Case Studies:

Tanada vs Tuvera, (G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985)

“The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden to the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the DATE OF EFFECTIVITY,
NOT the PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT, WHICH CANNOT in any event be
OMITTED.

Lara vs. Del Rosario (94 Phil 778)

Supreme Court fixed the date of effectivity of the New Civil Code (R.A. 386) on
August 30, 1950 (Art. 2, NCC), by commencing to count the one-year period from
August 30, 1949 (date of release for circulation) not from June, 1949 (date of
publication) of the Official Gazette. (Section 11 of Revised Administrative Code, which
provides that the date of publication of the Official Gazette is conclusively presumed to
be the date of circulation was disregarded by the Supreme Court).

Bagatsing vs. Herrera (65 SCRA 434)

Re: Common Law – Principles, Usages and Rules of Action applicable to the
government and security of person and property which do not rest for their authority on
any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. It is a law applied
throughout England by the King’s Court. Common law known as Anglo-American
jurisprudence is not in force in the Philippines, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom
binding on our courts save only insofar as they are founded upon sound principles
applicable to local conditions and are not in conflict with existing law (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12
Phil. 241); nevertheless, many of the rules, principles and doctrines of the common law
have, to all intents and purposes, been imported into this jurisdiction- hence, these laws
can only be construed and applied with the aid of common law from which they are
derived, and, to breathe the breath of life into some of the institutions introduced in these
Islands under American sovereignty, recourse must be had to the rules, principles and
doctrines of the common law.

In Re: Shoop (41 Phil 213)

Common law based upon Anglo-American Common Law only supplements and
amplifies Philippine Statute Law. Anglo-American common law is effective in the
Philippines insofar as it does not conflict with written law, local customs and
institutions.
Cruz vs. Pahati (98 Phil 778)

Between a common law principle and a statutory provisions (Art. 559, NCC),
principle of irredivindicability of title of personal property, the latter must prevail in this
jurisdiction. “Equity follows the law”.

Rural Bank of Caloocan vs. CA (104 SCRA 171)

Re: Article 8 of NCC in relation to Section 31 of Revised Administrative Code on

“pretermination of holiday” - The pretermination or the exclusion of the last day which
is a holiday, in computing the period which provides that, “the act may be done on the
next succeeding business day”, applies only to a period fixed by law or the Rules of
Court, not to a date fixed by a judge or a government officer, or ordinary contract.

Aznar vs. Garcia (7 SCRA 95)

Re: Article 16, NCC – Doctrine of Renvoi applied where deceased Edward
Christensen, an American citizen of the State of California, died testate as domiciliary of
the Philippines, leaving properties in the Philippines. The validity of the provisions of
the will depriving testator’s acknowledged natural child should be governed by
Philippine law pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California. The doctrine of renvoi has been defined thus: “When the Conflict of
Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law, is the reference to the
corresponding rule of Conflict of Laws of that foreign law, or is the reference to the
purely internal rules of law of the foreign system, i.e., to the totality of the foreign law,
minus the Conflict of Law rules?”The Supreme Court ruled that the reference is not only
to the internal law, but also to the Conflict of Laws rule of the foreign country which
refers the case to the country of domicile adopting the doctrine of renvoi in the
Philippines.

Bellis vs. Bellis (20 SCRA 358)

Re: Article 16, NCC. – Doctrine of Renvoi was not applied where the decedent
was a citizen of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. However, if
Texas has a conflict of laws rule adopting the rule of the lex rei sitai, renvoi would arise
where the properties involved are situated in another country other than the country of
which the decedent is a domiciliary or a national.

United Airlines Inc vs. CA (357 SCRA 99)

Re: Article 17, NCC. – Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationes: According to this
doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This is
true even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place
where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place
of performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply Philippine laws, the law of
the place where the airline ticket was issued even though the flights were between states
of the United States of America, the place where the obligations were to be performed.
(Note: Another leading case: Zalamea vs. CA, 228 SCRA 23).

