UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

LAW CENTER

SUGGESTED ANSWERS
To the
2017 BAR EXAMINATIONS IN
CIVIL LAW

State whether the following marital unions are valid, void, or voidable, and
give the corresponding justifications for your answer.

a. Ador and Becky’s marriage wherein Ador was afflicted with AIDS prior to the
marriage. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

a. The marriage is voidable, because Ador was afflicted with a serious and
incurable sexually-transmitted disease at the time of marriage. For a
marriage to be annulled under Article 45 (6), the sexually-transmissible
disease must be: 1) existing at the time of marriage; 2) found to be
serious and incurable; and 3) unknown to the other party. Since Ador
was afflicted with AIDS, which is a serious and incurable disease, and
the condition existed at the time of marriage, the marriage is voidable,
provided that such illness was not known to Becky.

b. Carlos' marriage to Dina which took place after Dina had poisoned her previous
husband Edu in order to free herself from any impediment in order to live with
Carlos. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

The marriage of Carlos to Dina is void for reasons of public policy. Article
38 (9) of the Family Code provides that a marriage between parties where
one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s
spouse or his or her own spouse is void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy.
c. Eli and Fely's marriage solemnized seven years after the disappearance of Chona,
Eli's previous spouse, after the plane she had boarded crashed in the West
Philippine Sea. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

c. The marriage is void under Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code. The requisites of a valid marriage under Article 41 are as follows: 1) the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, except when the disappearance
is in danger of death which only requires two years; 2) the present spouse had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and 3) the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death.
There is nothing in the facts that suggest that Eli instituted a summary proceeding
for declaration of presumptive death of her previous spouse and this cannot be
presumed. Thus, the exception under Article 35(4) is inapplicable and the
subsequent marriage is void.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

c. If the marriage was celebrated under the New Civil Code, the marriage
would be valid, as no declaration of presumptive death is necessary under
Article 391 of the said Code.

d. David who married Lina immediately the day after obtaining a judicial decree
annulling his prior marriage to Elisa. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

d. The marriage is valid as there were no facts showing that David and Elisa have
properties and children, which would render the marriage void under Article 53 of
the Family Code in relation to Article 52. In addition, David and Lina have nno
impediment to marry.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

d. If the spouses have properties and children, the marriage is void under
Article 53 of the Family Code in relation to Article 52. For a marriage
subsequent to a judgment of annulment of a previous marriage to be valid,
the properties of the spouses must have been partitioned and distributed,
the presumptive legitimes of children, if any, must have been delivered,
and the aforementioned facts must be recorded in the civil registry and
registries of property. The marriage was entered into the day after the
obtaining of a judicial decree of annulment and it would have been
impossible for David to comply with the requirements in such a short time.
Therefore, the marriage is void.

e. Marriage of Zoren and Carmina who did not secure a marriage license prior to
their wedding, but lived together as husband and wife for 10 years without any
legal impediment to marry. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

e. If Zoren and Carmina lived together as husband and wife for 10 years
prior to their marriage, then the marriage is valid, despite the absence of
the marriage license. An exception to the rule that a marriage shall be void
if solemnized without license under Article 35(3) is that provided for under
Article 34 of the Family Code. When a man and woman have lived together
as husband and wife for at least 5 years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other, they may celebrate the marriage without securing a
marriage license

II

In 1960, Rigor and Mike occupied two separate but adjacent tracts of land in
Mindoro. Rigor's tract was classified as timber land while Mike's was classified as
agricultural land. Each of them fenced and cultivated his own tract continuously for
30 years. In 1991, the Government declared the land occupied by Mike as alienable
and disposable, and the one cultivated by Rigor as no longer intended for public use
or public service. Rigor and Mike now come to you today for legal advice in
asserting their right of ownership of their respective lands based on their long
possession and occupation since 1960.

a. What are the legal consequences of the 1991 declarations of the Government
respecting the lands? Explain your answer. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

a) As to land occupied by Mike, the same remains a property of the public

dominion. According to jurisprudence, the classification of the property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion. There must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion [Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987 (2009) and (2013)].

