This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been

fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
1

Blockchain for Cyber Security in Smart Grid: A

Comprehensive Survey
Peng Zhuang, Student Member, IEEE, Talha Zamir, and Hao Liang, Member, IEEE

Abstract—Blockchain is an immutable type of distributed becomes important for customers [7]. Also, with the cutting-
ledger that is capable of storing data without relying on a third edge technologies, the smart grid is emerging with water/gas
party. Blockchain technology has attracted significant interest in supply, transportation, and other services to form the smart
research areas, including its application in the smart grid for
cyber security. Although significant efforts have been devoted to city [8], [9]. With the high degree of interdisciplinary among
utilizing blockchain in the smart grid for cyber security, there is a different sectors in a smart city, the vulnerability of the smart
lack of comprehensive survey on blockchain in the smart grid for grid to cyber attacks may cause severe disasters to the society,
cyber security in both application and technological perspectives. which is no longer limited to the electric systems. So, there is
To fill this gap, we conducted a comprehensive survey on an urgent need to investigate the cyber security of smart grid.
blockchain for smart gird cyber security. This conducted survey
presents the latest insights of ideas, architectures, and techniques In smart grid, different information and communication
of implementation that are relevant to blockchain’s application technologies (ICT) have been widely adopted over power
in the smart grid for cyber security. This paper aims at providing generation, transmission, distribution, and utilization sectors to
helpful guidance and reference for future research efforts specific collect and transfer data for smart grid optimization control.
to blockchain for cyber security in smart grid. For the power generation, transmission, and distribution, the
Index Terms—Blockchain, cyber security, resiliency, smart data are collected using remote terminal units (RTUs) of
contract, smart grid. SCADA systems, phasor measurement units (PMUs) of wide
I. I NTRODUCTION area measurement system (WAMS), sensors of intelligent
electronic devices (IEDs), and geographic information system
The electric grid is undergoing massive revolutions toward (GIS). For power utilization, the smart meters embedded in the
the smart grid to better adopt the generation with different advanced metering infrastructures (AMIs) are typically used
sizes and technologies, encourage the participation of cus- to collect the customers’ power usage data. The collected data
tomers for active system operation, and improve the system are transferred through communication networks to SCADA
reliability, stability, sustainability, and security [1]. The reliable systems and used for advanced management and control, such
and efficient smart grid operation relies heavily on the two- as automatic generation control (AGC), electric system state
way communication networks for data transfers [2]. However, estimation (SE), distribution automation control (DAC), and
the current communications over TCP/IP and Ethernet-based demand side management (DSM).
technologies expose the smart grid to public data networks [3], For the efficient and reliable communications among dis-
which makes it vulnerable to severe cyber attacks [4]. tributed and heterogeneous components within smart grid,
In December 2015, the cyber attack targeted on three elec- layered communication networks consisting of home area
tric distribution companies in Ukraine successfully seized the network (HAN), neighborhood area network (NAN), sensor
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems us- network (SN) wide area network (WAN), and core network are
ing spear-phishing emails, and remotely switched substations developed. The HAN and NAN are established by networking
off, which resulted in a power outage of 230,000 customers AMIs within a local area through ZigBee/Z-wave protocols
[5]. In March 2019, a denial of service (DoS) attack was and IEEE 802.11/802.15.4/802.16 standards [10]. Within the
launched against part of the SCADA infrastructures of electric WAN, the RTUs, WAMS, IEDs, and GIS firstly group through
utilities in Utah, which resulted in the loss of observability for SN, then communicate with the SCADA systems and data
part of the electric grid [6]. Although this cyber attack has not centers based on distributed networking protocol 3.0 (DNP3),
led to any blackouts in Utah electric grid, it has shown that Modicon communication bus (ModBus), and/or cognitive ra-
the adversaries can launch severe cyber attacks against critical dio with IEEE 802.22 standard [11]. Then, the data are
infrastructures in the smart grid. transferred to the core network and used by different control
With the development of the smart grid, the advanced authorities. In the core network, the common communication
monitoring and control technologies are being deployed on methods are TCP/IP network, WiMAX, and GPRS. For the
the customer side. Nowadays, most homes are equipped with ease of implementation in smart grid, these protocols are
smart devices, such as smart robots and smart security sys- designed to communicate raw data with no restrictions of en-
tems. Since these devices can be remotely monitored and cryption and authentication, and there is no excessive overhead
controlled through a central controller, the cyber security for data availability [12]. So, the smart grid can be easily
exploited by cyber attacks.
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engi-
neering, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 1H9 (e-mail: The vulnerabilities of different communication protocols in
{pzhuang, tzamir, hao2}@[Link]). smart grid are investigated in [13], and the most concerning

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
2

cyber security issues can be summarized in four aspects: smart grid [21]. These data are replicated and stored distribu-
• Integrity; tively on multiple devices, instead of a single data center. The
• Confidentiality; P2P data transfer and distributed replication of data storage on
• Availability; multiple devices prevent the smart grid from suffering from a
• Accountability/Non-Repudiation. single point of failure and guarantee high availability [22].
Also, due to the distributed data verification, validation, and
The integrity attack is based on unauthorized and stealthy storage features of blockchain, the data in blockchain-based
modification, alteration, or destruction of field measurement smart grid are nearly immutable, which can protect the data
data in smart grid. The false data injection (FDI) attack is a integrity, confidentiality, and availability of smart grid. Once
typical integrity attack against SE. The FDI attack can compro- data are added to a blockchain, it can never be manipulated
mise the field measurement data stealthily, which will alternate by attacks unless the adversaries own more than 51% of
the SE results and mislead the control center decisions. This the devices in the whole system. This property maintains
can cause cascade electric grid failures [14]. high auditability in blockchain-based smart grid and makes
The confidentiality attack targets on accessing or disclosing the accountability/non-repudiation attacks nearly impossible.
privacy and proprietary information by unauthorized entities The asymmetric cryptography in blockchain can increase the
or individuals. In smart grid, the AMIs are major sources of authentication and authorization levels of blockchain-based
the confidential breach. The adversaries can gain access to AMIs [23], which can protect the customers’ privacy and
AMI through root password recovery or exploitation of system integrity of electricity data [24]. Further, by leveraging the
vulnerabilities [15], and obtain the customers’ electricity usage smart contract and decentralized applications (DAPPS) ser-
information to invade customers’ privacy. In smart grid, both vices, the blockchain can provide cyber-secured computation
authentications of information and authorization of accessing environment for advanced smart grid applications.
are required to maintain the integrity and confidentiality. In the literature, there are several papers that have conducted
The availability that ensures timely and reliable access to surveys on the application of blockchain in smart grid covering
information is essential for efficient and stable operation of various topics. A systematic review of blockchain in energy
smart grid. By interrupting the data transfers, the cyber attacks sector is conducted in [25], in which an overview of a variety
against availability can delay, block, or even corrupt the control of energy applications of blockchain is presented with detailed
signal, and cause severe impacts on stability, efficiency, and discussion on benefits and limitations of blockchain tech-
security of smart grid operation [16]. nologies in energy sector. Also, the review and classification
For the accountability/non-repudiation in smart grid, the of around 140 most recent commercial and research initia-
actions made by systems or customers cannot be denied tives of energy blockchain are performed. With more focuses
later. With the integration of distributed generators (DGs), on blockchain-based smart grid, [26] reviews a variety of
local power trading is an important concept in smart prospects and approaches for blockchain applications in smart
grid. The local power trading involves valuable resources grid. The advantages and technical challenges of implementing
and information, which makes the cyber attacks against blockchain in smart grid are discussed, and the frameworks for
accountability/non-repudiation now a major issue [13]. To key blockchain-based smart grid applications are presented. In
maintain the accountability/non-repudiation, it is required that [27], a comprehensive survey is presented for the blockchain-
the smart grid communication networks have high auditability based P2P energy transaction in smart grid with main focuses
so that the complete information history can be reconstructed on P2P energy trading architecture, demand response opti-
from historical records in a trust manner [16]. mization models, and power routing mechanisms. Further, [28]
For enterprise communication networks, different cyber presents a comprehensive survey for the blockchain-based P2P
security technologies, such as firewalls with an intrusion energy transaction from the perspective of the designing of
detection system (IDS) for network security, encryption and local energy markets, in which the current research activities
authentication for data security, and host IDS for device on local energy market mechanisms, customer preferences,
security [10]. However, due to the real-time performance demand response strategies, and impacts of energy storage are
requirement and continuous operation feature of smart grid reviewed and assessed. Although the existing survey papers
communication networks, these techniques can hardly fit in have mentioned the advantages of blockchain in improving
smart grid [16]. Smart grid is featured by distributed gener- smart grid cyber security. A comprehensive survey that empha-
ation and control; however, the communication networks in sizes both application and technical perspectives of blockchain
smart grid still behave in a centralized manner, which makes in smart grid for cyber security has not been conducted so far.
the smart grid extremely vulnerable to a single point of failure To fill this gap in research, this paper presents a comprehensive
[17]. To address the above cyber security issues in smart grid, survey to provide helpful guidance and reference for the
blockchain technology has been seen as a promising solution research in improving cyber security of smart grid by using
[18]–[20]. blockchain technology.
Blockchain is a variant of distributed ledger technology The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
(DLT), which distributively stores and transfers data across tion II, an overview of blockchain technology is presented. The
multiple devices within a system. By leveraging blockchain architecture and development platforms of blockchain-based
technology, the field measurement data and local transaction smart grid for cyber security are introduced in Section III. In
data can be transferred in a peer-to-peer (P2P) manner within Section IV, the integration of blockchain technology for cyber-

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
3

TABLE I: A Comparison among Public, Consortium, and Private Blockchains [2], [4], [21]
Public Consortium Private
Participants Anonymus Trusted Trusted
Proof of Work (PoW),
Consensus mechanism Multi-party voting Strictly pre-approved nodes
Proof of Stake (PoS), etc.
51% attack tolerance, 33.33% attack tolerance,
Security performance
nearly impossible to tamper, no finality could be tampered, enabled finality
Computational complexity High Low
Access Open access Permissioned Strictly permissioned
Anonymity Yes No No

Key pair
Distributed ledger technology
Public Private
Sender key Cryptographic key Receiver
DAG Blockchain Tempo hash
Data Encryption Decryption Data

Fig. 2: Asymmetric cryptography in blockchain [82].

