[Link] v.

Cordova, AC 3249 1989

Facts

Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Cordova, with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar.

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married and 2 children were born.
The couple lives in Quirino Province but Cordova Cordova left his family as well as his
job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province,
and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely Holgado whom was herself
married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent
Cordova and Fely lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent
Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely using the name Fely
Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely funds with which to establish a sari-sari store
in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate
family.

Respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation

and respondent promised that he would separate from Fely and brought his legitimate
family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. However, respondent frequently come home from
beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate
family and even lived with his mistress despite his child was in the hospital.

Issue

Whether Atty. Cordova illicit relationship with his mistress constitute immoral
conduct.

Ruling

Yes. In Mortel v. Aspiras, the Court following the rule in the United States, held
that "the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for
the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment.” It
is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is
not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 

In the instant case, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental

institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the
community at large.
[Link] re Carlo S Basa (1920)

Facts

Atty Basa was admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands;
however, was charged in the CFI of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with
consent, was found guilty in a decision. rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario,
Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,
eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional.

Issue

Whether an accused attorney may still practice law.

Ruling

The Code of Civil Procedure, Sec 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the SC by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude." The sole question presented, therefore, is whether
the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code,
involves moral turpitude.

Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary). Although no
decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt
that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is
such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct.
[Link] vs. Atty. Tuanda (supra)

Facts

Respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry,

with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the
condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold
items. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces
of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks,
however, all 3 checks were dishonored by the drawee bank. Notwithstanding receipt of
the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the
honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to
Ms. Marquez.

Issue

Whether the violation of BP. 22 constitute of moral turpitude.

Ruling

Yes.  the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorney's oath and the CPR under both of which she was bound to
"obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not
relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she
had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Secs. 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of
the ROC provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by SC on what grounds. A member of the bar

may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. —

The CA or a CFI may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in
the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice
his profession until further action of the SC in the premises.
[Link] re Al Argosino (BM 712 1995)

Facts

A criminal information was filed with the RTC of Quezon City charging Mr. A.C.
Argosino along with 13 other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991 which stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered
into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was
accepted by the trial court.

In 1994, Mr. Argosino was granted to take the bar exam and passed it then he
filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to
admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated
his probation period by virtue of an Order.

Issue

Whether an accused who disclose the criminal offense be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath.

Ruling

As a general rule, the practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional

right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.

We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must

be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.