FIRST DIVISION National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B.

Cantre, mother of the

victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim
G.R. No. 152133             February 9, 2006 Cantre when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are
collectively summarized below.
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner, 
vs. On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents. witness Sañano, together with two other companions, had a drinking
spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate.
DECISION From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded
to go home to their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed
paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter
as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly
Rules of Court, petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner
August 2001,1affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw
Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. When hit by the
November 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness
doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan,
Code. and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to
put down another stone he was already holding. He also urged victim
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano
crime of homicide, allegedly committed as follows – accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the way, victim
Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone.
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and witness
Capsay, Barangay Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen. 8
Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident
and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, involving petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and
hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre
spleen due to impact which caused his death a day after. was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely
and his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him
CONTRARY TO LAW. to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following
day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth,
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996. when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but
he also later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant 4 for the backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died. 9
arrest of petitioner Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was
provisionally released5 after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S.
arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-
the crime of homicide charged against him. 7 Mortem Examination Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and
signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body
namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the
of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February
1996. 1996, he was walking with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their
way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the the victim Cantre and witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of
help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Bulalacao and punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan
Foundation, requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down,
victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that
victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April he was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point,
1996,12 after which, he reported the following findings – petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the victim Cantre
and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the enraged man
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that
Barong Tagalog and blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown the victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan
coffin and buried in a concrete niche. picked up a stone, which he described as approximately one-inch in
diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim
Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
started to run away, and victim Cantre chased after them, but witness
Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line. allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to
the police authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic]. Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek
medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and, instead,
Laceration, spleen. chose to go back to his hometown.14

Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed. Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the
victim Cantre after the stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially friends told him that they still saw the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke
digested food particles. bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim
Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food
xxxx poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal
grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident. 15
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision, 16 essentially
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident on 04 February 1996,
exhumation and autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre and pronouncing that –
suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive
accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the
spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt accused was in defense of his companion, a stranger, because after the
instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears that the victim was the
that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan. 13 unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceased
after Michael was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the stone. The throwing of the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act
sole testimony of the accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan. can be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally
liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by
on the left side was a treacherous one and the accused committed a Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of
felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The physical injury of the victim’s death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even
hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration presented to testify in court hence she was not even able to identify
of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made available for
liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even cross-examination on the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
if the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal
Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964) Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the
autopsy report (Exh. "C") of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of testified and was cross-examined by the defense.
one’s illegal acts merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310). Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died
of food poisoning, as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. present her as their witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal
249 of the Revised Penal Code. Officer of the NBI.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded
CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of the highest respect because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct
Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal and demeanor of said witness.
Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to Court of Masbate, Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty
Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002, 18 denied
of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, without the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. merit since the issues raised therein had already been passed and ruled
upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for
2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC against Review on Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the
petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus – RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29
August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2)
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
injury sustained by the victim was caused by the stone thrown at the
victim by the accused which, the accused-appellant does not deny. It was Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy
likewise shown that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the reports, with dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim
result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the liability of petitioner
traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the laceration of the victim’s Calimutan for the said death, arguing that –
spleen.
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy,
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Masbate was the first physician of the government who conducted an
Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings
the victim’s cadaver… was that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the
second government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre,
Mendez whose findings was that the cause of the death was due to a his findings as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than
traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and with just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may sufficiently
these findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings are at establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the
variance with each other materially, it is humbly contended that the same petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which,
issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of the petitioner. subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or
irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report
prosecution in the case at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt and testimony must be seriously considered by this Court.
as to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People
vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981). 19 Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries
would also support the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the victim Cantre.
his or her guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries 24 in the following
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not manner –
demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error. 20
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond bleeding and disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable
reasonable doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the are the point of attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of
victim Cantre. its blood supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction.

Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle
testimony before the RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico- bounded by the ribs on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally
Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence against petitioner through the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to trauma applied
Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of internal from any direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels
hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his changing direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the
testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the spleen hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as well as the accompanying
could be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area was hit with a veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas
blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the are in the retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon
victim Cantre. are in the triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow
on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-stress, contusion
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
as an expert witness, whose "competency and academic qualification
and background" was admitted by the defense itself. 21 As a Senior As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that
Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess –
sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and
such other branches of medicine germane to the issues involved in a The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of
case.22 a fall or blow from the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor
vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, 23 and although and also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of
it does not necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.
Appeals had properly accorded it great weight and probative value.
Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult condition of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the
to comprehend for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre
there are some points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the
to common perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had
area. The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the continuously complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical
spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than being
spleen and all internal organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the
trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument which could
Cantre from the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the have caused the laceration of his spleen.
victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture
the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured or Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a
lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the lacerated spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at
victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to an him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr.
obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the
victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the
which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 – victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the defense
insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning.
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and
viscera, is the most frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to probative value for the following reasons –
the abdomen or the lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide
the predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-
blows incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. mortem report, as well as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre,
xxx reveals that although she suspected food poisoning as the cause of
death, she held back from making a categorical statement that it was so.
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back In the post-mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic)
of the victim Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ cause of death was due to cardio-respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must
described as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile – even without causing be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death certificate of the
any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death was
that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated "Cardio-Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was "Food
spleen, and the cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that further laboratory tests
thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that the victim
necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none of the Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without such confirmation, her
external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal. suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that – a suspicion.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement 30 in
that the proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone which she had explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined
as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by 05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."27 A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.

The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano 06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the
and Belen Cantre, had adequately recounted the events that transpired death of PHILIP B. CANTRE?
on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the
said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip
"Food Poisoning". What I stated in the Death Certificate was that Cantre, what other matters did you do in connection therewith?
CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I didn’t state that
he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I even A We examined the internal organs.
recommended that an examination be done to confirm that suspicion.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the the intestines.
contusion or abrasion, measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I
based my suspicion from the history of the victim and from the police xxxx
investigation.
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal traumatic injury of the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the
hemorrhage in the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver? significance of this medical term traumatic injury of the abdomen?

A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as
made an incision on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of they make causes of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point
the cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found to the injury of the body like this particular case the injury was at the
none. I did not open the body of the cadaver. abdomen of the victim.

09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the
cadaver. Where was it located? victim this traumatic injury is located?

A: On the left portion of his back, sir. A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.