Private Consortium Public
(e.g., Corda and (e.g., Corda, B3i, (e.g., Bitcoin, However, the access for consortium and private blockchain
Hyperledger EWF, and R3 ) Ethereum, Iota,
networks is permissioned, there still requires an authority to
Fabric) and Ripple)
approve the permission for node. Due to a large number
Fig. 1: The classification of DLT and blockchain technologies. of nodes in public blockchain, it is nearly impossible to
tamper public blockchain [32]. Theoretically, the consortium
secured smart grid will be discussed in both application and
and private blockchains require less effort for tampering, in
technical perspectives. At the end, the conclusion and potential
practical, they still have good performance in cyber security,
future research directions will be addressed in Section V.
since the nodes in consortium and private blockchain are
authorized and can be well protected [33]. So, the selections
II. OVERVIEW OF B LOCKCHAIN T ECHNOLOGY FOR among different types of blockchain for different applications
C YBER S ECURITY OF S MART G RID in smart grid should consider the classes of nodes, the require-
DLT is defined as a database that consensually replicates, ment for anonymity, computational complexity (efficiency),
shares, and synchronizes data across geographically distributed and restriction on access [34].
multiple devices [29]. In DLT, the data are stored in a Based on the features of blockchain, some potential benefits
chronological order, which forms a digital ledger chain. Once a for smart grid are summarized as below [10]–[12]:
block containing a set of data is added in the chain, it can never • Reduction on cost of power transactions;
be modified by any unauthorized entities or individuals, so it is • Facilitating the adoption of DGs in smart grid;
inherently tamper-proof [30]. As shown in Fig. 1, according • Improved automation control and system monitoring;
to how the data are validated and stored, the DLT can be • Development of advanced control applications for smart
mainly classified into three types, i.e., blockchain, directed grid on blockchain DAPPS layer;
graph data (DAG), and tempol ledger (Tempo). Among these • Improved cyber security of smart grid.
three types of DLT, the blockchain is the most well studied In this paper, the main focus is on the cyber security feature
one with a high degree of penetration in practical applications of blockchain for smart grid. For the rest of this section, the
[29]. Blockchain is divided into blockchain 1.0 for simple blockchain technology will be discussed mainly related to
cryptographic currency, 2.0 with smart contract functionality, smart grid cyber security. Although the private, consortium,
and 3.0 for distributed application [31]. and public blockchains differ in many aspects, they share
Blockchain is a distributed database based on P2P network, some essential components in architecture: merkel tree, times-
with security enabled using multiple cryptographic technolo- tamp, hash function, encryption and decryption, consensus
gies. Different types of blockchain have been proposed to meet mechanism, and nonce [35]. Merkel tree is a data structure
different requirements for practical applications based on the used for efficiently summarizing and verifying the large sets
consensus mechanism and network openness. As shown in Fig. of data in a block. Each block has a Unix time timestamp,
1, the most studied blockchain variants are public, consortium, which creates a source of variation for block hash and makes
and private blockchains. A comparison of these three types of it more difficult for the adversaries to tamper a blockchain.
blockchains is summarized in Table I. The major difference be- The hash function is used to convert variable-length inputs
tween public and consortium/private blockchains is the classes into a fixed-length encoded output. The hash function should
of nodes, i.e., the devices responsible for data verification, have characteristics like puzzle-friendly and collision-free to
validation, transfer, and storage. For the public blockchain, achieve a high level of security. The secure hash algorithm
the nodes are trustless and anonymous, which results in (SHA) is widely used in cryptographic hash functions, e.g.,
large power consumption and long transaction approval time. SHA-256 in Bitcoin. In blockchain, the hash function is used
The nodes in consortium and private blockchains are trusted, in merkel tree, timestamp, and encryption [36].
and the consensus mechanisms based on trusted nodes have Encryption and decryption method in blockchain is based on
low power consumption and fast transaction approval rate. asymmetric cryptography, as shown in Fig. 2. Different from

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
4

symmetric cryptography, every node in blockchain has a public with decreased block size is introduced in [49], which im-
key and a private key. The public key is analog to account proves the overall performance of the blockchain. Similarly, a
public name, and the private key is like a password that scalable blockchain framework is proposed in [50] to improve
is confidential [37], [38]. In blockchain, the sender encrypts the scalability of blockchain for large-scale IoT systems. In
the data using the public key of the receiver, and the data which, the IoT devices are required to connect to the global
encrypted can be viewed, validated, and verified by all the blockchain as nodes directly. Instead, multiple IoT devices
nodes in blockchain using the receiver’s public key, which form a group through a fully trusted certificate authority, and
protects the data integrity and accountability/non-repudiation. the formed group of IoT devices is represented by a single peer
Then, the encrypted data can be decrypted by the receiver which participate in the global blockchian. Such architecture
using the corresponding private key. In this process, the public can be beneficial for smart grid as it proves to be reliable and
and private key pair provide additional authentication and protective against 51% attack with reduced forking.
authorization to smart grid, and the privacy of nodes can be For the successful integration of blockchain in smart grid,
protected since only public keys can be observed [39]. the interaction between blockchain and smart grid applica-
The consensus mechanism is used to allow data transfers tions should be carefully addressed to maintain the stability
with credibility and assurity that it has not been tampered of a blockchain. In [51]–[53], the stability problem caused
with. This develops trust among nodes without the involvement by the interaction between blockchain and applications is
of a third party. The main idea in blockchain is to time investigated. The incentives mismatch within a blockchain,
stamp all the published blocks, then running it through a when considering the interaction between blockchain and
SHA256 hash algorithm to maintain the data integrity. Every applications, is the main issue for potential instability, since
block also refers to the value of the previous block using the the nodes are economically motivated to confirm transactions
hash value. In this way, everyone can see which blocks are securely in a blockchain, and they have no direct incentive to
interconnected and what data have been transferred in the past support applications. The incentive mismatch between secure
and in what order [40], which can provide better protection confirmation of transactions in blockchain and supporting ap-
on the accountability/non-repudiation in smart grid. plications may lead to the collapse of blockchain. To avoid the
A simple application of blockchain in smart grid is provid- incentive mismatch in a blockchain, it is crucial to designing a
ing cyber-secured trading platform for P2P power transaction blockchain with high portability to provide common incentives
based on distributed ledger of Bitcoin [41]. Further, with a for blockchains and their applications [51].
completely new programming language named by Solidity, For the blockchain with applications, there are mainly
Ethereum has brought computational capabilities into cyber- four layers, i.e., application layer, execution engines, data
secured environment based on blockchain [42]. Also, with the storage, and consensus mechanism. Most of the research works
emerged smart contract functionality, many blockchain-based focus on the application layer, especially for DAPPS, since
applications have been investigated for the DAPPS services it can bring more functionalities to blockchain on top of
[43]. These DAPPS services allow for the integration of more smart contracts [54]. Some decentralized applications use past
variants of advanced applications for smart grid operation into data to develop trust for different nodes, and Airbnb is a
cyber-secured system built by blockchain [44]. However, most good example of such an application. The same methodology
of these applications are still limited to electronic currency, can be used for demand forecasting in smart grid by using
such as the Initial Coin Offerings (ICO’s) on Ethereum plat- blockchain-based big data analysis, which can ensure the
form, which provides services for fundraising [45]. integrity, availability, and accountability/non-repudiation of
One of the major issues that have impeded the broad historical data [55]. Also, in [36], the standard for emerg-
applications of blockchain-based DAPPS is the scalability. ing blockchain with various applications is proposed. This
Many researchers have devoted great efforts in addressing standard divides blockchain usage into four layers, i.e., the
this issue. In [46], a technology named IOTA that combines infrastructure layer that provides basic hardware and network
the blockchain technology and architecture of the internet support, the platform service layer that allows users to run the
of things (IoT), is investigated to improve the scalability of cyber-secured blockchain environment on different operating
blockchain. Compared with conventional linear single chain systems, such as Windows and BerkeleyDB. While the node
architecture, the IOTA introduces a meshed network architec- management, programming, and run-time management come
ture. Improvement in scalability is also achieved in [47] by under the third layer, this layer uses SDK interfaces, such
using techniques such as segwit, blocksize increment, shard- as JSON RPC, Solidity, and [Link]. The last layer is the
ing, and proof of stake algorithm. Among these techniques, user-level application layer, which is referred to as DAPPS
the sharding, which reduces the data size of a block, has been commonly.
tested to be the most efficient one to improve the scalability. The implementation of well-designed blockchain in smart
Also, some discussions have been made about changing the grid allows improving the overall smart grid system’s cyber
block size by alternating the blockchain structure. In [48], a security. It introduces cyber-secured environment for variants
new blockchain protocol, Bitcoin-NG, is proposed. In Bitcoin- of advanced applications in smart grid, such as electric grid
NG, the concept of micro block is introduced to accelerate monitoring, electricity data transfers, automation power con-
the block procession and reduce the block production time trol, and local power trading [30]. In the next section, an
from 10 minutes to 10 seconds; however, this comes with the overview of system architecture and development platforms
scarification of security. The cascaded structure of blockchain for cyber security of smart grid using blockchain technology

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
5

Power utility System operator Meter SN and HAN. Different blockchains can be used in the core
companies companies network for different applications, such as energy bidding
Core network in wholesale electricity market and real-time monitoring in
Third-party
energy management system. WAN layer is an intermediate
companies
Maintenance Blockchain layer connecting the NAN with the core network. WAN
companies in this system may be deployed on the cloud as a virtual
machine, where different blockchains can be implemented for
DAU Data WAN applications, such as field measurement aggregation and
center storage. In NAN and HAN, the local producers and consumers
WAN are directly connected, and the blockchains can be used to
Data DAU provide various applications, such as electric vehicle charging
center
Blockchain
and local energy trading.
SCADA
Also, as discussed in the recent research works [60], [62],
SCADA
based on the two-way communication links in smart grid,
DAU DAU
the trustless local producers and consumers connecting to
NAN HAN can be selected as nodes to provide mining power for
IoT-enabled public blockchains in smart grid. Initially, the mining power
ICT device Blockchain AMI
could be provided by standard home computers; however, with
the introduction of the application-specific integrated circuit
SN SN HAN
(ASIC) miners, the home computers are no longer capable of
Smart transmission Smart home/building mining [25]. To address this issue, different mining algorithms
Smart generation and distribution (Blockchain miners) have been proposed and examined. For example, the Ethash
Communication link algorithm of Ethereum [63] and Equihash algorithm of Zcash
Fig. 3: System architecture of blockchain-based smart grid. [64] are ASIC-resistant PoW algorithms, which allow for
the home computer-based mining through CPUs and GPUs.
will be presented in detail. Moreover, some smart grid-specific mining strategies are also
proposed. For example, based on CyClean in [65] and Solar-
III. S YSTEM A RCHITECTURE AND D EVELOPMENT
Coin [66], the coins are mined in advance and are rewarded
P LATFORM OF B LOCKCHAIN IN S MART G RID FOR C YBER
to local producers and consumers based on the generation
S ECURITY
and consumption of renewable energy, and the mining powers
The blockchains are implemented in the smart grid cy- are distributed among nodes based on the holding rewards.
ber layer to improve cyber security by protecting data in- For the consortium and private blockchains in smart grid,
tegrity, confidentiality, availability, and accountability/non- the trusted nodes that are typically selected from smart grid
repudiation. The implementation of blockchain in smart grid controlling authorities and distributed generation owners with
for cyber security can be mainly classified into four sectors large capacities will participate in consensus process.
that are field measurement and control, data aggregation, The data flow through these networks is published on
data management, and system operation [56]–[59]. In this corresponding blockchains, and that published data (verified
section, the system architecture of blockchain-based smart grid by the nodes) is used and communicated among networks
for cyber security will be discussed. Also, the development with added security, transparency, automation, and privacy
platforms for blockchain-based smart grid will be presented. protection functionalities [67]. However, the existing research
mainly focused on developing independent blockchains for
A. System Architecture for Smart Grid Cyber Security specific applications in each communication network. Signif-
By incorporating blockchain in the cyber layer of smart icant research efforts are still required to investigate different
grid, blockchain technologies can be leveraged to support the blockchains’ interoperability, especially for the synchroniza-
operation and development of smart grid. Considering the tion of data flow through different blockchains.
layered communication networks in smart grid with two-way In smart grid, the smart generation, smart transmission and
communication links, the system architecture of blockchain in distribution, and smart homes/buildings are monitored and
smart grid for cyber security is illustrated in Fig. 3, which directly controlled by field IoT-enabled ICT devices, such as
is based on the communication system model in [60]. This RTUs, IEDs, and WAMS for system operation, and AMIs
structure is divided into four networks, i.e., core network, for smart homes/building management [68]. By incorporating
WAN, NAN, and SN/HAN. This architecture is embedded the field measurement and control blockchain with smart
with blockchains in different communication networks for contracts to these IoT-enabled ICT devices in WAN, NAN,
different smart grid applications. The core network is related and SN/HAN, the field measurement data can be securely
to controlling authorities, such as power utility companies, and automatically collected [69]. Further, with the DAPPS ser-
system operators, meter operators, and maintenance compa- vices, the blockchain-enabled AMIs can perform decentralized
nies, which are above the SCADA systems [61]. Users in demand response, local power management, and local power
the core network have full access to monitor, make modi- trading within cyber-secured environment [70].
fications, and pass instructions (e.g., smart contracts) to the The field measurement data will be aggregated by selected

