THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 235937-40, July 23, 2018

JOHANNE EDWARD B. LABAY, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION,

AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the
Resolutions dated July 10, 20171 and October 19, 20172 of the Sandiganbayan, Third
Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-0642 to 0643 and Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-
CRM-0644 to 0645. The first assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reinvestigation, among others, while the second assailed motion denied petitioner's
motion for partial reconsideration of the first assailed resolution.

The Facts

The case arose from the complaint dated May 11, 2015 filed by the Field Investigation
Office I (FIO I) of the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Johanne Edward B.
Labay (Petitioner Labay) for his participation in the alleged anomalous utilization of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of former Representative of the
1st District of Davao del Sur, Marc Douglas C. Cagas IV (Rep. Cagas IV). The complaint
was for violation of Article 217 (Malversation of Public Funds or Property), Article 171
(Falsification of Public Documents), paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (7), Article 217 in
relation to Article 171 (Malversation thru Falsification of Public Documents), all of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as well as Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, as amended. The case was docketed as OMB-C-C-15-0152.3

The complaint alleged that Rep. Cagas IV, in conspiracy with other public officials and
private individuals such as petitioner Labay, through the Technology Resource Center
(TRC), sought the release and transfer of his PDAF in the total amount of
Php6,000,000.00 to Farmer-business Development Corporation (FDC), which was led
by its then president, herein petitioner Labay. However, upon field verification
conducted by the FIO I, it appears that the livelihood projects funded by Rep. Cagas
IV's PDAF were never implemented and were considered to be "ghost projects."4

In a Joint Order dated September 1, 2015, the Ombudsman directed respondents to file
their respective counter-affidavits.5 Several respondents filed their respective counter-
affidavits. However, copies of this Order could not be served on petitioner Labay.6
According to the Ombudsman, it exerted diligent efforts to serve copies of the
September 1, 2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay through his office and at his last
known address. However, the copies were returned unserved because he was no longer
employed in that office and he was unknown at the given residential address. As such,
the Ombudsman proceeded with the preliminary investigation without any counter-
affidavit or participation from petitioner Labay.7

In a Resolution dated May 10, 2016,8 the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
Rep. Cagas IV and his co-respondents, including petitioner Labay, for conspiracy in the
commission of two counts of Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, one count of
Malversation of Public Funds, and one count of Malversation thru Falsification.

Petitioner alleges that it was unknown to him that preliminary investigations for the
charges against him were being conducted by the Ombudsman. According to him, it
was only sometime in October 2016 that he learned of the cases when his daughter,
Atty. Jo Blanca P.B. Labay, came across the press releases of the Ombudsman wherein
petitioner was mentioned as among those who are facing charges.9

On October 3, 2016, Atty. Labay, on behalf of her father, attempted to secure

information on the cases from the Central Records of the Ombudsman, but she was
advised to submit a written request. Accordingly, Atty. Labay sent the Ombudsman a
letter dated October 4, 2016 in compliance with the said directive.10

In a letter dated October 10, 2016, the Ombudsman replied to Atty. Labay's request
and served on her copies of its May 10, 2016 Resolution. At the same time, the
Ombudsman directed Atty. Labay to file a motion for reconsideration of the said
Resolution within five days from receipt thereof.11

Accordingly, petitioner, through Atty. Labay, filed an Omnibus Motion for

Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information with Request for Copies of
Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents dated November 16, 2016.12 In said
Omnibus Motion, petitioner prayed that the Ombudsman conduct a reinvestigation on
his alleged participation in the crimes charged and take into consideration his answer
and counter-evidence which he would present. He pointed out that he had neither been
notified that a complaint had been filed against him nor was furnished a copy of the
same. Thus, he argued that he was not afforded an opportunity to present his defense
and to participate during the preliminary investigation. More importantly, petitioner
prayed that he be furnished copies of the complaint-affidavit and other supporting
documents and that he be given time to gather his evidence and submit his answer to
the complaint. At the same time, he prayed for the deferment of the filing of any
charges against him arising out of the May 10, 2016 Resolution pending the
reinvestigation of the case.13

In its Order dated November 25, 2016,14 the Ombudsman denied petitioner Labay's
Omnibus Motion, ruling thus:
This Office had exerted diligent efforts to serve on Labay copies of the 1 September
2015 Order directing him to submit his counter-affidavit and the 10 May 2016
Resolution finding him probably guilty of the charges. The same were sent to his office
and at his last known address and were returned unserved because he was no longer
employed in that office, or was unknown at the given address. There was sufficient
compliance with due process.

The filing by Labay of the Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation on 16 November 2016

cured whatever defect in the observance of due process. Denial of due process cannot
he success. fully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, this Office, through the undersigned, DENIES respondents Marc

Douglas C. Cagas IV's Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 August 2016; Maria
Rosalinda M. Lacsamana's Motion for Reconsideration dated 08 August 2016; Consuela
Lilian R. Espiritu's Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 August 2016; Marivic V.
Jover's Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September 2016; and Johanne Edward B.
Labay's Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information with Request
for Copies of Complaint-Affidavits and Supporting Documents  dated 16 November 2016.

All indictments against them, as originally embodied in the Resolution dated 10 May
2016, STAND.

SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis in the original)

Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner Labay filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Order dated 25 November 2016) and Deferment of Filing of
Information with Reiterative Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting
Documents dated January 30, 2017.16 Petitioner essentially reiterated his arguments in
his first omnibus motion, but added that the filing of the said omnibus motion did not
cure the defects in the Ombudsman's failure to observe due process.17

The Ombudsman treated this second Omnibus Motion as a second motion for
reconsideration and denied the same for lack of merit in its Order dated February 1,
2017.18

On March 24, 2017, the Ombudsman filed four (4) Informations before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Labay and his co-accused.19

It was only on March 28, 2017, four days after the Informations had already been filed
with the Sandiganbayan, that petitioner Labay was furnished a copy of the Complaint-
Affidavit and its supporting evidence.20

On April 4, 2017, petitioner Labay received copies of the Informations filed by the
Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan. Immediately thereafter, on April 5, 2017,
petitioner Labay filed an Extremely Urgent Motion of even date, arguing that he is
entitled to a reinvestigation of the case to prevent injustice against him brought about
by the wrongful filing of charges without affording him his right to a complete
preliminary investigation.21

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In the assailed Resolution dated July 10, 2017, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's
motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court -
 

(1) DECLARES the existence of probable cause in these cases. Accordingly, let warrants of
arrest be issued against all the accused except for accused Marc Douglas Chan Cagas IV
who had already posted bail;
(2) NOTES the Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause With Entry of
Appearance dated April 4, 2017, filed by accused Marc Douglas Chan Cagas IV; and
the Motion To Set Aside No Bail Recommendation in Crim Case No. SB-17-CRM-0644
for Malversation Through Falsification and To Fix the Amount of Bail in Crim Case No.
SB-17-CRM-0644 for Malversation Through Falsification filed by accused Johanne
Edward B. Labay; and
(3) DENIES the Motion For Reinvestigation and To Defer the Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest filed by accused Johanne Edward B. Labay for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.22
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration23 dated August 3, 2017.
However, this was denied for lack of merit and for being pro forma in the second
assailed Resolution dated October 19, 2017.24

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.

The Petition

In the present petition, petitioner prays for the (1) issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of injunction; (2) nullification and setting aside of the assailed
Resolutions; (3) remand of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for a
reinvestigation of petitioner; and (4) suspension of the criminal proceedings with
respect to petitioner Labay, pending the resolution of the reinvestigation before the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied him the constitutional right to
due process by denying his prayer for a reinvestigation. Essentially, petitioner argues
that he was not accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard since he could not have
effectively and intelligently moved for the reconsideration of the Ombudsman's May 10,
2016 Resolution due to the latter's failure to furnish him with a copy of the complaint
affidavit and its attachments upon which the resolution was based.

In a Resolution25 dated March 21, 2018, this Court required respondent to file its
Comment on the Petition and at the same time issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent Sandiganbayan to suspend the criminal proceedings against
petitioner Labay.

On April 2, 2018, the People of the Philippines represented by the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its counsel, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed
an Entry of Appearance with Comment and Motion to Dissolve the Temporary
Restraining Order Issued on 21 March 2018.26 It claimed that the Sandiganbayan did
not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Labay's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. It argued that there was no violation of his constitutional right to due
process

considering that he was given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence

through the Ombudsman's effort to issue subpoenas at his last known addresses,
especially since the government substantially complied with the requirements of the law
in doing so.27

Aside from the effort exerted in issuing subpoenas, the OSP contended that petitioner
Labay was eventually informed of the nature of the accusations against him when he
was furnished a copy of the Ombudsman's May 10, 2016 Resolution, in response to
which he was able to file an omnibus motion. It further maintains that petitioner Labay
had the opportunity to refute the charges against him and present any countervailing
evidence he may have, but faults him for hiding on technicalities and insisting that he
was denied due process without presenting any evidence to support his claim of having
a valid and meritorious defense. In other words, the OSP asserted that petitioner Labay
was afforded due process when he filed two motions seeking reinvestigation and
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's rulings.28

From the arguments presented by the parties, the Court is now faced with the issue of
whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner Labay's motion for reinvestigation and ruling
that he was not deprived of due process.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that petitioner's
constitutional right to due process was violated when he was not furnished a copy of
the complaint affidavit and its attachments during the preliminary investigation.

Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of every person to
due process before they are deprived of their life, liberty, or property. Due process in
criminal prosecutions is further emphasized under Section 14, Article III which provides
that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law. The same provision also states that the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.

Criminal due process requires that the procedure established by law or the rules be
followed to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking the life or liberty except
that of the guilty. All the necessary measures must be taken to guarantee procedural
due process throughout all stages of a criminal prosecution-from the inception of
custodial investigation until rendition of judgment.29

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of

determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial.30

The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial
for a criminal offense and be formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is
not a mere formal or technical right. It is a substantive right since the accused in a
criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not
to speak of expense, and the right to an opportunity to avoid a painful process is a
valuable right.31 It is meant to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to
protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. Indeed, to deny a
person's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure
of his right to due process.32

Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 07 otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) lays down the procedure to
be followed in handling preliminary investigations of criminal complaints brought before
the Ombudsman for offenses in violation of R.A. 3019, as amended, R.A. 1379 as
amended, R.A. 6713, Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and for
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office.33 It provides:
Section 3. Preliminary investigation; who may conduct. Preliminary Investigation may
be conducted by any of the following:

1) Ombudsman Investigators;

2) Special Prosecuting Officers;

3) Deputized Prosecutors;

4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations or

5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.

Section 4. Procedure - The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the
manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
provisions:

a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute
affidavits to substantiate the complaints.

b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits
and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The
complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-
affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may
consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any
event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a
motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondents desire any matter in the
complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the
time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.

e) If the respondents cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof,
or having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed
submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.

f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are
facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he
may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the
witness being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is
impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the
questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced
into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the
same in writing and under oath.

g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall
forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the designated
authorities for their appropriate action thereon.

No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also provides similar
guidelines in the conduct of preliminary investigation, to wit:
Section 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the
following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied
by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting
documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there
are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of
who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If
the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he
intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for
examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of there questing party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit
and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense.
The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in
paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant.
The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-
affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit

counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve
the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be
clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but
without th. right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits
and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall
be terminated within five (5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (3a)
It is clear from the foregoing that an accused in a criminal case has the right to be
informed of the charges against him,34 to submit a counter affidavit, and to have access
to and examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.35

In the case before Us, a complaint was filed by the FIO I of the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner Labay for representing the Farmerbusjness
Development Corporation (FDC) in the alleged anomalous utilization of the PDAF of
Rep. Cagas IV.36 The Ombudsman directed those charged to file their respective
counter-affidavits,37 but copies of this Order could not be served on petitioner
Labay.38 It appears that the Ombudsman attempted to serve copies of the September
1, 2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay at his office at the National Anti-Poverty
Commission (NAPC) and at his last known residence. However, the copies were
returned unserved because he was no longer employed in that office and he was
unknown at the given residential address. As such, the Ombudsman proceeded with the
preliminary investigation without any counter-affidavit or participation from petitioner
Labay.39

Thereafter, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and his co-
respondents for conspiracy in the commission of two counts of Violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019, one count of Malversation of Public Funds, and one count of Malversation
thru Falsification.

Upon learning from press releases of the Ombudsman about the criminal charges
against him,40 petitioner Labay, through his daughter, Atty. Labay, attempted to secure
information on the cases from the Central Records of the Ombudsman. Upon being
advised to submit a written request, Atty. Labay sent the Ombudsman a letter dated
October 4, 2016 in compliance with the said directive.41 In response to Atty. Labay's
letter request, the Ombudsman replied to Atty. Labay's request through a letter dated
October 10, 2016 and served on her copies of its May 10, 2016 Resolution. In the
letter, the Ombudsman directed Atty. Labay to file a motion for reconsideration of the
said Resolution within five days from receipt thereof.42

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of

Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting
Documents dated November 16, 2016,43 praying, among others, that a reinvestigation
be conducted on his behalf, asserting that he was not afforded an opportunity to
present his defense and to participate during the preliminary investigation since he had
neither been notified that a complaint had been filed against him nor was furnished a
copy of the same. Petitioner also prayed that he be furnished copies of the complaint-
affidavit and other supporting documents and that he be given time to gather his
evidence and submit his answer to the complaint.44 However, the Ombudsman denied
petitioner Labay's Omnibus Motion, ruling that his right to due process had not been
violated since he had the opportunity to be heard when he filed the Omnibus Motion.45

Aggrieved, petitioner Labay filed another Omnibus Motion essentially reiterating his
arguments in his first omnibus motion, but additionally argued that the filing of the first
omnibus motion did not cure the defects in the Ombudsman's failure to observe due
process when it failed to serve on him copies of the complaint affidavit.46 The
Ombudsman treated this second Omnibus Motion as a second motion for
reconsideration and denied the same for lack of merit in its Order dated February 1,
2017.47

Thereafter, on March 24, 2017, the Ombudsman filed four (4) Informations before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Labay and his co-accused.48 It was only on March 28,
2017 that petitioner Labay was furnished a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit and its
supporting evidence.49

Upon receiving copies of the Informations filed by the Ombudsman, petitioner Labay
immediately filed an Extremely Urgent Motion with the Sandiganbayan arguing that he
is entitled to a reinvestigation of the case to prevent injustice against him brought
about by the wrongful filing of charges without affording him his right to a complete
preliminary investigation.50

The Sandiganbayan, however, sustained the Ombudsman's position in the assailed

Resolution dated July 10, 2017, ruling that petitioner's right to due process was not
violated since he was afforded reasonable opportunity to address the charges against
him when he filed two motions with the Ombudsman. The Sandiganbayan ruled, thus:
The Court finds accused Labay's motion for reinvestigation bereft of merit.
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard in support of his case. What the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence
of the opportunity to be heard. When the party seeking due process was in fact given
several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or
choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail.

 Admittedly, there is no showing that accused Labay was served a copy of the order
requiring him to file his counter-affidavit. The record shows, however, that on October
4, 2016, accused Labay wrote the Office of the Ombudsman requesting information on
case numbers and titles of the cases it referred to in its press release where his name
appears. In reply to the said letter, the Office of the Ombudsman confirmed that
accused Labay is a respondent in two (2) cases and furnished him copies of the
Resolutions dated May 10, 2016 and June 3, 2016. It also reminded accused Labay that
he has five (5) days from notice within which to file a motion for reconsideration.

Thus, on November 16, 2016, accused Labay filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and
Deferment of Filing of Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavits and
Supporting Documents assailing the Office of the Ombudsman's Resolution dated May
10, 2016, finding probably cause to indict him. The said motion was denied by the
Office of the Ombudsman in its Order dated November 25, 2016 upon the following
ratiocination:

xxxx

Thereafter, accused Labay filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Deferment
of Filing of Information assailing the above order. In denying the said motion, the Office
of the Ombudsman pointed out that while accused Labay asserted that he did not
commit the crimes imputed to him and that he did not participate in any conspiracy in
the commission of the crimes, he prayed that the Office of the Ombudsman conduct a
reinvestigation, furnish him a copy of the complaint, allow him to gather evidence and
submit counter-affidavit. Further, the Office of the Ombudsman held that when accused
Labay filed his second motion, he already exhausted his remedy under Section 7(a),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which allows the filing
of only one (1) motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation.

The above circumstances unerringly show that accused Labay was accorded due
process by filing two (2) motions before the Office of the Ombudsman.
We disagree.

There is no dispute that the Ombudsman was unable to serve copies of the complaint or
of its September 1, 2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay prior to or even during the
preliminary investigation of the case. This was never denied by the OSP in its
Comment, stating thus:
20. By Joint Order dated 01 September 2015, the Office of the Ombudsman directed
therein respondents (including Labay) to file their respective counter-affidavits.

21. Despite earnest efforts, copies of the Joint Order could not be served in the last
known or given addresses of Cunanan, Semillano, Carrasco, Reyes, and herein
petitioner Labay, after they have been noted to be unknown in said addresses, or had
moved out and left no forwarding address.51 (emphasis in the original)
As pointed out by petitioner, the Ombudsman only tried to effect service of the order to
file his counter affidavit on petitioner on one instance, albeit to two different addresses.
However, this service failed since petitioner was no longer employed at his former office
at NAPC, as confirmed by the letter sent by the NAPC Secretary and Lead Convenor,
and since he was no longer residing at the residential address where the order was
sent.

In its Comment, the OSP seeks refuge in paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman
Rules of Procedure which provides that in cases where the respondents cannot be
served with the order to file their counter-affidavit, or having been served but does not
comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis
of the evidence on the record.

While the Ombudsman was correct in resolving the complaint based on the evidence
presented in accordance with Paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure, the situation, however, effectively changed when petitioner made himself
available to the Ombudsman when he requested access to the case records. The
Ombudsman had a clear opportunity to furnish petitioner with copies of the complaint
affidavit and its supporting documents. Instead, it merely decided to furnish petitioner
with a copy of its May 10, 2016 Resolution.

Even assuming that the Ombudsman was merely complying with Atty. Labay's request
for information when it responded with the case titles and docket numbers of the cases
pending against petitioner Labay, it should have exercised its duty to inform petitioner
of the charges filed against him by furnishing him copies of the complaint affidavit and
its supporting documents. Or at the very least, it should have directed and allowed
petitioner to access these records at its office. This, however, was not done by the
Ombudsman.

We also cannot subscribe to the Sandiganbayan's justification that petitioner was

afforded reasonable opportunity to address the charges against him since he was able
to file a motion for reinvestigation with the Ombudsman. By the mere fact that
petitioner was not yet even furnished a copy of the complaint affidavit at the time he
received the Ombudsman's May 10, 2016 Resolution, it is clear that he could not
effectively and sufficiently address the allegations against him. Petitioner Labay should
not be blamed for being unable to raise any substantive defense in either the omnibus
motions he filed with the Ombudsman since he had not even seen any of the allegations
filed against by the FIO. More importantly, he could not have been expected to seek
appropriate evidence to support his defense when he was not even given any access to
the documents submitted by the FIO in support of its complaint.

In fact, the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process is made even
more evident when the Ombudsman unceremoniously denied his request to be
furnished copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents in the first
omnibus motion that he filed, and reiterated in his second omnibus motion. In both
orders denying the two omnibus motions, the Ombudsman seemingly ignored
petitioner's requests and effectively denied petitioner of his right to secure copies of the
complaint affidavit. This should not be tolerated.

Unfortunately, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to

grant petitioner Labay's Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion despite the glaring violations
committed by the Ombudsman. The Sandiganbayan should have recognized these
patent violations and ordered the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for the
conduct of a proper preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner Labay's
participation in the crimes charged. Instead, it chose to turn a blind eye towards the
injustice committed against petitioner.

Time and again, the Court has held that suppression of evidence, regardless of its
nature, is enough to violate the due process rights of the accused.52 In the present
case, it was not only the prosecution's evidence which was withheld from petitioner. In
denying petitioner Labay's multiple requests for copies of the complaint affidavit, the
Ombudsman deprived him of his right to sufficiently and reasonably know the charges
and accusations against him. This is a patent violation of his constitutional right to due
process.

In Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,53 this Court ordered the dismissal of the criminal case

against the accused when they were not sufficiently apprised of the charges against
them during preliminary investigation, thus:
We have judiciously studied the case records and we find that the preliminary
investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner
laid down in Administrative Order No. 07.

In the 12 November 1991 Order of Graft Investigator Manriquez, petitioners were

merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in
Civil Case No. 20,550-91 and SAR No. 91-05. The said order was not accompanied by a
single affidavit of any person charging petitioners of any offense as required by law.
They were just required to comment upon the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA
Special Audit Report. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a
preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a
preliminary investigation was being conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had
intended merely to adopt the allegations of the plaintiffs in the civil case or the Special
Audit Report (whose recommendation for the cancellation of the contract in question
had been complied with) as his basis for criminal prosecution, then the procedure was
plainly anomalous and highly irregular. As a consequence, petitioners constitutional
right to due process was violated. (citations omitted)
While the Duterte case is not on all fours with the case before Us, We find that the
Ombudsman's failure to furnish petitioner Labay with copies of the complaint affidavit
and its supporting documents despite the latter's numerous attempts and requests to
secure the same is more severe as it gravely endangers petitioner's right to liberty
through no fault of his own. Undeniably, petitioner Labay's receipt of the May 10, 2016
Resolution is not equivalent to receipt of the complaint affidavit and its supporting
documents.

The OSP's assertion in its comment that petitioner deliberately evaded the
Ombudsman's attempts to serve its orders on him is purely hypothetical and is not
supported by any concrete proof. There is also no merit in the OSP's position that it was
incumbent on petitioner Labay to justify his whereabouts during the time that the
Ombudsman was attempting service of the subpoena on him since no law or regulation
requires an accused in a preliminary investigation to submit himself to the Ombudsman
or at the very least update the latter of his latest address. The burden should not be
placed on the accused since it is the State which has the responsibility to use its
resources for the proper implementation of the law. To rule otherwise would effectively
curtail the constitutionally protected rights of the people to be secure with their life,
liberty and property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 10, 2017 and
October 19, 2017 issued by the Sandiganbayan, Third Division in Criminal Case Nos.
SB-17-CRM-0642 to 0643 and Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-0644 to 0645 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
is ORDERED to file motions to withdraw Information in the aforedescribed criminal
cases.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

February 15, 2017

G.R. No. 187094

LIZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AND RAFAEL V.

MARIANO, Petitioners
vs.
HON. EVELYN A. TURLA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of
Palayan City, Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge
Provincial Prosecutor, ANTONIO LL. LAPUS, JR., EDISON V. RAFANAN, and EDDIE C.
GUTIERREZ, in their capacity as members of the panel of investigating prosecutors, and
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Upon filing of an information in court, trial court judges must determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of the prosecutor's report and its
supporting documents. They may dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or require the
submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot remand the case for another conduct of
preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly
conducted.

