GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

FINAL INVESTIGATION REPORT ON INCIDENT

TO M/S OPEN SKIES AVIATION PVT. LTD.,
MAULE MT-7-235 AIRCRAFT VT-MAT, WHILE
LANDING AT BARAMATI AIRPORT ON
12.03.2018.
 FOREWORD

In accordance with Annex 13 to the International Civil Aviation Organisation

Convention and the Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents & Incidents) Rules 2017, the sole
objective of this investigation is to prevent aviation incidents and accidents in the
future. It is not the purpose of the investigation to apportion blame or liability.

This report has been prepared based upon the evidences collected during the
investigation and opinions obtained from the experts. Consequently, the use of this
report for any purpose other than for the prevention of future incidents /accidents,
could lead to erroneous interpretations.

[i]
 INDEX
Sl. No. Contents Page
Synopsis 2
1 FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1 History of the flight 3
1.2 Injuries to Persons 4
1.3 Damage to Aircraft 4-6
1.4 Other Damage 7
1.5 Personnel Information 7-8
1.6 Aircraft Information 9-12
1.7 Meteorological Information 12
1.8 Aids to Navigation 12
1.9 Communications 12
1.10 Aerodrome Information 13
1.11 Flight Recorders 13
1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information 13-17
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information 17
1.14 Fire 17
1.15 Survival Aspects 17
1.16 Tests and Research 17-19
1.17 Organizational and Management Information 20
1.18 Additional Information 20-23
1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques 24
2 ANALYSIS
2.1 Serviceability of the Aircraft 24
2.2 Weather 24
2.3 Examination of the failed part 24-25
2.4 Handling of the controls by crew 25
3 CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Findings 26-27
3.2 Probable Cause of the Incident 27
4 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 27

[ii]
 FINAL INVESTIGATION REPORT ON INCIDENT TO M/S OPEN SKIES AVIATION
PVT. LTD., MAULE MT-7-235 AIRCRAFT VT-MAT, WHILE LANDING AT BARAMATI
AIRPORT ON 12.03.2018

1. Aircraft Type : MAULE AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY, INC.

Model : MAULE-MT-7-235
Nationality : Indian
Registration : VT-MAT
2. Owner : M/s Open Skies Aviation Pvt. Ltd.
3. Operator or hirer : M/s Open Skies Aviation Pvt. Ltd.
4. Pilot in command : PPL holder
Extent of injuries : Nil
5. Date of incident : 12.03.2018
6. Time of incident : 18:38 Hrs IST
7. Last point of departure : Juhu Airport (VAJJ)
8. Point of intended landing & : Baramati Airport &
Geographical location 18° 13' 471N, 74° 35' 484 E
9. Type of Operation : Private
10. Crew on board : 01
Extent of injuries : Nil
12. Passengers on board : 03
Extent of injuries : Nil
13. Phase of Operation : Landing
14. Type of Incident : ARC: Abnormal Runway Contact
(All Timings in the report are in IST)

Page | 1
SYNOPSIS

On 12.03.2018, M/s Open Skies Aviation Pvt. Ltd., Maule MT-7-235 aircraft
registration VT-MAT under private category operating flight Juhu-Baramati as single
pilot operation, was involved in incident at Baramati Airfield. The pilot was holding valid
PPL (Private Pilot Licence). The subject aircraft took off at 1714 hrs from Juhu and
landed on RWY 11 at Baramati around 1838 hrs. Aircraft has touchdown and bounced
into the air, then the nose dropped and aircraft touchdown runway again with high
impact on the nose landing gear resulted into the nose wheel oleo strut fracture.
Subsequently the propeller blades strike the runway surface and there after the nose
landing gear collapsed immediately; Due to several strikes of propeller, all the three
propeller blades bent inwards and got damaged. The aircraft finally stopped to the left
of the runway center line 2000ft from the threshold of Runway 11. There were 04
persons on board the aircraft including 01 pilot and no injury to any of the occupants.
There was no fire.

The incident was reported by M/s Open Skies Aviation Pvt. Ltd. to DGCA and AAIB.
Subsequently the investigation was ordered by DGCA under Rule 13(1) of the Aircraft
(Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules, 2017, by appointing the Investigator in-
Charge vide DGCA Order No DGCA-15018(18)/1/2018-DAS dated 02.04.2018.
The incident was caused due to the incorrect flare and bounce recovery technique by
the PIC during landing.