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
6

TABLE II: A Summary of Reviewed Research Works for the

data aggregators while utilizing data aggregation blockchain
Applications of Blockchain in Field Measurement and
in WAN and NAN. The purpose of using blockchain for data Communications
aggregation is mainly for additional data confidentiality pro-
Works Main contribution
tection in smart grid [71]. After received by multiple receivers
[22], [42], Smart grid, blockchain, guaranteed immutability,
of meter operators or SCADA systems and data centers, the [92], mitigation of cyber attacks, data collection,
aggregated data will be automatically processed and stored and [113] transfer, and storage
by the data management blockchain with smart contracts and [55], [93], Smart grid, blockchain, big data analysis,
DAPPS services [72], where the blockchain can protect the and [94] secured and traceable data flow and storage
integrity and auditability of stored data. For system operation [95] Smart grid, blockchain, big data sharing,
and [96] bad data detection, data integrity protection
blockchain within WAN, by utilizing the smart contracts and Smart grid, blockchain, real-time data storage
DAPPS services, the system operation decisions can be made [101]- and transfer, distributed cloud-based architecture,
automatically with less human interface, which can reduce the [103] software defined networking, IoT system
risk of cyber securities caused by human mistakes [73]. Also,
the storage of historical records of decisions in blockchain can Public Electricity Encrypted
key A usage data Encrypt electricity usage data Decrypt data
provide better audiability in smart grid. Private data by private key A by public key A
The data flow within and among these four networks is key A
Smart home Blockchain-enabled And check
validity
verified and stored by the blockchains with a high degree Public Electricity
smart meter
Encrypted Encrypt data
of cyber security, and the replications of data storage across key B usage data Decrypt electricity usage data by public key B
Private data by private key B
multiple devices can effectively protect the data availability key B
Utility company Blockchain-enabled Smart contract in
from a single point of failure [74]. With the advancement meter reader blockchain
in blockchain technology, power transaction functionality can
Fig. 4: Operational procedure of blockchain-based smart meter [22].
be integrated using specially designed blockchain built over
the DAPPS layer. For system operation, the blockchain is grid. BTL is a Canadian company that is working on cross-
able to increase the cyber security and efficiency of whole- border, large-scale, and cyber-secured power trading platform
sale electricity market [25]. Some start-up companies, such backed by Interbit private blockchain. Similarly, Drift is an
as Power Ledger, Grid+, and Greeneum, have started to American company working on efficient and secure grid trans-
use blockchain for local power transactions [59]. In this actions with multi-authentication and privacy protection on its
method, the authentication and authorization can be involved blockchain. A German company is using IBM-Hyperledger
in power transactions at low risk of confidential breach, and fabric blockchain for P2P power transactions with integrity
the integrity, availability, and accountability/non-repudiation and confidentiality protection. Companies like Engro, Xi-
of transaction data can be well protected. In some works, Watt, and Consensys are using public blockchains for P2P
the applications of blockchain for data management in EV power transactions. A Spain company, named Pylon Networks,
charging stations are also investigated, which mainly aim at uses the Litecoin public type blockchain for AMIs, aiming
providing confidentiality protection and data availability. to provide high auditability for power tracing. Omega grid
has developed smart grid management platform for cyber-
B. Development Platforms for Smart Grid Cyber Security secured system operation, which is based on privately running
Special applications and programs specific to smart grid blockchain [77]–[80]. A start-up blockchain company named
can be developed on IBM and Microsoft Azure development by Tenup proposes an architecture with high power efficiency
environments which ensure cyber security of blockchain. Fur- for remote areas and works on a mixed consensus mechanism,
thermore, the Ethereum platform can also be used to deploy in which the maximum transaction time is 60 seconds, which
smart contracts that are publicly available and verifiable. makes it useful for large-scale smart grid implementation [81].
Ethereum development can be done on Microsoft Visual basic
platform or online using Solidity remix. Ethereum platform IV. A PPLICATIONS OF B LOCKCHAIN IN S MART G RID FOR
is open-source, easy to implement, and has more security C YBER S ECURITY
features; however, the usage of Ethereum for large-scale smart In literature, the research on blockchain for smart grid
grid applications is inefficient, due to the gas limits and gas cyber security can be mainly categorized into three levels,
costs [75]. Like Ethereum, other platforms also support smart i.e., field measurement and communications, power generation
contract functionality, such as Quorum, Wan chain, Aternity, and transmission, and power distribution and utilization. In
Zen, Counter party, Root Stock, Rchain, and Qtum. All these this section, the details of blockchain applications at different
blockchains are different variants of Ethereum with some levels will be presented. The application of blockchain for
modifications. For example, Quorum has a major advantage of smart grid cyber security against data integrity attack will
no gas usage for its transaction [76], which is more suitable be discussed in detail to better illustrate the cyber security
in large-scale smart grid applications. Quorum platform comes mechanism of blockchain-based smart grid.
with functionality that Solidity can be embedded [22]. Quorum
is capable of executing private transactions between selected
parties using constellation. A. Blockchain for Field Measurement and Communications
Some North American start-up companies have developed Blockchain technology can have wide applications in smart
their blockchain platforms, which are specifically for smart grid for field measurement and communications, where a

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
7

summary of such research works is presented in Table II. IoT- Also, blockchain provides tamper-proof and traceable fea-
enabled ICT devices connected to the nodes in a blockchain tures for data flows, which are required in smart grid for
network to establish P2P communications in smart grid for data integrity and accountability/non-repudiation protections.
field measurement data uploading, fetching, and transferring. In [55], [93], [94], blockchain is enabled for big data analysis
For the stability and reliability of blockchain-based smart grid with secured data flow and storage. If old data presented
for cyber-secured field data measurement and transfer, all these is faulty and is not trustable, all the future estimations and
ICT devices connected to this system should be perfectly predictions will be inaccurate. For example, the wrong esti-
synchronized with the deployed blockchain. In [44], [82], mation of wind speed or solar intensity for a specific period
different types of architectures and synchronizing protocols can cause substantial economic loss and even destabilize the
have been explained and discussed. Selected IoT-enabled ICT smart grid. A decentralized blockchain architecture with bad
devices are used to create a connection with blockchain net- data detection mechanism is introduced in cite48 for secured
work and to store the copies of blockchain and smart contracts and trustful big data analysis; however, the synchronization of
locally [83]. Specific commands can be sent to blockchain blockchain and data fetch and upload delays have not been
using these ICT devices to initiate or call the smart contracts. accounted for. These factors will affect the simulation timings
For the case of AMIs in smart grid, they can be wirelessly and decrease the efficiency of big data analysis. To address this
connected to the blockchain and thus create a way to operate issue, Hyperledger fabric blockchain is used in [96] to work
such devices on smart grid through blockchain [23], [84]. with crowdsourced power markets, which is fast because of
The power trading and security enhancement (ETSE) module, the usage of PBFT consensus and is more secure.
designated in [23], can be implemented to allow for the cyber- In [72], [97], [98], surveys are conducted for blockchain
secured P2P communications among different AMIs within the usage for cyber security of IoT system, and blockchain-based
same blockchain network. If the smart contracts are deployed marketplace for business models with blockchain-IoT combi-
on a particular part of smart grid, automated commands can nation is introduced. Comparisons among different blockchain
be provided by blockchain to the smart grid. architectures and their connection with IoT devices are ex-
Among different cyber attacks, the data integrity attack is plained in [57], [99]. Methods of using smart contracts with
a major threat in smart grid [85]–[87]. FDI attack is a type IoT devices are further elaborated, and some new robust tech-
of cyber attack against data integrity, which stealthily manip- niques are introduced in [57]. Big data analysis for renewable
ulates the measurements [88]–[91]. Possible attacks include power generation forecasting can be performed locally with
tampering with consumption data for fraudulent purposes, less computing resources usage, and data can be published on
maliciously altering power trading transactions to destabilize blockchain in a tamper-proof manner, smart contracts will be
the grid, invading customer’s privacy by collecting and ana- executed based on the published forecasted data, automatically.
lyzing consumer data, and remotely controlling critical IEDs Special blockchain developed in [94] is specific for big data
to switch them off [90]. Many papers have introduced firewall analysis with proven high scalability and security; mechanisms
based methods to defend against such attacks. However, due to of this can also be utilized to develop blockchain for more
the low computational power of IoT-enabled ICT devices, such cyber-secured applications in smart grid.
as AMIs, firewall techniques are sluggish and are vulnerable In [100], a new cloud-based architecture for blockchain-
to cyber attacks cite44. based IoT system is proposed to improve the performances
The blockchain has been proved to be a better and more in real-time data storage and transfer with low latency. Dis-
efficient alternative to protect the smart grid against FDI tributed cloud-based architecture with controller fog nodes
attacks [92]. Some solutions are introduced in [22], [42], [92], has been proven to be a good alternative, as they provide
[113] for using blockchain to provide guaranteed immutability low-cost, secured, and on-demand access to the users [101].
of stored data, and mitigation of cyber attacks against data Fog node is based on software-defined networking (SDN) and
collection and transfer. In [22], the blockchain-based smart blockchain [100]. A significant reduction of end-to-end delay
meter is proposed to protect the integrity and confidentiality of between IoT devices can be achieved in this architecture.
customers’ electricity usage data. As shown in Fig. 4, the smart In [102], a comparison among the speeds of some typical
meter, and utility company have their public and private key blockchains, e.g., Hyperledger fabric (i.e., PBFT consensus
pairs. The electricity usage data measured by smart meter are algorithm), Parity, Ethereum, and H-Store blockchains, has
firstly encrypted by the private key of smart meter, i.e., private been conducted. H-Store can achieve the best throughput,
key A. Then, the smart contract in blockchain will decrypt the while the throughput rate of Hyperledger fabric ranks second.
encrypted data by using the public key of smart meter, i.e., Also, the P2P file system for data transfer based on blockchain
public key A, and check the validity. For the validity check, if is discussed in [103]. Inter Planetary File System (IPFS) can
public key A can successfully decrypt the encrypted data, then be used in combination with blockchain to achieve improved
the encrypted data has not been compromised since the private throughput, especially for big data analysis.
key of smart meter can not be obtained by adversaries, which
protects the data integrity. Further, the data will be encrypted
by using the public key of the utility company, i.e., public key B. Blockchain for Power Generation and Transmission
B, and only the utility company with the corresponding private In this section, the applications of blockchain for power gen-
key, i.e., private key B, can access the data. This can protect eration and transmission will be discussed, where a summary
the confidentiality of customers’ data. of such research works is presented in Table III Along with

