v. de Guzman (likewise a bulge on 132. People v. Salanguit, G.R. 133254, April 18, 2001
the waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-fitting clothes). There is, however, another
set of jurisprudence that deems “reliable information” sufficient to justify a search incident
to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos. To this class b) Personal determination by judge
of cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr., People v. Bagista, People v. Balingan, People v. Lising,
People v. Montilla, People v. Valdez, and People v. Gonzales. In these cases, the arresting 1. In General
authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or
suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is actually
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
committing, or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to
two, come under some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Thus,
Article III, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 constitution , and Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Maspil, Jr. involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a moving vehicle, Bagista
Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except “upon
was both, and Lising and Montilla were consented searches. Nevertheless, the great majority
probable cause.” The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the
of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in turn, more faithfully adheres to the letter
exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be
of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the phrase “in his presence” therein, connoting personal
delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary. (Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-
knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. (People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September
32409, 27 February 1971]; Codal references modified to suit present Constitution and Rules
2003])
of Court)
2. Obscene Materials Sufficiency of deposition or affidavit. The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury
The case of Pita vs. Court of Appeals, GR 80806, 5 October 1989, (1) The authorities must could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath
apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant
in order; (2) The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom
are “obscene”, and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant one considers to be reliable. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
State interference and action; (3) The judge must determine whether or not the same are personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
indeed “obscene:” the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor’s convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
sound discretion. (4) If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. (Alvarez vs. Court of First
search warrant prayed for; (5) The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937])
of the Revised Penal Code; and (6) Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court
may assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed “obscene.” The Court states, !!! Case(s)
however, that “these do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or 139. Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil 68 (1938)
applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the 140. Yee Sue Kuy vs. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141, (1940)
Revised Penal code.”
141. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (1937)

!!! Case(s)
142. Mata vs. Bayona , 128 SCRA 388 (1984)

133. Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)

134. Sta. Rosa Mining Co., vs. Fiscal Zabala, 153 SCRA 367 (1987)
d) Particularity of description
135. People vs. Inting, 187 SCRA 785 (1990)
136. Paderanga vs. Drilon, G.R. 96080, April 19, 1991 Purpose. A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
137. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1987) things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things
138. Abdula v. Guiani. 326 SCRA 1 (2000) to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave
the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end
c) Examination of witnesses that “unreasonable searches and seizures” may not be made, — that abuses may not be
committed. (Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896)
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Section 5, Rule 126, is more emphatic
and candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to “personally examine 1. Description of Place
on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce.” (Bache & Co.
(Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971]; Codal references modified to suit present The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
Constitution and Rules of Court) Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant searched. (Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December 1989])
and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. (Roan v. Gonzales, GR
71410, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 694) 2. Description of items to be seized

Listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described
commission of perjury, and administering the oath to the complainant and his witness; therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be
cannot be consider a personal examination. The reading of the stenographic notes to the specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. (In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil.
Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; 384, 389 [1932]) Where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
for by that manner the Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the that no warrant could issue. As a corollary, however, we could not logically conclude that
judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were where the description of those goods to be seized have been expressed technically, all others
important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not of a similar nature but not bearing the exact technical descriptions could not be lawfully
there was probable cause. (Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971]) subject to seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable purpose of the warrant issued would be
defeated by mere technicalities. (Yousef Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals [GR 126859, 4
September 2001])
Tests. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio; thereon. –
57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which
the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad 1. The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). under oath.
2. Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall
One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the
under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. (Bache and Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall
Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 [1971]) ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complied with and
shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall
!!! Case(s) see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
143. Olaes vs. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987) 3. The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian
of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of
144. Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1989)
the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
145. Chia vs. Coll. of Customs, 177 SCRA 755 (1989)
146. 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (1988) A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
147. Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
148. PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999) Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except
149. Yousef Al Ghoul vs. C.A, GR No.126859, September 4, 2001 upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

5. Objects of Seizure
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of
course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars
Rule 126, Sec. 2 State intrusions to a person’s body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by
virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; “otherwise such search and seizure become
search warrant shall be filed with the following: ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision.” This
interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in
2. For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant
where the warrant shall be enforced. to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3)
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in
arrests of escaped prisoners. (People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999])
the court where the criminal action is pending.

