Continuing Professional Development

Module 6 – System Operation

Course Co-ordinator Dr. M. Sadeghzadeh

Version C
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

INDEX
1. Overview
2. Safety Rules
2.1 Network Operator Training and Competence
2.2 Safety Documentation
2.3 Points of Isolation and Circuit Earthing
2.4 Policies for Safety Locking and Safety Notices
2.5 Switching Schedules
2.6 The Identification of Power Cables
2.7 Phase Checking
2.8 Management of Switchgear Defects
3. Reliability of Supply
3.1 System Load Factor
3.2 Duplication of Circuits
3.3 Interconnection of Circuits – Underground Cables
3.4 Supply Reliability – Primary Distribution Overhead Lines
3.5 Interconnection of Primary Distribution Overhead Lines
3.6 Embedded Generation in Distribution Networks
4. Security Standards in the UK
5. Repair Times for Plant and Circuits
6. The Cost of Supply Reliability
7. Voltage Regulation on Primary Distribution Circuits
8. Quality of Supply

8.1 Management of Harmonic Distortion

Appendix
A detailed description of the safe operation of a Merlin Gerin RN2C Ring Main Unit.

Version C 1
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

1. Overview

The operation of electricity distribution systems is controlled by the following considerations:

(1) The safety of the public.

(2) The safety of personnel, both directly employed and contractors.

(3) Continuity of supply.

(4) Timely and effective repair of system and restoration of supply in the event of a
fault or damage incident.

All of the above relate in various ways to cost, both to first investment cost and to cost of continuing
maintenance. Factors (1) and (2) balance cost against risk (danger to life and limb), whilst factor (3)
relates to the degree of network interconnection, the duplication of supply routes and the overall
system load factor. Highly loaded systems offer economy in terms of the cost per unit of energy
delivered, but the failure of one supply circuit may cause loss of supply because the alternative
supply circuit does not have enough spare capacity to carry the diverted load. Factor (4) balances
supply restoration time after fault or damage with the human and material resources available to
carry out repair, which are also a cost. Factors (3) and (4) also have risk implications, because failure
of the electricity supply results not only in economic loss but also gives rise to hazardous situations,
for example darkened buildings, darkened streets, traffic lights out of action, persons trapped in
elevators and so on.

Safety issues are the province of Safety Rules, described later in this Module. Security of supply is
a more subjective matter, because what is acceptable in a developing country with a largely
overhead network would not be acceptable in the urban areas of developed nations, where much of
the network is underground. As described in Module 1, the owners of large process plant generally
invest in a greater degree of system security than utilities, with duplication of supply circuits down
even to low voltage. This is because supply failure can result in a potentially hazardous situation,
plant that needs weeks to restart as well as the inevitable loss of production.

2. Safety Rules

Company Safety Rules are the basis on which safety is assured in the day to day network operations
in supply utilities and in those industries that are large users of electricity with extensive networks.
Generally implemented in the form of a book small enough to carry, they represent the collective
experience gained over a long period of time on the hazards experienced when operating on the
system and the measures that can be taken to eliminate or reduce them. Hence they can be thought
of as a continuing RISK ASSESSMENT.

Safety is a balance between:

RISK on the one hand and

COST, TIME and EFFORT on the other.

Safety Rules must comply with the legal requirements of the country in which the company operates.
In the UK, the principle statutes are The Electricity at Work Regulations and the Health and Safety
at Work Act. Safety Rules also reflect the particular circumstances in the company, for example
whether a central control facility exists or whether, as in small companies, each operator works solely
under his own supervision.

Version C 1
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

It is essential to ensure that Safety Rules are not only understood but also adhered to. In almost all
instances where accidents have occurred, it is because of a failure to follow the rules, even though
the people concerned knew, or claimed to know, what the Safety Rules were. The problem of not
following Safety Rules is most acute when system emergencies occur and there is pressure to
restore supplies quickly.

Although training plays an important part in ensuring operator safety, training is not a substitute for
experience; it is a pre-requisite to obtain experience. Thus:

TRAINING + EXPERIENCE = COMPETENT, SKILLED OPERATOR = SAFETY

In larger utilities and companies that are major users of electricity, a control room, which may be
manned 24/7, is a significant and proven safety benefit, especially in dealing with emergencies. The
reason for this is that operational decisions can be reached jointly by both the control engineer and
the operator 'in the field'. The control engineer has a better environment, more time to reach
considered decisions and is less affected by pressures to restore supply.

Even where the operation is routine, for example taking out an item of switchgear for periodic
maintenance, the control engineer plays an important monitoring role. Ideally, where operational
switching takes place to an agreed schedule, copies should be available both to the control engineer
and to the field operative, so that they proceed 'in step'. To maximise the benefit from this possibility,
the control engineer needs to receive the proposed schedule well before the work takes place.

Further safety benefits accrue from the fact that the control engineer has the larger picture of all of
the operations currently proceeding on the network and may foresee dangers that are not apparent
to the field operator. Also, if an operator fails to report back within a specified period of time,
investigative action can be started.

2.1 Network Operator Training and Competence

The operation of HV switchgear has become more complicated over the past two decades. This is
because historically, most designs of oil switchgear conformed to a well understood pattern,
particularly withdrawable pattern oil switchgear. However, SF6 and vacuum switchgear varies
significantly from maker to maker, with radically different methods of operation, especially the
differences between fixed and withdrawable (cassette) designs. Design differences also arise from
the different philosophies of operation in the countries in which the switchgear is manufactured and
principally marketed. In continental Europe, the focus has always been on obtaining safety mainly
by operator training and strict adherence to written procedure. In the UK and other countries,
procedural compliance is still important but safety is also ensured by the provision of extensive
locking and interlocking.

Training in network operation may be carried out in-company or through an external provider – in
either case a dedicated HV training network is a great advantage. After training, it is important that
the opportunity to practice what has been taught follows quickly and at best, this should be under
the immediate supervision of a person who already has the experience. In this context immediate
supervision means the supervisor is ‘at the shoulder’ of the trainee and not simply in the same
substation.

It is unrealistic and hazardous to provide training and then expect a safe, competent performance at
a much later date, possibly under emergency conditions, without any opportunity to practice the
acquired skills in the intervening period. Furthermore, safety training should be regarded as an
ongoing requirement, with refresher courses provided and assessment undertaken at suitable
intervals of time.

Version C 2
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

In English speaking countries and in many others operational personnel progress, over time, through
a standard hierarchy from Competent Person, through Authorised Person and finally to Senior
Authorised Person, a process that can take several years. Many companies and utilities also structure
their operative’s competence by a voltage level regime, in which authorised operation of the higher
voltage systems is the ultimate (and often best paid) accomplishment. All this is carried out under the
supervision of a single experienced person who acts as the Authorising Engineer. Categories of
authorisation are closely linked to safety documentation.

Award of competency or authorisation is always after training and subsequent

examination/assessment and often by practical examination as well. The following definitions are
reproduced from the Safety Rules of a particular utility but they are entirely typical.

A Competent Person (CP)

A person having sufficient technical knowledge and/or experience to avoid danger. Can receive and
clear specified safety documents. This level of competency typically allows the person to work on
equipment that has been isolated (by others) from the system for repair and maintenance purposes.
A competent person has at least the minimum level of training and experience to allow him to enter
substations.

An Authorised Person (AP)

A person to carry out specified duties which may include issue and cancelling of Limitations of
Access and/or receive Sanctions for Test. Normally awarded only to persons over the age of 21.

A Senior Authorised Person (SAP)

A person appointed in writing to carry out specified duties including issuing and cancelling of safety
documents (Permits to Work and Sanctions for Test). This higher level of competency typically
allows the person to carry out switching operations on high voltage equipment, including earthing
of feeders and busbars, insertion of test probes, etc. Normally awarded only to persons over the
age of 21.

Delegated Authority to Switch - Before leaving personnel authorisation, mention should be made
of delegated authority to perform limited switching operations. By prior written agreement this allows
selected and trained personnel of a large customer to carry out open and close operations under
the direct telephone authority of a supply utility’s control engineer. The delegated authority applies
only to the switchgear in the customer’s intake substation and it facilitates rapid changeover in
emergency to a live alternative circuit if the normal supply circuit or circuits fail, without having to
wait for the arrival of the utility’s engineer.

2.2 Safety Documentation

Whatever the level of authority of the individual, he or his team must always work to safety
documentation that is specific to the task. Three types of safety documentation are commonly in use
and they all specify:

• The work to be done.

• The safety precautions.

• The time and date.

• Who is to receive the document and who has issued it.

Version C 3
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

They also have:

• A facility to clear the document, by the person who received it and

• A facility to cancel the document, by the person who issued it.

Sometimes there is a facility to suspend the document and hence the work, although this is not
allowed by every company’s Safety Rules. Where there is a central control room, it is customary to
report the issue and cancellation of safety documents to the control engineer by reference to the
document number.

Safety documents are issued at least in duplicate (one copy for the issuer, one on card for the work
team) and sometimes in triplicate (extra copy for filing). Care must be taken to preserve all copies,
so that the correct clearance procedure may be followed. In many companies elaborate procedures
must be implemented if a copy is lost. Some companies display the safety document on the
equipment being maintained, others place it in a transparent folder which is then secured by a safety
lock.

Where some of the equipment is to remain live whilst the remainder is to be worked on, danger
notices must be displayed on the live equipment. Where there are live exposed busbars, safe zones
and safe access routes must be defined and marked by rope and flags, illuminated if work is to
proceed at night. A particular danger exists with overhead busbars and many accidents have
occurred where long objects (especially ladders) have contacted live busbars whilst being carried in
with fatal results. Some companies use only insulated ladders for this reason.

Pic.1 Danger notice and a defined safe zone in an open terminal substation

With all safety documents, it is important that the receiver fully understands the contents and many
Safety Rules embody a requirement that the receiver reads it back aloud to the issuer; where the
receiver is a team leader, he must make sure that his team members also understand the contents
of the document.

The Limitation of Access (LoA) - This document (Figure 2) normally covers work in substations,
where live equipment is present but is not to be taken out of service or interfered with in any other
way. It is applicable for example to:

• External work on metalclad apparatus (typically inspection or painting).

• Work near live busbars.
• Substation cleaning, compound weed killing, etc.

Version C 4
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Fig. 2 Limitation of Access document, front and back

The Permit to Work (PtW) - This document is the most commonly used and normally authorises
work on switchgear, transformers, tapchangers, overhead lines and cables that have been removed
from service by isolation and subsequent earthing. For most equipment, circuit earths applied at
the points of isolation from the remainder of the system are sufficient (Picture 3), but for overhead
lines extra, portable earths are required close to the work site to protect against induced voltages.
Provision is made for recording such additional earths.

Pic. 3 Circuit earths applied to an overhead busbar

Version C 5
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A PtW does not allow the removal of earths, hence test voltages cannot be applied under the
authority of this document after maintenance or repair work has been completed. Equipment
maintenance and repair normally takes place under a 'Permit to Work' and under the following
conditions:

• The equipment is ISOLATED from system. Isolation can mean either a

sufficient insulated gap between live and earthed parts of the system, or the
complete removal of the equipment to be worked on (for example a Circuit
Breaker from its housing).

• The equipment is connected to Earth at all possible points of infeed.

• The equipment is Identified by the Danger notices that are applied to adjacent
live equipment.

The back of this document (and the Sanction for Test) allow for ‘Suspension’, that is, the work has
been temporarily stopped, perhaps overnight. Not all organisations allow suspension, preferring
instead to cancel the first PtW and then issue a second. Figure 4 shows the front and back of a
typical PtW.

Fig. 4 Permit to Work document, front and back

The Sanction for Test (SfT) - This document (Figure 5) is similar to the previous PtW, but the SfT
permits removal of system earths, allowing a test voltage or voltages to be applied. Often this
document is issued by a Senior Authorised Person to himself, allowing him to locate a fault through
the application of test voltages or to prove satisfactory completion of repairs, again by application of
test voltage.

Version C 6
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Fig. 5 Sanction for Test document, front and back

These three safety documents cover the operational requirements of electricity utility or network
owning company.

Example 1 - Use of Safety Documents

The following example illustrates the use of Permit to Work and Sanction for Test documents in a
frequently occurring situation, the repair of an HV cable. It begins at the point where the faulty cable
section has been isolated and earthed by operation of the switchgear located at each end.

Operation Safety document in force/Issuer

Stage 1 is for the SAP or AP to locate the fault, Sanction for Test issued by SAP and cancelled
which will require the removal of circuit earth when the location of the fault has been
and the application of test voltages. In most determined and the identity of the cable proven.
cases, the cable identity will also need to be Circuit earths must be replaced on completion.
confirmed at the location of the fault by a
radiolocation method. This work can also be
carried out under the original SfT.
Stage 2 Is to excavate and expose the faulted No safety document required.
section of cable. Excavate at least 2 metres
beyond the fault location on either side to allow
for 2 new cable joints.

