G.R. No. 189834. March 30, 2011.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES, accused-appellant.
Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Dying Declarations; A
dying person’s declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule
against hearsay if it is made under the consciousness of an
impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.—While
witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their
own perception, a report in open court of a dying person’s
declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against
hearsay if it is “made under the consciousness of an impending
death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.” It is considered as
“evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence
since no person aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation.”
Criminal Law; Mitigating Circumstances; Lack of Intention to
Commit so Grave a Wrong; This mitigating circumstance
addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular
moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act.—
The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the
mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed. We held, “This
mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the
offender at the particular moment when the offender executes or
commits the criminal act.” We also held,
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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People vs. Maglian
“This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a
notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to
commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention
of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is
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manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed
and the injury sustained by the victim.”
Same; Same; Voluntary Surrender; The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give
himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture.—An accused may enjoy the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender if the following requisites are present: “1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent;
and 3) the surrender was voluntary.” We explained, “The essence
of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture.”
Same; Same; Damages; Civil indemnity ex delicto is
mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the
culpability of the accused for the death.—We award a civil
indemnity ex delicto as this is “mandatory upon proof of the fact of
death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for the
death.” As We ruled, “When death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.” Current
jurisprudence pegs the award of civil indemnity at PhP 50,000.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Villanueva, Villanueva & Bihasa for accused-appellant.
772
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Maglian
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the December 23, 2008 Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02541, which affirmed the May 8, 2006 Decision in
Criminal Case No. 8393-00 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 22 in Imus, Cavite. The RTC found accused
Jay Mandy Maglian guilty of parricide.
The Facts
An Information2 charged the accused as follows:
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“That on or about the 4th day of January 2000, in the
Municipality of Dasmarinas, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court[,] accused with
intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and set on fire Mary Jay Rios
Maglian, his lawfully wedded spouse, who as a result sustained
90% Third Degree Burns on the face and other vital parts of the
body that caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said Mary Jay Rios Maglian.”
During his arraignment, the accused pleaded “not
guilty.”
The prosecution presented witnesses Lourdes Rios,
Norma Saballero, Dr. Ludovino Lagat, Amy Velasquez, and
Ramon Oredain. The defense, on the other hand, presented
accused Maglian, Atty. Ma. Angelina Barcelo, Atty.
Rosemarie Perey-Duque, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celestino
San Jose, and Lourdes Panopio as witnesses.
The facts established during the trial below.
The accused is a businessman engaged in the lending
business and the buying and selling of cars and real estate.
He
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by
Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Arcangelita M. Romilla-
Lontok.
2 Rollo, pp. 4-5.
773
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011 773
People vs. Maglian
and Atty. Mary Jay Rios (Mary Jay) were married on
January 29, 1999. They had a son, Mateo Jay.3
On January 4, 2000, the accused and Mary Jay were
having dinner at their home in Dasmariñas, Cavite when
they got into an argument. The accused did not want Mary
Jay to attend a party, causing them to fight. Incensed, the
accused collected the clothes that Mary Jay had given him
for Christmas and told her he would burn them all and
started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary Jay tried to
wrestle the can of kerosene from him and, at the same
time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife’s
plea, the accused still poured gas on her, thus setting both
the clothes and his wife on fire.4
The accused brought Mary Jay to the De la Salle
University Medical Center in Dasmariñas. After four days,
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she was transferred by her aunt to the burn unit of the
East Avenue Medical Center in Quezon City, were her
condition improved. Subsequently, however, the accused
transferred her to St. Claire Hospital, which did not have a
burn unit. Since her condition deteriorated, Lourdes Rios,
Mary Jay’s mother, had her transferred to the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH) in Manila but she was no longer
able to recover. Before she expired, she told her mother
what had happened to her, declaring, “Si Jay Mandy ang
nagsunog sa akin. (Jay Mandy burned me.)” She passed
away on February 24, 2000.5
The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident
was completely accidental. He said it was Mary Jay who
was being difficult while they were arguing. She
threatened to throw away the clothes he had given her. To
spite her, he also took the clothes that she had given him
and told her he would burn them all. He then got a match
and a gallon of kerosene. Mary Jay caught up with him at
the dirty kitchen and took the match and kerosene from
him. In the process, they both
_______________
3 CA Rollo, p. 57.
4 Id., at p. 51.
5 Id.
774
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Maglian
got wet from the spilled kerosene. She got angry at how he
was looking at her and screamed, “Mandy, Mandy, wag
yan, wag yan, ako na lang ang sunugin mo. (Mandy, don’t
burn that, burn me instead.)”