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1. FACTUAL INFORMATION:

1.1 History of the flight:

On 12/03/2018, M/s Open Skies Aviation Pvt. Ltd., Maule MT-7-235 aircraft registration
VT-MAT under private category operating flight Juhu - Baramati as single pilot operation
was involved in incident. The flight was operated by pilot holding valid Private Pilot
Licence (PPL) with open rating on all conventional airplanes having all up weight not
exceeding 1500Kgs. The pilot had carried out two familiarization flights on 10 th & 11th
March 2018 under supervision of Dy CFI as PIC on this aircraft before operating the
incident flight. The pre-flight inspection of aircraft was carried out by the pilot (without
any authorization) before operating the sector Juhu - Baramati and the aircraft took off
at 1714 hrs from Juhu.

The take off and the en-route flight from Juhu to Baramati was uneventful. During in
bound Baramati the pilot took briefing from ATC Baramati for approach of runway 11.
Weather reported was calm with visibility of 6000 meters.

The aircraft landed on RWY 11 at Baramati airfield around 1838 hrs. Aircraft has
touched down and bounced into the air, simultaneously the tail hook strikes the runway
surface. Subsequently nose dropped and aircraft touchdown RWY again with high
impact on the nose landing gear and the nose wheel oleo strut fractured. At the same
time the propeller blades strike the runway surface and thereafter the nose landing gear
collapsed immediately; due to several strikes of propeller, all the three propeller blades
bent inwards and got damaged. The aircraft started dragging on the nose landing gear
oleo strut & bottom portion of the engine cowling, and finally stopped to the left of the
runway center line which is 2000ft distance from the threshold of RWY 11. Nose wheel
oleo strut assembly was found sheared off from the base of the landing gear at the
lower attachment point of torque link and the bottom portion of the engine cowling was
damaged due to continuous dragging on the runway. The tail (mooring) was found with
the rub mark. No other damage to the aircraft structure is visible. The hydraulic oil leak
was observed at the point of the first impact & propeller blade strike. The fuel leak was
observed from the left side of the left-wing tank vent where the aircraft has finally
stopped on the runway. However, there was no fire. The distance from the hydraulic oil
leak on impact to the nose landing gear collapse is 34 feet and the distance from the
nose landing gear collapse to the aircraft stopping point on the runway surface is 245
feet. There were 04 persons on board the aircraft including 01 pilot and no injury to any
of the occupants.
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1.2 Injuries to persons:

Injuries Crew Passengers Others

Fatal NIL NIL NIL
Serious NIL NIL NIL
Minor NIL NIL NIL
None 01 03 NIL

1.3 Damage to Aircraft:

1. All three propeller blades were severely bent inwards and damaged
explicitly (as shown in Picture 1)
2. Nose landing gear oleo strut sheared off from the base of the landing
gear at the lower attachment point of torque link (as shown in Picture 2
& 3)
3. Tail (mooring) has got rub mark on tail touchdown (as shown in Picture 4)
4. Bottom portion of engine cowling damaged (as shown in Picture 5)

3
2

Picture 1 - All the three propeller blades (1, 2 &3) strike runway and bent inwards

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 Picture 2–Nose Landing Gear collapse and the oleo strut shear off

Picture 3 – Nose Landing Gear Oleo strut shear off from the lower attachment of torque link

Page | 5
 Picture 4–Tail (mooring) rubs off during touchdown

Picture 5 – Bottom portion of the engine cowling damage

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1.4 Other damage:

Runway surface was damaged due to several strikes of the propeller blades and
dragging of bottom portion of engine cowling as nose landing gear bogged down.

1.5 Personnel information:

Details Commander
Age/Gender 67years 3 months/Male
Date of licence issue 24.11.1993
Valid up to 04.03.2028
Category PPL
Endorsement as PIC with open rating on all conventional
aeroplane having all up weight not
exceeding 1500Kg
Class of Medical Class 2
Date of Medical Exam 07.01.2017
Medical Exam validity 06.01.2019
FRTOL valid up to 02.03.2019
Total Flying Experience 26200
Experience on Type 02:00
Experience as PIC on Type NIL
Last flown on Type 12.03.2018
Total flying experience in last 365 06:20
days
Total flying experience in last 180 06:20
days
Total flying experience in last 90 days 06:20
Total flying experience in last 30 days 04:20
Total flying experience in last 7 days 02:00
Total flying experience in last 24 Hrs 0:50
English Language Proficiency Level 6
Previous incident History, if any NIL

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 The pilot started flying in 1974 with Indian Air Force (IAF) on HT-2 aircraft & did
flying instructors’ course on aircraft HT-2 a Tail dragger in 1980. As per the records the
involved pilot acquired DGCA licence in 1984 & acquired PPL on 24.11.1993 with
endorsement on Piper Cub J3C, Cessna 152, Cessna 172, Beech Bonanza B-25, Beech
Baron B55, Pilatus PC-12, Beech 200 and with open rating Up to 1500Kgs. He also holds
five helicopter licenses i.e. ATPL (H)s of the world (FAA, Nigeria, Macau, Hong Kong and
Indian ALTP (H)). He has flown across the globe and been a QFI, Instructor, Examiner,
Chief Flying Instructor and he also holds FAA PPL aero planes.