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
8

TABLE III: A Summary of Reviewed Research Works for the

Applications of Blockchain in Power Generation and Transmission Peer
Client 1 …... Client N System Smart
Works Main contribution operator contract
[59], [84], Smart grid, blockchain, smart contracts, F-CA F-CA F-CA F-CA
World
and [107] automatic P2P power transaction, local electricity state
Peer Peer
-[112] market, cyber security, reduced cost
Transaction
Smart grid, blockchain, smart contracts, DAPPS Block- data
[77] and
services, secured economic dispatch, electricity chain
[113]-[115]
wholesale market, renewable power certification Distributed
Smart grid, blockchain, power system state Peer Peer
[58] and ledger
estimation, system state integrity protection, Communication link
[116]-[120]
improved bad data detection capability
Smart grid, blockchain, smart contracts, secured Fig. 5: Blockchain-assisted economic dispatch mechanism [113].
[77], [121],
dynamic load redistribution, differential voltage
and [122] plementation of power transactions and power bidding backed
relays, voltage control transformers
by blockchain, including Piclo in the UK, Vandebron in the
Netherlands, and Brooklyn Microgrid in the US. The details
the development of smart grid, the conventional non-renewable about these start-up companies and the practical application
and centralized power generation is being replaced by renew- cases of blockchain in power generation and transmission are
able power-based DGs. The utilities usually face high costs introduced in [109].
for cyber-secured and efficient communications and control The optimization techniques, such as economic dispatch and
infrastructures to control these DGs in conventional centralized dynamic load redistribution in transmission systems, can also
structure [104]. Also, the centralized control structure exposes be integrated with blockchain by leveraging smart contracts
the generation control of DGs to a single point of failure. To and DAPPS services [77], [113]. With blockchain, the eco-
effectively and securely control the DGs, the idea of microgrid nomic dispatch function can automatically request the biddings
has emerged under the smart grid topic. In a microgrid, the from participating generators, clear the electricity wholesale
local DGs, energy storage systems, and local power demands market based on biddings, and make the requested power
are controlled by microgrid operators to operate in either values and settled procurement electricity prices publicly
isolated or grid-connected mode. Then, the power generation available. In [113], a blockchain-assisted economic dispatch
and transmission for smart grid with integrated DGs at high mechanism is proposed for power distribution system oper-
penetration level can be effectively controlled by leveraging ation. As shown in Fig. 5, within blockchain, the peers are
the microgrids using a decentralized multi-agent-based control responsible for executing transactions and smart contracts, and
system (DMACS) [44], [105], [106]. maintaining the world state and transaction data as distributed
Based on the structure of DMACS for power generation ledgers. The clients and system operators join the blockchain
and transmission systems, researchers have introduced the by communicating with a peer through fabric certification (F-
blockchain-based smart contracts to securely exchange power CA) mechanisms. After joining the blockchain, the clients
between consumers and prosumers within and among mi- will update their electricity usage/generation preferences, e.g.,
crogrids in local electricity market [59], [84], [107]–[112]. marginal costs for electricity generation and marginal utilities
The main idea behind the blockchain-based smart contract for electricity usage, and the updated preferences will be stored
functionality for local power transactions is to allow the as world state in blockchain. The system operators can read
consumers to buy power from local prosumers through P2P the preference data from the world state and perform the
power transactions while encourage the local prosumers to economic dispatch to get the locational marginal electricity
help utility in meeting local demands [84], [107]. By us- price, which will be used to form smart contracts. The smart
ing the blockchain-based smart contracts, the power gener- contracts will be used by the peers to commit the power
ation by local DGs and power transmission through P2P transactions among their corresponding clients automatically.
power transactions can be verified and securely recorded in This mechanism can significantly improve the efficiency and
a blockchain without a third party’s need. The transparency security of power system economic dispatches. This method
of blockchain can prevent fraud attempts in power trading offers data protection and resiliency against cyber attacks in
processes [111]. The asymmetric cryptography and tamper- electricity wholesale market, such as DoS attack on economic
proof feature of blockchain can provide authentication and dispatch [114]. Further, the blockchain-enabled AMIs can also
authorization to protect the integrity and accountability/non- be implemented for renewable power certification [115].
repudiation of power transactions. Also, the public-private The integrity and accountability/non-repudiation of dis-
key pair in asymmetric cryptography can better protect the tributed electric power system state estimation results are cru-
confidentiality of data [112]. cial for dynamic load redistribution in transmission systems.
Moreover, independence on a third party significantly re- However, the current state estimation is vulnerable to FDI
duces the power transaction costs, which further facilitates the attacks. By utilizing the blockchain-enabled ICT devices in
usage of DGs [110]. Due to the cyber security and potential smart grid, the blockchain-based distributed state estimation
economic benefits that the blockchain can bring to the power function can reduce the risk of data tampering by providing
generation and transmission, some start-up companies have integrity protection and help detect manipulations of data in
developed their local electricity market platforms for the im- addition to traditional bad data detection mechanisms [58].

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
9

TABLE IV: A Summary of Reviewed Research Works for the

Applications of Blockchain in Power Distribution and Utilization
with enough reserve of capacity to provide electrical power
for the customers stably and is left with a low degree of
Works Main contribution monitoring and control. However, with the integration of DGs
[44], [125], HAN, blockchain, home energy management, with bidirectional power flow and at high penetration level,
[134], bill data storage and access, remote bill payment
and [135] , improved privacy protection and cyber security the traditional load and power flow patterns have changed
Smart grid, blockchain, secured and trusted significantly. To address this issue, the power distribution
[74], [132],
demand response, real-time electricity price system is being redeveloped to integrate a large amount of
[136],
publication, DAPPS services, demand response IoT-enabled ICT devices, to improve the system observability
and [137]
regulation, improved fairness and cyber security and controllability. This redeveloped power distribution system
Smart grid, blockchain, smart contracts,
[44], [82],
automated and cyber-secured EV charging
is defined as an active cyber-physical distribution system (A-
[126]-[131], CPDS) [133]. The P2P data transfer, cyber security, confi-
management, vehicle-to-grid/vehicle-to-vehicle
[138]-[143] dentiality protection, and transparency features of blockchain
service management, autonomous vehicles
technology have made the blockchain a promising solution to
improve the cyber security and efficiency of A-CPDS [132].
Other severe data integrity attacks against state estimation, Under the context of A-CPDS, the smart homes equipped
such as distributed DoS (DDoS), data framing, and cyber with a variant of IoT-enabled ICT devices, such as AMIs
topology attacks, can also be defended using blockchain and power management systems, have created great intercon-
technology [116], [117]. For example, during DDoS attack, nectivity between individual customer and electric grid. This
the AMIs communications is not functional, but DAPPS improves the performance of power utilization on the customer
layer of blockchain can still provide actual data of power side. However, the concerns about privacy leakage and smart
consumption [118]. Instead of protecting the measurement grid data integrity attack caused by bad data intrusion from the
data from AMIs communication failure caused by DDoS customer side have greatly impeded the development of smart
attack, the blockchain-based IoT system can also support homes [68]. The blockchain has been seen as a suitable method
the smart grid for DDoS detection by using counter and to facilitate the development of smart homes by provid-
comparator components implemented in the smart contract ing integrity, confidentiality, and accountability/non-reputation
[119] and for DDoS prevention by implementing distributively protections and improve the authentication/authorization levels
static resource allocation mechanism on blockchian-based IoT for customer-side ICT devices [134].
system [120]. Moreover, the utility can easily and securely In [134], [135], the private blockchain is established, based
detect and redirect power to the affected area in case of an on the HAN, to allow for secured electrical appliances usage
emergency, as SCADA and PLC control is available through data uploading to the cloud server of power management
smart contracts in blockchain network [118]. This enhances system. The usage of private blockchain is to provide better
the performance of dynamic load redistribution in transmission privacy protection for customers. Based on the uploaded
system [121]. usage data, the policy for home power management can be
With the blockchain-based distributed state estimation func- implemented into the smart contract for automation control.
tion and embedded IoT system in smart grid, the blockchain Since the policy is replicated and stored distributively, any
can provide variant functionalities for secured and reliable abnormal power usage action can be easily detected and
distributed power transmission system operation [122]. For analyzed [134]. Also, based on the blockchain cloud server
example, the static var compensator can be continuously and for smart homes, the remote electricity bill payment function
securely monitored and controlled using smart contract. Pro- with high level of cyber security against theft of electricity
tection relays like long-distance and differential voltage relays is added in [44], [125]. With the blockchain-enabled smart
can be controlled by distributed blockchain ledgers, which can meter, the electricity bill can be automatically generated and
prevent the loss of control signals. Voltage control transformers uploaded to the blockchain cloud server, which is tamper-
at transmission level can be monitored by a smart contract proof. With the proper private key, the user can easily access
to provide automated functionality. Besides protecting data the bill information and make payment remotely.
integrity and accountability/non-repudiation, the blockchain In addition to providing cyber security for integrity, confi-
has a strong advantage in guaranteeing the data availability dentiality, and accountability/non-reputation of electricity us-
for distributed power transmission system operation [77]. age bill, the blockchain-based remote electricity bill payment
Moreover, some parts of the computation power of blockchain function can also significantly reduce the bill payment cost
can be potentially utilized to calculate demand forecasting and and settlement time [125]. In A-CPDS, the blockchain with
AC power flow in a distributed manner. smart contract functionality can also be used for secured and
trusted demand response (DR) of smart homes [132], [136],
[137]. By using blockchain technology, the latency of real-
C. Blockchain for Power Distribution and Utilization time electricity price publications can be reduced, which can
For power distribution and customer-side power utilization, guarantee the fairness and effectiveness of DR. Also, the smart
the blockchain also provides a variant of cyber security contract can be used to ensure that the requested DR power is
functionalities [30], [44], [79], [82], [123]–[132]. A sum- provided by the customers which can prevent fraud activities.
mary of such research works is shown in Table IV. The Moreover, by leveraging the DAPPS services of blockchain for
conventional power distribution system is typically designated AMIs, the distributed DR can be implemented. The blockchain

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted
Power for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has……………
not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
distribution Transactions on Industrial Informatics
system Grid
Substation DG DG
10

Distribution
system operator
delays. Due to the auditability of blockchain, the transaction
Smart
contract for and EV charging/discharging data can be easily traced, which
Published system Execution
prices operator Substation can help the system analyze and identify any susceptible
EV owners
by system Least expensive
Smart
contracts
adversary behaviors.
operator, Pricing
DG owners EV and Algorithm
for EV Execution IBM predicts that autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars
owners EV
DG Smart will be in demand abundantly by 2020 [127]. In [128], cyber
System owners contracts
for DG Execution
DG security for these vehicles are provided by blockchain-based
operator Communication link
Power flow
owners Power distribution
system
IoT system. Data collected from sensors flow through the
blockchain with smart contracts and DAPPS services with pre-
Fig. 6: Blockchain-based G2V and V2G/V2V bidding platform [44].
defined logic. For example, if a sensor detects any issue with
can protect the availability of critical data, such as electricity EV, based on smart contract, it will automatically schedule a
pricing signal, ancillary service signal, and regional system booking with the manufacturer and will go there on a specified
states, for distributed DR. Also, the auditability of blockchain time. More blockchain-based processes such as fueling, charg-
can ensure that the abnormal DR actions can be regulated ing, electronic parking, and repairs are introduced in [127].
and/or punished in a trust and fairway [74]. These processes need high level of security and can only
Further, the blockchain-enabled automated and cyber- be handled by a trusted system, which is, in fact, the main
secured machine-to-machine transactions, which includes auc- feature of blockchain. The same process can be implemented
tions, bidding, and payment, can be utilized for the smart on smart grid for automatic maintenance. Such add-ons in
charging of EVs [138]. In [139], [140], the blockchain-based smart grid operation will provide customer satisfaction and
billing system for EV charging is investigated, where this increased levels of serviceability, reliability, and security.
billing system is designated for the electricity transaction Smart contract functionality backed by the proof of power
between EV and charging station in grid-to-vehicle (G2V) algorithm is introduced in [129], which was adopted to reduce
mode. By using the blockchain-based billing system, the EV the consensus delay. This algorithm proves to be better for the
users can have a real-time charging price and immediately case of peer to peer power transaction and can be beneficial
make the payment after charging services. Also, the mu- for G2V and V2G/V2V. A comparison of this technique with
tual authentication for payment settlement in blockchain can Hyperledger-PBFT consensus can be done to obtain further
guarantee that the payment is cleared only when the user insights into this consensus. Furthermore, proof of probability
and charging station provider agrees on the realized charging algorithm also shows good performance [130], which can
amount [139]. The cyber-resiliency nature of blockchain can also be adapted in grid space to achieve fewer transaction
protect the billing system from adversary data manipulation. delays. Anonymous power trading between EVs is discussed
An extension of the blockchain-based billing system is in [131], with performance analysis and proof of practicality
proposed in [138], which also considers the autonomous EV of blockchain for cyber-secured V2G/V2V applications.
charging optimization by using smart contract functionality in
blockchain. By using smart contract, the EV users can request V. P OTENTIAL F UTURE R ESEARCH D IRECTIONS
several bids from different charging stations to minimize the A comprehensive review for blockchain in smart grid for
charging costs while satisfying the charging demand. Different cyber security is presented above. In which, the system ar-
from G2V mode, which considers only unidirectional power chitectures, implementation platforms, and applications for
flow from grid to EV, the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) and vehicle- field measurement and communications, power generation
to-vehicle (V2V) modes can be used to balance the supply and and transmission, and power distribution and utilization of
demand, reduce load fluctuation, and support voltage stability blockchain for smart grid cyber security have been discussed.
in power distribution system [124]. However, as an emerging technology, the usage of blockchain
The techniques proposed in [44], [82], [126], [140]–[143] in smart grid still faces great challenges. In the rest of this
introduce methodologies where connected EVs can request section, some major issues that have not been fully considered
charging/discharging from the smart grid with blockchain- in the research work for cyber security of blockchain-based
enabled trading platform, and they are given incentives if they smart grid mentioned above and recent advances in blockchain
support grid, through V2G or V2V, in return. For example, technologies for these challenges will be discussed. In the end,
power can be exchanged among EVs and grid using AdBEV potential future research directions in power transmission and
through the smart bidding algorithm implemented in the smart distribution systems will be highlighted.
contract [44]. As shown in Fig. 6, the electricity prices for
purchasing power from the grid, other EVs, and DGs can
be published through blockchain for publicly reviewing, in A. Major Issues and Recent Advances
which the integrity and confidentiality of the data can be well For the wide applications of blockchain for cyber security
protected. The least expensive pricing algorithm implemented in smart grid, the size of distributed ledger will increase,
in the smart contract can be used to select the preferred power and storage requirements will be enormous. This will slow
suppliers, and the smart contracts are issued between the users down the blockchain network for data processing and affect
and selected power suppliers. After the mutual authentication the efficiency and reliability of smart grid operation. In [144],
of smart contracts, the power flow and payments can be an efficient architecture based on network coding (NC) and
automatically executed by the smart contracts without any distributed storage (DS) for blockchain storage is proposed