As to the land occupied by Rigor, the declaration that it is no longer

intended for public use or public service converted the same into
patrimonial property provided that such express declaration was in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or in Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President was duly authorized by law. According to
jurisprudence, when public land is no longer intended for public use, public
service or for the development of the national wealth it is thereby
effectively removed from the ambit of public dominion and converted into
patrimonial provided that the declaration of such conversion must be made
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect [Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987 (2009) and
(2013)].

b. Given that, according to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, in relation
to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain ~ ~ CIVIL LAW 3 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
must be from June 12, 1945, or earlier, may Mike nonetheless validly base his
assertion of the right of ownership on prescription under the Civil Code? Explain
your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

b) No, because the land remains property of public dominion and,

therefore, not susceptible to acquisition by prescription. According to
jurisprudence, the classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property
of the public dominion. In order to convert the property into patrimonial,
there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription [Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic, GR. No. 179987 (2009) and (2013)].
 Here, the declaration of the property into alienable and disposable
land of the public domain in 1991 did not convert the property into
patrimonial in the absence of an express declaration of such conversion
into patrimonial in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law to that effect.

c. Does Rigor have legal basis for his application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title based on prescription as defined by the Civil Code given that, like
Mike, his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation was
not since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and his tract of land was timber land until the
declaration in 1991? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

c. None, because Rigor’s possession was short of the period required by

the Civil Code for purposes of acquisitive prescription which requires ten
(10) years of continuous possession, if possession was in good faith and
with a just title, or thirty years, in any event. While property may be
considered converted into patrimonial because of the 1991 declaration that
it is no longer intended for public use or public service (provided that the
declaration be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law to that effect), rigor failed to complete the 30-year period required
by-law in case of extra-ordinary prescription. Since the property was
converted into patrimonial only in 1991, the period of prescription
commenced to run beginning that year only. Rigor’s possession prior to the
conversion of the property into patrimonial cannot be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period because prescription did not
operate against the state at that time, the property then being public
dominion property (Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. G.R. No. 179987 (2009)
and (2013). Rigor may not likewise acquire ownership by virtue of the
shorter 10-year ordinary prescription because his possession was not in
good faith and without just title.

III

Josef owns a piece of land in Pampanga. The National Housing Authority (NHA)
sought to expropriate the property for its socialized housing project. The trial court
fixed the just compensation for the property at P50 million. The NHA immediately
deposited the same at the authorized depository bank and filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the trial court. Unfortunately, there was delay
in the resolution of the motion. Meanwhile, the amount deposited earned interest.

When Josef sought the release of the amount deposited, NHA argued that Josef
should only be entitled to P50 million.

Who owns the interest earned? (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

Jose owns the interest earned. In Republic v. Holy Trinity Realty

Development Corp., [G.R. No. 172410 (2008)], the Supreme Court has
declared that upon deposit by the appropriator of the amount fixed for just
compensation, the owner whose property is sought to be expropriated
becomes the owner of the deposited amount. Any interest, therefore, that
accrues to such deposit belongs to the owner by right of accession. In the
case at bar, Josef became the owner of the amount deposited by NHA;
thus, any interest that accrues therefrom pertains to Josef by right of
accession. [Note: In the case of NPC v. Heirs of Ramoran, G.R. No. 193455
(2016), the Supreme Court ruled that the imposable rate of interest is
12% per annum from the time of the taking until June 30, 2013, and 6%
per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment]

IV

a) Distinguish antichresis from usufruct? (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) (1). Antichresis is a real security transaction wherein the creditor

acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, and
the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and
thereafter to the principal of his credit (Article 2132, NCC). On the other
hand, a usufruct is a real right which authorizes its holder to enjoy the
property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance., unless otherwise provided.

(2). Antichresis is always created by contract, while usufruct need not

arise from contract, because it may also be constituted by law or by other
acts inter vivos, such as donation, or in a last will and testament, or by
prescription.
(3). The subject matter of antichresis is always a real property while the
subject matter of usufruct may either be real property or personal
property.

(4). Both create real rights, but antichresis is always is an accessory

contract, while usufruct when created by contract is a principal contract.

(5). During the usufruct, the fruits belong to the usufructury not the naked
owner, while the antichretic creditor has the right to receive the fruits with
the obligation to apply the fruits to the interest if a wing and thereafter to
the principal of the credit [Art.2132, NCC].

