Game Theory
Mixed strategy
Section 02 Eng. Ibrahim Ghonimi
Decision Making
Under Under
Under Risk Certainity Uncertainity
Non Competitive situations
Competitive
Situations (Games Theory)
Pure Strategy Mixed Strategy
(Saddle Point exist)
Algebraic Arithmetic Graphical
Method Method Method
Mixed Strategy Game “Algebraic Method”
Example 1
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.
Player 2
A B
A 5 2
Player 1
B 3 4
Mixed Strategy Game “Algebraic Method”
Example 1
Player 2 Minimum
Of rows
A B
A 5 2 2
Player 1
B 3 4 3 Maximin
Maximum
Of Columns 5 4
Minimax
4 = 3 There is no Saddle Point
Mixed Strategy Game “Algebraic Method”
Example 1
Player 2
A B
P A 5 2 1/4
Player 1
1-P B 3 4 3/4
𝑝∗5+ 1−𝑝 ∗3=𝑝∗2+ 1−𝑝 ∗4=𝑉
1 1 3
P= 1-P = 1 − =
4 4 4
1 3 7
Game Value = 5 * ( )+3 * ( ) =
4 4 2
𝟏 𝟑
Optimum Strategy for Player 1 is ( , ) , Player 1 should play strategy A = 25% and B = 75%
𝟒 𝟒
Mixed Strategy Game “Algebraic Method”
Example 1
Player 2
1-
A B
Player A 5 2
1 B 3 4
1/2 1/2
𝑞∗5+ 1−𝑞 ∗2=𝑞∗3+ 1−𝑞 ∗4=𝑉
1 1 1
=
2
1- = 1 − =
2 2
1 1 7
Game Value = 5 * ( )+2 * ( ) =
2 2 2
𝟏 𝟏
Optimum Strategy for Player 2 is ( , ) , Player 2 should play strategy A = 50% and B = 50%
𝟐 𝟐
Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 2
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.
Player 2
A B
A 5 2
Player 1
B 3 4
Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 2
Player 2 Minimum
Of rows
A B
A 5 2 2
Player 1
B 3 4 3 Maximin
Maximum
Of Columns 5 4
Minimax
4 = 3 There is no Saddle Point
Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 2
Player 2
Oddments
A B
Neglect negative sign
P A 5 2 3-4= -1
Player 1
1-P B 3 4 5-2= 3
1 1
P= = 1
1-P = 1 − =
3
1+3 4 4 4
1 3 7
Game Value = 5 * ( )+3 * ( ) =
4 4 2
𝟏 𝟑
Optimum Strategy for Player 1 is ( , ) , Player 1 should play strategy A = 25% and B = 75%
𝟒 𝟒
Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 2
Player 2
1-
A B
Player A 5 2
1 B 3 4
2 1
q= =
2+2 2
Oddments
2 – 4 = -2 5–3=2
1 1
1-q = 1 − =
Neglect negative sign 2 2
1 1 7
Game Value = 5 * ( )+2 * ( ) =
2 2 2
𝟏 𝟏
Optimum Strategy for Player 2 is ( , ) , Player 2 should play strategy A = 50% and B = 50%
𝟐 𝟐
Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 3
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.
Player 2
A B
A 2 -1
Player 1
B -1 0
Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 3
Player 2 Minimum
Of rows
A B
A 2 -1 -1
Player 1 Maximin
B -1 0 -1
Maximum
Of Columns 2 0
Minimax
0 = -1 There is no Saddle Point
Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 3
Player 2
Oddments
A B
Neglect negative sign
P A 2 -1 -1 -0 = -1
Player 1
1-P B -1 0 2- (-1)= 3
1 1
P= = 1
1-P = 1 − =
3
1+3 4 4 4
1 3 1
Game Value = 2 * ( )+ -1 * ( ) =
4 4 4
𝟏 𝟑
Optimum Strategy for Player 1 is ( , ) , Player 1 should play strategy A = 25% and B = 75%
𝟒 𝟒
Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 3
Player 2
1-
A B
Player A 2 -1
1 B -1 0
2 1
q= =
2+2 4
Oddments
-1 – 0 = -1 2 – (-1) = 3
1 3
1-q = 1 − =
Neglect negative sign 4 4
1 3 1
Game Value = 2 * ( )+ -1 * ( ) =
4 4 4
𝟏 𝟑
Optimum Strategy for Player 2 is ( , ) , Player 2 should play strategy A = 25% and B = 75%
𝟒 𝟒
Mixed Strategy Game
Example 4
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.
Player 2
A B
A 9 7
Player 1
B 5 11
Dominance Property In Game Theory
Example 5
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.
Maximin
2
2≠4
0
Minimax 5 6 5 4
There is no saddle point in this game and each player has more than two strategy.
Elimination By Dominance
R≤R
C≥C
Player B
q 1-q
3 4
P 2 2 4
Player A
1-P 4 5 2
Probability of player A Probability of player B
𝑝∗2+ 1−𝑝 ∗5=𝑝∗4+ 1−𝑝 ∗2 𝑞∗2+ 1−𝑞 ∗4= 𝑞∗5+ 1−𝑞 ∗2
2
P=
3 q=
5
5
2 1
1-p = 1 − =
3 2 1-q = 1 − =
3 5
5 5
2 1
V=
3
∗2
2
+ ∗ 5 = 3.2 V = ∗ 2 + ∗ 4 = 3.2
5 5
5 5
3 2 2 3
The strategy of player A =[0, ,0 ] The strategy of player B = [0,0 , ]
5 5 5 5
Thank You!
Section 02 Eng. Ibrahim Ghonimi