The following instances are not deemed “unreasonable” even in the absence of a warrant:
6. Warrantless searches
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence); (2) Search of evidence in “plain view”; (3) Search of a moving
Rule 126, Sec. 12 vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity; (4) Consented warrantless search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop and Frisk; and (7) submission to the authority of the law. (Const. Lim., 8th ed., Vol. I, I, 630.) As the
Exigent and emergency circumstances. (People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 [1999]) constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or
a) Valid Waiver waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard
for the supremacy of the law. (56 C. J., pp. 1180, 1181.)
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one
cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
!!! Case(s)
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 695). The
consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., 150. People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462 (1992)
the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or 151. People v. Correa, 285 SCRA 679 (1998)
coercion. (68 Am Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, §135.) Hence, consent to a search is not to be 152. People vs. Ramos, G.R. 85401-02, June 4, 1990
lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. (68 Am Jur 2d Searches
153. People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994)
and Seizures, §136.)
154. Veroy vs. Layague, 210 SCRA 97 (1992)

The Supreme Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless 155. People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457 (1992)
searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers’ request to search personnel 156. Lopez vs. Comm. Of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)
effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt 157. Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 5, 2002
that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even 158. People vs. Asis, et. al., G.R. No. 142531, October 15, 2002
verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and
consequences of such request. (People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 [1999])
159. People vs. Tudtud, et. al., G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003

The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
b) Incident to lawful arrest
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. (Schneckloth vs. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218) In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and
must first appear, first, that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said being committed or after its commission. The right to search includes in both instances that
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. ( People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 16 of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected
[1986]; citing Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689 [1938]; 67 C. J., 299) with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed. (Agnello vs. United
States, 269 US 20.)
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent
and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in his possession or in his
was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively control may be seized and used in evidence against him; and an officer has the right to make
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable grounds to
police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) have committed a felony. (Carroll vs. United States, 267 US 132.)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took
place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous
which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. (United States vs. Tillman, 963 F. 2d extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon
137; Florida vs. Royer, 460 U.S. 491; United States vs. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544.) or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be
reversed. (People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]; citing Malacat v. Court of
Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, 175 [1997].)
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. (People v. Encinada, 280 A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the
SCRA 72, 91 [1997]; citing Aniog v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424, 436-437 [1994]) premises within his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to
In any event, the failure to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for
constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a incriminatory evidence and destroy it. (People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001])
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person 168. People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist 169. People vs. Libnao, et al., G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search
for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or c) Plain view doctrine
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer
in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed 1. Elements
in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of
the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase Under the “plain view doctrine,” unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an officer who
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
evidence. There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room presented in evidence. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993]; citing Harris v. United
other than that in which an arrest occurs — or, for that matter, for searching through all the States, 390 U.S. 234, 19 [Link]. 2d 1067 [1968]) For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a)
desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. (Chimel v. California; 23 prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent
L. Ed. 2d 685, 23 June 1969) illegality of the evidence before the police. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993];
citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433,29 L. Ed. 2d 564 [1971]) The elements of
Rule 126, Section 12, Rules of Court plain-view are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
thereon. – evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search. (People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 [1999])
1. The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified 2. When object is in plain view
under oath.
2. Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the position from which he can particularly view the area. (Harris v. United States, supra) In the
person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall incriminating the accused. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra) The object must be open to
ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complied with and eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]) It
shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was
3. The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
the return, the result, and other actions of the judge. configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court. experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article,
then the article is deemed in plain view. (Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744,
751 [1981]) It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe
!!! Case(s)
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (People v. Musa [GR
160. Chimel vs. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1964)
96177, 27 January 1993])
161. People vs. de la Cruz, G.R. 83988, April 18, 1990
162. People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 645 (1991) 3. Plain-view objects as evidence
163. People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)
164. People v. Cuenco, G.R. 126277, November 16, 1988 The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend
165. Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998) beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
166. People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990) immediate control. Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the
167. People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592 (2000) position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When
the discovery of the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw 172. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 [1987]
what was placed before him in full view, the warrantless seizure of the object was legal on 173. People v. Compacion, G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001
the basis of the “plain view” doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. (People v.
Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993]) Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight
is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the d) Enforcement of fishing, customs and immigration laws
search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 [Link]. 1202 [1927]; Ker
v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 [Link].2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 1. Fishing and customs laws
[1968]).
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the
4. Limitations to plain-view customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
The “plain view” doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be
defendant’s guilt. The “plain view” doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not constitutionally effected (Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857, 871-74;
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, 774; Carroll vs. U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice
incriminating object. What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 225; Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1966
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came ed., p. 300). The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to fishery laws: They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. (Roldan vs. Arca [GR L-25434, 25 July
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present 1975])
unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is 2. Immigration laws
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
until something incriminating at last emerges. The “plain view” doctrine neither justify the
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
“plain view” of the object. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993])
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the “plain view doctrine” board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
been explained that “What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
supplement the prior justification –whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another procedures. (People vs. Johnson [GR 138881, 18 December 2000])
until something incriminating at last emerges.” (People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April
2001] citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433,29 L. Ed. 2d 564 [1971]) !!! Case(s)

