SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 208205, November 09, 2016 ]

ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS V. REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION;

G.R. NO. 208212: REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sirs and Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated  09 November 2016  which
reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 208205: ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS v. REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION; G.R. No. 208212:
REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

This is an offshoot of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated June 1, 2016 [1]

In the Decision, we ordered, among others, that petitioner Arty. Romeo G. Roxas "show cause why he
should not be imposed a disciplinary sanction for re-litigating the case and purporting to represent a
client against its will."[2]

We held that petitioner lacked the legal standing to appeal the case on behalf of respondent Republic
Real Estate Corporation.[3] The services of his law firm, RGR & Associates, were terminated by
respondent on June 29, 2009, four (4) years before the Petition was filed, due to loss of trust and
confidence.[4]

Petitioner's discharge as counsel was occasioned by his filing of criminal and administrative cases against
three (3) Court of Appeals Justices that issued a decision adverse to respondent. [5] Petitioner sued these
Justices for alleged misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in relation to
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as for disbarment. [6] The cases were filed without
respondent's knowledge and consent. [7] Thus, respondent formally dismissed the services of RGR &
Associates and hired another law firm to represent it. [8]

On August 1, 2013, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Review Pro Hac Vice.[9] He signed the
Verification and Certificate Against Non-Forum Shopping in his own name and admitted that the Petition
was filed "in his personal capacity and without [respondent's] authority[.]" [10] Yet, in his Petition,
petitioner argued for respondent's case without the latter's consent and authority. [11]

In our June 1, 2016 Decision, petitioner was directed to show cause why he should not be disciplined for
re-litigating a case and for representing a client against its will. [12]

In his Compliance/Explanation[13] dated August 22, 2016, petitioner claimed that he had "no intention
whatsoever to relitigate the case" [14] and that "his counselship could not be validly dismissed or
terminated by RREC."[15] According to him, respondent's engagement with RGR & Associates was
irrevocable because it was coupled with interest. [16] He prayed "that no disciplinary sanction be imposed
upon [him],[17] as he is already 77 years old and "in the twilight years of [his] life." [18]

For resolution is whether petitioner should be cited in contempt of court.

Rule 39, Section 47[19] of the Rules of Court bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim (bar by prior judgment), or the re-litigation of the same issue in another action between the same
parties, albeit on a different claim (conclusiveness of judgment).

Petitioner's assertion of lack of intent to re-litigate the case [20] fails to convince. The second action he
filed before this Court rehashed the same issues that had already been settled with finality in Republic v.
Court of Appeals, [21] an earlier case that involved the same set of facts, issues, and parties. [22]

Petitioner argued in his second Petition that "this Court's monetary award to [respondent] in Republic v.
Court of Appeals should reflect the current value of the peso, which is equivalent to P82.5 billion," [23] and
that respondent reclaimed 55 hectares of Manila Bay. [24] These claims were already flatly rejected
in Republic v. Court of Appeals[25] and in subsequent pronouncements[26] by this Court.

Petitioner explained in his Compliance/Explanation that he believed that his dismissal as respondent's
counsel, was not valid.[27]

In our June 1, 2016 Decision, we held that "[respondent's] Board of Directors already voted to terminate
RGR & Associates' legal services. The termination of RGR & Associates' services is not subject to this
Court's review. A lawyer may be dismissed at any time, with or without cause." [28]

The client's right to terminate the services of his or her counsel is absolute. [29] Under Rule 138, Section
26 of the Rules of Court, "[a] client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place[.]"