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition  with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
1

Restraining Order ;and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners seek to have the Orders  dated
2

July 18, 2008  and December 2, 2008  of the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 in
3 4

Criminal Case Nos. 1879-P and 1880-P nullified and set aside and the criminal cases against them
dismissed.

Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Satumino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casifio, and Rafael V. Mariano
(petitioners) are former members of the House of Representatives. Liza represented Gabriela
Women's Party (Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro represented Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan
Muna), while Rafael represented Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis). 5

In three letters  all dated December 14, 2006, Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo (Inspector
6

Palomo), Oeputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal Investigation and Detection Team,
referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three (3) cases of murder
against petitioners and 15 other persons. 7
Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly responsible for the
death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.  His findings show that the named
8

individuals conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List
(AKBAYAN), a rival of Bayan Muna and Gabriela.  Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were
9

AKBAYAN community organizers,  whereas Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a certain Ricardo
10

Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter. 11

Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted and that an

Information for each count of murder be filed against the 19 individuals. 12

On February 2, 2007, Investigating Prosecutor Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr. issued a subpoena  requiring 13

petitioners to testify at the hearings scheduled on February 16 and 23, 2007.

On March 9, 2007, petitioners filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Quash

Complaint/Subpoena and to Expu[ng]e Supporting Affidavits.  They argue that the Provincial
14

Prosecutor had no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation since no valid complaint was
filed against them.  They also claimed that, "the preliminary investigation conducted was highly
15

irregular, and that the subpoena issued against [them] was patently defective amounting to a denial
of their rights to due process." 16

On July 13, 2007, the panel of investigating prosecutors, composed of Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr., Eddie
C. Gutierrez, and Edison V. Rafanan, denied petitioners' motion and ordered the submission of their
counter-affidavits. 17

Petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits.  They also filed a (1) Motion to conduct
18

Clarificatory Hearing and to Allow [them] to Submit Written Memorandum,  and a (2) Joint 19

Supplemental Counter-Affidavit on Common Legal Grounds in Support of their Prayer to Dismiss the
Case,  both dated August 21, 2007.
20

On October 23, 2007, the panel issued an Order  again denying the motion. Petitioners moved for
21

reconsideration,  which was denied by the panel in the Resolution  dated November.14, 2007.
22 23

The panel of prosecutors issued on April 11, 2008 a Joint Resolution,  reviewed and approved by
24

Officer-in-charge Provincial Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Prosecutor Florendo). The panel found
probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito Bayudang and Jimmy Peralta, and for kidnapping
with murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe, against the nineteen 19 suspects. However, the panel
considered one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as a state witness. The panel recommended
that the corresponding Informations be filed against the remaining suspects.  On the same day, two
25

(2) Informations  for murder were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Branch 40 in
26

Nueva Ecija, (Palayan cases) and an Information  for kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba,
27

Nueva Ecija (Guimba case).

Petitioners filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the
Case Outright on the Guimba case. This was opposed by the panel of investigating prosecutors and
Prosecutor Florendo.  After the hearing on the motion and submission of the parties' memoranda,
28

Judge Napoleon R. Sta. Romana issued an Order  dated August 5, 2008, dismissing the case for
29

lack of probable cause. 30

On April 21, 2008, petitioners also filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with
Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright  on the Palayan cases. They requested the court to move
31

forward with the presented evidence and decide if there were probable cause and, consequently,
dismiss the case outright if there were none. 32
The panel of investigating prosecutors and Prosecutor Florendo opposed the motion.  Petitioners
33

filed their Reply  on May 12, 2008.

34

On April 25, 2008 and May 12, 2008, the motion was heard by the Regional Trial Court of Palayan
City, Branch 40.  Thereafter, both parties submitted their respective memoranda.
35 36

On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla (Judge Turla) issued an Order  on the 37

Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation was not followed in [the Palayan] cases"  due to the following:
38

First, the records show that the supposed principal witnesses for the prosecution were not presented
before the panel of prosecutors, much less subscribed their supposed affidavits before them.

The marginal note of one of the panel member, Asst. Prov'l Pros. Eddie Gutierrez said it all, thus: "I
concur with the conclusion but I would have been more than satisfied if witnesses for the
prosecution were presented."

Second, the charge against [petitioners] is Murder (two counts), a non-bailable offense. The gravity
of the offense alone, not to mention the fact that three of the movants are incumbent Party-List
Representatives while the other one was a former Party-List Representative himself, whose
imprisonment during the pendency of the case would deprive their constituents of their duly-elected
representatives, should have' merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation.

The panel of prosecutors, however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed hook, line and
sinker the allegations made by Isabelita Bayudang, Cleotilde Peralta[,] and Alvaro Juliano, and
principally hinges on the affidavit of Julie Sinohin, a supposed "co-conspirator" of the movants, which
were all not "subscribed or sworn" before the said panel.

Given the foregoing circumstances, this Court for all practical purposes will do an even worse job
than what the panel of prosecutors did, by accepting in its entirety the findings of the said panel
,despite its obvious flaws. This practice should not be condoned.

....

Third, [petitioners'] filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the preliminary

investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors is allowed by the rules....

....

Strictly speaking, the filing of a "Motion for Reconsideration" is an integral part of the preliminary
investigation proper. There is no dispute that the two (2) Informations for murder were
filed without first affording the movants their right to file a motion for reconsideration. The denial
thereof is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone
.already renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. The inevitable
conclusion is that the movants were not only effectively denied the opportunity to file a "Motion for
Reconsideration" of the "Joint Resolution" dated April 11, 2008 issued by the panel of prosecutors
assigned in these cases, but were also deprived of 'their right to a full preliminary investigation
preparatory to the filing of the Information against them. (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted).39

Judge Turla further held:

In this case, the undue haste in filing of the information against movants cannot be1 ignored. From
the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that the
state prosecutors were overly-eager to file the case and to secure a warrant of arrest of [petitioners]
without bail and their consequent detention. There can be no gainsaying the fact that the task of
ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the hope that they will in the future
reform and be productive members of the community rests both on the judiciousness of judges and
the prudence of the prosecutors. There is however, a standard in the determination of the existence
of probable cause. The determination has not measured up to that standard in this case. 40

Judge Turla added that her order of remanding the Palayan cases back to the provincial prosecutors
"for' a complete preliminary investigation is not a manifestation of ignorance of law or a willful
abdication of a duty imposed by law ... but due to the peculiar circumstances obtaining in [the cases]
and not just ''passing the buck' to the panel of prosecutors[.]"41

The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby resolves to:

1.) SET ASIDE the "Joint Resolution" of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Prosecutor's Office dated, April
11, 2008 finding probable cause for two (2) counts of Murder against the herein movants; and,

2.) ORDER the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the incidents subject matter hereof in accordance with the mandates of Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

42

Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration  of the July 18, 2008 Order, praying for the outright
43

dismissal of the Palayan cases against them for lack of probable cause.  The Motion was denied by
44

Judge Turla in an Order dated December 2, 2008. 45

Hence, on March 27, 2009, petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Judge
Evelyn A. Turla, Prosecutors Floro F. Florendo, Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr., Edison V. Rafanan, and Eddie
C. Gutierrez, and Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez (respondents). 46

Petitioners pray that the July 18, 2008 and December 2, 2008 Orders of Judge Turla be set aside
and annulled and that the murder cases against them be dismissed for failure to show probable
cause. They also ask for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin Judge Turla from remanding the cases to the provincial prosecutors, and "the
respondent prosecutors from conducting further preliminary investigation [on] these cases." 47

Petitioners claim that they "have no plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law[. ]"  They also contend that "[r]espondents' actions will certainly cause grave and irreparable
48

damage to [their] constitutional rights unless injunctive relief is afforded them through the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order[. ]"49

They allege that Judge Turla acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,
[I] WHEN SHE SHIRKED FROM HER CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO DETERMINE PROBABLE
CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONERS AND INSTEAD REMANDED THE CASES TO THE OFFICE OF
THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR DESPITE LACK OF EVIDENCE.

[II] WHEN SHE DID NOT DISMISS THE CASES DESPITE THE LACK OF EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONERS.

[III] WHEN SHE REFUSED TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS ARE PRINCIPALS BY INDUCEMENT.

[IV] FOR IGNORING THE ISSUE OF INADMISSIBILITY OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE ON THE

GROUND OF VIOLATION OF THE RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE. 50

Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the prosecutors had no
basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already evaluated the evidence submitted by
the prosecutors along with the Informations, she should have determined the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of arrest warrants or the dismissal of the Palayan cases. 51

Petitioners assert that under the Rules of Court, in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
Judge Turla could "order the prosecutor to present additional evidence [or] set the case for hearing
so she could make clarifications on the factual issues of the case."
52

Moreover, petitioners argue that the setting aside of the Joint Resolution establishes the non-
existence of probable cause against them. Thus, the cases against them should have been
dismissed. 53

Petitioners aver that the documents submitted by the prosecution are neither relevant nor admissible
evidence.  The documents "do not establish the complicity of the petitioner party-list representatives
54

to the death of the supposed victims.55

On May 29, 2009, respondents filed their Comment  through the Office of the Solicitor General,
56

raising the following arguments:

THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR VIOLATING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS.

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ACTION IN REMANDING THE CASES FOR PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION IS A RECOGNITION OF THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTORS TO DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PURPOSES OF FILING
APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL INFORMATION.

III.

THE PROSECUTION RIGHTLY FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE TO WARRANT THE FILING OF THE
INDICTMENTS.

IV.
A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IS NOT A PRONOUNCEMENT OF GUILT BUT MERELY
BINDS A SUSPECT TO STAND TRIAL.

V.

THE ISSUE OF ADMISSIBILITY OR INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IS PROPERLY

ADDRESSED DURING THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND NOT DURING THE
EARLY STAGE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. 57

Respondents claim that the petition before this Court violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
They contend that petitioners should have filed their petition before the Court of Appeals since it also
exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. According to respondents,
petitioners failed to justify a direct resort to this Court. 58

Respondents also allege that respondent Secretary Gonzalez was wrongly impleaded. There was no
showing that he exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions, for which certiorari may be issued. 59

On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged on her constitutional duty to determine probable cause,
respondents counter that she did not abandon her mandate.  Her act of remanding the cases to the
60

public prosecutors "is a confirmation of her observance of the well-settled principle that such
determination of probable cause is an exclusive executive function of the prosecutorial arm of our
government." 61

Furthermore, respondent prosecutors' finding of probable cause is correct since evidence against
petitioners show that more likely than not, they participated in the murder of the alleged victims.  The
62

prosecutors' finding is not a final declaration of their guilt. It merely engages them to trial.[[6 3]]

Finally, respondents argue that the "issue of admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence is properly
addressed during the trial on the merits of the case and not during the early stage of preliminary
investigation."64

Petitioners filed their Reply  on September 24, 2009. Aside from reiterating their allegations and
65

arguments in the petition, they added that direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction was
allowed as their petition involved legal questions.  Moreover, the inclusion of Secretary Gonzalez as
66

nominal party-respondent was allowed under Rule 65, Section 5  of the Rules of Court.
67 68

We resolve the following issues:

First, whether petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts in bringing their petition directly
before this Court;

Second, whether respondent Judge Turla gravely abused her discretion when she remanded the
Palayan cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and

Finally, whether admissibility of evidence can be ruled upon m preliminary investigation.

This petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.

This Court thoroughly explained the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections: 69

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial
courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively
perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their
writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perf01m the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before
them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the
'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort
to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may
not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in
the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.

In other words, the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in
respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly
and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided
exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government.

....

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases,
the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts
from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

....
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United
States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may
guide the lower courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

....

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court
held that:

... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher
judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated
in its discussion.

....

Fifth, . . . Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ ...

....

Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]

... The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct
resort to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found
to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past,
questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters'
registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.

....

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a
direct resort to this court.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
70

In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et al.,  this Court
71

reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari." 72

In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's
jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives.
The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed Orders be affirmed, would affect
their representation of their constituents in Congress.

Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this case necessitate this
Court's exercise of jurisdiction.

II

The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another preliminary
investigation is improper.

Petitioners assert that the documents submitted along with the Informations are sufficient for Judge
Turla to rule on the existence of probable cause. If she finds the evidence inadequate, she may
order the prosecutors to present additional evidence. Thus, according to petitioners, Judge Turla's
action in remanding the case to the prosecutors for further preliminary investigation lacks legal basis.

Petitioners' contention has merit.

Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

RULE 112
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

....

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint or information.

A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has the
following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable
cause. 73

The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal evaluation of
the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause by the
trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutors is an executive function.  This Court clarified this concept in Napoles v. De Lima:
74 75

During preliminary investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of probable cause for filing
an information in court or dismissing the criminal complaint. As worded in the Rules of Court, the
prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation whether "there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." At this stage, the determination of probable cause is an
executive function. Absent grave abuse of discretion, this determination cannot be interfered with by
the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.

On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause is a
judicial function. No less than the Constitution commands that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce[.]" This requirement of personal
evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in Rule 112, Section 5 (a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure[.]

....

Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that for issuance
of an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is filed in court, the trial court acquires
jurisdiction and "any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court."  (Citations omitted)
76

In De Lima v. Reyes,  this Court further held:

77

The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor’s conduct of a preliminary investigation.  The
1avvphi1

prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion. Prosecutors are
given a wide latitude of discretion to determine whether an information should be filed in court or
whether the complaint should be dismissed.  (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
78

Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors' conduct of preliminary investigation was
"incomplete"  and that their determination of probable cause "has not measured up to [the]
79

standard,"  she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of determining
80

probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary investigation.

In Leviste v. Hon. Alameda, et al.:81

[T]he task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a
personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable
cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.  (Citations omitted)
82

Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation, it was
incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused after a
personal evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the supporting documents. She could even
disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or require the prosecutors to submit additional
evidence. There was no option for her to remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for
another preliminary investigation. In doing so, she acted without any legal basis.
 III

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

In a preliminary investigation,

... the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.83

To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;] [i]t is not a trial on the
merits."  Since "it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor
84

would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the
accused,"  the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary
85

investigation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 18, 2008
and December 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 in Criminal Case Nos.
1879-P and 1880-P are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Palayan
City, Branch 40 for further proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 En Banc

July 25, 2017

G.R. No. 232413

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH
PETITION FOR RELIEF INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES PANGASINAN LEGAL AID
and JAY-AR R. SENIN, Petitioners
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, BUREAU OF JAIL
MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus with a petition for declaratory relief filed by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Pangasinan Chapter Legal Aid, pursuant to its purpose,
as stated in "In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines," issued by the Supreme
Court on January 9, 1973, and the provisions under Guidelines Governing the Establishment and
Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Guidelines on
Legal Aid).

The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP Legal Aid Program, as
well as a series of consultations with the Philippine National Police (PNP) on the extant condition of
detention prisoners, it was discovered that several detention prisoners had been languishing in jail
for years without a case being filed in court by the prosecutor's office and without definite findings as
to the existence or nonexistence of probable cause.

DOJ Issuances

The petition considers such condition of several detention prisoners as an alarming situation brought
about by several Department of Justice (DOJ) issuances, namely:

1. DOJ Circular (D.C.) No. 12, series of 2012, which provided that the dismissal of all drug-related
cases involving violations for which the maximum penalty is either reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is subject to automatic review by the Justice Secretary whether such case has been
dismissed on inquest, preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. It also stated that [ t ]he automatic
review shall be summary in nature and shall, as far as practicable, be completed within 30 days from
receipt of the case records, without prejudice to the right of the respondent to be immediately
released from detention pending automatic review, unless the respondent is detained for other
causes;
2. D.C. No. 22, series of 2013, entitled Guidelines on the Release of Respondents/ Accused
Pending Automatic Review of Dismissed Cases Involving Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165; and

3. D.C. No. 50, series of 2012, entitled Additional Guidelines on the Application of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as Amended (RPC). 1

For the IBP, it is the height of injustice when innocent persons are left to suffer in jail for years
without a fixed term. Contending that it is their duty to defend the Constitution and protect the people
against unwarranted imprisonment and detention, the IBP is requesting the Court to act on the
amendment of the Rules on Preliminary Investigation, by way of a letter, which has been forwarded
to the Committee on Revision. Pending the desired amendment, however, the IBP urges the Court
to act on the urgent and imperative need to release from detention those who are wrongfully
imprisoned despite the absence of probable cause.

The IBP represents in this case its client, Jay-Ar Senin (Senin). Senin's rights were allegedly
violated because he has been detained for at least eight months without any finding of probable
cause or a case having been filed in court.

Senin's case started when a complaint against him and other unidentified persons was indorsed on
February 9, 2015, by Police Chief Inspector Crisante Pagaduan Sadino of the San Fabian Police
Station, Pangasinan to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. He was arrested while engaged in the sale
of illegal drugs during a buy-bust operation. Thereafter, he executed a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the RPC. After the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor resolved to dismiss the
case. Pursuant to the then prevailing DOJ Circular, the case was forwarded to the DOJ for automatic
review.

The IBP claims that the waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest the DOJ, Provincial
Prosecutor's Office (PPO), Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), and the PNP, the
unbridled right to detain Senin indefinitely subject only to the whims and caprices of the reviewing
prosecutor of the DOJ. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that preliminary
investigation must be terminated within 15 days from its inception if the person arrested had
requested for a preliminary investigation and had signed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125.  It2

follows, therefore, that the waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the 15-day period of preliminary
investigation. The detention beyond this period violates Senin's constitutional right to liberty. The
review of the investigating prosecutor's resolution has been pending with the DOJ for more than
eight months. The IBP concludes that Senin must be released from detention and be relieved from
the effects of the unconstitutional issuances of the DOJ.

Thus, the petition prays that the Court:

a) declare that pursuant to A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, the petitioner is exempt from the payment
of filing fees;

b) issue a writ of habeas corpus directing the release of Senin;

c) declare the aforementioned issuances of the DOJ as unconstitutional;

d) immediately set the case for hearing due to its urgency; and

e) issue a writ of kalayaan directing the release of all detention prisoners in a similar plight.
Department Circular No. 50

On December 18, 2015, D.C. No. 50 was issued by then Secretary of Justice (SOJ), now Associate
Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa of this Court. In brief, D.C. No. 50 stated that a person with a
pending case for automatic review before the DOJ shall be released immediately if the review is not
resolved within a period of 30 days, to wit:

9. All cases subject to automatic review shall be resolved by the Office of the Secretary within thirty
(30) days from the date the complete records are elevated to this Department in order to give the
concerned signatory of the review resolution sufficient time to study the case, the reviewing
prosecutor to whom the case is assigned is mandated to submit his recommendation to the
concerned signatory ten (10) days before the thirty (30) day deadline. The docket section of this
Department is also directed to monitor compliance with the periods prescribed herein.

If the case subject of the automatic review is not resolved within thirty (30) days, then the respondent
shall be immediately released from detention pending automatic review, unless the respondent is
detained for other causes.

D.C. No. 50 also directed all heads of prosecution offices to immediately issue corresponding
release orders in favor of respondents, whose cases are still pending automatic review before the
Office of the Secretary, beyond the 30 day period, unless they are detained for other causes.

Department Circular No. 003

On January 13, 2016, however, D.C. No. 003 was issued revoking DC No. 50 and reinstating D.C.
No. 012, series of 2012.

Reversal of the Order of Dismissal

Meanwhile, on February 10, 2016, the Information against Senin for Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs was finally filed by Prosecutor Marcelo C. Espinosa. Later, the RTC, Branch 43, Dagupan
City (RTC), issued a commitment order directing Senin's detention during the pendency of the case
against him.

On February 16, 2016, the IBP filed a manifestation with motion informing the Court that to their
surprise, Senin signed a Motion for Issuance of Order of Release; that such motion was filed before
the R TC, Branch 43, and was later on set for hearing; that to protect the interest of Senin, the IBP
filed a motion to intervene in the said proceeding; that no case has been filed before the said trial
court; that any action the R TC would take might pre-empt the Court in resolving this case; and that
Senin remains incarcerated despite the issuance of D.C. No. 50. With all these events, the IBP prays
for the issuance of an order directing BJMP to release Senin from detention unless detained for
some other lawful causes.

An Amended Information, dated February 22, 2016, was subsequently filed before the RTC, Branch
43.

Department Circular No. 004

On January 4, 2017, the incumbent Secretary of Justice, Vitaliano N. Aguirre II, issued D.C. No. 004,
series of 2017, the pertinent provisions of which read:
In the interest of the service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, the dismissal of all
cases whether on inquest, preliminary investigation, reinvestigation or on appeal, filed for violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and involving the maximum
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be subject to automatic review by the
Secretary of Justice.

The entire records of the case shall be elevated to the Secretary of Justice, within three (3) days
from issuance of the resolution dismissing the complaint or appeal, as applicable, and the parties
involved shall be notified accordingly.

Notwithstanding the automatic review, respondent shall be immediately released from detention
unless detained for other causes.

This Department Circular shall apply to all pending cases and to those which have been dismissed
prior to the issuance hereof, if such dismissal has not yet attained finality as of the the effectivity of
this Circular.

This Department Order revokes all prior issuances inconsistent herewith and shall take effect
immediately until revoked.

For strict compliance.

Position of the IBP on the

effect of the amendments on
the DOJ issuances

The IBP concedes that the present detention of Senin had been overrun by the issuance of D.C. No.
50, the resolution of the DOJ reversing the dismissal order of the PPO and the eventual filing of the
February 22, 2016 Amended Information. It remains firm, however, that despite these
circumstances, the dismissal of this petition is not in order as the writ of habeas corpus for the
immediate release of Senin is but one of the three reliefs being sought from the Court. The IBP
reiterates that the constitutionality of DC No. 12, series of 2012, DC No. 22, series of 2013 and DC
No. 50 is still being questioned. Likewise, it emphasizes that the issuance of a writ of kalayaan is
one of the reliefs prayed for in order to protect those similarly situated as Senin.

The IBP pleads for the Court not to dismiss the petition outright and resolve the issue on the
constitutionality of the DOJ issuances in order to prevent the executive department from issuing
orders which tend to violate basic constitutional rights.

It appears that the IBP is unaware of the issuance of D.C. No. 004 as no manifestation has been
filed with the Court regarding the same circular.

Position of the BJMP

According to the BJMP, Senin has been confined in its facility through a valid commitment order
issued by the court and cannot be released without an order directing the same. It asserts that it has
not disregarded or violated any existing laws or policy at the expense of Senin's rights. The BJMP
cites Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman  and its 2007 Revised BJMP Manual,  wherein it is provided that
3 4

court order is required before a prisoner can be released. It insists that the continuous detention of
Senin is legal considering that the RTC has already issued a commitment order, which has not been
recalled or revoked.
The BJMP avers that D.C. No. 50 does not vest it unbridled discretion to release prisoners because
a court order is always required. It opines that the filing of an Information against Senin for Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs mooted the question on the legality of the latter's detention.

