Chapter – V
WHAT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO CONTEMPT
Section 13 of the Act 1971 postulates no punishment for contemptuous conduct in certain cases.
As a general guideline, it provides for no punishment unless the court is satisfied that the
contempt is of such a nature that “substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with
the due course of justice”. In fact, Section 13, as amended in 2006, under its sub-section (b)
allows for justification by truth to be raised as a valid defence against contempt, if the court is
satisfied that it is in public interest and the request for invoking the said defence is bona fide.1
In M.V. Jayarajan v. High Court of Kerala & Anr. 2 the Court held that right to freedom of
speech and expression postulates a temperate and reasoned criticism and not a vitriolic,
slanderous or abusive one. Such right certainly does not extend to inciting public directly or
insidiously to disobey Court order. But, no one can scandalise the Court using abusive and
pejorative language against the judiciary.
In B.K. Kar v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice and his companion Justices of the Orissa High Court &
Anr.3, the Supreme Court observed that where the order of the Court is not complied with,
mistakenly, inadvertently or by misunderstanding the meaning and object of the judgment,
charges of contempt cannot be leveled, because it is quite possible that the disobedience is
accidental.
The Supreme Court while striking a balance in relation to the invoking of provisions of contempt
held that a mere allegation of social intimacy between a party in litigation and a judicial officer
does not amount to an act of criminal contempt (vide Gobind Ram v. State of Maharshtra4).
(i.) Judgment / Order – if capable of different interpretations
A non-compliance of an order, which can be interpreted in more than one way, raising a variety
of consequences, has been held not to be a willful disobedience so as to make a case of contempt
allowing serious consequences including imposition of punishment as has been held in Dinesh
1
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2
M.V. Jayarajan v. High Court of Kerala & Anr. (2015) 4 SCC 81
3
B.K. Kar v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice and his companion Justices of the Orissa High Court & Anr. , AIR 1961 SC
1367
4
Gobind Ram v. State of Maharshtra, AIR 1972 SC 989
Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.5, The Supreme Court in the said case,
emphasizing on the element of willfulness in civil contempt, also observed that even though
there may be disobedience, yet if the same does not reflect that it has been conscious and willful,
a case for contempt cannot be held to have been made out.
In Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & Ors.6, the Court according the benefit of
doubt to the alleged contemnor in this case, where the order was capable of two interpretations
and one of which was adopted by the alleged contemnor, noted that
“Exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious
and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect of the contemptuous
conduct”.
(ii.) Execution of Order Not Possible
Where an alleged contemnor is able to place before the Court sufficient material to establish that
it is impossible to obey an order, the Court will not be justified in punishing such alleged
contemnor as has been held in Capt. Dushyant Somal v. Smt. Sushma Somal & Anr.7 A person is
not to be punished for contempt of Court for disobeying an order of Court except when the
disobedience is established beyond reasonable doubt, “the standard of proof being similar, even
if not the same, as in a criminal proceeding”.8
Similarly, in Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather9, the Court held that where the
appellant has genuine difficulties with regard to implementation of the order, the insistence of
the courts on implementation may not meet with realities of the situation and the practicability of
implementation of the court's direction. Enforcing obedience to such orders through contempt
proceedings hardly lends credence to judicial process and authority. While the court must always
be zealous in preserving its authority and dignity, but at the same time it will be inadvisable to
require compliance of an order impossible of compliance.
(iii.) Order Difficult to Comply being Unclear in Terms
5
Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 770
6
Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1293
7
Capt. Dushyant Somal v. Smt. Sushma Somal & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1026).
8
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9
Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather, AIR 1994 SC 2252
A non-compliance of an order owing to an omission in such order rendering it unclear in terms
of the required compliance, i.e. difficult to comply with, has been held to be not a contempt of
such order. As in the case of Dravya Finance Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. S. K. Roy & Ors.10, the Supreme
Court closed a contempt petition, treating it as a limited review petition, on account of an
apparent omission in the final order, which while ordering the payment of interest failed to
specify the date from which it is to be calculated and paid.
In Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr. v. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors.11, the Court noted that the court
exercising contempt jurisdiction does not function as an original or appellate court for
determination of the disputes between the parties, and if there is any ambiguity in the judgment
or order then it is better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter,
for clarification of the order, instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction. That the
power to punish for contempt of courts is a special power and needs to be exercised with care
and caution; that it should be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true
effect of contemptuous conduct12.
(iv.) Technical Contempt
Emphasising on initiating contempt proceedings with utmost reserve and greatest caution, courts
have on various occasions distinguished between a mere technical contempt and a contempt of
court which interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of justice. As was noted by the
Apex Court In Re : P.C. Sen13, a Court will not initiate proceedings for commitment of contempt
where there is a mere technical contempt.
Further, in the case of Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia 14, the Supreme Court underlining the
precondition of substantial interference with the due course of justice under Section 13 of the Act
1971, held “It is not enough that there should be some technical contempt of court but it must be
shown that the act of contempt would otherwise substantially interfere with the due course of
justice which has been equated with “due administration of justice”. Substantial interference
10
Dravya Finance Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. S. K. Roy & Ors., (2017) 1 SCC 75,
11
Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr. v. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2215
12
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13
Re : P.C. Sen, AIR 1970 SC 1821
14
Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia, AIR 2000 SC 833
with the course of justice being an essential requirement for imposition of punishment under the
statute.15
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