Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417               July 22, 2015

[Formerly known as OCA IPI No. 10-3466-RTJ]

ELADIO D. PERFECTO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO D. ESIDERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

On July 15, 2010, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative Complaint  against Judge Alma
1

Consuelo Desales-Esidera of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman,

Northern Samar for falsification of public document and dishonesty.

Eladio Perfecto (Perfecto) alleged that Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera (Judge
Desales-Esidera) was first married to Richard Tang Tepace on May 7, 1987 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
2

On October 3, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera gave birth to a daughter with Renato

Verano Esidera at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City.  Her marriage to Richard Tang
3

Tepace was later declared void on January 27, 1992. 4

Based on her certification of marriage records dated February 21, 2009, Judge Desales-
Esidera married Renato Verano Esidera on June 3, 1992. 5

Perfecto further alleged that Judge Desales-Esidera falsified her daughter’s birth
certificate to make it appear that she and Renato Verano Esidera were married on March
18, 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate child.  No marriage took place on that
6

date based on a certification of no marriage issued by the Office of the City Civil
Registrar of Paranaque City.  Judge Desales-Esidera did not take any step to rectify the
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error on her daughter’s birth certificate.

8

Perfecto prays for Judge Desales-Esidera’s dismissal from office for her alleged
dishonesty.  Judge Desales-Esidera filed her Comment with Motion to Dismiss on
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December 30, 2010.  She argued that Perfecto did not comply with the requirement of
10

personal knowledge under Rule 140, Section 1.  He should have supported his
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Complaint "with affidavits of persons who knew her personally or with authenticated
copies of documents that supported his allegations."  Otherwise, Perfecto’s allegations
12

were nothing more than "tsismis" or hearsay.  Perfecto perjured himself when he
13

subscribed to facts that were not based on his personal knowledge. 14

Judge Desales-Esidera brought this court’s attention to the allegedly malicious means by
which Perfecto obtained the documents supporting his allegations.  According to her, the
15

documents were secured in connivance with persons involved in or were related to

parties in other administrative cases. Perfecto also connived with court employees who
violated either the law or Supreme Court circulars by bringing court records outside the
court without the judge’s knowledge or consent.  Judge Desales-Esidera claimed that
16

this affects Perfecto’s credibility and integrity.

17
Moreover, Judge Desales-Esidera claimed that the persons involved in obtaining the
documents "desperately want[ed] [her] out of the judiciary so that they could continue
their illegal activities in the office[,] like temporary borrowing of funds in the Office of the
Clerk of Court . . . and the abuse of the accreditation of [Perfecto][,] whose newspaper
[was] not printed and circulated generally and regularly in Northern Samar." 18

Judge Desales-Esidera further argued that the charges against her were personal and
not judicial.  She did not participate in the accomplishment of the birth certificate.  She
19 20

had planned to correct her daughter’s birth certificate, but she and her husband decided
against it for the best interest of her daughter.21

On the question of integrity, honesty, and morality, Judge Desales-Esidera argued that
everything she did was legal and in accordance with her religious beliefs. She was,
indeed, married to her second husband on March 18, 1990, but only under recognized
Catholic rites.  The priest who officiated their marriage had no authority to solemnize
22

marriages under the civil law.

Further, Judge Desales-Esidera argued that while her religious marriage was done
before the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, the prevailing jurisprudence at that
time was that "there was no need for a judicial decree to establish the invalidity of void
marriage."  She described her state of mind and motivations for her acts as follows:
23

When I got married the first time, it was not our intention to live together as husband and
wife. It was a secret marriage solemnized by a judge. We planned of a church wedding
supposedly on my birthday of the same year. However, Richard reasoned out that he
was still confused because his mother was sick while his father, a Chinese, would not
agree because it was the Year of the Dragon. As established by the evidence in the
annulment case (Decision, page 4 onwards, Annex C of Complaint), I continued living
with my parents and using my paternal name. Never for a moment did we live together as
husband and wife. For some reasons we cooled off and finally called it quits. When I met
my second husband, I found it very much unfair to be bound in a marriage that was never
consummated. I wanted the marriage annulled. But the annulment process was long and
I was not getting any younger. Then, I got pregnant. I knew it was against my values but I
had no choice. I heard that getting pregnant beyond thirty was more risky.