Version C 7
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Stage 3 Install a new length of cable at the No safety document required.

fault location and extending 2 metres either
side.
Stage 4 Remove the faulted section of cable Permit to Work issued by SAP to the jointing
and expose the cores at both ends of the new team’s leader. To expedite the work, 2 jointing
cable and the cores at both ends of the old teams of 2 men are normally required, one
cable. Test for presence of water in the cable. jointer acting as team leader and permit holder.
The other cable jointing personnel work under
his supervision. The jointing team leader signs
off the PtW and the SAP cancels it on
completion of this stage.
Stage 5 SAP or AP to establish correct phase Sanction for Test issued by SAP. SfT must be
connections and inform the jointing team cancelled on completion and circuit earths
leader. This operation will require removal of restored.
circuit earths and replacement of circuit earths
on completion.
Stage 6 Complete 2 cable joints. Circuit earths Permit to Work issued by SAP to the jointing
must remain applied the entire time that the team’s leader. Again, 2 jointing teams of 2 men
cables are worked upon. are normally required, one jointer acting as team
leader and permit holder. The other cable
jointing personnel work under his supervision.
SAP cancels the PtW on completion of this
stage.
Stage 7 SAP or AP to test for correct phasing Sanction for Test issued by SAP and cancelled
and carry out over-voltage test to prove a when correct phasing has been proven and the
satisfactory repair. over-voltage test satisfactorily completed.
Circuit earths are not replaced on completion.
Circuit is now available for service.
Stage 8 Backfill and reinstate the ground No safety document required although it will be
surface. necessary to mechanically protect the cable and
joints during backfilling.

The sequence described above allows for issue and cancellation of safety documents at every stage,
however in some organisations suspension and re-issue of safety documents is allowed.

Fig. 6 Completed cable repair

Version C 8
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Figure 6 shows the completed repair – the distance between cable joints is typical at approximately
4 metres but this may need to be increased if water has penetrated the cable at the point of failure, a
possibility which should always be checked. For paper cables a check for moisture can be quickly
carried out by dipping a sample in very hot oil – if moisture is present, the water will vapourise as a
large number of very small bubbles.

The over-voltage test on completion is important and in some countries is a legal requirement; the
actual DC voltage applied and the duration of the test varies from company to company and some
will reduce the test voltage if the cables are old, to avoid precipitating further faults. Exactly what level
of leakage current is tolerable is a matter of experience.

Most faults on underground systems prove to be cable joint or cable termination faults rather than
faults in the cables themselves, because cables are manufactured in quality-controlled conditions
whereas cable joints and cable terminations are completed in the field and the quality is dependent
on skill and care. Genuine cable faults are often the result of prior damage, sometimes occurring
weeks or months beforehand and for this reason it is good practice to walk along the route of a faulted
cable, examining the ground for signs of recent excavation. One of the advantages of paper insulated
cables is that they fail fairly quickly after a damage incident, usually within two weeks at most.
Polymeric insulated cables by contrast can take months or years to fail; this factor reduces the
possibility of cost recovery and is a well-known disadvantage of polymeric cables.

2.3 Points of Isolation and Circuit Earthing

Points of Isolation are a requirement in all organisation’s Safety Rules; they are the separation
between the live parts of the system and the dead and earthed parts of the system that are to be
worked on under the authority of a safety document. At best a Point of Isolation is a wide physical
separation between live and dead contacts that is plainly visible; at worst it is a separation between
contacts inside a closed metal box that cannot be viewed directly but is only indicated by the position
of a lever, backed up by a mechanical semaphore. The former can usually be achieved in
withdrawable pattern switchgear, the latter is normal for example in Ring Main Units.

Fig. 7 Available Points of Isolation on a Ring Main Unit

Version C 9
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Circuit Breakers are generally considered to be unacceptable as Points of Isolation because there
is always a possibility that one or more contacts has failed to open. On withdrawable pattern
switchgear, complete removal of the Circuit Breaker carriage from its housing creates an excellent
Point of Isolation which may be secured by locking the shutter mechanism closed (Picture 8).

Pic.8 Busbar shutter on withdrawable pattern Circuit Breaker

locked by a black Safety lock

In Picture 8 the shutter acts as the Point of Isolation, covering the live busbars – however great care
must be taken to remove this lock before restoring the withdrawn Circuit Breaker, otherwise shutter
damage will occur. Points of Isolation must always be secured by a lock and this lock is normally a
special Safety lock. Safety locks often differ visually from the organisation’s normal operational locks
either by colour, marking or a combination of both and in all organisations they require a different
key. In addition to the safety lock, a safety notice should also be displayed that indicates the presence
of a Point of Isolation. Locking and notice policies are discussed later in this Module.

Pic.9 Safety lock and Caution Point of Isolation notice

applied to a 145kV isolator mechanism

Version C 10
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Points of Isolation are normally the locations at which circuit earths are applied, which will also need
to be Safety locked and have safety notices displayed. There are a number of ways of achieving
circuit earth.

Fig. 10 Circuit earths for a cable repair

In Figure 10, the circuit earth is applied using the same disconnector as is used for the Point of
Isolation – this is implemented as a three position disconnector, ON-OFF-EARTH. Some designs of
Circuit Breaker switchgear use this method, but it is even more popular for the circuit disconnectors
of Ring Main Units (RMUs were described in Module 4). Picture 11 shows the manually operated
controls and semaphore of a circuit disconnector on an oil filled Ring Main Unit.

Pic. 11 Circuit switch of a Ring Main Unit

To the operator, the right hand side ON/OFF control of Picture 11 appears entirely separate from the
left hand side EARTH ON/EARTH OFF control, with separate locking facilities and operated by
separate spigots for the portable, removable handle. In reality the disconnector inside the tank is a
single three position device – the controls are segregated in this way to prevent a continuous handle
movement from ON to EARTH; it is a safety feature designed to prevent operator error.

Version C 11
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Pic.12 Circuit earthing through a Circuit Breaker (FKI Eclipse)

Another popular method of circuit earthing is through the Circuit Breaker. This has the advantage
that a Circuit Breaker is fully rated to close and break fault current so that in the event of the
inadvertent earthing of a live circuit the operator is completely protected. A secondary advantage is
that where the Circuit Breaker is capable of operation by telecontrol (SCADA) it can be closed
remotely whilst the substation is empty of personnel, a further safety benefit if the circuit to be earthed
is inadvertently live. Picture 12 shows circuit earthing through a three position disconnector which is
located on the busbar side of the Circuit Breaker and controlled by the manually operated
mechanism with lockable [Link] the symbols indicating that a VT is fitted and that capacitor
voltage test points are available (symbols are located immediately below the word SEMAPHORE).

When a Circuit Breaker is used to obtain circuit earthing, it will need to be locked closed and its trip
circuit made inoperative or its trip control locked whilst a Permit to Work is in force. This can be
achieved by locking the control selector or if this is not possible (or sometimes in some Safety Rules
in addition) by removing the trip circuit fuses. If a local/remote control is fitted, it should be selected
to local and also locked (picture shows locked in remote, the normal service position).

Pic. 13 Lockable trip/close and local/remote controls

Version C 12
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Where a VT is fitted to a Circuit Breaker, this too will require isolation to prevent any possibility of
back feed from the secondary side, with safety lock applied and safety notice displayed whilst a
Permit to Work is in force. Methods of obtaining VT isolation were described in Module 4.

Before leaving circuit earthing, the method known as transfer earth should also be described.
Historically this technology applied mainly to oil Circuit Breakers (some small oil volume, early
vacuum and early SF6 CBs were also transfer earth) and although it is now considered obsolescent,
many thousands of units remain in service. Figure 14 illustrates the principle of transfer earthing.
The Circuit Breaker complete with its operating mechanism are contained within a carriage which

Fig. 14 Sectional views through a transfer earth Circuit Breaker

can be manually rolled on its wheels between three positions; they can also be raised and lowered
vertically in the carriage, again manually using a screw jack mechanism (a few were powered). In
normal service, the Circuit Breaker is located in the centre position (the middle diagram of Figure
14). To obtain circuit earth, the opened Circuit Breaker is first lowered, pushed back into the housing
and then raised and finally closed (the left hand diagram of Figure 14). To obtain busbar earth, the
opened Circuit Breaker is first lowered, pulled forward in the housing and then raised and finally
closed (the right hand diagram of Figure 14). In both circuit and busbar cases, earthing is through
the Circuit Breaker. Secondary circuits for power, control and indication are completed in the normal
service position through a plug and socket arrangement that automatically closes as the Circuit
breaker is raised; however the plug and socket are inoperative in the circuit earth and busbar earth
positions when, if the mechanism is power operated, a bridging device must be used (Picture 15).
This is arranged to allow electrical closing, but will not allow electrical tripping, thereby automatically
preventing opening when circuit or busbar earth is applied. Usually, Safety Rules will require any
mechanical Circuit Breaker trip device to be locked.

Pic. 15 Secondary circuit bridging device

Version C 13
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Busbar earthing is required only when work is to be carried out on switchgear; it is seldom needed
but nevertheless facilities must be provided for it on all multi-unit switchboards.

2.4 Policies for Safety Locking and Safety Notices

Safety Rules differ little between organisations and those differences that exist mainly reflect whether
or not a central control room is in operation. In contrast, equipment locking policies vary greatly;
some organisations apply locks to almost everything that can be locked whereas others apply a lock
only to the substation door. Whatever the policy, it is a bad practice to lock the means of opening
switchgear (except when it is being used to apply circuit earth) because a dangerous situation may
require the rapid de-energising of a circuit.

Pic. 16 Safety lock

marked with a red sleeve
Operational locks are used to control access when equipment is in normal operation; they are usually
self coloured brass padlocks operable by a common key. Safety locks are also padlocks but often
they are coloured or engraved to distinguish them from operational locks and they always have a
unique key (Picture 16). In some organisations, safety locks used to secure a circuit earth are
coloured differently from other safety locks and they are referred to as ‘earth locks’. Safety locks and
keys are normally issued on an individual basis to Senior Authorised Persons. Many organisations
use key safes or cabinets located in the substation; these vary in complexity between small metal
boxes capable of holding a few loose locks and keys to complex cabinets with labelled positions for
every lockable position (by row) on every Circuit Breaker (by column) (Picture 17). Key cabinets are
always lockable and are usually intended to be secured by the SAPs safety lock.

Pic. 17 Large key cabinet

Version C 14
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Safety requirements sometimes require complex switching procedures, particularly when operations
on two different switch boards must be co-ordinated. For example the earthing of a cable circuit may
require that the supplying Circuit Breaker shall be open and isolated before the supplied Circuit
Breaker can be earthed. Another example might be that access to a cabinet containing an air cooled
distribution transformer is available only if both HV and LV side switchgear is open and earthed.
Effective control over complex, sequenced operations of this type is normally obtained by a key
exchange system; in the UK these are manufactured by two companies, Fortress and Castell.

Pic. 18 Key exchange system

Picture 18 shows a typical key exchange system. In this example, the method of operation is that
the right hand key is not released unless all of the left hand keys are present and rotated. These left
hand keys will have been obtained from Circuit Breakers or other switchgear and will not have been
released unless that equipment is in a safe condition (for example open and earthed). The right hand
key will then be released allowing a final operation, such as earthing a circuit, opening a cabinet
containing exposed busbars, etc. Figure 19 illustrates the use of a key exchange system to ensure
that a connecting cable may only be earthed when the Circuit breakers at both ends are open and
isolated.

Fig. 19 Key exchange safety system

In the Castell and Fortress systems, keys are unique to locks and made so by engraving a number
or letter into the lock which must match a similar embossed number or letter on the key. Key
exchange systems are effective in ensuring safety but they must be specified and installed when the
equipment (normally switchgear) is manufactured, they are difficult or impossible to fit
retrospectively.

Version C 15
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Safety notices are widely employed in electricity distribution to provide both permanent and
temporary warning. Often a safety notice is combined with a safety lock, for example at a Point of
isolation. Magnetic notices are also manufactured, allowing easy attachment for example to the front
of a Circuit Breaker warning that is it in circuit earth, or forms a Point of Isolation, etc.

Historically the design of notices varied considerably between organisations but over the last 10
years a good standard of uniformity has been achieved, at least in Europe, by the EU Safety Signs
Directive. It is worth noting that many of the USA derived lock off, tag off (LOTO) systems in use in
UK process industries do not comply with directive because the tag text is too small, or they do not
show approved symbols, or the colour is incorrect, or in some cases all three.

In the UK, legislation implementing the directive refers to the graphical symbols specified by BS
5499. This standard is prescriptive in terms of the minimum size of text font needing to be used for
visibility at specified distances. Figure 20 shows a typical selection of safety notices used in electricity
distribution; hazard notices are yellow, danger notices are red. Notices that are only informative are
coloured blue (not shown). All colours are in conformity with the Directive.

Fig. 20 Safety notices

Note that the sign at lower left provides labelled spaces for the person posting the sign to record his
name, date and telephone number in felt tipped pen; some organisations require this, others do not.
Differences in operating procedures and to some extent Safety Rules arise mainly from the number
of persons operating on the network and whether the network is confined to a small geographic area
(process industry) or a large one (utility).

In general it is good practice to combine a safety lock with a notice, because the visibility of the lock
is improved and the chances of leaving the lock inadvertently in position on restoration to service
are reduced.