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
11

to reduce the storage room and improve the efficiency of participated nodes, the PoBT can achieve a better throughput
blockchain for large-scale applications. However, the frame- rate and a lower communication bandwidth requirement than
work proposed in this paper is vulnerable to pollution attacks. Hyperledger fabric. However, the PoBT proposed in [156] is
Advancement in this framework is being investigated to make explicitly designated for business applications, where a trusted
it more robust against cyber attacks. Furthermore, a fast, low certified authority is required to guarantee the security and
storage, and nonlinear fashioned blockchain is developed in efficiency of PoBT. In smart grid, there is a large number
[145], which utilizes a lightweight node to connect to the of authorities, e.g., transmission/distribution system operator
blockchain network. These lightweight nodes only carry the (T/DSO), microgrid operator (MGO), and EV aggregator, and
headers and are designated for verification without carrying they represent different parties. There is no discussion in [156]
much data. Such a blockchain was proven to be resilient on selecting a trusted certified authority out of a group of au-
to DDoS attacks and can provide better performances in thorities representing different parties for the entire smart grid
robustness and efficiency compared with the NC- and DS- system, which causes great challenges for applying PoBT in
based architecture [146]. The study in [147] casts light on smart grid. One possible solution to address this issue is con-
types of blockchains that can be used for industrial and other sidering the extension of PoBT consensus algorithm in [156]
generic applications, and the work in [147] illustrates its ap- to consortium blockchains, with an added layer for trusted
plicability. Furthermore, researchers have discussed the impact certified authority/authorities selection in a way similar to the
of using different consensus algorithms on the performance voting process of PBFT consensus algorithm. Another possible
of blockchain-based IoT systems. A more comprehensive solution is to leverage the cross-chain framework in smart
analysis about these impacts can be found in [148], where grid. Multiple sidechains are established in the cross-chain
the usage of PBFT consensus is studied in depth. Further, framework for different application scenarios, e.g., distribution
the comparison between PBFT and PoW in [149] proves that system management, microgrid operation, and EV charging
PBFT is more suitable for blockchain-based IoT systems. management, with the main blockchain as the backbone. In
Currently, the lack of scalability is still a great challenge this way, the trusted certified authority for each sidechain
impeding the practical applications of blockchain in smart can be easily selected based on their application scenarios.
grid for cyber security [150]. To address the scalability issue, In [157], the cross-chain framework for IoT data management
consortium blockchain is used for cyber-secured microgrid has been studied. However, there are still many challenges
operation in [150] [151] and data regulation mechanism in [71] that need to be addressed for the application of cross-chain
for data aggregation in smart grid. The consortium blockchain framework in smart grid, e.g., the sidechain interoperability
introduced proves to be much faster and secure. Computational [158].
complexity in blockchain has been reduced significantly. Per- The public blockchain provides better cyber security by
missioned blockchain is used in [152] to perform a comparison devoting the great computational power of mining nodes.
between gas consumption with a focus on privacy in smart However, the increasing computational power attributes great
grid. The usage of such modified blockchains gives a better impacts on the energy efficiency of blockchain-based smart
computational performance with a sacrifice on confidentiality grid. For example, the widely used PoW consensus mechanism
protection. A fast and public blockchain is the best choice for in public blockchain requires large energy consumption for
blockchain operation in the smart grid. Yet, modifications are the consensus process and has a significant carbon footprint
required to provide better privacy protection. and electronic waste. The existing consensus mechanism is
Numerous research works have tried to improve privacy not in support of the sustainable development of smart grid.
protection by adopting an anonymous external system. For The design of proper incentive and penalty mechanisms that
example, in [153], a blockchain-based anonymous reputation encourage the reduction of energy consumption and usage of
system (BARS) is established to provide a privacy-preserving renewable energy generation for consensus mechanisms is a
trust model for public blockchains. By leveraging BARS, crucial future research direction for the particular application
the certificate and revocation transparency can be effectively of blockchain in smart grid.
implemented in a public blockchain by leveraging the proofs of Since blockchain still suffers from several cyber security
presence/absence for public keys. The usage of 5G technique vulnerabilities [159], the integration of blockchain may expose
is discussed in [154] for smart grid application to decrease smart grid to new types of cyber security issues. In the past
the delay in communication time. However, high infrastructure few years, cryptanalysis of hash function has been an active
costs will be a great challenge when it starts rolling out. research area, and various types of cyber attacks against hash
Hyperledger fabric technology that gives owner authority to function in blockchain have been proposed [160]. With the
control the accesses of nodes has been proven to be a potential successful alternating hash function, the transaction malleabil-
solution for cyber security of large-scale smart grid [155]. ity attack can mislead the energy consumers in P2P energy
However, since Hyperledger fabric involves a small number transactions to pay twice. A routing attack that partitions the
of nodes and focuses mainly on the validation of data being blockchain network that prevents nodes from communicating
added to a block, it still suffers from low cyber security with each other is able to tamper data in smart grid through
levels [156]. In [156], a lightweight proof of block and trade delay attack. Targeting on the whole blockchain network,
(PoBT) consensus algorithm is proposed to improve the cyber the DDoS cyber attack can disconnect multiple nodes from
security of private blockchains, which allows for both data and the network. As an important component of blockchain-based
block validations. More importantly, with a varying number of smart grid, smart contracts’ vulnerabilities have severe impacts

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
12

Ethereum Blockchain Network

developed, considering DDoS attacks, Sybil attacks, routing
attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we will
Node C
Json
highlight the potential future research directions in power
Virtual Smart rpc Web 3
transmission and distribution systems.
server contracts
(Ganache) (Solidity)
API 1) Distributed Power Transmission System Monitoring:
Json
Node n Node A
rpc
The blockchain with smart contract functionalities may be
Local implemented in a distributed manner, in which the blockchain
Js/
blockchain
Python network of the whole transmission system can be established
Node B copy

Fig. 7: Voltage profile stabilization using smart contracts. by incorporating multiple distributed blockchain networks.
Smart power distribution system
This enables the distributively and cyber-secured monitoring
with PMU measurements and tap and control of transmission system, which can potentially
changers
address the increased penetration level of DGs and prevent
Smart contracts
Violating DGs
Tap changer Commands the power transmission system operation from a single point
PMU fined in
to maintain smart to tap of failure. For example, a power transmission system may
measurements crypto
voltage profile contract call changers
currency
be divided into different regions, which are monitored by
Responses of
Incentives supporting different sets of IoT-enabled ICT devices with smart contracts
for DGs
supporting that contain controlling logic and algorithms. One region may
DG be selected as the command center, and a mechanism can be
Tap changer command feedback
developed to invoke contracts between divided regions while
Fig. 8: Interface of testing system for smart contract in smart grid. considering the synchronization of measurements and control
on the stability and reliability of smart grid operation. As signals. Also, the distributed control algorithm is required
discussed in [161], the smart contracts can be easily tampered to allow for each divided region having its subcontracts for
through alternating source code, penetrating virtual machines, controlling generation and utilization within its region.
and modifying runtime environment. Moreover, usability is 2) Power Distribution System Automation System: The
also a big challenge as some users may lose their private blockchain-based smart contracts may also be developed with
keys, which lead to their accounts get locked forever. Some complex algorithms for cyber-secured RTUs and IEDs control
of these issues are already corrected by new blockchains, in smart grid. For example, in power distribution system,
but that leads to decreased privacy of the users. Currently, blockchain-based smart contracts can be used to control tap
such trade-offs still require great attention. Cyber attacks on changers for voltage regulation. A potential control procedure
blockchain like DAO, which occurred in 2016 on Ethereum, for blockchain-based voltage regulation is shown in Fig.7.
only strengthened and helped evolve this technology to be The smart contracts can be deployed in PMUs to measure
more cyber-resilient and robust [162]. Attacks like these will voltage levels. The measurements can be published on a public
expose more loopholes in the coming future. blockchain and used by the smart contracts deployed in tap
Several blockchain technologies that differ from each other changers to stabilize the voltage levels. The smart contracts
in protocols, mechanisms, and techniques are being investi- may also be deployed in DG controllers and used to command
gated and developed for blockchain-based smart grids. Also, the DG outputs to respond to voltage regulation requirements.
due to the geographical and operational complexities of smart Further, a performance scoring mechanism can be developed to
grid, multiple blockchains may be required to achieve effec- find the DGs that violate voltage regulation requirements and
tive operation of smart grid, among which different entities credit the supporting DGs by using smart contracts. Moreover,
may be responsible for different blockchains with distinctive a testing system based on a common blockchain platform
objectives. However, there still lacks proper and widely ac- can be developed to test the blockchain-based smart grid
cepted standards for seamless interoperability among different control system. The Ethereum blockchain with a flexible smart
blockchains with unique technologies. Therefore, there is an contract design feature may be used as the blockchain network
urgent need to achieve blockchain standardization in smart for the testing system. A potential interface of Ethereum-based
grid under no centralized authority that allows for seamless, testing system is shown in Fig. 8. In the testing system, some
cyber-resilient, and efficient exchange of data among differ- common coding languages, e.g., JavaScript and Python, can be
ent blockchains with distinctive technologies and objectives. used to encode the smart contracts. Also, smart contracts need
Blockchain technology is an excellent alternative to many, but to be able to interact with the Ethereum blockchain network.
it still needs more refinement, especially for smart grid. A potential method is to embed smart contracts in Solidicity
in the local server, then interact with Ethereum blockchain
through Ganache virtual server.
B. Potential Future Research Directions
To better address the issues mentioned above, some research
VI. C ONCLUSION
topics can be further studied. The development of blockchain-
based smart grid framework with an intrusion detection system With the development of smart grid, new challenges arise
and DAPPS specifically for smart grid applications can be to improve the cyber security of smart grid. Many methods
studied further with different architectures. Testing framework have been proposed to make the smart grid more resilient
for blockchain-enabled smart grid can be investigated and against cyber attacks. Among these methods, the blockchain is