Accused, trying to avoid further provoking his wife, left
his wife and went upstairs to his son. While climbing the
stairs, he heard Mary Jay shouting, “Mandy, Mandy,
nasusunog ako. (Mandy, I’m burning.)” He ran down the
steps and saw the blaze had reached the ceiling of the
kitchen. He embraced his wife and called out to his mother
to help them. He poured water on her when the fire could
not be put out and brought her to the living room. He then
carried Mary Jay to the car while shouting for help from
the neighbors. In the process, he sustained burns on his
legs and arms.6
While Mary Jay was still confined at the East Avenue
Medical Center, the accused learned from a certain Judge
Tanguanco that using “red medicine” would help heal his
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wife’s burn wounds. The hospital, however, did not allow
him to use the “red medicine” on Mary Jay. He thus had
his wife transferred to PGH. When there was no space at
the hospital, she was transferred to St. Claire Hospital
with the help of a certain Judge Español. The doctors at St,
Claire advised him to stop using the “red medicine” on his
wife when her wounds started to get worse and began
emitting a foul odor.7
The accused asserted that his mother-in-law, Lourdes
Rios, and their laundrywoman, Norma Saballero, accused
him of burning his wife since his wife’s family had been
angry with him ever since they got married. His mother-in-
law and Mary Jay’s siblings used to ask money from them
and would get angry with him if they did not receive any
help.8
The accused likewise claimed that his late wife made a
dying declaration in the presence of PO3 Celestino San
Jose and
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6 Id., at pp. 57-58.
7 Id., at p. 59.
8 Id., at p. 60.
775
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011 775
People vs. Maglian
Atty. Rosemarie Perey-Duque. This allegation was
corroborated by PO3 San Jose, who testified that Mary Jay
was a friend and he had visited her at East Avenue
Medical Center on January 13, 2000. He was there to take
Mary Jay’s statement upon instructions of Chief Major
Bulalacao.9 PO3 San Jose narrated the incident during his
direct examination by Atty. Bihasa:
Q What, if any, was the reply of Atty. [Mary Joy] Rios?
A She nodded her head.
Q And after that, what happened next:
A I told her that I will get her statement and she told me that she
could give her statement.
Q And after Atty. Rios told you that she was capable of giving her
statement, what if any transpired?
A I took her statement, which was in my handwriting.
Q Her statement was in your handwriting but who uttered those
statements?
A It was Atty. Rios.10
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Atty. Duque testified that the last time she spoke with
Mary Jay was on January 13, 2000, when she visited her at
the hospital along with PO3 San Jose. The statements of
Mary Jay were reduced into writing and Atty. Duque
helped in lifting the arm of the patient so that she could
sign the document.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC rendered its Decision on May 8, 2006, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and so it
hereby holds that the prosecution had established the guilt of the
_______________
9 Records, p. 20.
10 Id.
11 CA Rollo, p. 56.
776
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Maglian
accused JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES beyond reasonable
doubt and so it hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.”
Inasmuch as the civil aspect of this case was prosecuted
together with the criminal aspect, the accused is also hereby
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the following
amounts of:
a. Php500,000 as actual damages
b. Php500,000 as moral damages,
c. Php200,000 as exemplary damages,
d. Php200,000 as attorney’s fees; and
e. Cost of suit against the accused.
