------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY
PATNA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PROJECT OF ISPL
Methods of
Interpretation

Submitted to: -
Dr. [Link] Mohammad(Faculty of ISPL)

Submitted by: - SHAHNAWAZ KHAN, B.A.,L.L.B. (H), [Link]. 1162, Sem. VII

Page | 1
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing a project is one of the most significant academic

challenges, I have ever faced. Though this project has been
presented by me but there are many people who remained in veil,
who gave their all support and helped me to complete this project.

First of all I am very grateful to my subject teacher Dr Ali sir

without the kind support of whom and help the completion of the
project was a herculean task for me. He donated his valuable time
from his busy schedule to help me to complete this project and
suggested me from where and how to collect data.

I am very thankful to the librarian who provided me several books

on this topic which proved beneficial in completing this project.

Last but not the least, I am very much thankful to my parents and
family, who always stand aside me and helped me a lot in
accessing all sorts of resources.

I thank all of them!

Shahnawaz Khan
[Link]. 1162, Sem
VII B.A.,L.L.B. (H)
 TABLE OF CONTENT

Introduction.......................................................................................................04

Internal Aid of Interepretation..........................................................................06

Golden Rule of Interpretation.…...................................................................... 14

Heydon Rule of

Interprtation…………………………………………………………………………

17

CONCLUISION...............................................................................................22

Biblography........................................................................................................26

Page | 3
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The term interpretation means 'To give meaning to"1. Governmental power has been divided into three

wings namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Interpretation of statues to render justice is

the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Act and give meaning to

each word of the Statute.

The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in a

harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together.

The maxim 'A Verbis legis non est recedendum" means that you must not vary the words of the statute

while interpreting it. The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature

conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi swamp Sarkar v pradeep kumar sarkar,

the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of the same statute, the one which

validates the statute must be preferred. 2

Kinds of Interpretation :-

There are generally two kind of interpretation; literal interpretation and logical interpretation.

Literal interpretation Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation

or Iitera Iegis. It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is

clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be the

consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law making

body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has been called the

safest rule because the legislature's intention can be deduced only from the language through which it has

expressed itself.3
1
SALMMOND: “Jurisprudence” 11th Edition, p. 15
2
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse, AIR 1998 SC 7
3
Zander, Michael. The Law-Making Process. Cambridge University Press (United Kingdom), 2004, p. 129
Page | 4
The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need not probe

into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the language must be

construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as Iitera legis or Iitera script.

The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. This

interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation.

In Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh,4 the Election tribunal set aside the election of the appellant

under s 123(7) of the Representation of People's Act, 1951 on the grounds that the appellant had

employed more persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The appellant contended that the

excess employees were paid by his father and hence were not employed by him. The Supreme Court

followed the grammatical interpretation of S 123(7) and termed the excess employees as volunteers.

In Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay 5, the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did

not declare that he brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in violation of

government notification, was confiscated under 5 167 (8) Sea Customs Act, 1878. He was charged under

s 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act was

violative of Art 20(2) of the constitution relating to double jeopardy as he was already punished for his

act by was of confiscation of the gold. It was held by the Supreme Court that the sea customs authority is

not a court or a judicial tribunal and the confiscation is not a penalty. Consequently his trial was valid

under the Act of 1947.

In Madan mohan v [Link], it was held that when a statute contains strict and stringent

provisions, it must be literally and strictly construed to promote the object of the act.

In Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd,6 it was held that according to the

fundamental principles of construction the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter,

section by section and then word by word.

In Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, an application against the change of

4
AIR 1967 SC 643
5
AIR 1974 SC 685
6
(2000) 1 SCC 426 : (AIR 2000 SC 314
Page | 5
location of a bus stand could be made within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority

according to s 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the

contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the order"

The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the application as

invalid.

In Raghunandan Saran v M/s Peary Lal workshop Pvt Ltd, the supreme court validated 14 ( 2) of the

Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 and provided the benefit of eviction on account of non payment of rent.

The Supreme Court adopted grammatical interpretation.