10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that Q What particular organ are you referring to?
part of his body, his SPLEEN could be injured?
A The spleen, sir.
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact
was.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two
doctors of the body of the victim Cantre provides an adequate
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how explanation for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the cause of
he conducted the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows – death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her
unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive
of the body of the victim in this case? finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre,
then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen. courts.

Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted? Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the
RTC despite being included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a
A Yes, sir. willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption
that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced. 32 As Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the
this Court already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy33 – means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies,
and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the
information did not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, offender –
suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to
determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In
prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with
prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many as may be malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the
needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury
witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply
corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara,
corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from
and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is no imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 34
showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as
witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to
the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the
applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot
suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable
to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would be doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or
even as hostile witnesses. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the
definition of reckless imprudence –
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr.
Ulanday before the RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
without her testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its witness if it truly believed occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
prosecution.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the paragraphs, that demonstrate petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill
Court of Appeals and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court
the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an that the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s
injury which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed
petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC to appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the significance of such
and the Court of Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate crime circumstances.
or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the circumstances, was
witness Sañano, on the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his forced to act as quickly as possible.
helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as the two
parties were on their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the
witness Sañano were on their way home from a drinking spree in stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very
Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was
were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was, at
record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who
and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the
animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan. [Link]
victim Cantre.35

In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective
prosecution and the defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial when he threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with
aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size
of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the of a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also
victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely
Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously
claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.
does take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and
bigger, at 26 years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches, Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the
compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years old victim Cantre was the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being
and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre done with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent,
could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court,
Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim Cantre against the latter therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals
when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The stone to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the indemnity for his death and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of the
victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray,
CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC
he threw the stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the
in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby
position of the victim Cantre. When the victim Cantre stopped his
MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan,
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of
the latter also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim
the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment
Cantre.
for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period
of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of
minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as
hardly have the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of moral damages.
action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the
declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw
SO ORDERED.
the stone at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift
and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked attack by
the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO 
away from the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES- MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-

SANTIAGO MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. 

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN 
Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March
1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C.
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005 Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. 5 It
appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life.
DECISION Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress
Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
CALLEJO, SR., J.: himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina
was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would
slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left,
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court
and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo
P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R. Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from
the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7,
copy of the marriage contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated
2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they
exchanged their own vows.8
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar
named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and
where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love
legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage
with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital
feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-
relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had
MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of the
a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further
first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with
Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of
his first marriage before marrying Tina.
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was
married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife
was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal. 4 He met the private because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in
1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he
friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where,
despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo
Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an
was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of ₱200,000.00 by way the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that
of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9 the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to
the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as
Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its
even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that
even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on
previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy. July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that
accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he
was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He SO ORDERED.17
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there
must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on
motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did certiorari, insisting that:
so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He
posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of I
the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of
this Court in United States v. Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
Appeals.12
LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE
LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
of good faith and reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v. PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF
Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family THE FAMILY CODE.
Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of
this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as
II
provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the
present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS
nullity of the marriage;  MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW. 18
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution.
Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private complainant’s knowledge of The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second
the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally
against the State and not just against the private complainant. dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since
the trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a
appealed from with modification. matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390
of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before
for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
presumption of death with respect to succession. spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse
arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the  The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the wit:
absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not
heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse
whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the legítimamente disuelto el anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision
Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of mayor. xxx
law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present.
The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure
bigamy. the juridical tie of marriage established by law.20 The phrase "or before
the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the
in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the
remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the
does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial
before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be
contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a justification for bigamy."21
a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened
marriage. to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she
contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private the second marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the
complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of
her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that
relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house. the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent
intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are
CA affirming the petitioner’s conviction is in accord with the law, only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not
jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It
cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19 does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because
such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of
The petition is denied for lack of merit. competent jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of the
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a
bigamy, reads: defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996,
view as Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
(1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent
intention constituting the felony of the act.28 He explained that: The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when
he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or
… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony
incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to
is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be
supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he
be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded
second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first belief 
wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he has that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for
had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime. 29 wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal
with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The
performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is
deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the
"voluntary."31 proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the
without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a
injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and
have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony
have been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every is found incredible.
man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in
the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.
unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect
evidence.34 and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."
Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy,
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation
confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
nisi mens sit rea.35 manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. 37 The laws regulating
civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order,
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive
married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage
nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over
transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has
spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new been missing for four years;
relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of
life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take and his existence has not been known for four years.
means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive
evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven
absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created
One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration. 42 However,
court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded presumptive death, reads:
belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what
they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
dissolved as to permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not
shall be sufficient.
only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts
easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, 41 namely, a judgment of
the presumptive death of the absent spouse. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
the absent spouse.43
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under
the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for
except for those of succession. the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
order that his succession may be opened. bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
the division of the estate among the heirs: there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of
the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
of the vessel or aeroplane; absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention words "proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can
in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the
40, of the Family Code. Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of
a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of
a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive
Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated
a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the
by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on provision of Article 349 or "before the absent spouse has been declared
Criminal Law. presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper
proceedings" is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not
for purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared
spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent
contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true. 53 A
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in
purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view
the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 48 In In Re bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the
Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed
presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged
years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage. 56
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual
death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the
would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to
finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse
person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a
in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence
a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse
valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse
act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot
presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-
with the other spouse. Diy:
… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the
Code providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code. 62
bigamy in case he or she marries again.
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The
purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of
must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply
the latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for
present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private
the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present
spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established. 58 The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant
on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases
of Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from
declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of  awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary
rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with ... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió
possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas
necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro,
absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir
reappearance of the said absentee. en esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente,
base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the mencionados.64
clause "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
x x x" should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the
Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not
proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
otherwise, there is bigamy.59
The Court rules against the petitioner.
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an
eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
the settlement of his estate. 60 Before such declaration, it was held that the computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. 65 An award for moral
faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there
of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or
Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
remarry."
and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to
stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. 66 some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion,
relation, etc.)68
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in
criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219
the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.: of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral
damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under
analogous cases. Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; observe honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the
following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty
(4) Adultery or concubinage; and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal
right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; prejudicing or injuring another.69