Renato and I are both religious. We both wanted to correct what we have started
wrongly. I consulted at least two priests who were knowledgeable on Canon Law, a
certain Fr. Albarico from San Sebastian Church and Rev. Fr. David J. Tither, [Link].R of
the Redemptorist Church in Baclaran. I also made my own research on Catholic
annulment and got a copy of the deliberations on "psychological incapacity" as a ground
for annulment under the Family Code. I need not over emphasize that in view of the
separation of the Church and the State, civil marriages are not recognized by the
Catholic Church. Couples who are civilly married are considered living in state of sin, and
may be ex-communicated. They cannot receive the sacraments. Thus, my marriage to
Richard Tang was not recognized by the Catholic Church. Moreover, in my research I
found this digest in Vol. 1, Civil Code Annotated, Ambrosio Padilla, p. 454, 1975 edition:

"People vs. Whipkey, (CA) 69, O.G. 9678. – Pursuant to Art. 66 of the Civil Code, before
a marriage license can be obtained by a citizen or subject of a foreign country, he must
first present a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage to be issued by the
diplomatic or consular official of his own country. The law stresses the mandatory
character of this requirement by the use of the word "necessary", so that marriage
license secured in violation of Article 66 of the Civil Code is a void license."

I need not go into details. But anybody knows that a marriage solemnized with a void
license is no marriage at all. My marriage to Richard Tang, a Chinese, was void ab initio.
If I am not mistaken, at that time, the jurisprudence was that there was no need for a
judicial decree to establish the invalidity of void marriage. (People vs. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033, cited on page 470 of the same book).

The logical conclusion, therefore, was that there was no impediment for Renato and I to
get married although we still need the court order to cancel the registration. But we both
can receive the sacrament. Our primary purpose in availing of the Sacrament of Holy
Matrimony was to continue living in a state of grace while waiting for the result of the
annulment case which came two years later. So after consultations and a little catechesis
with Fr. David Tither, he finally officiated the sacramental marriage rite in one of the
confessional rooms in the parish office of Baclaran Church with two other priests. Rev.
Fr. Patrick J. Deane, [Link].R and Rev. Fr. Desmond de Souza, [Link].R., as witnesses.
Our second marriage on June 3, 1992 was again in a religious ceremony but with all the
formalities required by law.

That pregnancy was very complicated. In fact, it was diagnosed as ectopic pregnancy.
After two sessions with Fr. David Tither, also a known healer and exorcist, the fetus
finally went down from the fallopian tube to the womb but was born prematurely. It was
also difficult and painful giving birth to her. So, my husband Renato took charge of
everything, including the preparation for the registration of the baby.

Complainant accuses me of falsifying the birth certificate of my daughter, Mary Joyce.

However, her certificate of live birth form was accomplished by her father in his own
handwriting and signed by him. My husband Renato is not a lawyer. To him, what
matters is that our union is blessed by God and that before the eyes of the Almighty, our
daughter is legitimate.

The date of marriage which my husband supplied in the birth certificate of our daughter,
Mary Joyce, is the date we received the Sacrament of Holy Matrimony on March 18,
1990. Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National Archives
or from the civil government. . . . It was a purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal
effect but definitely valid and recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It is called
"matrimoña de conciencia". All he could give us was a blank certificate of marriage but
signed by him and the two priest witnesses, a certification and a covering letter (Annex E,
F and G). The need referred to in the covering letter did not arrive because our second
marriage (June 3, 1992) came before Mary Joyce attended the pre-school, so the form
remained blank up to this date. If I were as scheming as my accusers, I should have filled
it up a long time ago. But I am too honest and honorable to do that. According to the
Order to comment, I am also accused of immorality. The basis of morality is generally the
do’s and don’ts set by the Church of whatever religion. As Catholics, we have the Ten
Commandments. I have sinned against one but I took advantage of the Sacrament of
Reconciliation and the Sacrament of Matrimony. I did not, and do not live with anybody
not my husband as defined by my Catholic faith. Chastity is a virtue. Even if one is civilly
married but if there is no religious ratification, in the eyes of my God, the spouses are
living in sin and cannot take the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist.

From the day I saw the certified copy of the birth certificate of our daughter, I already
planned to correct it. But, being married, anything that would affect our family must be a
conjugal decision. We decided against it, not because I am a lawbreaker, dishonest or
immoral, but because not to disturb her birth record will serve her best interest and
welfare. It will save her the embarrassment of being different in some way from her
sisters; and the repercussion of being branded an "illegitimate" by her teachers and
peers. As a mother, I have to protect her from everything detrimental to her well-being.
More than a judge, I am a mother and a wife. As a lawyer, I agreed because it can
always be corrected when the time or need comes. This case has already affected my
daughter emotionally, especially when she learned that somebody secured her birth
certificate and pretended to be "Mary Joyce." She could not understand why she should
be dragged in this controversy using her birth certificate which is supposed to be
confidential. Neither do I. If the Xerox copies appended to the Complaint were perused
carefully, my children, especially Mary Joyce, would have been saved from emotional
shock and trauma. Being appointed to the Judiciary is not a license to pry on our
personal life before I became a judge and criticize our wisdom.