Aytona vs. Castillo (4 SCRA 1)

Re: Article 19, NCC - Midnight (December 26, 1961) mass appointments of
Aytona by President Garcia, whose term ends on December 30, 1962, was declared void
by the Supreme Court as an abuse of a right.

Cebu Country Club, Inc. vs. Elizagaque (542 SCRA 65)

Re: Article 19, NCC – There is abuse of right when the change which requires
unanimous vote thru “black ballsystem” for admission as proprietary member of the
Cebu Country Club, was not published and was not printed on the application form for
proprietary membership of the club and applicant was not informed why his application
was not approved; moreover, applicant’s motion for reconsideration of the rejection of
his application was ignored by the Club without any explanation for the rejection. Club
was liable for moral damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 and 2219, NCC.

Hermosisima vs. CA (109 Phil 629)

Mere breach to marry by itself is not an actionable wrong except if the act is
contrary to morals, good customs, etc. under Article 21, NCC; as when a woman 26
years of age voluntarily submitted herself to a man 10 years younger than herself;
However, in the case of Wassmer vs. Velez (12 SCRA 648) Re: Article 21, NCC – Breach
of promise to marry where groom formally set date of wedding with all necessary
preparations and to walk out is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs
under Article 21 and groom liable to moral damages (Article 2219 (10)) and exemplary
damages (Article 2232), both of NCC.

Baksh vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993)

(see link [Link]

People vs. Bayotas (236 SCRA 255)

Re: Article 32, 33, 34, 2176 and 1157, NCC and Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure - When the accused Bayotas was convicted of rape by the Regional
Trial Court, and the accused died pending appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the
death of the accused extinguished not only his criminal but also his civil liability. This is
because in the crime of rape, there is no separate civil action allowed by law, hence,
civil liability of accused is based solely on the conviction of the accused of the offense
committed. The Supreme court summarized the Bayotas ruling as follows:
 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, ‘the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex-delicto in senso
strictiore.”

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:

i. law
ii. contracts
iii. quasi-contracts
iv. xxx xxx xxx
v quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures, as
amended. (now Section 1, Rule 111 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure,
effective December 1, 2000). This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in case where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.

Cancio vs. Isip (391 SCRA 393)

Re: Articles 31 and 33, NCC and Rule 111, New Rules of Criminal Procedure of
2000. – There is no need to make reservation to file an independent civil action based on
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176, NCC. Hence, although the civil case filed by petitioner
arose from the same act or omission in the previously filed criminal cases, there is no
forum shopping, as they are based on different causes of action; the criminal cases for
estafa are based on culpa criminal and the civil case for collection is anchored on culpa
contractual.
Bobis vs. Bobis (336 SCRA 747)

Re: Article 36, (NCC Prejudicial Question) and Article 40, FC – In a prosecution
for bigamy, for contracting a second marriage, respondent cannot raise prejudicial civil
case of a case for declaration of nullity of first marriage for lack of a marriage license.
Under Article 40, FC, the respondent committed bigamy when he contracted the second
marriage with petitioner (second) wife before final judgment by a court of competent
jurisdiction declaring such first marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA 139)

Re: Article 26, FC– After a divorce is granted between a Filipina and her American
husband in the United States, the American husband is bound and cannot sue to take
over as administrator of their conjugal properties in the Philippines (estoppel applies).

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera (174 SCRA 653)

Re: Article 26,FC– After a divorce was acquired by the German husband from a
Filipino wife in Germany, German husband cannot file a complaint for adultery against
Filipino wife, for acts committed by wife before divorce was granted. Complainant
former husband must still be husband at time of filing of complaint.

Dacasin vs. Dacasin (611 SCRA 657)

Re: Article 26,FC – “a foreign divorce decree is valid against the alien divorcee
irrespective of who obtained the divorce” (citing Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera)

Republic vs Manalo, April 24, 2018

See link
([Link]

Uyguangco vs. CA (178 SCRA 684)

Re: Article 257, FC, fixed the date of effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, apparently adopting Memorandum Circular No. 85 of Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig that one year after the publication on August 4, 1987 of the Manila
Chronicle, is August 3, 1988, considering that 1988 is a leap year, and the month of
February has 29 days, not the usual 28 days.