Position of the OSG

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that the remedy of habeas corpus availed of by the
IBP and Senin is not appropriate considering that as of February 10, 2016, the SOJ has found the
existence of probable cause for the filing of information in court. For said reason, the OSG deems it
unnecessary for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the DOJ issuances as the question on
the legality of Senin's detention has already been put to rest. In other words, the OSG points out that
the constitutional question is not the very lis mota of the case, thus, precluding this Court from
exercising its power of judicial review.

Reply of the IBP

The IBP seeks to nullify the DOJ issuances for the alleged violation of the detainee's rights. It
asserts that the DOJ issuances requiring the automatic review of dismissed cases involving drug-
related cases for which the maximum penalty is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
permit the indefinite confinement of a pre-trial detainee who has waived Article 125 of the RPC in
order to undergo preliminary investigation. The IBP believes that a person who has requested the
conduct of a preliminary investigation can only be detained for a maximum period of 15 days
because the Rules require that the preliminary investigation be terminated within such period despite
waiver of Article 125. It also claims that those persons whose cases were dismissed initially by the
investigating prosecutor should be released even if the dismissal is still subject to re-investigation or
to the SOJ's automatic review.

History of the DOJ Issuances

D. C. No. 46, dated June 26, 2003

The process of automatic review of dismissed drug cases was first instituted in 2003

Due to numerous complaints about illegal drug cases being whitewashed or dismissed due to sloppy
police work, former SOJ Simeon Datumanong issued D.C. No. 46, empowering the DOJ to
automatically review dismissed cases filed in violation of R.A. No. 9165 and involving the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment or death.

The circular also applied to cases which had been dismissed prior to its issuance if such dismissal
had not yet attained finality as of the date of the circular.

D.C. No. 12, dated February 13, 2012

D.C. No. 46 was followed by D.C. No. 12 in which former SOJ Leila M. De Lima, for the most part,
reiterated the provisions of the first circular but added that automatic review of dismissed drug cases
shall be without prejudice to the right of the respondent to be immediately released from detention
pending automatic review, unless respondent is detained for other causes.

D.C. No. 22, dated February 12, 2013

A year after, SOJ De Lima revised the guidelines directing the continued detention of some
respondents accused of violating R.A. No. 9165. She reasoned that cases, where the maximum
imposable penalty reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, are presumably high-priority drug cases
whose alleged perpetrators should remain in custody.

In this circular, the only respondents who may be released, pending automatic review of their cases
by the SOJ, are those whose cases were dismissed during inquest proceedings on the ground that
the arrest was not a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or that no probable cause exists to charge respondents in court.

The respondents shall remain in custody, pending automatic review of the dismissal of their cases,
in the following instances as provided for under the circular:

1. When during inquest proceedings, respondent elects to avail of a regular preliminary investigation
and waives in writing the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC;

2. When an information is filed in court after inquest proceedings and the accused is placed in the
custody of the law, but the court allows the accused to avail of a regular preliminary investigation,
which results in the dismissal of the case, the handling prosecutor shall insist that the accused shall
remain in the custody of the law pending automatic review by the SOJ, unless the court provides
otherwise, or until the dismissal is affirmed by the SOJ and the corresponding motion to dismiss or
withdraw information is granted by the court;

3. When an information is filed in court after preliminary investigation proceedings and the accused
is placed in the custody of the law, but the court allows the accused to avail of reinvestigation, which
results in the dismissal of the case, the accused shall remain in custody of the law pending
automatic review by the SOJ, unless the court provides otherwise, or until the dismissal is affirmed
by the SOJ and the corresponding motion to dismiss or withdraw information is granted by the court;
and

4. When the case against respondent is dismissed after due reinvestigation, if the case was
commenced as an inquest case but was converted to a regular preliminary investigation after
respondent elected the same and waived the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC.

D.C. No. 50, dated December 18, 2015

In order to address the problem of delay in the disposition of cases subject to automatic review and
the prolonged detention of drug suspects without any case filed against them, then SOJ Caguioa
issued D.C. No. 50, directing all heads of prosecution offices to immediately issue corresponding
release orders in favor of respondents whose cases are still pending automatic review before the
SOJ beyond the 30-day period prescribed in the subject circular, unless respondents are detained
for some other causes.

D. C. No. 003, dated January 13, 2016

In view of the considerable number of petitions for habeas corpus filed against the DOJ by accused
languishing in jail for years while their cases were pending automatic review by the DOJ, then SOJ
Caguioa revoked D.C. No. 50 dated December 18, 2015 and D.C. No. 22, dated February 12, 2013.

SOJ Caguioa then reinstated D.C. No. 12, dated February 13, 2012, mandating immediate release
of respondents pending automatic review, unless respondents are detained for other causes.
D.C. No. 004, dated January 4, 2017

SOJ Vitaliano Aguirre, in this latest circular, reiterated the provisions of D.C. No. 3, dated January
13, 2016, in so far as it orders the respondent/s to be immediately released from detention, pending
automatic review, unless detained for other causes.

Petition is moot and academic

The Court agrees with the OSG that this controversy has become moot and academic. First, the
DOJ already issued D.C. No. 004, series of 2017, which recognizes the right of a detainee to be
released even if the dismissal of the case on preliminary investigation is the subject of automatic
review by the SOJ. Second, records show that the order of dismissal was reversed; that upon filing
of the information with the court, there was judicial determination of probable cause against Senin;
and that following such judicial determination, the court issued a warrant of arrest and a commitment
order.

The rule pertaining to pre-trial

detainees whose cases are under
preliminary investigation, or
whose cases have been dismissed
on inquest, preliminary
investigation but pending appeal,
motion for reconsideration,
reinvestigation or automatic
review

Although the latest circular of Secretary Aguirre is laudable as it adheres to the constitutional
provisions on the rights of pre-trial detainees, the Court will not dismiss the case on the ground of
mootness. As can be gleaned from the ever-changing DOJ circulars, there is a possibility that the
latest circular would again be amended by succeeding secretaries. It has been repeatedly held that
"the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.  All four (4) requisites are present in this case.
5

As the case is prone to being repeated as a result of constant changes, the Court, as the guardian
and final arbiter of the Constitution  and pursuant to its prerogative to promulgate rules concerning
6

the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,  takes this opportunity to lay down controlling
7

principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public on the propriety of the continued detention of an
arrested person whose case has been dismissed on inquest, preliminary investigation,
reinvestigation, or appeal but pending automatic review by the SOJ.

The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities  within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public official or
8

employee could be held liable for the failure to deliver except if grounded on reasonable and
allowable delays. Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a
person without informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It punishes public
officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. In case the detention is
without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention
under Article 124 of the RPC. This is without prejudice to the possible filing of an action for damages
under Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly arrested without a
warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation.  The question to be addressed here,
1âwphi1

therefore, is whether such waiver gives the State the right to detain a person indefinitely.

The Court answers in the negative.

The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the
unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and
caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the
prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.

Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to detain a
person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to proper judicial authorities as
prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC does not trump his constitutional right in cases where probable
cause was initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before the
prosecutor's office even if such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or on
automatic review. Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere
operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides limits and this
must be all the more followed especially so that detention is proscribed absent probable cause.

Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly released to
avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period
(or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 9165  ) for the conduct of the preliminary
9

investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to
dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion
for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that such dismissal
automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable cause to file an information in court
and to detain a person.

The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at this time when the
present administration aggressively wages its "indisputably popular war on illegal drugs." As Justice
Diosdado Peralta puts it, that the security of the public and the interest of the State would be
jeopardized is not a justification to trample upon the constitutional rights of the detainees against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law, to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved and to a speedy disposition of the case.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared, and ruled, that all detainees whose pending cases have gone
beyond the mandated periods for the conduct of preliminary investigation, or whose cases have
already been dismissed on inquest or preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal,
reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are entitled to be
released pursuant to their constitutional right to liberty and their constitutional right against
unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
 SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 208001, June 19, 2017

P/C SUPT. EDWIN A. PFLEIDER, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated July 23, 2013, of petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.) assailing the
Decision dated October 23, 2012 and Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the Court
of Appeals (CA).

The facts follow.

An Information for Murder against petitioner and Ryan Bautista was filed on April 18,
2011 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of September 2010 or prior thereto, in the City of
Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and by offering a price, reward or
consideration to Ryan O. Bautista (Crim. Case No. 2010-09-497) and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
evident premeditation, while Ryan O. Bautista was armed with an unlicensed firearm,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Manuel Granados with the use of said unlicensed firearm and inflicting upon the said
victim fatal wounds on different parts of his body, which resulted to his untimely death,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause against petitioner in a Resolution
dated September 5, 2011.

The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 26, 2011 praying for
the reinstatement of the case, but the Court denied the said motion on October 26,
2011.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was therefore filed with the
CA. The petition was grounded on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, since (a) the questioned resolution and order: (i) discarded and
ignored vital evidence and the authority of the public prosecutor in determining the
existence of probable cause; (ii) excluded the extra-judicial confession executed by
petitioner's co-accused, Ryan Bautista, despite the presumed voluntariness and due
execution thereof; and (iii) failed to give weight and consideration to other vital pieces
of evidence evincing trustworthiness of Bautista's extra-judicial confession and
establishing petitioner's complicity; and (b) the manifest presence of probable cause
supports the charge of murder as against petitioner.

On March 19, 2012, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition and, on April 23, 2012,
respondent filed its Reply to which petitioner filed a Rejoinder dated May 23, 2012.

The CA, in its Decision dated October 24, 2012, set aside the September 5, 2011
Resolution and October 26, 2011 Order of the trial court, and directed the
reinstatement of the Information for Murder against petitioner.

Petitioner, on November 26, 2012, filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the CA's
decision. Respondent, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest on November 29, 2012. Petitioner responded by filing an Opposition
dated December 8, 2012, and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 24, 2013. In a Resolution dated February 4, 2013, the CA resolved, among
others, to Note the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG) Motion for the Issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest.

On March 7, 2013, respondent filed its Comment to petitioner's motion for

Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion and, in response, petitioner filed his Reply
dated March 21, 2013.

The CA, in a Resolution dated June 26, 2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit, there being no legal and factual basis for the Court to depart from its
earlier ruling reinstating Criminal Case No. 2011-04-286 for Murder against petitioner.

Hence, the present Petition.

This Court, in a Resolution dated September 2, 2013, resolved "to DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the ruling of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 23, 2012 for
failure to show any reversible error committed by it when it held that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9 of Tacloban City committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
case against Edwin A. Pfleider despite the presence of probable cause linking him as
one of the perpetrators of the crime charged against him."1Thus, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 8, 2013.2

In a Resolution dated December 11, 2013, this Court resolved to "GRANT the Motion for
Reconsideration and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated September 2, 2013, REINSTATE
the petition and to require the Office of the Solicitor General to COMMENT thereon
within ten (10) days from notice."3

A Motion for Extension4 dated February 4, 2014 was filed by the OSG which was
granted by this Court in its Resolution5 dated March 24, 2014.
The OSG filed its Comment6 dated April 2, 2014, while the petitioner filed his
Reply7 dated May 15, 2014.

Petitioner raises the following Assignment of Errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE AND
NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS THE SAME IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY, AND CANNOT BE
AVAILED OF AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOST REMEDY OF AN APPEAL;

II.

ASSUMING THAT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CAN BE AVAILED IN LIEU OF A LOST

APPEAL, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
HONORABLE JUDGE ROGELIO SESCON OF BRANCH 9, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
TACLOBAN CITY, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE DISMISSED
THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR MURDER WITH NO. 2011-04-268 AGAINST HEREIN
PETITIONER FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE;

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HONORABLE JUDGE

ROGELIO SESCON ARROGATED UPON HIMSELF THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE, AND ALLEGEDLY ASSUMED THE POWER TO
PROSECUTE VESTED IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; AND

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROBABLE

CAUSE EXISTS, AND THAT PROSECUTION WAS ALLEGEDLY ABLE TO PROFFER
SUFFICIENT BASIS TO ESTABLISH, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, A LINK BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RYAN BAUTISTA WITH RESPECT TO THE KILLING OF MANUEL
GRANADOS.

The OSG, in its Comment, posited the following arguments:

I.

A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS THE PROPER REMEDY
TO CORRECT ERRORS OF JURISDICTION WHICH, IN THIS CASE, ARE DEMONSTRATED
BY THE TRIAL COURT IN:

A. EXERCISING THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING THE EXISTENSE OF

PROBABLE CAUSE IN SUPPORT OF THE MURDER CHARGE;

B. IGNORING AND DISREGARDING THE EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF

PETITIONER'S CO-ACCUSED, RYAN BAUTISTA; AND
c. REJECTING THE SAID EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION DESPITE ITS PRESUMED AND
MANIFEST VOLUNTARINESS AND DUE EXECUTION;

II.

WELL ENTRENCHED IS THE RULE THAT MINOR AND TRIVIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
STATEMENTS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES DO NOT WEAKEN, BUT RATHER
STRENGTHEN THEIR CREDIBILITY;

III.

THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWS THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, CRIME CHARGED
HAS BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT RESPONDENT IS PROBABLY GUILTY OF THE SAME,
THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE CASE;

IV.

THE CIDG IS PRESUMED TO HAVE PERFORMED ITS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS REGULARLY

AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

Basically, what the petitioner and the respondent want from this Court is for it to review
the facts and to finally determine whether a probable cause really exists in the case
against petitioner for murder.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.8 This is
consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or
stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.9 There are, however, exceptions to this rule.
Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile.10

However, a close examination of the arguments presented by both parties would show
that the present case does not fall under any of the above-cited exceptions.
Furthermore, in this case, this Court is once again confronted with the often raised
issue of the difference between the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor
on one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the other. To
have a clearer view on the matter, see the case of Mendoza v. People of the Philippines,
et al.11

It must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts. The determination of
probable cause is and will always entail a review of the facts of the case. The CA, in
finding probable cause, did not exactly delve into the facts of the case but raised
questions that would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled that,
"Questions remain as to why, among all people, Ryan would implicate Pfelider as the
inducer and why the other witnesses would associate Pfleider to the crime."12 From this
query, the CA has raised doubt. Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. —
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint
or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.13

In this case, the judge of the RTC, not finding the existence of probable cause,
outrightly dismissed the case. The contrasting findings of the CA and the RTC is well
noted and from the very provision of the Rules of Court,14 the remedy, in case of doubt,
is for the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. Therefore, in the
interest of justice, this Court finds it appropriate to remand the case to the trial court
for its proper disposition, or for a proper determination of probable cause based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution. This is not the first time that this Court has
remanded a case to the trial court for it to make a ruling on whether certain
Informations should be dismissed or not.15

Thus, it is my view that the Petition for Review on Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, dated July 23, 2013, of petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.), should
have been granted in so far as his prayer to set aside the Decision dated October 23,
2012 and Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals; and for this
Court to order that this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City
for the judicial determination of probable cause and the proper disposition of the same
case. However, in view of the demise of P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider on April 15, 2017,
which effectively extinguished his criminal liability, this case had been rendered moot
and academic. Thus, the criminal action against him should just be dismissed, and
deemed closed and terminated inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on  Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated July 23, 2013 of petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.) is
hereby GRANTED insofar as his prayer to SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 23,
2012 and Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals. However,
considering the demise of P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider, instead of remanding the case to
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban city for the determination of probable cause, the
criminal action is DISMISSED, there being no defendant to stand as accused.16

SO ORDERED
 FIRST DIVISION

July 31, 2017

G.R. No. 227038

JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  are the Decision  dated October 21, 2015 and the
1 2

Resolution  dated September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35318, which
3

affirmed the Decision  dated October 1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64
4

(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 10-912 convicting petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio (petitioner) of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Facts

On May 27, 2010, an Information  was filed before the RTC charging petitioner of illegal possession
5

of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,  otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," the accusatory
6

portion of which reads:

On the 24111 day of May 2010, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control, and custody a
total of one point ten (1.10) grams of dried Marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay
Bayan operative of Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB
Bahoyo) was doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a man showing off his
private parts at Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony
Velasquez (BB Velasquez) then went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which
they later identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in
front of a gate enclosing an empty lot. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez approached petitioner and
asked him where he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo then said that he also
lived in the same street but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an identification card,
but petitioner failed to produce one. BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification
card, but instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing one (1)
stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves, among others.
This prompted BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take petitioner to the
police station, and turn him, as well as the seized items, over to SP03 Rafael Castillo (SPO3
Castillo). SP03 Castillo then inventoried, marked, and photographed the seized items, all in the
presence of BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, and thereafter, prepared an inventory report and a
request for qualitative examination of the seized two (2) pieces of rolled paper and for petitioner to
undergo drug testing. After examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained
marijuana and that petitioner was positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for
THC-metabolites, both dangerous drugs. 8

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the facts.
According to him, he was just urinating in front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay
Bayan operatives, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, approached and asked him where he lived.
Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street, BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez then frisked him, took
away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought him to the barangay hall. He was then
detained for about an hour before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati and to another office where a
bald police officer questioned him. Thereafter, he was taken back to the barangay hall where they
showed him two (2) sticks of marijuana joints allegedly recovered from him. 9

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision  dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
10

the crime charged and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. 11

The RTC found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as
petitioner was scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the
resultant search incidental to such arrest which yielded the seized marijuana in petitioner's
possession was also lawful. In this regard, since the prosecution has adequately shown that
petitioner freely and consciously possessed such marijuana without authority by law, then he must
be convicted for violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. 12

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed  to the CA.

13

The CA Ruling

In a Decision  dated October 21, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.  It held that the
14 15

search made on petitioner which yielded the seized marijuana was validly made as it was done
incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public. As such, the said seized marijuana is
admissible in evidence and, thus, sufficient to convict him for the crime charged.  The CA likewise
16

held that the rule on chain of custody was duly complied with and, thus, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized drugs were not compromise d. 17

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,  which was, however, denied in a

18

Resolution  dated September 5, 2016; hence, this petition.

19

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."20

Proceeding from the foregoing, and as will be explained hereunder, petitioner's conviction must be
set aside.

One of the arguments presented in the instant petition is that the search and arrest made on
petitioner were illegal and, thus, the marijuana purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in
evidence.  In this relation, it is worth noting that his arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB
21

Velasquez, are mere Bantay Bayan operatives of Makati City. Strictly speaking, they are not
government agents like the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of Investigation
in charge of law enforcement; but rather, they are civilian volunteers who act as "force multipliers"
to assist the aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security within their
designated areas.  Particularly, jurisprudence described the nature of Bantay Bayan as "a group of
22

male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,
which is] an accredited auxillary of the x x x PNP."  In the case of Dela Cruz v. People  involving
23 24

civilian port personnel conducting security checks, the Court thoroughly discussed that while the Bill
of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution generally cannot be invoked against the acts of
private individuals, the same may nevertheless be applicable if such individuals act under the color
of a state-related function, viz.:

With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that
imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities.

In People v. Marti, the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard operating
procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and
detected a peculiar odor from the packages. The representative from the company found dried
marijuana leaves in the packages. He reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation
and brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory examination. Agents
from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal drugs. Andre Marti
was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence obtained against
the accused was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized
government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot
be invoked against the acts of private individuals:

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

xxxx

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and
vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in
this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be
considered agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel
during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

In People v. Malngan, barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed as law

enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Lauga, this
court held that a "bantav bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial investigation
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. x x x.  (Emphases and underscoring
25

supplied)

In this light, the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-based or
other volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace
and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be
deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III
of the 1987 Constitution to them. 26

Having established that the Bill of Rights may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who
arrested and subsequently searched petitioner, the Court shall now determine whether such arrest
and search were validly made.

"Section 2,  Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
27

out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3
(2),  Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
28

searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 29

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made- the process cannot be reversed. 30

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters
of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be
complied with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 31

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113
requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed
it.
32

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has
just been committed." 33

In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez simply responded to a
purported report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street which led to petitioner's
arrest. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that he was just urinating in front of his workplace
when the Bantay Bayan operatives suddenly approached and questioned him, and thereafter,
frisked and arrested him. BB Bahoyo's testimony on direct and cross-examinations is enlightening on
this matter, to wit:

PROSECUTOR: x x x

xxxx

So, upon seeing Jeffrey Miguel, what did you do?

WITNESS: We approached him and we asked him what was he doing in that place and he appears
to be intoxicated, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: After questioning him, what did you do?

WITNESS: We asked him from where he is residing and he told us that he is from Caong Street.

PROSECUTOR: What you do next?

WITNESS: Because I also live in Caong and he is not familiar to me, I asked for his I.D, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: Was he able to produce an I.D?

WITNESS: He was not able to produce any I.D., ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: When he failed to produce any I.D., what did you do?

WITNESS: One of my companions asked him if he has any I.D. with him.

PROSECUTOR: Who was this companion of yours?

WITNESS: Mark Anthony Velasquez, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: What was the response of Jeffrey to the request of Mark Anthony Velasquez?

WITNESS: He brought out the contents of his pocket and he brought out one pack of Fortune with
one stick inside and another pack, Marlboro light pack with one stick of cigarette and two sticks of
marijuana.

xxxx

[on cross-examination]

ATTY. PUZON: When you saw certain Jeffrey, you were not familiar with him, is that correct?

WITNESS: No, sir, I am not familiar with him.

A TTY. PUZON: And when you saw him, he was already showing his private parts, is that correct?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

A TTY. PUZON: In your "Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay" you stated that when you saw
Jeffrey, his back was turned to you and it seemed that he was peeing.  Do you remember saying
1âwphi1

that in your "Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay"?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

A TTY. PUZON: So, is it not true that when you saw him, he was already showing his private parts?

WITNESS: He was showing his private parts, sir.

ATTY. PUZON: While his back turned to you?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

ATTY. PUZON: How could you see his private parts if his back was turned against you?

WITNESS: He faced us, sir.

xxxx

COURT: Did you charge the accused for urinating in a public place or for showing his private
parts?

WITNESS: No, Your Honor.

ATTY. PUZON: And in fact, only a drug case was filed against Jeffrey?

WITNESS: I have no idea, sir. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) 34

On the other hand, pertinent portions of petitioner's Judicial Affidavit  containing his direct testimony
35

read:

Q: Naaalala mo pa ba ang petsang 24 May 2010?

A: Opo. Iyon po ang araw nang aka ay dakpin ng dalawang bantay-bayan.

Q: Ano ang naaalala mo bago ka mahuli, kung mayroon man?

A: Mga bandang pasado alas dose ng hating gabi aka ay umihi sa tapat ng pinagtatrabahuhan ko
ng may biglang lumapit sa akin na dalawang bantay-bayan.

Q: Ano ang sumunod na nangvari x x x, kung mavroon man?

A: Nagtanong po sila kung saan ako nakatira at sinagot ko na nakatira ako sa Kaong St., Brgy. San
Antonio Village, Makati City at pagkatapos ay kinapkapan nila ako.

Q: May nakulta ba sila sa iyo pakatapos kang kapkapan, kung mayroon man?

A: Opo. Nakulta nila ang aking charger, cellphone, lighter at sigarilyong Fortune.

Q: Ano ang sumunod na nangyari, kung mayroon man?

A: Pinosasan nila ako at dinala sa barangay.  (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

36

On cross-examination, petitioner testified, as follows:

PROSECUTOR: x x x Mr. Witness, you said that at past 12:00 in the midnight of May 24, 2010 you
were arrested by two Bantay Bayan, do you affirm that Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: And how did you know that they are Bantay Bayan complement?

WITNESS: They told me that they were Bantay Bayan personnel, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: What were you doing then, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: Urinating in front of my place of work, ma'am.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR: And you were working at that time that you were allegedly arrested by these
two Bantay Bayan complement, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: Not anymore because I was staying in at the company, ma'am.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR: You urinated outside because you do not have a comfort room inside, is it not a
fact, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: What is this Fine Home Incorporation doing, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: I am a caretaker at Fine Home Incorporation I guard the steels, ma'am.  (Emphases and
37

underscoring supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe that at around past 12
o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 2010, petitioner went out to the street to urinate when
the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon him. The latter then approached and questioned
petitioner, and thereafter, went on to search his person, which purportedly yielded the marijuana
seized from him. Verily, the prosecution's claim that petitioner was showing off his private parts was
belied by the aforesaid testimonies. Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in
jlagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting a crime committed by
petitioner in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances
necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan operatives do not have
any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed an offense.

More importantly, the Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's claim that a valid
warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private
parts because if it was indeed the case, then the proper charge should have been filed against him.
However, records are bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside from the instant
criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view that no
prior arrest was made on petitioner which led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier,
there must first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such process cannot be
reversed.

All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Since the confiscated marijuana is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
petitioner must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.
38

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2015 and the Resolution
dated September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35318 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio
is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered
to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

June 7, 2017

G.R. No. 200370

MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari,   Mario Veridiano y Sapi (Veridiano) assails the
1

Decision  dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution  dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
2 3

in CA-G.R. CR No. 33588, which affirmed his conviction for violation of Article II, Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 9165. 4

In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,  Veridiano was
5

charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Information read:

That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of dried
marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on
the merits ensued.7

During trial, the prosecution presented PO 1 Guillermo Cabello (PO 1 Cabello) and POI Daniel
Solano (POI Solano) to testify. 8

According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a
certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a
certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs. 9
P03 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and P02 Alvin Vergara (P02
Vergara) who were both on duty.   Chief of Police June Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02
10

Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.  11

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.

They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he was not on board.   At around 12

10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna.   They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark.   The police
13 14

officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and
to remove the contents of their pockets. 15

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana."   POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.   Veridiano was
16 17

arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights.   He was then brought to the police station.
18 19

At the police station, PO 1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO 1 Solano, who also placed
his initials.   PO 1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought
20

with the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.  The contents of the tea
21

bag tested positive for marijuana. 22

For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San Pablo City on January 15,
2008.  After participating in the festivities, he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney
23

bound for Nagcarlan.  At around 10:00 a.m., the jeepney passed a police checkpoint in Barangay
24

Taytay, Nagcarlan.  Veridiano noticed that the jeepney was being followed by three (3) motorcycles,
25

each with two (2) passengers in civilian attire. 26

When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists flagged down the
jeepney.  Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano.  However, they found
27 28

nothing on his person.  Still, Veridiano was accosted and brought to the police station where he was
29

informed that "illegal drug was ... found in his possession. " 30

In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,  the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond
31

reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Accordingly, he was sentenced to
suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. 32

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested."  He 33

argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a
poisonous tree. "[['34]] Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule
on chain of custody.  35

On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "[t]he legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over [the person of the accused]."  Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano
36

waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest.  With regard to the alleged illegal
37

warrantless search conducted by the police officers, the prosecution argued that Veridiano' s
"submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the warrantless
search.  38

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision  affirming the guilt ofVeridiano.
39 40
The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in jlagrante delicto" of having marijuana in
his possession.  Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived his right to question any
41

irregularity that may have attended his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that Veridiano consented to the
42

warrantless search because he did not protest when the police asked him to remove the contents of
his pocket. 43

Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the

Resolution dated January 25, 2012.44

On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. 45

Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  He asserts that his arrest was illegal.  Petitioner was
46 47

merely seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that
would give the police officers reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or
that he was committing a crime.   Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is insufficient to
48

constitute probable cause that would support a valid warrantless arrest.  49

Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues· that "the accompanying [warrantless] search was
likewise illegal."  Hence, under Article III, Section 2,  in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)  of the
50 51 52

Constitution, the seized tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit
of a poisonous tree." 53

Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana is admissible in evidence,
petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to preserve its integrity.  The apprehending team did
54

not strictly comply with the rule on chain of custody under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165. 55

In a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
petition.   In the Manifestation and Motion dated August 1, 2012,  respondent stated that it would no
56 57

longer file a comment.

The following issues are for this Court's resolution:

First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;

Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and

Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

The Petition is granted.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and
(c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as
constitutionally inadmissible.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised
through a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest." 58

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active
participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest.   The
59

reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused." 60

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from
questioning the admissibility of evidence seized.  The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected
61

when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in atimely manner.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are
separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

As a component of the right to privacy,  the fundamental right against unlawful searches and
62

seizures is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.  63

To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article
III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution considers any evidence obtained in violation of this right as
inadmissible.  64

The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures.  It is only directed
65

against those that are unreasonable.  Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the
66

scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden.  67

In People v. Aruta,   this Court explained that the language of the Constitution implies that "searches
68

and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest."  The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2
69

of the Constitution and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.  70

However, People v. Cogaed  clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches are
71

reasonable even when warrantless."  The following are recognized instances of permissible
72

warrantless searches laid down in jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest,"  (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,"' (3) "search of a moving vehicle," (4) "consented
73

warrantless search[es]," (5) "customs search," (6) "stop and frisk," and (7) "exigent and emergency
circumstances." 74

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any given
situation, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable ... search ... is purely a judicial question," the resolution of
which depends upon the unique and distinct factual circumstances.   This may involve an inquiry
75

into "the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured."  76
 II

Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto of having marijuana in his possession making the warrantless search lawful.  77

This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search
is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be
reversed."  For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
78

Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test  as explained in Cogaed:
79

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 80

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.
In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the
accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in
possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.  81

The warrantless search in People v. Racho  was also considered unlawful.  The police officers
82 83

received information that a man was in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus
bound for Baler, Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a red and white striped [t]-
shirt."  The police officers waited for the bus along the national highway.  When the bus arrived,
84 85

Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked and waited along the highway for a tricycle.  Suddenly, the police
86

officers approached him and invited him to the police station since he was suspected of having
shabu in his possession.  As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white envelope fell
87

yielding a sachet of shabu. 88

In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that Racho was not
"committing a crime in the presence of the police officers" at the time he was
apprehended.  Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based on a tip.  Although there are cases
89 90

stating that reliable information is sufficient to justify a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest, they were covered under the other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches. 91

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.  The rule requires that
92

an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."  That a crime was in
93

fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule.   An arrest under Rule 113,
94

Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up
to the point of arrest.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.

People v. Gerente  illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court.
95

In Gerente, the accused was convicted for murder and for violation of Republic Act No. 6425.  He 96

assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that they were
allegedly seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest.  On appeal, the accused's conviction
97

was affirmed.  This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b)
98

of the Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
indicating that the accused killed the victim:

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers
had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening
to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of
facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente
without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have
fled the law as his two companions did.  (Emphasis supplied)
99

The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts surrounding the
commission of an offense was underscored in In Re Saliba v. Warden.  100

In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected Datukan Salibo
(Salibo) as one (1) of the accused in the Maguindano Massacre.   Salibo presented himself before
101

the authorities to clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and
detained.   In granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was not restrained under a
102

lawful court process or order.   Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless
103

arrest: 
104

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear
his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in
the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that
he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.   (Emphasis 105

supplied)
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicta arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the
tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any
overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed. 10

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just
committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

III

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and
frisk" searches.

A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua   as "the act of a police officer to stop a
107

citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband."   Thus, the
108

allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for
weapons." 109

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed
towards crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures.  110

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While
probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a
suspicion or hunch.   Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their
111

experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be
afoot.   Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable
112

search.  113

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,   the police officers conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan
114

City Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug addicts.  They chanced upon a male person
115

who had "reddish eyes and [was] walking in a swaying manner."  Suspecting that the man was high
116

on drugs, the police officers approached him, introduced themselves, and asked him what he was
holding.  However, the man resisted.   Upon further investigation, the police officers found
117 118

marijuana in the man's possession. 119 This Court held that the circumstances of the case gave the
police officers justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs.  120

In People v. Solayao,   the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on
121

the presence of armed persons within Caibiran.  They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom
122

was the accused in a camouflage uniform.   When the police officers approached, his companions
123

fled leaving behind the accused who was told not to run away.   One (1) of the police officers
124

introduced himself and seized from the accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves.   This 125
Court likewise found justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions fled upon
seeing the government agents."  126

The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid because the accused in
both cases exhibited overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk"
search. In contrast with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed  was considered
127

as an invalid "stop and frisk" search because of the absence of a single suspicious circumstance
that would justify a warrantless search.

In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya would be transporting
marijuana.   A passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The
128

driver then disembarked and signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana.   The
129

police officers approached the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed)
and Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their bags.  130

Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's
bag.   In holding that the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was
131

not a single suspicious circumstance" that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2)
men and search their belongings.   Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in
132

possession of marijuana.  133

Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any
act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no
evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them
to infer anything suspicious.

IV

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be
surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with
clear and convincing evidence.   Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be
134

"unequivocal, specific, intelligently given ... [and unattended] by duress or coercion."

135

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the

circumstances.   This may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given
136

such as "the presence of coercive police procedures." 137

Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which
amounts to no consent at all.   In Cogaed, this Court observed:
138

Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment
brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and
the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is
knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. 139

The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented to the
warrantless search.

V
Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing
searches and seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical
purposes.  Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search
140

warrant when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating transactions
involving contraband or dangerous articles.   However, the inherent mobility of vehicles cannot
141

justify all kinds of searches.  Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause. 
142 143

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle.   Due to the number of cases
144

involving warrantless ·searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative
to discuss the parameters by which searches in checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid.   They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the
145

lives of individuals and ensure their safety.   They are also sanctioned in cases where the
146

government's survival is in danger.   Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a]
147

motorist'sright to 'free passage'"  to a certain extent, they must be "conducted in a way least
148

intrusive to motorists."   The extent of routine inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine
149

inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.  150

In Valmonte v. De Villa,   this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
151

its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search[es]."  Thus, a search where an "officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
152

vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a
light therein" is not unreasonable.  153

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers
have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle
contains instruments of an offense.  154

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a
visual search. This holds especially true when the object of the search is a public vehicle where
individuals have a reasonably reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive
searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained
will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an
extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of
confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse
suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped
information, there have been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by
the authorities.

In People v. Breis,  apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement agents
155

observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed.  The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the
156

law enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box which the accused
had in their possession.   In their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of the accused physically pushed
157

a law enforcer out of the way.   Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and
158

leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct. 159

In People v. Mariacos,   a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal drugs was
160

about to be transported on a passenger jeepney.   The bag was marked with "O.K."  On the basis
161 162

of the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney.  Upon seeing the
163

bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from
the bag.   The tipped information and the police officer's personal observations gave rise to
164

probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid.  165

The police officers in People v. Ayangao  and People v. Libnao  likewise received tipped

166 167

information regarding the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause
to arrest the accused based on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where
the accused was arrested.   On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers noticed marijuana
168

leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused.  169

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable
limits of warrantless searches.  They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any
1âwphi1

law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that
may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception.
The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based on
reasonable suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of Appeals   where this Court justified the warrantless
170

search of the accused who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police officers identified
themselves.  171

On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v.
People,   the search conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in
172

accordance with routine security measures in ports.   This case, however, should not be construed
173

to apply to border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per se;   there is a "reasonable
174

reduced expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through or stop at airports or other ports of
travel. 
175

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag
containing marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle
in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction,
petitioner must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No.
16976-SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario
Veridiano y Sapi is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 199018, September 27, 2017

ROLANDO DACANAY Y LACASTE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner
Rolando Dacanay y Lacaste assails the Decision1 dated May 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR. No. 30826, which affirmed the Decision2 dated July 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209, in Criminal Case No. MC02-6030-D, finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, in violation of Article II, Section 11
of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information dated October 24, 2002 filed before the RTC, petitioner was charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of October 2002, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
knowingly have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydro chloride, commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug without the
corresponding license and prescription, in violation of the above-cited law.3

During his arraignment on December 11, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
against him. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Annalee R.
Forro (Forro), Forensic Chemist, Philippine National Police (PNP); Raylan G. Genguyon
(Genguyon), a member of Task Force Anti-Vice (TFAV) Unit, Mandaluyong City Police
Station; and Police Officer (PO) 3 Noli S. Cortes 4  (Cortes), the officer on case, Eastern
Police District (EPD) Crime Laboratory Office.

The taking of PO3 Cortes's testimony was dispensed with after the defense admitted the
following: that PO3 Cortes was a member of the PNP who conducted an investigation of the
case; that PO3 Cortes could identify petitioner in court; that the specimen subject matter of
the case was turned over to PO3 Cortes during the investigation; and that PO3 Cortes
caused the preparation of the Request for Laboratory Examination, Genguyon's Sworn
Statement, the Arrest Report, and the Endorsement of the EPD to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for inquest proceedings; and that the Inquest Prosecutor, after conducting an
investigation, proposed the direct filing of the case. 5

As gathered from the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, at around 8:30 in
the morning of October 23, 2002, a TFAV Unit consisting of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2
Cirilo Maniego (Maniego), as team leader, and Carlos Gojo, Noel Bueva, and Genguyon, as
members, were on board an unmarked multi-cab, patrolling the streets of Fernandez and
Samat, Barangay Highway Hills, Mandaluyong City, when they noticed a male person, whom
Genguyon later identified as petitioner, holding a plastic sachet in his right hand and a
baseball cap in his left hand. The TFAV Unit already knew petitioner for the latter had been
previously arrested several times by authorities for illegal drug possession. As the TFAV
Unit neared petitioner, the latter scurried away. Petitioner tried to throw away the plastic
sachet as he was boarding a tricycle but the members of the TFAV Unit caught up with him.
Genguyon arrested petitioner and recovered the plastic sachet, containing white crystalline
substance, from the latter's possession. Genguyon placed his initials "RG" on the plastic
sachet. After informing petitioner of his constitutional rights, Genguyon gave the plastic
sachet to their team leader, SPO2 Maniego. Thereafter, the TFAV Unit brought petitioner to
the Mandaluyong City Medical Center and to the Criminal Investigation Unit for medical
examination and investigation, respectively.

The plastic sachet, marked as "RG," was turned over to PO3 Cortes, assigned to investigate
petitioner's case. PO3 Cortes made a written request for the laboratory examination of the
contents of said plastic sachet.

P/Sr. Insp. Forro performed the laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic
sachet, and per Chemistry Report No. D-2096-02E, 6  she confirmed the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or  shabu, a dangerous drug.

In the meantime, Genguyon executed a Sworn Statement and an Arrest Report both dated
October 23, 2002 relative to the apprehension of petitioner.

Together with Genguyon's Sworn Statement7  and Arrest Report8  dated October 23, 2002,
PO3 Cortes's written request for laboratory analysis and P/Sr. Insp. Forro's Chemistry
Report No. D-2096-02E, Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Plaridel V. Justo, Chief, Station
Investigation Unit, forwarded petitioner's case to the Mandaluyong City Prosecutor for
inquest proceeding.

On trial, Genguyon identified in court the plastic sachet that he marked as "RG." Likewise,
P/Sr. Insp. Forro testified that she prepared the Chemistry Report No. D-2096-02E and
identified her signature appearing thereon, as well as the signatures of PC/Insp. Leslie
Chambers Maala (Maala), Chief of the Chemistry Section, and Police Superintendent
(P/Supt.) Ma. Cristina B. Freyra (Freyra), Chief of the EPD Crime Laboratory. P/Sr. Insp.
Forro stated that she was present when PC/Insp. Maala and P/Supt. Freyra signed the
Chemistry Report.9

Version of the Defense

Petitioner was the sole witness for the defense.

According to petitioner, he worked as a tricycle driver. At around 8:30 in the morning of

October 23, 2002, he was transporting a passenger from Crossing I to Fernandez Street.
Upon arriving on Fernandez Street and while waiting for the passenger's tricycle fare, a
member of the TFAV Unit passed by, telling petitioner that there was an on-going sale
of  shabu  on Fernandez Street. After receiving the tricycle fare, petitioner proceeded to
Samat Street where he was flagged down by the TFAV Unit Petitioner alighted from his
tricycle and five members of the TFAV Unit conducted a search of petitioner's person and
his tricycle. A sixth member of the TFAV Unit, the driver, was standing near the TFAV
vehicle. Petitioner then saw said sixth member of the TFAV Unit picking up a small plastic
sachet about a meter away from where petitioner was. The sixth TFAV Unit member
approached petitioner while holding the plastic sachet and said that the TFAV Unit
recovered the plastic sachet from petitioner's tricycle. Petitioner denied that the plastic
sachet was his but he was handcuffed. Petitioner offered to bring the TFAV Unit members
to the passenger he dropped off on Fernandez Street but the TFAV Unit members said
nothing and simply brought petitioner to Mandaluyong City Hall. At the Criminal
Investigation Division, a person, who was not part of the TFAV Unit who arrested
petitioner, asked him if he owned the plastic sachet. Petitioner denied ownership of the
plastic sachet. Notwithstanding petitioner's denial, he was detained. Petitioner posted bail
afterwards.

On July 16, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding [petitioner],
ROLANDO DACANAY y LACASTE, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11
of Article II of Republic Act 9165 and hereby sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor  as minimum to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of  reclusion temporal  as maximum and to pay a fine of three hundred
thousand (P300,000.00) [pesos]. [Petitioner] shall be credited in full of the period of his
preventive imprisonment.

The specimen consisting of 0.03 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride is hereby

confiscated in favor of the government. The evidence custodian is ordered to turn over the
same to the Dangerous Drugs Board within 10 days from receipt for proper disposition.

Pursuant to section 6, paragraph 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the Clerk of this Court in charge of the records of criminal cases is ordered to record this
judgment in criminal docket and to serve a copy thereof at the last known address of
Rolando Dacanay y Lacaste or through his counsel. 10

Petitioner's appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 30826. The
appellate court affirmed petitioner's conviction in its Decision dated May 26, 2011.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the following issues:
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
INSOFAR AS IT FAILED TO RULE THAT PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND
ILLEGALLY SEARCHED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE ANTI-VICE UNIT.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT FOUND PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME BEING
IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.11

Petitioner refutes the findings of the Court of Appeals, maintaining that he was illegally
arrested and searched without a warrant by the TFAV Unit. According to petitioner, he was
arrested on mere suspicion of the TFAV Unit members who allegedly saw him holding a
plastic sachet. Petitioner's alleged possession of a plastic sachet, previous criminal record,
or act of running away from apprehending officers were not crimes, nor were they
sufficient to raise suspicion or provide probable cause for warrantless arrest. Considering
that petitioner's arrest did not fall under any of the instances identified under Rule 113,
Section 512  of the Revised Rules of Court - as petitioner was not actually committing or
attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer, and no offense
had just been committed that gave rise to a probable cause that he committed an offense -
petitioner's arrest was illegal.

Petitioner also contends that the warrantless search of petitioner's person, which was
neither incidental to a valid arrest nor based on probable cause that he had committed, was
committing, or was attempting to commit a crime, violated his Constitutional right 13  against
unreasonable search and seizures. As a consequence, any evidence, such as the plastic
sachet, obtained as a result of the unlawful search by the TFAV Unit, should be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding for being the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

Petitioner lastly points out that the version of the prosecution of his arrest was based solely
on Genguyon's self-serving testimony. Petitioner argues that the prosecution should have
presented additional witnesses, such as the other TFAV Unit members, to corroborate
Genguyon's testimony, as well as rebuttal evidence to disprove petitioner's defense of
frame up. The reliance by the RTC and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties was misplaced as such presumption could
not override the presumption of innocence in petitioner's favor. Therefore, the quantum of
proof required to convict petitioner,  i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, had not been
satisfied.

We find no merit in the present Petition.

Questions of fact are not the proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45; findings
of fact of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court

We highlight, at the outset, that this Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which should be limited to questions of law. For a question to be one of law, it
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them.14

The resolution of both issues raised in the Petition at bar requires us to sift through the
records, and examine and inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties before the RTC. This is exactly the situation which Rule 45, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court prohibits by requiring that the petition raise only questions of law. A re-
examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review
on  certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court because this Court is not a trier of
facts. This Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in
the RTC. Further, this case does not fall under any of the exceptions 15  recognized in
jurisprudence.

Moreover, it is settled that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies
of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the findings of the
trial court have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court.16  The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if
considered, will change the outcome of the case. 17

In the instant case, the RTC, after receiving and evaluating the respective evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, adjudged:
This court finds the prosecution adequate or sufficient to warrant conviction of the accused.

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be
proven with moral certainty.

(1) That the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated
drug; (2) That such possession is not authorized by law and, (3) That the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. To warrant conviction of the accused or that
animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of said articles xxx.

In the instant case, the arresting officer, Raylan G. Genguyon who executed a Sworn
Statement and confirmed in open court that on October 23, [2002] at 8:30 in the morning,
while he and members of his team were patrolling along Fernandez Street, he saw a male
person whom he knew for having been previously arrested by authorities for illegal
possession of drugs, came out from an interior alley, stood at the corner of Samat and
Fernandez Streets, a place notoriously known for buying and selling dangerous drugs,
holding a small transparent plastic sachet containing suspected shabu which he
immediately hide (sic) in his cap. When they stopped their patrol vehicle and approached
[petitioner], the latter tried to run away and in the process, [petitioner] attempted to throw
the plastic sachet. However, considering that witness was closed (sic) to the [petitioner],
only three (3) meters distance, he was able to catch the [petitioner], got hold of his hand
and recovered the small plastic sachet containing crystalline substance which yielded
positive result to the test of methamphetamine hydrochloride called shabu. [Petitioner]
was aware of his possession of said plastic sachet which he attempted to throw but was
timely recovered by witness Genguyon. He was the only one who handcuffed and conducted
the arrest of [petitioner]. As against these (sic) positive identification by the witness of
[petitioner] from whom possession of the plastic sachet containing shabu was recovered as
well as the positive results of the laboratory examination by the Forensic Chemist of the
substance contained in the subject plastic sachet, [petitioner] put up the defense of denial
amounting to frame up and illegal arrest.

