JOHN D.

SOLIVEN
JD-I

I. Define Statutory Construction.

Statutory Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.

Justice Martin defines statutory construction as the art of seeking the intention of the
legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state of facts.

II. Differentiate Construction from Interpretation

Construction is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct
expression of the text, while interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of
the language used.

Interpretation is limited to exploring the written text. Construction on the other hand is the
drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text.

III. Rules or matters on statutory construction applied on the following cases:

1. BOLOS vs. BOLOS, G.R. No. 186400

 In the case at bar, VERBA LEGIS PRINCIPLE applies in this case wherein
when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction and application.

In the case at bar, the issue is whether or not the [Link].02-11-10-SC entitled
“Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages? The court ruled that it is not applicable due to the rule
stated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which is under Section I, it states that “Rule
shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.”

Clearly left no room for doubt because the coverage extends only to those
marriages entered during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on 3 August 1988.

2. ADASA vs. ABALOS, G.R. No. 168617

 In this case, an administrative rule of procedure lies on the rule in statutory
construction that when statute or rule is clear and unambiguous,
interpretation need not be resorted to.  Since Section 7 of the subject
circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal
 or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is
necessary.

Section 7 and Section 12 are neither contradictory nor irreconcilable. Section 7

pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJnmust take, while Section 12
enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a Petition
for Review or of an appeal. Thus, when an accused has already been
arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or Petition for Review due course
and must dismiss the same.

3. MICROSOFT CORPORATION vs. ROLANDO D. MANANSALA and/or MEL

MANANSALA, G.R. No166391
 In this case, the court applied that laws should be construed in a manner that
avoids absurdity or unreasonableness.

The CA erred in its reading and interpretation of Section 5 of Presidential

Decree No. 49. Under the rules on syntax, the conjunctive word "and" denotes
a "joinder or union" of words, phrases, or clause; it is different from the
disjunctive word "or" that signals disassociation or independence. However, a
more important rule of statutory construction dictates that laws should be
construed in a manner that avoids absurdity or unreasonableness.

4. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs. COA, G.R. No.

183517
 It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that statutory provisions control
the rules and regulations which may be issued pursuant thereto. Such rules and
regulations must be consistent with and must not defeat the purpose of the
statute. The validity of R.A. No. 6758 should not be made to depend on the
validity of its implementing rules.

5. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. CA, G.R. No. 107135

 Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter implication (Samson vs. CA, 145 SCRA 659, 1986). The
exception provided for in Section 168 of the old Tax Code should thus be
strictly construed. Conformably, the sales, miller’s and exercise taxes paid on
all other materials (except on raw materials used in the milling process), such
as the sales taxes paid on containers and packaging materials of the milled
products under consideration, may be credited against the miller’s tax due
therefor.

6. VALERIA vs. TUASON G.R. No. L-1267

 One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that
endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws
so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal
another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be
so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. (U. S. vs. Palacios, 33
Phil., 208.) Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same subject
 matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied
repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of
the old one. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634.) 

Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 211 of the Revised
Administrative Code can stand [Link] a fair and reasonable construction,
section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply
to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised
Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the
Code of Civil Procedure. 

From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law
is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless
the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant.
And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to
include the matter in the special statute. (Manila Railroad Company vs.
Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions
of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision
controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary
intention upon the part of the legislature. Granting then that the two laws can
not be reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each other, section 73
of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a specific law, should prevail over, or be
considered as an exception to, section 211 of the Administrative Code, which
is a provision of general character. A general law is one which embraces a
class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular
persons or things of a class. 

7. MALINIAS vs. COMELEC, G.R. 146943

 The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons
of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the
natural workings of human mind. They predicted upon one’s own voluntary
act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.

8. CENTENO vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILOS, G.R. No. 113092

 Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This
rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, expressly limited to certain matters,it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to strict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

The fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such
interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.
 For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly
against the State and liberally bin favor of the accused. They are not to be
extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new
offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies.

If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory

construction, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its
provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves
innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and
unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever
is not plainly with the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as
without its intendment.

9. LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R.

No.189755

 The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis
to determine whether the area falls under “other similar facilities and
amenities” since P.D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for
water facilities.

Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an

enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include – to be restricted to – things akin
to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.

Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to
areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the
phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like
manner.

10. TOLENTINO vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same
is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. 

11. ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947

 This case talks about the enrolled bill doctrine provides that despite clerical errors in the
enrolled bill, its ratification gives it enforceable authority. The journal entry rule, meanwhile,
follows the agreed upon decisions of the [Link] the court had deliberated on
which between the enrolled bill doctrine and journal entry rule should be followed, the entry
journal rule in this case prevailed. The problem here is whether the passed bill was the same
text as that approved by the Senate. Looking at the journal entries proved that it is not. It being
not the same bill, attestation can be invalidated as was done by the Senate President in this
case. Such invalidation then results to no attestation at all. With no attestation, the bill cannot
be said to have been enacted into law.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity
of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. 

12. MABANAG VS. LOPEZ VITO, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the

Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways

specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the

effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the

enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy

appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the

journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of

state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine

Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published

statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine

Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due

enactment thereof."

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of

the journals.

13. MORALES VS. SUBIDO, G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968