SO ORDERED.”12
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for
not giving credence to the dying declaration Mary Jay
made to her friends who became defense witnesses. He
averred that the trial court erred in not admitting the
deposition by oral examination of Atty. Ma. Angelina
Barcelo which would corroborate the testimonies of the
defense witnesses regarding the handwritten dying
declaration of Mary Jay. The trial court was also
questioned for giving credence to the perjured and biased
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Lourdes Rios and
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Norma Saballero. Lastly, accused-appellant averred that
the trial court erroneously disallowed the defense from
presenting Dr. Ma. Victoria Briguela, a qualified
psychiatrist, who could testify that Mary Jay’s mental,
psychological, and emotional condition on February 24,
2000 was disoriented and she could not have made a dying
declaration on said date.
The CA upheld the ruling of the trial court. The dying
declaration made by Mary Jay to her mother Lourdes and
laundrywoman Norma had all the essential requisites and
could thus be used to convict accused-appellant. It noted
that while the testimonies of Lourdes and Norma on the
dying
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12 Records, p. 1130. Penned by Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang.
777
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011 777
People vs. Maglian
declaration had some inconsistencies, these were
immaterial and did not affect their credibility. It observed
that no ill motive was presented and proved as to why the
prosecution’s witnesses would make false accusations
against accused-appellant.
Hence, we have this appeal.
On December 14, 2009, this Court required the parties
to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The
People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
manifested that it was adopting its previous arguments.
The Issue
In his Supplemental Brief, accused-appellant raises the
following issue:
Whether the guilt of accused-appellant has been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant contends that (1) he never or did not
intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed or so
grave an offense as the felony charged against him; and (2)
that he voluntarily, and of his own free will, surrendered or
yielded to the police or government authorities. He claims
that the victim’s dying declaration showed that what
happened to her was an accident. He avers that this was
corroborated by three witnesses. The victim’s attending
physician, he insists, also testified that he was told by the
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victim that what happened to her was an accident.
If not acquitted, accused-appellant argues that, in the
alternative, his sentence must be reduced due to mitigating
circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong
and voluntary surrender. He claims he is entitled to the
latter since he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
before criminal proceedings were commenced against him.
The reduction of his sentence, he contends, must be by at
least another degree or to prision mayor or lower.
778
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Maglian
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm accused-appellant’s conviction.
Dying declaration
While witnesses in general can only testify to facts
derived from their own perception, a report in open court of
a dying person’s declaration is recognized as an exception
to the rule against hearsay if it is “made under the
consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of
inquiry in the case.”13 It is considered as “evidence of the
highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no
person aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation.”14The Rules of Court states
that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the
following circumstances are present: “(a) it concerns the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent
and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying
declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of
inquiry involves the declarant’s death.”15 The question to
be answered is which dying declaration satisfies the
aforementioned circumstances, the one made by Mary Jay
to Lourdes and Norma, or the one she made before Atty.
Duque and PO3 San Jose.
Accused-appellant contends that his late wife’s dying
declaration as told to the defense witnesses Atty. Duque
and PO3 San Jose effectively absolved him from any
wrongdoing. How-
_______________
13 Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA
273, 305.
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14 People v. Cerilla, G.R. No. 177147, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA
251, 262.
15 Gerald v. People, G.R. No. 173608, November 20, 2008, 571 SCR A
420, 430.
779
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011 779
People vs. Maglian
ever, it is the dying declaration presented by the
prosecution that satisfies all the requisites provided in the
Rules. In contrast, the dying declaration for the defense did
not show that Mary Jay’s death at the time of said
declaration appeared to be imminent and that she was
under a consciousness of impending death.
Moreover, We defer to the factual finding that the
witnesses for the prosecution were more credible. Mary
Jay’s dying declaration to her mother Lourdes and to
Norma showed that accused-appellant was the one who set
her in flames. Lourdes and the Maglians’ laundrywoman
Norma both testified that Mary Jay, moments before her
actual death, told them that it was accused-appellant who
was responsible for burning her. Lourdes and Norma both
testified that at the time of Mary Jay’s declaration, she was
lucid and aware that she was soon going to expire.
