Chernobyl, the accident scenario
and its global impact
As the world recalls the Chernobyl accident twenty years ago, this report aims to provide a brief
description of the facts surrounding the Chernobyl accident (known and assumed), to examine its
possible causes and to provide answers to commonly asked questions on issues like health, social
and socio-political impacts, environmental considerations etc. It also draws some conclusions on
the current state of affairs twenty years after an event that troubled man’s collective conscience.
The accident: what happened ?
Chernobyl’s N°4 reactor was a graphite moderated light water reactor (RBMK) with an output of
1000 MWe. It was a pressure tubes boiling water reactor with direct steam feed to the turbines.
A standard maintenance stop for reactor N°4 was planned on April 25. To run the RBMK type
plant requires the generation of electrical power, mainly for cooling. In the event of a power
failure, emergency generators start up a few seconds later. Due to problems with the new
emergency generators, it was decided to carry out a test on the cooling pumps, which required
the bypassing of safety systems. The aim of the test was to check if the inertia of the turbines
provided enough power to keep the cooling pumps operational during the time required to start
the emergency generators.
Here is chronological run-down of the chain of events that took place in the days and hours that
led up to the accident:
Friday April 25 1986:
01.00 a.m.: the operators decrease the power of the reactor
02.00 p.m.: the reactor runs at half power
11.00 p.m.: decision to start the test. Due to an error in the regulation, the power is
much lower than normal. Rather than stopping the reactor (and the test), the operators
try to increase the power again by lifting many more control bars than allowed (6-8
rather than 30). The problem is that at low power, the reactor has a positive void
coefficient
Saturday April 26 1986:
01.22 a.m.: the test begins while the reactor continues operating under non-authorised
conditions. The operators switch off the safety mechanism that should stop the reactor in
case of loss of steam supply to the turbine.
01.23.04 a.m.: the turbines shut down and the cooling pumps stop. This increases the
steam content in the tubes and the reactor power increases rather than decreases due to
the positive void coefficient.
01.23.40 a.m.: an attempt is made to manually stop the reactor by releasing the control
bars (211). The control bars take about 20 seconds to reach the core, and their design is
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such that reactivity increases during the initial seconds. Fuel elements start breaking up.
A few seconds later, shocks are felt and explosions are heard. Steam explosions destroy
the reactor core and blow the roof off the reactor building. Fires start all over the place.
The worst civil nuclear accident in history has just occurred.
01.28 a.m.: the first fire-fighters arrive on the scene
02.30 a.m.: the largest fires are under control
05.00 a.m.: the graphite fire starts
Today, the causes and the consequences of the accident have been thoroughly studied and many
lessons have been learnt.
The main causes of the accident, as identified by Western experts are:
Unsafe and unstable reactor design: In addition to generating electricity, the RBMK
reactors at Chernobyl were also designed and adapted for the production of plutonium for
military purposes, as fuel can be loaded and unloaded during operation. This double
function restricted the reactor’s built-in safety mechanisms. Consequently, the accident
cannot be disassociated from the politico-military context of the former Soviet Union at
that time, even if there are no indications that at any time plutonium was produced there
for military purposes
The operators’ lack of theoretical training and knowledge: During the cold war,
safety was clearly not a priority. There was a critical lack of safety culture at Chernobyl,
which was amplified by an global lack of understanding and training
The culture of strict confidentiality that reigned in the former Soviet Union due to the
strong interdependency of civil and military nuclear applications: Within the context of
the 1980’s, operators were not supposed to think critically or take initiatives in case of
emergency situations, which were never even officially considered.
Health
The question of exactly how many casualties resulted from the Chernobyl catastrophe remains on
everyone's mind today, twenty years later - even though quantifying human suffering in terms of
fatalities is much too restrictive. The following data mainly come from a report published by the
Chernobyl Forum (Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and
Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine 1) and
another one written by SCK-CEN report entitled Chernobyl, 20 years later2. Distinction has to be
made between the different categories of casualties, as follows:
Fatalities that occurred among people who received high radiation doses during the 4
months that followed the explosions (in total, 134 people suffered from radiation
sickness). It is highly probable that fatalities also occurred, a few years after the
accident, among people who had initially suffering from radiation sickness but had
seemed to have recovered from it
Fatalities estimated among rescue workers and the so called 'liquidators' who did not
suffer from radiation sickness
Fatalities estimated among the general population
Two employees died from injuries caused by the explosions that were not connected to
radiation.
One other employee probably died from an acute cardiac arrest brought on by the explosions.
28 employees or rescuers died within 4 months and there is no doubt that their death is as a
result of the accident. A further 19 workers died between 1987 and 2004. As they were among
those suffering from radiation sickness, it seems more than probable that the majority of them
died from the consequences of the accident, although some certainly died from other causes.
Some authors limit radiation-related deaths to 11.
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Remark: Out of 134 people, 28 died from extremely high radiation doses. That leaves
106 people. Of those 106, between 11 and 19 died over a period of more than 15
years. Those are “normal death rates?” Radiation-related models indicate much higher
rates. Why the discrepancy?