Version C 16
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Pic. 21 Safety lock and Caution notice on an isolator used as a Point of Isolation

Picture 22 shows an example of an informative (blue) notice. Note that both the trip/close and
local/remote controls on this circuit breaker instrument panel are capable of locking.

Pic. 22 Eye protection must be worn notice

Version C 17
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

2.5 Switching Schedules

The sequence of switching operations for planned work on an electricity network, including routine
maintenance of plant, should always be specified on a written ‘Switching Schedule’ prepared in
advance of the work.

Even for emergency work, it is good practice to prepare switching schedules in advance for likely or
possible events, because it is under the pressure of emergency conditions that human errors are
most likely to occur. Schedules are prepared in a standard format on company approved forms and
use standard abbreviations and terminology, so that all concerned clearly understand what the work
is and how it is to be done.

In many companies where a control room is in operation, the control engineer will receive a copy of
the schedule well in advance of the work commencing and so will have an opportunity to study and
check it, discussing any problem points with the originator.

The table below provides examples of a standard terminology; this may differ from company to
company, but the important concept is that within a single organisation a uniform standard applies.

Standard abbreviations and terminology for switching schedules

ACB Air Circuit Breaker LOA Limitation of access

BB Busbar OS Oil switch (fault making, load
breaking)
CB Circuit Breaker OCB Oil Circuit Breaker
CME Circuit Main Earth PTW Permit to Work
C02 Carbon Dioxide (fire extinguisher) RMU Ring Main Unit
CN Caution notice SFT Sanction for Test
CT Current transformer S/S Substation
DT Distribution transformer Sec Sup Secondary supplies
DN Danger notice SF Switch fuse
FDR Feeder SF6 CB SF6 Circuit Breaker
ES Earth switch SW Switch
GCB Gas Circuit Breaker SL Safety lock
HV High voltage VCB Vacuum Circuit Breaker
KV Kilovolts VT Voltage transformer
MV Medium Voltage

Figure 23 shows the front and back of a typical page format for a Switching Schedule – the front
specifies the work to be done, when and where and who has prepared the schedule, whilst the back
is the sequence of switching events.

In practice, Switching Schedules seldom need to be written from a blank form; templates are
available for most tasks (for example removal of a distribution substation for maintenance) and need

Version C 18
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Fig. 23 Switching Schedule typical page format

only be adapted in minor ways for the task in hand. Many organisations that operate smaller networks
have a complete suite of schedules on hand covering every possible eventuality.

Version C 19
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Example 2 – Switching Schedule

The network shown in Figure 24 is the property of a medium sized customer and comprises an intake
substation and four subsidiary substations connected to the internal HV network, shown in red. Two
of the substations are interconnected through the low voltage network (shown green). The system
normal open points are as indicated.

Fig. 24 Consumer’s network

The Switching Schedule is to remove Packet Substation from service for HV switchgear
maintenance and restore the network on completion.

Op. Substation Switch/Equipment Operation Circuit Safety

No. Earth Document
1 CAR PARK DISCONNECTOR CLOSE TO ON Normal
S/S TO BAKING S/S Open Point (make
parallel)
2 BAKING S/S DISCONNECTOR OPEN TO OFF Apply
TO PACKET S/S Safety Lock & Caution
Notice (break parallel)
3 BAKING S/S Low Voltage Panel Check phasing and
insert fuses (make LV
parallel)
4 PACKET S/S Low Voltage Circuit OPEN TO OFF. Isolate
Breaker Circuit Breaker, Apply
Safety Lock & Caution
Notice (break LV parallel)
5 PACKET S/S Low Voltage panel Erect safety screen and
apply Danger Notice
(panel remains live)

Version C 20
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

6 OFFICE S/S DISCONNECTOR OPEN TO OFF Apply

TO PACKET S/S Safety Lock & Caution
Notice
7 OFFICE S/S DISCONNECTOR CLOSE to EARTH Number 1
TO PACKET S/S APPLIED
8 BAKING S/S DISCONNECTOR CLOSE to EARTH Number 2
TO PACKET S/S APPLIED
9 PACKET S/S ALL HV Confirm in circuit earth
SWITCHGEAR position (identified at the
point of work)
10 PACKET S/S ALL HV Carry out periodic routine Issue
SWITCHGEAR maintenance Permit to
Work
11 PACKET S/S ALL HV On completion of Cancel
SWITCHGEAR maintenance Permit to
Work o
12 PACKETS/S ALL HV Carry out 5 kV DC Issue
SWITCHGEAR insulation test Sanction
for Test
13 PACKETS/S ALL HV On completion of test Cancel
SWITCHGEAR Sanction
for Test
14 PACKETS/S ALL HV Confirm disconnectors in
SWITCHGEAR the 'CLOSED to ON' (ON)
position *
15 PACKETS/S Low Voltage panel Remove safety screen
and Danger Notice
16 BAKING S/S DISCONNECTOR Open from EARTH to Number 2
TO PACKET S/S OFF REMOVED
17 OFFICE S/S DISCONNECTOR OPEN from EARTH to Number 1
TO PACKET S/S OFF REMOVED
18 OFFICE S/S DISCONNECTOR CLOSE to ON
TO PACKET S/S
19 BAKING S/S DISCONNECTOR CLOSE TO ON
TO PACKET S/S
20 CAR PARK DISCONNECTOR OPEN TO OFF (Restore
S/S TO BAKING S/S HV network Normal Open
Point )
21 PACKET S/S Low Voltage Circuit CLOSE to ON (make LV
Breaker parallel)
22 BAKING S/S LV Back feed fuses Remove back feed fuse
(break LV parallel, restore
LV network Normal Open
Point)

* It is customary to place the switchgear to be maintained in the CIRCUIT EARTH position before
starting work.

Version C 21
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

The steps for restoring the network are the mirror image of the steps undertaken to release the
equipment for maintenance – which is normal for these schedules. When writing them the objective
should be to progress the work in a safe manner with the minimum number of steps, the minimum
risk to the network and with the minimum amount of travelling. Minimum risk to the network means
in practice that HV system parallels once made should be broken as soon as possible – network
parallels place more of the system at risk from a fault or damage. Note that when a system parallel
is created, the two networks to be connected may be very slightly out of synchronism; when they are
connected this can create circulating currents capable of tripping the protection. For this reason it is
sometimes necessary to raise the overcurrent protection setting before creating the parallel and
restoring it to normal after the parallel has been broken.

When a central control room is in operation, the operator in the field will inform and agree with the
control engineer by radio or telephone his intention to carry out each numbered step and confirm
each step by the same means on completion – which should not be more than 3 to 5 minutes. Both
have copies of the schedule to hand and in the event of the field operator failing to report back,
emergency action can be initiated. This procedure works well most of the time, but when there are
multiple failures, for example a snow storm creating a large number of damage incidents, the control
engineer may devolve complete control to a field operator.

The procedure described for the customer owned system of Figure 24 is somewhat untypical of
network switching in electricity utilities, where routine work mainly consists of taking out of service
and maintaining the very large number of distribution substations that supply domestic and small
commercial premises at low voltage through cables or overhead lines in the streets.

Fig. 25 Low voltage network with substations and link boxes

Consider the network shown in Figure 25. The low voltage network in the area is supplied by several
substations, each substation with 2, 3 or 4 low voltage circuits connected.

Version C 22
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Total load on each distribution substation seldom exceeds 750kVA; 300-500kVA seasonal maximum
is more typical. As described in Module 1, the cross sectional area of the low voltage distributors is
primarily determined by volt drop considerations and even at times of peak load, cables are normally
well within their thermal current rating.

When substations are to be maintained, arrangements must be made to temporarily support the low
voltage network and hence the customers that they normally supply. This is achieved by connecting
circuits together using underground link boxes, which are permanently located in the public footpath
– some are indicated by blue arrows in Figure 25. Figure 26 shows links being fitted; it is also possible
to install fuses – phasing should always be checked before inserting links or fuses to guard against
the possibility of faults. Equivalent disconnection facilities can be incorporated on overhead low
voltage circuits.

Fig. 26 Fitting links in a pavement link box, note diving bell lid
to prevent water ingress and use of gloves and eye protection

At any given distribution substation only one, possibly two low voltage circuits are capable of
interconnection through a link box. This limitation is based on economic considerations with the result
that the available transfer capacity from surrounding substations, due to the thermal current limits of
the low voltage cables, is restricted to approximately one third of the substation transformer rating.
There are a number of implications to this arrangement for temporary supply, which are:

1. The low voltage distribution fuse board at the substation to be maintained will remain
live during maintenance and appropriate precautions must be taken to guard against
this hazard. Note that in many older substations, open busbar fuse boards remain in
use.

2. Load will be temporarily increased at the neighbouring distribution substation or

substations that are maintaining the load; however distribution transformers contain
a large volume of oil and may be overloaded for short periods without problem.

3. During seasonal high load periods maintenance of distribution substations may need
to be curtailed. In temperate countries the maximum load periods are 6am to 9am
and 4pm to 7pm; outage for substation maintenance will normally occur between
9.30am and 3.30pm and so this is a mitigating factor.

4. Voltage drop on low voltage circuits from the substation under maintenance may be outside
normal limits. Associated with this, any low voltage circuit intended to be utilised for load

Version C 23
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

transfer purposes will need to maintain its cross sectional area between substations; normal
tapering of mains is not appropriate.

2.6 The Identification of Underground Power Cables

Much of the daily work in utilities and the process industries involves buried underground cables for
example repairs, extensions, new branch connections, etc. Whilst low voltage cables are often
worked on when they are live (with suitable precautions), opening a live high voltage cable is
extremely dangerous and must be avoided at all costs – this is a real problem given that buried LV
and HV cables, when exposed in an excavation, look much the same. The problem is severe where
several cables are exposed and only one has been earthed and is therefore safe to work on; perhaps
a single ground opening has revealed two or three cables suspected to be HV and three or four
cables suspected to be LV, a situation not at all unusual near to a substation. In general with paper
insulated, Lead sheath cables LV are tape armoured and HV are wire armoured, however this
cannot be relied on as a distinguishing feature because tape armoured HV cables have been
made in the past. A better means of identifying cables is to trace them visually back to the source of
supply, either LV switchboard or HV circuit breaker. Some company Safety Rules allow opening of
cables without the need for further identification work, if this can be achieved. However this method
is only available when the excavated cables are fortuitously close to their source of supply.

When cables are laid, records should be created and kept to help with future identification; these
records will incorporate tying-in measurements (red in Fig. 27). Historically mains records were paper
or film based but may now be implemented on a computer, often as part of a GIS (Geographic
Information System).

Fig 27 Small part of a mains record

Whilst mains records are certainly useful, they cannot be completely relied upon for cable
identification for the following reasons:

1. HV and LV cables may be laid one on top of the other, which cannot be truly
represented in a two-dimensional record.

2. Over time, the tying-in measurements become meaningless because surface features
change; roads are widened, buildings replaced, etc. This is the most important factor
and particularly applies to urban centres.

Version C 24
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

2.6.1 Identification of HV Cables

Where the cable to be identified is HV, most company’s Safety Rules require identification by a
combination of radiolocation and spiking. Starting with radiolocation, the procedure is to impose a
signal at audio frequency (typically 800-100 Hz) between two cores of the cable, as shown in Fig 28.
This must be done whilst the cable is de-energised and under the authority of a safety document.
In the diagram, the audio frequency signal is injected into two cores of the cable, which are connected

Fig 28 Identifying an HV cable by radiolocation

together (and may also be earthed, this is optional) at the far end. As the operator walks along the
route of the cable, the signal rises and falls in his headphones in a characteristic manner as the core
twist first reinforces then attenuates the outgoing and returning current. The signal should be
particularly strong where the cable is exposed and the aerial can be placed close. This technique
should not be confused with applying a signal by induction; the directly injected signal tends to stay
within the cable, whereas an induced signal tends to transfer to adjacent cables and give a more
confusing picture.

Once the cable has been identified it must then be spiked. This is illustrated in Fig. 29. Some spiking
devices are operated by a small explosive cartridge whose powder charge can be varied according
to the size of cable to be spiked. Others are hydraulic. Both function by driving a steel wedge into
the cable, whilst the operator located at a safe distance. In the case of explosive devices, safety is
ensured by a long lanyard and for hydraulic devices by a long insulated hydraulic pipe. Because the
cable is in the public footpath, safety barriers are required around the excavation.

Fig 29 Spiker with operating lanyard

Once spiking is complete, radiolocation may be repeated as an extra safeguard; this time the signal
should be present up to the position of the spiker, but not beyond it, because the wedge should have
shorted all three cores together.

Version C 25
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

2.6.2 Identification of LV Cables

Because LV cables are often worked on live, their positive identification is less important from a
safety viewpoint but it can nevertheless be very useful operationally. Here the requirement is for a
device that can inject a signal whilst the cable is in service and under load. Two are available, one
UK made (the Grumbler) and one French (the NADIR). Both function in the same manner, by drawing
a heavy current from the source over only a few degrees of the cycle (Fig 30). Hence the signal is
not really ‘injected’, rather it is induced from the normal supply.