Furthermore, the so-called dying declaration made by
Mary Jay to defense witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San
Jose suffers from irregularities. The dying declaration
allegedly made to Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose was
handwritten by the latter but he did not have it sworn
under oath. We reiterate too that it was not clear that it
was executed with the knowledge of impending death since
the statements were made more than a month before Mary
Jay died.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts that
Lourdes and Norma were both credible witnesses and had
no motive to lie about Mary Jay’s dying declaration. The
appellate court correctly pointed out that although Lourdes
was Mary Jay’s mother, this relationship did not
automatically discredit Lourdes’ testimony. And while
accused-appellant alleged that Lourdes as his mother-in-
law did not approve of him, he could not give any improper
motive for Norma to falsely accuse him. Between the two
competing statements of the two sets of witnesses, the one
presented by the prosecution should clearly be given more
weight as it satisfies the requisites of an admissible dying
declaration.
780
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780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Maglian
No intent to commit so grave a wrong
The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the
mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. We held,
“This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the
intention of the offender at the particular moment when
the offender executes or commits the criminal act.”16 We
also held, “This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when
there is a notable disparity between the means employed
by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon
used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained
by the victim.”17
Aiming for this mitigating circumstance, accused-
appellant once again relies on the statements of the
defense witnesses that Mary Jay told them what happened
to her was an accident. However, as earlier discussed,
Mary Jay’s dying declaration contradicts the alleged
exculpatory statement she earlier made to the defense
witnesses. Moreover, the prosecution took pains in court to
demonstrate that fighting over the kerosene container
would not have caused Mary Jay to be drenched in
kerosene. As aptly explained by the trial court:
“The court is convinced that the deceased did not take
possession of the gallon container with kerosene. The accused had
full control and possession of the same. He is a bulky and very
muscular person while the deceased was of light built, shorter,
smaller and weaker. When a demonstration was made in open
court about the struggle for possession of the container, it was
shown that the contents of the same did not spill owing to the
little amount of liquid and its narrow opening. To be able to wet
90 percent of the body surface the kerosene content of the gallon
container must have been
_______________
16 People v. Badriago, G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 820, 837.
17 People v. Gonzalez, Jr., G.R. No. 139542, June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA 352, 379.
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VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011 781
People vs. Maglian
poured over the head of the deceased. This explains why when she
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got ignited, the flames rose up to the ceiling and burned her from
head to toe.”18
It is extremely far-fetched that accused-appellant could
accidentally pour kerosene on his wife and likewise
accidentally light her up and cause third degree burns to
90% of her body. We, thus, agree with the trial court’s
finding that accused-appellant knew the fatal injuries that
he could cause when he poured kerosene all over his wife
and lit a match to ignite a fire. There was no disparity
between the means he used in injuring his wife and the
resulting third degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of
the Code.
Voluntary surrender
An accused may enjoy the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender if the following requisites are present:
“1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or
the latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary.”19
We explained, “The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself
up and submit himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities
the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture.”20
To avail himself of this mitigating circumstance,
accused-appellant claims that he voluntarily yielded to the
police authorities on October 14, 2002, or before the
commencement of the criminal proceedings against him.
He avers that this claim is backed by the records of the
case and a certification made by the Dasmariñas Police
Station. He contends that
_______________
18 CA Rollo, p. 73.
19 De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 6, 2009, 584 SCRA 506,
515.
20 Id.
782
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Maglian
both the RTC and the CA inexplicably did not appreciate
this mitigating circumstance in his favor.
A review of the records shows that accused-appellant on
October 16, 2000 filed with the Department of Justice
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(DOJ) a Petition for Review of the Resolution of the private
prosecutor in the instant case. Subsequently, a warrant of
arrest for the parricide charge was issued against him on
October 30, 2000.21 However, a Motion, to Defer
Implementation of Warrant of Arrest was filed by accused
on November 13, 200022 and was granted by the RTC on
December 12, 2000 in view of the petition for review he had
filed before the DOJ.23 On September 11, 2002, the DOJ
issued a Resolution24 denying the petition of accused-
appellant. The defense later submitted a Certification25
issued by the Philippine National Police-Dasmariñas
Municipal Police Station dated October 18, 2002 stating
the following:
“THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the following are excerpts from
the entries on the Official Police Blotter of Dasmariñas Municipal
Police Station, appearing on page 0331 and 0332, blotter entry
nos. 1036 and 1047 respectively, dated 15 October 2002, quoted
verbatim as follows:
150740H October 2002 — “P/I Apolinar P. Reyes reported that
one Jaymandy Maglian y Reyes, 30 years old, resident of #24
Bucal, Sampalok II, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with Warrant of Arrest
issued by RTC Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in CC# 8393-00 for
Parricide, voluntarily surrendered to him on October 14, 2002.
