PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO.

87059; 22 JUN 1992]

Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen
was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his
abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but
unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the
accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The
weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information
was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon
was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote
made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the
weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had
been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as
provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant
lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
(b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person
arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused
appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves.
There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a
busy street on unexplained suspicion.

Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

 PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI
[Link]. 74869 July 6, 1988

Facts:

            The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was
identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him
as he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him
and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue:

            Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is
violated

Ruling:

            The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of
court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be
committed or had just been committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.

            In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the information they have
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine on his own
authority that a search warrant was not necessary.

            The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law
enforcement agents.

ACQUITTED
ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES v. PEOPLE, GR No. 205926, 2015-07-22
Facts:
Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante ofviolation of Section 11, A... unlawfully and
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession,... wn as "shabu", a dangerous drug.
Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan
PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag)... they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later
identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla[7] (Dasilla) - standing and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other...
confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory
examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[8]
Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher
in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private
Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There,... the police officers claimed to have confiscated
illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede
to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and
thereafter, were charged with... illegal possession of dangerous drugs.[10]
RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
RTC found that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante,... PO3 Calag saw, in...
plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend
the latter. F
, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that PO3 Calag had probable cause to effect the
warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was c
Hence, this petition.[18]
Issues:
Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him.
Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal war
Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him.
Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets
containing shabu should be rendered... inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.[19]
Ruling:
petition is meritorious.
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be... inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that
he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of
30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic
sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to
Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the... former had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante
untenable.
probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.
It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to
serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police... officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would...
constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this
light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante. As such, the
shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree.
petition is GRANTED.
Principles:
onstitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search
and seizure... becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision
One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest.[24]
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest... before a search can be made the
process cannot be reversed.[... three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a)
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that... said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just
been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to... another.[26]
Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such... overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
[27] On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had... personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused had committed it.[28]... factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag
had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not
enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe... that the accused had just committed
a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.[33]

PEOPLE v. NASARIO MOLINA Y MANAMAT, GR No. 133917, 2001-02-19

Facts:
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in
Davao City.
At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-
appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked
accused-appellant Molina to open... the bag.[13] Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this."[14]
SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter,
accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by... the police officers.
accused-appellants, through counsel... jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches... and seizures
Issues:
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION
OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present
case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Ruling:
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in
Davao City.
In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committed a crime.
It matters not that... accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the
request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of
the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal... statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arres... the Court holds
that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace
officers could not be admitted as evidence... against accused-appellants
Principles:
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor...
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;[24] and (6) stop and frisk
situations... search incidental to a lawful arrest)... the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before
a search can be... made --- the process cannot be reversed.
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest.
The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may,... without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in
flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable... cause to... believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final... judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners)

PEOPLE VS LAGUIO JR.

FACTS: Respondent was acquitted on 3 different cases filed against him (dangerous drugs act, illegal possession of
firearms and comelec gun ban) after his demurrer to evidence (inadmissibility of the evidence) was granted due to
the illegal/unlawful arrest, search and seizure that was conducted by the police officers contending that he was
arrested in flagrante delicto but the defense further presented that respondent did not do any overt act to make
him be subject to a warrantless arrest under the exceptions in section 5 of rule 113.

ISSUE: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the
absence of a WOA and/or SW.

HELD:
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search.
There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the
accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto  without need for
a warrant of arrest.
Section 5, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner
who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
 The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of
private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely
walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives
arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was
later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore,
there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within
the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.

The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure,
the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.

People vs. Acol

GR Nos. 106288-89, May 17 1994

FACTS:

When Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao.

When they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a hold-up where
the other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene Araneta.

After which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime.

A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits.

Victim Rene Araneta who went with the responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing
his stolen jacket, told the police authorities to accost said persons.

After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different directions but three of them,
namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended.

Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets.

The line of defense the accused have adopted is one of denial.

Tirso Acol escaped from detention during the trial, thus obviating any review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had
appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be considered as having abandoned his appeal. People vs. Acol

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid arrest, search and seizure.

HELD:

Yes.

With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused-appellant, we are of the view that the search falls within the
purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;

When an offense has in fact been committed, and the one has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
Inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on account of
the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed.

And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid.

Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not
for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.

The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling in Magoncia vs. Palacio that:

When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the offending police officers should
happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their
duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.

people vs. Gerente

GR No. 95847-48, March 10 1993

FACTS:

Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking
liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant

She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace.

Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace.

Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing as follows: Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace,
followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell,
Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head.

Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.

Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a
mauling incident.

He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought.

He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival.

The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.

Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place.

There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.

They were informed by Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who
killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping.

Read: People vs. Sucro

They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen.

Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in
cigarette foil.

Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police.

The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.

Two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of
Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, and for Murder.
The trial court convicted him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

ISSUES:

Was there a lawful arrest in the absence of a valid warrant?

Was there a lawful search in the absence of a valid warrant?

Was there a conspiracy to commit a crime?

HELD:

The appealed decision was affirmed.

ARREST

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace.

They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death.

The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente,
as one of the killers.

Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant.

If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions
did.

SEARCH and SEIZURE

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.

This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers
to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed.
G.R. Nos. 114224-25 April 26, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-defendant, vs. ROLANDO LUA y NERI, Accused-Appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City finding accused-appellant Rolando Lua Y
Neri guilty of violating Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. No. 6425 2 as amended, and of P.D. No. 1866. 3

Pursuant to OPLAN SATURN, a program addressing the growing drug problem in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, a buy-
bust operation was conducted by police operatives for the entrapment of Rolando Lua.

At 12 o'clock noon of 30 March 1991, Lt. Norberto Surara, Commander of Bagong Silang Police Sub-station, Caloocan
City, and his men discussed plans to serve a search warrant on alleged drug pusher Hilario Talavera and to conduct a
buy-bust operation against accused-appellant Rolando Lua alias "Chekwa." To verify the report on the illegal drug
activities of appellant, Ulysses Orlino, a police informer, was dispatched to the vicino of Lua. A few moments later, Orlino
returned confirming the report on appellant's illegal operations near his residence at Bo. Sto. Niño, Tala, Caloocan City.
Two teams were formed, one to conduct the buy-bust operation, and the other, to serve the search warrant on Hilario
Talavera. Police Officers Constantino Guerrero, Marine Puno, Jose Marte and Alfredo Antonio formed the buy-bust
team. Guerrero was designated as poseur-buyer. Before leaving the station Guerrero, in the presence of SPO3 Perfecto
Sobejana and other police officers, marked with "X" and his initials "C.G." 3 P10-bills to be used in the entrapment of
appellant.

Guerrero and his buy-bust team arrived at Bo. Sto. Niño at 4 o'clock in the afternoon together with their informant
Ulyssess Orlino. Orlino pointed to Guerrero the appellant who was then outside the door of his house. The team
strategically positioned themselves near a neighboring house while Guerrero approached accused-appellant Lua and
said, Chekwa, pa score nga," and simultaneously handed him the 3 marked P10-bills. Appellant took the money and
went inside his house. Shortly after, he returned with 3 small tea bags of marijuana which he gave to Police Officer
Guerrero. At this juncture, Guerrero signaled to his companions to close in. He then grabbed appellant by the hand after
introducing himself as a police officer and arrested him. Guerrero recovered the marked money from the other hand of
appellant.

When the rest of the team approached Guerrero and appellant Lua, PO Marine Puno noticed something bulging from
the waistline of appellant so he immediately frisked him. Puno lifted Lua's shirt and found a .38 cal. paltik in the latter's
possession. Guerrero who was standing beside the accused grabbed the handgun which had two (2) live bullets and an
empty shell in the cylinder. When Lua was asked where he kept the rest of the marijuana he unhesitatingly replied that
they were inside his house. Accompanied by the police operatives, appellant went inside his house and in the presence
of his wife pointed to the police officers a soapbox containing a brick of dried marijuana. Puno showed the marijuana
brick to those around him including appellant's household.
After the operation, appellant together with the pieces of evidence against him, namely, 3 marked P10-bills with serial
numbers RB886096, PF245345, QF260152; 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams); marijuana brick inside a soapbox
(209.00 grams); and, a .38 cal. paltik with two (2) live bullets and an empty shell, were surrendered to the team leader,
SPO3 Perfecto Sobejana, and Lt. Surara who were both waiting at the barangay hall. SPO3 Sobejana and Patrolmen
Guerrero, Puno, Antonio and Marte jointly executed a sworn statement on their operation.

At six o'clock in the evening appellant Rolando Lua as well as the pieces of evidence found in his possession were
referred to PO3 Gilbert Dioso for investigation.