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
13

a promising solution for protecting smart grid cyber security. [16] Y. Yan, Y. Qian, H. Sharif, and D. Tipper, “A survey on cyber
In this paper, a comprehensive review of blockchain-based security for smart grid communications,” IEEE Commun. Surv.
Tutor., vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 998-1010, Sept. 2012.
protection mechanism for cyber security of smart grid is [17] A. Bani-Ahmed, M. Rashidi, A. Nasiri, and H. Hosseini, “Relia-
conducted. Data protection is enabled by storing data in bility analysis of a decentralized microgrid control architecture,”
blockchain network and is validated by peers within the same IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 3910-3918, July 2019.
[18] Q. Yu, “Design, implementation, evaluation of a blockchain-
network. The verified data can then be used for advanced smart enabled multi-energy transaction system for district energy sys-
grid operations, such as load forecasting, local redistribution, tems,” M.S thesis, ETH Zurich Research Collection, Apr. 2018.
and demand response. Blockchain-based platforms, applica- [19] K. Christidis and M. Devetsikiotis, “Blockchains and smart con-
tracts for the Internet of Things,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, no. 1, pp.
tions, and services suitable for smart grid with an emphasis on 22922303, May. 2016.
cyber-security are studied in-depth in this paper. Many types [20] M. Marchesi, “Why blockchain is important for software devel-
opers, and why software engineering is important for blockchain
of applications can be structured on blockchain DAPPS layer, software,” in Proc. IEEE IWBOSE’18, Mar. 2018.
which helps establish control of smart grid with security over [21] P. Danzi, M. Angjelichinoski, C. Stefanovic, and P. Popovski,
cloud and autonomy. Therefore, blockchain can improve the “Distributed proportional-fairness control in microgrids via
blockchain smart contracts,” in Proc. IEEE SmartGridComm’17,
cyber security for data collection, storage, transfers, as well Oct. 2017.
as control execution in smart grid. Blockchain is a promising [22] T. M. G. L. Winter, “The advantages and challenges of the
solution for smart grid cyber security improvement. However, blockchain for smart grids,” M.S thesis, TU Delft University of
Technology, May 2018.
there are still great challenges from both the perspective of the [23] F. Lombard, L. Aniello, S. D. Angelis, A. Margheri, and V.
vulnerabilities of blockchian technologies and the implemen- Sassone., “A blockchain based infrastructure for reliable and cost-
tation of blockchain in smart grid. In this paper, the potential effective IoT-aided smart grids,” in Proc. IEEE iThings’18, Mar.
2018.
future research directions are discussed in detail to provide [24] G. C. Lazaroiu, “Blockchain and smart metering towards sustain-
some guidance for the research on blockchain-based smart able prosumers,” in Proc. IEEE SPEEDAM’18, Jun. 2018.
grid. [25] M. Andoni, V. Robu, D. Flynn, S. Abram, D. Geach, D. Jenkins,
P. McCallum, and A. Peacock, “Blockchain technology in the en-
ergy sector: a systematic review of challenges and opportunities,”
Renew. Sustain Energy Rev., vol. 100, pp. 143-174, Feb. 2019.
R EFERENCES [26] A. S. Musleh, G. Yao, and S. M. Muyeen, “Blockchain applica-
tions in smart gridreview and frameworks,” IEEE Access, vol. 7,
[1] C. Greer, D. A. Wollman, D. E. Prochaska, and P. A. Boynton, pp. 86746-86757, June 2019.
NIST framework and roadmap for smart grid interoperability. Ac- [27] J. Abdella and K. Shuaib, “Peer to peer distributed energy trading
cessed: Aug. 11, 2019. [Online]. Available: [Link] in smart grids: s survey,” Energies, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 1560-1573,
[2] R. Liu, C. Vellaithurai, S. S. Biswas, T. T. Gamage, and A. K. May 2018.
Srivastava, “Analyzing the cyber-physical impact of cyber events
on the power grid,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. [28] P. Siano, G. De Marco, A. Rolan, and V. Loia, “A survey and evalu-
24442453, Sep. 2015. ation of the potentials of distributed ledger technology for peer-to-
[3] H. Farhangi, “The path of the smart grid,” IEEE Power and Energy peer transactive energy exchanges in local energy markets,” IEEE
Mag., vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 18-28, July 2010. Syst. J., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 3454-3466, Sept. 2019.
[4] A. Stefanov and C. Liu, “Cyber-power system security in a smart [29] R. Kuhn, D. Yaga, and J. Voas, “Rethinking distributed ledger
grid environment,” in Proc. IEEE ISGT’12, Jan. 2012. technology,” in Computer, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 68-72, Feb. 2019.
[5] Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Analysis of [30] M. Mylrea and S. N. G. Gourisetti, “Blockchain: a path to grid
the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid. Accessed: Aug. modernization and cyber resiliency,” in Proc. IEEE NAPS’17, Sep.
11, 2019. [Online]. Available: [Link] 2017.
[6] The Highly Dangerous ‘Triton’ Hackers Have Probed the [31] S. Li, “Application of blockchain technology in smart city infras-
US Grid. Accessed: Aug. 11, 2019. [Online]. Available: tructure,” in Proc. IEEE SmartIoT’18, Aug. 2018.
[Link] [32] W. Wang, D. T. Hoang, P. Hu, Z. Xiong, D. Niyato, P. Wang,
[7] Y. Yu, Y. Li, J. Tian, and J. Liu, “Blockchain based solutions to Y. Wen, and D. I. Kim, “A survey on consensus mechanisms
security and privacy issues in the internet of things,” IEEE Wirel. and mining strategy management in blockchain networks,” IEEE
Commun., vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 12-18, Dec. 2018. Access, vol. 7, pp. 22328-22370, Jan. 2019.
[8] M. Curiale, “From smart grids to smart city,” in Proc. IEEE SASG, [33] E. B. Hamida, K. L. Brousmiche, H. Levard, and E. Thea,
Dec. 2014. “Blockchain for enterprise: overview, opportunities and chal-
[9] J. Xie, H. Tang, T. Huang, F. R. Yu, R. Xie, J. Liu, and Y. Liu, “A lenges,” in Proc. ICWMC’13, Jul. 2017.
Survey of blockchain technology applied to smart cities: research [34] J. Kang, R. Yu, X. Huang, S. Maharjan, Y. Zhang, and E. Hossain,
issues and challenges,” in Proc. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor., Feb. “Enabling localized peer-to-peer electricity trading among plug-
2019. in hybrid electric vehicles using consortium blockchains,” IEEE
[10] Z. E. Mrabet, N. Kaabouch, H. E. Ghazi, and H. ElGhazi, “Cy- Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 31543164, May 2017.
bersecurity in smart grid: Survey and challenges,” Comput. Elect. [35] M. S. Ali, M. Vecchio, M. Pincheira, K. Dolui, F. Antonelli, and
Eng., vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 469482, Apr. 2018. M. H. Rehmani, “Applications of blockchains in the Internet of
[11] M. A. Faisal, Z. Aung, J. R. Williams, and A. Sanchez, “Data- Things: a comprehensive survey,” in Proc. IEEE Commun. Surv.
stream based intrusion detection system for advanced metering Tutor., Dec. 2018.
infrastructure in smart grid: a feasibility study,” IEEE Syst. J., vol. [36] Z. Ma, W. Huang, and H. Gao, “Secure DRM scheme based on
9, no. 1, pp. 3144, Mar. 2015. blockchain with high credibility,” Chinese J. Electron., vol. 27, no.
[12] E. D. Knapp and R. Samani, Applied Cyber Security and the Smart 5, pp. 1025-1036, Sep. 2018.
Grid: Implementing Security Controls Into the Modern Power [37] S. Nakamoto, Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash
Infrastructure. Waltham, MA, USA: Syngress, 2013. system. Accessed: 22 March 2018. [Online]. Available:
[13] S. Shapsough, F. Qatan, R. Aburukba, F. Aloul, and A. R. Al Ali, [Link]
“Smart grid cyber security: challenges and solutions,” in Proc. [38] X. Wu, B. Duan, Y. Yan, and Y. Zhong, “M2M blockchain: the
IEEE ICSGCE, Oct. 2015. case of demand side management of smart grid,” in Proc. IEEE
[14] R. Deng, P. Zhuang, and H. Liang, “False data injection attacks ICPADS’17, Dec. 2017.
against state estimation in power distribution systems,” IEEE [39] M. T. Devine and P. Cuffe, “Blockchain electricity trading under
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 2871-2881, May 2019. demurrage,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 2323-
[15] M. R. Asghar, G. Dan, D. Miorandi, and I. Chlamtac, “Smart meter 2325, Mar. 2019.
data privacy: a survey,” IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor., vol. 19, no. 4, [40] D. Fakhri and K. Mutijarsa, “Secure IoT communication using
pp. 2820-2835, Sept. 2017. blockchain technology,” in Proc. IEEEISESD’18 Oct. 2018.