Finally, my life and the status of our firstborn could not have escaped the scrutiny of all
those involved in the selection process in the appointment to the Judiciary, including
those who conducted the background investigation. It is personal and has nothing to do
with my professional life then, and now, with my judicial life. My love story is the best
proof of my morality and my honesty. I never kept it a secret; but I cannot allow it also to
be publicized unnecessarily. The first civil marriage was never consummated because of
our agreement to have a church wedding first. The second marriage was purely a
sacramental rite in obedience to the Law of God, so that my husband and I would
continue living together without offending our God until the annulment process was
finalized. The third marriage was made to finally formalize our status in the eyes of the
law of man.

The reason for these administrative cases is that I cannot be like my accusers. I cannot
join them because I value my dignity and my peace of mind.

We all have our stories to tell. Nobody’s perfect. What is important is we learn from our
mistakes, amend our lives and avoid further wrongdoings. If the Honorable Court
Administrator, through the Legal Office, would only conduct discreet investigation on the
life of my accusers and their lifestyles, the Office would realize who among us is leading
an immoral life.  (Emphasis in the original)
24

On September 29, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge
Desales-Esidera be found guilty of disgraceful, immoral, or dishonest conduct and that
she be suspended from judicial service for 15 days with the warning that a repetition of a
similar offense would be dealt with more severely. 25

The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Desales-Esidera condoned the
misrepresentation made on her child’s birth certificate.26

The Office of the Court Administrator also found that Judge Desales-Esidera engaged in
an "illicit affair" and contracted a second marriage while another marriage
subsisted.  She contracted the second marriage knowing that there were legal
27

impediments to that marriage.  Judge Desales-Esidera "did not comport herself

28

according to her Roman Catholic faith." 29

We find that Judge Desales-Esidera’s omission to correct her child’s birth certificate is
not sufficient to render her administratively liable under the circumstances. The error in
the birth certificate cannot be attributed to her. She did not participate in filling in the
required details in the document. The birth certificate shows that it was her husband who
signed it as informant.  Judge Desales-Esidera is also not guilty of disgraceful and
30

immoral conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v.

Escritor,  this court described morality as "‘how we ought to live’ and why."
31 32

Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions
of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as this court
defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz,  is "a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
33

elevates man to his Creator."  A conduct is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is
34
carried out in light of the divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active
power.

Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine moral
prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does not derive its basis from
any religious doctrine but from the independent moral sense shared as humans.

The non-establishment clause  bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules,
35

moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should

be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of our
laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be
based on a secular purpose. 36

In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound
to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards. When
laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts should be careful not to overlook the
distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 37

There is the danger of "compelled religion"  and, therefore, of negating the very idea of
38

freedom of belief and non-establishment of religion when religious morality is

incorporated in government regulations and policies. As explained in Estrada v. Escritor: 39

Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might
regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled
to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon
religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As
a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even
make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of
religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy
of neutrality.
40

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that we find respondent judge guilty
of immoral conduct based on, among others, her alleged affair and her failure to comport
herself according to the Roman Catholic faith.

This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do
not have jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct
contradicts religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar
as it involves conduct that affects the public or its interest.

Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral
conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality"
under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved
as to reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding
whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this
court’s supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.

Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of contracting a

second marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an
alleged "illicit" affair are "immoral" based on her Catholic faith. This court is not a judge of
religious morality.
We also do not find that respondent judge’s acts constitute immorality for purposes of
administrative liability. Under the circumstances, respondent judge’s second marriage
and her alleged affair with her second husband were not of such depravity as to reduce
confidence in the Rule of Law. Respondent judge and her first husband never really lived
together as husband and wife. She claimed that her first husband did not want to have a
church wedding. She and her husband did not have a child. She claimed that this
marriage was not recognized by her church. Eventually, their marriage was declared
void,  and she was wed civilly to her second husband, with whom respondent judge
41

allegedly had an affair.

Moreover, respondent judge’s acts were not intrinsically harmful. When respondent judge
married her second husband, no harm was inflicted upon any one, not even the
complainant. There was no evidence on the records that the first husband, who was the
most interested person in the issue, even objected to the second marriage.

While we do not find respondent judge administratively liable for immorality, we can
determine if she is administratively liable for possible misconduct. The Code of
Professional Responsibility directs lawyers to obey the laws and promote respect for the
law.42

We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative liability, respondent

judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and her second husband conducted a
marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990.

Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a sacramental marriage
entered into only to comply with the requirements of their religious beliefs. It was valid
only under the Roman Catholic Church but has no legal effect. Their solemnizing officer
was not licensed to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from the civil
government. 43

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or subsequent marriage before
the legal dissolution of a first marriage:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The second or subsequent marriage contemplated under this provision is the marriage
entered into under the law. Article 1 of the Family Code defines marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life[.]"