Fig. 30 Current waveform

Although the current drawn by the location device is large, limiting it to a few degrees of the cycle
means that the power dissipated is not excessive and the device can be connected for a reasonable
period of time (15-30 minutes) before any overheating problems arise. Also the sharp rise and fall in
the load creates high frequency signal components that are easily propagated from the cable and
readily picked up by a low cost detector; the characteristic sound heard in the headphones is a
100Hz ‘rumble’. To use the locator, it is connected downstream of the required location, using any
convenient domestic service point, street lamp or disconnection box (Fig. 31).

Fig. 31 Using a LV cable identifier

2.7 Check Phasing

Completion of many if not most post fault or post damage repairs involves some form of phasing
check. In the case of overhead lines this is not generally needed because correct phasing is

Version C 26
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

physically obvious, but it is almost always required for repairs to cables, transformers and
switchgear. Ensuring that phasing is correct is the project engineer’s responsibility.

2.7.1 LV Check Phasing

It is sometimes possible to check phase across the open contacts of a disconnector, for example if
a distribution transformer has been replaced then the transformer LV side isolator can be used. But
in many cases the only access to conductors is at customer’s premises. Consider the situation in the
upper illustration of Figure 32, where a length of damaged cable has been replaced and two new

Figure 32 Correct and incorrect LV phasing

cable joints made. Correct phasing means that phases 1, 2 and 3 plus the neutral/earth conductor
on the left hand side correspond with the phases 1, 2 and 3 plus the neutral/earth conductor on the
right hand side. But in the lower illustration phases 1 and 2 have been switched over.

For downstream single-phase customers this does not matter; it is immaterial whether they are
supplied by phase 1, 2 or 3.

But for three phase customers correct phasing is vital, because if it is incorrect 3 phase motors will
run backward. To check this condition, a downstream three phase customer must be identified, the
supply fuses removed and a phase rotation meter applied.

The prudent engineer will identify all downstream 3 phase customers and remove their supply fuses
during the (de-energised) period of repair. They can be safely replaced only when the phase rotation
check has proven correct.

Note here that a transposition between phase and neutral/earth conductors is highly dangerous and
to be avoided at all costs.

2.7.2 HV Check Phasing

In the HV situation the requirement for correct phasing is just as important because as well as the
motor rotation problem, if it is incorrect a phase to phase fault will be created on the network if a
parallel is attempted. Here the means of checking is more complicated. The basic procedure is to
identify an HV asset on which phasing is known to be correct and use it for comparison. Traditionally
this was done on vertical isolation, horizontal withdrawal oil switchgear by removing the CB carriage,
opening both sets of shutters and using a moving coil voltage testing device. The two insulated sticks
used for testing are shown in Fig. 33, with the electrical circuit on the right:

Version C 27
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Fig 33 Phasing Sticks

The bent end adapters are provided to assist in making contact with the busbar and circuit
conductors, especially the circuit conductors at the rear.

Fig. 34 Phase checking on a vertical isolation

CB

This is an uncomfortable procedure in a confined space. Fig. 34 shows how it is achieved – maximum
PPE protection must be worn including HV grade rubber gloves, full eye protection and a fire-
resistant suit.

Version C 28
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

As measured by the moving coil meter, the resultant voltages are the vector sum of the voltages in
the contacted phases. The table below gives the expected values:

6.6kV System 11kV System 33kV System

measured measured measured
values values values
Individual phase to earth (with only the 3.81kV 6.35kV 19.05kV
voltmeter stick in contact)
Phase to phase, phases in phase 7.62kV 12.7kV 38.1kV
Phase to phase, phases out of phase 3.81kV 6.35kV 19.05kV

It is possible to check phasing in modern withdrawable cassette switchgear in a similar manner,

although it means removing the cassette completely from its housing. Shutters covering the busbar
and circuit contacts are located on the back wall:

Pic. 35 Movable shutters on Alstom PIX cassette

switchgear
2.7.3 HV Check Phasing Through Capacitor Voltage Test Points

In fixed pattern HV switchgear, the check phasing procedure described in the previous paragraph
cannot be applied, because there is no means of making contact with the main conductors. Instead,
use is made of the capacitor voltage test points that were described in earlier course module 4.
These are always provided on fixed pattern switchgear and they are often provided on withdrawable
cassette switchgear as well. They allow a much simpler, quicker and safer means of phase checking
using an electronic device known as a Phase Comparator.

Version C 29
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Pic. 36 shows the device complete with leads in a carrying case. To use, the leads are simply
plugged in sequence into the test sockets on the switchgear, when a simple red/green out-of-
phase/in phase indication is given.

Pic. 36 Phase Comparator

Pic. 37 shows voltage test points on Lucy Sabre VRN2A Ring Main Unit, here there are two sets,
one for each 11kV disconnector.

Pic. 37 Capacitor Voltage Test points on a Ring Main Unit.

2.8 Management of Equipment Defects

High voltage switchgear is complex equipment comprising a multiplicity of springs, rotating shafts,
levers, controls, interlocks, trip/close coils, small wiring, CTs, VTs and motors. Additionally, there are
insulating components that are highly stressed electrically, subject to partial discharge and other
forms of slow deterioration over the service lifetime. As in any other complex and highly stressed
equipment, failures can be expected; generally, these are due to one or more of the following three
reasons:

Version C 30
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

1. Inherently defective design which nevertheless was sufficiently satisfactory for the
switchgear to have passed its original type tests. This type of defect is comparatively rare.

2. Defective manufacture, especially failures to weld components together correctly or to

correctly install locking items such as split pins. This type of defect is common.

3. Long term deterioration effects such as tracking across the surface of insulation leading
to flashover and failure.

These three causes combine to give the failure over time characteristic shown in Figure 38, called
the bathtub curve which is actually typical of any complex manufactured item designed to function
over a period of years.

Fig. 38 Bathtub Curve

In the diagram, the red area marked A represents defects arising from design or manufacture which
should show up early in the service lifetime. There then should follow a long period with a relatively
low defect rate, which is shown in green and marked B. Finally, the blue area marked C represents
increasing defects from age related causes as the equipment nears the end of its service life. In HV
switchgear the length of service is expected to be 40 years and this is the period of time over which
the initial cost is amortised, that is, written down in value until it is zero on the owning company’s
financial balance sheet. There is plenty of time for defects to become apparent.

All defects in HV switchgear must be taken seriously, but those that are safety related are critical.
For example, failure of a circuit breaker to open on one or more phases even though the mechanical
semaphore shows an open condition – this would certainly be classified as safety critical.

An important factor is that switchgear of a single type can be serially produced often over long
periods of time, so that any defect detected in a particular make and type may potentially apply to
large numbers of the same make and type that remain in service. And a defect found by one utility
may apply to many similar units of switchgear of the same make and type in other utilities and
companies who have bought it. This is serious enough even if the original maker is still in business,
but very dangerous if the original maker has gone out of business, because there is then no channel
of communication by which switchgear owners can be informed.

Once a defect has been identified, its presence or otherwise in units of the same make and type
must be checked, a process that can be hugely expensive because it usually requires the switchgear
to be de-energised and an internal inspection carried out. In practice, where a defect has caused a
fatality or injury, or is judged to be so capable, units of the same make and type may be embargoed
from live operation, a situation that leads to great loss of network flexibility over lengthy periods of

Version C 31
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

time. This is a very good reason for not having a switchgear population characterised by a high
percentage of units of the same make and type.

SoPs, DINs and NEDERS

NEDERS (National Equipment Defect Reporting Scheme) is an industry wide attempt to mitigate the
switchgear defect problems described above on a UK national basis. Essentially it comprises a large
and ever growing register of all known switchgear (and on load tapchanger) defects by make and
type reported since the scheme’s inception in the 1970s.

Participating members can search a large archive of historic defects and they are also able in many
instances to retreive the recommended remedial work. They are also entitled to receive information
on newly found defects by e mail. The scheme is two way – members are expected to report defects
that they themselves have found.

In the scheme, DINs are Dangerous Incident Notifications and SoPs are Suspension of Operating
Procedure, that is, a defect of enough importance has been identified that normal operating
procedures should no longer be followed until the defect is checked for and if found, remedied.

3. Reliability of Supply

As discussed in the overview to this Module, an acceptable level of supply reliability is a matter which
varies from country to country. The overall reliability of a public supply system may be expressed in
terms of minutes lost per customer per annum, which in itself is somewhat misleading because
minutes lost per annum in rural areas exceed those lost in urban areas by a considerable margin. In
the UK this indicator varies year to year between 60 and 100 minutes per annum. Another indicator
is supply lost incidents per 100 customers per annum; in the UK this indicator averages around 80.
The privatised electricity utilities are ‘incentivised’ through their licence conditions and ultimately the
amount of money they receive to reduce both the number and duration of supply interruptions, hence
supply reliability is an important matter with statistics collected nationally through NAFIRS (National
Fault and Interruption Reporting System).

To provide economic guidance, attempts have been made to quantify the value ‘of a kilowatt hour
lost’ but this is extremely difficult because loss of supply to a domestic consumer may amount to the
loss of an hour’s television viewing whereas a shop or petrol filling station might lose considerable
revenue, even though the number of kWhs lost is small. A recent attempt at quantifying this indicator
on a national basis suggested a value of £6 ($9) per kWh.

The factors influencing the reliability of supply that are implicit in the design of the system are now
discussed.

3.1 System Load Factor

The system load factor may be defined as the actual load at the yearly maximum divided by the load
that could theoretically be supplied by the available equipment. It is not a uniform value across a
system because it varies with equipment, voltage level and location. In an interconnected system
high load factors will have an adverse effect on reliability simply because when one circuit fails, the
alternate circuit may have insufficient spare capacity, or at least insufficient medium-term spare
capacity. This constraint will have its greatest effect at the time of yearly maximum demand.

Considering the possibility of operating a system under overload conditions, the factors to be
evaluated are the amount of overload and its duration; one must be balanced against the other
because what is important is, at least in the high voltage system, the temperature rise of conductors
(and oil in transformers), which is dependent upon the period of overload and the square of the
current. In temperate countries the climate works to advantage because the lowest ambient

Version C 32
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

temperatures providing best cooling of equipment occur at the times of greatest demand; in tropical
countries where cooling (air conditioning) load predominates the opposite is true. In low voltage
systems, overload will result in excessive voltage drop.

As a planning guide, many utilities adopt a target load factor of 60% on first commissioning of the
asset. This value will provide an acceptable overload capacity over most of the year for a period of
several years if the annual load growth is 1-3% but a lower initial load factor may be selected where
annual load growth is greater.

The overload capability of some assets has been described in earlier Modules. The danger with power
cables (Module 2) is that thermal expansion of the conductor material may stress the material of the
insulation beyond its elastic limit. Although this is unlikely to cause immediate failure, the resulting
voids will discharge electrically, leading to a reduction in cable life.

Much the same problem applies to switchgear, where expanding conductors may stress the material
of bushings beyond their elastic limit, with the same result. With overhead lines (module 3), overload
will increase conductor temperature and hence sag, which may be acceptable for a short time;
however excessive overload will cause the conductor temperature to rise so much that annealing
begins, a very undesirable situation.

As mentioned previously in this module, transformers both system and distribution are large, massive
objects containing large quantities of Iron and mineral oil with a great thermal capacity. They cause
the least concern in the overload situation.

3.2 Duplication of Circuits

In electricity utilities, reliability achieved through the duplication of assets (transformers, cables,
overhead lines and switchgear) mainly applies at Primary and Secondary transmission voltages. In
industrial networks, duplication of circuits may extend to much lower voltages. This aspect of network
design was discussed in module 1.

It should be noted that although many Primary and Secondary transmission overhead circuits are
nominally duplicated, where they are supported on the same structure both will be vulnerable to
collapse of a single support in extreme weather conditions. True separation of overhead circuits is
more expensive than two circuits carried on a common support, but the latter is generally accepted
on economic and to some extent, visual amenity grounds.

In many situations, parallel operation of twin supply circuits cannot be permitted in normal service
because the resulting short circuit fault level would over-stress the switchgear. In these cases an
auto-changeover scheme will be required.

3.3 Interconnection of Circuits – Underground Cables

Reliability achieved through interconnection of circuits mainly applies to Primary distribution voltage.
Figure 33 shows an 11kV network similar to that described in module 1.

Version C 33
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Fig. 39

The four 33/11kV substations supply a larger number of distribution substations through cables and
some pole mounted substations through overhead lines. The factors affecting interconnection vary
between overhead and underground networks and the latter are considered first.

