2nd BN Scots Guards - The Battle of Tumbledown

2" Battalion Scots Guards The Battle for Mount Tumbledown 13/14" June 1982ea pi ee Ne 10. 12. B, 14. 15. NT, ile now Be Falkland Islands Battlefield Tour 2™ Battalion Scots Guards ‘The Battle for Mount Tumbledown 13/14" June 1982 prepared by LCpl K Gorman, BA (Hons) Contents: History of the Falkland Islands Map of the Islands Chronology of the War Introduction ‘Map ~ Brit/Argy Positions Prior to Battle for Mount Tumbledown ‘The Plan for the Final Battle for Stanley The Battle for Mount Tumbledown ‘The Diversionary Attack Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 & Right Flank Plan Sketch Map of Battle Orbats Lessons Learned Interview with General MenendezMay 28: May 29: dune June June June June Battle of Darwin/Goose Green. 2 Para attack along isthmus from Burntside House and after bitter fighting were investing Goose Green before dawn May 19. 2 Para lose 17 dead including their CO. J Coy 42 Cdo held at Camilla Creek House to reinforce 2 Para. Argentine forces at Goose Green surrender. Over 1,000 prisoners taken. 3 Para reach Estancia House and move to Mount Estancia and Mount Vernet. K Coy 42 Cdo seize Mount Kent. Recce group of 5 Infantry Brigade arrive San Carlos. 2 Para come under the command of 5 Brigade. 42 Cdo move another company on to Mount Kent. Canberra and Norland carrying bulk of 5 Brigade arrive San Carlos Water. Brigade lands on Blue Beach. 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move to Sussex Mountains. 2 Scots Guards move to Verde Mountains and 1 Welsh Guards move to Bonners Bay. 2 Para move forward by helicopter to Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove. A Coy of 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move forward to Goose Green to cover area as 2 Para leave. 2 Para complete in Bluff Cove/Fitzroy positions. 29 Battery Royal Artillery in support of 2 Para at Bluff Cove. 3 and 4 Troops of B Squadron Blues & Royals also at Bluff Cove. 42 Cdo completes move to Mount Kent. 79 Royal Artillery join 3 Para at Estai 1/7 Gurkha Rifles complete move to Goose Green to replace 2 Para and help with evacuation of prisioners. 42 Cdo start move onto Mount Challenger. 2 Scots Guards embark at San Carlos for sea journey to Bluff cove. 45 Cdo move onto Mount Kent to relieve 42 Cdo who move to Mount Challenger. 2 Scots Guards arrive Bluff Cove. 1 Welsh Guards embark at San Carlos for move by sea to Bluff Cove. Argentine dead from Darwin/Goose Green buried at Darwin. 1 Welsh Guards Bn HQ, 1 Rifle Coy and some Sp Coy at Bluff Cove. The remainder of the battalion returning to San Carlos. Sir Tristram anchored in Port Pleasant and unloaded.May 28: May 29: dune June June June dune Battle of Darwin/Goose Green. 2 Para attack along isthmus from Burntside House and after bitter fighting were investing Goose Green before dawn May 19. 2 Para lose 17 dead including their CO. J Coy 42 Cdo held at Camilla Creek House to reinforce 2 Para. Argentine forces at Goose Green surrender. Over 1,000 prisoners taken. 3 Para reach Estancia House and move to Mount Estancia and Mount Vernet. K Coy 42 Cdo seize Mount Kent. Recce group of 5 Infantry Brigade arrive San Carlos. 2 Para come under the command of 5 Brigade. 42 Cdo move another company on to Mount Kent. Canberra and Norland carrying bulk of 5 Brigade arrive San Carlos Water. Brigade lands on Blue Beach. 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move to Sussex Mountains. 2 Scots Guards move to Verde Mountains and 1 Welsh Guards move to Bonners Bay. 2 Para move forward by helicopter to Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove. A Coy of 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move forward to Goose Green to cover area as 2 Para leave. 2 Para complete in Bluff Cove/Fitzroy positions. 29 Battery Royal Artillery in support of 2 Para at Bluff Cove. 3 and 4 Troops of B Squadron Blues § Royals also at Bluff Cove. 42 Cdo completes move to Mount Kent. 79 Royal Arti. 1/7 Gurkha Rifles complete move to Goose Green to replace 2 Para and help with evacuation of prisioners. 42 Cdo start move onto Mount Challenger. 2 Scots Guards embark at San Carlos for sea journey to Bluff cove. 45 Cdo move onto Mount Kent to relieve 42 Cao who move to Mount Challenger. 2 Scots Guards arrive Bluff Cove. 1 Welsh Guards embark at San Carlos for move by sea to Bluff Cove. Argentine dead from Darwin/Goose Green buried at Darwin. 1 Welsh Guards Bn HQ, 1 Rifle Coy and some Sp Coy at Bluff Cove. The remainder of the battalion returning to San Carlos. Sir Tristram anchored in Port Pleasant and unloadCHRONOLOGY The account in this book has, inevitably, simplified the military complexites - the sheer human effort - of the conflict. So here, extracted from the Ministry of Defence's own matter-of- fact record of events, is the official diary of the campaign on the Falklands. April 2: Argentine invasion of the Falklands. April 3: South Georgia taken. April 5: First Task Force ships, among them Hermes, Invencible and Fearless, sail from Portsmouth. Lord Carrington resigns as Foreign Secretary. Britain declares 200 miles ‘exclusion zone’ around the Falklands. April April 8: US Secretary of State Alexander Haig arrives in Londen to begin 'shuttle'. Canberra sails from Southampton. April April 25: South Georgia retaken. April 30: US sides with Britain. May 1: Vulcans and Harriers bomb Stanley airfield. May 2: Argentine cruiser General Belgrano torpedoed. May 4: Sheffield hit by Exocet. May 15: Raid on Pebble Island to knock out enemy airfield and aircraft. May 21: 3 Cdo Brigade lands on Fast Falkland. 2 Para and 40 Cdo on Blue Beach. 45 Cdo on Red Beach. 3 Para and 42 cdo on en Beach. (Blue Beach is San Carlos Settlement, Red is Ajax Bay and Green Beach is Port San Carlos Settlement.) May 21/26: Consolidation of bridgehead, patrols move forward. Argentine air attacks hit 11 ships. May 27: 45 Cdo move from Red Beach to Green Beach to start overland move to Douglas Settlement. 3 Para leave Green Beach for Teal Inlet and Estancia. 2 Para move toward Darwin and Goose Green, reach Camilla Creek House by last light.June 8: dune June 10: June 11/12: June 12: June 13/14: June 15: 1 Welsh Guards' remaining Coy arrive in Port Pleasant on Sir Galahad together with Rapier battery and 16 Field Ambulancs. Argentine air attack on Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram and 2 Scots Guards positions at Bluff Cove. 53 dead, 46 injured. Landing craft sunk in Choisewl Sound by Argentine air attack. 1/7 Gurkha Rifles, less one company, complete in Bluff Cove, making 5 Brigade complete in that area. Two companies of 40 Cdo put under command of 1 Welsh Guards. 2 Para and 1 Welsh Guards under command of 3 Brigade for their attack on Mount Longdon. ‘Two Sisters and Mount Harriet. 3 Cdo Bde attack on 3 axes. 3 Para attack Mount Longdon with 2 Para in reserve. 45 Cdo attack from Mount Kent onto Two Sisters. 1 Welsh Guards secure start line for 42 Cdo who attack from Mount Challenger onto Mount Harriet and Goat Ridge. All positions taken by first light after heavy hand to hand fighting. 1 Welsh Guards return under command 5 Brigage. 5 Brigade Tac HQ established on Goat Ridge. 2 Scots Guards make diver: nary attack with troops of B: Royals from Mount Harriet towards Mount William Under cover of this, 2 Scots Guards attack and take ‘Tumbledown Mountain. 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move through 2 Scots Guards position to assault Mount William. Defenders break and run at dawn, having put up stiff resistance through the night. 1 Welsh Guards make attack to Sapper Hill. White flag flown over Stanley Formal surrender by General Menendez to Major General Jeremy Moore of all Argentine forces on East and West Falklands, 40 Cdo move to West Falkland to effect surrender their.At about 4.30 am on Fridey 2nd April 1982, 140 Argentine Specie) Forces landed at Wullot Crock, After ettecking the Royal Marine Gerracks at Noody Brock, they proceaded ta surround Government House. Whilet this was heppening the main Argentine lending canc aehore at the Airport. Despite a fighting retreat by [the 61 men of Naval Party 8901, as the Islands Marine detachnent were called, the Governor surrendered at 0925 hrs, The Argentinien Army now set about consolidsting their victory using Staniey Airport, which they meneged to keap open until hours before thei? fine} surrender, They brought in some 1100 men, APCs, armoured cere and artillery. In preparation for an attack they hoped would not come, they dug in and mined areas, Back in the UK @ Task Force was repidly put together and on the Sth April the carriers Invincible ond Hermes, accompanied by the assault ship Fearless sot out for the Falklands. Four deys leter the liner Canberra carrying some members of the Perachuts Ragiment and Marines eailed. In all over 100 ships came to play their part in returning the Felklands to Britain, On the 21st May the initial landings in Sen Carlos Neter commenced at: Green Beach at Port San Carlos ~ 3 Pare and 42 Connendos by Blue Beach at San Carlos Settionent ~ 40 Commando. &+ Glue Beach 2 at San Carlos Settlement - 2 para and gubgequently 5 Int ate, G, Red Beach st Ajox Say - 45 Commando. The battle for the Felklends was now ons Mearwhile in London, the Second dattalion Seats Guards (2 $6) wae finding the Gueents Guard at Buckingham Palaca, St James's Palace and the Touer ef London, Little did members of the @attalion then imagine that within ten veeks they would have landed on the Felklend Islands, Far less could they have guessed that they would be involved in @ full scale battle uhich would directly influence the tining of the Argentinien capitulation, thus curtailing hostilities and saving further loss of life. Exectly @ week ister, on Good Friday, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel M1 E Scott, accompanied by Major 1 ¢ Mackay-Dick MBE, Second in Conmand and Captein TS Spicer, Operations arricer, attended a briefing at Headquarters 5 Infantry Brigade in Aldershat. The Erigade Commander, Brigadier M/A Wilson OBE MC, oxpleined thet the Battalion, together vith Tet Battslion Welsh Guards (1 WG) might come under commend of 5 Infantry Brigade for possible deployment to the Falkland Isiends, This was merely the first of many such briefings and conferences uhich ultimstely led to a brigade exercies in Wales between 21st April and 3rd May and to the Grigade's departure on ANS Quesn Elizabeth IT (QE 11) from Southempton et 1600 hours on Wednesday 12th Mey. The Gattalion's stay on GE II vss extrenely confortable. There vas no lowering of the high standards of accommodation and service traditionally associated with such liners. There was anple space for intensive treining, consisting of continuation training on sll weapons, intelligence briefings, signals, first gid end PT. Shortly after the QE II seiled sauth ef Ascension Island, on 22nd Mey, active service conditions were intraduced. A ship's blackau uas Amposod ae a security neacure. On the 27th flay QE II arrived at Grytvyken, South Georgia where the gattalion cross-loaded into $5 Canberra. Ib will berecalled that @ Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) of 200 miles radius of the Falklands had been established as soon es the original Task Force, which hed sailed on 8th April, was in a position to enforce it. 2 5G entered the TEZ in Canberra and, et 1435 hours on 2nd June, landed at Sen Carlos in lending czaft (LCU), The Battalion's arrivel ceme three days -fter the remarkable success of 2nd Battalion The Parechute Regiment (2 PARA) at Daruin/Goose Green at which 1200 prisoners were taken and many onemics killed, 3 Conmando Srigade wes advancing on foot in the Northern part of East Falklond and 5 Infantry Brigada (now including 2 PARA) was to move sgainst Stanley in the South, Jen Carlos to Bluff Cove The Battalion cug in at San Carlos and occupied ite position for three days. ‘Throughout the operations, First light was at about O700 hours local time and lest light at 1600 hours. Digging in is perhaps not the correct terminclogy, Any trench more than tuo feet ceep filled with water, so trenchas were dug ao deep as possible and then sanga-2 wore constructed out of peat and rocks. Tho Gattalion command pest wes initially a large hole with a tarpaulin stretched over it, This was extremely difficult to operate in and it was soon replaced by a dug in 9 x 9 tent. During the three day stey at San Carlos, the dattelion was warned to be prepared to move forward to the area of Bluff Cove to relieve 2 PARA, 2 PARA had reached Glut? Cove fellowing the now well documented telephone call from the Suan Inlet House to Fitzray/Aluff Cove. Acting on information From the Local population, the Brigade Conmander ordered 2 PARA to send a perty in Scout helicopters foruaré to Suan Inlet House to ascertain by tolophone whether the eneny were in Fitzroy or Bluff Cove. In the event, the 14 yoar old coughter of the Fitzroy settlenent nanoger confirmed by telephone that the enemy ues ot neither locotion. The Brigede Commander commandeered a Chinook helicopter originally tasked to extract 2 PARA's prisoners end ordered 2 PARA to deploy @ force foruerd ta secura the tuo scttlenents for furthor operations. ‘The Operations Officer Flow forwerd to Bluff Cove with the Commanding Officer of the Welsh Guards, Lieutenant Colonel JF Rickett MBE, to recce and liaise on Friday 4th June. On the afternoon of the Sth June, the Commanding Officer moved to Darwin for an 0 Group, The Gettalion, under the Second in Command, embarked on the assault ship ‘MS Intrepid for the move to Bluff Cove, Due to the threat of s lend based Exocet missile system, Intrepid would only take the Settalion to the eres of Lively Island where it was off-loaded into Intrepid's LCUs and continue the journey to Bluff Cove. This wes considered to be quite adventurous as the LCi! is not really designed for offshore work and as well as being uncomfortable, is virtually unprotected and therefore vulnerable. The journgy itself was extremely unpleasant. for seven hours all ranks were jammed into four open LCUs, It was bitterly cold and shouers of drenching ice cold sea water continually came over the sids. At one stage nerves stretched when star shells from a 105mm gun burst overhead, There was concern thet the LCUs had been spotted from the share and that at sny moment the illumination rounds would be Followed by high explosive. This feeling was intensified when the Battery Commander, Major f T Guyn, took cover as the third ster shell burst overheed, (in fact thesa shells came from 5 suspicious Nevel ship, HMS Arrow).changed over, The forser ranoinod tuo alles foruerd of the mein Brigade Line for soven cold and snowy deys, providing an excellent Observation Pact for Mounts Herriet, Tumbledcun, billian and Sepper Hill, Thet there ware Fou exposure cosusities in the’ strocicus conditions teatifies to the extrently high stonderd of junior lvedarship within the Settalion, Gra cf tho exposure gevcs recovered after resuscitetion by his platoon commander, Lisutenant A A D Laurance. At the tine ths Conagnding OFFicer's priority ues the physical Susvivel of tha Battalion rather than operations ageinst the Acgentinians, nilet at S1urF Cove, the Jsttolion received mast velustle and weleone help From the settionent's civiliens. (ir Kevin kilneztin and ethore, including fir Tim Dobbyn end Mr Mike Macks) plus tuo Polish seamen uho hed junped ship fand sought ssylun shortly before the hostilities began, placed their tus tractors st the Gattelion's disposal and drave back and Forth throughout the dey bringing bergen rucksacks, Tatione and ammunition the one and 2 hel? miles From the beach, The Reginental Aid Post ues set up in the Kilmertin'e hovee fond tes snd uae were macs availoble to ell. Port Harriet House = Qporatian Inpunity ‘The first offensive operation mounted by the Gattalion was the ostabléshnent Bf en advanced petral bese 12 kilosotros forward ef Bluff Cove From which the Reccs Platoon could aparcte, Thie wos well within tho enemy's erea oP Oporee tions, The pletoon task wos to locate end destzay ta 105mm gun positions fend a recar site shich Grigede Headquarters hed suggested usre an Port Herriot, nd S8a Boint. ‘Tha Recee Plstocn Commander, Captain RA Scott, uas briefed by the operations Officer on the 7th una. The pletcon, Less Sergeant Coull's section, togather with @ Feruera abservation officer (FiO) Ceptein k Miller end Engineer Roose Party (Fron 9 PAAR Sqn RE) sot cut aon efter lest Light. the battalion wited ith anticipation for neus of the fizet strike at the onomy. Tho First report to cone through indicated thet Port Harriet House appesred to be occupied. Howavor, further inspection revealed that this uss not 80 ‘and the house ves then accupied by Sunguant Allun's potrels Captain Scott took his othes patrols to scarch for the 105me gun positions. Unfortunately tho informetion acted upon provad ta be inaccurate and no gua positions were Found, The patrols returned ta Port Hertiel House. ‘The Following dey the Bettalion vas joined by a four man petrol Froe 6 Squadron 22 SAS who were going to oparate within 2 SCte ares of responsibility, Although not under the Battelion’s conmend, they hed some apare time 20 it ues decided that their first tasi would bo to’ help Sergeant Allun's potzol of the Recce Platoon to destroy tho cnony reder site, NoJor The Honqurable ® W Oathell HOE and Captoin TS Spicer tried to insert ‘tha SAS patrol to Port Hortict House and resupply the Aecee Platoon ueing tue Eivilion landrovers driven by Mssers Dahbyn and Mackay, This group was only 700 m From Port Horriet House when the leoding vehicle tan over sn anti= «= Bersomel mine which denegad = front uheol. Tha menbera of the group disncuntad only to discover that theywore in tho middle of a minefield. Extrecticn from the minefield ues © slow business involving moving carefully along the tyre tracks of the Lendraver ard thon ravereing the vahicles outs The whuel on the Jondrover was changed snd tho group soturned t0 Dluft Cove, ie fader cite end Lt wos letor . ues unable to Locste tl Sito axisted, Tho petzel then returned to Sorgoont Allun's pet discovered that no =The following day (9th June) this operstion cams to e dremetic end. The Conmanding OFficer received outline instructions fox passille advence on tha Southern flank to. e Stanley. Proparstions for this advance required the feces Platoon to carry out certain reconnaissance tasks and also to be avaro of future Brigade plone, including tho petrol programma of 42 Commando Rayal Marines who were imnedistely to the forth. ‘Tha Commanding Officer decided that the maintenence of tho covert patrol bos had become less important than our arrangements far the possitle advance, He then sunt a helicopter to extract the Recee Platoon commander for briefing, The enemy's reaction was quicker and in groster strength than had bean expected, In the late efterncon the Recos Platoon camo under mortar and snail orns fire, It elso appeared that ground Forces were moving in to the attack, Accordingly Sergeant Allum gave the order to withdraw end the platoon moved out under intense mortar fire, During this time Sergeent Allum and tuo others were wounded, Tho Commanding Officer sent Captain Scott in 2 Scout helicopter from Battalion Heedquarters to the platocn's omergency RV, Staff Sorgeant Sell (ADTC) quided the helicopter in with his torch end the cesualtios uere evacuated direct ta the field hospital at Ajax Bay, Captain Scott then led the remainder of his platoon back through 2 minefield to © pre-arranged AV where they were picked up by & Toop of the Blues end Royals in their Scorpions and returned to Bluff Cove at about mic- night, During the evacuation of the Recce Platoon, artillery engaged eneny positions on Mount Harriet, In this account of the operations, the Commander of 5 Infantry Brigade stated that the information from this ",., 2 $C patrol was the best intelligence received by the Brigade throughout the campaign". Ho valued perticularly the indication that the oneny were deployed to mest 0 threat Launched fram the South and along the track running from Bluff Cove to Stanley. Bluff Cove On tho 8th June, while the Port Harriot minefield incident was taking place, the Sattelion wos ploced on air reid warning RED st 1259 hours, Very shortly afterwards, Five Argdntinian AG Skyhavks cee over, It was later discovered that thay attacked the LSLe off Fitzrey causing tragic losses for the Welsh Guards, ft 1530 hours four more Skyhawke came over ond were engaged by emoll era fire from most of tho Settalion, who fired 18,600 rounds, Cne was definitely hit, passibly by Lence Corgorel Winfield of the Machins Gun Platoon using his 0.5 inch Browning, Four mcre aircraft came in and a second one use brought down, A third uas possibly hit, The last wave jettisoned two bonds and a drop tenk which fell shors of Sight Flank's pasition, The Sattalion had suffered no casualties, an¢ as an intro! 8 engagonent proved @ tremendous morsic booster, uction te batt: On the efterncon of 10th junc, on eneny 155m battery began adjusting fire onto G Company's position. Sporedic shelling continued for tha next two days. Ona G Company sangar wos demolished but there were no injuries.OG — —— ws A “ = “a . is Pa 9 Id SR FOMEH IN fy aay 19 Assy o osz S19]SIg OM, mening NMOGSTEANL JO FILLVE po aN SHL OL YOIUd SNOILISOd NVINILNS5YV ONV yuve el uOPBUOT Ww ne eee Roe, ~ wo,TB FLAN FOR Tan PY On the 9th June the 5 Brigade Orders Group assembled at Fiteroy to consider the plan for the attack on Stanley. 3 Goonando Brigade was to atteck ‘Tho Sisters ant Yount Harsiet ty night with £5 Connando taking the former objective an? 42 Commande tho latter.” The 30 Settelion the Parachute Foginent wae to put in a foint attack on Fount Longion. Sinul taneously the 1st/7th Duke of Blinburgh's Own Gurkba Biflon (1/7 OR) woulé patsol againet Yount Tunbledown and Hount illian. 2 5, with a company of Gurkha, wae to seve long the Souther flank to conforn with 3 Connanto Srigade. It nas’ planned they if Tunblodown and "illiam were not to fell to the 1/7 Gurkhas patrols, 2 $0 would attack the features at first light on tho 12th om 13th June foum the Bouthy On his rotumn to the Battalion for the Onfers Group tho Commanding Officer held @ planning pooting with tho Scoom in Gonnand, tho Company Conmaniers, the Battory Gonmanier, the Adjutant and tho Operations ani Intolligonse Officers,’ He wee concerned that the Urigade plan involved a rether predictable long usbill daylight aaseult acrose aifficult ground during which tho Battalion vould bo extremely vulnerable. (It vas subsoquontly leamed that ton cuetained fire nachine gue Gosinated this approach). He preferred tho altoznetive of a flanking evtick launched ty night from the already socuro’ Comanto positions to the eet of ‘Tunbledown. oo Brigade Connanter approved of the flanking etteck alternative and gave formal crdere St Fiteroy on the 10th Juno. The Battalion vas to attack Tumbledome Ti GR ore to attack Mt Villian ant 1G to be propared to nove forward aed septune, Sapper Hill.(2 BATTLE TOR on Colonel Scott's retum to Bluff Cove the inal details of the operation were worked out, ‘The Comianding Officer geve his orders at 1550 hours, the plan was for 9 silent aight attack of 3 phascepreseded ty 2 small diversionary agiack fron the obvious Southerly direction. ‘the fire plan was to include f4ghter ground attack, five batterics of 105m Light guna, and naval gun fire from HHS Active and Yarmouth. Tho mortars of 42 Commando RX and 1/7 GR were also to be available. bach phase would involve « company attcck on a different part of the objective. Phase 1 was for G Conpany to take the first part of Tumbledown innediately after the diversionary attack. Phase IT involved Left Flnnk moving through and assaulting the main part of the mountain (GR332723 to GR 340723). In Phase IIT Right Flank would sceure the final part, The Battalion's move to its assoxbly area wis planned: for (oo hours on the 12th June but vas paetponed as helicopters were not available until too lato. At 1400 hours the Comondine Officer was called to Brigade Headquarters and given furthor information about the eneny and chout 3 Conmando Brigade's attack the previous evening. It vas agreed that in view of the dclay over helicopter evailobibity the attack shovld be postponed until the following night. A helicopter was provided for the Battalion reconnaicenace (R Group) to move forvard to observe ‘mbledown from the area of Goat Ridge. At last light on the 12th June the R Group returned to Bluff Cove. On the woming of the 13th tho Battalion moved by support helicopter to the assonbly area, On arrival, sangers were constructed. The R Group and platoon and commanders went forward to observe the enomy positions. If nothing else the campaign proved conclusively (again) the value of tho old wilitary saxin that time spent in reconnaissance in never wasted. The assently area wes shelled speradically from about 1000 hours onwards, Lance Sergeant ficGeorge ws wounded. Another shell scored a spectacular direct hit on tho equipment of Lance Corporal Campbell and Gusrdsuan Grecnshield ~ which thoy hod discarded while they dug in- setting off their white phosphorous grenades. At 1400 hours the Commanding Officer delivered confirmatory orders, the journalists, 2 J MeTlrey (Daily Telcgraph) end Tony Snow (Sun), who were to acconpany Battalion Headquarters, attended. Tt wes decided thet the Forming Up Point (FUP) guides and controlicrs = the Recce Platoon under ¢onmend of the Second in Command ~ vere to be in position by 1900 hours having held daylight reheatgals. G Company, leading the attack, were to cross tho start line at 2100 hours. For the attack on Mount ‘unbledow bergen rucksacks were not carried. the Battalion vere "bolt kit! only tut with six sleeping bags carricd per Company to help in the treatment of casualtios. ‘he verbal recognition signsls to be used wthin the Battalion and slo 1/7 GR were considered, ‘the NAIC password syatem was discarded in favour of the more practical and lose formal “Hoy Jimny" for the Battalion and “Hey Jékmay" for identifying the Gurkhas. While thé may sound a trivial point, the system adopted proved of considerable importance during the battle, -o-2HE Dwestonany armick ‘The attack vas intended ic distract the onony!s attention fron the Battalica's wuove from Gent Hidze to the foot of Mount Tumblodom, It was hoped that the Giversion would convince the onomy that our attack would be for the Southern Hanks ‘the attacking fore, under command of Officer Commanding Koadquarter Company, eonsisted of threo four man assault soctions fron the Recee Platoos ane a fire support group consisting of personnel from the Battle Group Hicadauartere and Al Eehelon, Specisliat support was provided by a troop of the Slucs -x2 Royals (86/0), two Sappers who acted as seoate, a Bombardier POD and = Mortar Fire Controller. fg duo to start the force was in position, but no eneny had been located in spite of their having been geen during the carlion Nisual recee, Hajor Botholl sent the RUG/D troop forward toverde the Stanley road to try to attract uneny fire, Tho leading Scorpion soon went over a ent personnel minc without any of the encny reacting, oo the main patrol advanocd towards the eueay an foots AE about 2045 hours 9 possible oneny eatger kas cpotted through a nfht sight at 75 metres. ‘the {ire support croup mder Company Scrgecnt Najer Sraty muved to tho South to find» fire position while th. agszult groups commanded by wagor Bothell, Drill Sorgoant Wight and Sergeant Could closed on the energy ‘who continuod to dleplay no reaction. The assault groups vere almest won tho Fret sangar when snoring vas heard and. other sangars wore soe. As the groupa eplit up to deal vith the various senvare they ona under heaty fire ond = fierce onchange of tine cupueds Drill Sexguant Wight and Lance Carsoral Pashtey (Royal Mgineers) wore Ruiled ab eae in ‘the aseaait on the northerost trench, Four other patrol weubera were , Wounded but throc pipors adsinistercd first aid, which saved furener Lose of life, ‘the eneny continued to tring dom hoary fire froa a number of oan trenches, including a machine gun post. At fire the fre of the Tire support ‘group as neutralised and the pstret was disonganiacd by the casuulties toes amd consequent medies1 roquirenents. Nonotheloaa, thc pusiticn wad cventually secured after alnost tvo tours of continuous fire, interspersed with ayetosstie deccults on individual trencitos and sang de. cra and Tactraction of the patrol vil snd wounded proved difficult, as it had 4 Zi: fe be sccoupliahod on foot. One enemy cusrgod fron a oingar unexpoctedly ana hofore he vas killed, threw a hond grenade vhich caused ehrapnel hemos vo Hajor Bethel and Piper Dufty, who were covering che wdthdretals Tuther casusl tics occurred whow Lance Sergeants Miller and HeLintock, Lance Gorpored Mitoholl ond Guarden=n Carruthers - all of vom vere esrrgisg she badly wounded ~ trod on two ati personnel mince ‘The enemy onlicd aoa . Gefensive fire on he arca out ite effect vas happily slight in the pesey grounds At tide etage the dead haé to be abandoned, The patrol toved aleuly beck” clearing the way vy using their torehce which Helped thor so avoid Yt lecce gne further sino. At about 0030 hours the RY was reached, ‘tumbledouny. the meene of the asin attaciy won lit up by artillery fire and «50 tracor ined fron Wount Hoxriot.BE © Conpany planned to advance in twa colums for the three kiloaetres tron the Forsing Up Point (FUP) across the open anddle, and to take the first erage of fhe ‘Musbledow: feature ir two phases. 7 Platdon, comianded by Licutenant HW doynetn, and Company Hoatquartere vers to sosurs the first cocpany objective supported by 8 Platoon, commanded by Second Licutensat C3 Pages ‘Then 9 Platoon conmanced by Liestonant ¢ J Blount ond 8 Platoon vere to nove forward cupported by Company Hoxdquartera to gecure the second company objective eatinated to be a machine gun post. tho OS's party, with stretchers, pipes and rosorve mediccl kit uss to bring up the rear. @ Ganpany woved off Silently fron the 7UP and erossed the wire fance marking the start Line at 2100 hours. By Giversionmy attack vias under way end there wa considerable noiso fron the Gouthera slopes of Tuabledovn and Harriet, As the Company advanced through snow flurries and sporadic shell and mortar ize, star shells were frequently Fired froa tite outskirts of Stanley and fren a battory sonewbors near the South of Noody Broo. These it the wkole battlefield and, util the slope loading to the first company objective wae reached, progreas ee Glove At this point there had beon no enemy reaction and ae the ficet columns was by then in ground hidden tron the Argentinian position, 7 Platoon fad Company Headquarters covered each other through this objective. the enemy had deserted it. 8 and 9 Platoos degen to nove against tho machine gin post white Company Headouarters moved into the Tunbledova Crage to be ablo to Lover both North and South of the moutain, ‘the Coupany romaimed undetected, he sasault platoons also found this escond objective deserted although a, Spanish woice wos heard in the rooks above, The accond paso of the attack boge with Left Flank sdvancing through 0 Company at 2230 hours and coming undor tines Alnost imediately, @ Copy gave supporting fire with auteaatie wespers wmtil the fire could no longer te axfely effective for Lert Flame aie fuPhorting fire drew nortar and shel fire onto the rocks around f Coopeny for {he euesy sortar lino behind Hount Willies and the gun battery dn Stanley. More of 9 Platoon wore Ait st this atagey including Sorgeant HeDoneld wo Tefussd trestment until the next moring, A Company Nedieal Aid Post wee oct HEB Fistoon Gonmsnicr, oho en two obcasions pratucted with hie ow toa, ‘huMided who could not move. Wien Left Flank began to take novere cesal ied, S Sogpany provided the CBS with Mia ochcion group, 28 extra medical ondeslien end 8 Platoon, vho wore uncommitted, as stretcher teams to join the Left Place GUS for the three kilonetro earry tack to the #egimental Aid Post (iB). Bee went forward through the auchine gun fire that vas holding up Let. Flank fo Peeover the wounded and poss then through tho Coupany Heddeat aad Ponte dpsrt fron replying to the regular aniper fine casing free the crags Company Headquarters, @ Company took no further port in tne notion’ GeEPRUY wounded, including & Gurkha dropped off by hie company, wesw evscunted the noxt day.Loft Flank passed through © Company at 2230 hours and started climbing the nein feature of Tunbledown Mountain with 13 Platoon, under command of Second Lieutenant JD Stuart, moving up to the crags on the left, 15 Flatoon, under cormand of Zoutenant 4 M Mitchell, advancing on the lower ground to the right and 14 Platoon, gonmanded ty Heutenant 4. J Fraser in reserve behind Company Headquarters. Rimost immediately, two or throe enery seni-eutonatic weapons opened up om 15 Flatoon who went to ground and returned the fire. The immdiate scction atvack by Lance Sorgcant Delgleish's section was beaten off by superior eneny automa tio Zire in depth, and there started an accurate ané inorossinely heavy bonberdmont by gneny artillery and mortars which continued throughout the might. Themy movement Ghout 100 = 200 netres ahead could be sean through wospon night sights (IuS) and in roving into fire positions to engago then, two casualtica were taken by 15 Platoon. Quardenan Strilling was shot and Killed and Sergeant Jackson received a shrapnel wound in the thigh. At aout the same timo, 13 Platoon in tho rocks were engaged by/eneny sniper cauipped with excellent night sights, killing Gusrdsman Heemeie, portally Nounding Sergeant Sinecn and wounding Lance Gorroral Fyre. Company sergeant Yajor Nicol vas shot in the hand while going to Sergeant Simon's aid and Guardanan Shaw had a lucky escape when a bullet was stopped by tho three magazines in his Zeft breast pocket. Both 13 and 15 Platoons attempted to dislodge their onomy with S(nm, Som and M79, but although this was partially offective in the hich ground against the sniper positions, it appeared to have little effect on the encny facing 15 Flatoon. For several hours 13 Flatoon's sections tried to fight through the rocks and crags $n4 Achioved sone success with high exploeives and white phosphorous grenades. Tho loading sections, commanded by Lance Sergeants Davidaon ani MeGuismecs flushed cut the forwand anipers andyyfolloving the enony's communication cable, located and dostroyad several sangara and snipor positions, despite Peres anny resistance. The onony in front of 15 Flatoon continued to put down a heavy weight of firey sone of them shouting and singing as they dia 80, but avvorel wore killed by Iance Sergeant Hitchell and bia section with I¥S fitted weapons. Tho FOO and MPC Gteapted to bring down fire on the encny immediately to the front of 15 Platoon, ‘but for much of the time only one mortar (out of six) was working and technical problems hampered the F0O's adjustment of fire. Throughout the campaign the soft ground was found to degrade the effect of mortar fire. The mortars soon bedded themselves in and hed to be mowed and their fire i quuber of mortars ‘broke when firing on maxiqun charge. 14 Platoon vas moving up to exploit 13 Flatoon's hard-won gains when artillery rounds arrived on target in frout of 15 Platoon. After three rounds Tire-for- effoct from one tettery, Lieutenant Mitchell led a platoon attack, supported by Conpeny Eeadquantexs nnd yospons of 13 Flatoon, on the forvixd enemy posi tions. 15 Tlatoon's asseult with grenndes and rifles proved successful and four or tivo grety sangrrs vero taken. Ae Company Headquarters coved forwerd to join thems further opportunities to maintain the momentur of the attack became apparent, and with the tio sections of 15 Fletoon en assault was mado on the next group of enemy Bbout 200 netres up the bill. Aboud eight encay ware killed with grenedes, rifles eed bayonets end an equal nugber gave thenselves up. The Conpany Gorrandox Binself killed two an Uayouotod a third. Ono enory round passed throuat his loft front pouch and bayonet scabbard before luiging in ha compass. Lithough ono section cormander, Janoe Sergeant Mitchel] wan shot dead an wnumur mo woes a, the aserult continued up tho hill with further enery eangars, and bunkers boine taken at the point of the bayonet; but with the demands of clearing those positions and guarding the prisoners as they were taken, only seven mon arrived ut the top Of the mountain. Below thom were the lighte of Port Stanley with soze half doxen enony Tunning down the hill. Of those seven, thrve, including the PlatoonConmander, Lieutenant Mitchell, were immediately cut down by a buret of mochine gon fire. The Company Commander and three men were holding Tumbledown Nounteins Within fiftmm minutes, several other members of 15 Flatoon and Company Headquarters arrived to help in securing the objective and 14 Platoon wore called forward, arriving soon after, A small oneny counter attack was driven off, mainly by 14 Platoon, but not before ance Sergeant Vash and Lance Corporal Govontzy had been seriously wounded ty grenade shrapnel, snd Lance Corporal Wilson and Guardeman Reynolds hit by rifle fire. As these caeuslties were boing ovacustod, the stretcher party received a direct hit fron a mortar bomb. Gurrdanan Reynolds (who although wounded, vas cerrying @ stretcher) and Gwindsuan Falcolneon wero Killod and eight other men vounded. The Left Flank sction had taken over seven hour. Qver 30 bodice were subsequently removed from the battleficld, 20 prisoners werd taken and an unknown number put to flight. The cost was 7 mon killed and 21 wounded, 18 of whom were adritted to hospital. Several of the wounded owed their lives to the prompt first aid, often under fire, which they recoived from their comrades. In particular from Tiper Rodgers, the Company Hedic, who worked ccasolosely throughout the night and treated all the casualtiuw h Ab about 0600 hours HaJor 8 A ¢ Price and his two forward platoons (2 Platoon Toeurdes By Second Licutenant WV Hathowson, and 3 Platoon eonmanded by Hauenent RA D Lawrence) moved forward. Hajor Price was briefed by Najer Kiszely wo indicated the ground and told then that the fire fron on enews machine gun ond som: 8 2 or 300 yarde dueluding Lientenant i Ll. Three of the vor & rock end the determined eneuy were unflinchine five trom B4mn and 6émaie wounded four men, exe pinned dovn behind FL Major Price solected the ‘o2ch to the cnemy as it offered the best cover, He delivered short orders to his FOO, Captain Hiller, fis BQwbERy Second in Conmand, his Platoon Commanders and'his Company Serfeens Hajor. | Unfortumately the gun position officer was unable to agree to register the tarset because of the believed proximity of 1/7 GR, who in fact did Got errive until later. ight SHE RIGHE FLAK FLAN mesatcGht Flank plan vas tor 2 and 3 Flatvoas to assault with Company Hpadquarters in the contre and 1 Flatoon (commanded by Second Lhenwevant the Viscount Dalrymple) giving covering fire trom Loft Flenk's position. Fire Support was to be provided on ‘the Company Comiaaier's oreirs and’ Sion sed Goan sere te, be fired immcdictely before the assault. Speed Vas ceventiel ae Gaytight vas only half an tour avay. No artillery fire support oar everlable and the mortars renaincé largely uiservicesbles After leaving the FUP, the assaulting sections moved forvard firing their anti tank and ether veapons as they vent, Ricochets flew is sil dircctions in the Tete terrain, 4 dozon men, amongst then Captain PA Bryden and Tien soe ant Lawrence, gained a feothold'on the ledge occupied by the enoay, The Feorganisation phase revealed that tuo ensiy had soon killed ond four captured. Shortly afterwards tho attack was resusod, principally against three groups of Teumeng, Mae Mot Been seen bofore the initial coupany azaault had beg oe iaunchod. Leaving his Hoadquartera to giare the prisoners, the Company Connancer vent forward to cenwiinate th: actions Cf thane acking partion, fhe moved forword using fire and movencnt. Qn ihe North side ote objective, pibeain rydon sad Licutonant Lawrence, vith two parties, moves long the Jeveis of the rocks wile Socond Licutcaant Hathougon moved along EX lower slopes. On tho South aide no progress could te made fe ially, because of enemy on the narrow centre ridge. Guardsmen Pengelly was driven pack Sy heavy enemy fire as he tricd to approach the encore However, sergeant eimnet, "OO Out the top machine gun post after discarding hie weet and climbing the rocks to troy = grenade, his Killed ose eneay and enadled the advance up the narrow ridgs to continuo. A little rekon Sergeant Jackson cna, Ange Sorgoant Boxter then killed an oneny and captured a torte wounded relaforsepiction cleared the way for 2 Platoon under Sergeant Lebeoter’ ang reinforeonents fron 1 Platoon te move rapidly forward and eventually lial up with Captel ABryden who was by thoy in the voeke at the Besiee eens position. Captain Bryden bad rochod the ruoke sniy attor oncountoring stift resistances on the Horth side of tho objective, While his and Licutunsetmeweene Rees nat jioved along the igh ground, cnomy suipere had wounded fieet goefnamen Harkness and HeBnteggart ond’ then Lioutensat Lawrence (vo oem shot in the head, regieringthe lattoxs group ineffectivg. With Lance Sergeant McDermid and Lance Cerporal Richardson giving covering fire, Lance Corporal Rennie bravely brought the wounded officer into cover. Meanwhile Captain Bryden ani Guardeman Morton had reached ‘the Eastern end of the objectiva before Norton too wae hit. The errivel of reinforcoments from 1 and 2 Fletoona, who bad been called forward ‘by the Company Conmanéer, secured the end crags for Right Flank. 4fter considerable movement jn tho ares, the enemy rounted heavy machine gun fire on the Company's forward elements. However, heavy machine gun fire was returned fron Lance Corporal Campbell's scction ani the cnony withdrew, bringing down artillery fixe as they did so. ph Gers The engagement ened at sbout C800 hours. Soven enemy had been killed and 14 oaptured (cf whom five were wounded). § Right Flankers hed been wounded. Once the position had boon secured, the Right Plank FOO, Captain Kilior, started Sixecting offootive fire onto Tort Stanley. He was on bis thin! "Fire Mevion') yhon the enony were soon leaving their trenches and walking around. ifter Teporting to bia Regiment what he cay, Captain Miller was directed to cease firing. The time was about 0815 hours. The innediate priority was to evacunte ‘:e wounded. Captain Tryden collected the Prisonsre and the velking wounded and took thom back to the Keeimontal Folice and RAT. It took some time for the Company Coneander to organise a defeneive Position, as platoons were thoroughly mixed up and many key men were looking after casuities. The Company was told shortly aftervards that the eneny had eurrendered ani that only action in eel? defenec usa to be conducted. During helicopter evacustion of casualties, the priaoners taken by left ani Right Flank were brought to Battalion Tactical Eeadquarters. ionget them was an officer who had commanded ons of the positions. hile the officer was questioned in Spanish by Captain J RB Campboll-Lanerton,a saiper fired on the Scout helicopter which wes teking out the gasualties. The Argentinian officer was invited to order this lone sniper to stop firing and surrender forthwith. The shipor did not do ao, but caused no further trouble, and it is assumed that he fled, or eurreniered to the G :, who were moving up towarda Mount “William. ‘The Conmanding Officer moved yoounni to visit Left and Right Plank and to examine the eneny positions. icooupsniec ty the Sattory Commander, the Operations Officer and eller, Lance Gorporal Scott, he svt off across the Southern Slope of the feature. hey were impressed with the degree of preparation of the Argentinian po: majority of which included wll dug in aangare ant shelter trenches with effective overhead cover. Woile the party was moving across this ground, news came cn the rudio that the Amgentinian ferocs on the Fal'sand Islands hed surrerdersd. The Battalion sent the night of the 14th/15th June on ‘TumbLegown before moving by helicopter ta Fitaroy.5 wo M17 > } ;ORBAT 2ND_Bawtal.TON 14 JUNE 1982 BAM ScUIS GuAIUIs ALION UBALQUAR CMS Coumanding Officer Second in Command Adjutant Operations Officer Intelligence Officer Regimental Signals Officer Anti Tank Platoon Commander Mortar Officer assistant Intelligence Officer Medical Officer Medical Officer (16 Fd amb Det) Paymaster Battery Conmander Forward Observation Officer Forward Observation Officer Company Commander Company Second in Command to 1 Platoon Coumander No 2 Platoon Commander Yo 3 Platoon Commander & COMPANY Company Conmidnder Company Second in [Link] No 7 Platoon Commander No 8 Platoon Comunder No 9 Platoon Commander i Company Conmander Company Second in Coumand Yo 13 Platoon Commander No 14 Platcon Commander No 15 Platoon Commander RECCE PLATOON Platoon Conmander ECHELON Commander Quartermaster Technical Quartermaster Mechanical ‘transport Officer Lieutenant Colonel i i Scott usd fajor 1 C fackay-vick fu Captain H 4 Eullough Captain T 8 Spicer Captain A W Foster Captain Wi P B Ellis Captain J 8 B Campbell-Lamerton Captain P J L Farrelly Lieutenant A A Bruce Lieutenant Colonel A J Warsap RANC Major K N A Millar RAC Captain D W O'Keefe RAPC Hajor RT Gwyn RA Captain WD Nicol RA Lieutenant K H iMiller Ra Najor S a C Price Captain I A Bryden 2 Lieutenant The Viscount Dalrymple 2 Lieutenant W V Mathewson Lieutenant R A D Lawrence NC Major I E Dalzel-Job Captain J H O'R Pollock IG Lieutenant HW Joynson 2 Lieutenant CS T Page Lieutenant C J Blount ajor J P diszely Captain Uhe Hon G U W Grimston 2 Lieutenant J D Stuart Lieutenant 4 H J Praser lieutenant A it Hitehell Captain R A Scott Hajor fhe Hon i N Bethell MBE Major C Brown Captain B Lawrie Captain % PatersonBOEELON Maj The Hon BETHELL Maj SMITH os Braby osm Evnyen OG@IS Collachen CONS Gault Sgt Robinson Sgt Hicklin Sgt IeCormack ISgt Paterson Sgt Walker Lepl Mitchell Gdsm McLennan OND RO ORQMS Archibald ISgt Cerson ISgt MacRae Lfpl Wicholson a Maj BRO. PSH Hope CSgt ¥cInnes Sgt Set Isgt Fawcett Sgt Fletcher LSgt NoInnes sgt Lsgt Lepl ¢: Lepl Toole Gdsm Dougherty Gasn Marsh {3 Capt LAWRIE TSH Taylor SSgt McDowell Isgt Edgar Sgt Leitch L8gt Slucock LO), Parkin fn Byrne Cin Me Capt sgt Set Set Sgt sgt sgt Lepl Lp) Gasn Casts Gasu _ Casm Gdsu Gdsm Cden PATERSON Sgt McGulloch Saith 1 Webster MacDonald Swaney Fyfe Ogston Sig Crook Southward Sig Weather! Gavican Nicol Brown 13 Denwood Reid Ritchie Rose SIGs Set Cpl Lop) Gdsn Gésa Rankin Watt MeNeill MED CENTRE, Lsgt Gdsa NeQuarrie Irons COOKS seis Sgt set 4 ep) Pte Pte Pte Pte Pte Bay Ssq@is Pte Hous ton-Robb Laycock Foley O'Learycapt POSTER Lt BRUCE Sgt Williems LSgt Leslie Isgt Reavley Isgt Sherrett Gaem McIntosh OF oLmts Sgt Stewart LOpl Kendall Lop) Lockwood, Sgt Third LSet Marshall L¢pl Hush L¢pl Michael Lepl Scott Gasm Clarke Gasm Davidson Gdsm Elliott Gdsm NoGowan HSH MacKenzie CSM Kaye CsM Sulley Sgt Pettit L8gt Johnston Lepl NeCoy Gdsm Ainslie Bap Lé Col waRsap Osgt Beira LSet Neechan Lepl Gibson Gdsm Noble ROYAL SICKAL cpl Reynolds Lopl Feeney cpl. Horne Sig Hawkins The following personnel joined the Bn during the Operatior Sig Perry ~ Port Howard 30 June Major AIC GORDON Port Howard 11 JulyOpi Douglas Lopl Galvin Gam Belford Gaem Bradley Pte Corbett LSgt MacKinnon * Gaem Kirkpatrick Isgt Hinto Casa Meine Lsgt Samson Gasm Ripley Isgt Williams Pte Stewart LOpl Buchan Gasm Webster Ho HQ _R PLATOON FO 9 PLATOON Lt JoxNson 2b PAGE Ue BLouNr Sgt anderson Sgt Morcon Sgt MacDonala Isgt Hanson Sgt Gribble LSgt Ferguson ISgt MacKenzie ISgt Douglass Lsgt Patterson Lsgt Scott Sgt Holmes Eset Scott Lop Bunyan Lepl Batty L¢pl Keers Icpl Catehpole 0p] Greenhalgh Lpl Overton epi Gott Lepl Morrison LOpl Turnbull, Lepl Young Gisn Cleag LGpl Vest Gasm Battorsby Gasn Crawford Casm Campbeli Gam Baxter Gasm Dick Gasm Deasley Gasa Campbell Gasm Gillenders Gas Dunlop Gdsm Comey Gasn Graham Gasa Gilchrist dem Flynn Caden Granay Gasn Gillespie Gaen Rendereon Gaom Glover Gdsm Houston GAs Henson GAsn Hunter Gdsm Hutchins Gasm Khan Gaon Hutton Gasm Lindsay Gasm Lettice Gésn Little Gasm YcGover Gasm Mackay Gism Nettheve Gasm Meleren Gdsn McMillan Gdsm Haciskil1 Gasm O'Brien Gasm Vickey Gésm Reid Gdsm Fictecd Gasm Rumney veWilliams Gasn Thompson Gdsn Thomson Gasm Smith Géen Whittingham Gasm Ward Gdem Ward Gden Williens Gsm Watts Gdsm WelshMaj PRICE Capt BRYDEN CSM ames OHS Allender Sgt Middlenass Sgt Oakes Isgt Baxter Sgt Roy sgt Whittall Lsgt Wilson’ pl Cocks HO 4 PLspoon 2Lt The Viscount DALRYMPLE Set Cravfora ISgt VecGeorge Isgt Waterhouse LOpl Campbell Lopl Lopl Mathieson Lop] NeIntosh Lp] wright Ppr Aitchison Gdsm Alexander Gasm Bell Gasm Brand 37 asm Broadfoot Gasm Graham 05 Gdsw Graham 60 Gdsm Greenshields Gdsm Bell Gden Eanilton Gasm Leveson Gasm Morrison Gasm O' fare wIGHy FL PLaTOON no 2 out Sat ist L8gt E¢pl Lop Lepl Leph Loph Lop Gasn Gasm Gdsm Sdex Gasx Caen Gasm ¢: Gasm Re Gasn Gas }aTHEWSON Robertson Bradley Hatton Bainbridge Pathice Brow MeKinna icicherdson ir Aitchison Cahillane 18 Caneran Jeffrey Kelly Logzie Touden McGuinness Sith 35 Rogers Skates Bottons Give Hardstart Lt Sgt Lge Iset LSet Lopl E¢pl iepl Gésm Gasm Gas Gasn Por Case Gasn, Case, Gisn Gdex Gasm Casa Case. Gasn asm case asm Gasm Gasn LaWiENOR Jackson Greig larsden MoDernia Reekie Rennie Simpson Backhov Brené 57 Clark Clough Ellwood Gibson Gifillan Gilsour Harkness BULL HeBetaggart Matester Morton OtReinty Pongelly Purdie Roading Sutherland Taylor Valkingshaw e 18o/s 51 Sgt Pitoaithly Isgt Gill Isgt Miller Iopl Perry Gdsm Blair ‘Thomson — Capt FARRELLY Osgt Buckley Gasm MeDonala Ppr Sutherland Gas Wood. of2 52 Sgt Hammel Set Noble LSgt Shepheré ep) Wolff Gdsm Collins Gasm Cruickshank Gas Davidson ~ Gdsm Johnstone — Gasn MacPadyen 2 Payne Somerville » Spence Turner os 3 sgt Corbett isgt Fisher (18) Hop) Harper L6pl Jones (WG) 1¢pl shamion (¥6) Gdsm Davies (\ e) Gass Mumford (Wc) Gasm Ponting (4G) Gasm Thorson (WG)No4 Set Lepl Lepl Gdsm Gasm Gdsm Gaem Gésm Gdsm Section Marr MeCabe Ureuhart Cameron Crawford — Hlueniak NeKay ~ Miller Saunders MACHINE GUN PLATO CaP? CaMPBELL-LAMERTON sgt Gdsm Ppr dsm No 2 Sgt Isgt Lepl cpl Gas Gésn Gdsa Gdsz Gasn Gésm PL EQ Shang Dukes MeDenald ~ MoLowal Section Oldham Walker Allen McChesney Barrett Fagan Lugton jartin Marshall Paton No 3 Sec: mn Sgt Tesker Lepl Blair Lopl Winfiela Gasm Cartmell Gasm Cheape Gdsm Jackson ~ Gdsm McConnachie Gdsm MutchRECOH PLaTOON OWBAT No i Section Ho 2 Section capt scorr Ssgt Bell Sgt allua Sgt Russell ISgt NeLintock Sgt Coull Sgt Coventry LGpl Donaldson TSet Gray ISgt Kinsella (IG) LCpl Straughton Lpl Beaty Lepl Dar Brady L¢pl Nicholson Dor Gasm Hardie L¢pl Ovens Por Ppr MacInnes Gasz Carruthers - pr Fleaing Dur Meechan x Tuffy Dur MandLEFT PLANE conpattt KISZELY ~ LCpl Thomson The Hon GRDISTON Gdsm archi bala Nicol ber Cdsm Graham EQL Pte Mer Yatthew Gdsn Nexo Taylor Gasn Porter son Pte Queen Galloway Ppr Rodger HacColl Bps Spencer Murley 2ut STUART Lt FRASER Lt MITCHELL Sgt Siseon Sgt Gavaghan Sgt Jackson ISgt Devideon set Dayeon Sgt Dalgleish Lsgt McGuinness ~ Isgt Martin is Guthrie Lepl Carle 1sgt Mash iSgt Mitchel) Lepl Fay Crockdake ‘Lepl Cameron Binds cpl Coventry Tytler LOpl Greenlees Wilsor cpl Stenton Allen icp? an Binnie Casa Boyes casa Brown Gdsa Bry Ganpoeil 01 Gdsm Campbell 66 Gdem Findlay sn Clasp Gden Cape - Gésn Forrest 5 Jotnetona Sden Dagcett Gésa Gordon Gdsm Meleolnson KA Gdsm Denholm -¢'4 Gasm Hamilton Gasn Moxfast asin Gasm Litterick Gésu Osborn — Gdsm Jackson Gian Need Gdsa Raynolas — Ser eA ds MeGeough Gdsm Mitchel] dsm Ridgm: Kay NePurlene Gaen Rogere Nelellan Peters Gass Robinson Nogueen Rcheréeon Gasn Seaw vontgonexy Jiatherfond Gasn Silver Uy n Slaney Regan Giss Sith Stevert Suaxt Gdsa Terhica - © Tait Stirling | Oden Wilicte Traynor UtesREAR PARTY Capt BOWSER Lt BOCLES-WIL:.1aMs DSgt Singler FANS Capt F Logs Lsgt ROWS NeConaigle Sgt Connor Lsgt Hogg Gasm Parkes Gdsm Smith LSgt Elder Lepl Smiles Dar McEwan Ppr MacLean F Coy OSgt Carli. Lsgt Cromar Gasm Good Lepl Pryde LOp] Barron Gdsm Scott Casn Ferns ME Gdsm Lochhead Gdsm Luk Gdsm MacKay LSgt Leftwich Gfn Harris Cfn Moore Right Flank Lepl Grierson Gdsm Beattie Gdsm English Gasm Johnstone Gdsm Scarr Gasm Sangster Gdsm Tellen G Coy Gdsm Benyon Gasm MeDougall Plank LSgt Pye Gdsm Cray Gdsm McFadden Gdsm Sinnofs 51 Sgt Pitcaithly ISgt Gill Isgt Miller Lopl Perry Gasu Blair Gasu Brown — 2 52 Sgt Hanne) [Sgt Noble LSgt Shepheré Lopl wolff Gasm Collins Gism Cruickshank Gésm Davidson — Gasm Johnstone - Gasm MacFadyen Gaeu Payne Gas Somerville Gass Spence Gass Tamer ols 33 Sgt Corbet Isgt Fisher (iG) LSgt Harrison Lepl Barper Jones (WG) Shannon (4 Davies (Wi Green (1. Some of the lessons learned from the campaign in the Falkland Islands have little relevance to the UX Priority 1 taske due to the difference in climate, terrain, oneay tactice, leck of armour end the overall inmobility accross country, between this country and North Wost Buropo. ‘The loerone therefore listed here will try to adhere to the general rather then to the particular, 2, As 8 background, tho Battelion was involved in preparstion for battle, in cluding using helicopters and L0Us end then, finally, conducting a battelion night attack. 3, Maxims. For those unused to a major war, tho old maxime of simple plans, time spent on reconnaisemnoo,coordinated fire support and covering firc apply as much as they over did. FIRSPOWR 4, Enomy Firepower. 8. Softmess of the ground reduced dramatically the ofect of onomy 155mm and 105mm artillery and 120mm mortars. b. Enouy firepower wae uncoordinated and single rounds, rether then those of a battery, causod littlo concern. DF, with ono notable oxcoption, wos inflexible and therefore could be walked rounds cs Vuoh onony ertillery/nortar fire was unobserved (Iilo that onto the Bn assembly area) and was, mostly, ineffectives ‘The Bn suffered ono casualty. Once observed, their Tze wae effoctive (onto the Bn on reorganisation on Mt Tumbledown); the only way to deal with this was to direct own fire onto likely OP positions (eg Mt villiam). 5. Om Firepower. a. Gonos Our own indirect fire was vastly superior to tho cnumyts but marginally offective ageinst a vory well dng in position (tho onomy aia not lose a eingle man in tho proparatory bombardmont on Kt Tuiblodown, how- ever T out of 10 of their SF GMG's wore destroyed because thoy did not teke thon into their trenches). d. NGS. Naval bombardnont was devastating and caused severe morclo lose to the onony. co. iol Artillory, Fiold artillery was very effeotive but difficult to got really accurate at long range vhon om troops wore 150m from the oncmy. 4. Eimm Hortere. Accurate for close support but sco Annex C for probleme. e+ OAS. Very little closo air support wos available to the 3n for the aseault on Ht Tumbledown. It is understood it was used against 155m battery for which wo wore grateful. f+ Machine Gung. 50 NG were very oficctive against oncmy sangars cither to dostroy then or their moralo. With tracor and loud,clow ratas of fire, usod as a platoon, they vore very good for our morale. Thoir weight ond weight of enmunitfon eovorcly reduced tho options for thoir usc whon solely manpackod,2. Smell Arms, The noe@ for an aseeult rifle with lighter anmunition is woll imown and confirnod by thie cempaign. GPEC in light rolo with maximum tracer, which the cnony disliked, is of-cotive. The LMG, being lighter and vasior to hendic, is a useful addition. , hh. Low Level Air Dofenco, SA aro highly offectivo, particularly GHGs on ouch Poles end .50 MGs, usod on assro, Tho Bn accounted for 2 Skyhawks and a possible third at Bluff Cove. LLAD must be prectisod. 6. Other Weapons. 2. Grenades, White Phosphorous &0 Grencdes were oxcellent for digging oncmy out of trenches rother than 12's. M79 is en cxcellent weapon but more onmunition must be issued (our issue wee 12 per gun) ~ N20} ie oven better and should bo issued to cach section. b. 6mm, 66mn wore very offective against oncay sengers snd lower snomy mor ale, Eqn wore also effoctive but hoavy and unwieldy, ce. Bayonot, Tho bayonot, dospito heated argument, romains very effoctive (vo OFficars killod oneay with their beyonets). a. Saal] HE Morter. 51mm Mor with EB in orcontiel for really close support. macros 7. Baomy Teotios. Although woll fod, woll armed, and wok] propered, in the ond Whe enemy Failed through leck of exporionce, coordinstion end will power. They did not petrol or counter ettnck, Although they ponsorsed some better night vision devi- ces then us they disliked tho night ond would not movs out of their trenches. Although thoy had depth, thoir positions lecked mutual support, Their mincficlde were often not covered by direct or obsarved fire and wore not combined with wire obst- ecles. Their positions were vory woll propered ond cluost impervious to indioct fire and they medo great use of bocky trops Pight cnongst their positions. ‘hoy did not onploy forvard OPs or standing patrols. Bs Own Mcotics. Yigbt. The In attack was by night end cchioved all the adventoges (and Giecaventegea) thet thet produced, Thie must bo co ond wo believe thet daylight att acks must now bo the excoption, Yo must train more at night (old demendl}. 9 v. Surprise. Agein, am old losron, At It Tumblodown, we used a highly rucccssful diversionary ettack (we lcerned from PY letur that tho onony thought this wae the main thrust). Any tactic thet cmploys surprise and tho unoxpcoted is well worth the complication end the tosking of additional trocps. c. Petmols. Patrols, particularly those going in/out of another company/ pavtelion arca cro much sore difficult to coordinate than on an cxoreinc. ‘Tho dangors of cleshos and compromiso comstimor negete the veluo of putting 2 patrol. oute a. Lieigon, Lieieon betveen unite must not bo loft up to thonselves. Higher formation must clsc ccordinsts whore thoro aro ingortant decisioy mato. to be Intelligence ‘The importence of intolligonce ie woll known. In this campeign itwes not good. Before the attack on Mt Tunblodown, we had no nir photographs end only 2 rough idés of tho strongth and porition of the cncmy, both of which were in correct. 10. SITRGPs. —SITW7Ps coming downwerda wore scarce, The importance of © "No Chango! or 'Nothing to Report" de not alwayn roclisod.EDLICOPTERS 12. Gonoral, Helicopters wore the life blood of the campaign. ‘Tasking, perticulorly, of SH was unwieldy and irfloxiblo. Unrolinbility, through appal- ling woathor end sorviceability, confounded well leid plona. 13. Liaison. Contact botwoon ground troope end SE pilots did not exist, Tis led to troops being droppod in the wrong plece, helicopters flying in- correct routos end into cnomy obeorved eress end dropping storor in wrong locations. Some SH nevigstor map reading wee suspect. 14. Rosupply. Resupply by holicoptor wre o cheney business and « constant worry duc to unreliability. Logistics: 15. Cenovs Cascvac from forward positions to RAP or Picld Aubulence could only really be done by helicopter. Stretchers cro too hervy3 wo nocd a much lighter version. It was 2 2 hour journoy by stretcher from It Tmbledown to cur RAP, by then 2 mon could bo deed. It wes only through bravery of light helicopter pilote that our wounded vere evecurtody thie muet heppen in futuro end helicopters must be risked to bring our cacurl tice from forvard positions. 16. Organiertion.. The logistic orgenisetion, duo to © mmbor of fectore, wes totelly inedoguate. The only wey tho Bettalion survived wae to hevo a OM colocated with the Ordnance Company, the Teholon Comndor et BG HQ and small GIS Echelon partios well forward with the companice. Constant forothought wes needed to build up etooks on tho ground to cushion agsinet tho abeonce of stendard rosupsly, which hepyened constantly. 1 Rotarns (G, A and @) must bo as simple as possible in this kind of war'end the profornas must be able to be corried in a pocket, Wo had to amend, or change, our SOPs thro: timos in so meny wecke. BATTALION ORCA TSAproN 18. Rocce *1ztocn. A rooce pletoon is oscential. We formod ours ct tho Weining et Somnybridgo which wee hardly in timo, It was only through tho fa force S48 officarthet the Fl tivo on St wane 19. Beholonr.. Snel) 41 Echelon Partice (cbout 15 poople), with CONS, should Be up loss to tho forwerd compenios. ‘hoy sot as beerers end strotcher partics. Toy aro drow fron HQ Compeny. 20. Bettelicn and Company Eis. ‘Those must bo preporly duplicated so that if the forward KC is dostroyed, then the elicrnative can teko over, Thie worked well in the Bn, oer at. - bres 4 22. - box Be 23. - amoz cyMORAL 24. Ageroseion and Coures, Couregu, like foen, is infectious. ‘here is no doubt that aggrostive loadorchip from comendore wOll forwerd con achieve tronondous ronulte ageinet odds 25. Hospitel Trostuont, ho moflieel treatment our weunded reocived wes out- standing, However, tho visiting eyston on the hompital skip UGANDA wes dis greceful, Thora was # conplote feilurc to reslisc that it wes vitel for tho wounded to to visited by all ranke, not just 00s and Pedres, to raise the Woundod's norels end ele that of those eskore who could thon sco how voll their fricnds wore reoovoring. ‘hie wos ono of tho mejor feilings of tho eftor - compaign. 26, Ropinontcd Spirit, The bottle for Kt Tunblodcwn epitonised the regimental spirit, Mon wort on forvard under fire because they were with thoir frionds end thoy were part of tho Ruily (scction, plotoon, compeny, bettolion). They could net heve fought as well had the syston not givon thon’ this dopth of confidence snd togetherness.ANTEK A 0 250/ex 8 DATED + 1. Bottorios, Rechargeable betterios cre too heavy and leet toc short e tine. Lithium batteries she GSCOTS LAR 2, 352 tmplifions, Ampligiors oo 3. Battory Changing arging wes very difficult. 10 Fa ¥ fuent to do it but ws nover hed a single bet eters oné ACCUs should be ieruod. nstently broke down, cep wore y charged by thom, Bonda goncr— 4 franc. and 320 wore not adeptablo to cerrioge oter then on the pack g fron a borgon wee difficult, 5. ptonnse, 351 antomnes broko frequontly, particularly et tho bese. Old 441 style ontonies ‘bottor. 6. Cox Cables. — Gorx Gables are too short, Thy should bo doublo the Longth. 7. Wests. 8m masts snap oreily in tho cold. &. Renge. 350 range is cdequato from platoon to company. 351s ere too big and bulky for fighting et pletocn level end wore not uscd. 9. GBIs. OMIs are fer too big end bulky, In thie kind of warfare th ‘be cut down tc eesiet connendors end eigncllors. oce must NUCO wee good and worked woll. 14, Evoqueney Ghenging. Tic should be dono at midday to avoid heving to uso toreion at midnight. 12, Scoure Kit. Secure Tit was not uncd, It could bo installed in « trailer with & gonoretor and thon undorslung forward. Be eveilabli + No kit eont in for ropair ne overa ro better than ours. The IWS ia cenuration night viowing device on aistriby Lo is work, 2. Digndays 1 » right but the be IEX. Ureful es shelter. Jyslotn would bo noful 4. Belt Tit. We discarded xidney pouches ond capo carrier in fevour of two ‘tor botile cerricrs. The eseentisle on th belt arce afmunition/ wator bettie, nese tin with 24 hrs nd oxenine, ings ond weterproot. A gon woe cesonticl, ‘Tho issuo large pick ie usvlvees Feblonnc? ups (iesuod) wore excellent, A snl] fold up ennowflegod eckod to the bolt Ts ‘The PILOPAK notebcck system is invelueblo. Roports/roturns could be tilored to this cysten. e cold wind which oqualled oxpesuro. {to cone people), the ordinary in) were imadequeu. We nocd the ctarprocf bat cnn Mopcatho! there Clothing, Me vor a full windproct guit is hepcloss, tetorar ng beg cover erused condensation. ought thoir ow found thes ideal. 10 easonticl or artic beets Procllent. £ wore gocd but diffioult to operate the ronult vill be good,AXUEZ C 10 256/Ex 8 LOSS07S LEARNED — 8100" MORTAR 4. Rasoplate. Neoés strongthoning, Tt sinks in soft post ené broaks on rock, The ‘nest? wes not tricd as it nevded to be fillod with firm soil; thts is impossible to find in peatod countrys 2. Bipod. Too week for Charge 8, Tho clenp or traversing gear broke. 3. Ammunition, Annunition must come peckod to its highest char 4. Henpack, Nanpaek francs aro usclose. elunsy end uncomfortable. #o did not uso tWEX G 10 280/ux 8 cep EE Be IMEAVID WWW ormUL seme, uoee notes wero mado by tho Prdzo, Rovorond £ Seith following an intervioy vith ie guend-on boend UY St Binund at'Port Stanley on the 26th Jeno 1982, TWERBCHEME pep In the Fulidends onapesgn, whet wes tho dccisive battle? 4+ Mpurrt Musblodow war tho dcotsive battio, Tt vas the last high feature that had to bo rotainod if our base position at Stenloy vas not tc bo takony Qs Hoy succesful vas tho bawhapduont of your pei tions? fr Tous Havel vanbendncny wag not very efveotive mainly due ts $49 4neooupeay, Bron sustetnod vosbardaont did not ceuse auch denngo om gery cagual tice won we wore dug iny Tt yap looked yoon pore ag a nhisange Lecter, het shout oun artillery beabapdocnt? Ay Tour orfillery bouberduont hovover ves devastating both in roepct of ite seoureey ent in pogpaot ef the casualties caused, the suntcined bombardnont alee nolo our troops bettleyony, tirud and ineffective evan pofore the battle of Tuablodown begeny un artillery rengo was eleo much shortor then youre, Gur” srtiliery aubtaita that wero further forvand could nt be rosuppliod vhon they were running shor} (again due to tho accuraey of your fixe), Yo also foeped Errvicr bonbardnant viioh vag eleo vory effective, & Wat stout Sapper 1122 4+ Sepper Hill wag not of dsoisive importance to our dofonece, ‘his vas boosuso $4 was a loyor fonture gna therefore of no consequence roslly after Tusbledom 8 tekon, % How 854 you Fook petoh tho battle of naptotoxny : ArT ronliged aftr Gusblotow ves takon thorafore that tho gano wap wp ¥f'9 ncn vere not to be padpeoral %, May did you suprondor af iat point? ¢ A Tt in part of Coskiniors duty ‘2 acoopt roalition ospocially ween they econo obvious and Hoja F moe Yojor Gonorel Hoye} itrinon after Nsblodown, |dheipive Upbtlos wore Lofeton apd Dhak oto, 2, tho onsmyte detonpiye popitions end partioulenty thot umdengrount vere Yothorod considerably Wy. flooding, 3 5 é : PHSERE he oowply vary direivult, 9, 1 eee