(6). IN antichresis the amount of the principal and the interest charge
must be in writing in order to be valid [Article 2134, NCC] while there is no
particular form required to constitute a valid usufruct.

b) Distinguish commodatum from mutuum. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(b) (1). In commodatum, the creditor of bailor delivers to the debtor or

bailee consumable or non-consumable property so that the latter may use
the same for a certain time and must return the same thing [Article 1933,
NCC]. In mutuum, the creditor delivers to the debtor money or other
consumable thing upon the condition that the same amount of the same
kind and quality is paid [Article 1933, NCC].

(2) The subject matter of commodatum maybe a movable or

immovable thing, which is ordinarily non-consumable (if the thing
borrowed is consumable, it is merely for display or exhibition), while the
subject matter of mutuum is either money or consumable.

(3) Commodatum is essentially gratuitous, while mutuum may be

gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.

(4) In commodatum, there is no transmission of ownership of the

thing borrowed then while in mutuum, the borrower acquires ownership of
the thing loaned.

(5) In commodatum, the same thing borrowed is required o be

returned while in mutuum, the borrower discharges his obligation not by
returning the identical thin loaned, but by paying its equivalent in kind,
quality, and quantity.
[Note: it is suggested that any three (3) of the above should merit full
points]

Jacob has owned a farm land in Ramos, Tarlac. In 2012, Liz surreptitiously entered
and cultivated the property. In 2014, Jacob discovered Liz's presence in and
cultivation of the property. Due to his being busy attending to his business in Cebu,
he tolerated Liz's cultivation of the property. Subsequently, in December 2016,
Jacob wanted to regain possession of the property; hence, he sent a letter to Liz
demanding that she vacate the property. Liz did not vacate despite the demand.
Jacob comes to enlist your legal assistance to bring an action against Liz to recover
the possession of the property.

What remedies are available to Jacob to recover the possession of his property
under the circumstances? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

The remedy available to Jacob is accion publiciana, or an action for

the recovery of the better right of possession or possession as a real right.
It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
from accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.

Since the entry made by Liz is through stealth, Jacob could have filed
an action for forcible entry. Ordinarily, the one-year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of
actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the
one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
Here, since more than one year had elapsed since Jacob learned of the
entry made by Liz through stealth, the action that may be filed by Jacob is
no longer forcible entry, but an accion publiciana [Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No.
184285 (2009); Valdez v. CA, G.R. No. 132424 (2006)].

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Jacob can file an action for unlawful detainer against Liz to regain
possession of the property. An action for unlawful detainer is proper when
the defendant’s initial right to possession of the property has terminated
but he unlawfully withholds possession thereof. It has to be filed within
one year from the termination of his right to possession. Although Liz
surreptitiously entered in 2012, her possession became lawful when Jacob
discovered it and allowed her to continue possession by tolerance in 2014.
Liz’ right to possession terminated in December 2016 when Jacob
demanded her to vacate the property. Since today is November 2017, it is
still within one year from the termination of Liz’ right to possession.
Therefore, Jacob can file an action for unlawful detainer.

VI.

Tyler owns a lot that is enclosed by the lots of Riley to the North and East, of Dylan
to the South, and of Reece to the West. The current route to the public highway is a
kilometer's walk through the northern lot of Riley, but the route is a rough road that
gets muddy during the rainy season, and is inconvenient because it is only 2.5
meters wide. Tyler's nearest access to the public highway would be through the
southern lot of Dylan.

May Dylan be legally required to afford to Tyler a right of way through his property?
Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

Dylan may not be legally required to afford Tyler a right of way

through his property, because Tyler already has an adequate outlet to the
public highway through his Riley’s lot.

One of the requisites for a compulsory grant of right of way is that

the estate of the claimant of a right of way must be isolated and without
adequate outlet to a public highway. The true standard for the grant of
compulsory right of way is “adequacy” of outlet going to a public highway
and not the convenience of the dominant estate. In the case at bar, there
is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
highway. Even if said outlet be inconvenient, the need to open up another
legal easement or servitude is entirely unjustified [Article 649, NCC;
Dichoso Jr. v. Marcos, G.R. No. 180282 (2011); Costabella Corp. v. CA, G.R.
No. 80511 (1991)].