(6) Illegal search; Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth
in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
(8) Malicious prosecution; thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. 70 If the
provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309; damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law,
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the
and 35. latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred latter for damages." The latter provision 
to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal
bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named. remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable
moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case. 71
social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of
another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and
inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even
brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference
his parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the with the jury’s reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the
private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298
the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner (App. Div.74 1955).
and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that
he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy
heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good
was already married to another before they were married. morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.
alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who  recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the
consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to
married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to do an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes
a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband. 72 to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he
has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v.
before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E.
willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff
damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems
ruled: to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated
the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was
180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that
recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were
may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley
though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct.
1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of
591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the action upon any transgression of the law by herself but upon the
defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed,
maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the
mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.
plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive
damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v [7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages marriage relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v.
in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v.
that because of the defendant’s bigamous marriage to her and the McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411.
out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific headaches" and
Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant’s the Court’s Division.
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon
any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations  REYNATO S. PUNO
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its
aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has Associate Justice
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which Chairman, Second Division
the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520,
154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76
CERTIFICATION
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
award of ₱200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
SO ORDERED.
Chief Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
REYNATO S. PUNO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
Associate Justice vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES
Chairman and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., accused-appellant.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SARMIENTO, J.:
On leave
In a decision   dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
1

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales,
Associate Justice Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all
the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has
ATTESTATION remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and
Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) surroundings.   The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock
10

months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer,
victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations.
P14,000.00 and to pay the costs."   The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada,
2
Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by
44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo. Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman
Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been
filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the informed of the incident, were already there conducting their own
pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs
by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then
Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry,
now Department, of Justice, Parole Division.  3
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about
11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision   on the
4 with the following findings:
appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in
that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to PHYSICAL FINDINGS
indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In
all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on 1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body
the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos,   the appellate court certified
5
moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
this case to us for review.
6

EXTERNAL FINDINGS
The antecedent facts are as follows:
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length,
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right,
Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was directed upward to the right axillary pit.
awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd 2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd,
Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm.
Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd,
her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in exit.
Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales
spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd,
building.   Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed
7

posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.

the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador
Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back
to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to 4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right
Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right
Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred.   There they saw
8

the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear,

sprawled face down inside the bedroom.   The group stayed for about an
9
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed INTERNAL FINDINGS:
inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left. 1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left
ventricle of the heart.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed
toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left 2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the
scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space. right lower lobe of the lungs.

7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of 3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right
the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity. middle lobe of the lungs.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, 4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the
directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the descending colon of the large intestine,
upper 3rd axilla left. thru and thru.

9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, 5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring
located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, the apex of the right lungs (sic).
directed downward.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm.
in length, medial aspect, palm right. MASSIVE
HEMMORRHAGE DUE
11. Stabwound, 4 [Link] width, iliac area, right, directed TO MULTIPLE
inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery LACERATED, STABBED
coming out. (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior
portion of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16)
aspex of the light thoracic cavity. wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal
organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased."  12

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length,

located at the medial portion of the medial border of the On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared
right scapula. before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow. requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where
his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located the Ajuy police force. 
13

at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder
fissural fracture of the skull. dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against
the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as
follows:
 The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada,
GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of the widow.
MURDER committed as follows:
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy.   His findings
17

within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
accused with four other companions whose identities are punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and
still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp- one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the
pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds
and helping each other, with treachery and evident (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined
premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose that due to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the
to kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and probability that at least two instruments were used is high.   The police
18

number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident.
Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by
accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome
said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses
parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the
the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused accused, as well as on other matters.
the immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged
CONTRARY TO LAW. eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his
age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982,   at 5:00 o'clock in the
19

Iloilo City, August 26, 1981.  14 afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in
Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio,
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both and walked home;   he took a short-cut route.   While passing at the
20 21

entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria   who
15 vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the
claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented evening, he heard cries for help.   Curiosity prompted him to approach
22

himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to
and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the trees.   From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging
23

basis of which an Amended Information,   dated March 3, 1982, naming

16 upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd
as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not moonlight.   Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were
24

guilty to the crime. through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and
carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated
some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan".   Huntoria then
25

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health
proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what
physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
he saw to his mother and to his wife   before he went to sleep.  Huntoria
26 27

Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman

explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what
Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt.
he witnessed for fear of his life.   In October 1981 however, eight months
28

(ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C.
after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim
which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into
helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially
he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla declared not to affect credibility.'"
Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and
related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981.  29
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted
that he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no
honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18,
participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio 1984) He said that he could not think of any reason why
Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep   in his house which was
30
Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus,
located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime   when the
31
Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 
33

incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his

grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of
night of February 21, 1981 to inform him.  32
alibi.   The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the
34

trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the
testimony of Huntoria. Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced
the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for
appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its
basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating or
in not appreciating his defense of alibi. aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to
upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that: the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00 should
be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including of the Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126
the herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31
Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v.
Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987). 35

a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering

that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the
Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant
were moving around the victim. After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we
find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities,
we think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave
said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his
in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The sworn statements   even gave the date of the commission of the crime as
36

natural reticence of most people to get involved in a "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch   he made of the scene is of little
37

criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and
v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no
country to volunteer information about a criminal case and indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the
prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime
on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused
would have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon.
credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who
more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what
directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional particular weapon was used by each of them.
mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the
other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on
the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would cross-examination):
have been more than in any other place.
Q And you said that the moon was bright,
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the is it correct?
other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused
Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to A Yes, Sir.
state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that
Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by
Q And you would like us to understand
the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never
that you saw the hacking and the
mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the
stabbing, at that distance by the herein
victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of
accused as identified by you?
the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the
killing mentioned in their criminal complaint   four other unnamed
38

persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly
conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada. shining.

Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the Q If you saw the stabbing and the
sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or hacking, will you please tell this
more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that Honorable Court who was hacking the
one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' victim?
testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales'
admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all A Because they were surrounding
too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that Peñacerrada and were in constant
there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen movement, I could not determine who did
described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance the hacking.
of these wounds later.
ATTY. GATON:
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by
the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the The interpretation is not clear.
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a
meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling. COURT:

To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, They were doing it rapidly.
including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd
Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981,
in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a
 A The moving around or the hacking or the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the
the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw Court of Appeals on him?
the rapid movement of their arms, Your
Honor, and I cannot determine who was Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is
hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw incurred.
the hacking and the stabbing blow.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be
ATTY. GATON: incurred:

Q You cannot positively identify before 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
this Court who really hacked Lloyd wrongful act done be different from that which he
Peñacerrada? intended.

A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did 2. By any person performing an act which would be an
the hacking. offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
this Honorable Court who did the
stabbing? (Emphasis supplied.)

A Yes sir, and because of the rapid Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through
movements. the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that
you could not even identify the weapons Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law
used because according to you it was just are felonies (delitos).
flashing?
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo)
A Yes, sir. 39
but also by means of fault (culpa).

(Emphasis supplied) There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd skill.
Peñacerrada.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court
and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or
of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by
evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under means of deceit or fault.
paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation
under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's
found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was
3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he
movement tending to produce some effect in the external world."   In this
40
feared a possible retaliation from the accused,   why did he finally
44

instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and
appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the
that produced his death. accused were then still free and around; they were not yet named in the
original information,   thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would
45

Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that still be clear and present when he testified.
he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this
principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by
"hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In
act was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was
the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal because the victim was also his landlord.
Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim
sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as x x x           x x x          x x x
adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it
follows to reason that one of the six accused could not have caused or Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you
dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, so long from the time you saw the
granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing stabbing and hacking of Lloyd
alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest Peñacerrada when you told Mrs.
(already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five Peñacerrada about what happened to her
accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is husband?
possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the
accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody
two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible,
else but because I was haunted by my
nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal
conscience and secondly the victim was
wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on
also my landlord I revealed what I saw to
her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota
the wife of the victim. 46

of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds,
coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be x x x           x x x          x x x
sustained.
(Emphasis ours.)
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the
fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if
the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to
he till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the
credibility,  here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
41 latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported
engenders doubt on his veracity.   If the silence of coming out an alleged
42 eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the
eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful,   the more it
43 conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta,
has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the
surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because
the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a
greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as
May 1981.   Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial
47

distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of
action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the
victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's
uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for
his family.   Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but
48

dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation
of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is
contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition
and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult
children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore
improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the
prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of
their 65-year old   father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone
49

adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And

considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from
the scene of the crime,   we seriously doubt that the appellant went there
50

just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr.,
Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and
Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a
perceived enemy.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense,   under appropriate

51

circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the

appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in
the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the
accused.  52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and

SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively.
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in
G.R. Nos. 120744-46               June 25, 2012 Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the
death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,  (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco)
vs. and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at the
2 

PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan

(Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of
Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes
x-----------------------x
and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises
Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David
G.R. No. 122677 (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A. Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple
MANGUERRA, Petitioners,  attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the
vs. inculpatory portions of which read:
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Criminal Case No. 16612:

x-----------------------x That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
G.R. No. 122776 Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO, Petitioners,  Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
vs. helping one another, and while responding to information about the
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully
DECISION and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince
S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the
PERALTA, J.: green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting
multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the
to wanton violence is never justified when their duty could be performed latter.
otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" disposition occupies no decent place
in a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of

human life. Criminal Case No. 16613:

These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Court assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
1  Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 – cases for murder, Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil negative plea. In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David,
10 

Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to
helping one another, and while responding to information about the Criminal Case No. 16612. Said motion was heard on the premise, as
11 

presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully hearing would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the
and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores, merits. On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal
12 

Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with Case No. 16612. Yapyuco likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and
13 

automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney the same was also granted on May 21, 1991. Pamintuan died on
14 

ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. November 21, 1992, and accordingly, the charges against him were
15 

Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of dismissed.

murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the
murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived
spontaneous desistance. the pre-trial inquest.  Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked
16 

up from where the presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
bail applications.

Criminal Case No. 16614: The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988,
Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel,
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road.
helping one another, and while responding to information about the With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva
and feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva, and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely. 17

attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green
Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim,
multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and having allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down. In open court,
18 

performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of murder, Flores executed a sketch depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw
19 

but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants’ jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come
will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C. from and the house situated on the right side of the road right after the
Villanueva, which prevented his death. curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to
be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many
firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney
the authorities, the accused – except Pabalan who died earlier on June
6  when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of
12, 1990, and Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed – entered
7  8  Naron’s house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced
individual pleas of not guilty. A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily
9  himself and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation
surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At
this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to
summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent the night at his
wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s house as instructed and, mother’s house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him
returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and with whom, however, he was not able to talk. 28

Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken
to the hospital. This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as
20 
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because
soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan, the electric post in front of Naron’s house was strangely not lit when he
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and arrived, and that none of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He
taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.
21
admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyuco’s group or the
group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the hospital,
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously
very rapidly succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured companions to
shot at all contrary to what the defense would say. He professed that he,
22 
the hospital.
29

together with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on
its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two men, each holding Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime
long firearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he Laboratory in Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined
and his companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners in the shooting
the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed and found them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not, however,
companions. He further narrated that the day after the shooting, he
23 
determine exactly when the firearms were discharged; neither could she
brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on tell how many firearms were discharged that night nor the relative
April 7, 1988. He claimed that all the accused in the case had not been
24 
positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer
known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the
identified to be his wife’s uncle and with whom he denied having had any opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed
rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which would have having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet
otherwise inspired ill motives.  He claimed the bullet holes on the
25 
holes on it, most of which had punctured the door at the passenger side
Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained,
other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.
26
rather inconclusively, that the bullets that hit at an angle might have been
fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or moving forward in a
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the
affirmed the presence of his companions at his residence on the subject road. Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of
30 

date and time, and corroborated Villanueva’s and Flores’ narration of the the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of
events immediately preceding the shooting. He recounted that after firearms and ammunitions to members of the local police force and
seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had passed his house CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the memorandum receipts
and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, for the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes,
he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire from a Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco. 31

distance which was shortly followed by Flores’ frantic call for help. He
immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical
by the lamppost just outside the gate of Naron’s house where, inside, he Center, examined the injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988.
noticed a congregation of more or less six people whom he could not He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of
recognize.  At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded
27
Villanueva’s head as well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he
into another jeepney occupied by three men who appeared to be in noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last
uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney from between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front
Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mother’s house, but before lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this wound would
driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the
an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground and the
same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by firearm was fired from the level of the assailant’s waist; but if the victim
was seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from
shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. service. Dolly Porqueriño, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testified that
35 

He hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the
would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a lower level. 32
report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had
previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together with the
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when sketch showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and
examined. On the patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to
temporal region of the head – one consistent with being hit by a hard and the NAPOLCOM Central Office for consideration. The Sandiganbayan, in
36 

blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the fact, subpoenaed these documents together with the joint counter-
locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan
the front: one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect and Puno.
of the middle portion of the right leg; another, through-and-through wound
at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in the Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He
abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and the identified himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in
intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners
seat as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included
must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the
level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the wound in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical
abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and exited at injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police assistance
the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a
Licup’s left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco
of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement
had changed his position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he
said that the wound on the leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and
the victim’s back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting bring their M-16 rifles with them.
37

any hard surface prior. 33

Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup’s right forearm must have with Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men
been caused by a bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan
right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby
hit on the abdomen, considering that he might have changed position Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there
following the infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more than were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron.
one assailant who fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects,
jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup having hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at
changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make
could not tell which of Licup’s three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan
be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the others announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno
because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He
his head lying low and steady. 34
claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to
its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police and Puno, to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing
38 

Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been administratively charged with instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of
and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting Naron’s house directly at the subject jeepney. 39

incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon

Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted operations" in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He intimated that
and exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation days prior to the incident, Yapyuco’s team had already been alerted of
employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyuco’s
searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and
passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby making a report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached
St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene Pamintuan’s statement referring to Flores as being "married to a resident
supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the of Barangay Quebiawan" and found after surveillance to be "frequently
jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone. 40
visited by NPA members." He affirmed having found that guns were
indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator was able to gather
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay bullet shells from the scene.  49

Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several
law enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the
supposedly by rebel elements, and that he frequently patrolled the
41 
testimony of Yapyuco as well as the latter’s documentary
barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men evidence. Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and
50 

therein. That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene
42 
Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and submitted their
were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the memorandum as told. 51

Sindalan Police Substation,  the team composed of Pamintuan and his

43 

men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had
that all of them, including himself, were armed. He denied that they had
44 
acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the
committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as
Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed.  He said that the shots which
45 
members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in
directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the
in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when intent of killing them. With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco,
52 

the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-
assembled. 46
principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of
Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of
one of the accused after the incident because he was at the time very frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted
confused; yet he did know that his co-accused had already been the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder
investigated by the main police station in San Fernando, but the inquiries charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De
did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno. He admitted an
47 
Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint
administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which Decision reads:
they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the
decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
an investigation independently conducted by their station commander,
S/Supt. Rolando Cinco.  48
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y
Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and
Fernando, Pampanga acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond
situation in his jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense of Homicide, as
victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of
elements had been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance
Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly conducted "clearing present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to
 suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of
as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of official duty; that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit
55 

the deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had
₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱600,000.00 as sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that
moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate shares the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by
of the costs of said action. evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence
when they acted as they did; that there was insufficient or total absence
56 

II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were
accused charged in the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting
Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-
Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda
Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty
Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are and amateurish attempt to gain commendation. 57

hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder

charged therein, with costs de oficio. These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements
of prosecution witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y on the circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan
Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it
Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and had truly been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since –
Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond as it turned out after the search of the vehicle – they had no firearms with
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted them, and hence, they had nothing to be scared of. It observed that while
58 

Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, in relation Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide residents of Barangay
to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain
crediting them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses which
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence
proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsang’s house that
indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE evening could not have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it
(1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) noted that Pamintuan’s Sworn Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as well
indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel as his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the subject
Villanueva in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and Tamaraw jeepney.  It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco in
59 

compensatory damages, plus ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed
damages, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said men – which allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring
action. barangays – were assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how
petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target
SO ORDERED. 53 vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners had already known that their
suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction of Salangsang’s
house – such knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the manner by
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to
which they advantageously positioned themselves at the scene to afford
Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been
a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the
committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining
house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to
peace and order; that the acts performed by them preparatory to the
54

by prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night. 60

shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to
themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores’ sketch depicting the front yard of Naron’s residence from which the volley of gunfire was
the position of the Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself. 66

concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney
and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found
that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of that the qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved
Naron’s residence and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was because first, it was supposedly not shown how the aggression
slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally
report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners had been injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this circumstance must
tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the
indicating that they had indeed been discharged. 61
mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from
circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco
circumstantial evidence pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the received the summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and
nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found to be
wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that
such damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location and circumstance. 67

trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney;
the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the street and Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required
inside the front yard of Naron’s house; the deliberate shutting off of the leave from work for 60 days which were all charged against his
lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic accumulated leave credits; that he was earning ₱8,350.00 monthly; and
68  69 

findings on the firearms of petitioners. 

62
that he had spent ₱35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw
jeepney. Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had spent
70 

This evidentiary resumé, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only ₱18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, ₱28,000.00 during the wake,
fortified petitioners’ admission that they did discharge their firearms, but ₱11,000.00 for the funeral plot and ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees for the
also provided a predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with prosecution of these cases. He also submitted a certification from San
71 

one another to achieve a common purpose, design and objective to harm Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son. On these
72 

the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to
proof of who among the several accused had actually fired the gunshots indemnify (a) Villanueva ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
that injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan damages and ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the
imposed collective responsibility on all those who were shown to have proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased Licup in
discharged their firearms that night – petitioners herein. Interestingly, it
63 
the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱600,000.00 as
was speculated that the manner by which the accused collectively and moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.
individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously with the
shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present
them, had a grudge against the employees of San Miguel recourse.
Corporation; and that on the basis of the self-serving evidence adduced
64 

by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding
the incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga of conspiracy and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that
as well as by the NAPOLCOM. It likewise found very consequential the
65 
the court a quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts
fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; intended to participate in any criminal object in common with the other
this, supposedly because it was incumbent upon them to individually accused, and that his participation in a supposed common criminal object
explain their participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is
prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the
lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in shooting incident when the wounded passengers were taken to the
their affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in hospital on his jeepney. He also points out the uncertainty in the
73 
Sandiganbayan’s declaration that the incident could not have been the In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of
product of a well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of conspiracy. They claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion
either a hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the result of a
officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their part to earn legitimate police operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to
commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter alternative, then he obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond
could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but rather reasonable doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated far as both of them are concerned, shown that they had ever been part of
homicide.  He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries
74
such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the
sustained by the victims were caused by his warning shots, he must assailed decision. They advance that as police officers, they merely
nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the scene of the followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the
incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before
presence at the scene of the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had
duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof – a fact which community of criminal design with the rest of the accused. They affirm
80 

has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on Yapyuco’s statement that they fired warning shots at the subject
appeal the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and jeepney, but only after it had passed the place where they were posted
81 

Puno. He also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to

75 
and only after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became
Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in apparent that it was going to speed away – as supposedly shown by
these cases, had entertained the belief that the suspects were armed bullet holes on the chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney.
rebel elements. 76
They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that would have
otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres none of the victims had been personally or even remotely known to either
Reyes claim that the Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond of them. That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe,
reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision was based on acts the shown by the fact that they did not directly aim their rifles at the
evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held their
attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of San Miguel
the case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could
Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David, have easily fired at the victims directly.
82

Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the presentation of

evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay stands by the finding of conspiracy as established by the fact that all
officials and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. accused, some of them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited
They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and the suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it would be
CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the coming from Salangsang’s residence. It posits that the manner by which
accused police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had fired the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a community of purpose and
upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact. Also,77 
design to commit the crimes charged. It believes that criminal intent is
83 

they believe that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the road
on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court that would give them a direct line of fire at the target – as shown by the
itself and those presented in a separate trial. They label the assailed trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney. This intent was
84 

decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious and, hence, supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores and
antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening
prosecution. Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no
78 
consequence. It refutes the invocation of lawful performance of duty,
85 

basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they mainly because there was no factual basis to support the belief of the
were with the other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they
among those who fired at the victims, and neither were they identified as have not shown that they had previously verified the whereabouts of the
among the perpetrators of the crime. 79
suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had merely
responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify
David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof the criminal. To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in
89 

when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by evidence the joint counter-affidavit of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the
90 

innocent individuals instead.86

counter-affidavit of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit of Cunanan
91  92 

and Puno; the counter-affidavit of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-

93 

As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that affidavit of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the
94 

the evidence adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that
based thereon should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said "[their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle" when it accelerated
petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had after warning shots were fired in air and when it ignored Yapyuco’s signal
previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as directed later for it to stop; in their earlier affidavit they, together with Yapyuco,
95 

on submitted the case for decision as to them with the filing of their declared that they were "constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the said
memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said fleeing vehicle." Yapyuco’s open court declaration, which was adopted
96

petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to
on the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation give warning to the subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when
to forego with the presentation of their own evidence. The right to present flagged down and second, at the tires thereof when it came clear that it
witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried and testifies was trying to escape. He suggested – substantiating the implication in
97 

in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the his affidavit that it was "the whole team [which fired] at the fleeing
latter has failed to register his objection thereto.
87 vehicle"  – that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated
98 

jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted
inferences that seem to rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle. 99

the records of the case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to
support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that
it was only Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only
I. into the air to give warning shots, and that it was the "policemen [who]
100 

directly fired upon" the jeepney. Manguerra himself shared this

101 

statement. Yet these accounts do not sit well with the physical evidence
102 

It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners

found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney which
were at the situs of the incident on the date and time alleged in the
Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come from
Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony – which was adopted by
bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This evidence
Cunanan and Puno – as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
in fact supports Yapyuco’s claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire
Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the
directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already
prosecution, explained that their presence at the scene was in response
88 

moved past them such that the line of fire to the passengers thereof
to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel
would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that,
elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims
almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has
were reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this
passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and when
suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5)
the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Naron’s house sitting
of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact.
on the right side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario
Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake but by
Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line of fire would
deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became apparent that
be direct and perpendicular to it. 103

the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to

whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers
aboard, and who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the While Dabor’s ballistics findings are open to challenge for being
eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva. inconclusive as to who among the accused actually discharged their
firearms that night, her report pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated
Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted
within the yard of Naron’s house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the
vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this case.
themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be applied to them as it is
evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is
not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate a legitimate law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to
trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on defeat the claim that all of them – who were either police and barangay
them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco. 104
officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and
order – were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to
admissible only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms
other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even
extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their
the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound to commit
admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing
then, it is transposed into a judicial admission. It is thus perplexing why,
105 
offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the
despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as accused were acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the
well as the latter’s testimony implicating them in the incident, they still suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is the
had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as
could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited
in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused,
been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms
be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to
affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence
co-accused. of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were
armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
II.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or members and whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial
lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the
Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the
of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules
office. The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and
106  of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly
negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest
connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his
negligence. Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
107  weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal
committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the
penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process
consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of pertains to other government officers or agencies. 108

his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused
relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force
burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis. as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome
his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm. United States v. Campo has laid
109  110 
they were peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn
down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden
authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The massacre
when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution. 116

means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and

obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney
of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing by claiming that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well
the death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force. He is,
111 
as the signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that
however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the the jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark
offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when road with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners’ signal to stop, and
the arrest could be effected otherwise. People v. Ulep teaches that –
112  113 
compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk
from the party they had just been to, still, we find incomprehensible
117 

The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a petitioners’ quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact there was at
last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot least one other vehicle at the scene – the Sarao jeepney owned by
otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police Yapyuco – which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects
officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when
pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute
action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and necessity justifies the use of force, and it is incumbent on herein
discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be petitioners to prove such necessity. We find, however, that petitioners
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms does
limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not
must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at
the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered
law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their
upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in mind suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their
that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the
society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with fulfillment of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve,
human rights. 114
thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to
Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to
Thus, in People v. Tabag, where members of the Davao CHDF had
115 
grave danger to life and limb – all of which could not have been the
killed four members of a family in their home because of suspicions that necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
they were NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration by
invoking among others the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the III.
Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding them
liable for murder said, thus: At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of
fact faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact"
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a 118 

can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it
the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if
119 

superior for some lawful purpose. Other than "suspicion," there is no the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is 120 

evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to
121 

children were members of the NPA. And even if they were members of the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of
122 

the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night, this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) 123 
that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to
124 
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the
129  130 

commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute
125 
justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. 126
mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the
accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained that –
131 

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found

in United States v. Ah Chong, but in that setting, the principle was
127 
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one
treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if
was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state
receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we
identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
placed against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad
a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his faith.
132

roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his

honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to IV.
commit the charge, the Court explained:
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in frustrated homicide has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The
point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the
invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the
no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its
liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. By reasonable
133 

laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole
circumstances as they appear to him." x x x proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt. The overriding consideration is not whether
134 

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 135

more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable
guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with evidence. Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and
136 

reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. In homicide
137 

authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result
facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act
thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are which produced the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder
in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim
measure. x x x  128
was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the discharged their service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets
words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no other
the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along
the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case,
138 
the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the
even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the
the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was
responsible for all the consequences thereof.  Evidence of intent to kill is
139 
not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the
crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and
same is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant
with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence. 144

of said offenses.140

The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the rifle and .30 caliber carbine. While the use of these weapons does not
145 

prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had always amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently
by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is
to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit
evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ affidavits as well as and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired
Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much
alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril
their (petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the
mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in gunfire was aimed at the tires – especially considering that petitioners do
court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in
his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was
being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyuco’s claim Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney
that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against members and the firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the
of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas driver – and in fact even the driver himself – of being hit and injured or
supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire
during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was
in court emerged. 141
proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their
natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt.
relevance and materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners’
inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It gains significance when actuations leaned towards the latter.
the commission of a crime is established by evidence purely
circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive. The question of motive is
142 
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on
important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or Licup who was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was
is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt that occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from
the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference
not so important to know the reason for the deed. 143
than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident
or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State tells that:
146 

In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they
did not intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the
natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up.
Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in
when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was purpose. 151

accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed

by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable
otherwise. period prior to the occurrence.  From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy
1a\^/phi1

exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had
V. the same purpose and were united in its execution. The instant case
152 

requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners that they

Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with were really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-
the deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners,
Yapyuco’s alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co- or all of the accused for that matter, had converged and strategically
petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting posted themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we
in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why: nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common
impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal when it suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting to
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it to stop and
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were confronted
the incident of another act performed without malice. People v.
147  with the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing
Guillen and People v. Nanquil  declare that a deliberate intent to do an
148  149  the jeepney’s supposed escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof.
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their concerted
imprudence. And in People v. Castillo, we held that that there can be no
150  action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the
frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of
negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver,
of frustrated homicide cannot exist. they did achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet
entries on the passenger side of the jeepney at angular and
perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly
which of all the accused had discharged their weapons that night and
found by the Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of
which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally
reckless imprudence.
wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that since
only herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy service firearms that night and had fired the same, they should be held
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law
commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong. 153

inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common
VI.
purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-
though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected principals in the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only,
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained
by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other
accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
unharmed victims. The allegation of evident premeditation has not been
154 
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated
proved beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as following MODIFICATIONS:
instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight
and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is (a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to
no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
and deliberately adopted by petitioners. of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two
reclusion temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the
relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these
cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary (b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally,
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel
properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from Villanueva, in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and
six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as compensatory damages, and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.
prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal. SO ORDERED.

However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
had committed attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in Associate Justice
order. The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that
of a consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into
WE CONCUR:
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum
of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the
minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision Associate Justice
correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
ROBERTO A. ABAD
lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one JR.***
Associate Justice
(1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Associate Justice

We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
with prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and Associate Justice
severally, to indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of
₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 in moral damages. With ATTESTATION
respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly
and severally, the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
damages and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
damages should be deleted, there being no aggravating circumstance the Court’s Division.
that attended the commission of the crimes.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
 FIRST DIVISION c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto
contracted marriage with herein complainant’s brother, Manuel P.
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673             August 11, 2004 Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish
priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this
EDUARDO P. DIEGO, complainant,  time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto,
vs. again, with a civil status of single.
1

JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

DAGUPAN CITY, BRANCH 43, respondent. After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated
a decision, on February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the STATE to prove accused’s guilt

beyond whisper of doubt, the COURT hereby orders her
DECISION ACQUITTAL with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED. 2

The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on
the part of the accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the
AZCUNA, J.:
defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. The
combined testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was
This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge aimed at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient
Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been
in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to
law. contract the second marriage with Manuel P. Diego.

The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus:
follows:
While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond
a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted between Jorge de Perio and the accused are not yet annulled, it
marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor remains undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in
Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247 th Judicial
In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the District, effective February 15, 1978.
name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single;
xxx
b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a
"Decree of Divorce" and purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as
The CHARGE filed against the accused is categorized as Mala
petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas
en se (sic) which requires the indispensable presence of criminal
(247th Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed,
intent/dolo.
that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de
Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled
and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce." The felony on BIGAMY as defined and penalized by the Revised
Penal Code explicitly mandates that it must be committed with
criminal intent. In other words, there must be an unquestionable
demonstration on the part of the perpetrator that he/she
 criminally, willfully and unlawfully contracted a second marriage The Disputed Decision
despite knowledge that his/her first marriage is still existing.
A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge
As borne out by the evidence adduced, the accused contracted had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence
the second marriage after she was informed and furnished of the applicable to the bigamy case.
Divorce Decree which was granted by the Family District Court of
Harris County Texas in her favor. In his comment, respondent Judge stated: "That the accused married
Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue
As an ordinary laywoman accused being a recipient of a divorce of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact."
decree, she entertains the impression that she can contract a
subsequent marriage which she did when she married the late This Court, in People v. Bitdu, carefully distinguished between a mistake
4 

Manuel Diego. of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy
case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay
To the honest evaluation of the Court the act complained of person, from liability. Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had
against the accused is not patently illegal for the reason that she obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed
acted in good faith believing that her marriage was already that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any
annulled by a foreign judgment. 3
violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does
not justify her act. This Court further stated therein that with respect to
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent the contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the
Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. He second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her
questions the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the divorce decree first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the
as a basis for the finding of good faith. In addition, complainant stresses law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a
that the evidence on record negates respondent Judge’s finding of good violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof. 5

faith on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to
impose sanctions upon respondent Judge as, according to complainant, Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People
these acts amount to knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or v. Schneckenburger,  where it was held that the accused who secured a
6 

gross ignorance of the law. foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that
the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.
In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was
the criminal culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not
Penal Code. Respondent Judge does not dispute that the second respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly
marriage was bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the first rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.
marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our
country and because the accused’s first husband was still alive. Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment
Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what was controlling was
whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly believed, Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and
albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she could penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to
7 

marry again. According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge
personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently,
should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a
and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent. judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
By separate manifestations, both parties agreed to submit the case for supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious
resolution based on the pleadings. and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 8
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.
unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that
9 

in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official
unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
rendering an unjust judgment remains the law. 10
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
As held in Alforte v. Santos, even assuming that a judge erred in
11 
It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he is
acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the
lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives.
faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be
proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia, where therein respondent judge,
15 

warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. 12

although absolved of any guilt for the charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, was still imposed sanctions by this Court, thus:
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment. In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately
penalized for his regrettably erroneous action in connection with
Gross Ignorance of the Law Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly
stressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Mañozca v. Domagas, is 13  judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he serves, and he
instructive. Therein respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost
of the law resulting in a manifestly unjust judgment for granting a probity. Any kind of failure in the discharge of this grave
demurrer to the evidence in a bigamy case. The grant of the demurrer to responsibility cannot be countenanced, in order to maintain the
the evidence was based on the judge’s finding of good faith on the part of faith of the public in the judiciary, especially on the level of courts
the accused, anchored upon a document denominated as a "Separation to which most of them resort for redress. 16

of Property with Renunciation of Rights." This Court stated that said act
of the judge exhibited ignorance of the law, and accordingly he was fined Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by
in the amount of P5,000. respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes
ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.
Also, in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., where therein respondent judge was
14 

given a reprimand with a stern warning of a more severe penalty should Penalty
the same or similar act be committed in the future, this Court explained:
After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent Judge be
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or reprimanded with a stern warning of a more severe penalty in the future.
decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming
that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in question took
would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called place on February 24, 1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1, 2001,
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as a
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error serious charge and penalized the offense with a fine of not less
must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad than P20,000 but not more than P40,000.
faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts
Applying the rule as then prevailing, and in line with applicable
17 

jurisprudence, the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine in the

18 

amount of P10,000.

WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby

FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio,

JJ., concur.
 EN BANC force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice,
"Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at
G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910 the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his
way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,  porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the
vs. intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant. enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above
the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the
door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow
Gibb & Gale, for appellant. 
had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable
that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
CARSON, J.: opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen
knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was
these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28,
think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's
weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which wounds.
there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct: There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the
date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it
No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. for his personal protection.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters
from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to
an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the
the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino
part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters
its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their
a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments
habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for
by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the
which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room. back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who
immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who
had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that
roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for
"a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open
despite defendant's warnings. the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and
Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-
was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness
who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
attacked by a robber. advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been
wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to
to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
the following day.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the
found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part
the minimum penalty prescribed by law. of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting,
and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend
his person or his property or the property under his charge.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his
roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction
of self-defense. one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to
the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability
if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true
state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
criminal liability: circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad
xxx             xxx             xxx faith.

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or
are the following attendant circumstances: mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the
law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in
(1) Illegal aggression. larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
repel it. touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him,
defending himself. even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law,
sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; punished by law.
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent
is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall
assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be
said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other different from that which he had intended to commit.
crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly
declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the
with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free,
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention
definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and
appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia,"
express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the
while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco
the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying
which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in
the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts
the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different
that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p.
from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even
16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
Viada are more apparent than real.
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal,
and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little
difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared
do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure that where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to
of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be
disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio
done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows 169.)
the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own
nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of
been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made
mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one use of the following language:
particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

 It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to
all the malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is
an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime. that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of
malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that any criminal liability on the actor.
"considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of
his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem
parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and
necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said
or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence." that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally
or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it
use of the following language: signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said
to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the
or malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it
and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice,"
court. "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating
intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference
between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be
to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and
an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein
signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New
defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
article 568, which are as follows:
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if
condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily,"
done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be
willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various
punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare
constitute a less grave crime.
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must
combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this
through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty doctrine:
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private
according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes
prescribed in article 81. important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal
mind. So that —
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty
prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In
in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without
the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor
proper. in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow
 that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our
other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited
— class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts
modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the
act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real
this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
— where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or
ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing
produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise
man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary,
ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point
keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's
when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes
the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any
from his neighbors does not offend. And — such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from
no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as
by God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C.,
And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342;
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209;
itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into
that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared
these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his
intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable
290.) cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing
— or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he
 mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to follows:
the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities,
it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand,
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified and using violent menaces against his life as he advances.
in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the
law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B
was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the
cited.) pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so
attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take
application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is
as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this
one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain,
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts
from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime
of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at
innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light
criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the
ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he
"voluntarily." turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which
he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said: blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him
another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor,
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his
person slain had a felonious design against him, and under that father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he
supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that learned his identity, and who died in about six days in
there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained
caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during
the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall
report of the case, p.7.) he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having
acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in
paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the
aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but
and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said
condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed
accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to
was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding
have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc.,
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable.
intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts 136.)
executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence,
and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is
his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window
and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is
he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money,
which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of
his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same
resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the
nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law?
accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there
the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable
of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused
Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) . to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide
committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors,
was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening
where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his
of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I
because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two Viada, p. 128.)
shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one
of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar
"Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged
finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the
speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in
the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they
declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted
in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly
exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be
said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court
should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which
he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both
instance de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur. 

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court,
believes that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide
by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal
Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully
(voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or
criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the
acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the
defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the
person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore
incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was
accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the

undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year
and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties
provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of
the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the
judgment appealed from.
REVISED PENAL CODE There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent;
and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
ARTICLE 1. Time When Act Takes Effect. — This Code shall imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
take effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and
thirty-two. ARTICLE 22. Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws. — Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person
ARTICLE 2. Application of Its Provisions. — Except as provided guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those
who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or JESUS D

airship; Rural He
Ajuy, Ilo
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into

these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the
preceding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an

offense in the exercise of their functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security

and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this
Code.

ARTICLE 3. Definition. — Acts and omissions punishable by law

are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but

also by means of fault (culpa).