San Luis vs. San Luis (514 SCRA 294)

 Re: Article 26, par. 2, FC. The case of Van Dorn vs. Romilio, Jr. (139 SCRA 139)
dated 1985, which is the basis of Article 26, FC – Divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
(American citizen) in U.S.A., absolutely allowed Governor San Luis to remarry even if
such divorce was granted before August 3, 1988 (effectivity of the Family Code).
However, proof of validity of divorce decree and the law allowing such divorce must be
established pursuant to Section 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Republic vs. Iyoy (470 SCRA 508)

Re: Article 26, par. 2, FC – A divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino wife against
her Filipino husband, does not capacitate the Filipino husband to remarry in the
Philippines, even if she, the Filipino wife, subsequently acquired American citizenship
after she obtained a divorce.

Republic vs. Obrecido III (472 SCRA 114)

Re: Article 26, par. 2, FC – In an obiter dictum, the Supreme Court ruled that
Article 26, paragraph 2, FC is applicable to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship and thereafter obtained a divorce decree and
remarried. (Nota Bene – however, the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondent
Obrecido was dismissed due to failure to prove divorce decree and the foreign law on
which it is based.)

Niñal vs. Bayadog (328 SCRA 122)

Re: Article 34, FC – To be exempt from the mandatory requirement of a

marriage license under Art. 34 FC, the absence of any legal impediment to marry each
other must exist during the 5-year period of cohabitation of the parties with each other
preceding the marriage; otherwise, the marriage is void. Thus, if during the 5-year
period of their cohabitation, the legal spouse of the man was still alive, a marriage
license is mandatory even if at the time of the celebration of the marriage the legal
spouse of the man was already dead.

Enrico vs. Heirs of Medinaceli , et. al (534 SCRA 418)

Re: Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) effective 15 March 2003. For marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code, only husband or wife may file an
action to assail the validity thereof. Hence, a separate petition for declaration of nullity
or annulment cannot be filed by the heirs of the deceased spouse. However, the heirs
can still question the validity of such marriage not in a separate proceeding for
declaration of nullity but in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

Carlos vs. Sandoval (574 SCRA 116)

 Re: A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC effective 15 March 2003 – The subject A.M. of the
Supreme Court does not cover cases already commenced before March 15, 2003,
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This covers
marriages under the Family Code and is prospective in nature. A petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely and exclusively by the spouses only.
However, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in the proceedings for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.

Santos vs. CA (240 SCRA 20)

Re: Article 36, FC – Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
the marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage; it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the party
involved.

Republic vs. Molina (268 SCRA 198)

Re: Article 36, FC – The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Article 68 – 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regards to parents and children. The Supreme
court set the following guidelines and application of Article 36, FC:

a. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.
b. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (1) medically or
clinically identified; (2) alleged in the complaint. (3) sufficiently proven by
experts and (4) clearly explained in the decision.
c. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’
of the marriage.
d. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
e. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
f. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
g. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
h. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. ♦No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
 in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

♦(Note: These Molina guidelines were subsequently modified by the Supreme

Court in A.M. No. 02-11-10 – New Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages effective March 15, 2003,
more particularly on paragraph nos.( b) (3) regarding expert testimony and
(h)on requirement of certification of the Solicitor General.

Domingo vs. CA (226 SCRA 572)

Re: Article 40, FC – Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for being
bigamous may be filed by aggrieved spouse even if the purpose is not to remarry. The
law (Article 40) did not say: “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriages”. Thus, marriage may be declared void for
the purpose of liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
erstwhile spouses.

Atienza vs. Judge Brillantes, Jr. (243 SCRA 32)

Re: Article 40 and Article 256, FC – Article 40 FC being a rule of procedure,

pursuant to Article 256 FC may be given retroactive effect regardless of the date of the
first marriage.