From the Pilot log book, it is observed that pilot did not fly the airplane from
21.03.2009 to 21.12.2017. On 22.12.2017 for Private Pilot Licence (PPL) renewal and
recency requirement, pilot has under gone Ground refresher training, Familiarization
flight and Skill test on VT-PTJ (Cessna-152) at Falcon Aviation Academy, Faizabad.

On 10th & 11th March 2018, Pilot has undergone two familiarization flights as
First Officer on VT-MAT (Maule MT-7-235) for duration of 1 hour 10 minutes & 50
minutes respectively with the [Link] of M/s Bombay Flying Club Ltd. On 12.03.2018,
Pilot has flown the aircraft as PIC to Baramati. Pilot has never flown this aircraft (Maule
MT-7-235) before 10.03.2018.

The pilot has carried out the class II medical on 07.01.2017, at that time his age
was 66 years 02 months. DGCA HQ’s Medical cell has given the validity of Medical
Assessment for two years i.e. till 06.01.2019 vide file no. 1-691/1982-L-2 dated
30.01.2017 wherein it was to be given for one year as per The Aircraft Rules 1937 Part V
39C Sub rule 5(b) - Period of validity of medical fitness Assessment and Licences.

The pilot was not involved in any serious incident/ accident in the past. The
licences and training of the involved pilot were current and valid other than the Medical
Certificate. The FDTL/FTL requirements were met.

Page | 8
1.6 Aircraft Information:

1.6.1 General Information:

Aircraft is five-seater (including pilot) high wing cabin monoplane fitted with
single tractor engine (with 03 propeller blades) in nose of fuselage. This is a light & STOL
(Short Take-off & Landing) aircraft. Wing is a strut braced two spar, metal covered,
modified USA 35-B airfoil & fiber glass wing tips. Fuselage is welded steel tube structure.
Fuselage and tail group covered with ceconite synthetic fabric and fiberglass engine
cowl. Forward fuselage and doors are with aluminum skin. Landing gear (tricycle
wheeled undercarriage) is a fixed type and an Air-Oil nose wheel oleo strut steerable
from rudder pedals. Main gear is spring aluminum with Hydraulics brakes. Control
systems – dual control wheels, rudder pedals and brakes. All controls directly cable
driven. Fuel control/shut off valve is at the left lower side panel. Mechanical flap and
trim controls are at the center on the floor. All other controls, switches, etc., are
instrument panel mounted. The cruise speed is 164 mph and range of 1,001 miles (1,610
km).

Page | 9
Photograph-6 MAULE MT-7-235 aircraft External dimensions as shown

Page | 10
 1.6.2 Aircraft Details:

Aircraft Registration VT-MAT

Manufacturer Maule Air Inc., USA
Type Maule-MT-7-235
Aircraft [Link]. 18086C
Year of Manufacture 2004
Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA) 6261, Issued on 14.01.2013
Airworthiness Review Certificate 22/06/2018
Validity
Engine Type Lycoming IO-540-WIA5
Engine [Link]. L-28838-48A
Propeller Type HZ-HC-C3YR-1RF-7693
Propeller [Link]. DY5914B
Aircraft TSN (as on 11/03/18) 567:36 Hrs
Engine TSN (as on 11/03/18) 567:36 Hrs
Engine TSO (as on 11/03/18) 19:10 Hrs
Propeller TSN (as on 11/03/18) 567:36 Hrs
Propeller TSO (as on 11/03/18) 19:10 Hrs
Empty Weight 1,500 lbs (791.07Kgs)
Maximum all up weight/MTOW 2,500 lbs (1,134Kgs)
Actual take-off weight 2,490 lbs (1,129.4Kgs)
Maximum Landing weight 2,500 lbs (1134Kgs)
Actual Landing weight 2,353.2 lbs (1067.4Kgs)

The aircraft was issued Certificate of Airworthiness number 6261 under NORMAL
category, sub-division PRIVATE by DGCA. The aircraft was operated under Private
category. Prior to flight the aircraft was holding a valid Certificate of Flight Release. The
aircraft and Engine were being maintained by M/s Bombay Flying Club Ltd. under
continuous maintenance as per maintenance program consisting of calendar period-
based maintenance and flying Hours / Cycles based maintenance as per maintenance
program approved by DGCA. Last maintenance check: 50 Hrs / 01-month inspection was
carried out at 565:36Hrs on 16.02.2018 and the CRS (Certificate of Release to Service)
was issued on the same date. There was no maintenance carried out on the nose wheel
landing gear oleo strut in this check.