The underground part of Figure 39 is arranged as a ‘Radial Network’. Distributors controlled by

Circuit Breakers supply the distribution substations; each distributor has a ‘Normal Open Point’
which is implemented by an open disconnector. For example in the lower left hand quadrant of the
diagram, Circuit Breaker number 7 of Castle 33/11kV substation supplies Hilltop, High Street, Torrys
and Bank Avenue distribution substations, with an open point at Mount Street substation (which it
does not supply). The other leg of this distributor connects to the first Circuit Breaker at Cranford
33/11kV substation, which supplies Drayton Avenue, Lowton and Mount Street distribution
substations. Similar arrangements apply to the other underground distributors, although some loop
back onto the opposite side of the same 33/11kV substation switchboard rather than extending to
another, for example the loop out of Towson 33/11kV substation which includes Cannons, Clyde
Avenue, Welford, Deepside, Greens, Bankside and Sweetmans. The degree of security offered by
looping back to the same 33/11kV substation is inferior to that provided by connection to another
33/11kV substation.

In the event of a single cable fault, any distributor may be reconfigured by manual operation of the
disconnectors to restore supply to the distribution substations. For example, consider a fault
occurring between Mayland and Kerry Road on the distributor Mayland, Kerry Road, Spekes, Low

Version C 34
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Road (at the bottom of the diagram). The CB at Brightstone 33/11kV substation will trip, but supply
to all substations may be restored by:

1. Opening the disconnector at Kerry Road towards Mayland.

2. Opening the disconnector at Mayland towards Kerry Road.

3. Closing the tripped CB at Brightstone 33/11kV substation.

4. Closing the disconnector at Spekes towards Kerry Road (this disconnector is the normal
open point).

In the case of distribution substations supplied by tees, it is not possible to restore supply if the cable
fault occurs in the tee. This restriction applies for example to the section of cable Mount Street,
Lowton and Drayton Avenue. If a fault occurs here, the best that can be hoped for is to restore
supplies to Lowton during the repair period through the low voltage network, in the manner described
earlier in this module. For this reason, planning policy in many UK utilities is ‘One tee only between
isolatable points’.

Restoration of supply after a cable fault is a rather more complex operation than is suggested above.
Consider for example the distributor with a CB at Towson 33/11kV substation (top of the diagram),
which supplies Cannons, Clyde Avenue, Welford, Deepside and Greens distribution substations.
When a fault occurs, all that is known is that the CB has tripped (reported through the SCADA
system) and that supplies have been lost (by telephone reports from customers). The fault could be
in any cabled section (or in any item of switchgear, but this is less probable). To restore supplies,
each section must be switched in sequentially, starting with the section Towson 33/11kV to Cannons,
then Cannons to Clyde Avenue and so on. At some stage, the faulted cable will be re-connected and
the Circuit Breaker will trip a second time, however the fault is then finally located. As will be
appreciated, the restoration process can be protracted, especially
if the fault lies in the final section.

Cable damages also occur in fact they cause far more supply
interruptions than do cable faults. However, they are generally less
troublesome than faults because a drive along the route will
immediately reveal excavation in progress in public land or often
the contractors will themselves report the damage (even though
they will be required to meet the cost of repairs).

Fault passage indicators, (FPIs), sometimes referred to as Earth

Fault Flow Indicators (EFFIs) were introduced in the 1970s to assist
in the more rapid location of faults on cabled networks and have
had a major influence in reducing post fault restoration times.

The blue arrows of Figure 40 show the path taken by fault current
for a cable fault occurring between Clyde Avenue and Welford
distribution substations. This current will flow in the cable sections
shown, but not in the cable sections beyond the fault. It is the
function of FPIs to detect and indicate that the (earth fault part) of
fault current has passed, with one FPI installed on the switchgear
at each distribution substation. When the operating engineer visits
the distribution substations along the distributor, this information
may be collected, assessed and the location of the fault deduced,
at least to the correct section. Fig. 40 Fault current path

Version C 35
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Fault passage indicators rely upon a current transformer inserted into the earth path provided by the
metallic cable sheath and they require the switchgear cable gland to be insulated. For this reason
they are normally fitted as original equipment when the distribution substation is first established,
because although they can be retro-fitted, it is a difficult operation. The early designs were manually
reset and failure to remember to properly reset them after previous faults gave them a reputation as
unreliable; modern designs are electrically and automatically reset on a delayed basis after a few
minutes of supply and so do not suffer from this problem. The design of Picture 41 is intended for
fitting externally and below the insulated cable gland, however modern dry terminations allow the
current transformer to be fitted within the cable termination box where they are better protected.

Pic. 41 FPI with integral CT

3.4 Supply Reliability – Primary Distribution Overhead Lines

Considerations of reliability in rural areas supplied by overhead lines are greatly influenced by
economics. As discussed in module 1, the revenue return per kilometre of circuit installed is small,

Fig. 42 Auto reclosed networks

Version C 36
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

because of the low load density per unit of geographical area. This means that capital investment in
all aspects of rural supply needs to be carefully balanced to obtain maximum advantage from
minimum cost. The role of auto reclosing in improving the reliability of supply for customers fed
through overhead lines has been described in module 4, where the focus was upon the implications
for Circuit Breaker performance. It will be recalled that the automatic reclosing of a Circuit Breaker
after a (transient) fault significantly improves the reliability of supply on overhead networks.

The schematic diagram of Figure 42 shows two different methods of implementing auto reclosing in
a network context. Circuit Breaker 1 supplies an extensive overhead network through only a short
length of cable at the 33/11kV substation end; this is good design practice.

In contrast, Circuit Breaker 2 supplies an extensive overhead line network, but only after it has
supplied the cabled section containing Hawksworth, Market Street, Cross Street and George Street
ground mounted distribution substations. This is not good design practice for two reasons:

1. The customers supplied by the ground mounted distribution substations will suffer
from the intermittent losses of supply caused by transient faults occurring on the
extensive overhead network. These substations would be best supplied through a
cable connected to a separate, non-auto reclosed Circuit Breaker.

2. In the event of damage to these underground cables, personnel close to the point of
damage will be at risk from not one but up to four arcing events as the Circuit Breaker
attempts to restore supply by auto reclosing, before it locks out.

The problem identified in 2 also applies to the cabled section through Fletton Village at the top right
of the diagram. Cabled sections embedded in extensive overhead line networks are best avoided,
not only for auto reclosing reasons but also because they are subject to damage from lightning
surges occurring on the overhead network. However cabled sections are sometimes unavoidable.
They are also operationally inconvenient to earth at the points where the overhead lines connect to
the cables, when repairs or maintenance within the cabled section is required. Earths will have to be
applied at the terminal poles by an overhead line team, whereas with a disconnector or Circuit
Breaker the operational engineer can apply the necessary earths himself simply by switching (of
course, under appropriately safe conditions). Where the supply of an overhead line network through
a cabled network cannot be avoided, it is better to install a pole mounted auto recloser. In the network
of Figure 42, the best position for this would be close to the point at which the overhead line network
connects to the cable section from George Street distribution substation.

Pic. 43 Modern SF6 pole mounted auto recloser

Version C 37
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Whilst auto reclosers reduce the adverse effects of transient faults on overhead lines considerably,
they have no effect on permanent faults.

Fig. 44
Consider the network of Figure 44. All the pole mounted transformers along the main section of the
line from George Street to Belton are individually protected by fuses, but for the branched sections,
there is a choice between individually fused transformers, for example the branch to West Stoke and
Stevensons, or fuses located where the branch connects to the main line and the transformers are
solidly connected, for example the branch to Ashover, Brights and Streets.

The optimum between these two choices depends upon the asset permanent fault rates; the rate for
overhead lines is expressed in terms of faults per kilometre per annum whilst for transformers the
fault rate is approximately one every 15 years or .066 annually – almost all pole mounted transformer
failures are the result of lightning damage.

Where transformers are solidly connected to a branch circuit that is collectively fused, a permanent
fault on the branch will cause a loss of supply to all connected transformers and customers, but the
fuses should operate to protect supplies to transformers and customers on the main section of the
circuit. Note that there is no trip-all-phases device on the fuses installed on overhead lines and so
loss of a single fuse in a three phase circuit will cause unbalanced LV side voltages.

3.5 Interconnection of Primary Distribution Overhead Lines

The overhead networks shown earlier in this Module in schematic form are not interconnected
however interconnection is possible and potentially offers improvement in supply reliability. In
overhead networks capable of supply from either end it must be possible to isolate a permanent
fault by isolating the faulty section of line and for this purpose disconnectors must be installed
along the route. They are exactly analogous to the disconnectors in Ring Main Units found in
underground urban networks.

Overhead line disconnectors may be manually operated, or power operated and controlled over
a radio link as shown in Picture 45. Manually operated disconnectors should be located within a
reasonable distance of a public or private road to allow easy access particularly at night. Another
factor is that they should not require access through a farm yard, because of roaming loose dogs
in the small hours of the night.

Version C 38
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Pic.45 Radio controlled power operated overhead line disconnector

Consider the two independent networks shown geographically in Figure 46 overleaf. As shown, both
networks are separated and a permanent fault at any location in either will cause a complete outage
for the duration of the repair time, typically 4 to 8 hours, potentially much longer in bad weather.
However, it is possible to establish interconnection on either of the two routes indicated. The
implications of these interconnectors are as follows:

1. The shortest route is between Dunnet Bridge Farm on the southern network and Waterson Farm
on the northern network. However at the extremities of both networks the conductor is only 40mm2
and this choice imposes an approximate 4MVA limit (at 11kV) transfer capacity. A second route
between Salter Farm and Moorfield Farm though longer connects the main 100mm2 sections of
each network, allowing an improved transfer capacity of approximately 8MVA. Note that
reconstructing 40mm2 network to 100mm2 on the same route is possible but as described in
Module 3, stronger supports will be required. Therefore the rebuilding on the same route option
requires lengthy and probably unacceptable outages at Dunnet Bridge Farm and Waterson Farm.

2. Neither of the two networks can be divided into sections because there are presently no
disconnection facilities. Installing a single disconnector will not offer any improvement in supply
reliability. Installing two disconnectors will allow splitting the combined networks into thirds, or
three disconnectors into quarters. Each increase in the number of disconnectors increases the
number of possible sections of the line, reducing the number of customers affected by a single
permanent fault, but clearly each additional disconnector increases cost.

Version C 39
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Fig. 46

3. The choice between manual and power operated disconnectors is once again a balance between
cost and restoration time. Manually operated disconnectors require travel from office to site and
probably some walking, typically this will require 1-2 hours. Power operated disconnectors may
be opened or closed from a central control room immediately a restoration strategy is decided

Version C 40
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

upon. They may be installed at almost any location whereas with manual disconnectors regard
must be paid to the hazards of walking over rough country at night in bad weather.

3.6 Embedded Generation in Distribution Networks

Most electricity distribution networks were originally designed and constructed to allow for load flows
entirely from higher to lower voltages. However, over the last 20 years as the cost of energy has
increased, efforts have been made to utilise a greater diversity of energy sources. This has led to
many companies who were originally only consumers of energy becoming self-sufficient with their
own generation or in many cases exporting power into the supply utilities network. This has
implications for energy metering which are outside the scope of this Module. Consider the supply
arrangements shown in Figure 47.

Fig. 47 Network with embedded generator

In this network the customer shown at lower left has a generator which supplies all that customer’s
internal load and also exports into the utility’s network, supplying a number of local distribution
substations through the right-hand busbar of the 33/11kV substation. Any shortfall in energy
requirement is supplied from the utility’s network through Circuit Breaker X. This connection ensures
that the system frequency is securely tied to national frequency.

There is however a danger that if supplies are in balance and no energy flows in either direction
through Circuit Breaker X, then if that Circuit Breaker opens, the network supplied from the
embedded generator becomes detached from the remainder of the system. This condition is known
as ‘Islanding’ and it can result in large swings of frequency as the embedded generator attempts to
follow the variations in load.

Large variation of frequency will cause under or over frequency protection relays to operate – in
process industries this may well result in the plant shutting down in an uncontrolled and potentially
dangerous manner. The only solution to this problem is to trip out the generator Circuit Breaker using
what is known as a ROCOF relay (which is sensitive to the Rate Of Change Of Frequency).

Version C 41
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

4. Security Standards in the UK

In the UK, public electricity supply security is determined by Standard P2/6, which is binding upon
the privatised utilities, with financial penalties for failure to comply. A small extract from this standard
is shown below – in the full document there are further rows below those shown covering larger
blocks of demand but these apply to transmission situations which are outside the scope of this
Module and course.

Table 1 Standards of Security up to 60MW

Class Range of First Circuit Second Circuit Notes

of Group Outage Outage
Supply Demand
A Up to 1MW In r e p a ir t im e: Nil Where demand is
Group Demand supplied by a single
1000kVA transformer the
"Range of Group
Demand" may be
extended to cover the
overload capacity of that
transformer
B Over 1MW and up (a)Within 3 hours Nil
to 12MW Group Demand
minus 1MW
(b) In repair time:
Group Demand
C Over 12MW and (a) Within 15 Nil Group Demand will be
up to 60MW minutes, smaller normally supplied by at least
of (Group two normally closed Circuits
demand minus or by one Circuit with
12MW) and (66% supervisory or automatic
of Group switching of alternative
demand) Circuits.
(b) Within 3 hours
Group demand

The rows in the above table are explained as follows.