Tenebro vs. CA (423 SCRA 272)

Re: Article 36, FC – Bigamy is committed even if the second marriage was
declared void under Article 36, FC.

Manuel vs. People (476 SCRA 461)

Re: Article 41, FC – Bigamy is committed if second marriage is contracted

before absent first spouse was judicially declared presumptively dead pursuant to Article
41, FC in relation to Article 349, Revised Penal Code.

Metrobank vs. Pascual (547 SCRA 246)

Re: Articles 50, 51, 52, FC – After declaration of nullity or annulment of

marriage, but before liquidation of properties, the conjugal properties are under co-
ownership; hence mortgage on property by former wife without consent of the former
husband is valid, but only insofar as share of former wife.

Estrada vs. Escritor (492 SCRA 1-91)

 Re: Article 41, FC and A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006 – Charge:
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. Freedom of Religion. Soledad Escritor, a member of
a religious sect, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and court interpreter, was abandoned by her
husband, who was living with another woman. She then started living with Luciano
Quilapio Jr., a married man for 20 years with whom she begot a son. Later, Soledad’s
husband died, but she still could not marry Luciano, as Luciano was still a married man.
Soledad and Luciano entered into an arrangement in conformity with their religious
beliefs, with the approval of the elders of her congregation, and signed a document,
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”, which arrangement is allowed by their sect
only in countries like the Philippines, where no divorce is allowed. Soledad was charged
with committing a disgraceful and immoral conduct under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI,
Sec. 46 (b) (5) of the Revised Administrative Code. In an EN BANC Resolution (J. Puno),
the Supreme Court dismissed the case and exonerated Soledad Escritor because her
conjugal arrangement, pursuant to the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”, made
her exempt from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion based on
the following:

(1) Principle of “Benevolent Neutrality Accommodation” – the Constitution has

made significant changes to accommodate and exempt religion from certain laws
and regulations;

(2) Respondent Escritor’s plea of exemption based on the “Free Exercise

Clause”; it has not been proven that the ‘compelling state interest’ test would be
jeopardized by the exemption.

Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio (43 SCRA 173)

An action for legal separation is purely personal and does not survive the death of
the plaintiff – actio personalis moritur cum persona. The resultant property rights are
vested exclusively on the persons of the spouses and are not transmissible or assignable.

Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa (374 SCRA 498)

Re: Articles 96 and 124, 2nd paragraph, FC – Contract to Sell of conjugal

properties signed by the husband without written consent of wife is not valid, even if wife
actually participated in the negotiations. The court authority under Article 124 is only
resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.

Guiang vs. CA (291 SCRA 372)

Re: Article 124, FC – The sale of conjugal property requires the written consent
of both the husband and wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null
and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale.
Alinas vs. Alinas (551 SCRA 154)

Re: Articles 124 FC – A sale by the husband of conjugal parcel of land, without
consent of wife who is separated from him is null and void in its entirety, including the
share of the consenting husband. However, under the salutary principle of non-
enrichment at the expense of another, purchase price must be reimbursed with interest at
6% per annum from filing of complaint and 12% per annum from finality of decision
until full payment.

Chessman vs. IAC (193 SCRA 93)

Re: Article 124, FC – Sale by Filipino wife of land without consent of American
husband, which land was purchased with conjugal funds by the spouses is valid.
American has acquired no right or interest on the land.

Valdez vs. Regional Trial Court (260 SCRA 221)

Re: Articles 36 and 147 (co-ownership), Article 147, FC (co-ownership) is

applicable to marriages declared void under Article 36 (psychological incapacity) not
Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 (liquidation of absolute community
assets and liabilities) and 109 (liquidation of conjugal partnership assets and liabilities)
of the Family Code. Thus, a marriage declared void on the ground of the mutual
psychological incapacity (Art. 36) of the parties to comply with their essential marital
obligations, the law on co-ownership under Article 147, FC, governs the property
relations between the parties. Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2),
(3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, on the procedure of liquidation of properties of the spouses,
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages (Article 45) and void marriage
under Article 40, i.e., the second marriage being considered void if entered into before
the final judicial declaration of a previous marriage as void.