Page | 11
 The defect record of the aircraft was scrutinized and observed that no MEL was
invoked on the aircraft & no defect was pending on the aircraft prior to the incident
flight.
Pilot has carried out Pre-flight inspection of the aircraft before flying on
12.03.2018 without any authorization from the quality manager of M/s Bombay Flying
Club Ltd.
Operator was not having approval of Load & trim sheet from DGCA and also
doesn’t have the Operations Manual. Pilots prepare the Load & Trim sheet based on the
OEM Pilot hand book procedures for the operating flights. As per the DGCA CAR Section
8 Series D Part I Para 15.1 (Rev 3, 20th Dec 2015) “Before starting operation the operator
shall prepare a load/trim sheet and get the same approved from the DGCA (Dte of
Airworthiness).”

1.7 Meteorological information:

There is no Indian Metrological Department (IMD) Metrological (MET) office

situated at Baramati Airfield. Nearest MET office is at Pune Airfield which is at a distance
of 44 NM. To have a better control & system functioning M/s Carver Aviation has setup
their own ATC station which is manned by the personnel of their organization. ATC,
Baramati uses Davis Vintage Pro 2 instrument to monitor wind Speed, Wind Direction,
Humidity, Temp., Dew Point, forecast etc.

The METAR recorded on register at 1830 hrs on 12.03.2018 was with winds 05
knots at 100o, visibility 6000 meters, temp 32 deg C and dew point 06 o C, no significant
clouds and QNH 1006 Hpa.

1.8 Aids to navigation:

There is no Navigational aid available at Baramati airfield other than the

windsock and aerodrome beacon.

1.9 Communications:

On 12.03.2018 communication was handled by M/s Academy of Carver Aviation

Pvt. Ltd. personnel (CPL holder) who were positioned at ATC tower. There was always
two-way communications between the aircraft and the Baramati ATC at frequency
129.25 MHz and aircraft had reported all operations normal. However, there is no
recording facility for ATC Communication.

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1.10 Aerodrome information:
Baramati Airfield is located in Pune district of Maharashtra state in India. The
Baramati Airfield is owned by Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC)
and given on lease to M/s Reliance Airport Developers Private Limited, Mumbai.
Elevation of the airfield is 604 meters MSL and is spread over an area of 182.5 hectares
(451.11 Acres). There is one Runway with orientation 11/29 having length of 5800 feet
and 150ft wide with turning pads at both ends. The Runway surface is made of 11
Bitumen and runway Strength is 16 LCN. Three taxiways connect airstrip to two adjacent
aprons measuring 180 by 100 meters and 100 by 75 meters. The airfield has a 112
square meter terminal building and approach road.

Both Runway directions are in use depending upon the wind direction. The strip
is an uncontrolled airfield. M/s Academy of Carver Aviation Pvt. Ltd. has set up local ATC
which is manned by the Pilots of flying club. Other than the aerodrome beacon and the
wind sock there are no navigational aids available on the airfield. The emergency
services i.e. the fire fighting vehicle and the medical emergency is manned by the M/s
Carver Aviation personnel. The elevation of Baramati Airfield is 1995 feet. There are
three Windsocks installed near the Runway, one each at Runway 11 & 29 end and other
near middle of Runway. The Baramati airfield is not Licenced by DGCA.

1.11 Flight Recorders:

Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) were
neither fitted nor required on this aircraft as per Civil Aviation Requirements.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information:

The aircraft landed on RWY and bounced into the air, simultaneously the tail hook
contact with the runway surface. Subsequently nose dropped and aircraft
touchdown RWY again with high impact on the nose landing gear and the nose
wheel oleo strut fractured. Then the propeller blades strike the runway surface 09
times and there after the nose landing gear collapsed immediately; due to several
strikes of propeller, all the three propeller blades bent inwards and got damaged.
After NLG collapse, the aircraft started dragging on the nose landing gear oleo strut
& bottom portion of the engine cowling and finally stopped to the left of the
runway centre line. The distance from the nose gear collapse to the aircraft
stopping point on the runway surface is 245feet. Nose wheel oleo strut assembly
was found sheared off from the base of the landing gear at the lower attachment
point of torque link and the bottom portion of the engine cowling was damaged
due to continuous dragging on the runway. No other damage to the aircraft
Page | 13
 structure is visible. The hydraulic oil leak was observed at the point where the first
impact & propeller blade strike and fuel leak was observed from the left tank
where the aircraft has finally stopped. There was no fire. The cockpit in situ
observations are, the Throttle position was in ‘IN’ position, Propeller control was in
Full Increase RPM position and Mixture control was in Full Rich position (as shown
in Picture 11). Flaps were in fully retracted position. (as shown in Picture 12). The
measurements on the runway were following:
Start point of the impact-
1. RWY centre line to point of impact-3.5 feet
2. Runway edge to point of impact - 42 feet 5 inches
End point of the impact –
1. Runway Centre line to right main landing gear-14feet5 inches
2. Runway edge to left main landing gear-22 feet
3. Distance from the threshold of the RWY11 is 2000 feet

Picture 7 – Pictorial drawing

“A” – The distance from hydraulic oil leak on impact to the Nose Landing Gear collapse is
34feet.
“B” -- The distance from the Nose Landing Gear collapse to the aircraft stopped point is
245feet.
“C” -- Distance from the start of the impact to stoppage of aircraft is 279feet.

Page | 14
 Centerline
of RWY11

Propeller blade
strike
Hydraulic
Oil leak

Picture 8 – Hydraulic Oil leak & Propeller blade strike

Propeller blades rub

marks

Rub mark of the

bottom portion
of the engine
cowling Nose Landing
Gear collapsed

Picture 9 – Nose Landing Gear Collapse & rub marks on the runway

Page | 15
 RWY LEFT Edge
line
Aircraft stopped point and
rub mark of the bottom
portion of the engine
cowling

Fuel leak from

the left tank

Picture 10 – Fuel leak from left tank and aircraft stopped point with rub mark

Mixture control
Propeller Control
Throttle was in Full in Full rich
in Full Increase
power position RPM position
Picture 11 – Throttle, Propeller & Mixture control Position

Page | 16
 Flaps in fully
retracted
position

Picture 12 - Flaps in Fully retracted position

1.13 Medical and pathological Information:

Pilot has not undergone Breath analyzer test before or after the flight on
12.03.2018.

1.14 Fire:

There was no fire.

1.15 Survival aspects:

The incident was survivable.

1.16 Tests and research:

Failed part of Nose Landing Gear of aircraft was sent to Aircraft Engineering
Directorate, Technical Centre, DGCA for detailed examination. During detailed
examination of the detached nose wheel which is shown in Photograph 13 and after

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dismantling the nose wheel as shown in Photograph 14 (a), the broken part of the strut
tube was removed from the assembly as shown in Photograph 14 (b). The fracture
surface of the strut tube found slant and fibrous and the hole of the tube found to be
oval shape (as shown in Photograph 14 (c)) which indicates that load exceeds the
strength of part which may be caused due to impact or overload during landing.

Photograph 13 - Detached nose wheel

Photograph 14 (a) - After dismantling

Page | 18
 Photograph 14 (b) - the broken part of the strut tube

Photograph14 (c)-the strut tube found slant and fibrous and the hole of the tube found to be oval shape

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1.17 Organizational and management information:

Open Skies Aviation Company was founded in year 2010 in Mumbai. The
Aircraft was imported in July 2011. The certificate of Registration was issued by DGCA
in November 2012 and the Certificate of Airworthiness was issued in November 2013.
M/s Bombay flying club (approved by DGCA) carried out the recommended
maintenance on the Maule MT-7-235 up till March 2018. The aircraft picked up was a
second hand which had done 537hrs before its proving flight which was done by an
American pilot for Certificate of Airworthiness purpose. The aircraft has flown total
567hrs since new. Since its import, the aircraft engine and the propeller has been
overhauled once.