!!! Case(s)
175. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 320 (1975)
170. Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)
176. Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517 (1996)
171. People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000
177. People v. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785 (1997)
 178. People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000 vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling
179. People vs. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003)
express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent
approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
180. Bureau of Customs v. Ogarlo, 329 SCRA 289 (2000)
question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a
serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called “bootlegging’ or ‘rum
e) “Stop and frisk” running,’ which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private
ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways.
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they
is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which
Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against it is made. (People v. Case [320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686]) Peace officers may
the person from whom they were taken. (Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1, 10 June 1968]) lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of
a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle,
since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
While probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that
warrant may be sought. (People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994])
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of
two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.
an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal (Padilla vs. CA, et al., 269 SCRA 402 [1997]; citing United States vs. Rem, 984 F 2d 806; United
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self- States vs. McCoy, 977 F 2d 706; United States vs. Rusher, 966 F 2d 868; United States vs.
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person Parker, 928 F 2d 365.) Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
be used against the police officer. (Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12 December practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things
1997]) and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of
!!! Case(s)
a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. A
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
181. Terry vs. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) in which the warrant must be sought. (Asuncion vs. CA, et al., 302 SCRA 490 (1999); People
182. People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996) vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]) Searches without warrant of automobiles is also
183. Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 7, 1997 allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided
such searches are made at borders or “constructive borders” like checkpoints near the
184. Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)
boundary lines of the State. (Almedia-Sanchez vs. United States, 37 [Link]. 2d 596; Carrol vs.
185. Florida v. J.L., 98-1993, March 28, 2000 United States, 267 U.S. 132)

f) Search of moving vehicles 2. Manner of search

1. Rationale In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited
to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to
by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions, until the slower, visual inspection. (People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]) When, however, a vehicle is
animal- drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana; (5) the accused who
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6)
proceeds of some criminal offense. (People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63 [1992]; Valmonte v. de where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information
Villa, 185 SCRA 665 [1990]). and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy. (Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 136292, 15 January 2002])
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the “stop-and-search” without warrant at
military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se (People vs. !!! Case(s)
Exala, 221 SCRA 494 [1993]; Valmonte vs. de Villa, 178 SCRA 211 [1989]), for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to 186. People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995)
motorists (People vs. Escaño, 323 SCRA 754 [2000], citing U.S. vs. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543). A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive
187. Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 125959, February 1, 1999
search. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against 188. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to 189. People vs. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980)
the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant 190. Whren v. United States, 95-5841, January 10, 1996
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a
191. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 00-00262, May 29, 2001
light therein without opening the car’s doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search
or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. g) Emergency circumstances

The physical intrusion of a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area As there was general chaos and disorder at that time … [that] the courts in the surrounding
protected by the Fourth Amendment (United States vs. Pierre, 932 F. 2d 377 cited in areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
Hermann, Search and Seizure Checklists, 1994 ed., p. 246). On the other hand, when a vehicle deserted … [and that] the military operatives … had reasonable ground to believe that a
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be crime was being committed, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or against a warrantless search. (People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994])
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or
they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be !!! Case(s)
searched (Obra, et al. vs. CA, et al., 317 SCRA 594 [1999]; People vs. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63
[1992]). 192. People vs. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716 (1994)