Thus, the validity of the second marriage, if not for the subsistence of the first marriage,
is considered one of the elements of the crime of bigamy. The elements of bigamy are:

(a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
44
Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as governed only by
the rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against bigamy. What the law
prohibits is not second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law
prohibits is a second marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the
subsisting marriage. Under our law, respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid
because of the solemnizing officer’s lack of authority.

Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or may not include marriages
recognized in certain religions. Religious marriages are recognized in and may be
governed by our laws only if they conform to legal requirements. Religious marriages that
lack some or all the requirements under the law are invalid.  They are not considered to
45

have been entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, and incidents of
marriage provided under the law.

The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge’s marriage in 1990
renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our law. Hence, no second marriage
can be imputed against respondent judge while her first marriage subsisted.

However, respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code, which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the
provisions of laws. Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. – The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person
who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contract
marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that
the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent judge knew that the solemnizing officer during her and her husband’s
marriage in 1990 had no civil authority to solemnize marriages. It is clear from her
Comment that she and her husband’s only consideration for their 1990 marriage was the
recognition from the Roman Catholic Church. She stated that:

Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from
the civil government. Hence, he was not under obligation to register our marriage. It was
a purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal effect but definitely valid and recognized
by the Roman Catholic Church. It is called "matrimoña de conciencia." 46

However, Article 350 may be of doubtful constitutionality when applied to religious

exercise and expression insofar as it prescribes upon individuals and religious
communities formal requirements for the conduct of their religious ceremonies. It puts a
burden  upon the exercise of beliefs by criminalizing marriages performed in accordance
47

with those beliefs, but lacks some or all the requisites of a valid marriage under the law.
These requirements include not only age and consent, but also formal requisites such as
marriage license and civil authority of the solemnizing officer even though violence, fraud,
or intimidation was not present under the circumstances. It may, therefore, limit religious
exercise and expression to the formalities of law.

Thus, unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to

her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent danger to
the society,  we cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable for her
48

participation in her religious marriage ceremony.49

In Estrada,  this court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of benevolent
50

neutrality should be applied. Under the test of benevolent neutrality, religious freedom is
weighed against a compelling state interest:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.  (Emphasis in the
51

original)

We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judge’s right
to participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other
people’s rights and with no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not
threatened when we accommodate respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such
ceremonies even if they have secular counterparts under our laws.

In any case, respondent judge did not ask that she and her husband be given the same
rights as civilly married partners before their civil wedding in 1992. She does not ask that
our laws recognize her marriage in 1990 as valid. Respondent judge also does not seem
to be against civil marriages. She and her husband were even civilly wed after her
marriage with her first spouse was declared void.

However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield respondent
judge from liability for misconduct under our laws. Respondent judge knowingly entered
into a civil marriage with her first husband. She knew its effects under our laws. She had
sexual relations with her second husband while her first marriage was subsisting.

Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another person
during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious expression. Legal
implications and obligations attach to any person who chooses to enter civil marriages.
This is regardless of how civil marriages are treated in that person’s religion.

Moreover, respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is expected to

abide by the law. Her conduct affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice.
Thus, in finding respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her marriage
obligations under our laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in
administering justice. In the words of Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion in Estrada:

Court employees, from the highest magistrate to the lowliest clerk, are expected to abide
scrupulously with the law.  They are held to a higher standard since they are part of the
1âwphi1

judicial machinery that dispenses justice. . . . [T]here exists a compelling state interest to
hold Escritor to the same standards required of every court employee. If unsanctioned,
Escritor’s unlawful conduct would certainly impair the integrity and credibility of the
judiciary.
52

Lawyers are not and should not be expected to be saints. What they do as citizens of
their faiths are beyond this court’s power to judge. Lawyers, however, are officers of
court. They are expected to care about and sustain the law. This court’s jurisdiction over
their actions is limited to their acts that may affect public confidence in the Rule of Law.
Our state has secular interests to protect. This court cannot be expected to condone
misconduct done knowingly on account of religious freedom or expression.

Finally, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Administrators of lower courts
should look into the motives of persons who file complaints against our judges and
officers of court when allegations point to possible administrative violations. This is not to
say that complainants’ motives are relevant to their causes of actions. However,
complainants who come to court with unclean hands should not be spared from liability
just because they were the first to submit their accusations.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera guilty of
violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent Judge
Desales-Esidera is SUSPENDED from judicial service for one (1) month with a warning
that repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. She is STERNLY
WARNED that repetition of the same violations in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to conduct an investigation regarding

respondent's claims of illegal court activities.

SO ORDERED.