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
14

[41] M. M. Esfahani and O. A. Mohammed, “Secure blockchain-based [68] B.L.R. Stojkoska and K.V. Trivodaliev, “A review of Internet of
energy transaction framework in smart power systems,” in Proc. Things for smart home: challenges and solutions,” J. Clean Prod.,
IEEE IECON’18, Oct. 2018. vol. 140, n0. 3, pp. 1454-1464, Jan. 2017.
[42] S. Wang, L. Ouyang, Y. Yuan, X. Ni, X. Han, and F. Wang, [69] A. Pieroni, N. Scarpato, L. D. Nunzio, F. Fallucchi, and M. Raso,
“Blockchain-enabled smart contracts: architecture, applications, “Smarter city: smart energy grid based on blockchain technology,”
and future trends,” IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Syst., Feb. IJASEIT, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 298-307, Sept. 2018.
2019. [70] S. Noor, W. Yang, M. Guo, K. H. van Dam, and X. Wang, “Energy
[43] Bitcoin Project Group, The Bitcoin project. Accessed: Mar. 22, demand side management within micro-grid networks enhanced
2018. [Online]. Available: [Link] 2018-3-16. by blockchain,” Appl. Energy, vol. 228, no. 15, pp. 1385-1398,
[44] C. Liu, K. K. Chai, X. Zhang, E. T. Lau, and Y. Chen, “Adaptive Oct. 2018.
blockchain based electric vehicle participation scheme in smart [71] M. Fan and X. Zhang, “Consortium blockchain based data aggre-
grid platform,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 2565725665, May 2018. gation and regulation mechanism for smart grid,” IEEE Access,
[45] W. Cai, Z. Wang, J. B. Ernst, Z. Hong, C. Feng, and V. C. M. vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 35929-35940, Mar. 2019.
Leung, “Decentralized applications: the blockchain empowered [72] T. H. Kim and J. Lampkins, “BRICS: blockchain based resilient
software system,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 53019-53033, Sep. information control system,” in Proc. IEEE Big Data’18, Dec.
2018. 2018.
[46] C. Ehmke, F. Wessling, and C. M. Friedrich, “Proof-of-property - a [73] L. Thomas, Y. Zhou, C. Long, J. Wu, and N. Jenkins, “A general
lightweight and scalable blockchain protocol,” in Proc. IEEE/ACM form of smart contract for decentralized energy systems manage-
WETSEB’18, May - Jun. 2018. ment,” Nature Energy, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 140-149, Jan. 2019.
[47] D. Mechkaroska, V. Dimitrova, and A. Popovska-Mitrovikj, [74] C. Pop, T. Cioara, M. Antal, I. Anghel, I. Salomie, and M.
“Analysis of the possibilities for improvement of blockchain tech- Bertoncini, “Blockchain based decentralized management of de-
nology,” in Proc. IEEE TELFOR’18, Nov. 2018. mand response programs in smart energy grids”, SENSORS, vol.
[48] I. Eyal, A. E. Gencer, E. G. Sirer, and R. van Renesse, “Bitcoin- 18, no. 1, pp. 162, Jan. 2018..
NG: a scalable blockchain protocol,” in Proc. NSDI’16, Mar. 2016. [75] M. Baza, M. Nabil, M. Ismail, M. Mahmoud, E. Serpedin, and
[49] Z. Qi, Y. Zhang, Y. Wang, J. Wang, and Y. Wu, “A cascade M. Rahman, Blockchain-based privacy-preserving charging coor-
structure for blockchain,” in Proc. IEEE HotICN’18, Aug. 2018. dination mechanism for energy storage units. Accessed: Mar. 22,
[50] S. Biswas, K. Sharif, F. Li, B. Nour, and Y. Wang, “A scalable 2018. [Online]. Available: [Link]
blockchain framework for secure transactions in IoT,” IEEE Inter- [76] J. P. Morgan, Quorum, advancing blockchain tech-
net Things, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 4650-4659, June 2019. nology. Accessed: 23-Mar-2018. [Online]. Available:
[51] K. Shudo, R. Kanda, and K. Saito, “Towards application portabil- [Link]
ity on blockchains,” in Proc. IEEE HotICN’18, Aug. 2018. [77] D. Livingston, V. Sivaram, and M. Freeman, Applying blockchain
[52] R. Abe, K. Nakamura, K. Teramoto, and M. Takahashi, “Attack technology to electric power systems. Accessed: Mar. 22, 2018.
incentive and security of exchanging tokens on proof-of-work [Online]. Available: [Link] [Accessed: Mar. 22,
blockchain,” in Proc. AINTEC ’18, Nov. 2018. 2018].
[53] M. Westerkamp, “Verifiable smart contract portability,” in Proc. [78] G. Zizzo, E. R. Sanseverino, M. G. Ippolito, M. L. D. Silvestre,
IEEE ICBC’19, May 2019. and P. Gallo, “A technical approach to P2P energy transactions in
microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 14, no. 11, pp. 4792-
[54] T. T. A. Dinh, J. Wang, G. Chen, R. Liu, B. C. Ooi, and K. L. 4803, Nov. 2018.
Tan, Untangling blockchain: a data processing view of Blockchain [79] J. A. F. Castellanos, D. Coll-Mayor, and J. A. Notholt, “Cryp-
systems, in IEEE TKDE, vol. 30, no. 7, pp. 13661385, Jul. 2018. tocurrency as guarantees of origin: simulating a green certificate
[55] H. Hassani, X. Huang, and E. Silva, “Big-crypto: big data, market with the Ethereum blockchain,” in Proc. IEEE SEGE’17,
blockchain and cryptocurrency,” BDCC, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 34-50, Aug. 2017.
June 2018. [80] H. N. Vaibhav Saini, An encyclopedia of 40+ smart contract
[56] S. Aggarwal, R. Chaudhary, G.S. Aujla, A. Jindal, A. Dua, platforms. Accessed: 19-Jan-2019. [Online]. Available:
and N. Kumar, “EnergyChain: enabling energy trading for smart [Link]
homes using blockchains in smart grid ecosystem,” in Proc. ACM smart-contract-platforms-4867f66da1e5.
NCSC’18, Jun. 2018. [81] Tenup Team, Tenup white paper. Accessed: Mar. 22, 2018. [On-
[57] R. Henry, A. Herzberg, and A. Kate, “Blockchain access privacy: line]. Available: [Link]
challenges and directions,” IEEE Secur. Priv., vol. 16, no. 4, pp. [82] P. Danzi, A. E. Kalr, . Stefanovi, and P. Popovski, “Analysis of
3845, Aug. 2018. the communication traffic for blockchain synchronization of IoT
[58] M. Mylrea and S. N. G. Gourisetti, “Blockchain for smart grid devices,” in Proc. IEEE ICC’18, May. 2018.
resilience: exchanging distributed energy at speed, scale and secu- [83] S. Yu, K. Lv, Z. Shao, Y. Guo, J. Zou, and B. Zhang, “A high
rity,” in Proc. IEEE RWS’17, Sept. 2017. performance blockchain platform for intelligent devices,” in Proc.
[59] E. R. Sanseverino, M. L. D. Silvestre, P. Gallo, G. Zizzo, and M. IEEE HotICN’18, Aug. 2018.
Ippolito, “The blockchain in microgrids for transacting energy and [84] C. Plaza, J. Gil, F. D. Chezelles, and K. A. Strang, “Distributed
attributing losses,” in Proc. IEEE GreenCom’17, Jun. 2017. solar self consumption and blockchain solar energy exchanges
[60] Z. Guan, G. Si ; X. Zhang, L. Wu, N. Guizani, X. Du, and Y. Ma, on the public grid within an energy community,” in Proc. IEEE
“Privacy-preserving and efficient aggregation based on blockchain EEEIC’18, Jun. 2018.
for power grid communications in smart communities,” IEEE [85] G. Liang, S. R. Weller, J. Zhao, F. Luo, and Z. Y. Dong, “The 2015
Commun. Mag., vol. 56, no. 7, pp. 82-88, July 2018. Ukraine blackout: implications for false data injection attacks,”
[61] I. Ullah and Q. H. Mahmoud, “An intrusion detection framework IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 33173318, Jul. 2017.
for the smart grid,” in Proc. IEEE CCECE’17, Apr. 2017. [86] R. M. Lee, M. J. Assante, and T. Conway, “Analysis of the cyber
[62] T. Alladi, V. Chamola, J. J. Rodrigues, and S. A. Kozlov, attack on the Ukrainian power grid,” ICS E-ISAC, vol. 1, no. 1,
“Blockchain in smart grids: a review on different use cases,” pp.1-29, Mar. 2016.
Sensors, vol. 19, no. 22, pp. 4862, Nov. 2019. [87] G. Liang, J. Zhao, F. Luo, S. R. Weller, and Z. Y. Dong, “A review
[63] V. Buterin, The Ethereum project. Accessed: Nov. 12, 2019. [On- of false data injection attacks against modern power systems,”
line]. Available: [Link] IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 16301638, Jul. 2017.
[64] Zcash, Privacy-protecting digital currency. Accessed: Nov. 12, [88] A. Rahman and H. Mohsenian-rad, “False data injection attacks
2019. [Online]. Available: [Link] against nonlinear state estimation in smart power grids,” in Proc.
[65] M.B. Mollah, J. Zhao, D. Niyato, K. Y. Lam, X. Zhang, A. M.Y.M. IEEE PESGM’13, Nov. 2013.
Ghias, L. H. Koh, and L. Yang, Blockchain for future smart [89] J. Zhu and X. Wei, “Defending false data injection attacks against
grid: a comprehensive survey. Accessed: Sept. 15, 2019. [Online]. power system state estimation: a stealthiness corruption oriented
Available: [Link] method,” in Proc. IEEE POWERCON’16, Sep. 2016.
[66] SolarCoin, One megawatt hour one SolarCoin. Accessed: [90] J. Hao, R. J. Piechocki, D. Kaleshi, W. H. Chin, and Z. Fan,
Sept. 15, 2019. [Online]. Available: [Link] “Sparse malicious false data injection attacks and defense mech-
content/uploads/[Link]. anisms in smart grids,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat, vol. 11, no. 5,
[67] J. Fiaidhi, S. Mohammed, and S. Mohammed, “EDI with pp. 11981209, Oct. 2015.
blockchain as an enabler for extreme automation,” in IT skilled, [91] S. Tan, W. Song, S. Member, M. Stewart, J. Yang, and L. Tong,
vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 6672, Aug. 2018. “Online data integrity attacks against real-time electrical market in

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
15

smart grid,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 313-322, [116] K. Singh and S. C. Choube, “Using blockchain against cyber
Jan. 2018. attacks on smart grids,” in Proc. IEEE SCEECS’18, Feb. 2018.
[92] M. N. Kurtm, Y. Yilmaz, and X. Wang, “Secure distributed dy- [117] H. Sedjelmaci and S. M. Senouci, “Smart grid security: a new
namic state estimation in wide-area smart grids,” CoRR, vol. 1, no. approach to detect intruders in a smart grid neighborhood area
1, pp. 1902-1918, Jul. 2019. network,” in Proc. IEEE WINCOM’16, Oct. 2016.
[93] L. Yue, H. Junqin, Q. Shengzhi, and W. Ruijin, “Big data model [118] J. Gao, K. O. Asamoah, E.l B. Sifah, A. Smahi, Q. Xia, H. Xia,
of security sharing based on blockchain,” in Proc. IEEE BIG- X. Zhang, and G. Dong, “Grid monitoring: secured sovereign
COM’17, Aug. 2017. blockchain based monitoring on smart grid,” IEEE Access, vol. 6,
[94] E. Bandara, W. K. Ng, K. D. Zoysa, N. Fernando, S. Tharaka, P. no. 1, pp. 99179925, Feb. 2018.
Maurakirinathan, and N. Jayasuriya, “Mystiko blockchain meets [119] Z. Ahmed Khan, N. Afaqui, and O. Humayun, “Detection and pre-
big data,” in Proc. IEEE Big Data’18, Dec. 2018. vention of DDoS attacks on software defined networks controllers
[95] [Link], [Link], [Link], and [Link], “Big data model for smart grid,” IJCA, vol. 181, no. 45, pp.16-21, Mar. 2019.
of security sharing based on blockchain,” in Proc. IEEE 2017 [120] U. Javaid, A. K. Siang, M. N. Aman, and B. Sikdar, “Mitigating
BDCC’17, Aug. 2017. loT device based DDoS attacks using blockchain,” in Proc. Cry-
[96] F. Luo, J. Zhao, Z. Y. Dong, Y. Chen, Y. Xu, X. Zhang, and Block’18, June 2018.
K. P. Wong., “Cloud based information infrastructure for next [121] G. Liang, S. R. Weller, F. Luo, J. Zhao, and Z. Y. Dong, “Dis-
generation power grid: conception, architecture, and applications,” tributed blockchain based data protection framework for modern
IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 18961912, Jul. 2016. power systems against cyber attacks,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
[97] P. K. Sharma, M. Y. Chen, and J. H. Park, “A software defined vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 112, Mar. 2018.
fog node based distributed blockchain cloud architecture for IoT,” [122] C. Burger, A. Kuhlmann, P. Richard, J. Weinmann, “Blockchain in
IEEE Access, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 115124, Sep. 2018. the energy transition: a survey among decision-makers in the Ger-
[98] T. M. Fernndez-Carams and P. Fraga-Lamas, “A review on the use man energy industry,” Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH (dena) -
of blockchain for the internet of things,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, no. German Energy Agency, Nov. 2016.
1, pp. 3297933001, May. 2018. [123] M. E. Elkhatib, R. E. Shatshat, and M. M. A. Salama, “Decentral-
[99] M. A. Rahman, M. M. Rashid, M. S. Hossain, E. Hassanain, M. F. ized reactive power control for advanced distribution automation
Alhamid, and M. Guizani, “Blockchain and IoT based cognitive systems,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1482-1490,
edge framework for sharing economy services in a smart city,” Sep. 2012.
IEEE Access, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 18611-18621, Jan. 2019. [124] W. Tang, S. Bi, and Y. J. A. Zhang, “Online coordinated charging
[100] T. T. A. Dinh, R. Liu, M. Zhang, G. Chen, B. C. Ooi, and J. Wang, decision algorithm for electric vehicles without future informa-
“Untangling blockchain: a data processing view of blockchain tion,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 28102824, Nov.
systems,” IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 30, no. 7, pp. 2014.
13661385, Jul. 2018. [125] L. DOriano, G. Mastandrea, G. Rana, G. Raveduto, V. Croce, M.
[101] S. Prianga, R. Sagana, and E. Sharon, “Evolutionary survey on Verber, and M. Bertoncini, “Decentralized blockchain flexibility
data security in cloud computing using blockchain,” in Proc. IEEE system for smart grids: requirements engineering and use cases,”
ICSCA’18, Jul. 2018. in Proc. IEEE CANDO-EPE’18, Nov. 2018.
[102] Y. Chen, H. Li, K. Li, and J. Zhang, “An improved P2P file [126] C. Liu, K. K. Chai, E. T. Lau, Y. Wang, and Y. Chen, “Optimised
system scheme based on IPFS and Blockchain,” in Proc. IEEE Big electric vehicles charging scheme with uncertain user-behaviours
Data’17, Dec. 2017. in smart grids,” in Proc. IEEE PIMRC’17, Oct. 2017.
[127] B. A. Scriber, “A framework for determining blockchain applica-
[103] M. L. Di Silvestre, P. Gallo, M. G. Ippolito, E. R. Sanseverino, bility,” IEEE Softw., vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 7077, Jul. 2018.
and G. Zizzo, “A technical approach to the energy blockchain
in microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat. , vol. 14, no. 11, pp. [128] B. Yu, J. Wright, S. Nepal, L. Zhu, J. Liu, and R. Ranjan, “Trust
47924803, Nov. 2018. chain: establishing trust in the iot based applications ecosystem
using blockchain,” IEEE Cloud Comput., vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 1223,
[104] S. Mhanna, A. C. Chapman, and G. Verbic, “A fast distributed Aug. 2018.
algorithm for large-scale demand response aggregation,” IEEE [129] P. Siano, G. De Marco, A. Roln, and V. Loia, “A survey and evalu-
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 20942107, Jul. 2016. ation of the potentials of distributed ledger technology for peer-to-
[105] K. Dehghanpour, C. Colson, and H. Nehrir, “A survey on smart peer transactive energy exchanges in local energy markets,” IEEE
agent-based microgrids for resilient/self-healing grids,” Energies, Syst. J., Mar. 2019.
vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 620-645, May 2017. [130] S. Kim and J. Kim, “Mining with proof of probability in
[106] C. Pop, T. Cioara, M. Antal, I. Anghel, I. Salomie, and M. blockchain,” in Proc. ACM ASIACCS’18, Jun. 2018.
Bertoncini, “Blockchain based decentralized management of de- [131] H. Wang, Q. Wang, D. He, Q. Li, and Z. Liu, “BBARS: blockchain
mand response programs in smart energy grids,” Sensors, vol. 18, based anonymous rewarding scheme for V2G networks,” in IEEE
no. 1, pp. 162-184, Jan. 2018. Internet Things J., vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 3676 - 3687, Jan. 2019.
[107] A. Goranovic, M. Meisel, L. Fotiadis, S. Wilker, A. Treytl, and [132] P. Danzi, S. Hambridge, . Stefanovi, and P. Popovski,
T. Sauter, “Blockchain applications in microgrids an overview of “Blockchain-based and multi-layered electricity imbalance settle-
current projects and concepts,” in Proc. IEEE IES’17, Oct. 2017. ment architecture,” in Proc. IEEE SmartGridComm’18, Oct. 2018.
[108] M. Faschang, T. G. Deutsch, and G. Kienesberger, “Transition [133] W. Liu, Q. Gong, H. Han, Z. Wang, and L. Wang, “Reliability
roadmap from centralized to massively decentralized grid control modeling and evaluation of active cyber physical distribution
systems,” Wissenschaftlicher Bericht fur die FFG Eigenverlag der system,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 7096-7108,
Energy&IT Group, pp. 75, 2015, ISBN 978-3-200-04337-4. Nov. 2018.
[109] A. Paudel, K. Chaudhari, C. Long, and H. B. Gooi, “Peer-to-Peer [134] Y. N. Aung and T. Tantidham, “Review of Ethereum: smart home
energy trading in a prosumer based community microgrid: a game- case study,” in Proc. IEEE InCIT’17, Nov. 2017.
theoretic model,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron., vol. 66, no. 8, pp. [135] E. S. Kang, S. J. Pee, J. G. Song, and J. W. Jang, “A blockchain-
6087-6097, Aug. 2019. based energy trading platform for smart homes in a microgrid,” in
[110] E. Munsing, J. Mather, and S. Moura, “Blockchains for decentral- Proc. IEEE ICCCS’18, Apr. 2018.
ized optimization of energy resources in microgrid networks,” in [136] Pop Claudia, Tudor Cioara, Marcel Antal, Ionut Anghel, Ioan Sa-
Proc. IEEE CCTA’17, Aug. 2017. lomie, and Massimo Bertoncini, “Blockchain based decentralized
[111] A. Alam, M. T. Islam, and A. Ferdous, “Towards blockchain- management of demand response programs in smart energy grids,”
based electricity trading system and cyber resilient microgrids,” Sensors, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 162-183, Jan. 2018.
in Proc. ECCE’19, Feb. 2019. [137] X. Luo, J. Wang, M. Dooner, and J. Clarke, “Overview of current
[112] S. J. Pee, E. S. Kang, J. G. Song, and J. W. Jang, “Blockchain development in electrical energy storage technologies and the
based smart energy trading platform using smart contract,” in Proc. application potential in power system operation,” Appl. Energy,
ICAIIC’19, Feb. 2019. vol. 137, no. C, pp. 511-536, Jan. 2015.
[113] S. Wang, A. F. Taha, and J. Wang, “Blockchain assisted crowd- [138] M. Pustiek, A. Kos, and U. Sedlar, “Blockchain based autonomous
sourced energy systems,” in Proc. IEEE PESGM’18, Aug. 2018. selection of electric vehicle charging station,” in Proc. IEEE
[114] J. Kim, L. Tong, and R. J. Thomas, “Dynamic attacks on power IIKI’16, Oct. 2016.
systems economic dispatch,” in Proc. IEEE ACSSC’15, Nov. 2015. [139] S. Jeong, N. Dao, Y. Lee, C. Lee, and S. Cho, “Blockchain based
[115] D. Canto and D. Enel, “Blockchain: which use cases in the energy billing system for electric vehicle and charging station,” in Proc.
industry,” in Proc. IET CIRED’17, June 2017. IEEE ICUFN’18, July 2018.