Class A supplies cover up to 1MW with an extension to include that where the failure is a distribution
transformer, the load covered by Class A is up to that transformer’s overload rating
(distribution transformers are available up to 1.5MVA). This class covers most faults and
damages at distribution voltages, for example the loss of supply from a single ground
mounted distribution substation or failure of a low voltage or Primary distribution voltage
circuit. It allows ‘repair time’ for restoration of supply, without imposing a limit of hours.
However, there are separate financial penalties on utilities and compensation for customers
if repairs require an excessive amount of time, which are specified in the licence conditions.

Class B covers the load range 1 to 12MW and requires that within 3 hours Group Demand minus
1MW is restored and secondly that all the Group demand is restored in repair time, which
is again unlimited. The first part of the requirement allows for restoration of supply to most
of the lost load by manual switching of the network (the 3 hour requirement) whilst the
second part allows for a remaining 1 MW to be restored in repair time, which is essentially
a repeat of Class A and covers the same situations.

Version C 42
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Class C covers the range 12 to 60MW, which is normally the Secondary transmission voltage
situation. It requires restoration of supply within 15 minutes of the smaller of either (Group
demand minus 12MW) or (66% of Group demand). The remaining lost load must be
restored within 3 hours. The first requirement implies automatic restoration of supply
through an alternate circuit, with switch over initiated by the protection system or by a
control engineer performing switching operations over a SCADA facility. The second
requirement is essentially a repeat of Class B.

Note that all of the above refer to a single fault or damage, no requirements are specified for the twin
fault or damage occurrence (although they are at Transmission voltages).

5. Repair Times for Plant and Circuits

The table below provides guidance on repair times under normal circumstances for plant and circuit
assets that have been damaged or have failed. Repair times will be much longer for overhead lines
where multiple failures have occurred over a wide area in adverse weather, where the constraint will
always be the availability of resources. The quoted times are from first notification of loss of supply
through to restoration of supply to all customers and include network switching and the issue of
safety documents where appropriate, but do not allow for completion operations such as permanent
reinstatement of roads and footpaths. In all cases out of normal working hours repairs will take
longer, typically by an extra 2 hours. HV refers to Primary distribution voltage.

Table 2 Repair times of assets

Asset Average Range of Notes

Repair Repair
Time Time
Hours Hours
LV underground 6 5-10 Open circuit faults are more easily located
distributor than short circuit
LV overhead distributor 4 3-6
– conductor or insulator
LV overhead distributor 6 4-8
– support
HV underground 8* 6-12 For fault location methods refer to
network ‘Underground Cable Fault Location’, Barry
Clegg, ISBN 0 95 3265609.
HV overhead distributor 5 4-7 Insulators may be replaced live in some
– conductor or insulator circumstances
HV overhead distributor 7 5-9
– support
Distribution transformer 8 7-10
cabled supply
Distribution transformer 5 4-6
pole mounted
Pole mounted 6 5-7
disconnector
HV Ring Main Unit 8* 7-10
Unit substation 16* 14-20 Allows for removal and replacement of

Version C 43
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

complete housing
HV Circuit Breaker 6 4-12
repair only
* Stated times assume two cable jointing teams.

Asset faults can occur at any time, damage incidents to underground cables occur mainly during
normal working hours; in urban networks damages usually exceed failures by a considerable margin.

Table 3 describes the expected life of assets and their failure mechanisms.

Asset Expected life years Deterioration failure

mechanism
Overhead lines
Copper conductor Indefinite
Aluminium conductor and 40-50 years depending upon Corrosion to the hydroxide
Aluminium Alloy conductor local environment
Aluminium conductor steel 30-40 years depending upon Corrosion of the Aluminium to
reinforced local environment the hydroxide, Steel to rust
Steelwork (especially 30-40 years depending upon Corrosion to rust, rapid once the
crossarms) local environment Zinc has gone
Creosoted wood poles 20-40 years, may be prolonged
by anti-biological treatment
Stay wire 20-30 years depending upon Corrosion to rust, rapid once the
local environment Zinc has gone
Concrete supports 30-40 years where ice occurs, Spalling of the surface concrete
indefinite elsewhere leading to corrosion of the steel
Steel structures Indefinite, but only if the paint
film is renewed every 10-15
years
Pole mounted transformers 20-30 years Corrosion of the steel tank
leading to oil loss. Also
vulnerable to lightning damage
Pole mounted disconnectors 25-30 years Corrosion of steelwork
Insulators The insulation material has an indefinite life, the steel parts 30-40
years. Subject to deliberate damage.
Underground cables
Cables have an indefinite life but if overloaded will eventually fail, in paper cables this is by
solidification of the impregnant leading to excessive ionisation. In oil pressure cables leakage rates
may become unacceptable after 30-40 years. The life of triple extruded polymeric cables is presently
indeterminate.
Ground mounted transformers
Distribution transformers Indefinite if indoor, 30-40 years Corrosion of the steel tank
outdoor
System transformers including Indefinite if properly maintained
associated tapchangers

Distribution class switchgear

Indefinite life if properly maintained however spares can become a problem also discharge over

Version C 44
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

internal insulation after 30-40 years. Likely to become technically obsolete with age and/or incapable
of operation under more stringent Safety Rules. Increasing system short circuit level can lead to over-
stressing. Outdoor sited switchgear is unlikely to last longer than 40 years.

6. The Cost of Supply Reliability

Where capital is to be spent to improve supply reliability, it is customary to assess the proposal in
terms of cost per kWh saved. The steps in this process are as follows:

1. Assess the capital cost of the asset(s) to be created and from that value determine the
annual cost. The annual cost may be simply the interest cost of the capital employed
however a more accurate method is to use the ‘Amortisation’ formula which also allows
for repayment of the capital over the period under consideration (that is, the life of the new
assets). The formula is:
r (1 + r )n
Yearly Cost = Capital Sum x
(1 + r )n − 1

Where r is the interest rate (6% is specified as 0.06) and n is the number of years. This
formula will produce a value greater than simple money interest.

2. Add the annual maintenance cost of the new asset(s) to the value determined in 1.

3. Determine the per-annum kWh lost to failures without the new asset(s) and the per-
annum kWh lost due to failures with the new asset(s) established.

4. Multiply the kWh saved by the cost per kWh attributable to distribution (that is, the total
cost of energy per unit sold minus the cost due to energy production). Subtract this value
from the annual cost determined in 2.

5. Determine the overall cost per kWh saved.

In utilities, few schemes for improvement of supply reliability are fully economically justified, but at
least the calculation allows an appreciation of the benefits of possible alternatives.

Some assets are notoriously troublesome to replace. A failure of a single Circuit Breaker in a multi-
panel switchboard will often require replacement of the whole; cable box failures can sometimes be
repaired but seldom a busbar failure. System transformers are also in this category, a replacement
unit must have the same rating, same winding vectors, same number of tappings and the same
percentage voltage variation between tappings if it is to operate successfully in parallel with a second
transformer, which is normally required. Both switchgear and system transformers have lengthy
delivery times.

7. Voltage Regulation on Primary Distribution Circuits

Voltage is adjusted by on load tapchangers fitted to the system transformers and controlled by a
voltage sensing relay. Figure 48 shows the normal arrangement.

Version C 45
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Fig. 48 Voltage control arrangement

The voltage control relay is provided with both voltage and current inputs and in addition its controls
may be adjusted to compensate for any value of circuit resistance and reactance, allowing the
voltage to be held constant at any distant location. In practice, where there are two system
transformers operating in parallel (as is normal at most 33/11kV substations), one control is selected
to be ‘Master ‘whilst the second acts as ‘Follower’. Either transformer/control system may be selected
as master.

Most transformers supply several separate Primary distribution circuits, all of which have different
resistance and reactance values. Therefore, compromise settings must be selected for the control
relay which are reasonably representative or an average of all the supplied circuits.

In the past, the voltage control relay comprised a vertical rod suspended on a spring and pulled down
by a solenoid; secondary contacts sensed the rod position and closed either to raise tap or lower tap
after a small delay (to prevent too rapid operation after transient load changes). The sending voltage
was adjusted by changing the spring tension. Today the equivalent function is implemented by solid
state electronics.

8. Quality of Supply – Disturbing Loads

Ideally the voltage and current waveforms in a supply network should be pure sine waves at the
supply frequency. Until the middle of the twentieth century this was largely the situation; the major
disturbing, harmonic creating loads were electrified railways, large arc furnaces and rectifier/inverter
systems associated with speed control and soft start on large AC motors, for example mine winders.

These major loads were of little interest to the distribution engineer; firstly because most were
supplied at transmission voltage and secondly because the suppression of harmonics was the
undisputed responsibility of the customer. Disturbing loads could be easily identified on the network
and appropriate steps taken to prevent harmonics creating problems elsewhere, all costs associated
with this process being attributable to the customer. The minor disturbing loads which did affect the
distribution system were mainly transformer/rectifier installations supplying the DC traction loads of
tram and trolleybus systems, the latter rapidly becoming obsolescent. Harmonics generated by these
DC converter systems depend upon the designed number of pulses, 6 pulse generating 5 th and 7th
harmonics, 12 pulse generating 11th and 13th harmonics. It’s worth noting at this point that because
supply systems are linear, only the fundamental frequency voltage and current deliver useful power,
harmonic voltages and currents do not. The fall in system efficiency attributable to harmonics is very
similar to that caused by poor power factor; the equation

Version C 46
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Ipower
Power factor = must take into account that Itotal = 2
Ipower + Ireactive
2
+ Iharmonic
2

Itotal

Most customer loads prior to the 1960’s were resistive for example incandescent lamps, ovens,
heaters, etc. and the main source of harmonics on distribution networks arose from the magnetizing
currents of older type transformers, which produced small third and fifth harmonic components. This
source of harmonics became gradually less important following the introduction of cold rolled, grain
oriented steels which had improved hysteresis curves. A further though rare effect with large
transformers is that if a circuit breaker interrupts a large current fault during the brief period when a
substantial DC component is flowing, the transformer steel can be permanently magnetised, shifting
the B-H curve and resulting in even order harmonics, sometimes for long periods of time.

The method of assessing the harmonic content of any particular supply current is by calculation of
the Root Mean Square (RMS) value and therefore heating effect; fortunately for the purpose of
calculation third harmonic currents combine to produce power only with third harmonic voltage and
so on.

Once the total harmonic power has been determined the value of Total Harmonic Distortion (THD)
may be expressed as a percentage by:

THD =
 harmonic power x 100%.
fundamental power

During the 1960’s the benign situation with regard to harmonic current on distribution networks
changed for the worse as household and office electronic equipment containing switched mode and
other forms of sophisticated power supplies began to be introduced in large quantities, distributed
over the entire low voltage network. These devices draw highly non-linear currents, generating
significant harmonics.

In addition to electronic equipment, variable speed drives for small AC motors became more
widespread, being used typically in factories, lifts and the more expensive types of washing machine.
These too draw highly non-linear currents from the supply system. During the 1980’s even more
harmonics were generated by the introduction of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs).

Fig. 49 Current waveforms, switched mode power supply (left) and variable speed drive (right)

Version C 47
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Figure 49 illustrates these current waveforms; that on the right comprising mainly third and fifth
harmonics, whilst the fast rise, square waveform on the left contains odd integer harmonics up
to many multiples of the supply frequency.

Even in the 1960’s it was possible to design and construct power supplies for electronic
equipment and variable speed drives which either limited the generation of harmonics or
filtered them out. However, this made the equipment more costly and therefore less
competitive. Note that voltage and current waveforms which are symmetrical on the positive
and negative going half cycles contain only odd number harmonics. Non sinusoidal waveforms
that differ as between the two half cycles are also possible and generate even number
harmonics; they arise mainly from the switching of power factor correction capacitors, are
usually transient and therefore less important.

Harmonic voltages and currents caused by disturbing loads affect both customer and supply
network adversely. Considering firstly the customer’s installation, non-sinusoidal currents
create non-sinusoidal voltages, through the volt drop in the source impedance. The greater the
source impedance the greater the volt drop and it affects the voltage supplied to other
customers through the Point of Common coupling. In supply networks impedance is mainly
inductive and therefore rises with frequency, harmonic currents giving rise to a greater volt
drop than does the fundamental.

Harmonics can be divided into positive, negative and zero sequence components, as shown
in the table which covers odd number harmonics up to the 23rd.

Positive sequence Negative sequence Zero sequence

Fundamental, 7, 13, 19 5, 11, 17, 23 3, 9, 15, 21

Negative phase sequence harmonic components adversely affect AC motors because they
produce a rotational torque that is opposite to the fundamental. This causes vibration, power
loss and excessive wear in the bearings – fifth is the most common harmonic causing this
problem. Other equipment that requires an accurate waveform for its correct operation, for
example light dimmers, may malfunction if harmonic distortion is present.

Zero phase sequence harmonic components cause excess current in the neutral. Where
many distorting single phase loads are connected to a three-phase supply, for example in an
office block, it can in severe cases give rise to a neutral current greater than the phase current.
This is particularly important for cables with a reduced cross section neutral conductor, taking
advantage of the fact that in a well managed network, neutrals carry only the out of balance
current. For example, 300mm2 cables may have only a 185mm2 neutral. Third harmonic
voltage is the most common harmonic causing this problem.