1.18 Additional information:

1.18.1 Information from Pilot statement/discussions:

As per the statement of pilot “They departed at 1714 hrs from RWY 26, Juhu. After
take-off, the flight was normal cleared to 5500ft. In en-route he contacted Pune ATC
and was changed over to Baramati at approx. 35nautical miles. He was advised to
descend to 3000ft at 15 nautical miles and report at 5NM. He was advised to join left
downwind to RWY 11 (Baramati) when runway in sight. He made a normal approach
for RWY 11 and stabilized at approach speed of approx. 65kts. He carried out a
normal flare and held up the nose with backward pressure. The altitude did not seem
high for him. Then he observed the nose drop with landing gear collapsing and
propellers striking and within 3 second the aircraft stopped on the nose. He switched
off fuel, electrical (BATT, ALT) and ignition key & taken out. There was no fire, no
injury to any PAX. His familiarization flight on this aircraft was carried out by [Link],
M/s Bombay flying club Ltd. on 10th & 11th Mar 2018. He did not carry out Pre-flight
medical check on 12.03.18 since he was flying under privileges of PPL. The Preflight
inspection of aircraft on 12.03.18 was carried out by him as a privilege of his PPL”.

As per the Flight Safety report filed by the Pilot:

“The aircraft was on a stabilized approach for runway 11, for Baramati. It touchdown
on centerline in a three point attitude with a light bounce. The nose was kept up with
backward pressure and then the nose collapsed and propeller touched the ground.”

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1.18.2 Information from ATC officer of M/s Carver Aviation statement/discussions:

As per statement of ATC officer “Aircraft VT-MAT was on a flight from Juhu to
Baramati. The pilot contacted Baramati ATC on 129.25 at 35NM inbound Baramati
maintaining altitude 5500 feet, he was advised to report when released by Pune ATC.
Again the pilot contacted Baramati at 27NM and reported aircraft was released by
Pune. The pilot was advised to descend 3000ft & report 5NM inbound to Baramati
and when reported at 5NM aircraft was advised to report when RWY in sight. When
aircraft was on final for RUNWAY 11, pilot was given instructions cleared to land on
Runway 11 & given the wind checks as ‘Winds Calm’. After landing on RWY 11 pilot
reported “RUNWAY BLOCKED” at time approx. 1840 hrs. He has seen the aircraft in
nose drop attitude on the runway”.

1.18.3 Information from Dy. Chief Flying Instructor ([Link]) of M/s Bombay Flying
Club Ltd. statement/discussions:

As per the statement of [Link] “He has conducted Familiarization flight for pilot on
10th & 11th of Mar 2018. On 10th March circuit flying was carried out with one landing
and on 11th March Circuit & Landing was carried out with 4 touch & Go’s (4 landings).
[Link] was the PIC on both the flights and had thoroughly briefed pilot on the
operation of the aircraft under the privileges of his flight instructor rating, so the pilot
could operate the airplane under the privileges of his open Rating. [Link] has
certified the pilot log book for the two familiarization flights”. Further he added that
“In general pre-flight inspection of aircraft is carried out by the PIC on the availability
of CRS and other relevant documents from maintenance Organization. The pre-flight
inspection authorization is given on the basis of pre-flight training carried out by the
organization. The authorized person is authorized by the QM of their organization.
Ideally the flaps for landing are at 50%, but for Baramati on longer Runway you could
land at 00 flaps. Negative flaps are not desirable for landing”.

1.18.4 Bouncing and Bounce Recovery (As per DGCA Operations Circular 09 of 2017)

Bouncing during a landing usually is the result of one or more of the following factors:
1. Excessive sink rate;
2. Late flare initiation;
3. Incorrect flare technique;
4. Excessive airspeed; and/or,
5. Power-on touchdown (preventing the automatic extension of ground spoilers,
as applicable).

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The bounce-recovery technique varies with each aircraft type and with the height
reached during the bounce.
A. Recovery from a Light Bounce (Five Feet or Less)
When a light bounce occurs, a typical recovery technique can be applied:
1. Maintain or regain a normal landing pitch attitude (do not increase pitch
attitude, because this could lead to a tail strike);
2. Continue the landing;
3. Use power as required to soften the second touchdown; and
4. be aware of the increased landing distance.

B. Recovery from a High Bounce (More Than Five Feet)

When a more severe bounce occurs, do not attempt to land, because the remaining
runway may be insufficient for a safe landing. The following go-around technique can
be applied:
i. Maintain or establish a normal landing pitch attitude.
ii. Initiate a go-around by activating the go-around levers/ switches and advancing
the throttle levers to the go- around thrust position.
iii. Maintain the landing flaps configuration or set a different flaps configuration,
as required by the Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM)/quick reference handbook
(QRH).
iv. Be prepared for a second touchdown.
v. Be alert to apply forward pressure on the control column and reset the pitch
trim as the engines spool up (particularly with under wing-mounted engines);
vi. When safely established in the go-around and when no risk remains of
touchdown (steady positive rate of climb), follow normal go-around procedures;
and,
vii. Re-engage automation, as desired, to reduce workload.

