CARLOS R. SAUNAR v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.

ERMITA
[ GR No. 186502, Dec 13, 2017]

FACTS:
Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
which he joined as an agent in 1988
Through the years, he rose from the ranks and eventually became the Chief of the Anti-
Graft Division. During his time as chief of the said division, Saunar conducted an official
investigation regarding the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and
involving then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President Joseph E. Estrada
(President Estrada), and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada. President Estrada's assailed
involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate crimes
included in his indictment for plunder.
Saunar was reassigned as regional director for Western Mindanao based in
Zamboanga City. During his stint as such, he received a subpoena ad testificandum
from the Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in the plunder case against President
Estrada.
In 29 October 2004, then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special
Order No. 005033[7] informing Saunar that he was relieved from his duties as regional
director for Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further
instructions.
Pursuant thereto, he reported to Bautista on the first week of November 2004. Bautista
informed Saunar that an investigation was being conducted over his testimony before
the Sandiganbayan and that he should just wait for the developments in the
investigation. In the meantime, Bautista did not assign him any duty and told him to be
available at any time whenever he would be needed. He made himself accessible by
staying in establishments near the NBI. In addition, he also attended court hearings
whenever required.
On 6 October 2006, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) requiring him to answer the allegations against him in the PAGC
Formal Charge dated 3 October 2006. The charge was based on a letter, dated 19
August 2005, from Wycoco recommending an immediate appropriate action against
Saunar for his failure to report for work since 24 March 2005, without approved leave of
absence for four (4) months.
The OP Decision
In its 19 January 2007 decision, the OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty
and of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and dismissed him from
service.
It pointed out that Saunar failed to report for work for more than a year which he himself
admitted when he explained that he did not report for work because he had not been
assigned any specific duty or responsibility. The OP highlighted that he was clearly
instructed to report to the DDROS but he did not do so.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed 20 October 2008 decision, the CA affirmed in toto the OP decision. The
appellate court ruled that Saunar was not deprived of due process because he was
informed of the charges against him and was given the opportunity to defend himself. It
expounded that the absence of formal hearings in administrative proceedings is not
anathema to due process.
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENTS DID
NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS
GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION
RULING:
In any case, the PAGC violated Saunar's right to due process because it failed to
observe fairness in handling the case against him. Its unfairness and unreasonableness
is readily apparent with its disregard of its own rules of procedure.
Under the PAGC rules of procedure, it is crystal clear that the conduct of clarificatory
hearings is discretionary. Nevertheless, in the event that it finds the necessity to
conduct one, there are rules to be followed. One, the parties are to be notified of the
clarificatory hearings. Two, the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present in
the hearings without the right to examine witnesses. They, however, may ask questions
and elicit answers from the opposing party coursed through the PAGC.
To reiterate, due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The
due process requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to
judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be
heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not be confined to the mere
submission of position papers and/or affidavits and the parties must be given the
opportunity to examine the witnesses against them. The right to a hearing is a right
which may be invoked by the parties to thresh out substantial factual issues. It becomes
even more imperative when the rules itself of the administrative body provides for one.
While the absence of a formal hearing does not necessarily result in the deprivation of
due process, it should be acceptable only when the party does not invoke the said right
or waives the same.
The Court finds that Saunar was not treated fairly in the proceedings before the PAGC.
He was deprived of the opportunity to appear in all clarificatory hearings since he was
not notified of the clarificatory hearing attended by an NBI official. Saunar was thus
denied the chance to propound questions through the PAGC against the opposing
parties, when the rules of the PAGC itself granted Saunar the right to be present during
clarificatory hearings and the chance to ask questions against the opposing party.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 20 October 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100157 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Carlos
R. Saunar is entitled to full back wages from the time of his illegal dismissal until his
retirement and to receive his retirement benefits.
[Link]
EXECUTIVE-SECRETARY-EDUARDO-R-ERMITA-pdf
EL BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA
G.R. No. L-11390 ; March 26, 1918

FACTS:
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to
his debt which amounted to 218, 294. 10 Php while his property was worth 75, 000 Php
more than what he owed. Due to his failure to pay, El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage the former's property. However, Engracio left for Amoy, China and eventually
died there. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is
a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was
also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant's last known address but it
was not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after
publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by
default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by
public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder and the same was
confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a
motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein he requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. On the ground that the
order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter
or the action.

RULING:

Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives outside of the country and refuses
to appear or otherwise submit himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the
latter is limited to the mortgaged property, with respect to which jurisdiction of the court
is based upon the fact that the property is located within the district and that the court,
under the provisions of law applicable in such cases is vested with the power to subject
property to the obligation created by the mortgage. In such case personal jurisdiction
over the non-resident defendant is non-essential and in fact cannot be acquired.
[Link]

ANG TIBAY V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION

(G.R. NO. 46496, FEBRUARY 27, 1940)

FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of a
number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned
the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of
NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood
(NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio
was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The
Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD: 
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by
NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but
already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound
by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it
is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
  The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

[Link]

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULaONG

(G.R. 99327 May 27, 1993)
FACTS:
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila
Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as
a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution
dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students
guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president
of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven students.
However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the
students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse
its decision and reinstate the said students.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing
such students pursuant to its rules.
HELD: 
Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and
therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim a
venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may
foreseeably cast a  malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those
who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the school which
includes:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;
b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.