Our Supreme Court in various cases has ruled that Denial and allegation of frame up are
couple and standard defenses in the prosecution of violations of dangerous drug xxx.

The defense of frame up or denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the court with
disfavor for it can just be easily concocted and is a common defense play in most
prosecution for violation of Dangerous Drug Act xxx.

Witness are to be weighed, not by numbered (sic), it is not uncommon to read a conclusion
of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness xxx.

Furthermore, it could be mentioned in passing that number (sic) of Task Force Anti-Vice are
public officers who enjoy the privilege of the presumption of regularly (sic) in the
performance of their duties in the absence of ill motive and bias. 18

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC and held that:
The central issue raised by [petitioner] in his appeal is the legality of his search and arrest,
[Petitioner] contends that his arrest was illegal for not falling under the exceptions
mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 for a warrantless arrest. He was allegedly not committing
or attempting to commit a crime, and the apprehending officer had no personal knowledge
that a crime was just committed and that the accused had committed it. Anything that
turns up in the course of the subsequent search should be inadmissible as the fruit of an
unlawful arrest.

The defense makes capital of the admission of the arresting officer Genguyon that upon
seeing [petitioner], he was prompted to think that [petitioner] was committing a crime. But
Genguyon himself qualifies his admission with the statement that, at that juncture, he did
not try to arrest [petitioner]. The continuing narrative of Genguyon reveals that
[petitioner] was intercepted by his team only because they noticed him to be in possession
of a plastic sachet and that he quickly fled to a tricycle. Unfortunately for him, the lawmen
got hold of him before he could escape.

In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it must be shown that
[petitioner] was in possession of an object or item that is identified to be a prohibited drug
and that his possession was not authorized by law. These elements have been satisfactorily
established. Genguyon who apprehended [petitioner] testified that from three meters or
thereabouts (sic), he sighted (sic) [petitioner] holding a plastic sachet on his right hand.
When they approached him, he ran away to ride a tricycle and was about to throw the
plastic sachet. But they caught up with him. Genguyon took the sachet from [petitioner]
and told him that they were arresting him for violation of illegal possession of prohibited
drugs. In  People vs. Suzuki, 414 SCRA 43, the Supreme Court held that mere possession of
a prohibited substance is a crime  per se  placing the burden of the evidence on the accused
to prove that his possession was lawful. [Petitioner] denied that he was in possession of
the shabu recovered by the Task Force Anti-Vice [Unit] and even went on to say that the
men who arrested him merely picked up the plastic sachet from a distance of a meter from
him. This is, for sure, a pat and convenient excuse. But without proof of any motive on the
part of the arresting officers to falsely impute a criminal charge against him, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails. xxx.
[Petitioner] was caught  in flagrante delicto  in possession of illegal drugs. The arresting
officer had reasonable ground to believe based on his own personal observation that the
[petitioner] was holding on to a plastic sachet that he believed contained shabu, judging
from the past record of [petitioner], and that his suspicions were heightened when
[petitioner] ran away after seeing him. The warrantless arrest is lawful under the
provisions of Section 5 (a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which provides that - a police
officer may without a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or attempting to commit a crime. In the
course of a lawful warrantless arrest, the person of the accused may be searched for
dangerous or illegal objects. It follows that the prohibited object or item taken from him on
the occasion is admissible in evidence. xxx.

In a word, we find no substantial reason to disturb the findings of the courts  a quo.19

The consistent findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals on petitioner's guilt deserve
utmost respect and should no longer be disturbed. However, if only to put  finis  to this case
and ensure that no material fact was missed or misappreciated by the trial and appellate
courts, we will still proceed to address the issues raised by petitioner. 20

The prosecution was able to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs

Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes possession of dangerous drugs as
follows:
SECTION 11.  Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:

(1)
10 grams or more of opium;
(2)
10 grams or more of morphine;
(3)
10 grams or more of heroin;
(4)
10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5)
50 grams or more of rnethamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6)
10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7)
500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8)
10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate
(GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives,
without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93,
Article XI of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
be graduated as follows:

(1)
Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2)
Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging
from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less
than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or
other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500)
grams of marijuana; and
(3)
Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs  such as, but not
limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred
(300) grams of marijuana. (Emphasis ours.)

In prosecuting cases for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (l)the accused was in possession of an item or object,
which was identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. 21

Additionally, in the prosecution of criminal cases involving drugs, it is settled in our

jurisprudence that the narcotic substance itself constitutes the  corpus delicti, the body or
substance of the crime, and the fact of its existence is a condition  sine qua non  to sustain a
judgment of conviction. It is essential that the prosecution must prove with certitude that
the narcotic substance confiscated from the suspect is the same drug offered in evidence
before the court. As such, the presentation in court of the  corpus delicti  establishes the fact
that a crime has actually been committed.22

Evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimonies of its witnesses, chiefly that of
Genguyon; documentary evidence, particularly, Genguyon's Sworn Statement and P/Sr.
Insp. Forro's Chemistry Report No. D-2096-02E; and the  corpus delicti, the plastic sachet
of  shabu  confiscated from petitioner.

In his Sworn Statement,23  which was offered in evidence and formed part of his testimony,
Genguyon immediately recalled:
We saw a male person whom we know for having been arrested by authorities for many
times for illegal drug possession came out from an alley thereat and stood at the corner of
Samat and Fernandez Sts., this city holding a  small transparent plastic sachet containing
suspected  shabu  which he immediately hide (sic) in his cap.

xxx Since I was already closed (sic) to him at that time, I was able to catch him and got
hold of his hand and recovered the  small transparent plastic sachet containing
suspected  shabu. xxx. (Emphases ours.)

During trial, Genguyon further testified as follows:

Q:
And while you were patrolling said area, could you please tell us if there was any unusual
incident that happened in that area?
A:
Yes, Ma'am.
Q:
What is that?
A:
While we were patrolling the said area of Samat corner Fernandez St., we noticed a male
person who is inside the interior street, ma'am.
Q:
And what is so unusual in that particular person, Mr. Witness?
A:
While we were looking at him while we were approaching him, we saw that he was holding
a plastic sachet, ma'am.
Q:
How did you know that he was holding a plastic sachet?
A:
He was quite near us, about three meters, ma'am.
Q:
What is your position in relation to his position?
A:
He was facing us, ma'am.
Q:
How did he hold the plastic sachet?
A:
He was holding it in his right hand and on his left hand, he was holding a baseball cap,
ma'am.
Q:
And what did you then (sic) when you saw him [with] a plastic sachet?
A:
When we approached him, he tried to run away, ma'am.
Q:
And what did you do then when he tried to run away?
A:
We ran after him and we were able to catch him trying to ride a tricycle and he was trying
to throw the plastic sachet, ma'am.
Q:
Was he able to ride the tricycle?
A:
No, ma'am almost.
Q:
What was his reaction when you accosted him?
A:
He was surprised, ma'am, because I was already holding him.
Q:
What happened when you arrested him?
A:
He did not resist when we told him that we are from the Task Force Anti-Vice, ma'am.
Q:
What about the plastic sachet that you saw. what happened to that?
A:
I got it from his possession and then I told him that we are arresting him for violation of
section 11, ma' am.
Q:
After apprising him of his constitutional rights, what else happened, if any?
A:
After apprising him of his rights, I immediately gave the evidence to our team leader, SPO2
Cirilo Maniego, ma'am.
Q:
You said that you were able to  recover from  him one plastic sachet with white crystalline
substance?
A:
Yes,  ma'am.
Q:
Could you please describe the size of that sachet?
A:
It was a very, small plastic sachet. I cannot estimate the size, ma'am.
Q:
If that will be shown to you will you be able to identify it?
A:
Yes, ma'am.
Q:
Why will you be able to identify it?
A:
I put my markings, ma'am, my initials "RG."
Q:
Showing to you this plastic sachet with markings "RG" and already marked as Exhibit "F-1"
could you please tell us if that is the same plastic sachet recovered from the possession of
the [petitioner]?
A:
Yes, Ma'am this is the one.
Q:
By the way, what does "RG" stands (sic) for?
A:
"RG" stands for Raylan Genguyon, ma'am.24  (Emphasis ours.)

The prosecution then submitted in evidence the Chemistry Report No. D-2096-02E, which
confirmed that the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachet recovered from
petitioner was methamphetamine hydrochloride or  shabu, a prohibited drug.

The totality of the evidence satisfactorily establishes all the necessary elements for the
conviction of petitioner for illegal possession of prohibited drug.

Notably, petitioner did not offer any evidence to prove that he had authority to possess the
said drug, and it is well-entrenched that mere possession of a prohibited drug
constitutes  prima facie  evidence of knowledge or  animus possidendi  of the prohibited
drug, sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of satisfactory explanation. 25

Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence of frame-up

Petitioner's defense of frame-up does not inspire belief. Frame-up, like denial, has always
been viewed with disfavor by the courts as it can be easily fabricated. As we declared
in  People v. De Guzman26:
The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can easily
be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have
performed their duties in a regular and proper manner. xxx.

Petitioner miserably failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that the TFAV Unit members who arrested him, including Genguyon,
performed their duties in a regular and proper manner, and that said TFAV Unit members
were instead impelled by a sinister motive in charging petitioner with the serious offense of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. As between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witness Genguyon that petitioner was caught in possession of a prohibited
drug and petitioner's self-serving and unsubstantiated claim of frame-up by the TFAV Unit,
the former deserves more weight and credence, just as the trial and appellate courts found.

Petitioner waived any objection to his warrantless arrest; in any case, petitioner was
legally arrested without a warrant
Petitioner also assails his conviction on the ground that his arrest without a warrant did not
fall among any of the exceptional circumstances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Court, so that the evidence obtained by the TFAV Unit during his unlawful
arrest was inadmissible in evidence.

We disagree. Applicable herein are our pronouncements in  People v. Alunday27  that:
The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We
have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if
he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment.
And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a number of
cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest
does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.

In this case, petitioner failed to raise any objection as to his warrantless arrest before he
entered his plea of "not guilty." Petitioner likewise did not move to quash the information
against him prior to his arraignment. Petitioner then actively participated in the trial of his
case before the RTC. Therefore, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the RTC and waived any objection to the jurisdiction of the RTC based
on a defect in his arrest, and he is estopped from raising such an objection to have the
judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC reversed and set aside.

Yet, even if we consider petitioner's objection to the legality of his arrest, we find the same
unpersuasive.

Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the exceptional
circumstances when a warrantless arrest may be legally made:
SEC. 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense[.]

In  in flagrante delicto  arrests, the concurrence of two elements is necessary, to wit: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done  in
the presence or within the view  of the arresting officer.28  Petitioner's overt act of
holding/possessing the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance in the presence and
within the view of Genguyon, a TFAV Unit member and prosecution witness, satisfied both
elements. By having a plastic sachet of  shabu  in his possession, petitioner was definitely
committing an offense punishable under Republic Act No. 9165, which justified his
warrantless arrest. This should negate any insinuation that petitioner was arrested simply
because of his past criminal record or because he fled upon seeing the TFAV Unit.

The instant case is closely similar to the factual milieu in  Palo v. People29  where a police
officer testified that he arrested therein petitioner Roberto Palo (Palo) who was holding a
plastic sachet, which the police officer believed to be containing  shabu:
PO3 Capangyarihan, a member of the Valenzuela City Police, testified that at around 6:30 in
the evening of July 24, 2002, he was walking along a dark alley at Mercado Street, Gen. T.
De Leon in Valenzuela City. With him at that time was a boy who was a victim of a stabbing
incident and right behind them, was PO1 Santos. While they were walking toward the
petitioner's direction, at a distance of about five to seven meters, PO3 Capangyarihan saw
[Palo] and Daguman talking to each other. PO3 Capangyarihan also noticed [Palo] holding
a plastic sachet in his hand who was then showing it to Daguman. Believing that the plastic
sachet contained  shabu, from the manner by which [Palo] was holding the sachet, PO3
Capangyarihan immediately approached [Palo], held and recovered from his hand the said
plastic sachet. Right there and then, [Palo] was arrested by PO3 Capangyarihan. Daguman
was also arrested by PO1 Santos.

PO3 Capangyarihan further testified that [Palo] and Daguman were informed of their
constitutional rights and that the two accused, together with the item seized, were brought
to the police station where the confiscated item was marked by PO3 Capangyarihan with
[Palo's] initials "RPD." During his cross-examination, PO3 Capangyarihan disclosed that
there is a rampant selling of  shabu  at the place where the two accused were apprehended
and that his suspicion was aroused by [Palo's] delicate way of handling the plastic sachet.

In the  Palo case, the Court affirmed the judgments of the trial and appellate courts finding
Palo's warrantless arrest lawful as he was caught  in flagrante delicto  and convicting Palo
for possession of dangerous drugs, and ratiocinated as follows:
To secure a conviction for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the concurrence of the
following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.

The Court finds that these elements were proven by the prosecution in the present case.
PO3 Capangyarihan testified in a clear and straightforward manner that when he chanced
upon [Palo], the latter was caught red-handed in the illegal possession of  shabu  and was
arrested  in flagrante delicto. On direct examination, the police officer positively identified
[Palo] as the person holding, scrutinizing and from whom the plastic sachet was
confiscated. After conducting a chemical analysis, the forensic chemical officer certified
that the plastic sachet recovered from [Palo] was found to contain 0.03 gram of  shabu.
Nowhere in the records was it shown that [Palo] is lawfully authorized to possess the
dangerous drug. Furthermore, Daguman admitted that [Palo] intentionally sought and
succeeded in getting hold of  shabu. Clearly, [Palo] knowingly possessed the dangerous
drug, without any legal authority to do so, in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.

The Court concurs with the trial court in attributing full faith and credence to the testimony
of PO3 Capangyarihan. His detailed narration in court remained consistent with the
documentary and object evidence submitted by the prosecution. As there is nothing in the
record to indicate that PO3 Capangyarihan was impelled by improper motive when he
testified against [Palo], the Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the
apprehending officer's performance of official duty. 30

The case of  Esquillo v. People31  is likewise analogous to the instant case. In  Esquillo, the
Court upheld the following actions of the police officer, despite the absence of a warrant:
(a) approaching therein petitioner Susan Esquillo (Esquillo) after observing from  three
meters away  that Esquillo placed a plastic sachet with white substance inside a cigarette
case; (b) inquiring from Esquillo about said plastic sachet; (c) restraining Esquillo who
attempted to flee; (d) requesting Esquillo to take out the plastic sachet from the cigarette
case; (e) confiscating the plastic sachet from Esquillo; and (f) arresting Esquillo. The Court
held in the  Esquillo  case:
On the basis of an informant's tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2
Aguas), proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay,
Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher
operating in the area known only as "Ryan."

As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the
target area, he glanced in the direction of [Esquillo] who was standing three meters away
and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 [Cruzin] was not sure
what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when [Esquillo] started acting
strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to
[Esquillo] and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case.
Instead of replying, however, [Esquillo] attempted to flee to her house nearby but was
timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic
sachet from the cigarette case.

After apprising [Esquillo] of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic
sachet on which he marked her initials "SRE." With the seized item, [Esquillo] was brought
for investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of
the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum dated December 10, 2002 addressed
to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory
examination of the substance contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence
of  shabu, and 2) the conduct of a drug test on the person of [Esquillo]. PO1 Cruzin and PO2
Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension recounting the details of their
intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to [Esquillo's] arrest.

xxxx

[Esquillo's] conviction stands.

[Esquillo] did not question early on her warrantless arrest - before her arraignment.
Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the
issue of warrantless arrest - as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the
occasion thereof - for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court. By such
omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.

Be that as it may, the circumstances under which [Esquillo] was arrested indeed engender
the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a
surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts.  When PO1 Cruzin saw
[Esquillo] placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette
case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was
instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That [Esquillo] reacted
by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the
contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.

That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search
warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions,  viz.:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and
aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving
vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders;  (6) where the
prohibited articles are in "plain view;"  (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce
fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8)  "stop and frisk" operations.  xxx.

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, the
determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely
a judicial question, taking into account, among other things, the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. 32(Emphases supplied.)

Ultimately, the Court adjudged that the  Esquillo  case involved a valid  stop-and-frisk
operation  as the police officer had to require the accused to take out the plastic sachet
from the cigarette case. In contrast, there was no need to stop-and-frisk petitioner in this
case because the plastic sachet with suspected  shabu  remained in
Genguyon's  plain  view  from the time Genguyon saw petitioner holding it, to the time
petitioner tried to dispose of it, and up to the time he seized it from petitioner.
Nevertheless, just as in  Esquillo, Genguyon herein had a genuine reason to believe that
petitioner was committing a crime as he saw petitioner holding the plastic sachet with
suspected  shabu  from a distance of three meters. And, as pronounced in  Esquillo, the
unique circumstances of each case must be taken into account in determining whether or
not a warrantless search or seizure is reasonable. Here, we see no reason to doubt the
testimony of the prosecution witness that petitioner was seen holding a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance or suspected  shabu. Petitioner ran away, was about
to board a tricycle, and throw away the sachet. The urgency of the situation called for
Genguyon and the rest of the TFAV Unit to act immediately. Thus, even without a warrant,
the TFAV Unit was authorized to arrest petitioner who was at that time violating Article II,
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Penalty modified in accordance with Republic Act No. 9165

Finally, the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, imposed on petitioner the penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor  as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of  reclusion temporal  as maximum. We modify the penalty imposed upon petitioner to
conform to Article II, Section 11(3) of Republic Act No. 9165. Petitioner, found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegally possessing 0.03 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or  shabu  (less than five [5] grams), is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months, as maximum.33

We sustain the fine imposed on petitioner by the trial and appellate courts in the amount of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is  DENIED. The Decision
dated May 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30826, affirming the Decision
dated July 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209, in
Criminal Case No. MC02-6030-D, is  AFFIRMED  with the  MODIFICATION  that petitioner
Rolando Dacanay y Lacaste is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019

MARVIN PORTERIA Y MANEBALI, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, A., JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and
set aside the Decision2 dated May 12, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated August 16, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 37273. The challenged issuances of the CA affirmed the
Judgment4 dated December 5, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 26, in
Crim. Case No. 2011-0501, which found petitioner Marvin Porteria y Manebali (Marvin) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 2(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539,5 as amended, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972."

Factual Antecedents

Wilfredo Christian P. Mien (Christian) is the registered owner of a blue Honda motorcycle, 2004 model,
with Engine No. KPH125ME-8005271, Chassis No. KPH12-03X-005271, and Plate No. EL5401.6

According to the prosecution, Christian used his motorcycle on December 10, 2010, at about 6:00
a.m., when he went to work at St. John Hospital in Panganiban Drive, Naga City. He parked his
motorcycle in front of the hospital, in the parking area of the Nazareno Drug Store.7

After finishing his shift at about 2:00 p.m., Christian discovered that his motorcycle was no longer in
its parking spot. Unable to find his motorcycle, Christian went to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Naga City Police Office, Police Precinct No. 2 to report that his motorcycle was stolen.8 The police
recorded the incident in the Daily Record of Events.9

The following day, Christian and his brother, Wilfredo Angelus Mien, went to the PNP Provincial
Highway Patrol Group (HPG) 5-Camarines Sur to report the incident again.10 He filled out an Alarm
Sheet and a Complaint Sheet.11 Afterwards, Christian was asked to submit certain documents, such as
the original copies of the Official Receipt (OR) of registration and the Certificate of Registration (CR),
the police blotter, the certificate of ownership, the relevant Deed of Sale, if any, and the duplicate
copy of the motorcycle's key. Christian complied with the requirements of the PNP HPG.12

On February 1, 2011, the police officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur supposedly received a report that
there was a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist.13 The Chief of Police of the Ocampo
Police Station, Police Inspector Samuel De Asis Villamer (P/Insp. Villamer), dispatched a team to verify
the report.14

The report eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin along me highway of Barangay San Francisco,
Ocampo, Camarines Sur, for the illegal possession of firearm. He was, thereafter, subjected to a
search of his body and of the bag allegedly found in his possession. Inside the bag, the arresting
officer found an assortment of documents, including photocopies of the OR and CR of Christian's
stolen motorcycle.15

At the Ocampo Police Station, Marvin was asked regarding the documents discovered in his bag.
P/Insp. Villamer stated that Marvin responded voluntarily, informing the police that the motorcycle
was in the possession of a certain Felix Maratas (Felix) in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.16 Later on, P/Insp.
Villamer sent a text message to Christian's brother, notifying Him that Marvin was arrested, and that
they found the registration of the stolen motorcycle in his possession. Christian and his brother then
went to the Ocampo Police Station, where they were advised thait Marvin has been transferred to the
Naga City District Jail (NCDJ).17

On February 5, 2011, the mother of Christian, Virgie P. Mien (Virgie), went to the NCDJ, intending to
talk to Marvin.18 She asked Marvin about the registration of the subject motorcycle found in his
possession, to which Marvin apparently replied by confessing his guilt. Virgie testified that Marvin
admitted taking Christian's motorcycle and going on a road trip to Quezon. Marvin also allegedly told
Virgie that he left the motorcycle with a certain "Insan Joy," whose address is Phase 5, Southville
Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.19

That night, Virgie called her friend, who was a police officer, to relay the information she obtained
from Marvin. This friend of hers, Police Superintendent Teodorico Bolitic, called her a week later to
inform her that the motorcycle was not at the address Marvin provided.20

On March 11, 2011, at around 3:00 p.m., a checkpoint was placed at the road of Barangay Kaingin,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Senior Police Officer 3 Jaime A. Cariaso (SPO3 Cariaso) and several other police
officers were manning the checkpoint-at that time. By 3:20 p.m., a blue motorcycle approached the
checkpoint. Seeing that the driver was not wearing a helmet, the police flagged down the motorcycle,
who refused to stop and continued to pass the checkpoint. The police officers chased the motorcycle
using their police car, and finally caught up with the driver at around 3:30 p.m.21

The police officers asked the driver of the motorcycle for his license, and for the registration
documents of the motorcycle. The driver, later identified as Albert Orino (Albert), was unable to
present any document. The police officers, thus, brought Albert to the barangay hall to record the
incident in the barangay blotter. He was thereafter taken to the police station of Sta. Rosa, Laguna,
together with the motorcycle.22

At the police station, Albert supposedly told the police officers that he does not own the motorcycle.
According to SPO3 Cariaso, Albert stated that a certain Marvin left him the motorcycle. The police then
charged Albert with a traffic violation for driving without a license.23 After verifying the ownership of
the motorcycle, the police notified Christian regarding its recovery.24

Marvin, for his part, denied the accusations of the prosecution. According to him, he met a friend at
Barangay San Francisco, Ocampo, Camarines Sur on February 1, 2011. His friend, a certain Francis
Aguilar, was driving a motorcycle and carrying a bag. His friend left the area, leaving behind the
motorcycle, with the bag on top of it.25 Several moments later, police officers approached Marvin and
invited him to go to the police station. The invitation was purportedly pursuant to a report of a
suspicious person in the area. Marvin refused, but the police officers forced him to go with them.26

The police officers brought him to the Ocampo Police Station, where he was interrogated and
detained. At no point was Marvin informed of his rights.27 When the police officers told him about a
gun recovered inside his bag, Marvin denied owning the bag, much less its contents.28
On October 27, 2011, the Information against Marvin, Albert, and Felix, was filed with the RTC of
Naga City, charging them with violation of R.A. No. 6539, viz.:
That on or about December 16, 2010, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with intent of gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally take and steal,
the motorcycle, with plate no. EL-5401, belonging to and owned by herein complaining witness
WILFREDO CHRISTIAN P. MIEN, without his consent, while same was parked along Panganiban
Avenue, Naga City, to his damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.29

In an Order dated November 2, 2011, the RTC scheduled Marvin's arraignment on November 15,
2011, and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against both of his co-accused, Felix and
Albert.30 During his arraignment, Marvin pleaded not guilty.31

Trial proceeded and the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Christian, the complainant;
(b) Virgie, the complainant's mother; (c) SPO4 Jaime Pequiras (SPO4 Pequiras), the arresting officer;
(d) P/Insp. Villamer, the Chief of Police of Ocampo, Camarines Sur; and (e) SPO3 Cariaso, the police
officer manning the checkpoint in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.32

On the other hand, the defense presented Marvin as its sole witness. The defense also intended to
present SPO3 Cariaso. However, instead of testifying again, both parties agreed on the following
stipulations with respect to his testimony: (a) at the time of Albert's apprehension, Marvin was not
with him; and (b) the carnapped motorcycle was found in the possession of Albert only.33

Ruling of the RTC

The trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the persons of Marvin's co-accused, including Albert,
the person in whose possession he motorcycle was found. Nonetheless, in its Judgment34 promulgated
on December 5, 2014, the trial court found Marvin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping, punishable under R.A. No. 6539, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [Marvin] is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation
of [R.A. No.] 6539 otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum. The period of accused['s] preventive detention shall be
credited in his favor.

