Manila Prince Hotel
Facts:
GSIS pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic
partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability
and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.
Respondents:
Maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.
Issue:
Whether or not Art. XII Sec. 10 (2) of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Provision Subject to Constitutional Provision:
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
Yes, it is self-executing and does not implementing legislation to carry it. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos , it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Therefore, GSIS is directed to accept the matching bid of the petitioner to purchase the 51% shares of the MHC.
*In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. (natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos)
*The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.
*The word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders.
Chavez
Facts:
The unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the filing of this case.
To rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw
the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative
of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex
officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the Senate
would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the
JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote.7 Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
Petitioner:
Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no interpretation in that the JBC shall have only one representative from Congress.
Furthermore, the framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and decided on a JBC composed of only seven (7) members.
Respondent:
They cite Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution to determine the meaning of the term "Congress." In simplistic terms, the House of Representatives,
without the Senate and vice-versa, is not Congress. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from
Congress," it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter
to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Provision:
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
Yes. The provision can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of
Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in
mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure. the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
The word "Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in
the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his
memorandum, "from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only."
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
Facts:
The petitioners sought for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25,
1987, allowing the member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other
positions and receive compensation therefor.
Petitioners’ Argument:
Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order runs counter to Section 13, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “The President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. X x x”
According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Section 3, par. (2), Article 7 thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8
(1), Article 8.
Issue:
Whether or Not the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is
quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries."
Ruling:
• The Court ruled in the negative. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
• The evil sought to be prevented or remedied by the provision is the practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government which soon
led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.
• The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned, because they exercise more powers and, therefore, more cheeks and
restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case.
• Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Marcelino
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape. Furthermore, the attorneys for both parties moved for time within which to submit their respective
memoranda and the trial court granted the motion. Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was filed by the
People.
Petitioner’s Argument:
On the date set for promulgation of the decision, the petitioner moved for postponement because he espouses the thesis that the three-month period
prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance
thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.
Respondent’s Argument:
The respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said case for promulgation.
Issue:
WON the 3-month period prescribed by Section 11(1) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character
and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.
Provision:
Section 11 [1], Article X of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
No. On 85 days from September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge veritably rendered his decision on
said case within the three-month period prescribed by the Constitution. Furthermore, the rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of
the signed decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and
not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent judge had resolved the case
within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at
a later date, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the
judge.
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest."
Magtoto
Facts:
The confessions of the accused were taken before the effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been
violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed
of such right," because, We repeat, no such right existed at the time.
Petitioner:
Contended that the confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to
silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence
Respondent:
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 20, Art. IV of the New Constitution should be given a retroactive effect.
Provision:
Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution
Ruling:
No, the Court hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect.
Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to
silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New
Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the
right to be so informed before that date.
Even as We rule that the new constitutional right of a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of any confession given
by him in violation thereof declared inadmissible in evidence, to be prospective, and that confessions obtained before the effectivity of the New
Constitution are admissible in evidence against the accused, his fundamental right to prove that his confession was involuntary still stands. Our present
ruling does not in any way diminish any of his rights before the effectivity of the New Constitution.
Therefore, the confession in the said case are hereby declared admissible in evidence.