VII

Alice agreed to sell a parcel of land with an area of 500 square meters registered in
her name and covered by TCT No. 12345 in favor of Bernadette for the amount of
P900,000.00. Their agreement dated October 15, 2015 reads as follows:
 I, Bernadette, agree to buy the lot owned by Alice covered by TCT No. 12345
for the amount of P900,000.00 subject to the following schedule of payment:

Upon signing of agreement - P100,000.00

November 15, 2015 - P200,000.00
December 15, 2015 - P200,000.00
January 15, 2016 - P200,000.00
February 15, 2016 - P100,000.00

Title to the property shall be transferred upon full payment of P900,000.00

on or before February 15, 2016.

After making the initial payment of P100,000.00 on October 15, 2015, and the
second installment of P200,000.00 on November 15, 2015, Bernadette defaulted
despite repeated demands from Alice.

In December 2016, Bernadette offered to pay her balance but Alice refused and told
her that the land was no longer for sale. Due to the refusal, Bernadette caused the
annotation of her adverse claim upon TCT No. 12345 on December 19, 2016. Later
on, Bernadette discovered that Alice had sold the property to Chona on February 5,
2016, and that TCT No. 12345 had been cancelled and another one issued (TCT No.
67891) in favor of Chona as the new owner.

Bernadette sued Alice and Chona for specific performance, annulment of sale and
cancellation of TCT No. 67891. Bernadette insisted that she had entered into a
contract of sale with Alice; and that because Alice had engaged in double sale, TCT
No. 67891 should be cancelled and another title be issued in Bernadette's favor.

(a) Did Alice and Bernadette enter into a contract of sale of the lot covered by TCT
No. 12345? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) Yes, they entered into a contract of sale which is a conditional sale.
Article 1458(2) provides that a contact of sale may be absolute or conditional.

Ina contract of conditional sale, the buyer automatically acquires title to the
property upon full payment of the purchase price. This transfer of title is “by
operation of law without any further act having to be performed by the seller. In a
contract to sell, transfer of title to the prospective buyer is not automatic, the
prospective seller [must] convey title to the property [through] a deed of
conditional sale” [Olivarez Realty Corporation v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251 (2014)].
 In this case, it was stipulated that “Title to the property shall be transferred
upon full payment of P900,000.00 on or before February 15, 2016.” Thus, they
entered into a conditional sale.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) No, because in the agreement between Alice and Bernadette,

the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price, which makes the
contract one of contract to sell and not a contract of sale.

Distinctions between a contract to sell and a contract of sale

are well established in jurisprudence. In a contract of sale, the
title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement,
reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of
sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot
recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded;
whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until
full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the
price is appositive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a
breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to
convey title from becoming effective [Saberon v. Ventanilla, Jr.,
G.R. No. 192669 (2014)].

In this case, the contract entered between the parties is a

contract to sell because ownership is retained by the vendor and
is not to pass o the vendee until full payment of the purchase
price.

(b) Did Alice engage in double sale of the property? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(c) No, Alice did not engage in double sale. Article 1544 of the Civil Code
contemplates contracts of sale which are absolute sales. The sale to
Bernadette, however, is a conditional sale wherein the condition was
not fulfilled. In a conditional sale, the non-fulfillment of the condition
prevents the obligation to sell from arising and, thus, the prospective
 seller retains ownership without further remedies by the buyer. Since
title is reserved to Alice until Bernadette pays the full price for the
lot, the contract in this case is a conditional sale.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) No, because there was no previous sale of the same property prior to
its sale to Chona. Despite the earlier transaction of Alice with Bernadette,
the former is not guilty of double sale because the previous transaction
with Bernadette is characterized as a contract to sell. In a contract to sell,
there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying such
property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full
payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in
bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relied of reconveyance
of the property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to the property
will transfer to the buyer after registration because there is no defect in
the owner-sellers title per se, but the latter, of course, may be sued for
damages by the intending buyer [Coronel v. CA, G.R. No. 103577 (1996)].

VIII

Pedro had worked for 15 years in Saudi Arabia when he finally decided to engage in
farming in his home province where his 10- hectare farmland valued at
P2,000,000.00 was located. He had already P3,000,000.00 savings from his long
stint in Saudi Arabia.

Eagerly awaiting Pedro's arrival at the NAIA were his aging parents Modesto and
Jacinta, his common-law spouse Veneranda, their three children, and Alex, his child
by Carol, his departed legal wife. Sadly for all of them, Pedro suffered a stroke
because of his overexcitement just as the plane was about to land, and died
without seeing any of them.

The farmland and the savings were all the properties he left.

