THE UNITED STATES v.
DALMACIO ANTIPOLO (1918)
DOCTRINE: The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death, concerning
the circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person charged with killing the
declarant.
FACTS: The appellant was prosecuted in CFI Btatangas. He was charged with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal.
The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he has appealed. One of the errors assigned is
based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the deceased, to testify as a witness
on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations.
The witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what
occasion did your husband die?" To this question the fiscal objected: "I object to the testimony of this witness. She
has just testified that she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe that she is not
competent to testify under the rules of procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her
husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified from
testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party.”
Stating Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows: which states that "Except with the
consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife
shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both
shall be parties."
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the deceased’s widow regarding the dying declaration of her murdered husband
may be admitted
RULING: YES. The reasons for rule Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) are thus stated in Underhill’s
work on Criminal Evidence (second edition) on page 346: "At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a
competent witness for or against the other in any judicial proceedings, civil or criminal, to which the other was a
party. . . . If either were recognized as a competent witness against the other who was accused of crime, . . . a very
serious injury would be done to the harmony and happiness of husband and wife and the confidence which should
exist between them."
In Greenleaf’s classical work on evidence, in section 337 [vol. I], the author says, in stating the reason for the rule at
common law: "The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness by placing the protecting seal of the law
upon all confidential communications between husband and wife; and whatever has come to the knowledge of either
by means of the hallowed confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony even
through the other party be no longer living."
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is
to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to
relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made from the obligation
of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the
manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential.
On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death
of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death, concerning the
circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person charged with killing the
declarant. (U. S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. Rep., 530.) Such dying declaration are admissible in favor of the defendant as well
as against him. (Mattox v. U. S., 146 U. S., 140.) It has been expressly held in several jurisdictions in the United
States that the widow of the deceased may testify regarding his dying declarations. In the case of the State v. Rayan
(30 la. Ann., 1176), cited by appellant in his brief, the court said: "The next bill is as to the competency of the
widow of the deceased to prove his dying declarations. We see no possible reason for excluding her . . . after the
husband’s death she is no longer his wife, and the rules of evidence, as between husbands and wives, are no longer
applicable."
DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the court below is hereby set aside, and a new trial is granted at which the
testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted.