Article 11. Justifying circumstances.

- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and
those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

CASES

1. United States vs. Paras, 9 Phil., 367, No. 3959 December 16, 1907

Syllabus

1. SELF-DEFENSE. — When in the commission of the crime of homicide the three requisites named in
Penal Code, viz, unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or to
repel it, and absence of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, are all proven,
the author of the homicide has committed no crime and is exempt from liability, and he should forthwith be
acquitted, in accordance with rule 51, penultimate paragraph of the provisional law for the interpretation of
the code.

2. ID.; THE RULE OF REASONABLE NECESSITY. — According to the well established rule, the fact of
the reasonable necessity of the means employed in the defense does not depend upon the harm done,
but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.

Facts: Between 9 and 10 p. m. on September 9, 1906, as Florencio Paras and Feliciano Gadula were in
a carenderia or eating place situated near the market of the town of Angeles, Pampanga, James Reed,
an American negro, made his appearance therein and at once approached the said Paras and entered
into conversation with him; shortly thereafter the aforesaid two individuals left in the direction of the
market; Reed followed them, and on nearing Paras attacked the latter, striking him in the face with his fist.
In consequence the assaulted man fell to the ground, where Reed repeatedly kicked him, but immediately
after this aggression the accused fired four shots with a revolver at the deceased, wounding him in the
right arm, in the lumbar region, and in the gluteal region, from the result of which wounds he fell dead.
Upon hearing the shots, three members of the municipal police of the town, Maximino Samia, Lucas
Ocampo, and Monico Pingal, repaired to the place of the occurrence and found the accused with a .38-
caliber Colt revolver and leather holster in his hand, and at a distance of about 12 meters the body of
James Reed was lying on the ground with three wounds upon it.

Court of the First Instance: sentencing the accused to the penalty of twelve years and one day of
reclusion temporal, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased James Reed, and the
costs.
Issue: WON Florencio Paras is criminally liable for homicide.

Held: Following the doctrine of the courts and the settled interpretation of said article and number of the
Penal Code, the accused in the present case should be exempted from all liability as to the homicide in
question, and therefore, under the considerations above set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be reversed and, by virtue of his complete exemption, Florencio Paras is hereby
acquitted, with the costs of both instances de oficio and his bail is hereby canceled. So ordered.

With the sole purpose of setting forth herein the constant opinion of the supreme court of Spain in respect
to the application of paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code of 1870, similar in this connection to the
one in force in these Islands, the opinion of the well-known and reputable writer Sr. Viada, on page 99,
Volume I of his work, in here quoted. It reads:jgc:[Link]

"The questions of lawful defense are undoubtedly those which in greater number are submitted to the
decision of the supreme court, by means of cassation proceedings, generally instituted by the counsel of
the culprits on account of violations of article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code. Therefore the decisions
rendered in this matter are very numerous. It being impossible to make an extract of all of them, we will
limit ourselves to pointing out the cases, unfortunately too frequent, wherein the supreme court has
declared that an appeal should be considered by it because the sala sentenciadora (sentencing chamber)
failed to apply in part or in whole, as it should, the exemption from criminal liability in favor of the culprit
pursuant to said article and number, or according to article 87, which directs that the penalty lower by one
or two degrees than that imposed by law shall be applied when the number of the concurrent requisites is
greater than is needed to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases dealt with in article 8.

"On the other hand, the jurisprudence of the supreme court does not register but a very limited number of
cases wherein it has been held that the sentencing court has improperly applied the said circumstance of
exemption from criminal responsibility in favor of the culprit or that the prosecuting attorney, the ever-
faithful representative and keeper of the law, has instituted cassation proceedings in said sense. This is a
most peculiar phenomenon which ought justly to call the attention of judges and tribunals, and give them
to understand the necessity of somewhat mitigating the excessive severity shown by them in this
important matter, as a general rule, in connection with the judgments finally reversed and annulled by the
supreme court."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. Lacson vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 461, No. L-46485 November 21, 1979

Facts: Norman Lacson, Jimmy Pitalio, Carlos Tan and Enrique Masacote were neighbors in General
Tiburcio de Leon, Valenzuela, Bulacan. At about noon on January 23, 1972, Carlos Tan invited Masacote
and Pitalio to the birthday party of his son in their house. While they were eating and drinking in the yard,
Tan told Pitalio that the laborers of Lacson were leaving their work. Tan also asked Pitalio to find out
whether the latter could get the balance of his unpaid wages from Lacson. Pitalio went to Lacson's
residence, kicked open the gate of appellant's residence, and forced his way inside the yard. Appellant
and his wife had just arrived and were alighting from their car when Pitalio, under the influence of liquor,
confronted Mrs. Lacson and asked her to produce their truck driver named Serafica, saying- 'Pag hindi
mo siya hinarap sa akin ay may mangyayari.' Appellant remonstrated with Pitalio to abide by the law. This
enraged Pitalio who replied: 'Ano ang batas, ito ang batas!' Taking the Magnum. 22 caliber pistol of his
wife from her handbag the appellant then fired it once at chest.

Thereafter Mrs. Lacson brought Pitalio to the hospital. There Pitalio's gunshot wound was treated and
operated on (Exhibit 'A'). Pitalio's confinement in the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital lasted from
January 23 to February 2, 1972. The medical certificate issued unto him stated that his injury would
incapacitate him for more than thirty (30) days.
Court of First Instance and CA rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 0430-V and convicting said petitioner of the
crime of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 0429-V.

Issue: Whether or not he is entitled to acquittal on the ground of complete self-defense

Held: In the instant case, there was an imminent danger of the lives of the petitioner and of his wife from
the unlawful attack of an enraged, drunken, and armed Pitalio. The gun in the bag of his wife, who was.
beside him, afforded the petitioner the only reasonable means to ward off the attack.

The petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground of complete self-defense. It is no longer necessary to
discuss the other errors assigned by him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information in C Case No. 0429-V of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, with costs de oficio.

3. People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389, Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983

Facts: At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar
Ibanez together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of
George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and
the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato.
At the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n.,
Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were
being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant
would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the
group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is
good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however,
answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun
and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a
gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense transcript).
Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting.

Issues:

1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of
his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was
indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the
person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However,
in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code
recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not
in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was
the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Page 1 of 13

Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property
rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up,
instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that
possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in his possession Reasonable necessity of means employed to
prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack. Lack of sufficient
provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was
asleep Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender
and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because
treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately
chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning
or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due
to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the
provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of
incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000
w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14
years so his immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on
person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to
prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.

4. Olbinar vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 115, G.R. No. 76235 January 21, 1991

- Defense for husband

5. People vs. Rubiso, 399 SCRA 267, G.R. No. 128871 March 18, 2003

- Justifying Circumstances; SelfDefense; Words and Phrases; Unlawful aggression contemplates an

6. People vs. Nugas, 661 SCRA 159, G.R. No. 172606 November 23, 2011

- Tamaraw FX

7. People vs. Del Castillo, 663 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 169084 January 18, 2012

- SPO1 vs SPO2

8. Flores vs. People, 692 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 181354 February 27, 2013