On 1 April 1991 PO3 Dioso prepared a referral letter to the National Bureau of Investigation for laboratory examination
and chemical analysis of the 3 tea bags and the brick of marijuana wrapped in a newsprint and placed inside a plastic
bag. The following day, 2 April 1991, Dioso also prepared a referral letter to the Inquest Fiscal of Caloocan City for
proper evaluation and disposition of the cases against appellant.

On the same day the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Alicia Liberato submitted her Reports Nos. DDM-
91-249 and DDM-91-250 finding the specimens positive for marijuana.

Parenthetically, on 6 July 1992, PNP Senior Superintendent Antonio T. Sierra, Chief of the Firearms and Explosive Office,
issued a certification that accused-appellant Rolando Lua was not a licensed nor a registered firearm holder of any kind
and caliber after verifying the computerized master list of all licensed firearm holders.

Separate informations for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, and for violation of P.D. 1866 were filed
against Rolando Lua.

The appellant has a different account of the events. He says that at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon of 30 March 1991
while sleeping in his house with his 3-year old daughter he was awakened from his sleep when a certain Resty, a security
guard of the Tala Leprosarium, handcuffed him. He asked Resty why, but he received no answer. According to appellant
Resty was with three (3) other companions Rodel Ginco who was also a security guard at the Tala Leprosarium, Boy
Mano who was a civilian, and Police Officer Guerrero. Then he was bearded in an owner-type jeep and brought to the
other barangay in front of Hilario Talavera's house. He also claims he was transferred to a parked mobile car where he
saw Edgardo Calanday inside the car also handcuffed. From where he was sitting he could see the police operatives
walking to and fro inside Talavera's house. Then they were brought to the administration site outside the Tala
Leprosarium where they stayed for an hour, after which they were brought to the Bagong Silang Detachment where
they were detained for three (3) days.

Appellant's neighbor, Catalino Hidacan, corroborated the testimony of appellant. Hidacan testified that after the arrest
the persons who nabbed the appellant returned and entered the latter's house. However, when they went out, they
were already carrying with them something wrapped in a newspaper while one of them was holding a gun.
Appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court: (a) in sustaining the prosecution and disregarding completely the
testimony of defense witness Catalino Hidacan; (b) in according probative weight to the testimonies of the police officers
on the disputable presumption that they regularly performed their duties thus disregarding the right of the accused to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and, (c) in not taking judicial notice of his physical
condition when his hand were closed and clinched because of Hansen's disease or leprosy so that it is highly improbable
to possess a firearm and violate P.D. 1866.

The thrust of this appeal is laid on the credibility of the witnesses. Time and again this court has ruled that the findings
of the lower court respecting the credibility or witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which if considered would materially affect the
result of the case, this court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.

We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court. The appellant asseverates that the police
arrested him at all cost to save face and to project that OPLAN SATURN was successfully carried out. Such allegation is a
mere conjecture bereft of factual basis. In drug related cases, the accused would most often raise the defense to of
being framed up. However, for that defense to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it
is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. In the absence of proof, the presumption is that the
police officers regularly performed their official duties. Moreover, the appellant failed to convincingly show any ill
motive on the part of prosecution witnesses to testify falsely and to impute to him such grave offenses. It is settled that
where there is no evidence to indicate that a principal prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated. He would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no
harm or injury. 4

Appellant would persuade us that the police narration of facts could not be freed from material inconsistencies, thus the
disputable presumption that the police officers acted regularly in pursuance of their official duties must be rendered
subordinate to the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

We are not convinced. The imputed inconsistencies regarding the time when the arresting officers arrived. at the
appellant's residence and the date when the markings on the recovered gun were placed do not affect the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. This court finds the same too minor to matter, the same having been satisfactorily explained
by the prosecution witnesses. Thus, in People v. Gonzales 5 we held that testimonial discrepancies could be caused by
the natural fickleness of memory which tend to strengthen rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony. Contrary to appellant's claim, the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The testimony of PO Guerrero was sufficient to show that indeed appellant committed the offenses with which
he was charged. It was established that appellant sold and delivered prohibited drug to PO Guerrero who acted as
poseur-buyer knowing fully well that what he sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.

As regards the third assigned error, we do not find the same compelling enough to exculpate the appellant, Leprosy or
Hansen's disease is a chronic granulomatous infection of humans which attacks superficial tissues, especially the skin
and peripheral 6 nerves. The infection normally results in the loss of touch but the patient does not really lose his motor
functions. Only in severe cases do trauma and secondary chronic infections lead to loss of digits or distal extremities. 7 In
the case at bar, the appellant failed to show that he can no longer make use of his hands, thus rendering him incapable
of committing the offenses with which he is being charged. The disease does not deter him from possessing nor of using
a firearm in violation of P.D. No. 1866.

Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the equally important matter as regards admissibility of the evidence
should likewise be passed upon. The buy-bust operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of entrapment
allowed by law. The arrest of the appellant was lawful having been caught in flagrante delicto. Consequently, there is no
need for a warrant for the seizure of the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same being the fruit of the crime.
With respect to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .38
cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell found in the cylinder are admissible in evidence.

As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in
view of its inadmissibility.

While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside appellant's house
became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under
"search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or
control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In
the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the
inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.

In sum, this court finds accused-appellant Rolando Lua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A.
6425, as amended, under which the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to
thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed. However, with the passage of R.A. 7659, which took effect on 31 December
1993, amending certain sections of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the imposable penalty for the sale or delivery of
prohibited drug is prision correccional to reclusion temporal 8 if the quantity involved is less than 750 grams of
marijuana. Taking into account that appellant is not shown to be a habitual delinquent and the said amendatory
provision being favorable to him, the quantity of marijuana involved being only 5.3934 grams or less than 750 grams, the
aforestated penalty imposed under P.A. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating . . . aggravating
circumstances, and following People v. Simon, 9 the imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while
the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months of arresto mayor.

On the charge of illegal possession of firearms, we sustain the finding and conclusion of the trial court. The prosecution
has indubitably established the existence of the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the fact that appellant did
not have the necessary license or permit to possess the same. Accordingly, under Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed, the range of which is seventeen (17)
years four (4) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. Considering the pertinent provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law, while the
minimum shall not be lower than the minimum likewise fixed by law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. For violating P.D. 1866, accused-appellant ROLANDO LUA y
NERI is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal maximum as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and 20 days likewise of reclusion
temporal maximum as maximum; and, for violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to two (2) years, six (6) months and
ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as maximum, to be served successively in accordance with Art. 70 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Appellant should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment upon a showing that he agreed to abide
by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited with four-fifths (4/5) of
the time of such preventive imprisonment.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815

FACTS:

On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was released.
Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found
tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but
to another person.

The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in the
boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the
raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming
that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a
Memorandum Receipt.

Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a revolver
bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal
asked the court to be reconsidered.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid

HELD/DECISION:

Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested lawfully may be
searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect
the welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can
be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person
or within the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest,
He was tied and placed outside the room where the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could
not be “in his immediate control.” Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted to seize any
weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view doctrine.” However, the firearm was
not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation
of Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court
and cannot be used against him.
CRESPO VS MOGUL CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for
arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred
in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The
CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the
office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused then filed a
petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders fro, the Secretary
of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of
the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review
to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an
information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for
the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
 Miranda v. Arizona
Facts
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving
custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers,
detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none
of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the
interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them,
signed statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he was identified by the
complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed,
written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found
guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the
confession.

Issues
Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation”
are admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures which assure that the individual
is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to
incriminate himself” are necessary.

RULING:

The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such,
“the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so
freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires.”
Terry vs. Ohio

Facts of the case

Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a
stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of
carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.

Issue:
Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Ruling:
In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly
on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably
prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's
safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in
scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.
People v. Chavez

Facts:

Following denial in the trial court of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, defendant entered
a plea of guilty to violation of Health and Safety Code section 11500.5, possession [27 Cal. App. 3d 885] of heroin for
sale. On this appeal, he challenges the ruling of the trial court on his section 1538.5 motion. Notwithstanding the entry
of the guilty plea, a review of the search and seizure contention may be had. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m); People v.
West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 601 [91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409].)

Defendant contends the search of his residence was invalid because of the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the affidavit which was the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. No attack is made upon the substance of the
affidavit or its form.

The circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant are as follows: Narcotics Agent Thomas L. Carl prepared an
affidavit setting forth his reasons for believing that defendant was in possession of heroin and narcotic paraphernalia at
his residence in Delano, California. Agent Carl appeared at the municipal court clerk's office with the affidavit on May 28,
1970. The clerk asked Agent Carl: "Do you swear that the contents of this affidavit are true and correct to the best of
your knowledge so help you God?" He answered: "Yes." The clerk then had him sign the affidavit, which she took to
Judge Nairn. Out of the presence of affiant, who waited in the clerk's outer office, judge Nairn read and approved the
affidavit and issued a search warrant.