3. Existence of probable cause

h) Checkpoints

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
1. Minimal interference
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of
the territory and in the absence of probable cause. (People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401
(1991]) Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential
interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken
by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and
The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
will not be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both appear to and actually
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a
involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established
package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command (”Narcom”)
checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the
of the Philippine National Police (”PNP”) had received a confidential report from informers
stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed
that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall
was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or
agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he
oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing
failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (4)
the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals them there
Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical
was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of
discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop !!! Case(s)
judicial review. (U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 49 L Ed. 2d 1116 [1976])
196. Camara vs. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967)
2. Exercise of police power

Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the

government, in the interest of public security. At the cost of occasional inconvenience, 7. Arrests with warrant
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community. (Valmonte vs. de Villa, [GR 83988, 29 September 1989]) Under a. Probable cause defined
exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance,
or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist’s right on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
to “free passage without interruption”, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
brief question or two. (Valmonte vs. de Villa, [GR 83988, 24 May1989]) officers making the arrest. (People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]; citing Umil v. Ramos, 202
SCRA 251, 263 [1991]; United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917]; People v. Bati, 189 SCRA
3. Extent 97 [1990]; People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1990] and People v. Ramos 186 SCRA 184 [1990])
Thus, the term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be (People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72, 85-86 [1997]) Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such
regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. These routine facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. (Valmonte vs. de Villa, [GR that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. (1 Bernas 87) In
83988, 24 May 1989]) People v. Montilla, (285 SCRA 703 [1998]) the Court acknowledged that “the evidentiary
measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges, and correlatively, for effecting
!!! Case(s) warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized.”

193. Gen. De Villa vs. Valmonte G.R. No. 83988 (May 24, 1990) b. Probable cause distinguished from prima facie evidence
194. Aniag vs. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
195. People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754 (2000) The confusing concepts of “prima facie evidence” and “probable cause” were clarified and
set aright by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof
that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as
i) Inspection of buildings
suffices to “engender as well founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of the crime
and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related
Administrative searches are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal “finds
Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant cause to hold the respondent for trial,” or where “a probable cause exists.” It should,
procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be
individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for considered as legally authorized. (People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703, 720-721 [1998])
upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of
the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland,
c. Reliable information as basis for probable cause
Fourth Amendment interests are not merely “peripheral” where municipal fire, health, and
housing inspection programs are involved whose purpose is to determine the existence of
physical conditions not complying with local ordinances. (Camara vs. Municipal Court of the The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that
City and Country of San Francisco [387 US 523, 5 June 1967]) “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5
(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case
offense.” Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required,
that the search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint,
one’s abdomen, or of standing on a corner with one’s eyes moving very fast, looking at every affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic
person who came near, does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
does putting something in one’s pocket, handing over one’s baggage, riding a motorcycle, nor which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The
does holding a bag on board a trisikad sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as
crossing the street per se. (People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003]) Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his
d. Personal determination by judge report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to
personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has
consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
or the report of the investigating officer.” (Ho vs. People, 280 SCRA 365)
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and The question whether “probable cause” exists or not must depend upon the judgment and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents discretion of the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant. It does not mean that particular
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, facts must exist in each particular case. It simply means that sufficient facts must be
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may presented to the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the
disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses particular person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause for believing that
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. (Soliven vs. the person whose arrest is sought committed the crime charged. No rule can be laid down
Makasiar, 167 SCRA 398) which will govern the discretion of the court in this matter. If he decides, upon the proof
presented, that probable cause exists, no objection can be made upon constitutional grounds
against the issuance of the warrant. His conclusion as to whether “probable cause” existed or
First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
not is final and conclusive. If he is satisfied that “probable cause” exists from the facts stated
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable
in the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for
conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue the warrant for arrest. He may, however, if he is
trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether
not satisfied, call such witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. The
a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for
issuance of the warrant of arrest is prima facie evidence that, in his judgment at least, there
placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even
existed “probable cause” for believing that the person against whom the warrant is issued is
if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should
guilty of the crime charged. There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion
be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
that “probable cause” exists from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone, or any
other person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge or
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the magistrate. (US vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1, 41-42)
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously
and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion
Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without
that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the
warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting person must
judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
have actually witnessed the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought to be
prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
arrested; or he must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining
arrested perpetrated the crime that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply
personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in
determines personally from testimonies of witnesses that there exists reasonable grounds to
him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease
believe that a crime was committed by the accused. (People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26
the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not
September 2003])
only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the
records and the evidence on hand as to enable the His Honor to make his personal and
separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest. 8. Warrantless arrests