All harmonic currents cause heating in the network conductors and in the iron circuits of
transformers and motors, resulting in waste of energy and in the case of conductors degrading
of the current carrying capability. They can also affect adjacent telecommunication circuits by
electromagnetic induction – this is a greater problem with higher order harmonics.

System resonances are important because they can cause over voltages leading to
equipment failure, particularly failures in power factor correction capacitors. The capacitive
reactance of the capacitor(s) combines with the inductive reactance of the network to form a
resonant circuit. If the resonant frequency is an integer multiple of the supply frequency, then
the high impedance causes a small harmonic current to produce a disproportionately high
voltage, degrading the capacitor insulation and potentially leading to failure. Resolving this

Version C 48
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

situation may require changing the capacitor value so that resonance with the supply
impedance occurs at a frequency that is not an integral of the fundamental.

Considering the distribution network, the excess neutral current possibility also exists.
Where the third harmonic problem is severe, filters may be required in the transformer neutral
connection to prevent spurious tripping of the standby earth fault relay (Module 5).
Transformers are also affected, in that the eddy current energy loss rises in direct proportion
to the frequency, for example fifth harmonic currents causing five times the loss at fundamental
frequency, on an Ampere for Ampere basis. Some energy meters may be inaccurate in a high
THD situation and finally circuit breaker protection may trip inappropriately because of the
excess harmonic current.

8.1 Management of Harmonic Distortion

From the distribution engineer’s standpoint there is little that can be done individually regarding
small disturbing loads. However, standards have been introduced in Europe and elsewhere to
both reduce the generation of harmonics by small loads and the tolerance of small loads to
harmonics in the supply. These standards comprise IEC6100 (several parts), in Europe
EN50160 and in the USA IEEE 519-1992. They cover equipment that is locally manufactured
and equipment that has been imported; they are backed by legislation and because it is in the
interest of the utility and in the interest of the commercial customer to reduce neutral currents
for example, they are generally complied with. Larger disturbing loads and their effect on the
local network and on other local customers must be considered individually, taking into
account the existing measured levels of harmonics on the local network because the
harmonics of the proposed load will be additive. Any application for supply should include
details not only of the proposed total demand, but also of any equipment within that total that
is likely to be disturbing. Manufacturer’s data will be required for any disturbing load equipment
that the customer intends to connect and its effect at the Point of Common Coupling calculated
taking into account system impedance at the proposed point of connection.

In the UK, Electricity Networks Association standard G5/4-1 applies, most recently updated in
2001. The overall THD limits embodied in G5/4-1 are:

LV 6.6, 11, 20kV 22 to 400kV

5% 4% 3%

Within this THD, the individual limits to percentage harmonic voltage are:

2 1.6 9 1.2 15 0.3

3 4.0 10 0.4 17 1.6
4 1.0 11 3.0 19 1.2
5 4.0 12 0.2 21 0.2
6 0.5 13 2.5 23 1.2
7 4.0 More than 0.2 25 or more 0.7
12 even odd
8 0.4

Where the calculated harmonic(s) exceed the permitted limit(s) steps will need to be taken to
reduce them. This can include the installation of harmonic filters or connection of the disturbing
load to a higher voltage level with lower supply impedance by establishing a separate
substation, or both. These costs will need to met by the customer.

Further Reading

Version C 49
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Books on power system operation tend to focus on generation and transmission, very few
focus on the operation of distribution systems. However, students may find the following book
useful:

1. Introduction to Electrical Power Systems by Mohamed E. El-Hawary, published by

IEEE

Notes on Student’s answers to questions

Marks will be awarded for presentation and answers should be typed in WORD. Students may
convert their WORD .doc into .pdf to reduce the file size if preferred. In the mathematical
questions, students should describe and comment upon the practical implications of
their answers.

Mathematical equations should be created using the WORD equation editor. If this is not
available on your PC, go to TOOLS - CUSTOMISE then select INSERT. Scroll down the right
hand selection until you see EQUATION EDITOR then drag and drop the symbol onto any
place in the tool bar. You will then have the
necessary mathematical commands available for
use.

Questions on Module 6

Question 1.

(a) Specify the sequence of operations and the

issue/clearance of safety documents required to
replace a faulty distribution transformer at Cross
Street Substation as shown in the diagram
(transformer is cable connected on both HV and
LV sides). The fault has tripped the 11kV
transformer circuit breaker at the substation and
customers are off supply. Set out your answer in
the form of a table with the procedure steps listed
in descending order. Supplies to customers
normally supplied from the substation are to be
restored and maintained during the repair
through the interconnection on the low voltage
circuit (the substation fuse board will remain
live). Include the posting and later removal of
screens, safety and earth locks and safety
notices. Normal open points on the HV and LV
network are shown by arrows.

Version C 50
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(b) Construct a switching schedule for these operations in the format described in this
Module for the same operation.

Question 2.

(a) Using the network shown in Figure 40 (you may request a copy of this illustration in
jpg format, please contact course tutor), measure the distance and determine the
costs of building the 100mm2 interconnector circuit on the route marked B plus the cost
of installing three manually operated disconnectors (allowing division of the combined
network into four parts). Capital costs inclusive of overheads are:

Single support section angle up to 30° complete £514 ($720)

‘H’ support section angle 30° to 55° complete £742 ($1040)
Intermediate support complete £370 ($520)
Conductor 3 phase per route metre (3 conductors complete) £8 ($11)
Manually operated disconnector complete £2200 ($3100)

(b) Select three positions for the manually operated disconnectors and give your reasons for
the choice of location.

(c) Using the sinking fund formula and the initial capital cost from (a), establish the annual
cost of the capital to establish the interconnector and disconnectors. The amortisation
formula is:

r (1 + r )n
Yearly Cost = Capital Sum x
(1 + r )n − 1
Where r is the interest rate to be taken as 8% per annum (0.08) and n is the number of
years, to be taken as 30. Add £800 ($1100) per annum for the cost of maintaining the
disconnectors (£266 or $373 each) to determine the total annual cost.
(d) Measure the length of all the overhead circuits and determine the cost per kWh saved
from permanent faults. Use the annual cost of the interconnector plus disconnectors from
(c) and using the following information:

The annual rate for permanent faults for transformers is 0.066, for overhead line 0.07 per
km.

The average repair time for a transformer is 6 hours and for an overhead line 7 hours.

The average year round load factor of the connected pole mounted transformers is 8%.

The revenue per kWh attributable to distribution (that is, excluding the cost of energy) is
£0.025 ($0.042).

You should include for permanent failures occurring on the new inter connector but may
omit the failure rate of the new disconnectors. You may work in £ or $.

Version C 51
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Appendix

This appendix is provided to demonstrate in detail the operation of modern switchgear (Merlin
Gerin RN2C Ring Main Unit). It was written to comply with a particular company’s Safety Rules,
operational locking and safety notice policies, although the Safety Rules are typical of those
used in process industries.

A1. General Description of the Equipment

This metalclad SF6 filled Ring Main Unit (RMU) comprises two fault making, load breaking
circuit (Ring) switches and a transformer Circuit Breaker controlled by a self powered
protection relay. The transformer Circuit Breaker is rated at 200A. A top hinged and lockable
cover fitted with a rubber sealing strip around its outer edge acts as a weather seal enclosing
the upper front panel of the RMU and is supported in the raised position by gas struts fixed on
either side. This cover is fitted with twin clips on its internal surface to provide storage for the
anti-reflex operating handle. All switching operations are undertaken from this front panel,
where the control facilities and status semaphores are grouped and linked by painted circuit
lines to form a logical mimic diagram. The front panel also contains a gas pressure gauge at
the upper left hand corner, with green and red sectors. Note that the selectors and controls for
two Ring Switches are complete mirror images of each other; left to right and clockwise to
anticlockwise.

Fig. 1 Front view of RN2C RMU with front cover raised

and all locks removed

Version C 52
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A lockable and top hinged compartment at the lower front provides access to the ring circuit
test contacts and the transformer Circuit Breaker relay protection. This compartment also
houses a moulded plastic test key, which is required if test access to the Ring Switch circuits
is needed, as described in the operational sections of this document.

Fig. 2 below is a single line diagram (SLD) of the Ring Main Unit, corresponding electrically to
the unit shown physically in Fig. 1. The transformer Circuit Breaker and its associated earth
disconnector are shown located in a central position above the horizontal busbar. They
correspond to the control and indication elements grouped at the upper right hand corner of
the RMU’s operating panel. This Circuit Breaker is interlocked with and operates in conjunction
with its two position disconnector, allowing safe earthing of the transformer transformer circuit.

Fig.2 Single Line Diagram (SLD) of RN2C Ring

Main Unit

The two x three position switch-disconnectors (ON, OFF and EARTH) shown below the
horizontal busbar correspond to the controls and indications of the two Ring Switches located
at the centre left and right of the RMU’s operating face. Each Ring Switch is physically and
electrically arranged as a mirror image of the other.

Ring Switch circuit earth connections are completed through star bars. Physically these bars
are implemented as twin rear-pivoted contact arms located in the roof of the lower
compartment, one pair of bars for the left hand circuit and one pair of bars for the right hand
circuit. Normally they are positioned horizontally to enclose Ring circuit contacts (studs) also
located in the roof of the compartment and set into an insulated plate. Following release by a
test key, the star bars may be rotated downward using the standard operating handle (if the
associated Ring Switch is in the EARTH position), allowing electrical tests on the Ring circuits.

Version C 53
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Transformer Circuit Breaker

Figure 3 shows the semaphore, selectors and controls for the RN2C Transformer Circuit
Breaker, located at the upper right of the RMU operating face, in greater detail.

Fig. 3 RN2C transformer Circuit Breaker control,

selector and semaphores. Locks not shown

If the Transformer Circuit Breaker operates on fault, the small semaphore indicator located
above and to the right of the spigot will change from white to orange. Before resetting and
closing the CB mechanism, ensure that the protection relay is reset – this item is located in the
lower compartment.

Ring Switches

Fig. 4 shows the selectors and controls for the Ring Switches in greater detail. The operating
handle connects to the centre spigots and drives the independent manual spring operated
mechanisms – the required control movement is approximately 45° between ON, OFF and
EARTH. Lockable selectors are associated with each Ring Switch; they move through 90° arcs
between the MAIN SWITCH and EARTH SWITCH options.

Fig 4 Ring Switch controls and selectors. Each

control is the mirror image of the other. All locks
removed

Version C 54
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Moving the selector requires the rectangular slider to be pulled back toward the pivot point;
this will not be possible if a selector padlock is in position. Ring Switch status semaphores are
located within painted mimic lines above the Ring Switch controls and selectors (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5 Ring Switch status semaphores.

All locks removed

Operating Handle

Fig.6 shows the anti-reflex operating handle for both the Ring Switches and the transformer
Circuit Breaker, which is stored in a spring clip inside the outer door. The double spigot ends
allow for both clockwise and anticlockwise rotational movement, both being clearly marked by
embossed arrows. This handle is also used to release and restore the earth star bars on the
Ring Switches.

Fig. 6 Operating handle

Version C 55
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

SF6 Gas Pressure

Fig. 7 shows the SF6 gas pressure gauge, located left and above the Ring Switch controls and
selectors. Check this gauge before each switching operation – the needle must be within the
green arc. If it is in the red arc, proceed no further and report the matter to your supervisor.

Fig. 7 Gas pressure gauge

Test access

Fig. 8 shows the lower compartment open, looking into the roof and showing the twin pivoted
star bars and stud contacts for the right and left hand Ring circuits. Interlocks are provided at
the front of each bar, which in association with an interlock device (test key) allow removal of
earth bars only under the safe operational condition of Ring Switch in circuit earth.

Fig. 8 Roof of lower compartment showing the twin Ring

circuit star bars, pivoted at the rear

Version C 56
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.2 Procedure to RESET and CLOSE the transformer Circuit Breaker (after fault
operation)

(1) Unlock and open the front cover. Identify

the control panel for the transformer
Circuit Breaker at the top right of the
panel. Confirm that the Circuit Breaker is
TRIPPED by examining the trip
indicator, which should show ORANGE.

Orange trip indicator showing

(2) Before work commences on the CB

transformer circuit, remove the operational
lock from the door release button of the
lower compartment, press the button
upward and open the compartment door.

Lower compartment opened

Location of relay

(3) Check the transformer Circuit Breaker

protection relay and reset it if required.
Close and lock the compartment door on
completion.

Version C 57
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Ensure that the gas gauge shows satisfactory

pressure.

Gas pressure gauge

(5) Unlock and open the front panel door.

Unclip and insert the operating handle
set for an anticlockwise movement and
rotate it anticlockwise to the RESET
position.

Rotating the mechanism to RESET

(6) Reverse the operating handle for a

clockwise movement and rotate it
clockwise to the CB CLOSE position.

The circuit is now energised (LIVE). Moving the mechanism to CLOSE

Version C 58
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Remove the operating handle and

ensure that the trip semaphore
indicates white and the CB status
semaphore indicates CLOSED.
Leave the switchgear with the handle
stowed in its clips. Close and lock the
front cover.