Penal Code section 1526, subdivision (a), provides that "The magistrate may, before issuing the warrant, examine on
oath the person seeking the warrant and any witnesses he may produce, and must take his affidavit or their affidavits in
writing, and cause same to be subscribed by the party or parties making same."

Defendant emphasizes the language "must take his affidavit," giving it a literal interpretation, and insists that the
magistrate must personally "take" the affidavit. Here, the clerk of the court administered the oath and the agent, as
affiant, subscribed the affidavit in her presence. She then took the affidavit to the magistrate.

The United States Constitution does not require the magistrate who issues a search warrant to personally take the
affidavit of the officer whose affidavit is the basis for the search warrant. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides simply that "... no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Article I,
section 19, of the California Constitution contains substantially identical language. Both federal and state constitutional
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were complied with in this case. [27 Cal. App. 3d 886]

Since defendant does not challenge the sufficiency or substantiality of the allegations of the affidavit nor the "method of
execution of the warrant," and we find no federal or state constitutional requirement that the affidavit be subscribed in
the presence of the magistrate, the question narrows to whether the alleged statutory irregularity constituted "any
other violation of federal or state constitutional standards" (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (a)(2)(v)) or, constitutionally
speaking, amounted to a denial of due process.
As we have already noted, defendant rests his claim of reversible error upon the failure of the magistrate to literally
comply with section 1526, subdivision (a) of the Penal Code. Looking at the entire section to discern the legislative intent
of the statute, we find that subdivision (b) provides: "In lieu of the written affidavit required in subdivision (a), the
magistrate may take an oral statement under oath which shall be recorded and transcribed. The transcribed statement
shall be deemed to be an affidavit for the purposes of this chapter. In such cases, the recording of the sworn oral
statement and the transcribed statement shall be certified by the magistrate receiving it and shall be filed with the clerk
of the court."

When the section is viewed in its entirety it is apparent that the essence of the statute is not to require a face to face
confrontation between the magistrate and the affiant, but that the magistrate shall have an opportunity to examine the
affiant should any questions arise in his mind concerning any of the allegations in the affidavit or of the sufficiency of the
affidavit as a whole. The case of People v. Aguirre (1972) 26 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7 [103 Cal. Rptr. 153], pointed out that
the magistrate may take the affidavit by telephone as subdivision(b) permits the magistrate to receive the substance of
the affidavit orally, although it must be recorded and transcribed. The underlying purpose of the statute was met here,
as the affiant waited in the clerk's outer office while the judge read the affidavit. Had Judge Nairn been dissatisfied with
the affidavit or wished to question the affiant as to any of the statements therein, Agent Carl was immediately available.

Ruling: The judgment is affirmed.

We find no denial of due process under the Constitution of the United States or of the California Constitution. The
Supreme Court of the United States upheld a Florida statute which authorized a municipal court clerk not only to take an
affidavit for an arrest warrant but to issue the warrant. (Shadwick v. City of Tampa (1972) 407 U.S. 345 [32 L. Ed. 2d 783,
92 S. Ct. 2119].) In Shadwick the court discussed the role of a magistrate in issuing a search warrant, saying: "He must be
neutral and detached, and he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or
search. ... If ... detachment and [27 Cal. App. 3d 887] capacity do conjoin, the magistrate has satisfied the Fourth
Amendment's purpose." (P. 350 [32 [Link].2d pp. 788-789, 92 [Link]. p. 2123].)

The emphasis is upon substance, not form, in the issuance of a warrant under Penal Code section 1526. It is apparent
from the record that Judge Nairn fulfilled the substantive requirements of the statute by reading and approving the
affidavit before issuing the search warrant, while the affiant stood ready to be questioned by the judge. There was no
violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

The fundamental principle underlying the role of a court in reviewing an attack upon the sufficiency of a warrant was
expressed by the United States Supreme Court, as follows: "... the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area
should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants." (United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
109 [13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 689, 85 S. Ct. 741, 746].) (See also People v. Superior Court (Johnson) 6 Cal. 3d 704, 714 [100 Cal.
Rptr. 319, 493 P.2d 1183].)

A literal compliance with section 1526, subdivision (a), is preferable, of course, as it removes all doubt. Nevertheless,
where the affidavit admittedly is sufficient and there is no other attack upon the issuance of the warrant or the service
thereof, substantial compliance rather than literal compliance does not void the warrant. This is particularly so in view of
defendant's failure to demonstrate prejudicial error resulting from the alleged procedural irregularity. We have
examined "the entire cause" pursuant to article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution, and we find that the error,
if any, has not resulted in a miscarriage of justice.