Among the rescue workers and the liquidators (initially about 350.000, later up to 600.000),
about 1000 received radiation doses ranging from 2 – 20 Gy. The average effective dose among
all 600.000 liquidators is estimated to be around 100 mSv. Therefore, the doses range between
25 and 250 times the natural radiation dose. 21 cases of leukaemia have been detected among
workers who received more that 150 mSv. That is about twice the normal rate of occurrence (in
other population groups, no increase has been seen). An increase in solid or thyroid cancers has
also been noted, but this is certainly due to vastly improved screening methods. A radiation-
induced increase in incidence of these cancers cannot, however, be excluded. But statistically this
is not significant due to the very low numbers involved.
Models, mainly based on observations made with regard to survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
led to about 2000 radiation-induced cancers being made attributable to rescue workers or
liquidators, during their lifetime. Furthermore, the extrapolated numbers depend upon the life
expectancy model used. The current life expectancy in the Ukraine or Belarus is now as low as 55
- 65 years for adult males. Many solid cancers may not have the time to develop by this age
group.
All numbers derived from such models are subject to great uncertainty, but the ongoing
discussion about the linear threshold model, or a simple threshold, or even hormesis, is irrelevant
here because the doses are much too high for those potential effects to have played a role.
Among the general population, there is very little doubt that the increase of thyroid cancer in
children (about 5000 detected cases) is due to contamination, probably by iodine and caesium
isotopes trapped by an iodine deficient thyroid. Unfortunately, about 15 children have died. It has
been suggested that screening explains the increase in observed cases of thyroid cancer. The
observed correlation with soil contamination points to radiation effects. It should be realised,
however, that in Western countries one half of all elderly people have thyroid cancer that goes
totally unnoticed (autopsy data). No other increase in cancer incidence has been observed.
However, it may yet ocur, or it may be too small to be detected.
Based probably on a linear non-threshold model, the report by the Chernobyl Forum (September
2005 version) predicts some 2000 extra cancer deaths among the general population, taking into
account average radiation doses above background levels. It is stated that this is an increase of
3% on normal cancer incidence levels. This means that since the normal incidence of cancer
death is about 25%, a total exposed population of about 250.000 people was considered.
Obviously, nobody will be able to prove or disprove 2000 extra cases among what is a normal
rate of occurrence - unless the cancers are of a very specific nature.
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The linear non-threshold model assumes that there is no threshold level below which no
detrimental radiation effect is observed. A model with even a small threshold level would greatly
decrease the number of 2000 cancer cases. Also, it does not seem reasonable to speak about
“extra cancer deaths” as if those people would not have died without radiation. Would it not be
better to speak about “early cancer deaths?” Furthermore, an increase in cancer deaths does not
necessarily mean decreased life expectancy in general. It may be that survivors live longer (the
“healthy survivor” effect) and, therefore, that cancer may not be the only indicator for radiation
effects to be taken into account.
It is probably fair to conclude that, apart from thyroid cancer among children, no statistically
significant increase in cancer incidence has been observed today, and if it were to occur, it will
not have a major impact on the average health status of the population in the Chernobyl area.
Indeed, even though statistically significant, and certainly dramatic from a personal point of view,
10 or even 100 extra deaths due to a particular or rare cancer have no impact on public health in
areas where chronic factors such as alcohol abuse, malnutrition, smoking etc. have a compound
effect on health.
As far as incidence of malformations is concerned, about which numerous false information has
been communicated and misleading photographs published, no relevant radiation-induced
increase has been identified. The only probable non-cancer health effect is an increase in the
incidence of cataracts among liquidators and children.
Social consequences
On April 27 at 11.00 a.m., the population of the town of Pripyat was told that it was going to be
evacuated. Two and a half hours later, all inhabitants had left their homes forever, along with
friends, people living in the neighbourhood, cats and dogs. The evacuation was progressively
extended to include people living within a 30 km radius of the stricken reactor. This brought the
total number of evacuees to about 116.000. In the years following the accident, the number of
people that were relocated grew to more than 330.000. It is not hard to imagine the
psychological damage cause by this forced evacuation and relocation - not only among the
resettled people, but also among the residents of the areas of resettlement who feared and
disapproved of the mass arrival of busloads of 'contaminated foreigners'.
This forced relocation gave rise to mental health problems, alcohol and tobacco abuse etc..., in
what the Chernobyl forum reports as "the largest public health problem unleashed by the
accident today".
The permanent relocation of such a large number of people, irrespective of age and social
background, can certainly be questioned. Many public health arguments used to justify the
relocation policy were either irrelevant or temporary by nature. Some formerly evacuated areas
have now been resettled. This is a positive development, but probably happened much too late.
If one accepts that the first evacuations had to be decided upon in an emergency situation, it is
not clear what other reasons could have led to the evacuation of an extra 200,000 residents
months or years after the accident.