Tee off circuit ON

Version C 59
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.3 Procedure to OPEN, establish a POINT OF ISOLATION and EARTH the transformer
Circuit

(1) Unlock and open the front panel. Ensure that

the gas gauge shows satisfactory pressure.

SF6 gas pressure satisfactory

(2) Unclip and insert the operating

handle set for an anticlockwise
operation and rotate it
approximately 45° until the
mechanism toggles over to the
OFF (OPEN) position.

Moving the mechanism to OFF

Version C 60
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(3) Remove the operating handle and

ensure that the transformer Circuit
Breaker semaphore indicates OFF
(OPEN).

CB OPEN

Version C 61
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Identify the transformer circuit selector

and remove the operational lock.

Lock to be removed

(5) Lift the selector slide upward,

rotate it a quarter turn
anticlockwise and release.

Selector moved to the EARTH SWITCH position

(6) Apply a Safety lock and Caution notice

to the selector.

The Point of Isolation is established.

SL & CN posted

Version C 62
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Before closing the transformer earth switch, confirm that a Point of Isolation has been
established on the transformer low voltage side.

Moving the CB to EARTH ON

(8) Insert the operating

handle set for an
anticlockwise operation.
Rotate it approximately
45° until the mechanism
toggles over to the
EARTH ON position.

Version C 63
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(9) Remove the operating handle and

ensure that the status semaphore
indicates EARTH ON.

EARTH is now applied to the

transformer circuit.
Transformer CB status semaphore showing
EARTH ON

Version C 64
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(10)Apply a Safety lock to the operating spigot

of the transformer circuit. Close and lock
the front panel cover.

Safety lock applied

Version C 65
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.4 Procedure to REMOVE EARTH and RESTORE the transformer Circuit Breaker to
ON

(1) Unlock and open the front panel cover. Ensure that
the gas gauge shows satisfactory pressure.

SF6 gas pressure satisfactory

(2) Remove the Safety lock from the

operating spigot of the
transformer circuit.

Spigot safety lock to be removed

(3) Insert the operating handle set for a

clockwise movement and rotate it
clockwise until the mechanism
toggles over to the OFF (OPEN)
position.

Moving the transformer CB to the OPEN position

Earth is now removed from the transformer circuit

Version C 66
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Ensure that the status

semaphore indicates OFF
(OPEN).

Transformer CB semaphore showing OPEN

(5) Remove the operating handle.

Operating handle removed

Version C 67
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(6) Remove the Safety lock and Caution

notice from the transformer selector.

SL & CN removed

Version C 68
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Identify the selector slide. Move the

slide to the left, rotate it a quarter turn
clockwise and release it.

Selector moved to Circuit Breaker position

(8) Restore an operational lock to

the selector slide.

Operational lock restored to the selector

(9) Insert the operating handle set for

a clockwise movement and rotate
it clockwise approximately 45°
until the mechanism toggles over
to the ON position.

Moving the CB to ON

The circuit is now energised (LIVE).

Version C 69
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(10) Remove the operating handle. Store

the operating handle in its clips, close
and lock the front panel cover.

Handle removed

Version C 70
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.5 Procedure to OPEN, establish a POINT OF ISOLATION and EARTH the Left Hand
Ring Switch

(1) Unlock and open the front panel. Ensure that the gas
gauge shows satisfactory pressure.

SF6 gas pressure satisfactory

(2) Unclip and insert the operating

handle set for a clockwise
movement.

Handle inserted

Version C 71
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(3) Rotate the handle clockwise until

the mechanism toggles over to the
OFF (OPEN) position.

Moving the mechanism to OFF

Version C 72
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Remove the operating handle and

ensure that the status semaphore
indicates OFF (OPEN).

Semaphore indicating OFF

(5) Remove the operational lock

from the left hand Ring
Switch selector.

Operational lock removed

(6) Pull the selector slide to the

left, rotate it a quarter turn
downward and release.

Selector moved to EARTH SWITCH position

Version C 73
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Fit a Safety lock and Caution notice to the

left hand Ring Switch selector.

The POINT OF ISOLATION is established.

SL & CN applied

(8) At this stage and before proceeding, ensure that all required Points of Isolation elsewhere
on the network have been established, with locks applied and notices posted.

(9) Insert the operating handle set for a

clockwise movement.

Handle inserted

Version C 74
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(10)Rotate the handle clockwise until the

mechanism toggles over to the EARTH ON
position.

Moving the mechanism to EARTH ON

(11) Remove the operating handle and

ensure that the left hand Ring Switch
status semaphore indicates EARTH
ON.

Circuit Earth is now applied.

Semaphore indicating EARTH ON

(12) Apply a Safety lock to the left hand Ring

Switch spigot. Store the operating handle
in its clips, close and lock the front panel
cover.

Handle removed

Version C 75
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.6 Procedure to REMOVE an EARTH from the Left Hand Ring Switch and RESTORE
to ON

(1) Unlock and open the front panel. Ensure that the
gas gauge shows satisfactory pressure.

SF6 gas pressure satisfactory

(2) Remove the Safety lock from the

left hand Ring Switch spigot.

Safety lock removed from spigot of left hand Ring

Switch

(3) Unclip and insert the operating handle

set for an anticlockwise operation.

Operating handle inserted

Version C 76
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Rotate the handle anticlockwise until the

mechanism toggles over to the OFF
(OPEN) position.

CIRCUIT EARTH is now removed.

Moving the Ring Switch to OPEN

(5) Remove the operating handle and

ensure that the left hand Ring
Switch status semaphore
indicates OFF (OPEN).

Left hand Ring Switch semaphore showing OPEN

(6) At this stage and before proceeding, confirm that all earths on the circuit have been
removed.

Version C 77
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Remove the Safety lock and

Caution notice from the left Hand
Ring Switch selector.

Safety lock and Caution notice removed from left hand

Ring Switch selector

(8) Pull the selector slide

upward, rotate it a quarter
turn anticlockwise and
release.

Left hand Ring switch selector moved to MAIN SWITCH

position

(9) Restore the operational lock to the

left hand Ring Switch selector.

Operational lock restored to selector

Version C 78
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(10) Insert the operating handle set for an

anticlockwise movement.

Operating handle inserted

(11) Rotate the handle anticlockwise

approximately 45° until the
mechanism toggles over to the
ON position.

Closing the Ring Switch

The circuit is now energised (LIVE).

(12) Remove the operating handle and

ensure that the status semaphore
indicates CLOSED. Leave the
switchgear with the handle stowed
in its clips and the front cover
closed and locked.

Left hand Ring Switch semaphore showing CLOSED

Version C 79
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.7 Procedure to OPEN, establish a POINT OF ISOLATION and EARTH the Right Hand
Ring Switch

(1) Unlock and open the front panel. Ensure that the gas
gauge shows satisfactory pressure.

SF6 gas pressure satisfactory

(2) Unclip and insert the

operating handle set for an
anticlockwise movement.

Handle inserted

Version C 80
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(3) Rotate the handle

approximately 45° anticlockwise
until the mechanism toggles
over to the OFF (OPEN)
position.

Operating handle inserted

Version C 81
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Remove the operating handle

and ensure that the status
semaphore indicates OFF
(OPEN).

Ring Switch semaphore showing OPEN

(5) Remove the operational lock

from the right hand Ring Switch
selector.

Lock removed

(6) Pull the selector slide to the right,

rotate it a quarter turn downward
and release.

Selector moved to EARTH SWITCH position

Version C 82
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Fit a Safety lock and Caution notice

to the right hand Ring Switch
selector.

SL & CN posted
The POINT OF ISOLATION is
established.

(8) At this stage and before proceeding, ensure that all required Points of Isolation
elsewhere on the network have been established.

(9) Insert the operating handle set for an

anticlockwise movement.

Operating handle inserted

Version C 83
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(10) Rotate the handle approximately 45°

anticlockwise until the mechanism
toggles over to the EARTH ON position.

Moving the mechanism to EARTH ON

(11) Remove the operating handle

and ensure that the right hand
Ring Switch status semaphore
indicates EARTH ON.

Semaphore indicating EARTH ON

Version C 84
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

Circuit Earth is now applied.

(12) Apply a Safety lock to the right hand

Ring Switch spigot. Store the operating
handle in its clips, close and lock the
front panel cover.

Safety lock applied

Version C 85
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.8 Procedure to REMOVE an EARTH from the Right Hand Ring Switch and RESTORE
to ON

(1) Unlock and open the front panel. Ensure that the
gas gauge shows satisfactory pressure.

SF6 gas pressure satisfactory

(2) Remove the Safety lock from

the right hand Ring Switch
spigot.

Safety lock removed from right hand Ring Switch spigot

(3) Unclip and insert the operating handle

set for a clockwise operation.

Operating handle inserted

Version C 86
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Rotate the handle clockwise

approximately 45° until the mechanism
toggles over to the OFF (OPEN) position.

Circuit Earth is now removed.

Moving the Ring Switch to OFF

(5) Remove the operating handle

and ensure that the right hand
Ring Switch status semaphore
indicates OFF (OPEN).

Right hand Ring Switch semaphore showing OFF

(6) At this stage and before proceeding, confirm that all earths on the circuit have been
removed.

Version C 87
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Remove the Safety lock and

Caution notice from the right hand
Ring Switch selector.

SL & CN removed

(8) Pull the selector slide upward,

rotate it a quarter turn
clockwise and release.

Selector moved to MAIN SWITCH

(9) Restore the operational lock to the

right hand Ring Switch selector.

Operational lock restored to selector

Version C 88
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(10) Insert the operating handle set for a

clockwise movement.

Operating handle inserted

(11) Rotate the handle clockwise

until the mechanism toggles
over to the ON position.

The circuit is now energised (LIVE).

Closing the right hand Ring Switch to ON

(12) Remove the operating handle

and ensure that the status
semaphore indicates
CLOSED. Leave the
switchgear with the handle
stowed in its clips and the
front cover closed and locked.

Right hand Ring Switch semaphore showing CLOSED

Version C 89
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.9 Procedure to obtain test access to the left hand Ring Circuit

This procedure commences with the left hand Ring Switch in the EARTH ON position, with a
Safety lock and Caution notice fitted to the selector and a Safety lock to the spigot.

(1) Ensure that the left hand Ring

Switch is in the EARTH ON
position, with a Safety lock and
Caution notice fitted to the
selector and a Safety lock to the
spigot.

Left hand Ring Switch in EARTH ON with Safety lock,

SL&CN

(2) Remove the operational lock

from the door release button of
the lower compartment, press
the button upward and open the
compartment door.

Lower compartment opened

(3) Identify the test key for the Ring Switch on

its stand and release it.

Test key removed

Version C 90
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Remove the Safety lock from the left hand Ring
Switch spigot.

Safety lock removed

(5) Apply the test key in the unlocked condition

with the correct orientation as shown. The
locking barrel must enter the keyway below
the left hand Ring Circuit switch.

Test key applied

(6) Rotate the test key bar to the

vertical to lock it in position.

Test key locked

Version C 91
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Insert the operating handle into the large

socket on the end of the left hand star bar
and swing it down to release the circuit
contacts for testing (test key omitted for
clarity).

Earth star bar released

(8)Test voltages may now be

applied to the circuits and
safely discharged to earth in
the approved manner. Always
use insulated rubber gloves to
re-position the clip connectors
(test key omitted for clarity).

Contacts available for testing

Reverse these steps on completion including restoration of the Safety locks.

Earth star bars must be restored to the upper CLOSED position and the test access
compartment locked following completion of test operations.

Version C 92
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

A.10 Procedure to obtain test access to the right hand Ring Circuit

This procedure commences with the right hand Ring Switch in the EARTH ON position, with
a Safety lock and Caution notice fitted to the selector and a Safety lock applied to the spigot.

(1) Ensure that the right hand Ring Switch is in

the EARTH ON position, with a Safety lock
and Caution notice fitted to the selector and
a Safety lock to the spigot.

Right hand Ring Switch in EARTH ON with

Safety lock, SL&CN

(2) Remove the operational lock

from the door release button of
the lower compartment, press
the button upward and open the
compartment door.

Lower compartment opened

(3) Identify the test key for the Ring Switch on

its stand and release it.

Test key removed

Version C 93
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(4) Remove the Safety lock from the right hand

Ring Switch spigot.

Safety lock removed

(5) Apply the test key in the unlocked condition

with the correct orientation as shown. The
locking barrel must enter the keyway below
the right hand Ring Circuit switch.

Test key applied

(6) Rotate the test key bar to the vertical to

lock it in position.

Test key locked

Version C 94
 Electricity Distribution Module 6

(7) Insert the operating handle into the

large socket on the end of the right
hand star bar and swing it down to
release the circuit contacts for
testing (test key omitted for clarity).

Earth star bar released

(8) Test voltages may now be

applied to the circuits and safely
discharged to earth in the
approved manner. Always use
insulated rubber gloves to re-
position the clip connectors (test
key omitted for clarity).

Contacts available for testing

Reverse these steps on completion including restoration of the Safety locks.

Earth star bars must be restored to the upper CLOSED position and the test access
compartment locked following completion of test operations.

Version C 95