Francisco vs. CA (299 SCRA 188)

Re: Article 105 (conjugal partnership) in relation to Article 256 (retroactive

application of the Family Code). Properties acquired by husband thru inheritance or
thru purchase during first marriage continue to be exclusive property of husband who
contracted second marriage before effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
pursuant to the vested rights acquired by husband under Article 256, FC. The fact that
title to land is “Eusebio Francisco married to Teresita Francisco” is merely descriptive
of civil status of Eusebio since land had been acquired prior to registration.

Security Bank & Trust Company vs. Mar Tierra Corp. et. al. (508 SCRA 419)

Re: Article 121 (3) (Obligations of conjugal partnership) – Where the husband
contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that
such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership, hence, such
obligation is chargeable to the conjugal partnership properties. However, if the money
or services are given to another person or entity, the transaction is not deemed for the
conjugal partnership, such as when husband acted as surety for the company of which he
was Executive Vice President in a contract of loan (Ayala Investment & Dev. Corp vs.
CA, 286 SCRA 272); hence, such obligation is not chargeable to the conjugal
partnership properties.

Metrobank vs. Tan (509 SCRA 383)

Re: Articles 116, FC – Presumption that properties acquired during marriage

are conjugal (Art. 116, FC) does not apply where title registered under P.D. 1529 is in
the name of “Jose Tan married to Eliza Tan”, citing Ruiz vs. CA (401 SCRA 410), thus:
the phrase “married to Rogelio Ruiz” is merely descriptive of status of Corazon and is
not proof that such property was acquired during marriage. The property could have
been acquired by Corazon while she was still single and registered only after her
marriage to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts.

Agapay vs. Palang (276 SCRA 340)

Re: Article 148, FC – Where a woman (22 years old) cohabited with a married
man (63 years old and a U.S. Gov’t pensioner) and the woman fails to prove that she
contributed money to purchase the rice land, the property is not under co-ownership but
should revert to the conjugal partnership of the deceased and his lawful wife. On the
other hand, the status of the child Kristopher, as the illegitimate child of the deceased
should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceedings instituted
for that purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action for
recovery of ownership and possession..

Atienza vs. De Castro (508 SCRA 593)

Re: Article 148, FC – This article is applicable to bigamous marriages,

adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required.
Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, before the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, Article 148, FC applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.

Francisco vs. Masters Iron Works (451 SCRA 507)

In a bigamous marriage, a parcel of land acquired by the “wife” who was only
23 years of age, not gainfully employed, belonged to “husband” who was gainfully
employed, absence of proof that “wife” contributed to acquisition of property. Article
148 was given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 258, FC.
Benitez-Badua vs. CA (229 SCRA 468)

Re: Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171, FC – The aforementioned articles are not
applicable where the spouses in a Certificate of Live Birth claimed that petitioner was
their daughter, but the totality of the contrary evidence presented by private respondents
sufficiently rebutted the truth of the contents of the Certificate of Live [Link], in a
Special Proceeding for Settlement of Estate of the alleged father of petitioner, the issue
of whether the petitioner was the child of the deceased was still resolved and not
considered to have prescribed.

Articles 170 and 171 on prescription to impugn legitimacy of child were held not
to be applicable. In Cabatbat-Lim vs. IAC (166 SCRA 451): “Petitioners’ recourse to
Article 263 of the Civil Code (now Article 170, FC, on prescription of action to impugn
legitimacy of child) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. This is not an action to impugn legitimacy of a child but an action of private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.
They do not claim that petitioner is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is
not the decedent’s child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, petitioner is not a legal heir of deceased.”

Agustin vs. CA (460 SCRA 315)

DNA Testing to prove parentage is allowed and compulsory DNA testing is not a
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Jao vs. CA (152 SCRA 359)

Blood group testing can establish conclusively that the man is not the father of
the child x x but it cannot show conclusively that a man is the father of a particular
child, but at least only a possibility that he is.

