Cuenco vs.

CA
 on 7:00 AM  in Case Digests, Remedial Law 
 0
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

o The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts

FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed
a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but
this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have
acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied.
Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI
Quezon.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

o Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance
to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings

HELD:

The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.

LIM VS CA (323 SCRA 102)

Lim vs Court of Appeals
323 SCRA 102 [GR No. 124715 January 24, 2000]

Facts: Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate
proceedings in special proceedings Q-95-23334 entitled, “In re: Intestate Estate Of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim,
represented by George Luy, petitioner.” Private respondents auto truck corporation, alliance marketing corporation,
speed distributing inc, active distributing inc, and action company are corporations formed, organized and existing
under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. On June 11, 1994, Pastor
Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew, George Luy filed
on March 17, 1995, a joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Private respondents corporations whose properties were included in the inventory of the
estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of his pendens an motion for exclusion of certain
properties fromthe estate of the decedent.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity is applicable to be able to include in the
probate proceedings the company formed by deceased Pastor Y. Lim.

Held: No. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for
the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.

Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its
stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by
protective mantle and imbued with by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.

Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts its
stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly
separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.

The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego
of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a
wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of the legal entity should come to naught.
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows:
1.) Control, not merely the majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of
policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction
had at the time so separate mind, will or existence of its own; 2.) Such control must have been used by the defendant
to commit fraud on wrong to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, on dishonest and
unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and 3.) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent “piercing
the corporate veil.”

Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate personalities.

Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong doing must be clearly and
convincingly established, it cannot be presumed.

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B.

GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, 74 SCRA
189 (1976) (SpecPro 2016)
Posted onJUNE 29, 2016
FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition
for letters of administration alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the
motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of
the

deceased, contending that

1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death
certificate and therefore have an improper venue.

2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition.

  

CFI denied the motion.

CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix.

Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUES:

a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present
case?

b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?

c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

Held:

1. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on
the merits or the substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial
proceeding. It is granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived or
stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is
situated. Venue is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience
purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it may be waived
or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
 and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate.
1. “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary.
 

1. In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased
should be the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna base on his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
 

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special
administratix.