(a) State who are Pedro's legal heirs, and the shares of each legal heir to the
estate? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) Pedro’s legal heirs are Alex, who is his legitimate child by his deceased
wife, [Article 979, NCC] and his three children by VEneranda, who are his
illegitimate children [Article 873, NCC]. Modesto and Jacinta, his parents,
are excluded by Alex, his legitimate child. Veneranda, as a common-law
spouse, is not among Pedro’s legal heirs. Assuming that the Farmland and
savings are the exclusive properties of Pedro, Pedro’s estate amounts to
P5,000,000. Alex is entitled to one-half of Pedro’s estate, amounting to
P2,5000,000, while three illegitimate children divide the remaining one-
half equally, such that each will receive P833,333.33.

(b) Assuming that Pedro's will is discovered soon after his funeral. In the will, he
disposed of half of his estate in favor of Veneranda, and the other half in favor of
his children and his parents in equal shares. Assuming also that the will is admitted
to probate by the proper court. Are the testamentary dispositions valid and
effective under the law on succession? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) The testamentary dispositions are invalid insofar as they impair

the legitimes of Pedro’s compulsory heirs. Pedro’s compulsory
heirs are Alex and his three illegitimate children [Article 887,
NCC]. Alex, as Pedro’s sole legitimate child, is entitled to a
legitime to one-half of his father’s estate, amounting to P2,500,00
[Article 888, NCC]. The three illegitimate children of Pedro are
theoretically entitled to a legitime equal to one-half of the legitime
of Alex, amounting to P1,250,000 each or P3,750,000 total but as
this exceed the balance of the estate amounting to P2,500,000,
the latter amount must be divided equally among the three,
amounting to P833,333.33 each. The other testamentary
dispositions to Veneranda and Pedro’s parents, may not be given
effect, as there is nothing left of the estate to distribute.
[Note: if the farmland and the P3M savings were acquired during
the cohabitation of Pedro and Veneranda, these are owned in
common by both of them [Art. 147, Family Code]. One-half of the
P5M belongs to Veneranda as her share in the co-ownership].

IX

Danny and Elsa were married in 2002. In 2012, Elsa left the conjugal home and her
two minor children with Danny to live with her paramour. In 2015, Danny sold
without Elsa's consent a parcel of land registered in his name that he had
purchased prior to the marriage. Danny used the proceeds of the sale to pay for his
children's tuition fees.

Is the sale valid, void or voidable? Explain your answer. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

The sale of the parcel of land is void. There is no indication in the facts that
Danny and Elsa executed a marriage settlement prior to their marriage. As the
marriage was celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code and absent a
marriage settlement, the property regime between the spouses is the Absolute
Community of Property [Article 75,FC].

Under the absolute Community of Property regime, the parcel of land belongs
to the community of property as the property he had brought into the marriage
even if said property were registered in the name of Danny [Article 91, FC]. In
addition, said property do not fall under any of the exceptions under Article 92.
Therefore, the sale of the property is void, because it was executed without the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse [Article 96, 100,
FC].

Briefly explain whether the following contracts are valid, rescissible, unenforceable,
or void:

(a) A contract of sale between Lana and Andy wherein 16-year old Lana agreed to
sell her grand piano for P25,000.00. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) The contract of sale is voidable, because Lana is a minor, and is

thus incapable of giving consent to a contract.

(b) A contract of lease of the Philippine Sea entered by and between Mitoy and Elsa.
(2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) The contract of sale is void, because its object, the Philippine Sea, is
outside the commerce of men.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

(b) The contract of sale is void under Article 1306 of the Civil Code because
it is against public policy.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

(b) The contract of sale is void as it is prohibited by a treaty, which is

considered binding law in the Philippines.

[Note: Under Article 137 of the UNCLOS, the Philippine Sea is governed by
the following mandates:

Xxx

(b) No State or natural or juridical person shall appropriate any part

thereof.

Xxx].

(c) A barter of toys executed by 12-year old Clarence and 10-year old Czar (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(c) The contract is unenforceable, because both parties, being minors, are
incapable of giving consent.

(d) A sale entered by Barri and Garri, both minors, which their parents later
ratified. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(c) The contract is valid and may not be annulled by either party due to the
ratification by the parents of Brri & Garri, if done while both were still
minors. Ratification extinguishes the action to annul a voidable contract, or
an unenforceable contract, as in this case were both parties were minors
and may be done by the parents, as guardians of the minor children
[Article 1407, NCC].