The instant case as against the two other accused [Felix] and [Albert] are hereby ordered sent to the
files of ARCHIVED cases pending the arrest of said accused. Accordingly, let an alias warrant of arrest
be issued for their immediate apprehension to stand trial before this Court.
 
SO ORDERED.35

The trial court found that the circumstantial evidence presented in this case was sufficient to hold
Marvin guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC considered the following circumstances: (a) Marvin
was apprehended on February 1, 2011, in possession of the registration documents of the stolen
motorcycle; (b) P/Insp. Villamer testified that Marvin voluntarily answered their query as to the
whereabouts of the motorcycle, which he left with a certain Felix in Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (c) Virgie's
testimony that Marvin confessed to stealing the motorcycle, which he then drove all the way to Sta.
Rosa, Laguna; and (d) the stolen motorcycle eventually being found in Sta. Rosa, Laguna on March
11, 2011.36 These circumstances, according to the RTC, constitute an unbroken chain that leads to the
fair and reasonable conclusion that Marvin indeed committed the crime.

Aggrieved, Marvin filed a Notice of Appeal on January 5, 2015.37 The RTC, in its Order38 dated January
6, 2015, allowed the appeal and elevated the records of the case to the CA.

Ruling of the CA
After the parties filed their respective briefs,39 the CA rendered its Decision40 dated May 12, 2017,
affirming Marvin's conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the [RTC] dated December 5,
2014 in Criminal Case No. 2011-0501, is hereby AFFIRMED with modification.

Accused-appellant, [Marvin], is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of [R.A. No.]
6539 otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, and as modified, is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of fourteen years (14) years (sic), eight (8) months as minimum, to
fifteen (15) years, as maximum. The period of accused-appellant's preventive detention shall be
credited to his favor.

SO ORDERED.41

The CA held that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court sufficiently supported the
conviction of Marvin. It painted an unbroken series of events, which eventually resulted in the
recovery of the motorcycle in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Furthermore, the CA anchored its findings on the fact
that during the course of Marvin's arrest for illegal possession of firearms, the police found the
registration documents of the stolen motorcycle in his possession.42 His extrajudicial confession also
corroborated the evidence of the prosecution.43

Unsatisfied with the decision of the CA, Marvin moved for its reconsideration on June 9, 2017.44 The CA
denied this motion in its Resolution45 dated August 16, 2017. Hence, Marvin filed the present petition
before the Court.

Marvin alleges that the trial court and the CA should not have considered the supposed discovery of
the stolen motorcycle's OR and CR in his possession because the search was not legal. He further
argues that the extrajudicial confession he made to Virgie was not freely and voluntarily made.46 Based
on these grounds, Marvin asserts that his conviction does not hold water.

Ruling of the Court

The Court grants the petition. The circumstantial pieces of evidence of the prosecution are not
sufficient to find Marvin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping.

The search of Marvin's body and belongings, as an incident to his warrantless arrest, was
not valid.

Our constitution guarantees the inviolable right of every person to be secure in his or her persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures for whatever nature and for
any purpose.47 Thus, there should be a warrant duly issued on the basis of probable cause, in order to
consider these searches and seizures as valid. This notwithstanding, there are several circumstances
which the Court recognizes as exceptions to the requirement of a warrant: (a) a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) seizure of evidence in plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d)
consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk; and (g) the existence of exigent
and emergency circumstances.48

In this case, the CA found that the discovery of the stolen motorcycle's OR and CR in the possession of
Marvin was the product of a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.49 For the search to become valid
under this exception, the inquiry of the Court should focus on the legality of the arrest. The arrest
must not be used as a mere pretext for conducting the search, and the arrest, to be lawful, must
precede the search. Assuming that there was a valid arrest, the arresting officer may only search the
arrestee and the area within which he or she may reach for a weapon, or for evidence to destroy. The
arresting officer may also seize any money or property used in the commission of the crime, or the
fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee the
means of escaping or committing violence.50

Since Marvin was arrested without a warrant, his apprehension may only be considered valid under
the three (3) instances provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) the arrest of a suspect where, based on the personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that the suspect was the perpetrator of a crime that had just
been committed, or a "hot pursuit" arrest; and (c) the arrest of a prisoner, who has escaped from
custody, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.51 For the case at
bar, the last circumstance for a valid warrantless arrest obviously cannot apply.

An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two (2) elements: (a) the person arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.52 Meanwhile, for a hot pursuit arrest, there must be an offense that was just
committed, and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
committed it.53

Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the Court holds that Marvin was not validly arrested
without a warrant. The prosecution failed to establish any overt act which could lead to Marvin's in
flagrante delicto arrest. There was also no evidence that the arresting officers, or SPO4 Pequiras in
particular, knew of an offense that was just committed and that Marvin was the perpetrator of the
offense.

According to P/Insp. Villamer, the radio operator at the Ocanipo Police Station received a telephone
call from a concerned citizen regarding a suspicious person with something bulging in his body. This
report constrained P/Insp. Villamer to send a team to verify the report.54 One of the police officers,
SPO4 Pequiras, verified the report, which resulted in the arrest of Marvin. However, he did not specify
the reason why Marvin was arrested, other than the fact that there was a report of a suspicious
person, thus:
[Direct examination of
SPO4 Pequiras by
Prosecutor Alan
Fernando]
Q: Could you tell us now Mr. Witness why did you search the bag of
this accused and found out inside his bag these 2 documents?
A: Because on February 1, 2011 when we apprehended the accused
for illegal possession of firearm[,] we also searched his bag to
secure the firearm inside his bag.
Q: And you said you have apprehended the accused for illegal
possession of firearm and incident thereto you made a search on
the bag whether there is a concealed firearm or explosive, is that
what you mean to say?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
[Cross-examination of
SPO4 Pequiras by Atty.
Ernesto Mendiola]
Q: Were you the one or you were present when this accused was
apprehended for illegal possession of firearm?
A: I was present.
xxxx
Q: Because you arrested the accused while he was in possession of
that firearm you likewise bodily searched him. [C]orrect?
A: After we saw the firearm.
Q: You mean to say your search is valid?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is your purpose in conducting the search on his body and
his bag that he was carrying?
A: On February 1, 2011[,] we received information that a certain
person was seen with a suspicious thing tucked on his
waist.  (Emphasis ours)
55

From this testimony, the Court cannot determine Marvin's overt actions, which led SPO4 Pequiras to
believe that Marvin was illegally in possession of firearms. There is a dearth of evidence describing
how Marvin committed a crime, was committing, or was about to commit a crime in the presence of
the arresting officers. SPO4 Pequiras merely testified that after receiving the information regarding the
presence of a suspicious person, they verified the report, and this eventually resulted in the arrest of
Marvin. It was not established that Marvin had a firearm visibly tucked in his waist, or that he behaved
in a manner which would elicit a reasonable suspicion that he committed an offense. Clearly, the trial
court and the CA grievously erred in agreeing with the prosecution. The prosecution established only a
suspicion that a crime was committed—nothing more—prior to the arrest of Marvin.

In the same manner, the present circumstances do not suffice to fulfill the requirements for a hot
pursuit arrest. The prosecution did not allege and prove that SPO4 Pequiras and the arresting officers
have personal knowledge of facts that Marvin had just committed an offense. Neither does the
anonymous report of a suspicious person operate to vest personal knowledge on the police officers
about the commission of an offense. In Veridiano v. People,56 the Court ruled on the validity of the
warrantless arrest made pursuant to a report of illicit or suspicious activity:
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.
In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the
accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in
possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.

xxxx

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip
they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest
absent any overt act from the person to be arrested imdicating thet a crime has just been
committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be
arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a
warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.57 (Emphases ours and citations omitted)
There being no valid warrantless arrest, the search conducted on Marvin's body and belongings is
likewise unjustified. The law requires that there should be a lawful arrest prior to the search. The
process cannot be reversed.58 "[W]here a person is searched without a warrant, and under
circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest x x x upon a mere suspicion that he
has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a
crime [was] committed by him, then the search x x x of such person as well as his arrest are
deemed illegal."59 The CA thus committed a reversible error in deeming the search valid without
making a prior determination of the legality of the arrest.

The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry the admissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

When there is an irregularity in the arrest of an accused, the accused must object to the validity of his
arrest before arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.60 Here, Marvin may no longer
raise the issue regarding the validity of his arrest, especially after participating in the proceedings
before the trial court. Nonetheless, this does not preclude Court from ruling against the admissibility
of the evidence obtained from the illegal warrantless arrest.61

As such, the OR and CR allegedly found in the bag of Marvin after he was arrested for illegal
possession of firearms are inadmissible. The Court cannot consider the documents supposedly seized
from Marvin's possession as part of the circumstantial evidence for the prosecution.

Neither was the search of Marvin's body and belongings valid as a stop-and-frisk search.

One of the arresting officers, SPO4 Pequiras, further muddled his testimony when he stated that the
search on Marvin and his bag was due to the "information [they received] that a certain person was
seen with a suspicious thing tucked [in] his waist."62 Verily, the factual circumstances were ambiguous
as to whether the arrest preceded the search, or if Marvin was stopped and frisked pursuant to the
anonymous report the police received regarding a suspicious person. Regardless, the warrantless
search is still unjustifiable as a stop-and-frisk search.

A stop-and-frisk search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband."63 Searches under stop-and-frisk are
limited to the protective search of outer clothing for weapons.64 For purposes of searching a person's
clothing for concealed weapons, the police officer is required to introduce himself properly, make initial
inquiries, approach and then restrain the person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct.65

In order to be considered valid, a stop and frisk search must be premised on the manifest overt acts
of an accused, which give law enforcers a "genuine reason" to conduct the search. Jurisprudence has
refined the standard to less than probable cause, but more than mere suspicion. The search cannot be
based on a suspicion or a hunch.66 Their suspicion is formed on the basis of the law enforcers' prior
experience with criminals and their behavior, as well as the surrounding circumstances of the case.67

In some cases, the Court has also required the presence of more than one activity which,
when taken together, gives a reasonable inference of criminal activity. 68 This is determined on
a case-to-case basis, as when a man with reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, avoided the
police officers approaching him,69 or when a person was seen placing a heat-sealed plastic sachet
containing a white substance inside a cigarette case.70 For this particular case, however, the Court
cannot discern any circumstance that would give SPO4 Pequiras a genuine reason to stop-and-frisk
Marvin.

The prosecution stated that Marvin was arrested and searched because the police received a report
regarding a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist. But in his testimony, SPO4
Pequiras did not specify the actions or behavior of Marvin, or the factual circumstances
occurring prior to his arrest and search. He simply stated that Marvin was arrested due to
the anonymous tip. SPO4 Pequiras did not even state how they were able to identify Marvin
as the suspicious person referred to in the concerned citizen's report. Evidently, these are not
enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that Marvin was illegally searched. Following the exclusionary
principle, the items seized as a result of this unlawful search are inadmissible as evidence. Again, the
OR and CR of the subject motorcycle, allegedly discovered as a result of the invalid search of Marvin,
cannot be used as evidence against him.

Marvin's alleged admissions of guilt do not suffice to convict him for carnapping.

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to counsel.
These rights may not be waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.71

This principle is further reiterated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438.72 Under this statute, extrajudicial
confessions made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation must fulfill the
following requirements:
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse,
the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence
in any proceeding. (Emphasis ours)

These safeguards are intended to prevent the practice of extracting coerced confessions, no matter
how slight, which could lead the accused to make false admissions. They are meant to insulate the
accused from "coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of [a custodial] investigation."73

The trial court, in convicting Marvin for the crime of carnapping, relied on several circumstantial pieces
of evidence. There include his supposed voluntary admission to P/Insp. Villamer that the motorcycle is
in the possession of a certain Felix.74 This admission, as shown in he following testimony of P/Insp.
Villamer, was given after Marvin was arrested and taken to the police station for further investigation:
[Direct examination of
P/Insp. Villamer by
Prosecutor Alan
Fernando]
Q: Could you tell us your Memorandum with respect to the accused,
[Marvin], explain to us (sic)?
A: This was addressed to the Chief of Police of Sta[.] Rosa City
because on February 1, 2011[,] we apprehended [Marvin].
Q: For what crime?
A: For Illegal Possession of Firearms.
Q: Then what happened?
A: Upon verification and inspection to him (sic) we found out several
registration of motorcycle and it so happened that during the
inventory, one of my investigators found out the registration of the
motorcycle of [Christian].
xxxx
Q: Please tell us your investigation on [Marvin]?
A: When we asked him regarding the registration of motorcycle of Mr.
Mien, he told us voluntarily that the motorcycle subject matter of
this case was in the possession of [Felix] of Olivia [Subdivision,]
Sta. Rosa City.
xxxx
Q: And according to you, [Marvin] told the investigators that the
motorcycle is in the possession of [Felix] and because of this
information given to the office of [Marvin] (sic), you sent this
Memorandum addressed to the Chief of Police of Sta. Rosa City.
A: Yes, Sir. 75

At that time, Marvin was already under custodial investigation, having been placed in the custody of
the police, or deprived of his freedom of action in a significant manner.76 Thus, when the police officers
asked Marvin regarding the discovery of the motorcycle's registration documents in his possession,
Marvin's right to counsel automatically attached. Furthermore, his answer constitutes an implied
admission of guilt, which should have been done in writing, with the assistance of his counsel, or after
a valid waiver of these rights.

Remarkably, neither P/Insp. Villamer nor SPO4 Pequiras testified that Marvin was informed of his
rights, much less granted the opportunity to obtain a counsel of his own choice. Marvin, on [Link]
hand, narrated in his direct examination that he was not informed of his rights:
[Direct examination
of the petitioner by
Atty. Jopito
Agualada]
Q: The policemen presented to you the Original PLeceipt and the
Certificate of Registration of the motorcycle of [Christian] yet you said
that you do not know from where they recovered the same. And you
also said that after that you were put under detention. Did they inform
you Mr. witness the grounds of putting you under detention?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Did they inform you that they were able to recover a gun inside the bag
of Francis Aguilar?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And upon being informed that a gun was found inside the bag of Francis
Aguilar, what did they do to you?
A: I was put me (sic) inside the detention cell, Sir.
Q: Did they tell you that they are arresting you because of a gun that was
found inside the bag of Francis Aguilar?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did they show you the gun?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where did they show you the gun?
A: I was moved-out of the detention cell and I returned to the office of the
Chief, Sir.
Q: The Chief you are referring to the Chief of Police of Ocampo,
Camarines Sur?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And that Office of the Chief of Police of Ocampo is at the Municipal
Police Station of Ocampo, Camarines Sur?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Q: When they show[ed] you a gun at [the] Municipal Police Station of
Ocampo, Camarines Sur[,] was that the first time that you saw that gun
that they allegedly recovered from the bag of Francis Aguilar?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, because of that, they incarcerated you because they found the gun
inside the bag of Francis Aguilar?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: They did not detain you because of their discovery of the [Official]
Receipt and Certificate of Registration of the motorcycle of [Christian]?
A: No, Sir.
xxxx
Q: At the Police Station, did they inform you that they are putting you
under arrest because of the recovered gun inside the bag of Francis
Aguilar?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did they inform you that you have a right to a lawyer?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Did they inform you that you have the right to remain silent?
A: No, Sir.
Q: But you are sure that it was at the Police Station that they arrested you?
A: Yes, Sir.  (Emphases ours)
77

At this point, it bears reiterating that when the police officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur began
questioning Marvin about the items found in his possession, there should have been a counsel present
to assist Marvin. Without the assistance of a counsel, and in the absence of a valid waiver of this right,
Marvin's "voluntary" answer to P/Insp. Villamer is inadmissible as evidence of his guilt.
Another circumstantial evidence considered by the trial court is the alleged confession of Marvin to
Virgie, the mother of the complainant. Unlike Marvin's admission to P/Insp. Villamer, the confession to
Virgie, a private party, is not within the scope of the constitutional and statutory limitations on
extrajudicial confessions.78

This notwithstanding, the Court should still inquire upon the voluntariness of the confession. The
prosecution must establish that the accused spoke freely, without inducement of any kind, and fully
aware of the consequences of the confession. This may be inferred from the language of the
confession, as when the accused provided details known only to him or her.79

In the present case, the Court cannot determine the voluntariness of Marvin's supposed confession to
Virgie because it was not reduced into writing or recorded in another manner. The Court can only rely
on the testimony of Virgie as to the substance of Marvin's confession. Aside from her testimony, there
is no independent evidence that establishes the voluntariness and substance of Marvin's alleged
extrajudicial confession.80

The testimony of Virgie as to the supposed confession of Marvin may, nonetheless, be admitted as an
independently relevant statement, which proves only the fact that such statement was made. The
admission of this testimony does not necessarily mean that the Court is persuaded. Virgie is
competent to testify only as to the substance of what she heard—not the truth thereof. Her testimony,
by itself, is not sufficient proof of its veracity.81 As the Court explained in People v. Satorre:82
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by
whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may
be proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at
best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on
which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.

Main prosecution witness Castañares testified that after appellant's alleged oral confession, she
brought the latter to the office of the police at the Municipal Hall of Carcar, Cebu. At the police station,
Castañares was investigated, after which she executed her sworn statement. Also at the police station,
appellant allegedly admitted before policemen that he killed Pantilgan. His statement was not taken
nor was his confession reduced into writing. This circumstance alone casts some doubt on the
prosecution's account that appellant freely and voluntarily confessed killing Pantilgan. It raises
questions not only as to the voluntariness of the alleged confession, but also on whether appellant
indeed made an oral confession.83 (Emphasis ours and citations omitted)

The Court emphasizes that an extrajudicial confession is not a sufficient ground for conviction, unless
it is corroborated by either direct or circumstantial evidence.84 If it is the latter, the accused may be
convicted when: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived and proven; and (c) the combination of jail the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.85

Unfortunately for the prosecution, most of the circumstantial pieces of evidence are inadmissible as
evidence against Marvin. The only remaining circumstance is the recovery of the stolen motorcycle in
Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

Yet notably, the police officers did not recover the motorcycle through the information Marvin allegedly
provided to either P/Supt. Villamer or Virgie. It was neither found in the possession of a certain Felix
as Marvin supposedly told P/Supt. Villamer, or with "Insan Joy," in the address given to
Vergie.86Rather, the police officers of the Sta. Rosa City Police Station chanced upon the
stolen motorcycle when they set-up a checkpoint at the Barangay Road of Kaingin, Sta.
Rosa, Laguna. The driver of the stolen motorcycle was Albert, not the petitioner in this
case.87Marvin was not even present at the time Albert was driving the motorcycle.

For these reasons, the totality of the evidence does not corroborate the extrajudicial confession of
Marvin. His conviction rests on tenuous grounds—the OR and CR were products of an illegal search,
the admission to P/Supt. Villamer was in violation of his right to counsel, and the Court cannot
determine the voluntariness and veracity of Marvin's oral confession of guilt to Virgie. The doubts as to
the guilt of Marvin are, therefore, more than reasonable, which warrants his acquittal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 12,
2017 and Resolution dated August 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37273, which
in turn affirmed the Judgment dated December 5, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 26, in Crim. Case No. 2011-0501, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Marvin Porteria y Manebali is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to: (a) cause the immediate release of the petitioner, unless he is
being lawfully held for another cause; and (b) inform this Court of the date of his release, or the
reason for his continued confinement as the case may be, within five (5) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

April 3, 2019

G.R. No. 240596

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
NOVO TANES y BELMONTE, Respondent

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
1

assailing the Decision  dated February 21, 2018 and Resolution  dated July 11, 2018 of the Court of
2 3

Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 08305-MIN, which upheld the Orders  dated 4

March 31, 2017 and June 27, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City
(RTC) in Crim. Case No. 22306. The RTC granted the application for bail of respondent Novo Tanes
y Belmonte (Tanes), who was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

On April 6, 2011, an Information  was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A.
5

9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about December 14, 2010, at about 8:20 P.M. in DARBCI Subdivision, National Highway,
General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
for Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) to poseur buyer, one sachet containing 0.0296 grams (sic)
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Tanes pleaded not guilty to the charge. On April 10, 2015, he filed a Petition for Bail.  The RTC
7

conducted hearings on October 7, 2015, November 4, 2015, and February 3, 2017 for the bail
application.8
Ruling of the RTC

On March 31, 2017, the RTC issued an Order  granting Tanes' application for bail, the fallo of which
9

reads:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the records, this Court finds justifiable grounds to grant
bail to the accused.

Accused is allowed to post bail bond for his temporary liberty in the fixed amount of TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00).

Set the continuation of trial x x x.