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2020.2998479, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics
16

[140] N. H. Kim, S. M. Kang, and C. S. Hong, “Mobile charger billing Peng Zhuang (S’15) received the [Link]. degree in
system using lightweight Blockchain,” in Proc. APNOMS’17, electrical and computer engineering from University
Sept. 2017. of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada, in 2015. He
[141] P. Fraga-Lamas and T. M. Fernndez-Carams, “A review on is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree with the
blockchain technologies for an advanced and cyber-resilient auto- Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
motive industry,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 17578-17598, Jan. 2019. University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada. His
[142] K. Xiang, B. Chen, H. Lin, Y. Shen, Y. Du, and T. Yan, “Auto- current research interests include stochastic model-
matic demand response strategy of local pure electric vehicle with ing and optimization in smart grid, cyber-physical
battery energy storage system based on blockchain technology,” in security of smart grid, microgrid planning, operation,
Proc. IEEE EI2’18, Nov. 2018. control, and self-healing, distribution system opera-
[143] F. Gao, L. Zhu, M. Shen, K. Sharif, Z. Wan, and K. Ren, tion with distributed generation and energy storage
“A blockchain-based privacy-preserving payment mechanism for devices, computational intelligence and optimization, and big data analytics.
vehicle-to-grid networks,” IEEE Netw., vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 184-192,
Nov. 2018.
[144] J. Hinckeldeyn and K. Jochen, “Developing a smart storage con-
tainer for a blockchain based supply chain application,” in Proc.
IEEE CVCBT’18, Nov. 2018.
[145] Y. Xu, “Section-Blockchain: a storage reduced blockchain proto-
col, the foundation of an autotrophic decentralized storage archi-
tecture,” in Proc. IEEE ICECCS’18, Dec. 2018.
[146] M. Saad, M. T. Thai, and A. Mohaisen, “Deterring DDoS attacks
on blockchain based cryptocurrencies through mempool optimiza-
tion,” in Proc. ACM ASIACCS’18, Jun. 2018.
[147] H. Sukhwani, J. M. Martnez, X. Chang, K. S. Trivedi, and A. Talha Zamir received the [Link]. degree from Uni-
Rindos, “Performance modeling of PBFT consensus process for versity of Management and Technology, Lahore,
permissioned blockchain network,” in Proc. IEEE SRDS’17, Sep. Pakistan in 2013 and Master of Engineering degree
2017. from University of Alberta Edmonton, AB, Canada,
[148] M. Vukolic , “The quest for scalable blockchain fabric: proof of
in 2019. During his Masters, he started working as
work vs BFT replication,” in Proc. iNetSec’15, May 2015.
[149] D. Miller, “Blockchain and the internet of things in the industrial a researcher in the field of smart grids and came up
sector,” IT Prof., vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 1518, May. 2018. with new ideas related to integration of blockchain
[150] M. Dai, S. Zhang, H. Wang, and S. Jin, “A low storage room in grid communication space to achieve robust cyber
requirement framework for distributed ledger in blockchain,” IEEE security. He specializes in the field of power sys-
Access, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 2297022975, Mar. 2018. tem protection, coordination, instrumentation, and
[151] J. Bergquist, A. Laszka, M. Sturm, and A. Dubey, “On the design renewable energy systems. He is currently working
of communication and transaction anonymity in blockchain based with Dynawest Engineering Ltd., Edmonton, AB, Canada as an Electrical
transactive microgrids,” in Proc. ACM SRIDL’17, Dec. 2017. EIT. His research interests include smart grid, cyber security, power system
[152] K. Gai, Y. Wu, L. Zhu, L. Xu, and Y. Zhang, “Permissioned protection and power quality.
blockchain and edge computing empowered privacy preserving
smart grid networks,” IEEE Internet Things J., Mar. 2019.
[153] Z. Lu, W. Liu, Q. Wang, G. Qu, and Z. Liu, “A privacy-preserving
trust model based on blockchain for VANETs,” IEEE Access, vol.
6, no. 1, pp. 45655-45664, Aug. 2018.
[154] K. Valtanen, J. Backman, and S. Yrjola, “Blockchain powered
value creation in the 5G and smart grid use cases,” IEEE Access,
vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 25690-25707, Feb. 2019.
[155] The Linux Foundation, The hyperledger project: august
12, 2015. Accessed: Mar. 22, 2018. [Online]. Available:
[Link]
[156] S. Biswas, K. Sharif, F. Li, S. Maharjan, S. P. Mohanty, and Y. Hao Liang (S’09-M’14) is an Assistant Professor
Wang, “PoBT: a lightweight consensus algorithm for scalable IoT and Canada Research Chair in the Department of
business blockchain,” IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 7, no. 3, pp. Electrical and Computer Engineering at the Uni-
2343-2355, March 2020. versity of Alberta, Canada. He received his Ph.D.
[157] Y. Jiang, C. Wang, Y. Wang, and G. Lang, “A cross-chain solution degree from the Department of Electrical and Com-
to integrating multiple blockchains for IoT data management,” puter Engineering, University of Waterloo, Canada,
Sensor, vol. 19, no. 9, pp. 2042-2060, May 2019. in 2013. From 2013 to 2014, he was a postdoctoral
[158] S. Johnson, P. Robinson, and J. Brainard, “Sidechains and interop- research fellow in the Broadband Communications
erability”. Accessed: 23-Mar-2019. [Online]. Available: Available: Research (BBCR) Lab and Electricity Market Sim-
[Link] ulation and Optimization Lab (EMSOL) at the Uni-
[159] M. Saad, J. Spaulding, L. Njilla, C. Kamhoua, S. Shetty, versity of Waterloo.
D. Nyang, and A. Mohaisen, “Exploring the attack sur- Dr. Liang’s current research interests are in the areas of smart grid, cyber-
face of blockchain: a systematic overview,” arXiv preprint physical systems, wireless communications, and wireless networking. He is a
arXiv:1904.03487 2019. co-recipient of the IEEE Power & Energy Society (PES) Prize Paper Award
[160] J. J. Hoch, A. Shamir, “On the strength of the concatenated 2018, the Best Conference Papers on Electric Vehicles, Energy Storage,
hash combiner when all the hash functions are weak,” in Proc. Microgrids, and Demand Response from the 2016 IEEE Power & Energy
ICALP’08, Jan. 2008. Society General Meeting (PES GM’16), Boston, MA, USA, and the Best
[161] M. Conti, E. Sandeep Kumar, C. Lal, and S. Ruj, “A survey Student Paper Award from the IEEE 72nd Vehicular Technology Conference
on security and privacy issues of Bitcoin,” IEEE Commun. Surv. (VTC Fall-2010), Ottawa, ON, Canada. He serves/served as an Editor for IET
Tutor., vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 3416-3452, May 2018. Communications, a Guest Editor for IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics
[162] N. Atzei, M. Bartoletti, and T. Cimoli, “A survey of attacks on
in Computing, and the Chair of Electric Vehicles, Vehicular Electronics, and
Ethereum smart contracts SoK,” in Proc. ACM PST’17, Apr. 2017.
Intelligent Transportation Track for IEEE VTC Fall-2020. He was the System
Administrator of IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology (2009-2013).

1551-3203 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See [Link] for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on June 02,2020 at [Link] UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.