(e) Jenny's sale of her car to Celestine in order to evade attachment by Jenny's
creditors. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(d) The contract is rescissible because it is in fraud of creditors [Article

1381, NCC].
 XI

Zeny and Nolan were best friends for a long time already. Zeny borrowed
P10,000.00 from Nolan, evidenced by a promissory note whereby Zeny promised to
pay the loan "once his means permit." Two months later, they had a quarrel that
broke their long-standing friendship.

Nolan seeks your advice on how to collect from Zeny despite the tenor of the
promissory note. What will your advice be? Explain your answer. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The remedy of Nolan is to go to court ask that a period be fixed for

the payment of the debt. Article 1180 of the New Civil Code provides that
when a debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so,
the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period (suspensive).
Article 1197 provides that the Courts may fix a period if such was intended
from the nature of the obligation and may also fix the duration of the
period when such depends on the will of the debtor.

XII

Krystal owns a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12345 in Angeles City. Due to
severe financial constraints, Krystal was forced to sell the property to RBP
Corporation, a foreign corporation based in South Korea. Subsequently, RBP
Corporation sold the property to Gloria, one of its most valued clients.

Wanting her property back, Krystal, learning of the transfer of the property from
RBP Corporation to Gloria, sued both of them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
annulment of sale and for reconveyance. She alleged that the sale by RBP
Corporation to Gloria was void because RBP Corporation was a foreign corporation
prohibited by the Constitution from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines.

Will Krystal's suit for annulment of sale and reconveyance prosper? Explain your
answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Krystal’s suit will not prosper. The Supreme Court, in Borromeo v. Descallar,
[G.R. No. 159310 (2009)], reiterated the consistent ruling that If land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to
a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considred cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.
In this case, RBP, being a foreign corporation is prohibited from acquiring private
land, making the sale of Krystal to RBP void ab initio. However, the subsequent
transfer to a Filipino citizen cured the defect, making Gloria’s title valid and
defeating Krystal’s action for annulment and reconveyance.

XIII

TRUE or FALSE - Explain your answers.

(a) All rights are considered as property. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) False. Only right which are patrimonial in character can be considered
property. Rights which are not patrimonial, such as the right to liberty, the
right to honor, family rights, and political rights cannot be considered
property.

(b) A lessee cannot bring a case for quieting of title respecting the property that he
leases. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) True. The plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title to the real
property in question or some interest therein, (or must be possession
thereof, so that the action may be in prescriptible [Article 476-477, Civil
Code].

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

(b) False. If the property lease is a moveable property, like a car, an

airplane or a ship, the lessee cannot bring the action to quiet title. The
property – subject matter of the action to quiet title should be real
property only [Art.477, NCC].

(c) Only the city or municipal mayor can file a civil action to abate a public
nuisance. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(c) False. Article 703 of New Civil Code provides that a private person may
file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is especially injurious to
himself. Thus, a private person may file a civil action to abate a public
nuisance that is especially injurious to him.

(d) Possession of a movable property is lost when the location of the said movable
is unknown to the owner. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(d) False. Article 556 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of
movables is not deemed lost so long as they remain under the control of
the possessor, even though for the time being he may not know their
whereabouts. Possession of a movable, therefore, is lost only when
possessor loses control over it.

(e) Continuous non-apparent easements can be acquired either through title or by

prescription. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(e) False. Article 620 of the Civil Code provides that continuous and
apparent easement are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years. Continuous non-apparent easements and
discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, maybe acquired only by
virtue of a title [Art.622, NCC]. An easement must be both continuous and
apparent in order to be subject to acquisition by prescription.

XIV

Plutarco owned land that borders on a river. After several years, the action of the
water of the river caused the deposit of soil, and increased the area of Plutarco's
property by 200 square meters.

(a) If Plutarco wants to own the increase in area, what will be his legal basis for
doing so? Explain your answer. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Plutarco’s legal basis for owning the increase in area would be by
accretion under Article 457 of the New Civil Code, which says that the
accretion of soil which is gradually received from the effects of the current
of the waters belongs to the owners of land adjoining the banks of the
river. The requisites in order that the reparian owner will own the alluvion
deposited through the process of accretion are as follows:

(1). The deposit should be gradual and imperceptible,

(2). The cause of the accretion is the current of the river and is not
artificial or man-made, and 3) the land where the accretion takes
place is adjacent to the river bank.