SO ORDERED. 10

The RTC found that the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong because there was doubt as to
whether the chain of custody in the buy-bust operation was preserved, explaining as follows:

The [c]ourt noted that in the affidavits of [the] prosecution's witnesses[,] there was allegedly a
previous buying transaction of shabu with the accused prior to the buy-bust operation subject of this
case. Thus, the PDEA agents had enough time to contact the media or DOJ representatives,
or any elected public official to witness the buy-bust operation being conducted following the
report on the illegal trading in drugs by the accused, but they fail[ed] to do so. Instead, they
were just merely called to sign the inventory sheet.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
11

The RTC ruled that the failure of the prosecution to show that the three witnesses (i.e., media
representative, DOJ representative, elected official) were also present in the actual buy-bust
operation and not only during the inventory negated the requirement of strong evidence of the
accused's guilt to justify a denial of bail. Moreover, the RTC ruled that the defense correctly cited the
case of People v. Jehar Reyes  (Jehar Reyes) in support of its argument.
12

The People (herein petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in an
Order  dated June 27, 2017.
13

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via petition for certiorari. It alleged that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting bail to Tanes
because: (1) it did not state a summary of the prosecution's evidence in its Order, therefore,
petitioner was not accorded due process; and (2) it required the presence of the three witnesses
during the conduct of the buy-bust operation and during the actual seizure of the drug, thereby
extending the requirement laid down in R.A. 9165. 14

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision  dated February 21, 2018, the CA dismissed the petition. According to the
15

CA, petitioner failed to show that the RTC's exercise of discretion in granting the application for bail
was unsound and unguided by jurisprudence.  It found that the RTC's Order was based on
16

jurisprudence, specifically on the rule on chain of custody and the Jehar Reyes case, which held that
the three witnesses must be present during the buy-bust operation and the confiscation of the
dangerous drugs from the accused. 17
Moreover, the CA also made its own appreciation of the evidence presented and found that "[t]he
evidence presented by the prosecution in establishing that [Tanes'] guilt was strong was tarnished by
a seemingly broken chain in the custody."  Specifically, the CA made the following findings:
18

Here, the poseur buyer testified that the representative from the media and the elected official who
signed the Inventory Sheet were absent during the actual buy bust operation. The said officials
appear to have gone to the crime scene only to sign the Inventory Sheet and leave after
signing the same. The absence of a representative from the DoJ also appears to be
inadequately explained as the police officers could have contacted another representative from the
DoJ when the other DoJ representative was unavailable.

It also appears that no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the
seized shabu in the presence of [Tanes], the representative of the media, and the elective
public official. There were only pictures captioned "Media representative signed/witness (sic) the
inventory" and "Brgy Kagawad signed/witness (sic) the inventory" but the person who took the
pictures was not presented during the bail hearing to explain the photographs. Moreover, the
testimony of the buy bust team leader regarding whether there was a photograph showing
the inventory of the seized sachets appears to be unclear.  (Emphasis and underscoring
19

supplied)

Further, the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. The records showed that three
hearings were conducted by the trial court for the bail application. During these hearings, petitioner
was duly represented by its prosecutors. Moreover, the CA stated that petitioner failed to identify
which piece/s of evidence that the prosecution presented before the bail hearings was/were
excluded by the RTC in weighing whether the evidence against Tanes' guilt was strong. 20

Furthermore, the CA also disagreed with petitioner's assertion that the RTC Order did not contain a
summary of the prosecution's evidence. 21

Petitioner's MR was denied by the CA in a Resolution  dated July 11, 2018; hence, this Petition.
22

Petition before the Court

In its Rule 45 Petition, petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court when the latter granted the petition for bail based solely on Jehar Reyes. In
particular, petitioner claims that R.A. 9165 only requires the presence of the three witnesses during
the conduct of the inventory, and not during the actual buy-bust operation. Also, petitioner avers that
the CA erred in affirming the trial court's ruling despite the latter's failure to appreciate the evidence
of the prosecution.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the RTC which granted Tanes' application for bail.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is totally without merit.

The right to bail

The right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, as stated in Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of discretion if the offense charged is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong.23

Procedure when bail is discretionary

In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 which carries the
penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the
evidence of his guilt is not strong.

To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail hearings is
required where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-
examine witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a summary
hearing, consistent with the purpose of merely determining the weight of evidence for purposes of
bail.
24

The court's grant or denial of the bail application must contain a summary of the prosecution's
evidence. On this basis, the judge formulates his or her own conclusion on whether such evidence is
strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. 25

Petitioner was not deprived of

procedural due process

Applying the abovementioned standards to the present case, the Court finds that, contrary to
petitioner's assertions, the trial court did observe the rules to be followed in granting or denying the
bail application. Records show that the RTC conducted hearings for the application of bail on
October 7, 2015, November 4, 2015, and February 3, 2017. In all these hearings, petitioner was duly
represented by its prosecutors. 26

Petitioner insists that the trial court miserably failed to state a summary or a reasonable recital of the
evidence for the prosecution.  As a result, petitioner avers that it was denied its right to due
27

process.  The Court disagrees.

28

In this regard, the Court finds it necessary to quote the relevant portions of the assailed RTC Order,
to wit:
Hearing on the petition ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses to prove that the
guilt of the accused is strong, to wit:

1. PSI Lily Grace M. Tadeo, the forensic chemist, who identified her findings as contained in the
Chemistry Reports Nos. D-332-2010 and D-333-2010 and the drug items;

2. PDEA Agent IO1 Mark Louis R. Degayo, team leader and photographer;

3. PDEA Agent IO1 Vincent Quelinderino, arresting officer; and

4. PDEA Agent IO1 Rodrick I. Gualisa, poseur-buyer.

They identified accused as the person who sold the drug item during the buy bust operation in the
amount of P500.00. The inventory of evidence/property and chain of custody were also identified.

Upon judicious and meticulous perusal of the evidence presented, the [c]ourt is of the view that the
evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong.

The [c]ourt note[s] that in the affidavits of prosecution's witnesses[,] there was allegedly a
previous buying transaction of shabu with the accused prior to the buy-bust operation subject of this
case. Thus, the PDEA agents had enough time to contact the media or DOJ representatives, or any
elected public official to witness the buy-bust operation being conducted following the report on the
illegal trading in drugs by the accused, but they fail[ed] to do so. Instead, they were just merely
called to sign the inventory sheet.

xxxx

With the evidence presented for the consideration of the Court, the prosecution failed to
substantiate its allegation to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Clearly, therefore,
the prosecution evidence as such does not meet the required standard of "strong evidence" to justify
the denial of the accused's right to bail.  (Emphasis supplied)
29

Petitioner assails the RTC Order because it did not contain (1) a recital of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of an actual buy-bust operation against Tanes;  or (2)
30

a summary of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses establishing the links in the chain of
custody of the confiscated drug.  However, a perusal of the RTC Order shows that it complied with
31

the jurisprudential standards on providing a summary of the prosecution's evidence.

In Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),  the Court discussed the meaning of "a summary of
32

the evidence for the prosecution" as follows:

x x x The summary of the evidence shows that the evidence presented during the prior hearing
is formally recognized as having been presented and most importantly, considered. The
summary of the evidence is the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only after
weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his discretion.
Thus, judicial discretion is not unbridled but must be supported by a finding of the facts relied upon
to form an opinion on the issue before the court. x x x  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
33

Moreover, in People v. Cabral,  which petitioner cites as basis, the Court ruled that the summary
34

"should necessarily be a complete compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented
during the hearing proper. x x x An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of
evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is
necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution." 35

Thus, what jurisprudence requires is a reasonable recital of every piece of evidence of the
prosecution - which was done in this case. Contrary to petitioner assertions, the testimonies per
se of the witnesses need not be reproduced in the Order, as long as the same
is recognized and considered by the trial court in its exercise of judicial discretion over the bail
application.

Clearly, the trial court followed the proper procedure in granting Tanes' bail application. Having
settled that petitioner was not deprived of its right to procedural due process, the Court shall now
deal with the propriety of granting the bail application.

Non-compliance with the rules on

chain of custody of illegal drugs
negates a strong evidence of Tanes'
guilt

The main thrust of the RTC's Order granting bail is that based on the evidence presented during the
bail hearings, the prosecution failed to prove that the chain of custody over the seized drug had been
preserved; hence, the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong. The Court wholeheartedly agrees.

To recall, Tanes was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165. The elements for conviction under said provision are: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.  The burden is on the State to prove not only these elements but also the corpus
36

delicti or the body of the crime.

In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the
law.  Consequently, compliance with the rule on chain of custody over the seized illegal drugs is
37

crucial in any prosecution that follows a buy-bust operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential
that the prohibited drug recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt.
38

In this regard, Section 21,  Article II of R.A. 9165 lays down the following procedure to be followed in
39

order to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence: (1) the seized items must
be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or
counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative
from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of
apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the
buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team.  In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be
40

physically present at the time of the conduct of the physical inventory of the seized items which, as
mentioned, must be immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation - a requirement that
can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its
nature, a planned activity.

In the present case, it appears that the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses
concerning the chain of custody of the seized drug. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that: (1)
there was no representative from the DOJ present during the buy-bust operation and the inventory;
(2) the two other witnesses (i.e., the media representative and the elected public official) were not
present during the apprehension and seizure of the illegal drug but were merely called to sign the
inventory sheet; and (3) no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in
the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. These lapses in the chain of custody created doubt as to
the identity and integrity of the seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes' guilt cannot be
characterized as strong.

No error in RTC's reliance on the case

of Jehar Reyes

Petitioner avers that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the bail application based
solely on the Jehar Reyes case. It maintains that R.A. 9165 only requires the presence of the three
witnesses during the conduct of the inventory, and not during the actual buy-bust operation.

The argument is without merit.

For reference, the relevant portion of Jehar Reyes is quoted below:

Thirdly, another substantial gap in the chain of custody concerned the absence of any
representative of the media or of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and of the elected public
official during the buy-bust operation and at the time of the confiscation of the dangerous
drugs from the accused in the area of operation. The Prosecution did not attempt to explain why
such presence of the media or DOJ representatives, and of the elected public official had not been
procured despite the buy-bust operation being mounted in the afternoon of November 27, 2002
following two weeks of surveillance to confirm the veracity of the report on the illegal trading in drugs
by the accused. The objective of requiring their presence during the buy-bust operation and at
the time of the recovery or confiscation of the dangerous drugs from the accused in the area
of operation was to ensure against planting of evidence and frame up. It was clear that ignoring
such objective was not an option for the buy-bust team if its members genuinely desired to protect
the integrity of their operation. Their omission attached suspicion to the incrimination of the accused.
The trial and appellate courts should not have tolerated the buy-bust team's lack of prudence in not
complying with the procedures outlined in Section 21(1), supra, in light of the sufficient time for them
to comply.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
41

The RTC cannot thus be faulted for relying on the clear and unequivocal ruling made in Jehar
Reyes because unless overturned, the same remains good case law. To the contrary, Jehar
Reyes has even been cited by the Court in at least six cases  subsequent to it, one of which
42

is People v. Sagana,  wherein the Court made similar findings regarding the three witness rule.
43

Citing Jehar Reyes, the Court therein held:

Similarly, none of the required third-party representatives was present during the seizure and
inventory of the dangerous articles.  Their presence in buy-bust operations and seizure of illicit
1âшphi1

articles in the place of operation would supposedly guarantee "against planting of evidence
and frame-up." In other words, they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination
proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."
x x x In this case, the records were bereft of any explanation why the third-party representatives
were present only during the belated photographing of the confiscated articles. Hence, the
very purpose of their mandated presence is defeated.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
44

It bears stressing that the pronouncement in Jehar Reyes as regards the presence of the three
witnesses in the buy-bust operation has also been ruled upon by the Court in other cases. In the
recent case of People v. Supat,  the Court made the following pronouncements:
45

Section 21(1) of RA 9165 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of
the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation.
Further, the inventory must be done in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or
representative, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official, who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of
apprehension. And only if this is not practicable that the IRR allows the inventory and photographing
at the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. This also means
that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of
apprehension - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. In other words, the
buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them said witnesses.

Moreover, while the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory and photographing
of the seized drugs, the requirement of having the three required witnesses to be physically
present at the time or near the place of apprehension is not dispensed with. The reason is
simple: it is at the time of arrest - or at the time of the drugs "seizure and confiscation" - that
the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of
seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the police practice of planting
evidence.  (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)
46

Also, the Court made similar pronouncements in People v. Tomawis,  to wit:
47

The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more
importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the
three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that
would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust
operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert
the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation
and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA
9165.

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three
witnesses, when they could easily do so and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to
witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has
already been finished - does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses
prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.

To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the
drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they
are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to
witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately
after seizure and confiscation."48

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed noncompliance with the three-
witness rule: first, only two witnesses were present; and second, the two witnesses were merely
"'called in" to witness the inventory of the seized drug. Additionally, no photograph was presented
showing the inventory of the seized shabu in the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. Hence, the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the petition for bail on the ground that
the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong due to doubts as regards the preservation of the chain of
custody. Such ruling by the RTC has unquestionable jurisprudential basis. Consequently, the CA
was correct in upholding the RTC.

A final note

There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug seized during the buy-bust
operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of illegal sale of drugs against Tanes is deemed not
strong. Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.

The present ruling, however, should not prejudge the RTC's ruling on the merits of the case. Indeed,
there are instances when the Court had ruled that failure to strictly comply with the procedure in
Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
void. In such cases, the prosecution must still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.  The prosecution must be able to adequately explain the reasons behind the procedural
49

lapses.50

The Court emphasizes that no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional
evidence for the prosecution to prove Tanes' guilt in the main case. After all, a grant of bail does not
prevent the RTC, as the trier of facts, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial
on the merits. 51

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 224974, July 03, 2017 ]
MARVIN CRUZ AND FRANCISCO CRUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS BONDSMAN,
PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The trial court's failure to comply with procedural rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion and may be the subject
of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated January 18, 2016 and Resolution[3] dated
June 1, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Marvin Cruz (Cruz) and his
bondsman, Francisco Cruz (Francisco) for being the wrong remedy. They filed the Petition before the Court of
Appeals to assail the Regional Trial Court's denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond after the criminal case
against Cruz was dismissed.

In an Information[4] dated September 19, 2013, Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with Robbery in an
Uninhabited Place and by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps of bronze metal and a copper
pipe worth P72,000.00 collectively.[5] Cruz posted bail through a cash bond in the amount of P12,000.00.[6]

The private complainant in the criminal case subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance[7] stating that he was no
longer interested in pursuing his complaint against Cruz.[8] On October 23, 2014, Assistant City Prosecutor Deborah
Marie Tan filed a Motion to Dismiss,[9] which was granted by Branch 170, Regional Trial Court, City of Malabon in an
Order[10] dated October 24, 2014.

Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond.[11] In an Order[12] dated January 7,
2015, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion on the ground that the case was dismissed through desistance and
not through acquittal. The Motion for Reconsideration[13] filed by Francisco was likewise denied in an Order[14] dated
April 6, 2015.

Cruz and Francisco filed a Petition for Certiorari[15] with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Regional Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond.

On January 18, 2016, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[16] dismissing the Petition.

The Court of Appeals anchored its dismissal on the ground that Cruz and Francisco should have filed an appeal,
instead of a petition for certiorari, to question the denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond.[17] The Court of
Appeals further stated that it could not treat the Petition for Certiorari as an appeal since the period for appeal had
lapsed before its filing.[18]

Cruz and Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied in the Resolution[19] dated June 1, 2016.
Hence, this Petition[20] was  filed.

Petitioners Cruz and Francisco insist that the filing of a petition for certiorari was proper since the Regional Trial
Court's denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond amounted to grave abuse of discretion. They point out that under
Rule 114, Section 22[21] of the Rules of Court, bail is deemed automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case
regardless of whether the case was dismissed through acquittal or desistance.[22]

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, points out that while Rule 114, Section 22 calls for automatic
cancellation, the cancellation is without prejudice to any liabilities on the bond.[23] Thus, it posits that while the
cancellation is automatic, the release of the bond is still subject to further proceedings. It adds that if the trial court
erred in dismissing petitioners' Motion to Release Cash Bond, the error is "perhaps . . . a mistake in the application of
the law" and not grave abuse of discretion, which should not be the subject of a petition for certiorari.[24]

Considering the parties' arguments, the sole issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy to question the denial of a motion to release cash bond.

The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower courts and tribunals.
It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial
system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of
their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and  adequate remedy
available to correct the error. Thus, certiorari may not be issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal.
As explained in Delos Santos v. Metrobank:[25]

We remind that the writ of certiorari — being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is
to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that
courts have no power or authority in law to perform) — is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot
be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or
the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before
them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine
from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors
were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no
other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in
matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its
jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or
quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common
law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying
down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an
inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that
purpose[.]

....

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.[26] (Citations omitted)

An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."[28] In order to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial
Court acted with grave abuse of discretion as to warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari against it.

Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may
be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution
of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

The provisions of the Rules of Court are clear. Bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled in three (3) instances: (1)
the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The
Rules of Court do not limit the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused.

The Office of the Solicitor General made the same observation in its Comment[29] before the Court of Appeals:

The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal was only due to the
desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was acquitted or that the crime was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is clear: the dismissal of the
criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail bond.[30] (Citation omitted)

Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the Solicitor General asserts, a mere error of
judgment. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation:[31]

This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, the Court held as inexcusable abuse of
authority the trial judge's "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure." Such level of
ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law," or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less.
[32]
 (Citations omitted)

When a court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, petitioners' remedy
was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court.

The Court of Appeals, however, focused on the Office of the Solicitor General's argument that petitioners availed the
wrong remedy. It cited Belfast Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. People[33]  and Babasa v. Linebarger[34] as
bases to rule that appeal was the proper remedy for a denial of a motion to release cash bond.

In Belfast Surety,[35] the trial court declared a forfeiture of cash bond under Rule 114, Section 15[36] of the 1964 Rules
of Criminal Procedure[37] for failure of the accused to appear on trial. This Court stated that while appeal would be the
proper remedy from a judgment of forfeiture of bond, certiorari is still available if the judgment complained of was
issued in lack or excess of jurisdiction:

While appeal is the proper remedy from a judgment of forfeiture, nevertheless, certiorari is available despite the
existence of the remedy of appeal where the judgment or order complained of was either issued in excess of or
without jurisdiction. Besides, appeal under the circumstances of the present case is not an adequate remedy since
the trial court had already issued a writ of execution. Hence, the rule that certiorari does not lie when there is an
appeal is relaxed where, as in the present case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution.[38] (Citations omitted)

Babasa, meanwhile, states that an appeal should be available in denials of petitions for the cancellation of a bond.
Nothing in Babasa,  however, limits the remedy to an appeal only:

Inasmuch as the said petition to procure the cancellation of the bond was denied without further process of law, it is
unquestionable that the order of court denying it could be appealed from, for the reason that if this last decision were
not appealable, it would become final, without ulterior remedy, and would work irreparable injury to the petitioner.[39]

Thus, a party may still file a petition for certiorari in instances where the lower court commits grave abuse of
discretion in excess of jurisdiction.

The automatic cancellation of bail, however, does not always result in the immediate release of the bail bond to the
accused. A cash bond, unlike a corporate surety or a property bond, may be applied to fines and other costs
determined by the court.[40] The excess shall be returned to the accused or to the person who deposited the money
on the accused's behalf.[41] Here, the Order dated October 24, 2014 reads:

Acting on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Deborah Marie O. Tan, based on the Affidavit of
Desistance executed by private complainant Efren C. Ontog, which states, among others, that he is no longer
interested in the further prosecution of this case, hence, without the active participation of the said private
complainant, the prosecution could no longer effectively obtain the required evidence to sustain the conviction of the
accused, the motion to dismiss is granted.

WHEREFORE, this case of "Robbery in Uninhabited Place and by a Band" against Marvin Cruz (MNU) is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

City of Malabon, October 24, 2014.[42]

There was no fine imposed on Cruz. The Order does not specify any costs of court that he must answer for. There
was, thus, no lien on the bond that could prevent its immediate release. Considering these circumstances, petitioners
could not have been faulted for filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals since there was no legal
basis for the Regional Trial Court to deny their Motion to Release Cash Bond.

Instead of addressing the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals instead chose to focus on procedural technicalities,
dismissing the petition for certiorari based on cases that did not actually prohibit the filing of a petition for certiorari.
While procedural rules are necessary for the speedy disposition of justice, its indiscriminate application should never
be used to defeat the substantial rights of litigants.[43]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 18, 2016 and Resolution dated June 1, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 141009
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for a resolution on the
merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL ESCOBAR,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the accused's second petition for bail. Res
judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case,[1] not in an interlocutory order in a criminal case.[2] An order
disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory.[3] This order does not attain finality when a new matter warrants a second
look on the application for bail.

Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which was denied by the Regional
Trial Court in the Order[4] dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of Appeals in the Decision[5] dated March 8, 2011. A
subsequent development in the accused's case[6] compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second Bail
Petition). On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied[7] this on the ground of res judicata. In the
Decision[8] dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals overturned the Regional Trial Court Order and granted the
Second Bail Petition.

Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace),
daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other victims.[9] Robert was the
owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines,[10] a manufacturing company of foams and mattresses.[11]

On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B. Torres (Torres), and her driver Dionisio F.
Burca (Burca) were passing by the front of Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City when a
vehicle blocked their way.[12] Another group of suspects helped as lookouts.[13]

Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres inside the vehicle.[14] The incident
happened in broad daylight.

Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects then travelled and detained Mary Grace,
Burca, and Torres in an undisclosed location in Batangas.[15] Afterwards, the group headed to Club Solvento, a
resort[16] in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar,[17] who personally served them food.[18]

Some of the accused[19] stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the others, namely, Villaver, Cesar Olimpiada,
a certain Cholo, and Biboy Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for the victims' release.[20] Cheng paid the ransom of
P15,000,000.00.[21]

At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club Solvento,[22] followed by co-accused brothers Rolando
and Harold Fajardo (the Fajardo brothers), who were alleged advisers of Villaver.[23] The group then locked
themselves in a room where Villaver partitioned the ransom money.[24] Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's driver,
[25]
 confessed to have received a total of P1,250,000.00 for the kidnapping operation.[26]

At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were finally released.[27] They were freed somewhere
in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12 hours since they were abducted.[28]

Cubillas became a state witness.[29] On June 3, 2002, he executed an extrajudicial confession and implicated
respondent Escobar as an adviser for Villaver.[30] Cubillas believed that Escobar was involved after he saw Escobar
talk to Villaver while they were in Club Solvento.[31] In his extrajudicial confession, Cubillas also claimed that Escobar
received a portion of the ransom money from Villaver.[32]

On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court charging Escobar as a co-
conspirator[33] in the kidnapping for ransom.[34] The charging portion stated:

That on or about June 18, 2001 at around 7:40 in the morning, at Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and
grouping themselves together, with others not present during the actual kidnapping but performing some other
peculiarly contributory roles, did, then and there, by force and intimidation, with the use of long firearms and clad in
police uniform, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and thereafter detain at some undisclosed place,
after having blocked their car in front of Malcolm Hall, Osmena Avenue, UP Campus, Diliman, Quezon City, MARY
GRACE CHENG-ROSAGAS, her driver DIONISIO F. BURCA and her bodyguard VALENTIN B. TORRES, against
their will and consent thereby depriving them of their liberty for more than twelve (12) hours for the purpose of
extorting ransom for their release in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), and which amount
was in fact paid by Mary Grace's father, Mr. Robert Cheng, owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, and have the same
delivered at E. Rodriguez Compound, Calamba, Laguna thereby resulting to the release of the kidnap victims
somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna at about 10:30 p.m. of the same day all to the damage and prejudice of the three (3)
victims and their families in such amount as may be awarded to them and their families under the provisions of the
Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[35]

Escobar was arrested on February 14, 2008.[36]

On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional Trial Court.[37] During the hearing on
Escobar's bail application, Cubillas testified that Escobar and the Fajardo brothers were Villaver's advisers.[38]

In the Order dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied[39] Escobar's First Bail Petition. The dispositive
portion read:

The Petition for Bail filed by accused Manny Escobar is denied for lack of merit considering that state witness Cancio
Cubillas positively identified said accused as the owner of Club Solvento located in Calamba, Laguna; that he was
the one who served food to the group of Rolando Villaver, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez,
Cholo, Cesar Olimpiada, Mike, Alan Celebre, Biboy Lugnasin and witness himself, Cancio Cubillas; that it was also in
said Club Solvento where Cancio Cubillas, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Mike and Alan
Celebre rested and slept after Rolando Villaver, Cholo, Biboy Lugnasin and Cesar Olimpiada left to negotiate for the
ransom of kidnap victim Mary Grace Cheng Rosagas, and that on the night of June 18, 2001, Cubillas saw accused
Rolando Villaver gave part of the ransom money to him.