Exception to the rule of Literal Interpretation:-

Generally a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following circumstances it

is not possible:Logical defects

A) ambiguity

B) inconsistency

C) incompleteness or lacunae

D) unreasonableness

Logical interpretation :-

If the words of a statute give rise to two or more construction, then the construction which validates the

object of the Act must be given effect while interpreting. It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate

it or it is better the Act prevails than perish. The purpose of construction is to ascertain the intention of

the parliament. 7

The mischief rule

The mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydon's case. If there are two interpretations possible

7
Zander, Michael. The Law-Making Process. Cambridge University Press (United Kingdom), 2004, p. 129
Page | 6
for the material words of a statute. then for sure and true interpretation there are certain considerations in

the form of questions. 8

The following questions must be considered.

1. What was the common law before making the Act?

2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide a remedy?

3. What is the remedy resolved by the parliament to cure the disease of the common wealth?

4. The true reason of the remedy. The judge should always try to suppress the mischief and advance the

remedy. The mischief rule says that the intent of the legislature behind the enactment should be

followed.

Rule of casus omissus:-

Generally, the court is bound to harmonize the various provisions of an Act passed by the legislature

during interpretation so that repugnancy is avoided. Sometimes certain matters might have been omitted

in a statute. In such cases, they cannot be added by construction as it amounts to making of laws or

amending which is a function of legislature. A new provision cannot be added in a statute giving it

meaning not otherwise found therein. A word omitted from the language of the statute, but within the

general scope of the statute, and omitted due to inadvertence is known as Casus Omissus.

In Padma Sundara Rao v State of Tamil Nadu 9 it was held that the cassus omissus cannot be supplied

by the court except in the case of a clear necessity and when reason for it is found within the four comers

of the statute itself.

Rule of ejusdem generis:-

Ejusdem generis means “of the same kind". Generally particular words are given their natural meaning

provided the context does not require otherwise. If general words follow particular words pertaining to a

class, category or genus then it is construed that general words are limited to mean the person or thing of

the same general class, category or genus as those particularly exposed.

Eg: if the husband asks the wife to buy bread, milk and cake and if the wife buys jam along with them, it
8
12th Edition; 1969 (Reprint 2010)
9
(2011) 4 SCC 635
Page | 7
is not invalidated merely because of not specifying it but is valid because it is of the same kind.

The basic rule is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted sense, then it

need not have used particular words at all. This rule is not of universal application.

In Devendra Surti v State of Gujarat 10, under 52 (4) of the Bombay shops and Establishments Act,

1948 the term commercial establishment means "an establishments which carries any trade, business or

profession". Here the word profession is associated to business or trade and hence a private doctor's

clinic cannot be included in the above definitions as under the rule of Ejusdem Generis.

In Grasim Industries Ltd v Collector of Customs, Bombay, the rule of Ejusdem Generis is applicable

when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words.

In such a case the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified.

CHAPTER 2

INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION

Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The general rule of the

interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this ordinary meaning. If the words are clear, free

from ambiguity there is no need to refer to other means of interpretation. But if the words are vague and

ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for interpretation.

INTERNAL AID

1. CONTEXT :- If the words of a statute are ambiguous then the context must be taken into

consideration. The context includes other provisions of the statute, its preamble, the existing state of law

and other legal provisions. The intention behind the meaning of the words and the circumstances under

which they are framed must be considered.

2. TITLE :- Title is not part of enactment. So it cannot be legally used to restrict the plain meaning of the

10
2000) 1 SCC 426 : (AIR 2000 SC 314
Page | 8
words in an enactment. Lgng title The heading of the statute is the long title and the general purpose is

described in it. E.g. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the long title reads as follows “An Act to

make provisions for the prevention of adulteration of food".

In Re Kerala Education bill, the Supreme Court held that the policy and purpose may be deduced from

the long title and the preamble.

In Manohar Lal v State of Punjab, Long title of the Act is relied as a guide to decide the scope of the Act.

3. SHORT TITLE:- The short title of the Act is purely for reference only. The short title is merely for

convenience. E.g. The Indian Penal Code, 1860

The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. The main objective and purpose of the Act are

found in the Preamble of the Statute. ”Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a preparatory statement. It

contains the recitals showing the reason for enactment of the Act. if the language of the Act is clear the

preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretation of an ambiguous act.

In Kashi Prasad v State, the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat the

enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for the interpretation of the statute.

[Link]:- A group of Sections are given under a heading which act as their preamble. Sometimes a

single section might have a preamble. 5.378441 of WC is "Offences against property".