In Plutarco’s case, all three requisites are met, as the accretion took
place over several years, was caused by the action of the river, and the
land he owned borderes a river; therefore, he owns the increase in area by
virtue of accretion

(b) On the other hand, if the river dries up, may Plutarco validly claim a right of
ownership of the dried-up river bed? Explain your answer. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Rivers and their natural beds, being of public dominion [Article 502(1)
Civil code], are not subject to appropriation or accretion. The dried-up
riverbed remains to be public dominion and Plutarco cannot validly claim a
right ownership over it [Republic v. Santos, G.R. No. 160453 (2012)]

XV

Kevin signed a loan agreement with ABC Bank. To secure payment, Kevin
requested his girlfriend Rosella to execute a document entitled "Continuing
Guaranty Agreement" whereby she expressly agreed to be solidarily liable for the
obligation of Kevin.

Can ABC Bank proceed directly against Rosella upon Kevin's default even without
proceeding against Kevin first? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. Despite the designation of the contract as a “Continuing

Guaranty Agreement,” the terms of the document prevail. Rosella
expressly agreed to be solidarily liable for obligation of Kevin. According to
par.2, Article 2047 of the New Civil Code, if a person binds himself
solidarily with the principal debtor, the contract is called a suretyship. A
surety is under a direct and primary obligation to the creditor and may be
proceeded against in case the principal debtor does not pay as he is an
insurer of the debt. Only a guarantor, an insurer of the principal debtor’s
solvency, enjoys the benefit of excussion.

[Note: It is the panel’s recommendation that due credit should also be

given to examineess who answered that suretyship being an accessory
contract, the principal debtor should be an indispensable party to the
action against the surety]

XVI

Jovencio operated a school bus to ferry his two sons and five of their schoolmates
from their houses to their school, and back. The parents of the five schoolmates
paid for the service. One morning, Porfirio, the driver, took a short cut on the way
to school because he was running late, and drove across an unmanned railway
crossing. At the time, Porfirio was wearing earphones because he loved to hear loud
music while driving. As he crossed the railway tracks, a speeding PNR train loudly
blared its horn to warn Porfirio, but the latter did not hear the horn because of the
loud music. The train inevitably rammed into the school bus. The strong impact of
the collision between the school bus and the train resulted in the instant death of
one of the classmates of Jovencio's younger son.

The parents of the fatality sued Jovencio for damages based on culpa contractual
alleging that Jovencio was a common carrier; Porfirio for being negligent; and the
PNR for damages based on culpa aquiliana.

Jovencio denied being a common carrier. He insisted that he had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Porfirio, claiming that the latter
had had no history of negligence or recklessness before the fatal accident.

(a) Did his operation of the school bus service for a limited clientele render Jovencio
a common carrier? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Yes. Jovencio is a common carrier. The true test for a common carier is
not the quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or the
number and character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether
the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he
has held out to the general public as his business or occupation [Spouses
Perena v. Spouses Zapate, G.R. No. 157917 (2012)].

Jovencio operated the school bus as a business and not just as a

casual occupation; he undertook to carry the students in established routes
to and from the school; and he transported the students for a fee, Jovencio
was a common carrier notwithstanding the limited clientele.

(b) In accordance with your answer to the preceding question, state the degree of
diligence to be observed by Jovencio, and the consequences thereof. Explain your
answer. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Jovencio, as a common carrier, must observe extraordinary diligence in the

vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier should “carry the
passengers safely as far as human car and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.”

(c) Assuming that the fatality was a minor of only 15 years of age who had no
earning capacity at the time of his death because he was still a student in high
school, and the trial court is minded to award indemnity, what may possibly be the
legal and factual justifications for the award of loss of earning capacity? Explain
your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) If it can be shown that the deceased student was enrolled in a reputable
institution and was able-bodied prior to his death, the basis for award of
loss of earning capacity is the prevailing minimum wage at the time
child’s death. The computation of the child’s life expectancy must be
reckoned from the age of 21 years, which is the age when the child would
have graduated from college and would have begun to work [Spouses
Perena v. Spouses Zapate, G.R. No. 157917 (2012)].