Some 100.000 people are considered as permanently disabled as a result of the accident and 7
million people receive compensation because of it. Today, between 5 and 7% of government
spending in Ukraine and Belarus is allocated to various Chernobyl-related compensation
packages.
How many people are objectively entitled to specific support and how many have obtained
support from “less acceptable channels” - simply in order to escape unbearable poverty - remains
an open question.
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Environment
The effects on the environment are well-documented and less subject to fuzzy interpretations as
they are often measurable. However, the economical or political decisions taken on the basis of
the measured data, such as the restrictions on the sale of milk products and vegetables have
taken account of many other factors than public health alone. These were taken not only the
accident region, but also worldwide. The decision-making process also showed how difficult it is
for experts to communicate their findings to the authorities, and for the authorities to know which
experts to listen to.
About 4300 km2 are in the no-go zone. Another area of about 7000 km 2 is considerably
contaminated by 137Cs. In Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, a further 130.000 km 2 were less severely
contaminated. Similar levels also occurred in 60.000 km 2 in other parts of Europe.
In the inhabited but contaminated areas, the radiation burden due to remaining radioactivity in
soil and food is now down to less than 1 mSv/y/person. This is due, among other reasons, to
natural decay, but also to countermeasures affecting soil contamination levels and farming
methods.
In Europe, different countermeasures were taken. Not all of them were justifiable. The fact that
some radioactivity could be measured, certainly when expressed in Bq, was interpreted by some
that danger was inevitable.
It seems that among wildlife in the most contaminated regions, malformations occurred in the
first generation of offspring, but no obvious hereditary effects have been observed. What has
been observed, however, is flourishing biodiversity. This is to be expected when the main
predator - man - is no longer present.
One remaining problem that has potential consequences that go far beyond strongly-
contaminated areas is contamination of groundwater and downstream water-ecosystems by 137Cs
and 90Sr. It adds to existing problems due to industrial pollution.
Regulations
The regulatory impact of the accident has been profound, both at national and international
levels. The major international actors involved since the beginning are the IAEA, EURATOM, ICRP,
NEA, WHO, WANO and others.
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The Chernobyl accident gave rise to a fundamental worldwide change in approach when it comes
to safety. The world certainly is much safer now that it was before, not only with respect to
safety of nuclear power, but also with regard to other industrial areas - where the pioneering role
of regulation in the nuclear industry gave rise to similar initiatives in other industries.
One perverse effect of stricter regulations is to induce increased fear among the population. The
general view is that if something requires strong regulations it has to be very dangerous to begin
with. It is certainly correct top say that nuclear power, air travel, even driving a car are all very
dangerous if regulations are not respected. This is what regulations are for.
Nuclear power
In 1972, the Club of Rome predicted that, in the US alone, nuclear energy would supply 900.000
MW by year 2000. The Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents drastically changed all previous
projections. Whereas in Western Europe and the US the installation of new power plants came to
a full stop, this was not the case in the East.
The accidents occurred at a time of increasing environmental awareness and changing views
worldwide. The green political movement demonised nuclear power as an evil technology. This
situation has slowly changed, due mainly to the more objective analysis of pro's and con's, strong
economic arguments put forward by the power industry, awareness of the potentially harmful
effects of CO2 emissions and the problem of security of supply.
Politics
In 1985, President Gorbachov decided to impose a certain degree of transparency to Russian
politics. This was called 'Glasnost' and was part of his 'perestroika' policy. Then the Chernobyl
accident occurred and the old culture of secrecy once again took the upper hand. Under heavy
pressure from the West to provide open information on the accident, Gorbachov imposed full
glasnost, thereby annihilating one of the strongest pillars of the Soviet regime. That regime fell
apart soon after. Chernobyl was a major catalyst in triggering the chain reaction of events that
would soon lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Conclusions
Twenty years have passed since Chernobyl. Twenty years without a significant nuclear accident in
a power plant. Twenty years later, the public seems to have gradually changed it's perception of
nuclear energy, against the backdrop of what is often referred to as 'the nuclear renaissance'.
This could be seen as evidence of the maturity of nuclear technology, of the adequacy of the
safety culture, of effective regulations etc... . But it may also be proof of loss of memory.
We know that coal mining alone kills thousands of people every year. We know that car accidents
kill more people during a single weekend than Chernobyl ever will. Let’s not forget that public
perception is not about cold figures, but instead about feelings. One single major accident in a
power plant could - in a matter of minutes - ruin twenty years of considerable effort.
References
1) The Report by the Chernobyl Forum 2003-2005, second revised version, Chernobyl's Legacy: Health,
Environmental and Socio-Economoic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, IAEA/PI/A.87 Rev.2/06-09181, April 2006.
URL: [Link]/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/[Link]
The Chernobyl Forum is composed of the IAEA, WHO, UNDP, FAO, UNEP, UN-OCHA, UNSCEAR, the World Bank
Group, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
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2) Chernobyl, 20 years later, a report published by SCK•CEN (available in April 2006):
[Link]/sckcen_en/publications/brochures/[Link]
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