Headings are prefixed to sections. They are treated as preambles. if there is ambiguity in the words of a

statute, headings can be referred. In Durga Thathera v Narain Thathera, the court held that the headings

are like a preamble which helps as a key to the mind of the legislature but do not control the substantive

section of the enactment.

5. Marginal notes Marginal notes are the notes that are printed at the side of the section in an Act and it

summarizes the effect of the section. They are not part of the statute. So they must not be considered. But

if there is any ambiguity they may be referred only as an internal aid to the construction.

In Wilkes v Goodwin, the Court held that the side notes are not part of the Act and hence marginal notes

cannot be referred.

6. Emiso :- A proviso merely carves out something from the section itself. A proviso is a subsidiary to
Page | 9
the main section and has to be construed in the light of the section itself. Ordinarily, a proviso is intended

to be part of the section and not an addendum to the main provisions. A proviso should receive strict

construction. The court is not entitled to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge the scope

7. Interpretation clause

The legislature can lay down legal definitions of its own language, if such dehnitions are embodied in the

statute itself. it becomes binding on the courts when the act itself provides a dictionary for the words

used, the court must first look into that dictionary for interpretation.

In Mayor of Portsmouth v Smith, the court observed ”The introduction of interpretation clause is a

novelty.”

8. Word

The word "and" is conjunctive and the word “or” is disjunctive. These words are often interchangeable.

The word ‘and' can be read as 'or' and 'or‘ can be read as 'and’.

Punctuation is disregarded in the construction of a statute. Generally there was no punctuation in the

statutes framed in England before 1849.

Punctuation cannot control, vary or modify the plain and simple meaning of the language of the statute.

11. Explanations IN certain provisions of an Act explanations may be needed when

doubts arise as to the meaning of the particular section. Explanations are given at the end of each section

and it is part and parcel of the enactment.

Chapter 3

Golden rule of interpretation

Lord Wensleydale called it the ‘golden rule’ and adopted it in Grey v Pearson[xiii] and thereafter it is

Page | 10
usually known as Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. There are three fundamental rules11 suggested in the

Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of section is plain, it is to be applied whatever the result. The

Second is “golden rule” that the words should be given their ordinary sense unless that would lead to

some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; and the “mischief rule” which

emphasizes the general policy of the enactment and the evil at which it was directed.”12

For the application of literal rule a clear and unequivocal meaning is essential. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v.

Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.[xx]The Supreme Court held that the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to

read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning.

If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the

court may adopt the same. But when no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt

the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax,

Bihar,13 the Apex Court had held: “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions

used therein should ordinary be understood in a sense in which they best harmonies with the object of the

statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two constructions are feasible,

the court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the legislature

envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach

keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility

permits.” In Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, 14 the Supreme Court said: “in order to get true

import of the statute, it is necessary

to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the object it

was to sub-serve. The Act has therefore to be viewed as a whole and its intention determined by

construing all the construing parts of the Act together and not by taking detached section as to take one

word here and another there.”

11
Jurisprudence, eleventhedn, p 152.
12
Sussex Peerage 65 RR 11.
13
AIR 1946 Cal 348, p 353
14
(1929) 1 H&B IR 623, p 648
Page | 11
APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE

If the choice is between two interpretations, said Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster

Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.15 “We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to

futility or the narrower one which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation. We

should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for

the purpose of bringing about an effective result. Thus, if the language is capable of more than one

interpretation, one ought to discard the literal or natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and

adopt that interpretation which leads to reasonably practical results.”

Maxwell says16that the application of Golden Rule of Construction, and its limits, can be seen in the area

devoted to construction with reference to the consequences, and construction to avoid inconvenience and

injustice, and to prevent evasion He illustrated the application of the rule in various cases relating to

criminal, civil, labour, revenue taxation and administration branches of law. In Free Lanka Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Ranasinghe. (1964) AC 541 a Statute made it felony ‘to break from prison”. Held it would not

apply to a prisoner who escaped while the prison was on fire. Since his act was, not to recover liberty,

but to save his life. Similarly a statute which made ‘an act’ criminal in unqualified terms was understood

as not applying where the act done was excusable or justifiable on grounds generally recognized by law.