Canon 22, Rule 22.02 of the Code, of Professional Responsibility requires the discharged  lawyer to
"immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and [to] cooperat[e] with
his [or her] successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the
proper handling of the matter." Petitioner's representation of a non-client before this Court constitutes
direct contempt of court. In  Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles: [30]
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties, litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct
contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit
or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which
is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt. [31]
Petitioner's act of representing a corporation that refuses its services does not only prejudice this
corporation; it also degrades the authority and the administration of law. His filing of the Petition is
tantamount to "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice."[32]

In Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.,[33] this Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for his adamant refusal
to withdraw his appearance:
Evidently, respondent's obstinate refusal to withdraw from the intestate proceedings was improper.
Since his unauthorized appearance was willful, he could have been cited in contempt as an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official transactions. In addition, he may be disciplined for professional
misconduct.[34]
In Que v. Revilla, Jr.,[35] a lawyer was found liable for abusing court procedures and processes when he
persisted in applying for the same relief in various petitions that he filed to prevent the execution of
judgment against his clients.[36] He also committed unauthorized appearances on behalf of 15 non-
consenting litigants, as well as deliberate falsehood in court. [37] For these infractions, this Court meted
him the penalty of disbarment. [38]

Petitioner's representation of a non-client before this Court is an act of direct contempt. His refusal to
withdraw as lawyer for at least four (4) years merits his suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Atty. Romeo G. Roxas is cited for DIRECT CONTEMPT and is SUSPENDED for

eight (8) months. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED. (Brion, J., no part due to close association to the counsel of a party; Reyes, J., designated
additional member per Raffle dated September 22, 2014. Mendoza, J., no part due to prior action in the
Court of Appeals; Perlas-Bernabe, J., designated additional member per Raffle dated September 16,
2013.)"
   
 
  Very Truly yours,  
     
     
     
  (Sgd.)MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTO  
  Division Clerk of Court  
   
By:  
   
  (Sgd.)TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON  
  Deputy Division Clerk of Court  

[1]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 208205), pp. 930-960.
[2]
 Id. at 959
[3]
 Id.
[4]
 Id. at 941.
[5]
 Id.
[6]
 Id.
[7]
 Id.
[8]
 Id.
[9]
 Id. at 942.
[10]
 Id.
[11]
 Id.
[12]
 Id. at 959.
[13]
 Id. at 962-971.
[14]
 Id. at 967.
[15]
 Id. at 970.
[16]
 Id. at 21.
[17]
 Id at 970.
[18]
 Id.
[19]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, sec. 47 provides:
SECTION 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. -The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or
the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship
of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed
to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.  See also Salud v.
Court of Appeals, 303 Phil. 397, 404-405 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division]
[20]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 208205), p. 967.
[21]
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530 (1998) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].
[22]
 Id. at 571.
[23]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 208205), p. 943.
[24]
 Id.
[25]
 359 Phil. 530, 570 (1998) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].
[26]
 This Court has already denied RREC's attempts to indirectly amend Republic v. Court of Appeals. We
recall the other instances in which RREC sought for a recomputation and failed: (1)     On April  17, 2001, 
RREC moved for execution (after adjustment of quantum meruit compensation) before the Regional
Trial Court (rollo (G.R. No. 208212), p. 107).  The trial court denied the recomputation'on November 22,
2002 (rollo (G.R. No. 208212), pp. 201-208), which this Court affirmed in the June 25, 2003 Resolution
(rollo (G.R. No. 208205), p. 805).  On August 20, 2003, RREC's Motion for Reconsideration was denied
with finality (rollo (G.R. No. 208205), p. 743). (2)    In 2003, RREC and Pasay City again moved for
adjustment of the arbitration award (rollo (G.R. No. 208205), p. 807). This Court expunged the Motion
from the records (rollo (G.R. No. 208205), p. 807J in view of the Entry of Judgment in Republic v. Court
of Appeals dated September 11, 2003 (rollo (G.R. No. 208205), pp. 807-808).
[27]
 Rollo (GR. No. 208205), pp. 969-970.
[28]
 Id. at 957.
[29]
 Malvar v. Kraft Food Phils., Inc., 717 Phil. 427, 450 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
[30]
 567 Phil. 189 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
[31]
 Id. at 203-204.
[32]
 Baculi v. Belen, 604 Phil. 1,9 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division],
[33]
 478 Phil. 859, (2004) [Per C.J. Davide, First Division].
[34]
 Id. at 869.
[35]
 622 Phil. 1 (2009) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[36]
 Id. at 12-14.
[37]
 Id. at 14-16.
[38]
 Id. at 24

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