SO ORDERED.[40]

Escobar appealed before the Court of Appeals.[41] On March 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed[42] the denial of
the First Bail Petition. It recognized that Cubillas' extrajudicial confession was generally incompetent evidence against
his co-accused and was admissible against himself only[43] for being hearsay and for violating the res inter alios
acta rule.[44] Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals invoked an exception to this rule and held that the Regional Trial
Court "did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of Cubillas"; rather, the trial court also relied on Cubillas'
testimony during the bail hearing.[45]

Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeals March 8, 2011 Decision.[46]

Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of the co-accused Fajardo brothers, Rolando
Fajardo (Rolando),[47] who applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court.[48] As in Escobar's bail hearing, the
prosecution relied solely on Cubillas' statements to establish the strength of Fajardo's guilt.[49] In an Order dated
September 13, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied Rolando's petition for bail.[50]

However, in an Order dated October 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court reversed its previous order and granted
Rolando's bail application.[51] The Regional Trial Court stated:
To summarize, the evidence for the prosecution does not establish that accused Rolando Fajardo participated during
the actual abduction of Rosagas, Burca and Torres or that during the actual abduction, accused Rolando Fajardo
gave advice or instruction to the other accused herein. The evidence for the prosecution likewise does not establish
that accused Rolando Fajardo acted as adviser to accused Rolando Villaver and his group in connection with the
kidnapping of the victims herein. There is no testimony as to what advice or instructions were made by accused
Rolando Fajardo in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is thus a paucity of evidence
establishing the participation of accused Rolando Fajardo in the kidnapping of Rosagas, Burca and Torres.
[52]
 (Emphasis supplied)

The reversal came about after the trial court considered that, according to Cubillas, "[Rolando] was not present
before, during and after the kidnapping."[53] There was paucity of evidence on Rolando's alleged participation.[54]

Meanwhile, on October 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied Escobar's motion for reconsideration.[55] He no longer
appealed before this Court.[56]

By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final judgment on the merits of the case as all the
other accused who had active participation in the kidnapping had been granted bail.[57] Escobar saw Rolando's
release on bail as a new "development which warrant[ed] a different view" on his own bail application.[58]

Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second Bail Petition) before the Regional Trial
Court.[59] He noted that Cubillas could not explain how either Rolando or Escobar advised Villaver and that both
Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, and after the kidnapping.[60] Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail
was granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas' testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial court should likewise
grant him provisional release.[61]

On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied[62] Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata,
[63]
 reasoning thus: "[i]n deference to the Decision of the Court of Appeals which has already attained finality,
accused's Petition for Bail which is actually a second petition for bail[,] must be necessarily denied."[64]

Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional Trial Court.[65] On January 14, 2013, he
appealed before the Court of Appeals via Rule 65, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his Second Bail Petition.[66]

In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted[67] the petition for certiorari and ordered the
Regional Trial Court to determine the appropriate bail for Escobar's provisional liberty. The dispositive portion read:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2012, September 14, 2012, September 17, 2012 and
November 6, 2012 Orders, are SET ASIDE. The trial court is directed to determine the appropriate bail for the
provisional liberty of the petitioner, Manuel Escobar, with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.[68]

The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.[69] According to the Court of Appeals,
Escobar's Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata, which applies only if the former judgment is a final
order or judgment and not an interlocutory order.[70] An order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.[71]

On April 4, 2014, the Regional Trial Court fixed[72] Escobar's bail at P300,000.00. The dispositive portion read:

In view of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 24 March 2014, the bail for the provisional liberty of
accused Manuel Escobar is hereby fixed at Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[73]

In the Resolution dated September 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied[74] the prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration.

On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for Review[75] via
Rule 45 before this Court. In its Petition, the prosecution does not pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order of the Court of Appeals Decision;[76] rather, in assailing the grant of Escobar's Second Bail Petition, the
prosecution avers that the doctrine of res judicata must be respected.[77]

On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment,[78] arguing that res judicata did not apply here,[79] that there was no
strong evidence of his guilt,[80] and that the Court of Appeals could rectify errors of judgment in the greater interest of
justice.[81] According to Escobar:

13. Due to this sudden development of the grant of bail to his co-accused, [Rolando], and considering that both
[Rolando] and [Escobar]'s alleged participation in the crime are based on the same court-declared unreliable
"speculations" of the state witness Cubillas, who even admitted he was lying when questioned during [Escobar]'s own
bail hearings, it was in the interest of justice and fairness to re-open the matter of bail with respect to [Escobar] and
thereby grant the same. And the Honorable Court of Appeals agreed.[82]

This Court's program to decongest holding jails led City Jail Warden Randel H. Latoza (City Jail Warden Latoza) to
review Escobar's case.[83] In his manifestation dated August 18, 2016, City Jail Warden Latoza informed this Court
that there was no temporary restraining order against the Regional Trial Court April 4, 2014 Order, which fixed
Escobar's provisional liberty at P300,000.00. He also acknowledged the Court of Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision
granting Escobar the right to bail.[84] He mentioned that Escobar had posted the P300,000.00 bail, as ordered by the
trial court.[85] Thus, he moved to allow Escobar's provisional release on bail.[86]

City Jail Warden Latoza alleged that Escobar had paid the necessary surety bond[87] and attached a copy of
Traveller's Insurance Surety Corporation's surety bond undertaking to his manifestation.[88] However, the attached
surety bond undertaking was neither notarized nor approved by the Regional Trial Court judge.[89]

In a Letter dated May 15, 2017, the Commission on Human Rights wrote to Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio to
ask for the speedy resolution of the case as Escobar was already 78 years old.[90]

For resolution are the following issues:

First, whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata; and

Finally, whether respondent should be granted bail.

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained but "whose guilt
has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt.[91] The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to
be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:[92]

The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a
person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be allowed
provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court, as required under
specified conditions.[93] (Citations omitted)

Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is "not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional Trial Court.
[94]
 However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment—"regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution"—and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong,
then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.[95]

In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death,[96] reduced to reclusion perpetua.[97] Escobar's
bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.[98]

Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.
....

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The Regional Trial Court denied[99] Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals
overturned[100] this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata.

In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged."[101] This doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same
claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment.[102] It likewise bars the re-
litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also known as issue preclusion or
conclusiveness of judgement.[103] It "exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical
necessity, and public tranquillity."[104]

Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan[105] held that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39"[106] of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:

Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

....

(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings.
[107]

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between the parties or their
successors-in-interest.[108] Trinidad v. Marcelo[109] declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings."[110] Rule 124, Section 18 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. - The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and
48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases
shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases,[111] Rule 39 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Trinidad:[112]

Petitioner's arguments — that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis
to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening event or
evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of facts and circumstances — do not lie.

Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.

But even if petitioner's arguments] were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or the criminal
law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman.[113] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not give rise to res
judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to contemplate "res
judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will still not apply.[114] Double jeopardy requires that the accused
has been convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his
express consent.[115] Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been
convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's Second Bail Petition cannot
be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.

Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements:

1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;

3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.[116]
In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an interlocutory order. A final judgment
"leaves nothing else to be done" because the period to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has already ruled
on the case.[117] In contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a
case, the court decides on a point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy.[118]

An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action";[119] in other
words, something else still needs to be done in the primary case—the rendition of the final judgment.[120] Res
judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory
order even if this order is not appealed.[121] In Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit:[122]

Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the September 17, 1997 [interlocutory] Order of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 3517 bars it from rehearing questions on the ownership of Lot 4417. She insists that said
Order has become final and executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it.

We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule 39, has two accepted
interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to do so has
expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved. The second sense
connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The
phrase refers to a. final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental,
subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to
dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only to
those falling under the second category.

....

For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res adjudicata [sic] that will bar a
subsequent action, because such order is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the rendition of the
final judgment.[123] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter[124]—whether accused is entitled to provisional
liberty—and is not a final judgment on accused's guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is
summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s] unnecessary thoroughness" and does not try the merits of the case.
[125]
 Thus:

Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for
purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration
particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.[126] (Emphasis in the original)

Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying bail is an interlocutory order."[127] The
merits of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.

Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying Escobar's First Bail Petition did
not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not attained finality. Since res judicata has not
attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision, the Regional Trial Court should have taken cognizance of
Escobar's Second Bail Petition and weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt against him.

In any case, the Court of Appeals may still reverse its Decision, notwithstanding its denial of the First Bail Petition on
March 8, 2011.

Rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party and deprive him or her of fundamental rights
and liberties. A judgment or order may be modified where executing it in its present form is impossible or unjust in
view of intervening facts or circumstances:[128]

[W]here facts and circumstances transpire which render [the] execution [of a judgment] impossible or unjust and it
therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition
with the prevailing circumstances."[129] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Appellate courts may correct "errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of
final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality."[130] Thus, an accused may file a second petition
for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or a "new matter or fact which warrants a different view."[131]

Rolando's release on bail is a new development in Escobar's case.[132] The Court of Appeals has pointed out that the
other alleged co-conspirators are already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was granted bail because Cubillas'
testimony against him was weak.[133] "[Escobar] and [Rolando] participated in the same way, but [Escobar]'s bail was
denied."[134] Escobar's fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in the meantime.

Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable . . . (Emphasis supplied)

The same evidence used by the trial court to grant bail to Rolando was not used similarly in Escobar's favor. As the
Court of Appeals found:[135]

We cannot ignore the allegation of conspiracy and that the other accused were all granted bail except him.
Specifically, [Rolando] was granted bail due to the weakness of Cubillas' testimony against him.[136]

In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar's First Bail Petition, his Second Bail Petition should have
been given due course. It should not be denied on the technical ground of res judicata.

II

The Court of Appeals already approved Escobar's bail petition. Meanwhile, City Jail Warden Latoza has informed this
Court of the absence of any temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals Decision granting the Second
Bail Petition, as well as the Regional Trial Court Order fixing his bail at P300,000.00.[137] Thus, the Court of Appeals
March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar's provisional liberty can be executed upon the approval of his bail bond, if
he has indeed paid the surety bond.

In closing, no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional evidence for the prosecution to prove
Escobar's guilt in the main case. "[A] grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts . . . from making a final
assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits."[138] As the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

[T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without prejudice for the prosecution to submit additional
evidence to prove [Escobar]'s guilt in the course of the proceedings in the primary case.[139]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No.
128189 is AFFIRMED.

Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety bond that must be contained in a public
document and approved by the Regional Trial Court judge. Otherwise, he is directed to post bail.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

APRIL 4, 2018

G.R. No. 213225

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
RENANTE COMPRADO Y BRONOLA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision  dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
1

CR-HC No. 01156 which affirmed the Decision  dated 18 April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court,
2

Branch 25, Misamis Oriental (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 finding Renante
Comprado y Bronola (accused-appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuan.

THE FACTS

On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Information reads:

That on July 15, 2011, at more or less eleven o'clock in the evening, along the national highway,
Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, control and custody 3,200
grams of dried fruiting tops of suspected marijuana, which substance, after qualitative examination
conducted by the Regional Crime Laboratory, Office No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City, tested positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug, with the said accused, knowing the substance to be a dangerous
drug. 3
Upon his arraignment on 8 August 2011, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant (CJ) sent a text message to Police
Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 6,
Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged courier of marijuana together with a female
companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his possession a
backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. At
9:30 in the evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged drug courier had
boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City.
The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the marking
"Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put
up a checkpoint in front of the station. 4

At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen stopped the bus bearing the said body and plate
numbers. P/Insp. Orate, Police Officer 3 Teodoro de Oro (PO3 De Oro), Senior Police Officer 1
Benjamin Jay Reycitez (SPOJ Reycitez), and PO1 Rexie Tenio (PO1 Tenio) boarded the bus and
saw a man matching the description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the back of the
bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp. Orate asked the man to open the bag, the police
officers saw a transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves. 5

SPO1 Reycitez took photos of accused-appellant and the cellophane bag containing the dried
marijuana leaves.  PO3 De Oro, in the presence of accused-appellant, marked the bag "RCB-2" and
6

the contents of the bag "RCB-1."  Thereafter, PO1 Tenio and PO3 De Oro brought accused-
7

appellant and the seized bag to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.   On 16 July 2011, at
8

around 1:40 in the morning, Police Senior Inspector Charity Caceres (PSI Caceres) of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Office 10, Cagayan de Oro City, received the requests for examination and the
specimen. PSI Caceres, after conducting qualitative examination of the specimen, issued Chemistry
Report No. D-253-2011  stating that the dried leaves seized from accused-appellant were marijuana
9

and which weighed 3,200 grams.

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He maintains that on 15 July
2011, at around 6:30 in the evening, he and his girlfriend went to the house of a certain Freddie
Nacorda in Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect the latter's debt. When they were about to leave, Nacorda
requested him to carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City

When they reached Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, their vehicle was stopped by three (3) police
officers. All of the passengers were ordered to alight from the vehicle for baggage inspection. The
bag was opened and they saw a transparent cellophane bag containing marijuana leaves. At around
9:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-appellant, his girlfriend, and the police officers who arrested
them boarded a bus bound for Cagayan de Oro City.

When the bus approached Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, the police officers told the bus driver to
stop at the checkpoint.  The arresting officers took photos of accused-appellant and his girlfriend
1âwphi1

inside the bus. They were then brought to the police station where they were subjected to custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel.  10

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. It held that
accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim that he was merely requested to bring the bag to Cagayan
de Oro City, did not prove his innocence; mere possession of the illegal substance already
consummated the crime and good faith was not even a defense. The RTC did not lend credence to
accused-appellant's claim that he was arrested in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, because it was
unbelievable that the police officers would go out of their jurisdiction in Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City,
just to apprehend accused-appellant in Bukidnon. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused RENANTE COMPRADO y

BRONOLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime defined and penalized under
Section 11, [7], Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as charged in the Information, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the Fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos [₱500,000.00], without subsidiary penalty in case of nonpayment of
fine.

Let the penalty imposed on the accused be a lesson and an example to all who have criminal
propensity, inclination and proclivity to commit the same forbidden acts, that crime does not pay, and
that the pecuniary gain and benefit which one can derive from possessing drugs, or other illegal
substance, or from committing any other acts penalized under Republic Act 9165, cannot
compensate for the penalty which one will suffer if ever he is prosecuted and penalized to the full
extent of the law.  11

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined that accused-appellant
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court because he raised no objection as to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. The CA reasoned that the seized items are admissible in evidence
because the search and seizure of the illegal narcotics were made pursuant to a search of a moving
vehicle. It added that while it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no representatives
from the media and other personalities required by law were present during the operation and during
the taking of the inventory, noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal
and would not render inadmissible accused-appellant’s arrest or the items seized from him because
the prosecution was able to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had
been preserved. The CA disposed the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment dated 18 April 2013 of the Regiorial Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 is hereby
affirmed in toto. 
12

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES

I. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid;

II. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence; and

III. Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

 OUR RULING

The Court finds for accused-appellant.

I.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. 13

The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.   This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search
14

incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4)
Consented warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and
emergency circumstances.  15

II.

A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
However, the distinctions between the two have already been settled by the Court in Malacat
v. CA: 16

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or prope1iy found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.

xxxx

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled [to] the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk" it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk."
A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.   (emphases supplied and citations omitted)
17

III.

A valid stop-and-frisk was illustrated in the cases of Posadas v. CA (Posadas),   Manalili v. CA

18

(Manalili),   and People v. Solayao (Solayao).

19

In Posadas, two policemen were conducting a surveillance within the premises of the Rizal Memorial
Colleges when they spotted the accused carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They
approached the accused and identified themselves as police officers. The accused attempted to flee
but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the policemen who then checked the buri bag wherein
they found guns, ammunition, and a grenade. 21

In Manalili, police officers were patrolling the Caloocan City cemetery when they chanced upon a
man who had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. When this person tried to avoid
the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The
policemen then asked what he was holding in his hands, but he turned to resist.  22

In Solayao, police operatives were carrying out an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran, Biliran. Later on, they met
the group of accused-appellant. The police officers became suspicious when they observed that the
men were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit. Upon seeing the government agents, accused-appellant's companions fled. Thus, the police
officers found justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused.
23

IV.

On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and frisk committed by the
police in People v. Cogaed (Cogaed).   In that case, the police officers received a message from an
24

informant that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San
Gabriel, La Union, to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. A checkpoint was set up and when a
passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the checkpoint, the jeepney driver disembarked
and signaled to the police officers that the two male passengers were carrying marijuana.

SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Cogaed
and Santiago Dayao. SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao what their bags contained.
Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the
bags as a favor for their barrio mate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue
bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. The Court, in that case, invalidated the
search and seizure ruling that there were no suspicious circumstances that preceded the arrest.
Also, in Cogaed, there was a discussion of various jurisprudence wherein the Court adjudged that
there was no valid stop-and-frisk:
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus
terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street and· identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged
that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta's arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. It
was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not
admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.

Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police's informant,
who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. Here, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI
waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. Like
in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin's bag and found bundles of what turned out to be
marijuana leaves. The court declared that the search and seizure was illegal. Aminnudin was
acquitted.

xxxx

People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been
receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles
City." One night, the police received information that this drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at the hotel. The
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. The man alighted from
his car. He was carrying a juice box. The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live
ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua's situation when the
police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no. valid 'stop-and-frisk'."  (citations omitted)
25

The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the
records reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to
rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. P/Insp. Orate testified as follows:

[Prosecutor Vicente]:

Q: On that date Mr. Witness, at about 6:30 in the evening, what happened, if any?

A: At about 6:30 in the evening, I received an information from our Confidential Informant reporting
that an alleged courier of marijuana were sighted in their place, Sir.

xxxx
[Court]:

Q: Aside from the sighting of this alleged courier of marijuana, what else was relayed to you if there
were anything else?

A: Our Confidential Informant told me that two persons, a male and a female were having in their
possession a black pack containing marijuana, Sir.

xxxx

Q: And then, after you received the information through your cellphone, what happened next, Mr.
Witness?

A: So, I prepared a team to conduct an entrapment operation in order to intercept these two persons,
Sir.

Q: You said that the Informant informed you that the subject was still in Cabanglasan?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: How did you entrap the subject when he was still in Cabanglasan?

A: I am planning to conduct a check point because according to my Confidential Informant the

subject person is from Gingoog City, Sir.

Q: According to the information, how will he go here?

A: He will be travelling by bus, Sir.

Q: What bus?

A: Bachelor, Sir.

Q: And then, what happened next Mr. Witness?

A: At about 9:30 in the evening my Confidential Informant again called and informed me that the
subject person is now boarding a bus going to Cagayan de Oro City, Sir.

Q: What did he say about the bus, if he said anything, Mr. Witness?

A: My agent was able to identify the body number of the bus, Bus No. 2646.

Q: Bearing Plate No.?

A: Bearing Plate No. KVP 988, Sir.

Q: What was he bringing at that time, according to the information?

A: According to my agent, these two persons were bringing along with them a back pack color black
violet with markings LOWE ALPINE.
Q: Then, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A: We set up a check point in front of our police station and we waited for the bus to come over, Sir.

xxxx

Q: About 11 o'clock in the evening, what happened, Mr. Witness?

A: When we sighted the bus we flagged down the bus.

Q: After you flagged down the bus, what happened next?

A: We went on board the said bus, Sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next?

A: We went to the back of the bus and I saw a man carrying a back pack, a black violet which was
described by the Confidential Informant, the back pack which was placed on his lap.

xxxx

Q: What happened next?

A: When he opened the back pack, we found marijuana leaves, the back pack containing cellophane
which the cellophane containing marijuana leaves.  ·26

In his dissent from Esquillo v. People,  Justice Lucas P. Bersamin emphasizes that there should be
27

"presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." This principle was subsequently recognized in the recent
cases of Cogaed and Sanchez v. People.   In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a
28 29

passenger carrying his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover,
such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-
appellant was in possession of marijuana.

V.

As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.  Thus, it
30

becomes imperative to determine whether accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was valid.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances wherein a peace
officer or a private person may lawfully arrest a person even without a warrant:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (l) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.  On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot
31

pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just
been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. 32

Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-appellant could not be said to
have executed any overt act in the presence or within the view of the arresting officers 'Which would
indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Neither did the
arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had just
committed an offense. Again, without the tipped information, accused-appellant would just have
been any other bus passenger who was minding his own business and eager to reach his
destination. It must be remembered that warrantless arrests are mere exceptions to the
constitutional right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus, they must be
strictly construed against the government and its agents. While the campaign against proliferation of
illegal drugs is indeed a noble objective, the same must be conducted in a manner which does not
trample upon well-established constitutional rights. Truly, the end does not justify the means.

VI.

The appellate court, in convicting accused-appellant, reasoned that the search and seizure is valid
because it could be considered as search of a moving vehicle:

Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability
of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however,
are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an]
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
33

The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this
particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a· specific person. Further, in search of a
moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy
to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus
was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of
the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the
said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus
passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the
floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of
waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that
vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target
person.

VII.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.  This exclusionary rule instructs that evidence
34

obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words,
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding.  35

Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an

acquittal is warranted, despite accused-appellant's failure to object to the regularity of his arrest
before arraignment. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 
36

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Renante
Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from detention unless he is detained
for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to
IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days
from receipt.

SO ORDERED.