Tayag vs. CA (209 SCRA 665)

An action to compel recognition and a claim to inheritance may be joined in one

complaint filed by respondent against administratrix of the deceased alleged father of
respondent.

De Jesus vs. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon (366 SCRA 499)

Re: Articles 170 and 171, FC – Petitioners who having been born in lawful
wedlock of their parents, cannot, in a complaint for “Partition with Inventory and
Accounting”, demand, a share of the estate of another man not the husband of their
mother, as the illegitimate children of that other man, although there was a notarized
document of the deceased which acknowledged the petitioners as his illegitimate
children. Petitioners must first impugn their legitimate status of their father before
they can claim to be illegitimate children of another man. Moreover, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170 (within one year after knowledge of
birth of child or its recording in the civil registry) and in proper cases Article 171, FC,
the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be feasible and the
status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

Concepcion vs. CA (468 SCRA 438)

Re: Article 167, FC – Marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
declared void for being bigamous, respondent having been previously married to
another man who is still living. The child, Jose Gerardo, born during the second
marriage was declared the legitimate child of private respondent and her first legitimate
husband, notwithstanding express acknowledgment of petitioner and private respondent,
the second husband, that Jose Gerardo is their son. This declaration of private
respondent is proscribed by Article 167, FC which provides that the child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy.
For reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had
no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.

Lahom vs. Sibulo (406 SCRA 135)

Re: Republic Act 8552 which repealed Article 192, FC – R.A. 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act) which took effect in 1998, repealed right of adopter to rescind decree of
adoption under Article 192 FC, without prejudice to right of adopter to disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided by law.

Lee vs. CA (367 SCRA 110)

Re: Article 412, NCC (Change of Entries in Civil Registry, Rule 108, Rules of
Court) and Republic Act 9048 (Correction of Clerical/Typographical Errors). Petition
by respondents in a special proceedings under Rule 108, Rules of Court for
cancellation/correction of the records of birth of the illegitimate children of the father of
the respondent, who were falsely recorded as full blood, legitimate brothers/sisters of
respondents held valid. R.A. 9048 substantially amended Article 412, NCC as
clerical/typographical error can now be corrected without need of judicial order, but
may be changed/corrected by the civil registrar or consul general. Hence, what is left
for Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register,
provided, however, that the appropriate adversarial proceedings under said rule be
observed.

Thus, the entries enumerated in Article 408 NCC like births, marriages, deaths x x x
changes of names, including nationality may be changed/corrected under Article 412
NCC and Rule 108, Rules of Court. Lastly, the prescriptive period is five (5) years,
counted not from the erroneous entry in the records of the Civil Registrar, but from
discovery of the same by the aggrieved party, applying Article 1149, NCC when period
is not fixed by law.

Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462)

Re: Article 412, NCC and Rule 108, Rules of Court (En Banc). Pursuant to Rule
108, Rules of Court, Citizenship and status of the respondents as entered in the records
of the Civil Registrar may be corrected, as “Chinese” to “Filipino” and “legitimate” to
“illegitimate” provided that there is adversarial proceeding where all the parties in
interest are notified and represented.

Silverio vs. Republic (537 SCRA 373)

Re: Art. 412 NCC, Rule 108, Rules of Court, Republic Act 9048. A person’s
first name cannot, under R.A. 9048 be changed on the ground of sex reassignment thru
surgery, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to the sex, from
male to female, on the ground of sex reassignment thru surgery. The sex of a person is
determined at birth. Since there is no law recognizing sex reassignment, the Petition to
Change First Name from “Rommel” to “Mely” and sex from “male” to “female” is
denied.

Republic vs. Cagandahan (565 SCRA 72)

In the case of a person, who was born “intersex” with “Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia” (CAH) at birth, with neither categorically and consistently female nor
categorically and consistently male composition, and who later developed normally and
naturally more pronounced male composition, a petition to change sex from “female” to
“male” and name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff” was granted.