INDIAN CASES

In India there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High Courts have applied the

Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it appears that even for literal

rule, this rule is named. As golden rule initially starts with the search of literal meaning of the provision,

and if there is unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and no repugnancy, uncertainty of absurdity

appears, apply the meaning. But when there is possibility of more than one meaning, we have to go

further to avoid the inconvenience by even modifying the language by addition, rejection or substitution

of words so as to make meaning accurate expounding of intention of the legislature.17

15
(1854) 23 LJCP 108 ,p 144
16
G.W Paton, Jurisprudence (1946), p294
17
Paton, Text Book of Jurisprudence, 1946, p 188
Page | 12
In Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore 18, the Supreme Court held that the expression

“landless person” used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made provision for grant

of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A landless labour is he who is engaged in

agriculture but having no agricultural land. The Court further said that “any landless person” did not

include a landless businessman residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan

movement, which aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A

businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act.

The ‘Golden rule’ could, thus, be explained as follows:—

It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be fairly

gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction would lead to an absurdity while another

will give effect to what common sense would show, as obviously intended, the construction which would

defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the

same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts

sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, if by doing so absurdity and

inconsistency can be avoided.

The Court should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is, on the face of it,

reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act or any part of it can be recast. It must be

possible to spell the meaning contended for, out of the words actually used.19

Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their natural meaning

because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention[lv] and it would not be

in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on

the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in

accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained by the Court. [lvi]
18
[1957] S.C.R. 754
19
AIR 1955 SC 376
Page | 13
 CHAPTER 4

MISCHIEF RULE

Mischief Rule

This is a very important rule as far as the Interpretation of Statute is concerned. It is often referred to as

the “rule in Heydon’s Case”[i]. This very important case reported by Lord Coke and decided by the

Barons of the Exchequer in the 16th century laid down the following rules:

That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial, restrictive

or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered –

1) What was the common law before the passing of the Act?

2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of the

Commonwealth”.

4) The true reasons for the remedy.

And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief

and advance the remedy. Before proceeding any further, a word of warning is appropriate. Uses the exact

words – “disease of the Commonwealth” – used byLord Coke in his report and it is important to bear in

mind that words had different meanings. It is necessary to discover their meaning at the time of writing.

From the 14th century to the end of the 17th, the meaning of disease was lack of ease, disquiet or distress

and Commonwealth, of course, meant the Country. According to an early case, The Longford(1889) 14

P.D. 34 an Act must be construed as if one were interpreting it on the day it was passed. Thus, we ask

ourselves what the word meant on the day it was uttered, if by analogy we argue that the same can be

said of a judgment. The importance of the mischief rule in the criminal law can best be shown

byconsidering examples. An Act of Parliament will state the purpose for which it was enacted. Ifwe take

the case of Parkin v. Norman[1982] 2 All E.R. 583, (reserved judgment), it can be seen that the court
Page | 14
decided that the Public Order Act 1936 was never designed to deal with homosexual behaviour in public

toilets. The long title to the Act reads:

“An Act to prohibit the wearing of uniforms in connexion with political objects and the maintenance by

private persons of associations of military or similar characters; and to make further provision for the

preservation of public order on the occasion of public processions and meetings and in public places.”

The purposes of the Act and the mischief rule are, therefore, closely connected, and it is very genuine to

look at the long title. Another example of the application of the mischief rule is found in Ohison v.

Hylton[1975] 2 All E.R. 490. The facts, briefly, were a carpenter was on his way home from work. He

boarded a train which was crowded. Another passenger objected and subsequently both finished up on

the platform. The defendant, the carpenter, took one of his tools of his trade, a hammer, from his

briefcase and struck the other man with it. He was charged under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953.

Lord Widgery, CJ, said, inter alia: “This is a case in which the mischief at which the statute is aimed

appears to me to be very clear. Immediately prior to the passing of the 1953 Act the criminal law was

adequate to deal with the actual use of weapons in the course of a criminal assault. Where it was lacking,

however, was that the mere carrying of offensive weapons was not an offence. The long title of the Act

reads as follows:

‘An Act to prohibit the carrying of offensive weapons in public places without lawful authority or

reasonable excuse’.20 Parliament is there recognizing the need for preventive justice where, by

preventing the carriage of offensive weapons in a public place, it reduced the opportunity for the use of

such weapons. If, however, the prosecutor is right, the scope goes far beyond the mischief aimed at, and

in every case where an assault is committed with a weapon and in a public place an offence under the

1953 Act can be charged in addition to the charge of assault. Whilst on the subject of offensive weapons,

mention must be made of the Divisional Court’s decision in Gibson v. Wales(1983) 147 J. P. 143, which

decided that a “flick knife” is an offensive weapon per se.’

20
Crawford, Statutory Construction, p 274
Page | 15
Literature Survey: A lot of work has been done on this particular topic which belongs to Interpretation of

Statute because of the peculiar nature of its operation as it is considered to discover Parliament’s

intention and to give the judge more discretion than any other rule as it allows him to effectively decide
21
on Parliament’s intent. But at the same time It can be argued that this undermines Parliament’s

supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes law-making decisions away from the legislature. There’s

Judicial Overreach, So this controversy has been considered in favour by many authors in their books of

which some are like “Interpretation of Statutes” by Kafaltiya, B.M. Gandhi, Maxwell and “Principles of

Statutory Interpretation” by G.P. Singh and many more in this regard and therefore Purposive

interpretation was introduced as a form of replacement for the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and

the golden rule to determine cases. Purposive interpretation is exercised when the courts utilize

extraneous materials from the pre-enactment phase of legislation, including early drafts, hansards,

committee reports, white papers, etc. The purposive interpretation involves a rejection of the

exclusionary rule.

CONCLUSION

We have experienced significant changes over the interpretation of statutes. This change from literal to

purposive approaches has had significant effect on our legal system. So much so that the powers of the

legislative and judicial arms are beginning to converge. Parliament has enacted laws telling the judicial

branch how they must interpret legislation, and the judicial arm can read words into legislation to

promote what they believe is the apparent purpose of the legislature, when, in fact, unrestrained by

obedience to the specific words of the statute, they could be promoting their own policy agenda. In

relation to statutory interpretation and the purposive approach, ‘what is at stake is the separation of
21
[ 1913] AC 107, p 117, per Lord Macnaughten, Lord Atkinson, Lord Moulton
Page | 16
powers and respect by the judicial branch of government for the powers of the legislative branch.’ It is

clear that although the purposive approach may result in some benefits, its application brings with it

significant difficulties and problems. The conjunction “and” or “or” can never be given a definite and

dogmatic interpretation and the entire interpretation would depend on the intention of the maker laws or

bye-laws using such conjunction.

In a latest case of 2011, Union of India v. Ind-Swift Laboratories [Link] Apex Court has once again laid

emphasis on the need to interpret “and” and “or” in a manner that ensures the manifest intent of the

Legislature is giving effect to.

It is essential to understand the need for correct interpretation of “and” and “or” as this can at times,

change the entire meaning of the relevant statutory provision. The Judicature should expound the law in

a manner that suppresses the evil and the wrong and advances the true meaning and scope of the Statute.

The Legislature cannot predict the myriad possible future situations that might arise and it is impossible

to draft a law perfect to meet all situations in future. This conflict is inevitable and thus it is the duty of

the Judges to use the techniques of Interpretation to give most desired and required meaning to ensure

justice prevails. Need For Interpretation

In his The Law-Making Process, Michael Zander gives three reasons why statutory interpretation is

necessary:

1. Complexity of statutes in regards to the nature of the subject, numerous draftsmen and the blend of

legal and technical language can result in incoherence, vague and ambiguous language.

2. Anticipation of future events leads to the use of indeterminate terms. The impossible task of

anticipating every possible scenario also leads to the use of indeterminate language. Judges therefore

have to interpret statutes because of the gaps in law. Examples of inderterminate language include words

such as “reasonable”. In this case the courts are responsible for determining what constitutes the word

“reasonable”.

3. The multifaceted nature of language. Language, words and phrases are an imprecise form of

communication. Words can have multiple definitions and meanings. Each party in court will utilize the
Page | 17
definition and meaning of the language most advantageous to their particular need. It is up to the courts

to decide the most correct use of the language employed.

General Rules of Interpretation, Internal Aids to Interpretation, External Aids to Interpretation, Literal

Rule, Golden Rule, Mischief Rule, Subsidiary Rules and Harmonious Construction are some of the most

important rules.

Page | 18