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the The Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the be allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the counsel.
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has Rebellion as Continuing Offense
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners). (People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 444 [1999]; and the Revised Rules on
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
Criminal Procedure (as amended), Rule 113, Section 5.)
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio V. warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a
Panganiban in People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 720 [1999]) As applied to in flagrante delicto judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
arrests, it is settled that “reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
(People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]) authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the
exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or
Rule 113, Sec. 5 insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining
them while any of these contigencies continues cannot be less justified. (Umil vs. Ramos [GR
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, 81567, 9 July 1990])
without a warrant, arrest a person:
!!! Case(s)
1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; 197. Umil vs. Ramos, G. R. 81567, July 9, 1990
2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the Committed in the Presence of Police Officers
person to be arrested has committed it; and
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
being transferred from one confinement to another. although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to
the scene thereof. (People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991])
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
!!! Case(s)
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
198. People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 (1991)
Art. 125, Revised Penal Code 199. People V. Doria, 301 SCRA 668) (1999)
200. People v. Luisito Go, G.R. No. 116001, March 14, 2001
Article 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — 201. People v. De Guzman, GR No. 117952-53, February 14, 2001
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer
or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
Personal Knowledge of the Offense
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a
crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, !!! Case(s)
must have personal knowledge of such fact or as recent case law adverts to, personal 209. People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 (1993)
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. (People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]) Lack of Urgency
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may
!!! Case(s) validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. When one was
not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed,
there is no justification for the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of
202. People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993)
Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant.
203. People v. Sinoc, 275 SCRA 357 (1997) Warrantless arrests cannot be resorted to when police officers have ample opportunity to
204. People v. Baula, G.R. No. 132671, November 15, 2000 secure a warrant of arrest.
205. People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001
Applications made during weekends and holidays. The Supreme Court’s Circular 19, dated 14
Time of Arrest August 1987, which reads “3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court
having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify
1. Hot Pursuit
and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent”
merely provides for a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the
Paragraph (b) of Section 5 is otherwise known as the doctrine of “hot pursuit” arrests. This validity of an otherwise valid search warrant. (Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December
doctrine is based on the rule that an arrest can be made without warrant when an offense 1989])
has just been committed and the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that a crime has just been committed. It is not
!!! Case(s)
necessary that the arresting officers have direct knowledge of the crime. But they must have
direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its commission. (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA
210. People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001
668) 211. People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)

2. “Has just been committed”

It is not sufficient that a crime was indeed committed but it is required that the said crime Effect of Entry of Plea
has just been committed. The proximity of time of commission of the crime must be close to
the time of the arrest. Otherwise, the arrest is illegal. (Pineda, Ernesto L., The Revised Rules By pleading “not guilty” at their arraignment, the accused submitted to the jurisdiction of the
on Criminal Procedure, 2003 Edition, 161.) trial court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. (People vs. Plana [GR 128285, 27 November
!!! Case(s) 2001])

206. People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992) !!! Case(s)

207. Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 586 (1992)

212. People v. Plana G.R. No. 128285, November 27, 2001

208. People v. Calimlim, G.R. No. 123980, August 30. 2001

Marked Money
Validity of Conviction
The discovery of the marked money on [a person] did not mean he was caught [in fragrante
delicto]. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure. (People vs. Enrile [GR 74189, 26 rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. (People vs. De Guzman, 224
May 1993]) SCRA 93, 100 [1993]). The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other
proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused,
nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record
point to their culpability. (People vs. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701, 710 [1994]; People vs. De Guia, Article 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
227 SCRA 614, 626 [1993]) not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee, or servant who, in
such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.
!!! Case(s)
213. People v. Conde, G.R. No. 113269, April 10, 2001 Article 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the
person in charge, employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment
who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of the
latter.

Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship.
— Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or
edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of
the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if:

a. The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery
was committed, by any of the following means:
1. Through a opening not intended for entrance or egress.
Privacy of Communication & Correspondence 2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or
window.
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
Article III, Sec 3 (1)
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public
Section 3.
authority.
1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
b. Or if –
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
1. The robbery be committed under any of the following
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
circumstances:
2. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind
of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle;
3. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open
R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) (1965) outside the place of the robbery.

Arts, 290, 291, 292 and 299. Revised Penal Code. When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250
pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
Article 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property
imposed upon any private individual who in order to discover the secrets of another, shall taken does not exceed 250 pesos.
seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents thereof.
When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed
If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and a fine not 250 pesos, they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two next preceding paragraphs, in
exceeding 500 pesos. its minimum period.

The provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public
custody of minors with respect to the papers or letters of the children or minors placed building, or building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than
under their care or study, nor to spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of those prescribed in this article shall be imposed.
them.
!!! Case(s)
 214. Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 113 (1986)
215. Katz vs. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
2. Exclusionary Rule
Art. III, Sec. 3(2)
216. Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
Section 3.
xxx
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
1. Privileged Communications be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

a. Foundation / Basis

The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy,’which looks to the free Background. Following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal
and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 [Link]. 1684, 6 [Link]. 1081 [1961]), the Supreme Court, in
instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. (Abbott vs. Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by
National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma, 175 U.S., 409, 411) Public policy is the foundation of virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier
the doctrine of privilege communications. It is based upon the recognition of the fact that the adopted in Moncado v. People’s Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of
right of the individual to enjoy immunity from the publication or untruthful charges evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure.
derogatory to his character is not absolute and must at times yield to the superior necessity
of subjecting to investigation the conduct of persons charged with wrong-doing. In order to Reason. The reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
accomplish this purpose and to permit private persons having, or in good faith believing unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
themselves to have, knowledge to such wrong doing, to perform the legal, moral, social duty privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been
resulting from such knowledge or belief, without restraining them by the fear that an error, protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
no matter how innocently or honestly made, may subject them to punishment for controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be
defamation, the doctrine of qualified privilege has been evolved. (U.S. vs. Cañete, et al., 38 repressed”. (Judge Learned Hand, Pugliese (1945) 153 F. 2d. 497.) Without the exclusionary
Phil. 235) rule, the right to privacy would be a form, of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom
b. When injunction applies from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence merit the Court’s high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. (Mapp
[to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, 1090 [1961])
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the fourth Amendment, declaring his rights to
prescribed by law.” (Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February 1996]) be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
c. When injunction does not apply their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. (Weeks vs. United
The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield
States (1914) 232 US 383, 58 L. ed, 652, 34 S. Ct. 341)
for contemptuous acts against the Court. (In RE Laureta [GR 68635, 12 March 1987])

!!! Case(s)
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary
217. In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)
to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
218. People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987) (Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
219. Zulueta v. Court of Apeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
220. Deano v. Godinez, 12 SCRA 483 (1964) Effect of plea. As stated in the case of People v. Barros (231 SCRA 557 [1994]), “It might be
221. Waterhouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271. October 16, supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
1997 arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori
argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State
a detective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for witness;
provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality 18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. [The Court does] not imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of declared unconstitutional; and
the former. . . Waiver of the non-admissibility of the ” fruits” of an invalid warrantless arrest 19. Freedom of access to the courts.
and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional
right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act or omission
people.” constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate end distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
!!! Case(s) proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
222. Silverthorne Lumber vs. US, 251 US 385 (1920) proved by a preponderance of evidence.
223. People v. Aruta, G. R. 120915, April 3. 1998
224. People v. Rondero, G.R. 125687, December 9, 1999 The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
3. Liability for damages constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Article 32 of the Civil Code provides that “Any public officer or employee, or any private Article 32 clearly speaks of an officer or employee or person “directly” or “indirectly”
individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
for damages: Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of accountability of public
officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No
1. Freedom of religion;
longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
2. Freedom of speech;
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
3. Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
4. Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
citizen. (Aberca vs. Ver [GR L-69866, 15 April 1988])
5. Freedom of suffrage;
6. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
!!! Case(s)
7. The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
8. The right to the equal protection of the laws; 225. Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)
9. The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
11. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
12. The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;
14. The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15. The right of the accused against excessive bail;
16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf;
17. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward