[G.R. NO.

146527 : January 31, 2005] Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing
Office, the Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the June 12, 1995 issue
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MANNA PROPERTIES, INC., of the Official Gazette officially released on June 19, 1995. The same notice
Represented by its President, JOSE TANYAO, Respondent. was published in the July 12, 1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald.

DECISION Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao], who testified on

the acquisition of the subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepeña, co-
CARPIO, J.:
owner of the subject property, who testified on the possession of the
The Case applicant-appellee's predecessors-in-interest.

This is a Petition for Review 1 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals' The [documentary] evidence presented were:
Decision2 dated 20 December 2000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and 1006;
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union
("trial court") dated 21 February 1996 in Land Registration Case No. N-2352 2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515;
("LRC No. N-2352") approving the application of respondent Manna
Properties, Inc. ("Manna Properties") for the registration in its name of a 3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006;
parcel of land located in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union.
4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyor's Certificate;
Antecedent Facts
5. Certificate of Latest Assessment;
As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence, the facts of the case are
as follows: 6. Notice of Initial Hearing;

On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the 7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the LRA;
registration of title of two (2) parcels of land, specifically:
8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the National
a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434; andcralawlibrary Printing Office;

b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434, located in Barangay 9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the Circulation
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union measuring around 1,480 square meters. Manager of the Ilocos Herald;

Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the court a quo. 10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing;

Copies of the application, postal money orders for publication purposes and 11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995;
record were forwarded to the Land Registration Authority by the Court a
12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995;
quo on October 7, 1994.
13. Sheriff's Return of Posting;
However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of the Land Registration
Authority, the full names and complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot 14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice of Initial
owners were not stated for notification purposes. As a result thereto, per Hearing on July 18, 1995.
Order dated December 5, 1994, the applicant was directed to submit the
names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of Lots 9514 Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21, 1996
and 9516. On December 14, 1994, the applicant filed its compliance, which granting the application. (sic)3
was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority on December 22, 1994
together with the notice of the Initial Hearing, which was reset to April 13, The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic
1995. of the Philippines ("petitioner"), promptly appealed the trial court's decision
to the Court of Appeals. On 20 December 2000, the Court of Appeals
On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority requested for the dismissed petitioner's appeal.
resetting of the initial hearing since April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a
non-working day to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353 or ninety (90) Hence, this petition.
days from date of the Order to allow reasonable time for possible mail delays
The Regional Trial Court's Ruling
and to enable them to cause the timely publication of the notice in the
Official Gazette. The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and
competent evidence all its allegations in the application for original land
The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20, 1995 by the court a
registration. The Land Registration Authority ("LRA") did not present any
quo.
evidence in opposition to the application. The trial court ruled in this wise:
On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby approves the
from the LRA with the information that the notice can no longer be published
application, and orders that the parcels of land identified as Lots 9515 and
in the Official Gazette for lack of material time since the National Printing
1006 of Cad. 5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total area of One
Office required submission of the printing materials 75 days before the date
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters, situated in Barangay
of the hearing. It was again requested that the initial hearing be moved to a
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union and embraced in Plan AS-1331434 (Exh.
date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353.
"A" and the technical description described in Exhibit "B" and "B-1") shall be
Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing was reset to July 18, registered in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
1995. known as the Property Registration Decree in the name of the applicant
Manna Properties, Inc., represented by its President Jose [Tanyao], Filipino
The Opposition to the application stated, among others, that the applicant is citizen, of legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao] with residence and postal
a private corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to address at Jackivi Enterprises, Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, pursuant
hold alienable lands of public domain. to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529.4

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling and dismissed petitioner's duties."6 A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of
argument that the applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on
requirements of Presidential Decree No. 15295 ("PD 1529"). The Court of matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or
Appeals pointed out that the 90-day period for setting the initial hearing omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
under Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it is the publication especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.
of the notice of hearing itself that confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
stated that the records of the case reveal that the testimony of Manuel Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of
Sobrepeña was not the sole basis for the trial court's finding that Manna the order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing
Properties's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in itself. Petitioner does not raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency
question as early as 1953. The Court of Appeals added that while tax of the application. Petitioner does not also question the sufficiency of the
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they are "the best publication of the required notice of hearing. Consequently, petitioner does
indicia" of possession. not dispute the real jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases -
compliance with the publication requirement under PD 1529. As the records
The Issues show, the notice of hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: complies with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with
sufficient notice of the registration proceedings.
1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION; On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently Established Possession of the Land
For the Period Required by Law
2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN POSSESSION
OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE PERIOD. Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession of
the land for the period of time required by law. Petitioner alleges that the
The Ruling of the Court
trial court and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely on their
On Whether Manna Properties Failed to Comply with the Jurisdictional evaluation of the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties.
Requirements for Original Registration
The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law.7 This Court is
the court order setting the initial hearing date and the hearing itself. not bound to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in prior
Petitioner points out that in this case, the trial court issued the order setting proceedings. Absent any of the established grounds for exception, this Court
the date of the initial hearing on 15 March 1995, but the trial court set the is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
hearing date itself on 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125 days in
The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the
between the two dates, petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded the
required possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a question
90-day period set by PD 1529. Thus, petitioner concludes "the applicant
of fact.8 It invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us
[Manna Properties] failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for
to re-evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial
original registration."
and appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not allow this. Matters of proof
The petitioner is mistaken. and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45
petition, except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances.9 We find
The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads: one such circumstance in this case. The evidence on record does not support
the conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. - The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties
initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than that, as a private corporation, Manna Properties is disqualified from holding
ninety days from the date of the order. alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease. Petitioner cites the
constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution.
xxx Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of the public
domain.
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration
court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that the
issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial land in question has been in the open and exclusive possession of its
hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the land was already private
judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA. This land when Manna Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-interest.
involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no
participation. The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141") otherwise
known as the "Public Land Act." Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended by
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant
complied with the jurisdictional requirements. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
was set beyond the 90-day maximum period. The records show that the of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately
Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial court to reset the preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
initial hearing date because of printing problems with the National Printing prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
Office, which could affect the timely publication of the notice of hearing in have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
the Official Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records indicates that Manna be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Properties failed to perform the acts required of it by law. (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

We have held that "a party to an action has no control over the Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the
Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that open,
meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private land.10 Judicial Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration reads, "Subscribed and
confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950' " This means that the tax
conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.11 came into existence. Manna Properties gave no explanation why its tax
declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the alleged issuance
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in- of the tax declaration. The totality of these circumstances leads this Court to
interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole purpose of making it
since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for appear that Manna Properties' predecessors-in-interest have been in
confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945.
IAC,12 Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial
confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding The earliest of the "un-cancelled" tax declarations presented by Manna
for its predecessors-in-interest first. Properties is dated 1950. This is clearly insufficient to prove possession of the
land since 12 June 1945. The same can be said of the transferee's affidavit,
We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and which was dated 1955. Manna Properties' reliance on Manuel's testimony is
remains part of the public domain. similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient and self-serving on
its own but, Manuel did not also specifically testify that he, or his parents or
Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to
predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or
ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not
earlier.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.13 Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears The only clear assertion of possession made by Manuel was that his family
the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his used to plant rice on that piece of land.20
name.14 Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only subject
to formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first prove Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not
open, continuous and adverse possession for the requisite period of time.15 It present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
is only when the applicant complies with this condition that he may invoke continuous and adverse possession of the land in question since 12 June
the rights given by CA 141. 1945. At best, Manna Properties can only prove possession since 1952.
Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of Manuel and substitute tax declarations. We have previously cautioned
possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest, against the reliance on such secondary evidence in cases involving the
Manuel Sobrepeña ("Manuel"),16 transferee's affidavits, and several tax confirmation of an imperfect title over public land.21 Manna Properties'
declarations covering the land in question. evidence hardly constitutes the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA 141.22
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove
ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision of
possession.17 However, the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52562. The
do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna Properties claimed during Application for Registration filed by Manna Properties, Inc. over Lots No.
trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving possession since 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total area of One Thousand Four
12 June 1945,18 a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is not the tax Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San
declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. Exhibit Q-16 was in fact a Fernando, La Union, is DENIED.
substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November 1950. The
annotation at the back of this tax declaration indicates that it was issued to SO ORDERED.
replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in question. A substitute
is not enough.

The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12
June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12
June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a
previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is
unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or
after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax
declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless
the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.

There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna

Properties must fail. The tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and
marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. A small annotation found
at the bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a previous tax
declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was issued in
1945, Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required information that will
enable this Court or any interested party to check whether the original 1945
tax declaration ever existed.19 The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render any
attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile. Moreover, on its face
Exhibit Q-16 lacks any indication that it is only a substitute or reconstituted
tax declaration. The net effect is an attempt to pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the
original tax declaration.

The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states G.R. No. 156117             May 26, 2005
that it was "FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160." Republic Act No. 7160
is the Local Government Code of 1991. The sworn undertaking by the Deputy
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of
vs. Special Default,17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents. registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel,
proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional
DECISION facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence
from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the
8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,1 which
Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion,
final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration
Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2 granting the application for land
Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.18
registration of the respondents.
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and
to the Court of Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22
David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application
November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be
fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3 Together since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code,
with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following respectively provides that "All things which are within the commerce of men
set of documents: are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the
State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent
object of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over
Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
respondent David;4
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since
(DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits,
Lots;6 bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p.
6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously,
certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;7 exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming
arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned only from June 25,
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the
Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not
and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated hold water.
25 June 1963;8
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of
1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its
8423, also issued in 1994;9 and registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows
individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio
considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963,
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements
the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees
thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David,
have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in
for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant
David.10
application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20
filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the
Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of
of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents'
the following arguments:
muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject
were not subject to private appropriation.11 Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the
petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.12 All
cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of
owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice
possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
of Initial Hearing.13 A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a
disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges
conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the
that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription
municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were
period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court
located.14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02
declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
August 199915 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.16
Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession
of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the
same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance
subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the
separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with
implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a
as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David,
registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration
applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the
subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.26 They are not
province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under the Rules of
statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court,
respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order
the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with
void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it. separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of
a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to
I be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).

Jurisdiction The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may
have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it;
the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of
Republic. the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action
and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements
registration. mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not
invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots
even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration
8422 and 8423, respectively. proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by
assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for
the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to
registration.
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots,
based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in
Appeals,22 to wit: rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land
through publication and service of notice.29
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with
the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be
invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by
because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the
statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:
all proceedings utterly null and void.
1. By publication. –
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
registration of the Subject Lots. published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the
for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all
registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to
parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of
province.25 The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the said application shall not be granted.
present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two
parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the
the parcels of land in their respective names. Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of
then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of Appeals30 that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory
action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the
"[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree
this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing,
or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient." and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements,
including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is
essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of
case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.32
of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus –
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I,
be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under
in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is
already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."33 The Subject Lots
newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. disposable as of 25 June 1963.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and
may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by
rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice government;34 and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public
in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.31 mode of acquisition recognized by law.35

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except
held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which
printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and reverted to the State.36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which public
officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat lands may be disposed, as follows:
News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province
(1) For homestead settlement;
and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19
December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing. (2) By sale;
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial (3) By lease;
hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the
Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him
to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose (a) By judicial legalization; or
respondents' application for registration, and to present his claim and
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37
evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should
the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of
hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and application
respondents' application for registration and even the registration decree procedure for every mode.38 Since respondents herein filed their application
that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of before the MTC,39 then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking
Special Default on 03 September 1999. the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title
over the Subject Lots.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of
general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land,
ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the not exceeding 144 hectares,40 may be availed of by persons identified under
MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
over respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC 1073, which reads –
Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
without jurisdiction. thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

II (a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

Period of Possession (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
incomplete title. preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required
period of possession for acquiring title to public land. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they
domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona
obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights
Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent
granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application for
be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or registration is DISMISSED.
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land SO ORDERED.
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots
became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen
into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto.41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied
with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots
that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on

the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the
Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of
the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other
manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having
possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-
in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their
application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary
prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil
Code.42

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property

Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration
Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while
under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim
an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open,
and notorious possession.43 As established by this Court in the preceding
paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may
have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may

acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public
Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof
must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50
of the Public Land Act reads –

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in

right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this
chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of
First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be
inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act.44

Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must

have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property
Registration Decree.

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and

other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land
Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another,
the Public Land Act may be considered a special law45 that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of
statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the
special law prevails – Generalia specialibus non derogant.46

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion,
Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02