Subject is turned over to this station on this date”.
151350H October 2002 — “One Jaymandy Maglian was
transferred to BJMP and escorted by P/I Apolinar Reyes”.
(Entries written by SPO3 Ricardo V. Sayoto – duty desk officer)”
_______________
21 Records, p. 55.
22 Id., at p. 57.
23 Id., at p. 54.
24 Id., at pp. 77-78.
25 Id., at p. 199.
783
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011 783
People vs. Maglian
We find that in the case of accused-appellant, all the
elements for a valid voluntary surrender were present.
Accused-appellant at the time of his surrender had not
actually been arrested. He surrendered to the police
authorities. His surrender was voluntary, as borne by the
certification issued by the police. There is, thus, merit to
the claim of accused-appellant that he is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
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It bears noting that parricide, however, according to Art.
246 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by two
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. The Code
provides under Art. 63(3) that when a law prescribes a
penalty with two indivisible penalties and the commission
of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be applied. But Section 3 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines) provides that “persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason
of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended.” The proper sentence in the instant case
would, thus, be reclusion perpetua which is still the lesser
penalty.
Anent an issue previously raised by accused-appellant
and which was not discussed by the CA, while accused-
appellant claims that the trial court erred in not admitting
the deposition by oral examination of Atty. Ma. Angelina
Barcelo, We note that the records show that an Order26
was issued by Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr. granting
accused-appellant’s motion to take oral deposition of Atty.
Barcelo.
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26 Id., at pp. 127-128.
784
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Maglian
Pecuniary liability
The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay PhP
500,000 as actual damages; PhP 500,000 as moral
damages; PhP 200,000 as exemplary damages; and PhP
200,000 as attorney’s fees.
We modify the monetary awards, those being excessive.
We award a civil indemnity ex delicto as this is “mandatory
upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the
culpability of the accused for the death.”27 As We ruled,
“When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.”28
Current jurisprudence pegs the award of civil indemnity at
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PhP 50,000.29
Moral damages should also be awarded even absent
allegation and proof of the emotional suffering by the
victim’s heirs. The amount should be decreased to PhP
50,000 in accordance with jurisprudence.30 Exemplary
damages in the lowered amount of PhP 30,000 are likewise
in order in this case charging parricide, as the qualifying
circumstance of relationship is present.31
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27 People v. Español, G.R. No. 175603, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA
326, 340.
28 People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 176354, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 485.
29 People v. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA
797.
30 Id.
31 People v. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 510,
522. See also People v. Malibiran, G.R. No. 178301, April 24, 2009, 586
SCRA 668, 705.
785
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011 785
People vs. Maglian
As to the attorney’s fees awarded, these must be
reasonable in accordance with Art. 2208 of the Civil Code.32
We, thus, reduce the attorney’s fees to a more reasonable
amount of PhP 50,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02541 affirming the RTC Decision
that found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of parricide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The fallo of the RTC Decision should be modified to read,
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and so it
hereby holds that the prosecution had established the guilt of the
accused JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES beyond reasonable
doubt and so it hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Inasmuch as the civil aspect of this case was prosecuted
together with the criminal aspect, the accused is also hereby
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the following
amounts of:
a. PhP 500,000 as actual damages;
b. PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity;
c. PhP 50,000 as moral damages;
d. PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages;
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e. PhP 50,000 as attorney’s fees; and
f. Cost of suit against accused-appellant.”
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,** and Perez, JJ., concur.
_______________
32 ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
xxxx
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
** Additional member per Raffle dated October 11, 2010.
786
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Maglian
Appeal denied, judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—The act of surrender must be spontaneous,
accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt, or an
intention to save the authorities the trouble and the
expense that search and capture would require. Going to
the police station “to clear his name” does not show any
intent of appellant to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities. (People vs. Viernes, 372 SCRA 231 [2001])
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