1.18.5 Before Landing checklist (Extract from the Airplane Flight Manual):

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1.18.6 Normal Flight operations (Extract from the Airplane Flight Manual):

Page | 23
1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques: NIL
2. ANALYSIS

2.1 Serviceability of the aircraft:

Maule MT-7-235 aircraft VT-MAT (MSN 18068C) was manufactured in the year
2004. On the day of incident, the aircraft VT-MAT had logged 567:36 airframe hours.
Aircraft was holding a valid Certificate of Airworthiness and flight release prior to flight.
The aircraft and Engine were being maintained under continuous maintenance as per
maintenance program consisting of calendar period-based maintenance and flying
Hours / Cycles based maintenance as per maintenance program approved by DGCA. Last
maintenance check: 50 Hrs / 01-month inspection was carried out at 565:36Hrs on
16.02.2018 and the CRS (Certificate of Release to Service) was issued on the same date.
There was no maintenance carried out on the nose wheel landing gear oleo strut in this
check. The defect record of the aircraft was scrutinized for a period of one month from
the date of occurrence of the incident and no defect was pending on the aircraft prior to
the incident flight.
Pilot has carried out Pre-flight inspection of the aircraft before flying on
12.03.2018 (without obtaining any authorization from the quality manager of M/s
Bombay Flying Club Ltd) and recorded all satisfactory in the checklist.

From the above it is inferred that the serviceability of the aircraft is not a factor
to the incident.

2.2 Weather:

The METAR recorded on register at 1830 hrs on 12.03.2018 was winds 05 knots
at 100 , visibility 6000 meters, temp 32 deg C and dew point 06 o C, no significant clouds
o

and QNH 1006 Hpa. Aircraft landed at 1838 hrs in calm wind and sky clear condition.
In view of the above, it is inferred that weather was not a contributory factor to
the incident.

2.3 Examination of the failed part:

During detailed examination of the detached nose wheel, the fracture surface of
the strut tube found slant and fibrous and the hole of the tube found to be oval shape,

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which indicates that load exceeds the strength of part, which may be caused due to
impact or overload during landing.

2.4 Pilot handling of the aircraft:

On 12/03/2018 the pilot calculated the Load & trim as per the OEM Pilots hand
book for the sector Juhu-Baramati and the centre of gravity was found to be within limit.
Pilot operated the flight for sector Juhu – Baramati as single pilot operation. Prior to this
flight, on 10th & 11th March 2018, Pilot has undergone two familiarization flights as First
Officer on aircraft Maule MT-7-235 for duration of 1 hour 10 minutes & 50 minutes
respectively with the [Link] of M/s Bombay Flying Club Ltd. On 12.03.2018, Pilot has
flown the aircraft as PIC to Baramati. Pilot has never flown this aircraft (Maule MT-7-235)
before 10.03.2018.
The aircraft took off at 1714 hrs from Juhu on 12/03/2018, the take off and en-
route flight from Juhu to Baramati was uneventful. During in-bound Baramati the pilot
took briefing from ATC Baramati for approach of RWY 11. Weather reported was calm
with visibility of 6000 meters with clear skies and wind 100o/05KTs. The pilot flared the
aircraft and held up the nose with backward pressure for landing, the aircraft touched
down and bounced into the air. As the aircraft was in the air, as per the bounce recovery
technique mentioned in para 1.18.4 “the normal pitch attitude as to be maintained or
regained (to avoid the tail strike) and use the power required to soften the second
touchdown” however it seems to be pilot had increased the pitch attitude and pushed
the throttle lever in to full power position which led to the tail hook strike the RWY
surface and when the aircraft touchdown RWY again with high impact on the nose
landing gear resulted into the nose wheel oleo strut fracture. There was a hydraulic oil
leak from the oleo strut on the RWY just before the nose wheel completely bogged
down. Due to several strikes of propeller, all the three propeller blades bent inwards and
got damaged. The aircraft finally stopped on the runway at approx. 2000 feet from
threshold of RWY11.
During the post incident investigation, the flaps were found fully retract condition
(Ref: Picture 12). This implies that the pilot has used 0 o flaps during landing, which is
recommended as per the Para 3.3 of Airplane Flight Manual (ref: 1.18.6) only under
gusty crosswind conditions. However, the weather was calm as per the report. Further
the movement of the flaps was checked for any stuck in position but found to be in
satisfactory condition.

In view of the above, the pilot handling is considered as a factor to the incident.

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3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Findings:

a) The Certificate of Airworthiness and the Certificate of Registration of the aircraft

was valid on the date of incident.
b) The certificate of release to service (CRS) was valid on the day of incident.
c) Last maintenance check: 50 Hrs/01-month inspections were carried out at 565:36
Hrs on 16.02.2018. There was no maintenance pertaining to the nose landing gear
oleo strut in this check.
d) There was no pending MEL or defect on the aircraft.
e) Pilot has carried out Pre-flight inspection of the aircraft before operating the flight
on 12.03.2018 without any authorisation and there were no abnormalities
observed by Pilot before operating the flight.
f) From the Pilot log book, it is observed that pilot did not fly the aeroplane from
21.03.2009 to 21.12.2017.
g) On 22.12.2017, Pilot has under gone Ground refresher training and Familiarization
flight on VT-PTJ (Cessna-152) at Falcon Aviation Academy, Faizabad for Private
Pilot License (PPL) renewal.
h) Pilot has undergone two Familiarization flights on VT-MAT (Maule MT-7-235) on
10th & 11th March 2018 for duration of 1 hour 10 minutes & 50 minutes
respectively with [Link] of M/s Bombay Flying Club. The third flight has flown i.e.
incident flight on 12.03.2018 as PIC (Single pilot). Pilot has never flown this aircraft
type (Maule MT-7-235) before 10.03.2018 however he has PPL license with open
rating on all conventional airplanes having all up weight not exceeding 1500Kgs.
i) Operator was not having approved Load & trim sheet from DGCA. Pilot has
prepared the Load & Trim of the operating flight based on the OEM Pilot hand
book procedures and the Centre of gravity was found within limit.
j) The pilot’s improper landing flare caused the aircraft land and bounce into the air.
Further with the incorrect bounce recovery technique when the aircraft
touchdown on runway again with high impact on the NLG resulted into the nose
wheel oleo strut shear off from the lower attachment point of the torque link.
k) It was found that all the three propeller blades were severely bent inward and
damaged explicitly. The Nose landing gear oleo strut has sheared off from the
base of the landing gear at the lower attachment point of torque link and Tail
(mooring) has got rub mark on tail touchdown. Further the damage on the bottom
portion of engine cowling damaged was observed.

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 l) Weather was not a contributory factor to the incident.
m) During the post incident investigation, the pilot has used 0 o flaps during landing,
which is recommended as per the Para 3.3 of Airplane Flight Manual (ref: 1.18.6)
only under gusty crosswind conditions. However, the weather was calm at the
time of landing as per the weather report available.
n) Pilot has neither undergone Pre-flight Medical Examination (PFME) before
operating the flight nor after the flight on 12.03.2018. As per Pilot “he did not
carry out PFMC since he was flying under privileges of PPL”.
o) Operator was not having Pre-Flight Medical examination facility and also does not
have Operations Manual.
p) The pilot has carried out the class II medical on 07.01.2017, (age of the pilot was
66 years 02 months). DGCA HQ’s Medical cell has given the validity of Medical
Assessment for two years i.e. till 06.01.2019 vide file no. 1-691/1982-L-2 dated
30.01.2017 wherein it was to be given for one year as per The Aircraft Rules 1937
Part V 39C Sub rule 5(b) - Period of validity of medical fitness Assessment and
Licences.
q) The laboratory examination report of the failed part confirms that, the fracture of
the NLG oleo strut may be caused due to impact or overload during landing.

3.2 Probable Cause:

The incorrect flare and bounce recovery technique by the PIC was the probable cause of
the incident.

4.0 Safety Recommendations:

1. DGCA may take appropriate action against the findings mentioned in Para 3.1
(i, j, n, o & p).

Date: 12.09.2019 (Preetham Reddy N)

Asst. Director of Air Safety
Investigator in-Charge.

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 GLOSSARY

ATC Air Traffic Control

CRS Certificate of Release to Service
DGCA Directorate General of Civil Aviation
[Link] Deputy Chief Flying Instructor
FDTL Flight Duty Time Limitation
FRTOL Flight Radio Telephone Operator’s Licence
FTL Flight Time Limitation
IST Indian Standard Time
MEL Minimum Equipment List
NLG Nose Landing Gear
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
PFME Pre-Flight Medical Examination
PIC Pilot in-Command
PPL Private Pilot License
RWY Runway